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Migration and Immigrants in Europe: A Historical and Demographic

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Chapter 3
Migration and Immigrants in Europe:
A Historical and Demographic Perspective

Christof Van Mol and Helga de Valk

Introduction

This chapter outlines the general developments of migration within and towards
Europe as well as patterns of settlement of migrants since the 1950s. We take as our
starting point the bilateral labour migration agreements signed by several European
countries in the 1950s and 1960s. Three main periods can be distinguished from this
point onwards. The first, up to the oil crisis in 1973–1974, was characterized by
steady economic growth and development and deployment of guest worker schemes,
(return) migration from former colonies to motherlands, and refugee migration,
mainly dominated by movements from East to West. The second period started with
the oil crisis and ended with the fall of the Iron Curtain in the late 1980s. During this
time North-Western European governments increasingly restricted migration, and
migrants’ main route of entrance became family reunification and family formation.
Furthermore, asylum applications increased. By the end of this period, migration
flows had started to divert towards former emigration countries in Southern Europe.
The third period is from the fall of the Iron Curtain until today, with increasing
European Union (EU) influence and control of migration from third countries into
the EU and encouragement of intra-European mobility.
The historical overview presented here stems from a comprehensive literature
study, complemented by an analysis of available statistical data for trends in the last

C. Van Mol (*)

Netherlands Interdisciplinary Demographic Institute/ KNAW/UG,
The Hague, The Netherlands
e-mail: [email protected]
H. de Valk
Netherlands Interdisciplinary Demographic Institute/ KNAW/UG,
The Hague, The Netherlands
Free University, Brussels, Belgium

© The Author(s) 2016 31

B. Garcés-Mascareñas, R. Penninx (eds.), Integration Processes
and Policies in Europe, IMISCOE Research Series,
DOI 10.1007/978-3-319-21674-4_3
32 C. Van Mol and H. de Valk

decade. It should be noted, however, that statistical data on migration and mobility
in Europe is mostly incomplete, as they are based mainly on reports and registra-
tions of the individuals concerned. Besides, data on immigration and emigration are
not always fully available and are not consistently measured across countries and
time (see, e.g., EMN 2013). This means that the quality of migration data is often
limited (Abel 2010; Kupiszewska and Nowok 2008; Nowok et al. 2006; Poulain
et al. 2006). Several initiatives and projects have been launched to overcome these
problems and promote comparable definitions, statistics, and estimations of missing
data (Raymer et al. 2011). Most of the EU’s current 28 member countries produce
annual statistics on immigration and emigration. However, the information and
level of detail is not yet comparable across countries (for an overview of databanks
and limitations, see Raymer et al. 2011). The final section of this chapter presents
figures on migration and migrants relying mainly on data from three research proj-
ects which aimed to create and improve harmonized and consistent migration data
(Abel and Sander 2014; Raymer et al. 2011, see www.nidi.nl for more information
on the MIMOSA and IMEM projects). The conclusion summarizes the main pat-
terns and discusses some implications of our findings.

Three Periods of Migration in Europe

From the 1950s to 1974: Guest Worker Schemes

and Decolonization

In the period after the Second World War, North-Western Europe was economically
booming. Industrial production, for example, increased by 30 % between 1953 and
1958 (Dietz and Kaczmarczyk 2008). Native workers in this region became increas-
ingly educated, and growing possibilities for social mobility enabled many of them
to move up to white-collar work (Boyle et al. 1998). Local workers could not fill the
vacancies, as labour reservoirs were limited. Furthermore, the local native popula-
tion was no longer willing to take up unhealthy and poorly paid jobs in agriculture,
cleaning, construction, and mining. As a result, North-Western European govern-
ments started to recruit labour in peripheral countries. The main destination coun-
tries were Belgium, France, Germany, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Sweden, and
Switzerland. The recruited foreign workers were expected to return home after
completing a stint of labour. They therefore tended to be granted few rights and little
or no access to welfare support (Boyle et al. 1998). At the end of this period, most
migrants in North-Western Europe originated from Algeria, Greece, Italy, Morocco,
Portugal, Spain, Tunisia, Turkey, and Yugoslavia.
Initially, geographical proximity played an important role in the development of
specific migration flows. For example, Sweden recruited labour from Finland, the UK
from Ireland, and Switzerland from Italy. A migration system emerged whereby
peripheral—especially Southern European—countries supplied workers to
North-Western European countries. Migration flows were strongly guided by differ-
ences in economic development between regions characterized by pre-industrial
3 Migration and Immigrants in Europe: A Historical and Demographic Perspective 33

agrarian economies and those with highly industrialized economies (Bade 2003;
Barou 2006), both internationally and nationally (e.g., with unskilled workers moving
from Southern Italy towards the industrial centres in Northern Italy). Within the ori-
gin countries, most migrant workers were from poor agricultural regions where there
was insufficient work, such as Northern Portugal, Western Spain, Southern Italy, and
Northern Greece (Bade 2003). However, European governments gradually enlarged
their zones of recruitment to countries outside Europe. One of the main reasons was
the Cold War division of Europe which severely restricted East-West labour mobility.
In West Germany, for example, there was a significant inflow of workers from Greece,
Italy, and Spain, as well as from East Germany. The construction of the Berlin Wall in
1961, however, put a stop to the latter. As a result, West Germany reoriented its
recruitment towards elsewhere. Bilateral agreements were signed with Turkey (1961),
Morocco (1963), Portugal (1964), Tunisia (1965), and Yugoslavia (1968). Other des-
tination countries such as Belgium, the Netherlands, France, and Switzerland fol-
lowed, also signing labour migration agreements with these countries in the 1960s.
In this period, international migration was generally viewed positively because
of its economic benefits (Bonifazi 2008), from the perspective of both the sending
and the receiving countries. In the Mediterranean region, for example, emigration
helped to alleviate pressures on the labour market, as the region was characterized
by significant demographic pressure, low productivity and incomes, and high unem-
ployment (Page Moch 2003; Vilar 2001). A comparison of annual gross national
product per capita in the 1960s illustrates this with US $353 for Turkey, $822 for
Spain, and $1272 for Italy; $1977 for the UK and $2324 for France (Page Moch
2003, 180). Furthermore, migrants’ remittances were expected to benefit the
national economy. In Turkey, for example, the monetary returns of migrants became
a vital element of the economy: the country even experienced economic destabiliza-
tion when labour migration to Germany ended in 1974 (Barou 2006). However,
reasons for origin countries to support emigration went beyond the economic. The
Italian government, for example, considered the labour migration programmes of
North-Western European countries as a way to ‘get rid of the unemployed and to
deprive the socialist and communist parties of potential voters’ (Hoerder 2002,
520).
Estimates of the numbers of individuals that left Italy, Spain, Greece, and
Portugal between 1950 and 1970 vary from 7 to 10 million (Okólski 2012). As can
be seen from Table 3.1, in 1950 immigrant populations were most numerous in
France, the UK, Germany, and Belgium.
Twenty years later, at the beginning of the 1970s, these numbers had increased
substantially in both absolute and relative terms (Table 3.1). One in seven manual
labourers in the UK and one in four industrial workers in Belgium, France, and
Switzerland were of foreign origin in the mid-1970s (Page Moch 2003, not in table).
Eighty per cent of the total foreign stock in 1975 was concentrated in four countries,
namely France, Germany, Switzerland, and the UK (Bonifazi 2008).
At the same time, the process of decolonization gave rise to considerable migra-
tion flows towards Europe’s (former) colonial powers. A significant number of
people from the colonies came to Belgium, France, the Netherlands, the UK, and in
the 1970s, Portugal. Many of these (return) migrants were juridically considered
34 C. Van Mol and H. de Valk

Table 3.1 Minority populations in the main Western-European countries of immigration, 1950–
1975 (thousands and last column % of total population)
As per cent of total
Country 1950 1960 1970 1975 population 1975
Belgium 354 444 716 835 8.5
France 2128 2663 3339 4196 7.9
West Germany 548 686 2977 4090 6.6
Netherlands 77 101 236 370 2.6
Sweden 124 191 411 410 5.0
Switzerland 279 585 983 1012 16.0
United Kingdom 1573 2205 3968 4153 7.8
Source: Castles et al. (2014, 108). See Castles et al. (1984, 87–88) for detailed sources
Notes: Figures for all countries except the UK are for foreign residents. They exclude naturalized
persons and immigrants from the Dutch and French colonies. UK data are census figures for 1951,
1961, and 1971 and estimates for 1975. The 1951 and 1961 data are for overseas-born persons and
exclude children born to immigrants in the UK. The 1971 and 1975 figures include children born
in the UK, with both parents born abroad

citizens; estimates suggest that between 1940 and 1975 the number of people of
European origin returning from the colonies was around 7 million (Bade 2003). The
main (return) migration flows were from Kenya, India, and Malaysia to the UK,
from Northern Africa to France and Italy, from Congo to Belgium (although in
smaller numbers), and from Indonesia to the Netherlands (Bade 2003). Some of
these migrants, as for example from the new Commonwealth, came for economic
reasons (Page Moch 2003). Others, such as the Algerian harkis (auxiliaries in the
French colonial army) in France, Asian Ugandans in Britain, and a substantial share
of Surinamese in the Netherlands, arrived during or after independence (ibid.). In
the 1970s, Portugal received a significant number of citizens “returning” from its
former colonies, fleeing from violent combats in the struggle for independence.
Although European migrants returning from the colonies were often quickly able to
insert themselves into the social fabric of the mother country, this was less the case
for those of non-European origin who were economically and socially deprived and
also often discriminated (Bade 2003).
Lastly, the Iron Curtain severely limited East-West mobility. Nevertheless, it did
not bring East-West migration to a complete halt (Fassmann and Münz 1994).
Straddling our period demarcations we discuss these migrations patterns here, as
they started in this period. Between 1950 and 1990, 12 million people migrated
from East to West (Fassmann and Münz 1992), many of them to Germany. Between
1950 and 2004, for example, 4.45 million Aussiedler—ethnic Germans from Central
and Eastern Europe—returned to Germany (Dietz 2006). Until 1988, most of these
Aussiedler migrated from Poland (Dietz 2006; Münz and Ulrich 1998). Nevertheless,
the largest share of these Aussiedler (63 %) arrived after 1989 (Dietz 2006). The
vast majority who came after the fall of the Iron Curtain originated from the former
Soviet Union (Dietz 2006; Münz and Ulrich 1998). Occasionally, however, there
were larger inflows of Eastern Europeans, following political crises such as from
Hungary (1956–1957), Czechoslovakia (1968–1969), and Poland (1980–1981)
3 Migration and Immigrants in Europe: A Historical and Demographic Perspective 35

(Castles et al. 2014; Fassmann and Münz 1992, 1994). In line with the logic of the
Cold War, whatever the motives of those who moved to the West, they were consid-
ered to be political refugees (Fassmann and Münz 1994).

From 1974 to the End of the 1980s: The Oil Crisis

and Migration Control

The oil crisis of 1973–1974 had considerable impact on the economic landscape of
Europe. The crisis gave impetus to economic restructuring, sharply reducing the
need for labour (Boyle, Halfacree & Robinson 1998). During this period, belief in
unbridled economic growth diminished. Switzerland and Sweden were the first
countries to invoke a migration stop, respectively, in 1970 and 1972. Others fol-
lowed: Germany in 1973 and the Benelux and France in 1974. Policies aiming to
control and reduce migration, however, transformed rather than stopped migration.
The number of foreign residents kept rising, due to a change in European migra-
tion systems from circular to chain migration and the related natural growth of
migrant populations. Migrants from non-European countries who had come under
labour recruitment schemes increasingly settled permanently, as returning to their
home country for long periods now entailed a significant risk of losing their resi-
dence permit. Many migrants started to bring their families to Europe. Although
governments initially tried to limit family migration, this met little success (Castles
et al. 2014; Hansen 2003). After all, family reunification of migrant workers was
considered a fundamental right, anchored in article 19 of the European Social
Charter of 1961.
The composition of the residing migrant population also changed during this
period. Whereas in the first period, European migrants were most numerous, the
share of non-European migrant populations significantly grew during the second
period. In Sweden, for example, 40 % of the foreign born were non-European by
1999, compared to only 7.6 % in 1970 (Goldscheider et al. 2008). This reflected the
continuing immigration and natural growth of these populations. But it was also the
result of a larger extent of return migration among Southern European populations,
given the increased quality of life and employment opportunities in Southern Europe
(Barou 2006). In countries on the other side of the Mediterranean, population pres-
sure continued to be substantial, due to high fertility and unemployment rates.
During this period, the number of Greek, Italian, Portuguese, Spanish, and
Yugoslavian foreigners in Europe diminished (except in Switzerland, where the
number of Portuguese and Yugoslavians grew), and a significant increase was
observed in the number of Turks and North Africans across Europe (Bade 2003).
After the migration stop, countries increasingly controlled entries of foreigners,
and migration became an important topic in national political and public debates
(Bonifazi 2008; see also Doomernik & Bruquetas in this volume). Increasing unem-
ployment levels due to the economic recession fuelled hostility, racism, and xenopho-
bia towards certain “visible” groups of resident migrants. In several European
36 C. Van Mol and H. de Valk

countries, violent anti-foreigners incidents occurred. In France, for example, Le Pen’s

Front National acquired considerable political support for its simple message that ‘2
million unemployed = 2 million immigrants too many’ (Boyle et al. 1998, 27). During
this period, however, awareness also grew that immigrant populations were here to
stay. As a result, the need for adequate integration policies became apparent, and such
policies slowly started to develop (see Doomernik and Bruquetas in this volume).
In this same phase, numbers of asylum applications started to rise in Europe
(especially in the 1980s and after the fall of the Berlin Wall; Hansen 2003). Between
the early 1970s and the end of the twentieth century the number of asylum applica-
tions in the EU, at that time 15 member states, increased from 15,000 to 300,000
annually (Hatton 2004). Germany was the largest recipient of asylum applications
in Europe in all periods (Table 3.2). From the 1980s onwards, significant increases
were also observed in Belgium, the Netherlands, and the UK. The different attrac-
tiveness of particular European countries over time is related to historical events
that have induced new refugee flows. The dramatic increase in asylum applications
from within Europe in the early 1990s, for example, accompanied the disintegration
of the Soviet Union and the Yugoslavian wars (Hatton 2004, see also further on in
this chapter).
The restrictions on the entrance of foreigners into North-Western Europe also
had another effect. From the mid-1980s onwards, migration flows increasingly
diverted towards Southern Europe, especially gaining momentum in the 1990s.

Table 3.2 Asylum applications to the EU-15 by destination country, 1970–1999 (thousands)
Years
1970–74 1975–79 1980–84 1985–89 1990–94 1995–99
Total EU applications 64.5 213.7 540.2 1012.3 2419.8 1613.5
Austria 8.7 14.7 63.2 64.4 76.1 53.5
Belgium 1.7 6.6 14.5 32.1 87.0 93.4
Denmark 3.7 1.3 5.6 42.1 76.4 36.0
Finland – – 0.1 0.3 11.4 6.9
France 5.1 40.5 106.3 178.7 184.5 112.2
Germany 34.3 121.8 249.6 455.3 1374.7 749.6
Greece 9.2 6.4 24.0 12.8 11.8
Ireland – – – – 0.5 21.2
Italy 11.0 9.2 16.5 26.3 40.8 48.8
Luxembourg – – – – 0.1 5.7
Netherlands – 5.3 8.8 46.4 151.1 170.4
Portugal 0 1.7 4.3 1.3 3.9 1.7
Spain – – 5.4 15.7 53.1 30.4
Sweden – – 41.9 97.1 197.0 48.5
United Kingdom – 3.4 17.5 28.5 150.8 223.3
Source: Hatton (2004, 10). The numbers in Hatton (2004) are based on UNCHR (2001, Tables I.2,
II.2, III.2, IV.2, VI.4, and VI.5)
3 Migration and Immigrants in Europe: A Historical and Demographic Perspective 37

Greece, Italy, Portugal, and Spain had long been emigration countries. As a result,
they did not dispose of well-developed immigration legislation and entrance control
systems. Furthermore, these countries were experiencing economic growth and fall-
ing birth rates, resulting in labour shortages (Castles et al. 2014). The jobs available
were often irregular ones, characterized by unfavourable labour conditions and low
pay, making them unattractive to the local population. Southern Europe thus became
an attractive destination for non-European migrants, especially those from North
Africa, Latin America, Asia, and—after the fall of the Iron Curtain—Eastern Europe
(Castles et al. 2014).
Besides migration flows from non-European countries, the favourable economic
conditions in Southern Europe also resulted in return migration among those who
had moved to Northern Europe. Spain, for example, registered the return of 451,000
citizens during this period, of which 94 % had resided in another EU country (Barou
2006). Portugal, in contrast, experienced return migration from its former colonies,
where fierce and violent struggles for independence were under way. Greece was
the last country to transition from an emigration into an immigration country. Until
1973, some 1 million Greeks were working abroad (Bade 2003). Half of them
returned in the period after the oil crisis (ibid.).

From the 1990s to 2012: Recent Trends in Migration

towards and Within Europe

Patterns of migration from, towards, and within Europe underwent significant

changes and further diversification starting in 1990. The collapse of the Iron Curtain
and the opening of the borders of Eastern Europe induced new migration flows
across Europe. The end of the Cold War, as well as the wars in the former Yugoslavia
led to new flows of asylum seekers to Western Europe. Between 1989 and 1992, for
example, asylum applications increased from 320,000 to 695,000, to decline to
455,000 by the end of the decade (Hansen 2003) and increase again to 471,000 in
2001 (Castles et al. 2014). The top-five countries of origin during this period were
the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (836,000), Romania (400,000), Turkey
(356,000), Iraq (211,000), and Afghanistan (155,000) (ibid.). In the first decade of
the twenty-first century, new asylum applications followed the conjuncture of
admission restrictions and numbers of violent conflicts (ibid.). Between 2002 and
2006, asylum applications in the EU-15 decreased from 393,000 to 180,000 (ibid.).
From 2006 onwards, however, asylum applications rose due to the conflicts in
Afghanistan, Iraq, and more recently, the Arab Spring. By 2010, the EU-25 plus
Norway and Switzerland had received 254,180 applications, and humanitarian
migration accounted for 6 % of newcomers to the EU (ibid.). Most applications
were made in France (47,800), Germany (41,300), Sweden (31,800), the UK
(22,100), and Belgium (19,900) (OECD 2011, Table A.1.3., cited in Castles et al.
2014, 229).
38 C. Van Mol and H. de Valk

The 1992 Maastricht Treaty’s abolition of borders considerably eased intra-EU

movements (see also next sections of this chapter). At the same time, entrance into
the EU became progressively restricted due to the unification of the European mar-
ket, which imposed strict border controls and visa regulations. These controls on the
entrance of foreigners went hand in hand with increased irregular migration (Bade
2003; Bonifazi 2008; Castles et al. 2014). Migrants’ countries of origin as well as
their migration motives became increasingly diversified.
[Nowadays migrants] come to Europe from all over the world in significant numbers: expa-
triates working for multinational companies and international organizations, skilled work-
ers from all over the world, nurses and doctors from the Philippines, refugees and asylum
seekers from African, near Eastern and Asian countries, from the Balkan and former Soviet
Union countries, students from China, undocumented workers from African countries, just
to single out some of the major immigrant categories (Penninx 2006, 8).

During this third period, integration issues became a central policy concern (see
Doomernik & Bruquetas in this volume). Many European countries stepped up
attempts to attract highly skilled or educated migrants. This goal is still reflected
in a number of national programmes today, for example, in Denmark, Germany,
Sweden, and the UK. The EU established its Blue Card Scheme, an EU-wide resi-
dence and work permit (Eurostat 2011). Moreover, student migration from outside
the EU became increasingly important in some parts of the EU (ibid.). Some coun-
tries’ governments have actively recruited students with the intention of incorpo-
rating the “best and brightest” into their domestic labour market upon graduation
(Lange 2013). Institutions of higher education have joined these efforts, stimu-
lated by the economic benefits of attracting international students in the form of
high tuition fees (Findlay 2011). In this context, several European countries, such
as France, Germany, the Netherlands, and the UK simplified procedures for inter-
national students to make the education-to-work transition (Tremblay 2005; Van
Mol 2014).
In the last section of this chapter, we differentiate between intra-EU mobility of
European citizens and migration within and towards the EU of third-country nation-
als, as these groups are subject to different legislation. Intra-European mobility is
often considered in positive terms, as contributing to the EU’s ‘vitality and competi-
tiveness’ (e.g., EC 2011, 3–4). European citizens, moreover, are entitled to move
freely within the EU without the need for a visa, and hence may face fewer institu-
tional barriers in migration trajectories. Migration into the EU, in contrast, remains
largely associated with active measures of access restriction and border control
(see, e.g., Council of the EU 2002). In recent decades, European migration policy
has thus represented ‘different intersecting regimes of mobility that normalise the
movements of some travellers while criminalising and entrapping the ventures of
others’ (Glick Schiller and Salazar 2013, 189). The global economic crisis that
started in 2008 might be considered the end of this third period, as it brought, at
least temporarily, an end to ‘rapid economic growth, EU expansion and high immi-
gration’ (Castles et al. 2014, 103). However, as Castles, De Haas and Miller (ibid.)
observe, the decline in immigration from non-European countries has been rather
modest, and the anticipated mass returns to migrants’ home countries have not
3 Migration and Immigrants in Europe: A Historical and Demographic Perspective 39

occurred as yet. The crisis mainly seems to have affected intra-European migration,
with a decrease in overall free movement within the EU and with the peripheral
countries hardest hit by the crisis—particularly Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal, and
Spain—again becoming emigration countries (Castles et al. 2014).

Migration Towards and from Europe

We first analyse general trends in migration towards Europe, based on new esti-
mates of global migration flows by Abel and Sander (2014). Their figures are based
on stock statistics published by the United Nations. Note, however, that using stock
data might be misleading for measuring flows. Furthermore, although the tables
below represent the best estimates available, they are far from complete, as they are
based on national statistics and thus reflect different legislation and definitions. This
causes, for example, difficulties in comparability between countries as well as over
time. The presented figures should thus be seen as indicative of larger patterns. The
circular plots present migration flows from different world regions towards Europe
and vice versa (Fig. 3.1) for four five-year periods between 1990 and 2010. Broader
lines indicate more sizeable migration flows, while the arrow indicates the direction
of the flow. As can be observed, migration from former Soviet Union countries to
Europe gained momentum after the fall of the Berlin Wall but gradually decreased
thereafter. Migration from Africa to Europe increased, especially in the mid-1990s.
Furthermore, migration from East, South, and South-East Asia and from Latin
America significantly rose, particularly after the start of the twenty-first century.
Finally, migration from North America, Oceania, and West Asia remained relatively
stable. Additional Eurostat data (not in the plots) show that between 2009 and 2012,
the influx of non-EU migrants into the EU decreased slightly, from 1.4 million in
2009 to 1.2 million in 2012 (Eurostat 2014a).
In terms of the stock, 4 % of the total EU population in 2013 was a non-EU
national, accounting for about 6 % of the EU’s total working age population (Eurostat
2014a). Non-EU nationals were evenly split between men and women (ibid.). Note,
however, that these data by nationality do not include all foreign-origin European
residents (meaning those born abroad or having a foreign-born parent), as they cover
only those who did not hold the nationality of the country they resided in. We further
deconstruct these general trends below with a main focus on the last decade.
Looking at the top-15 countries of origin of newly arrived immigrants in 2009
and 2012, we find large numbers of migrants from India and China, followed by
Morocco and Pakistan (Table 3.3). Based on figures from 2008, the majority of
Indian and Pakistani migrants seems to have headed to the UK. Most Chinese
migrants seem to have gone to Spain (Eurostat 2011), and Moroccan migrants were
mainly attracted to Italy and Spain.
In addition to the data on newly arriving immigrants (flow statistics), it is also
relevant to know the main countries of origin of non-European migrants residing in
the EU (stock statistics). When considering the top-10 countries of origin of non-EU
40 C. Van Mol and H. de Valk

Fig. 3.1 Circular plots of migration flows towards and from Europe, per 5 year period between
1990 and 2010 (Source: www.global-migration.info)

nationals residing in the EU (Table 3.4), it can be noted that the largest residing
populations are from countries where Europe recruited labour in the post-war period
(Morocco and Turkey), as well as from former colonies (India and Pakistan), and
countries near the EU’s eastern border (Albania, Russia, and Serbia). The large
Chinese diaspora is also prominent as well as the—mostly highly-skilled and life-
style (Castles et al. 2014)—migrants from the USA.
Until the 1990s, the vast majority of migrants could conveniently be classified
under the categories “family reunification”, “labour migration”, and “asylum”.
Since the 1990s, however, migration motives have become increasingly diversified,
including a growing number of young people migrating to attend higher education.
According to Eurostat (2014a), in 2012, 32 % of migrants received a residence per-
3 Migration and Immigrants in Europe: A Historical and Demographic Perspective 41

Table 3.3 Top-15 countries of origin of newly arrived non-EU migrants in the EU, 2009 and 2012
2009 2012
Number of Number of
Country of origin migrants Country of origin migrants
1. India 92,575 China (incl. Hong Kong) 87,889
2. Morocco 78,729 India 64,416
3. China (incl. Hong Kong) 65,367 Morocco 53,121
4. Ukraine 47,747 Pakistan 43,108
5. Pakistan 35,969 United States 38,587
6. United States 32,072 Russia 28,807
7. Philippines 29,800 Ukraine 26,068
8. Albania 28,153 Nigeria 21,130
9. Bangladesh 25,611 Australia 19,331
10. Peru 24,740 Brazil 18,307
11. Moldova 24,222 Albania 16,775
12. Brazil 24,204 Philippines 16,748
13. Colombia 23,274 Turkey 16,198
14. Nigeria 21,657 Bangladesh 13,880
15. Russia 21,057 Afghanistan 13,060
Source: Eurostat (2014a)
Note: Numbers refer to non-EU nationals whose previous place of residence was in a non-EU
country and who had established their residence in a EU member state in the respective year

Table 3.4 Top-10 countries Country of origin Number of migrants

of nationality of non-EU
1. Turkey 1,983,240
migrants residing in the
European Union, 2012 2. Morocco 1,384,935
3. China (incl. Hong Kong) 724,428
4. India 650,710
5. Ukraine 634,851
6. Russia 589,634
7. Albania 464,149
8. Serbia 408,491
9. Pakistan 407,133
10. United States 406,266
Source: Eurostat (2014a)
Note: Numbers refer to non-EU nationals whose previous
place of residence was in a non-EU country and who had
established their residence in a EU member state for a period
of at least 12 months
42 C. Van Mol and H. de Valk

mit for family reasons, 23 % for work, 22 % for education, and 23 % for other rea-
sons including asylum. Moreover, it should be noted that these categories report
only the main migration motive as captured in the official statistics. In practice,
these categories reflect migration motives as accepted in admission labels. Both
may shift in the course of time. International students, for example, might become
labour migrants upon graduation, and subsequently seek family reunification.
Lastly, migration is often not limited to moving from Country A to Country B but
may involve several successive destinations. Considering intra-EU mobility of
third-country nationals, an upward trend is observed between 2007 and 2011. This
trend is most prominent in Germany, where the number of third-country nationals
arriving from European Economic Area countries more than tripled, from 3784 in
2007 to 11,532 in 2011 (EMN 2013). A similar rise is also observed in the UK,
where numbers increased from 1000 to 3000 (ibid.). Increases seem to be more
modest in other EU countries, such as Austria (33.6 %), Finland (17.1 %), the
Netherlands (53.7 %), and Sweden (30.2 %) (ibid.). However, whereas these per-
centages are high, absolute numbers are generally low. Compared with European
citizens, intra-EU moves of third-country nationals are found to form only a small
share of total intra-EU mobility between 2007 and 2011. The share of non-EU
nationals in these movements barely surpasses 4 % in the countries for which statis-
tics are available: 1.8 % in Germany, 3.6 % in Austria, 3.7 % in Finland, 2.3 % in
the Netherlands, and 1.2 % in the UK (ibid.). Third-country nationals, moreover,
move to geographically close countries, for example, from Germany and Italy to
Austria, from Estonia and Sweden to Finland, from the Czech Republic and
Germany to Poland, from Austria and the Czech Republic to Slovakia, and from
Denmark and Germany to Sweden (ibid.). In sum, although it is often assumed that
linear migration trajectories between two countries are less common now (see, e.g.,
Pieke et al. 2004), non-EU migrants do not seem to move frequently within the
EU. This might be due to the legal restrictions often imposed on this group of
migrants, or it could be more related to factors such as language similarities between
bordering countries (De Valk and Díez Medrano 2014).

Mobility of EU Citizens

Numbers and Destinations

Previous studies indicate that only a small share of the European population is
mobile (Bonin et al. 2008; Pascouau 2013). Favell and Recchi (2009), for example,
show that less than one in fifty Europeans lives abroad, and around 4 % have some
experience of living and working abroad. Nevertheless, the scale of intra-EU mobil-
ity clearly increased between 2000 and 2011 (Fig. 3.2). Data from Eurostat (2011),
for example, show that nearly 2 million EU citizens moved within the EU in 2008.
In absolute numbers, Polish migration made up the greatest share of intra-EU flows
in the first decade of the twenty-first century (Fig. 3.2). Migration between Poland
 a
RO-DE (i)

IT-DE (i)

UK-ES (e)

DE-IT (e)

RO-ES (i)

UK-FR (i)

RO-IT (i)

FR-UK (e)

DE-PL (e)

PL-DE (i)

0 20 40 60 80 100 120 140 160

i = according to country of immigration; e = according to country of emigration;

DE: Immigration 2000–2003 = 2000, 2002, and 2003;
FR: Immigration and emigration 2000–2003 = 2002–2003;
IT: Immigration and emigration 2000–2003 = 2001–2003;
ES: Emigration 2000–2003 = 2002–2003
Data source: Eurostat, own calculations by NIDI

b
RO-DE (i)

DE-IT (e)

UK-FR (i)

PL-UK (i)

UK-ES (i)

FR-UK (e)

RO-IT (i)

DE-PL (e)

RO-ES (i)

PL-DE (i)

0 20 40 60 80 100 120 140 160

i= according to country of immigration; e=according to country of emigration
UK: Immigration 200–42007=2004–2006
Data source: Eurostat

Fig. 3.2 Top-ten intra-European migration flows, 2000–2011 (absolute numbers)

44 C. Van Mol and H. de Valk

UK-PL (e)

DE-RO (e)

PL-UK (i)

UK-FR (e)

RO-DE (i)

FR-UK (e)

RO-ES (i)

RO-IT (i)

PL-DE (i)

DE-PL (e)

0 20 40 60 80 100 120 140 160

i= according to country of immigration; e=according to country of emigration
DE: Immigration and emigration 2008–2011=2008
FR: Immigration and emigration 2008–2011=2008
UK: Immigration and emigration 2008–2011=depending on varying availability of data
Data source: Eurostat

Fig. 3.2 (continued)

and Germany was most prevalent, and consists of movements from as well as to
Poland. The prevalence of Polish-German migration might be explained by the fact
that such migration has been regulated since 1990, when the German and Polish
governments signed a bilateral agreement allowing Polish citizens to engage in
legal seasonal employment for 3 months in specific sectors of the German economy
(Dietz and Kaczmarczyk 2008). This led to a sharp increase in the inflow of Polish
seasonal workers in Germany, from approximately 78,600 in 1992 to 280,000 in
2002 (ibid.). From 2004 to 2007, after Poland’s EU accession, we observe a similar
increase in population movements from Poland to the UK. This can be attributed to
the fact that—unlike other EU member states—Ireland, Sweden, and the UK did not
restrict migration from the new member states. Of these three destinations, Ireland
and the UK were the most popular, in part due to favourable labour market condi-
tions (Castles et al. 2014). In more recent years, however, many Polish migrants
have left the UK, indicating increasing return migration, perhaps related to the eco-
nomic crisis, as the Polish economy has kept growing (Castles et al. 2014). Apart
from the migration flows from and towards Poland, similar inflows and outwards
movements from Romania were observed between 2000 and 2011. Whereas
3 Migration and Immigrants in Europe: A Historical and Demographic Perspective 45

between 2000 and 2003 some 39,000 Romanians migrated to Italy and Spain, these
numbers increased to about 110,000 in the subsequent years. Furthermore,
Romanian migration to Italy remained relatively stable, in sharp contrast with the
migration flow towards Spain, which dropped sharply between 2008 and 2011. This
can be attributed to the more difficult labour market conditions in Spain, because of
the economic crisis, which has redirected the movement of Romanian migrants
towards other EU countries (OECD 2013).
Besides migration between Eastern Europe and several other EU countries,
migration flows have been considerable between the UK, France, and Spain. These
movements likely include retirement migration from Northern to Southern Europe,
but also point to increased labour mobility between these countries, especially con-
sidering the flows towards the UK, as will be further discussed later.
Finally, in recent years, the global economic crisis seems to have impacted pat-
terns of intra-EU migration. Data from the OECD (2013) show, for example, an
increase in emigration from countries heavily affected by the crisis (Table 3.5). Cases
in point are Greece and Spain where unemployment rose to unprecedented lev-
els—27.3 % in Greece and 26.1 % in Spain in 2013, with youth unemployment rates
of, respectively, 58.3 and 55.5 % that same year (Eurostat 2014b). Countries that
eased their way into economic recovery, such as Iceland and Ireland, have already
registered declines in the numbers of individuals leaving these countries (OECD
2013). Belgium, Germany, the Netherlands, and the UK appear to be popular desti-
nation countries, as intra-European migration flows towards these countries almost
doubled in the 5 years prior to 2012. The crisis, however, also led to migration to

Table 3.5 Migration from specific European countries to main European and other OECD
destination countries, 2007–2011
Index Number (thousands)
2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2011
Country of origin
Greece 100 106 102 143 236 39
Iceland 100 111 163 165 135 4
Ireland 100 104 174 210 181 21
Italy 100 116 111 132 142 85
Portugal 100 120 98 103 125 55
Spain 100 114 123 173 224 72
Country of destination
Germany 100 105 116 133 188 78
United Kingdom 100 120 113 174 195 88
Switzerland 100 116 96 102 121 33
Belgium 100 142 146 169 193 15
Netherlands 100 138 144 157 184 12
All other OECD countries 100 109 116 124 129 50
Total 100 115 114 140 165 275
Source: OECD (2013, 23)
46 C. Van Mol and H. de Valk

UK
SK
SE
RO
PL
NO
NL
LV
LT
IT
FI
ES
DK
DE
AT
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
emigration immigration

PL: immigration 2008–2011 = 2008 and 2010; emigration 2008–2011 = 2008;

RO: emigration 2008–2011 = 2008
(Source: Eurostat, own calculations by NIDI)

Fig. 3.3 Share of intra-European migrants in total emigration and immigration for selected
European countries, 2008–2011 (%)

non-European countries, such as Argentina, Australia, Brazil, China, Turkey, the

USA, and in the case of Portugal, to former colonies in Africa (Castles et al. 2014).
It is important to keep in mind that most of the previous analyses are based on
absolute numbers, whereby EU member states with larger populations are logically
more visible. We now consider the relative importance of migration flows as a share
of countries’ total immigration and emigration figures. Figure 3.3 shows the relative
share of EU migration for selected EU countries.
Intra-EU migration forms a substantial share of movements to and from the
majority of the countries in Fig. 3.3. Based on these numbers, we can discern sev-
eral groups. The first group consists of countries where intra-EU immigration and
emigration comprises the largest share of migration movements. It includes Austria,
Germany, Lithuania, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Slovakia, and Denmark.
The attraction of these countries is explained by their well-developed economies.
Particularly significant within this group are Polish and Lithuanian migrants mov-
ing on to other European destinations. The second group is made up of countries
where more than half of emigration moves are directed towards other European
countries, and immigration is mostly non-European. This group is comprised of
Finland, Italy, Latvia, and Romania. Their geographical location at the borders of
Europe might explain this pattern, as these countries receive immigrants from
neighbouring (non-European) countries and function as transit countries.
3 Migration and Immigrants in Europe: A Historical and Demographic Perspective 47

Furthermore, these countries might be less attractive to migrants from other EU

countries because of their limited economic opportunities and relatively low wages
(except for Finland). The third group consists of countries where both emigration
and immigration from and to non-European countries is still of considerable impor-
tance. This group includes Spain, Sweden, and the UK. For Sweden, the most popu-
lar destinations for migrants are (besides the Nordic neighbours) English-speaking
countries such as the UK and the USA (Mannheimer 2012). In terms of the arriving
population, humanitarian refuge and family reunification are the main channels of
immigration in Sweden, which explains the large share of non-European migrants
(Fredlund-Blomst 2014). Spain’s and the UK’s migration balances might reflect
continuing migration from former colonies and historical links with various world
regions which include, for example, language similarities. The UK attracts a consid-
erable number of migrants from ex-colonies such as India and Pakistan (Office for
National Statistics 2011). Furthermore, the principal non-European destinations for
UK migrants are English-speaking countries such as Australia, Canada, New
Zealand, and the USA (Murray et al. 2012). For Spain, non-European migrants
mainly originate from Morocco and Latin American countries, and Spanish migrants
emigrate to Latin American countries such as Argentina and Venezuela (INE 2014).

Demographic Characteristics of Intra-EU Movers

It has been suggested that free movement within the EU is particularly availed of by
the highly educated (Favell 2008). We therefore investigate the demographic char-
acteristics of those who move within Europe, focusing on selected cases and the
period 2008–2011. Contrasting these cases, for which we have detailed information,
suggests the diversity of migration flows and motives within Europe. Obviously this
analysis does not do justice to more recent moves from Southern Europe to North-
Western Europe, but data to make similar analyses are not yet at hand.
We start with characteristics of those who move. Figure 3.4 shows population
pyramids for Polish migrants heading to Germany and vice versa. As we demon-
strated previously (see Fig. 3.2), Polish-German migration is the most prominent
intra-European migration flow in absolute numbers. The population pyramids are
indicative of the trend in the preceding years. Mobility between both countries is
clearly dominated by men, particularly those between 20 and 50 years of age. This
strongly male-dominated movement of Polish workers towards Germany appears
temporary, as a similar population moves back again (compare Fig. 3.4a and b).
When we compare Polish migration to Germany with Polish migration to the
Netherlands, we find a different panorama (Fig. 3.5). Polish migrants in the
Netherlands are significantly younger, the majority being between 20 and 35 years
of age. Moreover, there is a more equal gender balance. The coincidence of these
migration flows with other life transitions, such as having children and forming a
union, is crucial to gain insight into the way intra-European mobility develops over
the life course.
48 C. Van Mol and H. de Valk

Recent research on Polish migrants based on Dutch population registers shows

that having children as well as the choice of partner are important determinants of
permanent settlement (Kleinepier et al. 2015). Similar findings have been reported
on intra-EU migrant groups in other destinations such as Belgium and the UK (see,
e.g., Levrau et al. 2014; Ryan and Mulholland 2013). Where generally circular and
return migration of intra-EU movers is high, this seems especially so for those who
are young, single, and do not have children (see, e.g., Bijwaard 2010; Braun and
Arsene 2009; Kleinepier et al. 2015; Nekby 2006).
The relationship between life course and migration becomes more apparent when
we compare migrants from Romania and those from the UK residing in Spain (Fig.
3.6). Romanian migration to Spain is clearly dominated by young people, with an
overrepresentation of the 20–24 year category. Most of these men and women arrived
in Spain for work or study. The population pyramid of British residents in Spain has
a totally different structure. Some of the British migrants are 30–40 years old, and
many are in the older age groups, from 55 years and older. Thus, British migrants in
Spain seem to be free movers coming to work in Spain alongside retirement migrants.

a
85+
80-84
75-79
70-74
65-69
60-64
55-59
50-54
45-49
40-44
35-39
30-34
25-29
20-24
15-19
10-14
5-9
0-4
-12 -10 -8 -6 -4 -2 0 2 4 6 8 10 12
men women

Data source: Eurostat; calculations by NIDI

Fig. 3.4 Population pyramid of migrants from Poland to Germany (a) and Germany to Poland (b),
2008 (%)
3 Migration and Immigrants in Europe: A Historical and Demographic Perspective 49

b
85+
80-84
75-79
70-74
65-69
60-64
55-59
50-54
45-49
40-44
35-39
30-34
25-29
20-24
15-19
10-14
5-9
0-4
-12 -10 -8 -6 -4 -2 0 2 4 6 8 10 12
men women

Data source: Eurostat; calculations by NIDI

Fig. 3.4 (continued)

In sum, patterns of intra-EU migration are becoming increasingly diverse.

European citizens enjoy the right of freedom of movement, and might decide to
temporarily or permanently settle in another European country for a variety of rea-
sons, including family formation, retirement, study, and work. Finally it is crucial to
realize that categorization of migrants into certain migration motives is rather dif-
ficult as very often multiple different reasons overlap (see, e.g., Gilmartin and
Migge 2015; Santacreu et al. 2009; Verwiebe 2014).

Conclusions

In this chapter we addressed the first key actor of the binomials presented in Chap.
1 of this volume, namely migrants themselves. We first of all presented a historical
overview of trends in international migration to and within Europe since the 1950s.
Furthermore, we examined the demographic characteristics of these migration flows
50 C. Van Mol and H. de Valk

85+
80-84
75-79
70-74
65-69
60-64
55-59
50-54
45-49
40-44
35-39
30-34
25-29
20-24
15-19
10-14
5-9
0-4
-14 -12 -10 -8 -6 -4 -2 0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14
men women

NB. NL 2009: break in series due to new regulation

Data source: Eurostat; calculations by NIDI

Fig. 3.5 Population pyramid of Polish migrants to the Netherlands, 2009 (%)

as well as the characteristics of residing migrants across Europe using recent data.
We looked at both immigration and emigration in the European context to do suffi-
cient justice to the dynamic nature of migration. Yet, our findings provide only a
general overview, as the complexity of migration to and from Europe extends well
beyond the scope of a single chapter. Three historical periods were distinguished. It
is important to bear these different periods in mind when studying current migration
flows in Europe. They help to frame but also for analysing the (demographic) behav-
iour of migrant populations. The distinguished periods may help us to structure and
understand the socio-demographic situations which migrants face today. In addi-
tion, this distinction into different periods enables us to appreciate the current and
ongoing political and public debates on migration in Europe.
The first period was characterized by labour migration and a favourable stance
towards migration, covering the years from the beginning of the bilateral guest
worker agreements until the oil crisis. European governments first recruited guest
workers in Southern Europe, but quickly expanded towards countries at Europe’s
borders. Apart from labour migration, a significant postcolonial migration flow
3 Migration and Immigrants in Europe: A Historical and Demographic Perspective 51

characterized this period. Due to struggles for independence in former colonies,

many European countries received return migrants as well as migrants fleeing hos-
tile conflict environments. The Cold War limited East-West mobility during this
period.
The second period extended from the oil crisis in the early 1970s to the fall of the
Iron Curtain in the late 1980s. It was characterized by a cessation of guest worker
migration and stringent entry restrictions for new migrants. Nevertheless, migration
flows were transformed rather than halted. Whereas previously labour migration
had been the main migration channel, family reunification (and family formation)
now took over the primary role, and asylum applications were also on the rise.
European governments became aware that migrant populations were likely to
remain on their territory, and they slowly began to develop integration policies. This
continues to be an important issue in the discourse today.
The third period dates from the 1990s to the present day. During this time, we find
substantial diversification in terms of countries of origin, destinations, flows, migra-
tion motives, and structure of migrant populations. One of the most important ele-
ments in this period has been the removal of barriers to intra-European mobility,

a
85+
80-84
75-79
70-74
65-69
60-64
55-59
50-54
45-49
40-44
35-39
30-34
25-29
20-24
15-19
10-14
5-9
0-4
-12 -10 -8 -6 -4 -2 0 2 4 6 8 10 12
men women
Data source: Eurostat; calculations by NIDI

Fig. 3.6 Population pyramid of Romanian (a) and British (b) migrants in Spain, 2008–2011 (%)
52 C. Van Mol and H. de Valk

b
85+
80-84
75-79
70-74
65-69
60-64
55-59
50-54
45-49
40-44
35-39
30-34
25-29
20-24
15-19
10-14
5-9
0-4
-12 -10 -8 -6 -4 -2 0 2 4 6 8 10 12
men women

Data source: Eurostat; calculations by NIDI

Fig. 3.6 (continued)

while migration into the EU has become more restricted. As such, intra-EU mobility
and migration into the EU have become embedded in different and often opposing
discourses. The end of this third period might be the economic crisis, which so far
seems to have affected mainly intra-European mobility patterns. Peripheral countries
have been hit particularly hard by the crisis, and an increasing tendency towards
emigration can be observed from countries such as Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal,
and Spain. Immigration of non-EU migrants, however, seems less affected. This is
perhaps because many migrants from outside Europe have found other routes of
arrival, including irregular entrance and stay. Moreover, European countries are inter-
ested in highly skilled migrants in the context of a global competition for talent.
As a result, it seems that comparable to the “migration stop” after the oil crisis of
the 1970s or during the Cold War, migration towards Europe will be transformed
rather than come to a complete halt in the coming years. Mobility within Europe, in
this regard, cannot be seen as separate from migration from outside the EU. Studying
migration systems rather than focusing exclusively on one aspect of mobility is thus
called for. At the same time, our analyses in this chapter also suggest an increasing
3 Migration and Immigrants in Europe: A Historical and Demographic Perspective 53

dichotomy between migrants who are in a favourable situation with easy access and
rights in Europe (e.g., EU free movers and highly skilled migrants) and those in less
favourable situations (mainly those arriving from outside Europe for other reasons).
Development of this dichotomy has important consequences for the lives of
individual migrants and for social cohesion. European societies must demonstrate
awareness of this with policies crafted to acknowledge the diverse nature and
dynamic character of migration that we have shown in this chapter.

Acknowledgments This research was part of and supported by the European Research Council
Starting Grant project (no. 263829) “Families of Migrant Origin: A Life Course Perspective”.

Open Access This chapter is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution
Noncommercial License, which permits any noncommercial use, distribution, and reproduction in
any medium, provided the original author(s) and source are credited.

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