Command and Control
Command and Control
To put effective command and control into practice, we must first understand its
fundamental nature—its purpose, characteristics, environment, and basic functioning.
This understanding will become the basis for developing a theory and a practical
philosophy of command and control.
No single activity in war is more important than command and control. Command and
control by itself will not drive home a single attack against an enemy force. It will not
destroy a single enemy target. It will not effect a single emergency resupply. Yet none
of these essential warfighting activities, or any others, would be possible without
effective command and control. Without command and control, campaigns, battles, and
organized engagements are impossible, military units degenerate into mobs, and the
subordination of military force to policy is replaced by random violence. In short,
command and control is essential to all military operations and activities.
With command and control, the countless activities a military force must perform gain
purpose and direction. Done well, command and control adds to our strength. Done
poorly, it invites disaster, even against a weaker enemy. Command and control helps
commanders make the most of what they have—people, information, material, and,
often most important of all, time.
In the broadest sense, command and control applies far beyond military forces and
military operations. Any system comprising multiple, interacting elements, from
societies to sports teams to any living organism, needs some form of command and
control. Simply put, command and control in some form or another is essential to
survival and success in any competitive or cooperative enterprise. Command and
control is a fundamental requirement for life and growth, survival, and success for any
system.
WHAT IS COMMAND AND CONTROL?
Command and control is the means by which a commander recognizes what needs to
be done and sees to it that appropriate actions are taken. Sometimes this recognition
takes the form of a conscious command decision—as in deciding on a concept of
operations. Sometimes it takes the form of a preconditioned reaction—as in immediate-
action drills, practiced in advance so that we can execute them reflexively in a moment
of crisis. Sometimes it takes the form of a rules-based procedure—as in the guiding of
an aircraft on final approach. Some types of command and control must occur so
quickly and precisely that they can be accomplished only by computers—such as the
command and control of a guided missile in flight. Other forms may require such a
degree of judgment and intuition that they can be performed only by skilled,
experienced people—as in devising tactics, operations, and strategies.
Sometimes command and control occurs concurrently with the action being
undertaken—in the form of real-time guidance or direction in response to a changing
situation. Sometimes it occurs beforehand and even after. Planning, whether rapid/time-
sensitive or deliberate, which determines aims and objectives, develops concepts of
operations, allocates resources, and provides for necessary coordination, is an important
element of command and control. Furthermore, planning increases knowledge and
elevates situational awareness. Effective training and education, which make it more
likely that subordinates will take the proper action in combat, establish command and
control before the fact. The immediate-action drill mentioned earlier, practiced
beforehand, provides command and control. A commander’s intent, expressed clearly
before the evolution begins, is an essential part of command and control. Likewise,
analysis after the fact, which ascertains the results and lessons of the action and so
informs future actions, contributes to command and control.
Some forms of command and control are primarily procedural or technical in nature—
such as the control of air traffic and air space, the coordination of supporting arms, or
the fire control of a weapons system. Others deal with the overall conduct of military
actions, whether on a large or small scale, and involve formulating concepts, deploying
forces, allocating resources, supervising, and so on. This last form of command and
control, the overall conduct of military actions, is our primary concern in this manual.
Unless otherwise specified, it is to this form that we refer.
Since war is a conflict between opposing wills, we can measure the effectiveness of
command and control only in relation to the enemy. As a practical matter, therefore,
effective command and control involves protecting our own command and control
activities against enemy interference and actively monitoring, manipulating, and
disrupting the enemy’s command and control activities.
The basis for all command and control is the authority vested in a commander over
subordinates. Authority derives from two sources. Official authority is a function of
rank and position and is bestowed by organization and by law. Personal authority is a
function of personal influence and derives from factors such as experience, reputation,
skill, character, and personal example. It is bestowed by the other members of the
organization. Official authority provides the power to act but is rarely enough; most
effective commanders also possess a high degree of personal authority. Responsibility,
or accountability for results, is a natural corollary of authority. Where there is authority,
there must be responsibility in like measure. Conversely, where individuals have
responsibility for achieving results, they must also have the authority to initiate the
necessary actions.2
The traditional view of command and control sees “com- mand” and “control” as
operating in the same direction: from the top of the organization toward the
bottom.3 (See figure 1.) Commanders impose control on those under their command;
commanders are “in control” of their subordinates, and subordinates are “under the
control” of their commanders.
We suggest a different and more dynamic view of command and control which sees
command as the exercise of authority and control as feedback about the effects of the
action taken. (See figure 1.) The commander commands by deciding what needs to be
done and by directing or influencing the conduct of others. Control takes the form of
feedback—the continuous flow of information about the unfolding situation returning
to the commander—which allows the commander to adjust and modify command action
as needed. Feedback indicates the difference between the goals and the situation as it
exists. Feedback may come from any direction and in any form—intelligence about
how the enemy is reacting, information about the status of subordinate or adjacent units,
or revised guidance from above based on developments. Feedback is the mechanism
that allows commanders to adapt to changing circumstances—to exploit fleeting
opportunities, respond to developing problems, modify schemes, or redirect efforts. In
this way, feedback “controls” subsequent command action. In such a command and
control system, control is not strictly something that seniors impose on subordinates;
rather, the entire system comes “under control” based on feedback about the changing
situation.
Command and control is thus an interactive process involving all the parts of the system
and working in all directions. The result is a mutually supporting system of give and
take in which complementary commanding and controlling forces interact to ensure that
the force as a whole can adapt continuously to changing requirements.
WHAT DOES IT MEAN TO BE “IN CONTROL”?
The typical understanding of effective command and control is that someone “in
command” should also be “in control.” Typically, we think of a strong, coercive type
of command and control—a sort of pushbutton control—by which those “in control”
dictate the actions of others and those “under control” respond promptly and precisely,
as a chess player controls the movements of the chess pieces. But given the nature of
war, can commanders control their forces with anything even resembling the
omnipotence of the chess player? We might say that a gunner is in control of a weapon
system or that a pilot is in control of an aircraft. But is a flight leader really directly in
control of how the other pilots fly their aircraft? Is a senior commander really in control
of the squads of Marines actually engaging the enemy, especially on a modern
battlefield on which units and individuals will often be widely dispersed, even to the
point of isolation?
We are also fond of saying that commanders should be “in control” of the situation or
that the situation is “under control.” The worst thing that can happen to a commander
is to “lose” control of the situation. But are the terrain and weather under the
commander’s control? Are commanders even remotely in control of what the enemy
does? Good commanders may sometimes anticipate the enemy’s actions and may even
influence the enemy’s actions by seizing the initiative and forcing the enemy to react to
them. But it is a delusion to believe that we can truly be in control of the enemy or the
situation.5
The truth is that, given the nature of war, it is a delusion to think that we can be in
control with any sort of certitude or precision. And the further removed commanders
are from the Marines actually engaging the enemy, the less direct control they have over
their actions. We must keep in mind that war is at base a human endeavor. In war, unlike
in chess, “pieces” consist of human beings, all reacting to the situation as it pertains to
each one separately, each trying to survive, each prone to making mistakes, and each
subject to the vagaries of human nature. We could not get people to act like mindless
robots, even if we wanted to.
Given the nature of war, the remarkable thing is not that commanders cannot be
thoroughly in control but rather that they can achieve much influence at all. We should
accept that the proper object of command and control is not to be thoroughly and
precisely in control. The turbulence of modern war suggests a need for a looser form of
influence—some- thing that is more akin to the willing cooperation of a basketball team
than to the omnipotent direction of the chess player—that provides the necessary
guidance in an uncertain, disorderly, time-competitive environment without stifling the
initiative of subordinates.
COMPLEXITY IN COMMAND AND CONTROL
Military organizations and military evolutions are complex systems. War is an even
more complex phenomenon—our complex system interacting with the enemy’s
complex system in a fiercely competitive way. A complex system is any system
composed of multiple parts, each of which must act individually according to its own
circumstances and which, by so acting, changes the circumstances affecting all the other
parts. A boxer bobbing and weaving and trading punches with his opponent is a
complex system. A soccer team is a complex system, as is the other team, as is the
competitive interaction between them. A squad-sized combat patrol, changing
formation as it moves across the terrain and reacting to the enemy situation, is a complex
system. A battle between two military forces is itself a complex system.
Each individual part of a complex system may itself be a complex system—as in the
military, in which a company consists of several platoons and a platoon comprises
several squads—creating multiple levels of complexity. But even if this is not so, even
if each of the parts is fairly simple in itself, the result of the interactions among the parts
is highly complicated, unpredictable, and even uncontrollable behavior. Each part often
affects other parts in ways that simply cannot be anticipated, and it is from these
unpredictable interactions that complexity emerges. With a complex system it is usually
extremely difficult, if not impossible, to isolate individual causes and their effects since
the parts are all connected in a complex web. The behavior of complex systems is
frequently nonlinear which means that even extremely small influences can have
decisively large effects, or vice versa. Clausewitz wrote that “success is not due simply
to general causes. Particular factors can often be decisive—details only known to those
who were on the spot . . . while issues can be decided by chances and incidents so
minute as to figure in histories simply as anecdotes.” The element of chance, interacting
randomly with the various parts of the system, introduces even more complexity and
unpredictability.
It is not simply the number of parts that makes a system complex: it is the way those
parts interact. A machine can be complicated and consist of numerous parts, but the
parts generally interact in a specific, designed way—or else the machine will not
function. While some systems behave mech- anistically, complex systems most
definitely do not. Complex systems tend to be open systems, interacting frequently and
freely with other systems and the external environment. Complex systems tend to
behave more “organically”—that is, more like biological organisms.
The fundamental point is that any military action, by its very nature a complex system,
will exhibit messy, unpredictable, and often chaotic behavior that defies orderly,
efficient, and precise control. Our approach to command and control must find a way
to cope with this inherent complexity. While a machine operator may be in control of
the machine, it is difficult to imagine any commander being in control of a complex
phenomenon like war.
Second, the action-feedback loop makes command and control a continuous, cyclic
process and not a sequence of discrete actions—as we will discuss in greater detail later.
Third, the action-feedback loop also makes command and control a dynamic, interactive
process of cooperation. As we have discussed, command and control is not so much a
matter of one part of the organization “getting control over” another as something that
connects all the elements together in a cooperative effort. All parts of the organization
contribute action and feedback— “command” and “control”—in overall cooperation.
Command and control is thus fundamentally an activity of reciprocal influence—give
and take among all parts, from top to bottom and side to side.
Fourth, as a result, this view does not see the commander as being above the system,
exerting command and control from the outside—like a chess player moving the chess
pieces—but as being an integral part of this complex web of reciprocal influence. And
finally, as we have mentioned, this view recognizes that it is unreasonable to expect
command and control to provide precise, predictable, and mechanistic order to a
complex undertaking like war.
The words “command” and “control” can be nouns,9 and used in this way the phrase
command and control describes a system—an arrangement of different elements that
interact to produce effective and harmonious actions. The basic elements of our
command and control system are people, information, and the command and control
support structure.
The first element of command and control is people—people who gather information,
make decisions, take action, communicate, and cooperate with one another in the
accomplishment of a common goal. People drive the command and control system—
they make things happen—and the rest of the system exists only to serve them. The
essence of war is a clash between human wills, and any concept of command and control
must recognize this first. Because of this human element, command is inseparable from
leadership. The aim of command and control is not to eliminate or lessen the role of
people or to make people act like robots, but rather to help them perform better. Human
beings—from the senior commander framing a strategic concept to a lance corporal
calling in a situation report—are integral components of the command and control
system and not merely users of it.
All Marines feel the effects of fear, privation, and fatigue. Each has unique, intangible
qualities which cannot be captured by any organizational chart, procedure, or piece of
equipment. The human mind has a capacity for judgment, intuition, and imagination far
superior to the analytical capacity of even the most powerful computer. It is precisely
this aspect of the human element that makes war in general, and command in particular,
ultimately an art rather than a science. An effective command and control system must
account for the characteristics and limits of human nature and at the same time exploit
and enhance uniquely human skills. At any level, the key individual in the command
and control system is the commander who has the final responsibility for success.
The value of information exists in time since information most often describes fleeting
conditions. Most information grows stale with time, valuable one moment but irrelevant
or even misleading the next.
There are two basic uses for information. The first is to help create situational awareness
as the basis for a decision. The second is to direct and coordinate actions in the
execution of the decision. While distinct in concept, the two uses of information are
rarely mutually exclusive in practice. There will usually be quite a bit of overlap since
the same exchange of information often serves both purposes simultaneously. For
example, coordination between adjacent units as they execute the plan can also help
shape each unit’s understanding of the situation and so inform future decisions. An
order issued to subordinates describes the tasks to be accomplished and provides
necessary coordinating instructions; but the same order should provide a subordinate
insight into the larger situation and into how the subordinate’s actions fit into that larger
situation. Likewise, a call for fire, the primary purpose of which is to request supporting
arms from a supporting unit, also provides information about the developing situation
in the form of a target location and description.
Information forms range from data—raw, unprocessed signals—to information that has
been evaluated and integrated into meaningful knowledge and understanding. A
commander’s guidance to the staff and orders to subordinates constitute information as
do intelligence about the enemy, status reports from subordinate units, or coordination
between adjacent units. Without the information that provides the basis of situational
awareness, no commander—no matter how experienced or wise—can make sound
decisions. Without information that conveys understanding of the concept and intent,
subordinates cannot act properly. Without information in the form of a strike brief
which provides understanding of the situation on the ground, a pilot cannot provide
close air support. Without information which provides understanding of an upcoming
operation and the status of supply, the logistician cannot provide adequate combat
service support.
The final element of command and control is the command and control support
structure11 which aids the people who create, disseminate, and use information. It
includes the organizations, procedures, equipment, facilities, training, education, and
doctrine which support command and control. It is important to note that although we
often refer to families of hardware as “systems” themselves, the command and control
system is much more than simply equipment. High-quality equipment and advanced
technology do not guarantee effective command and control. Effective command and
control starts with qualified people and an effective guiding philosophy. We must
recognize that the components of the command and control support structure do not
exist for their own sake but solely to help people recognize what needs to be done and
take the appropriate action.
The words “command” and “control” are also verbs,12 and used that way, the phrase
command and control describes a process—a collection of related activities. We draw
an important distinction between a process, a collection of related activities, and a
procedure, a specific sequence of steps for accomplishing a specific task. Command
and control is a process. It may include procedures for performing certain tasks, but it
is not itself a procedure and should not be approached as one.
Command and control is something we do. These activities include, but are not limited
to, gathering and analyzing information, making decisions, organizing resources,
planning, communicating instructions and other information, coordina-ting, monitoring
results, and supervising execution.
So rather than ask what are the functions that make up command and control, we might
better ask: What should effective command and control do for us? First, it should help
provide insight into the nature and requirements of the problem facing us. It should help
develop intelligence about the enemy and the surroundings. As much as possible, it
should help to identify enemy capabilities, intentions, and vulnerabilities. It should help
us understand our own situation—to include identifying our own vulnerabilities. In
short, it should help us gain situational awareness.
Next, command and control should help us devise suitable and meaningful goals and
adapt those goals as the situation changes. It should help us devise appropriate actions
to achieve those goals. It should help us provide direction and focus to create vigorous
and harmonious action among the various elements of the force. It should help us
provide a means of continuously monitoring developments as the basis for adapting. It
should provide security to deny the enemy knowledge of our true intentions. And above
all, it should help generate tempo of action since we recognize that speed is a weapon.
So, what does command and control do? In short, effective command and control helps
generate swift, appropriate, decisive, harmonious, and secure action.
The defining problem of command and control that overwhelms all others is the need
to deal with uncertainty.13 Were it not for uncertainty, command and control would be
a simple matter of managing resources. In the words of Carl von Clausewitz, “War is
the realm of uncertainty; three quarters of the factors on which action in war is based
are wrapped in a fog of greater or lesser uncertainty. A sensitive and discriminating
judgment is called for; a skilled intelligence to scent out the truth.” 14
Command and control aims to reduce the amount of un- certainty that commanders
must deal with—to a reasonable point—so they can make sound decisions. Though we
try to reduce uncertainty by providing information, there will always be some
knowledge that we lack. We will be aware of some of the gaps in our knowledge, but
we will not even be aware of other unknowns. We must understand the forces that
guarantee uncertainty and resolve to act despite it on the basis of what we do know.
The second main element that affects command and control, second only to uncertainty
in order of importance, is the factor of time. Theoretically, we can always reduce
uncertainty by gaining more knowledge of the situation (accepting that there is some
information we can never gain). The basic dilemma is that to gain and process
information takes time. This creates three related problems. First, the knowledge we
gain in war is perishable: as we take the time to gain new information, information
already gained is becoming obsolete. Second, since war is a contest between opposing
wills, time itself is a precious commodity used by both sides. While we strive to get
information about a particular situation, the enemy may already be acting—and
changing the situation in the process. (Of course, the enemy faces the same problem in
relation to us.) And third, the rapid tempo of modern operations limits the amount of
information that can be gathered, processed, and assimilated in time to be of use.
Command and control thus becomes a tense race against time. So the second absolute
requirement in any command and control system is to be fast—at least faster than the
enemy.
The resulting tension between coping with uncertainty and racing against time presents
the fundamental challenge of command and control. This is perhaps the single most
important point to take from this chapter. It is also important to recognize that the enemy
faces the same problems—and the object is to achieve some relative advantage.
Although there is no easy answer to this problem, the successful commander must find
a solution, as we will discuss.
COMMAND AND CONTROL IN THE INFORMATION AGE
Many of the factors that influence command and control are timeless—the nature of
war and of human beings and the twin problems of uncertainty and time, for example.
On the other hand, numerous factors are peculiar to a particular age or at least dependent
on the characteristics of that age. As war has evolved through the ages, so has command
and control. In general, as war has become increasingly complicated, so have the means
of command and control. What can we conclude about the environment in which
command and control must function today and in the foreseeable future?
The prevailing characteristics of the information age are variety and rapid, ongoing
change. An unstable and changeable world situation can lead to countless varieties of
conflict requiring peacekeeping operations on the one extreme to general war on the
other. Since we cannot predict when and where the next crisis will arise or what form
it will take, our command and control must function effectively in any envi- ronment.
The increasing lethality and range of weapons over time has compelled military forces
to disperse in order to survive, similarly stretching the limits of command and control.
Military forces are bigger and more complex than ever before, consisting of a greater
number and variety of specialized organizations and weapons. As a result, modern
military forces require ever greater amounts of information in order to operate and
sustain themselves, even in a peacetime routine.
CONCLUSION
Although command and control systems have evolved continuously throughout history,
the fundamental nature of command in war is timeless. Noteworthy improvements in
technology, organization, and procedures have not eased the demands of command and
control at all and probably never will. While these improvements have increased the
span of command and control, they have barely kept pace with the increasing dispersion
of forces and complexity of war itself. Whatever the age or technology, the key to
effective command and control will come down to dealing with the fundamental
problems of uncertainty and time. Whatever the age or technology, effective command
and control will come down to people using information to decide and act wisely. And
whatever the age or technology, the ultimate measure of command and control
effectiveness will always be the same: Can it help us act faster and more effectively
than the enemy?
Chapter 2
Command and Control Theory
“Confronted with a task, and having less information available than is needed to
perform that task, an organization may react in either of two ways. One is to increase
its information-processing capacity, the other to design the organization, and indeed
the task itself, in such a way as to enable it to operate on the basis of less information.
These approaches are exhaustive; no others are conceivable. A failure to adopt one or
the other will automatically result in a drop in the level of performance.”
Our study of command and control theory starts with a simple model of the command
and control process known as the OODA loop.1 The OODA loop applies to any two-
sided conflict, whether the antagonists are individuals in hand-to-hand combat or large
military formations. OODA is an acronym for observation-orientation-decision-action,
which describes the basic sequence of the command and control process. (See figure 2.)
When engaged in conflict, we first observe the situation—that is, we take in information
about our own status, our surroundings, and our enemy. Sometimes we actively seek
the information; sometimes it is thrust upon us. Having observed the situation, we next
orient to it—we make certain estimates, assumptions, analyses, and judgments about
the situation in order to create a cohesive mental image. In other words, we try to figure
out what the situation means to us. Based on our orientation, we decide what to do—
whether that decision takes the form of an immediate reaction or a deliberate plan. Then
we put the decision into action. This includes disseminating the decision, supervising
to ensure proper execution, and monitoring results through feedback, which takes us
full circle to the observation phase. Having acted, we have changed the situation, and
so the cycle begins again. It is worth noting that, in any organization with multiple
decision makers, multiple OODA loops spin simultaneously, although not necessarily
at the same speed, as commanders exercise command and control at their own level and
locale.
Importantly, the OODA loop reflects how command and control is a continuous,
cyclical process. In any conflict, the antagonist who can consistently and effectively
cycle through the OODA loop faster—who can maintain a higher tempo of actions—
gains an ever-increasing advantage with each cycle. With each reaction, the slower
antagonist falls farther and farther behind and becomes increasingly unable to cope with
the deteriorating situation. With each cycle, the slower antagonist’s actions become less
relevant to the true situation. Command and control itself deteriorates.
The lesson of the OODA loop is the importance of generating tempo in command and
control. In other words, speed is an essential element of effective command and control.
Speed in command and control means shortening the time needed to make decisions,
plan, coordinate, and communicate. Since war is competitive, it is not absolute speed
that matters, but speed relative to the enemy: the aim is to be faster than our enemy,
which means interfering with the enemy’s command and control as well as streamlining
our own. The speed differential does not necessarily have to be a large one: a small
advantage exploited repeatedly can quickly lead to decisive results. We should
recognize that the ability and desire to generate a higher operational tempo does not
negate the willingness to bide time when the situation calls for patience. The aim is not
merely rapid action, but also meaningful action.
Raw data comprise the lowest class of information and include raw signals picked up
by a sensor of any kind (a radio antenna, an eyeball, a radar, a satellite) or
communicated between any kind of nodes in a system. Data are bits and bytes
transferred between computers, individual transmissions sent by telephone or radio or
facsimile, or a piece of unprocessed film. In other words, raw data are signals which
have not been processed, correlated, integrated, evaluated, or interpreted in any way.
This class of information is rarely of much use until transformed in some way to give it
some sort of meaning.
The next class is data that have been processed into or have been displayed in a form
that is understandable to the people who must use them.* Processed data include film
that has been developed into a photograph, radio transmissions copied into a standard
report format, a computer file displayed as text or a graphic on a screen, grid coordinates
plotted on a map, or an intercepted enemy message deciphered. The act of processing
in itself gives the data a limited amount of value. Clearly, processed data are more useful
to people than raw data—and some may have immediate, obvious and significant
value—but they have not yet been evaluated or analyzed.
The next rung on the information hierarchy is knowledge—data that have been analyzed
to provide meaning and value. Knowledge is data which have been evaluated as to
reliability, relevance, and importance. Knowledge is various pieces of processed data
which have been integrated and interpreted to begin to build a picture of the situation.
For example, military intelligence is a form of knowledge as compared to combat
information which has not yet undergone analysis and evaluation. Likewise, situation
reports pieced together to create an estimate of the situation represent knowledge. At
this level, we are starting to get a product which can be useful for decisionmaking.
The gradations between the different classes of information are not always very clear.
It is not always easy to tell the exact difference between raw and processed data, for
example. But it is important to realize that there are differences and that knowledge is
usually more valuable than data, for instance. Moreover, it is also important to
recognize that information is transformed as it moves up the hierarchy and to understand
the forces that cause that transformation.
Raw data are turned into processed data, as we might expect, through processing, an
activity involving essentially the rote application of procedure. Processing includes
formatting, translating, collating, plotting, and so on. Much processing occurs
automatically (whether by humans or by machines) without our even being aware that
it is taking place—such as when a facsimile machine converts bits of data into
understandable text or graphics. In many cases, machines can process data much more
quickly and efficiently than people.
We turn processed data into knowledge through the activity of cognition—the act of
learning what something means, at least in general terms. To a degree, cognition may
be based on rules of logic or deduction (“If A happens, it means B”). Expert systems
and artificial intelligence can assist with cognition to a certain extent—by helping to
integrate pieces of processed data, for example. But cognition is primarily a human
mental activity—not primarily a procedural act like processing, but an act of learning.
We should note that as information moves up the hierarchy from data toward
understanding, an integration occurs. Multiple bits of raw data are pieced together to
make processed data. Numerous pieces of processed data coalesce into knowledge.
Various bodies of knowledge distill into understanding. This integration is essential to
eventually reaching understanding because it involves reducing the total number of
“pieces” that must be considered at any one time. The vast number of bits of raw data
that describe any situation would overwhelm any commander if they had to be
considered singly. It takes a certain amount of time and effort to make these
integrations, but without this effort the commander would be overloaded by a staggering
number of things to consider.
By nature, data are significantly easier to generate, identify, quantify, reproduce, and
transmit than are knowledge and understanding. But commanders need knowledge and
understanding in order to make effective decisions. Likewise, subordinates need not
merely data but knowledge and understanding of the commander’s concept and intent.
The goal in command and control should not be collecting, processing, and
communicating vast amounts of data—and increasing the danger of information
overload in the process—but approaching understanding as closely as possible.
However, we cannot simply provide commanders with ready-made understanding.
They will have to make the final judgments themselves. But we can strive to provide
information that is as easily assimilable and as close to final form as possible. This
means providing information in the form of images.
IMAGE THEORY
Human beings do not normally think in terms of data or even knowledge. People
generally think in terms of ideas or images—mental pictures of a given situation.
Not only do people generally think in images, they understand things best as images
and are inspired most by images.3
We can say that an image is the embodiment of our understanding of a given situation
or condition. (The term coup d’oeil, which refers to the ability of gifted commanders to
intuitively grasp what is happening on the battlefield, means literally “stroke of the
eye.”) Images apply not only to the military problems we face but also to the solutions.
For example, a well-conceived concept of operations and commander’s intent should
convey a clear and powerful image of the action and the desired outcome. Figure 2. The
command and control process: The OODA loop.
People assimilate information more quickly and effectively as visual images than in
text. The implications of this are widespread and significant, ranging from technical
matters of presentation—the use of maps, overlays, symbols, pictures, and other
graphics to display and convey information visually—to conceptual matters of sharing
situational awareness and intent.
Our image of a situation is based not just on the facts of the situation, but also on our
interpretation of those facts. In other words, it is based on our intuition, appreciation,
judgment, and so on, which in turn are the products of our preconceptions, training, and
past experiences. New information that does not agree with our existing image requires
us to revalidate the image or revise it—not easily done in the turbulence and stress of
combat. The images we create and communicate to others must approximate reality.
Conversely, if we want to deceive our enemies, we try to present them with an image
of the situation that does not match reality and so lead them to make poor decisions.
We generate images from others’ observations as well as our own. In general, the higher
the level of command, the more we depend on information from others and the less on
our own observations. All but the smallest-unit commanders receive most of their
information from others. This can cause several problems. First, when we observe a
situation firsthand, we have an intuitive appreciation for the level of uncertainty—we
have a sense for how reliable the image is—and we can act accordingly. But when we
receive our information secondhand, we usually lose that sense. This is especially
dangerous in a high-technology age in which impressively displayed information
appears especially reliable. Second, we can sense more about a situation from firsthand
observation than we can faithfully communicate to others or, at least, than we have time
to communicate in a crisis. Third, since each of us interprets events differently, the
information we communicate is distorted to some degree with each node that it passes
through on its way to its final destination. And fourth, this same information is likewise
delayed at each node. Since the value of information exists in time, this delay can be
critical.
Commanders need essentially three different pictures. The first is a closeup of the
situation, a “feel” for the action gained best through personal observation and
experience. From this picture, commanders gain a sense of what subordinates are
experiencing—their physical and moral state. From this image, commanders get a sense
of what they can and cannot demand of their people. In the words of Israeli General
Yshayahor Gavish about his experience in the 1967 Arab-Israeli war: “There is no
alternative to looking into a subordinate’s eyes, listening to his tone of voice.” 4
The second picture is an overall view of the situation. From this view, commanders try
to make sense of the relative dispositions of forces and the overall patterns of the
unfolding situation. From this view, they also gauge the difference between the actual
situation and the desired end state. The desired result of the overall view is a quality we
can call “topsight”—a grasp of the big picture. If “insight is the illumination to be
achieved by penetrating inner depths, topsight is what comes from a far-overhead
vantage point, from a bird’s eye view that reveals the whole—the big picture; how the
parts fit together.” 5
The third picture we try to form is the action as seen through the eyes of the enemy
commander from which we try to deduce possible enemy intentions and anticipate
possible enemy moves. Of the three pictures, the first is clearly the most detailed but
usually offers a very narrow field of vision. Commanders who focus only on this image
risk losing sight of the big picture. The second picture provides an overall image but
lacks critical detail—just as a situation map does not capture more than a broad
impression of the reality of events on the battlefield. Commanders who focus only on
this image risk being out of touch with reality. The third picture is largely a mental
exercise limited by the fact that we can never be sure of what our enemy is up to.
Squad leaders or fighter pilots may simultaneously be able to generate all three images
largely from their own observations. Higher commanders, however, feel a tension
between satisfying the need for both the closeup and overall images—the former best
satisfied by personal observation at the front and the latter probably best satisfied from
a more distant vantage point, such as a command post or higher headquarters.
Because as war has evolved, it has become increasingly complex and dispersed,
commanders have found it increasingly difficult to observe all, or even most, critical
events directly. One historical solution to this problem is a technique known as the
directed telescope, which can be especially useful for gaining a closeup image. This
technique involves using a dedicated information collector—whether a trusted and like-
minded subordinate or a sensor—to observe selected events and report directly to the
commander. Commanders may direct the “telescope” at the enemy, at the surroundings,
or at their own forces. In theory, because these observers report directly, the information
arrives with minimal delay or distortion. Directed telescopes should not replace regular
reporting chains but should augment them—to avoid burdening lower echelons with
additional information gathering and to check the validity of information flowing
through regular channels. Improperly used, directed telescopes can damage the vital
trust a commander seeks to build with subordinates.6
The second way to deal with the problems of delay and distortion of information is to
rely on implicit communications to the greatest extent possible. Implicit communication
minimizes the need for explicit transmission of information. Theoretically, because
implicit communication requires individuals who share a common perspective,
information will suffer minimal distortion as it passes up or down the chain. We will
discuss implicit communication in greater detail later.
The third way to deal with the problems of delay and distortion of information, also
discussed later in more detail, is to decentralize decisionmaking authority so that the
individual on the spot, the individual who has direct observation of the situation at that
spot, is the person making the decisions.
Historically, there have been two basic responses to the fundamental problem of
uncertainty: to pursue certainty as the basis for effective command and control or to
accept uncertainty as a fact and to learn to function in spite of it.
Detailed command and control can be described as coercive, a term which effectively
describes the manner by which the commander achieves unity of effort.7 In such a
system, the commander holds a tight rein, commanding by personal direction or detailed
directive.8 Command and control tends to be centralized and formal. Orders and plans
are detailed and explicit, and their successful execution requires strict obedience and
minimizes subordinate decisionmaking and initiative. Detailed command and control
emphasizes vertical, linear information flow: in general, information flows up the chain
of command and orders flow down. Discipline and coordination are imposed from
above to ensure compliance with the plan.
In a system based on detailed command and control, the command and control process
tends to move slowly: information must be fed up to the top of the chain where sole
decisionmaking authority resides, and orders must filter to the bottom to be executed.
Understandably, such a system does not generally react well to rapidly changing
situations. Nor does it function well when the vertical flow of information is disrupted.
While distrust is not an inherent feature of detailed command and control, organizations
characterized by distrust tend toward detailed command and control.
This approach represents an attempt to overcome the fundamental nature of war. Since
we have already concluded that precise direction is generally impossible in war, detailed
command and control risks falling short of its desired result. The question is whether it
nears the desired result enough to achieve overall success.
By contrast, mission command and control accepts the turbulence and uncertainty of
war. Rather than increase the level of certainty that we seek, by mission command and
control we reduce the degree of certainty that we need. Mission command and control
can be described as spontaneous: unity of effort is not the product of conformity
imposed from above but of the spontaneous cooperation of all the elements of the
force.9 Subordinates are guided not by detailed instructions and control measures but
by their knowledge of the requirements of the overall mission. In such a system, the
commander holds a loose rein, allowing subordinates significant freedom of action and
requiring them to act with initiative. Discipline imposed from above is reinforced with
self-discipline throughout the organization. Because it decentralizes decisionmaking
authority and grants subordinates significant freedom of action, mission command and
control demands more of leaders at all levels and requires rigorous training and
education. Figure 3. The information hierarchy.
Mission command and control tends to be decentralized, informal, and flexible. Orders
and plans are as brief and simple as possible, relying on subordinates to effect the
necessary coordination and on the human capacity for implicit communication—mutual
understanding with minimal information exchange. By decentralizing decisionmaking
authority, mission command and control seeks to increase tempo and improve the
ability to deal with fluid and disorderly situations.
Moreover, with its reliance on implicit communications, mission command and control
is less vulnerable to disruption of the information flow than is detailed command and
control.
The two approaches to the problem mark the theoretical extremes of a spectrum of
command and control. (See figure 4.) In practice, no commander will rely entirely on
either purely detailed or purely mission methods. Exactly what type of command and
control we use in a particular situation will depend on a variety of factors, such as the
nature of the action or task, the nature and capabilities of the enemy, and, perhaps most
of all, the qualities of our people. This is not to suggest that the two types of command
and control are of equal value and merely a matter of personal preference. While
detailed command and control may be appropriate in the performance of specific tasks
of a procedural or technical nature, it is less than effective in the overall conduct of
military operations in an environment of uncertainty, friction, disorder, and fleeting
opportunities, in which judgment, creativity, and initiative are required. Militaries have
frequently favored detailed command and control, but our understanding of the true
nature of war and the lessons of history points to the advantages of mission command
and control.
LEADERSHIP THEORY
The authoritarian theory of leadership is based on the assumption that people naturally
dislike work and will try to avoid it where possible, and that they must therefore be
forced by coercion and threat of punishment to work toward the common goal. This
theory further argues that people actually prefer to be directed and try to avoid
responsibility. The result is an autocratic style of leadership aimed at achieving
immediate and unquestioning obedience. Leaders announce their decisions and expect
subordinates to execute them. The authoritarian leader is sometimes also known as a
telling or directing leader. While authoritarian leadership may result in rapid obedience,
it also can often result in subordinates who are highly dependent on the leader, require
continuous supervision, and lack initiative. Military discipline is widely seen as an
example of this model since quick and unquestioning response to orders may be
required in the heat of an emergency. This is, however, only one version of leadership
that military leaders have used successfully.
The leadership style we adopt in a given situation depends on a variety of factors. Key
among them is the maturity of subordinates—that is, how motivated, experienced, and
willing to accept responsibility they are. Here maturity is not necessarily linked to age
or seniority. The more mature the subordinate, the more we can delegate; the less
mature, the more we will have to direct. All other things being equal, we prefer the
persuasive approach because it seeks to gain the committed performance of
subordinates and encourages subordinate initiative. Moreover, persuasive leadership
reduces the need for continuous supervision, an important consideration on a dispersed
and fluid battlefield on which continuous, detailed supervision is problematic.
PLANNING THEORY
Planning is the process of developing practical schemes for taking future actions.
Planning may occur before a decision and so support decisionmaking—by analyzing
the mission, the enemy, or the environment to help develop situational awareness or by
studying the feasibility of different courses of action. Planning may also occur after a
decision and so support its execution—by working out necessary coordination
measures, allocation of resources, or timing and scheduling.
Planning facilitates future decisions and actions by helping commanders provide for
those things which are not likely to change or which are fairly predictable (such as
geography and certain aspects of supply or transport). Planning helps them to examine
their assumptions, to come to a common under- standing about the situation and its
general direction, to anticipate possible enemy actions, and thus to consider possible
counteractions. Planning helps to uncover and clarify potential opportunities and threats
and to prepare for opportunities and threats in advance. Conversely, planning helps to
avoid preventable mistakes and missed opportunities.
Depending on the situation and the nature of the preparations, planning may be done
rapidly or deliberately. Rapid/ time-sensitive planning is conducted in response to
existing conditions and is meant for immediate or near-future execution. In contrast,
deliberate planning is based on anticipated future conditions and is intended for possible
execution at some more distant time. We should keep in mind that all planning takes
time and must facilitate the generation or maintenance of tempo, while ensuring that
time allocated for planning does not adversely impact on tempo.
Planning occurs at different levels and manifests itself differently at these levels. At the
highest level is what we can call conceptual planning which establishes aims,
objectives, and intents and which involves developing tactical, operational, or strategic
concepts for the overall conduct of military actions. Conceptual planning should
provide the foundation for all subsequent planning, which we can call functional and
detailed. These are the more routine and pragmatic elements of planning which are
concerned with translating the concept into a complete and practicable plan. Functional
planning is concerned with the various functional areas necessary to sup- port the
overall concept, such as subordinate concepts for mo-bilization, deployment, logistics,
intelligence, and so on. Detailed planning encompasses the practical specifics of
execution. Detailed planning deals primarily with scheduling, coordination, or technical
matters required to move and sustain military forces, such as calculating the supplies or
transport needed for a given operation.
In general, conceptual planning corresponds to the art of war, detailed planning applies
to the science of war, and functional planning falls somewhere in between. Detailed
and, to a lesser extent, functional planning may require deliberate and detailed
calculations and may involve the development of detailed schedules or plans, such as
landing tables, resupply schedules, communications plans, or task organizations.
However, the staff procedures which may be necessary in detailed and functional
matters are generally not appropriate for broader conceptual planning. Rather, such
planning should at- tempt to broadly influence rather than precisely direct future
actions. Conceptual planning should impart intent, develop overall operating concepts,
and identify contingencies and possible problems but otherwise should leave the
subordinate broad latitude in the manner of functional or detailed execution.
ORGANIZATION THEORY
Importantly, organization should establish unity of command which means that any
given mission falls within the authority and responsibility of a single commander and
that a commander receives orders from only one superior for any given mission.
Similarly, organization should ensure that a commander has authority over or access to
all the resources required to accomplish the assigned mission.
Organization should ensure a reasonable span of control which refers to the number of
subordinates or activities under a single commander. The span of control should not
exceed a commander’s capability to command effectively. The optimal number of
subordinates is situation-dependent. For example, the more fluid and faster-changing a
situation is, the fewer subordinate elements a commander can keep track of
continuously. Likewise, commanders exercising detailed command and control, which
requires them to pay close attention to the operations of each subordinate element,
generally have narrower spans of control than commanders who use mission command
and control and let their subordinates work out the details of execution.
Although a reasonable span of control varies with the situation, as a rule of thumb an
individual can effectively command at least three and as many as seven subordinates.
Within this situation-dependent range, a greater number means greater flexibility—
three subordinate units allow for more options and combinations than two, for example.
However, as the number increases, at some point we lose the ability to effectively
consider each unit individually and begin to think of the units together as a single,
inflexible mass. At this point, the only way to reintroduce flexibility is to group
elements together into a smaller number of parts, thereby creating the need for another
intermediate echelon of command. The evolution of the Marine rifle squad during the
Second World War is a good example of this. Entering the war, the rifle squad consisted
of nine Marines—a squad leader and eight squad members with no additional internal
organization. In combat this squad lacked the flexibility needed for small-unit fire and
maneuver. Moreover, squad leaders often could not effectively command eight
individual Marines. The answer was the creation of an intermediate organizational
level, the fire team of four Marines, which also allowed an increase in squad size to
thirteen Marines. The creation of the fire team decreased the number of immediate
subordinates the squad leader had to deal with, while extending the squad leader’s
influence over a larger squad.
Information may flow vertically within the chain of command, but it should not be
restricted by the chain of command. It also flows laterally between adjacent units, or
even “diagonally”—between a platoon and an adjacent company headquarters, for
example, or between a supported unit and a supporting unit outside the chain of
command. Information flows informally and unofficially—that is, between individuals
according to personal relationships—as well as according to formally established
channels. These informal channels provide an important redundancy and are especially
important in team building.
COMMUNICATIONS THEORY
Since effective command and control is concerned with getting the right information to
the right person at the right time, information management is crucial.
Demand-pull can help focus scarce resources on those tasks which the commander has
identified as critical; it can deliver information specifically tailored to the commander’s
information needs; and it will produce only that information which the commander
requests. These characteristics can be both strengths and weaknesses. They can be
strengths because information flow is tailored specifically to identified requirements.
However, they can also be weaknesses because there will often be information
requirements that the commander has not identified, and in a pure demand-pull system
those requirements will go unsatisfied. One definite disadvantage of demand-pull is the
cost in time since the search for information may not begin until the commander has
identified the need for that information.
In practice, the different aspects of information management are far from incompatible;
in fact, combined wisely they can effectively complement one another within the same
command and control system.
DECISIONMAKING THEORY
A principal aim of command and control is to enhance the commander’s ability to make
sound and timely decisions. As we might expect, the defining features of command and
control—uncertainty and time—exert a significant influence on decisionmaking.15 All
decisions must be made in the face of uncertainty. Theoretically, we can reduce
uncertainty by gaining more information, but any such decrease in uncertainty occurs
at the expense of time. And as we have already mentioned, it is not so much the amount
of information that matters, but the right elements of information available at the right
time and place.
There are two basic theories on how we make decisions.16 The traditional view is that
decisionmaking is an analytical process based on generating several different options,
comparing all the options according to some set of criteria, and identifying the best
option. The basic idea is that comparing multiple options concurrently will produce the
optimal solution. As a result, analytical decisionmaking tends to be methodical and
time-consuming. Theoretically, reasoning power matters more than experience.
The other basic approach, called intuitive decisionmaking, rejects the computational
approach of the analytical method and instead relies on an experienced commander’s
(and staff’s) intuitive ability to recognize the key elements of a particular problem and
arrive at the proper decision. Intuitive decisionmaking thus replaces methodical
analysis with an intuitive skill for pattern-recognition based on experience and
judgment. The intuitive approach focuses on situation as-sessment instead of on the
comparison of multiple options. Intuitive decisionmaking aims at “satisficing,” finding
the first solution which will satisfactorily solve the problem, rather than on optimizing,
as the analytical approach attempts to do.17 The intuitive approach is based on the
belief that, war being ultimately an art rather than a science, there is no absolutely right
answer to any problem. Intuitive decisionmaking works on the further belief that, due
to the judgment gained by experience, training, and reflection, the commander will
generate a workable first solution, and therefore it is not necessary to generate multiple
options. Because it does not involve comparing multiple options, intuitive
decisionmaking is generally much faster than analytical decisionmaking. If time
permits, the commander may further evaluate this decision; if it proves defective, the
commander moves on to the next reasonable solution.
Each approach has different strengths and weaknesses, and determining which
approach is better in a given situation depends on the nature of the situation, particularly
on how much time and information are available. The analytical approach may be
appropriate for prehostility decisions about mobilization or contingency planning when
time is not a factor and extensive information can be gathered. It may be useful in
situations in which it is necessary to document or justify a decision or in decisions
requiring complicated computations which simply cannot be done intuitively (such as
in making decisions about supply rates). It may be appropriate when choosing from
among several existing alternatives, as in equipment acquisition, for example. Finally,
an analytical approach may have some merit in situations in which commanders are
inexperienced or in which they face never-be- fore-experienced problems. However,
that said, the intuitive approach is more appropriate for the vast majority of typical
tactical or operational decisions—decisions made in the fluid, rapidly changing
conditions of war when time and uncertainty are critical factors, and creativity is a
desirable trait.18
We frequently associate intuitive decisionmaking with rapid/time-sensitive planning
and analytical decisionmaking with deliberate planning. This may often be the case but
not necessarily. For example, a thorough, deliberate planning effort in advance of a
crisis can provide the situational awareness that allows a commander to exercise
effective intuitive decisionmaking. Conversely, the analytical approach of developing
and selecting from several courses of action may be done rapidly. The point is that the
planning model or process we choose, and the decisionmaking approach that supports
it, should be based upon the situation, the time available, the knowledge and situational
awareness of the organization, and the commander’s involvement in the planning and
decision- making process. While the two approaches to decisionmaking are
conceptually distinct, they are rarely mutually exclusive in practice.
CONCLUSION
Our view of the true nature of war leads us to one of two responses to dealing with the
fundamental problem of command: either pursuing certainty or coping with uncertainty.
These responses lead to two distinctly different theories of command and control. Each
theory in turn imposes its own requirements on the various aspects of command and
control—decisionmaking, communications, information management, planning,
organization, training, education, doctrine, and so on—and so forms the basis for a
distinct and comprehensive approach to command and control. The question is: Which
approach do we adopt? The Marine Corps’ concept of command and control is based
on accepting uncertainty as an undeniable fact and being able to operate effectively
despite it. The Marine Corps’ command and control system is thus built around mission
command and control which allows us to create tempo, flexibility, and the ability to
exploit opportunities but which also requires us to decentralize and rely on low-level
initiative. In the next chapter, we will discuss the features of such a command and
control system.
Chapter 3
Creating Effective Command and Control
"Whoever can make and implement his decisions consistently faster gains a
tremendous, often decisive advantage. Decision making thus becomes a time-
competitive process, and timeliness of decisions becomes essential to generating
tempo."
Having reached a common understanding of the nature of command and control and
having laid out its key theories, we can develop the characteristics of an effective
command and control system. How do we create effective command and control, both
in our units and within the Marine Corps as a whole?
Before we discuss the features of our command and control system, it might help to
review the challenges that the system, as a complex blend of people, information, and
support, must face. What obstacles must our command and control system overcome
and what must it accomplish? First and foremost, the system must deal effectively with
the twin problems of uncertainty and time. It must be compatible with our doctrine of
maneuver warfare. It must function effectively across a broad spectrum of conflicts and
environments—that is, in "any clime and place." Moreover, while designed principally
to work effectively in war, it should also apply to peacetime activities, operational or
administrative.
Our command and control must improve our ability to generate a higher tempo of action
than the enemy. It should help us adapt to rapidly changing situations and exploit
fleeting opportunities. It should allow us to withstand disruptions of all kinds, created
by the enemy, the environment, or our- selves, since we recognize that disruption will
be a normal course of events. It should help to gather information quickly, accurately,
and selectively and to get the right information to the right person at the right time and
in the right form—without creating information overload. It should improve our ability
to build and share situational awareness.
Our command and control should help provide insight into the nature of the problem
facing us and into the nature and designs of our enemy. It should help us to identify
critical enemy vulnerabilities and should provide the means for focusing our efforts
against those vulnerabilities. At the same time, it should help conceal our true designs
from the enemy. It should help establish goals which are both meaningful and
practicable, and it should help devise workable, flexible plans to accomplish those
goals.
It should facilitate making timely and sound decisions despite incomplete and unclear
information, and it should provide the means to modify those decisions quickly. It
should allow us to monitor events closely enough to ensure proper execution, yet
without interfering with subordinates’ actions. It should help us communicate
instructions quickly, clearly, and concisely and in a way that provides subordinates the
necessary guidance without inhibiting their initiative.
With this in mind, what should such a command and control system look like?
First and foremost, our approach should be based on mission command and control.
Mission command and control is central to maneuver warfare. We realize that the
specific combination of command and control methods we employ in a particular
situation depends on the unique requirements of that situation. We also realize that,
within an overall mission approach, detailed command and control may be preferable
for certain procedural or technical tasks. That said, however, for the overall command
and control of military actions, we should use mission command and control as much
as the situation allows. Why? Mission command and control deals better with the
fundamental problems of uncertainty and time. Since we recognize that precision and
certainty are unattainable in war anyway, we sacrifice them for speed and agility.
Mission command and control offers the flexibility to deal with rapidly changing
situations and to exploit fleeting windows of opportunity. It provides for the degree of
cooperation necessary to achieve harmony of effort yet gives commanders at all levels
the latitude to act with initiative and boldness.
Mission command and control relies on the use of mission tactics in which seniors
assign missions and explain the underlying intent but leave subordinates as free as
possible to choose the manner of accomplishment. Commanders seek to exercise a sort
of command by influence, issuing broad guidance rather than detailed directions or
directives. The higher the level of command, the more general should be the supervision
and the less the burden of detail. Commanders reserve the use of close personal
supervision to intervene in subordinate’s actions only in exceptional cases. Thus all
commanders in their own spheres are accustomed to the full exercise of authority and
the free application of judgment and imagination.1 Mission command and control thus
seeks to maximize low-level initiative while achieving a high level of cooperation in
order to obtain better battlefield results.
Orders should include restrictive control measures and should prescribe the manner of
execution only to the degree needed to provide necessary coordination that cannot be
achieved any other way. Orders should be as brief and as simple as possible, relying on
subordinates to work out the details of execution and to effect the necessary
coordination. Mission command and control thus relies on lateral coordination between
units as well as communications up and down the chain.
The aim is not to increase our capacity to perform command and control. It is not more
command and control that we are after. Instead, we seek to decrease the amount of
command and control that we need. We do this by replacing coercive command and
control methods with spontaneous, self-disciplined cooperation based on low-level
initiative, a commonly understood commander’s intent, mutual trust, and implicit
understanding and communications.
LOW-LEVEL INITIATIVE
Our command and control must be biased toward decision and action at all levels. Put
another way, the command and control process must be self-starting at every level of
command as all commanders within their own spheres act upon the need for action
rather than only on orders from above.
It is important to point out that initiative does not mean that subordinates are free to act
without regard to guidance from above. In fact, initiative places a special burden on
subordinates, requiring that they always keep the larger situation in mind and act in
consonance with their senior’s intent. The freedom to act with initiative thus implies a
greater obligation to act in a disciplined and responsible way. Initiative places a greater
burden on the senior as well. Delegating authority to subordinates does not absolve
higher commanders of ultimate responsibility. They must frame their guidance in such
a way that provides subordinates sufficient understanding to act in consonance with
their desires while not restricting freedom of action. Commanders must be adept at
expressing their desires clearly and forcefully—a skill that requires practice.
Beyond its tactical utility, initiative has an important psychological effect on the
members of an organization. Recognizing what needs to be done and taking the action
necessary to succeed is a satisfying experience and a powerful stimulant to human
endeavor. People not merely carrying out orders but acting on their own initiative feel
a greater responsibility for the outcome and will naturally act with greater vigor. Thus,
initiative distributed throughout is a source of great strength and energy for any
organization, especially in times of crisis.
COMMANDER’S INTENT
In a decentralized command and control system, without a common vision there can be
no unity of effort; the various actions will lack cohesion. Without a commander’s intent
to express that common vision, there simply can be no mission command and control.
There are two parts to any mission: the task to be accomplished and the reason, or intent.
The task describes the action to be taken while the intent describes the desired result of
the action. Of the two, the intent is predominant. While a situation may change, making
the task obsolete, the intent is more enduring and continues to guide our actions.
Understanding our commander’s intent allows us to exercise initiative in harmony with
the commander’s desires. The commander’s intent should thus pull the various separate
actions of the force together, establishing an underlying purpose and focus. It should
provide top sight. In so doing, it should provide the logic that allows subordinates each
to act according to their unique circumstances while maintaining harmony with one
another and the higher commander’s aim. While assigned tasks may be overcome by
events, the commander’s intent should allow subordinates to act with initiative even in
the face of disorder and change.
MUTUAL TRUST
Mission command and control demands mutual trust among all commanders, staffs, and
Marines—confidence in the abilities and judgment of subordinates, peers, and seniors.
Trust is the cornerstone of cooperation. It is a function of familiarity and respect. A
senior trusts subordinates to carry out the assigned missions competently with minimal
supervision, act in consonance with the overall intent, report developments as
necessary, and effect the necessary coordination. Subordinates meanwhile trust that the
senior will provide the necessary guidance and will support them loyally and fully, even
when they make mistakes.
Trust has a reverse side: it must be earned as well as given. We earn the trust of others
by demonstrating competence, a sense of responsibility, loyalty, and self-discipline.
This last is essential. Discipline is of fundamental importance in any military endeavor,
and strict military discipline remains a pillar of command authority. But since mission
command and control is decentralized rather than centralized and spontaneous rather
than coercive, discipline is not only imposed from above; it must also be generated from
within. In order to earn a senior’s trust, subordinates must demonstrate the self-
discipline to accomplish the mission with minimal supervision and to act always in
accord with the larger intent. Seniors, in order to earn subordinates’ trust, must likewise
demonstrate that they will provide the subordinate the framework within which to act
and will support and protect subordinates in every way as they exercise initiative.
Mutual trust also has a positive effect on morale: it increases the individual’s identity
with the group and its goals. Mutual trust thus contributes to a supportive, cooperative
environment.
The final essential ingredients of effective mission command and control are implicit
understanding and communication which are the basis for cooperation and coordination
in maneuver warfare. These intangible human abilities allow us to harmonize our
actions intuitively with others.
DECISIONMAKING
INFORMATION MANAGEMENT
Our command and control system should make use of all the various channels and
methods by which information flows—implicit as well as explicit and informal as well
as formal. Our system must facilitate communications in all directions, not only
vertically within the chain of command, and should ensure that information flow is
interactive rather than one-way. Our system should provide redundant channels as a
safeguard against disruption and battle damage; which channel information follows is
less important than whether it reaches the right destination. Since information is
changed by each person who handles it, important information should pass directly
between principal users, eliminating intermediaries, such as equipment operators or
clerks. Wherever possible, person-to-person in- formation should be communicated by
word of mouth and face-to-face since humans communicate not only by what they say
but also by how they say it. The desire to have principals communicate directly and by
voice does not mean that we do not need to keep a record of communications;
permanent records can be important as a means of affirming understanding and for
reasons of later study and critique.
Our information management system should also combine the best characteristics of
supply-push and demand-pull. We recognize that supply-push is the most efficient way
to provide much of the information needed routinely—whether broadcast or point-to-
point. Through the implicit understanding and shared images of its members, the system
should attempt to anticipate commanders’ needs and should attempt to push routine
information to an easily accessible, local data base. Commanders then pull from the
base only that information they need. In this way, we avoid the danger of information
overload associated with supply-push and broadcast and circumvent some of the delays
normally associated with demand-pull.
We also recognize that commanders will likely be unaware of the need for certain
information, so we must ensure that truly critical, time-sensitive information is pushed
directly to them without delay, even if it means skipping intermediate echelons of
command. Echelon-skipping does not mean, however, that intermediate echelons are
left uninformed. After critical information has passed directly between the primarily
concerned echelons, both those echelons should inform intermediates by normal
channels.
LEADERSHIP
Because people are the first and most important element of our command and control
system, strong and effective leadership is of essential importance to our command and
control. Mission command and control requires predominantly a persuasive or
delegating approach to leadership. It becomes the role of the leaders to motivate
Marines to perform to the highest standards and to instill self-discipline. Leadership is
thus a matter of enlisting the committed, enthusiastic, and loyal performance of
subordinates, both as a habitual quality and in support of each specific mission. A good
part of this comes from keeping subordinates informed and from one’s own
demonstration of commitment. Mission command and control does not imply a
depersonalized or detached demeanor. Since leaders who employ mission tactics are
not overly involved in the details of execution, one of their primary roles will thus be
to provide the intent which holds together the decentralized actions of subordinates.
Another important role of leadership will be to create a close-knit sense of team which
is essential to developing trust and understanding within the organization. Leaders
should reinforce the common core values which are the basis for implicit understanding
and trust. Leaders should strive to create an atmosphere of mutual support in which
subordinates are encouraged to demonstrate initiative and to effect the necessary
coordination locally. Importantly, this means avoiding a "zero-defects" mentality which
tends to penalize initiative.
Planning should be participatory. The main benefits of planning are not from consuming
the product but from engaging in the process. In other words, the planning matters more
than the plan. We should view any plan as merely a common starting point from which
to adapt as the situation requires and not as a script which must be followed. We should
think of the plan as a scheme for solving a problem. Since the future will always be
uncertain, plans must be flexible and adaptable, allowing the opportunity to pursue a
variety of options.
Effective planning must involve an appreciation for time horizons. We must project far
enough into the future so that we can maintain the initiative and prepare adequately for
upcoming action, but not so far into the future that plans will have little in common with
actual developments. Effective planning should facilitate shaping the conditions of the
situation to our advantage while preserving freedom to adapt quickly to real events. As
actions approach and our ability to influence them grows, planning should have helped
us develop an appreciation for the situation and get into a position to exploit it.
Without question, planning is an important and valuable part of command and control.
However, we must guard against overcontrol and mechanical thinking. A properly
framed commander’s intent and effective commander’s planning guidance create plans
which foster the environment for subordinate commanders to exercise initiative to
create tempo while allowing for flexibility within execution of operations. The object
of planning is to provide options for the commander to face the future with confidence.
The measure of a good plan is not whether it transpires as designed but whether it
facilitates effective action in the face of unforeseen events.
The focus of the command and control effort should reflect the overall focus of efforts.
We should focus the command and control effort on critical tasks and at critical times
and places. We can do this by a variety of means. We concentrate information-gathering
assets and other command and control resources where they are needed most. We
concentrate planning, coordination, analysis, and other command and control activities
on the most important tasks, and we exercise economy elsewhere. We prioritize
information requirements and concentrate gathering, processing, and communications
on the critical elements. We filter, prioritize, and fuse information to ensure that critical,
time-sensitive information moves quickly and effectively and that less important
information does not clutter communications channels. We manage that most precious
of all commodities, time, to ensure that the most important tasks receive our earliest
and utmost attention. We especially ensure that commanders devote their time and
energies only to critical tasks, and that they are protected against routine distractions.
The commander should do only those things which only the commander can do or
which nobody else can do adequately. Routine tasks must be delegated to others.
A key way commanders can provide focus is by personal attention and presence. In the
words of Field Marshal Sir William Slim, "One of the most valuable qualities of a
commander is the flair for putting himself in the right place at the vital time." As we
have mentioned, by positioning themselves at the critical spot, commanders can observe
events more directly and avoid the delays and distortions that occur as information
filters up the chain of command. In so doing, commanders can gain firsthand the
essential appreciation for the situation which can rarely be gained any other way.
Equally important, they can influence events more directly and avoid the delays and
distortions that occur as information filters down the chain of command. By their
personal presence, commanders can provide the leadership that is so essential to success
in war. And simply by the moral authority that their presence commands, commanders
direct emphasis to the critical spot and focus efforts on the critical task.
We have discussed the need to gain several different images. Commanders go wherever
they must to get the most important image. For the closeup image, this often means at
the front—which does not necessarily mean at the forwardmost point of contact on the
ground, but wherever the critical action is taking place or the critical situation is
developing. For ground commanders, even senior ones, this may in fact mean at or near
the point of contact. But for others, and even for ground commanders, this may mean
with a subordinate commander in the critical sector—in a ready room listening to flight
debriefs during an important phase of an air operation, at a critical point along a route
of march, or in an aircraft flying over the battlefield. If the critical view at a particular
moment is the overall picture, the commander may want to be in the command post’s
operations center, piecing together various reports from far-flung sources, or even at a
higher headquarters, learning about the larger situation (although in general it is better
for senior commanders to come forward than for subordinate commanders to go
rearward to exchange information). And for that matter, if a commander is trying to get
inside the mind of an adversary who has made a bold and unexpected move that has
shattered situational awareness, the best place may be sequestered from distractions,
sitting against a tree, alone with a map.
Our philosophy of command calls for energetic and active commanders with a flair, as
Slim says, for being in the critical place, lending leadership, judgment, and authority
wherever it is needed most. The commander might start at the command post to piece
together an overall image and supervise the development of the plan, but should then
usually move forward to supervise execution at the critical spot, returning to the
command post only long enough to regenerate an image of the overall situation before
moving out again to the next critical spot. The important point is that commanders must
not feel tied to the command post, unable to leave it for fear of missing a valuable
report—especially since modern communications increasingly allow commanders to
stay informed even when away from the command post. When commanders leave the
command post, it is imperative that they empower the staff to act on their behalf. The
staff must be able to act with initiative when the commander is away and therefore must
understand the commander’s estimate of the situation, overall intent, and designs.
Mutual trust and implicit understanding apply to the staff as much as to subordinate
commanders. Commanders who do not empower the staff to act on their behalf will
become prisoners in their own headquarters, out of touch with reality and limited in
their ability to influence events.
THE COMMAND AND CONTROL SUPPORT STRUCTURE
It is important to keep in mind that the command and control support structure merely
provides the supporting framework for our command and control; it does not constitute
the system itself. The sole purpose of the support structure is to assist people in
recognizing what needs to be done and in taking appropriate action. In addition to
supporting our approach to command and control, the components of our command and
control support structure must be compatible with one another. And since people are
the driving element behind command and control, the components of the structure,
together and alone, must be user-friendly—that is, designed first and always with
people in mind.
Collectively, training, education, and doctrine prepare people for the roles they play in
command and control. First, since mission command and control demands initiative and
sound decisionmaking at all levels, training, education, and doctrine must aim at
fostering initiative and improving decisionmaking ability among all Marines. It is not
enough to allow initiative; we must actively encourage and demand an eagerness to
accept responsibility. This means that we must develop an institutional prejudice for
tolerating mistakes of action but not inaction. Training and education should seek to
develop in leaders the pattern-recognition skills that are essential to intuitive
decisionmaking.
Second, training, education, and doctrine must prepare Marines to function effectively
in varying environments amid uncertainty and disorder and with limited time. Exercise
scenarios should purposely include elements of disorder and uncertainty—an
unexpected development or mission change, as examples. Field exercises and command
post exercises should purposely include disruption of command and control, for
example, "destruction" of a main command post or loss of communications during a
critical phase of an evolution. Planning exercises should incorporate severe time limits
to simulate stress and tempo. As Field Marshal Erwin Rommel said, "A commander
must accustom his staff to a high tempo from the outset, and continuously keep them
up to it." Third, education and training should teach the appropriate use of techniques
and procedures. Training should provide techniques and procedures which emphasize
flexibility, speed, and adaptability—fast and simple staff planning models, for example.
Education should provide an understanding of when to apply different techniques and
procedures—when to use intuitive or analytical decisionmaking techniques, for
example.
Last and perhaps most important, training, education, and doctrine should provide a
shared ethos, common experiences, and a shared way of thinking as the basis for the
trust, cohesion, and implicit communication that are essential to maneuver warfare
command and control. They should establish a common perspective on how Marines
approach the problems of command and control.
PROCEDURES
We must recognize that procedures apply only to rote or mechanical tasks. They are not
acts of judgment, nor are they meant to replace the need for judgment. The purpose of
procedures "is not to restrict human judgment, but to free it for the tasks only it can
perform." 6 We must keep in mind that procedures are merely tools to be used,
modified, or discarded as the situation requires. They are not rules which we must
follow slavishly.
Our command and control procedures should be designed for simplicity and speed.
They should be designed for simplicity so that we can master them easily and perform
them quickly and smoothly under conditions of extreme stress. They should be designed
for speed so that we can generate tempo. Streamlined staff planning sequences, for
example, are preferable to deliberate, elaborate ones. The standard should be simple
models which we can expand if time and circumstances permit, rather than inherently
complicated models which we try to compress when time is short—which is likely to
be most of the time. As Second World War German General Hermann Balck used to
say to his staff, "Don’t work hard, work fast."
MANPOWER
Since people are the first and driving element of our command and control system,
effective manpower management is essential to command and control. Since mission
command and control relies heavily on individual skills and judgment, our manpower
management system should recognize that all Marines of a given grade are not
interchangeable and should seek to put the right person in the right billet based on
specific ability and temperament. Additionally, the manpower management system
should seek to achieve personnel stability within units and staffs as a means of fostering
the cohesion, teamwork, and implicit understanding that are vital to mission command
and control. We recognize that casualties in war will take a toll on personnel stability,
but the greater stability a unit has initially, the better it will absorb those casualties and
incorporate replacements.
ORGANIZATION
The general aims of organization with regard to command and control should be to
create unity of effort, reasonable spans of control, cohesive mission teams, and effective
information distribution. Organization should not inhibit communications in any way
but instead should facilitate the rapid distribution of information in all directions and
should provide feedback channels. In general, we should take a flexible approach to
organization, maintaining the capability to task-organize our forces to suit the situation
which might include the creation of nonstandard and temporary task groupings.
However, the commander must reconcile this desire for organizational flexibility with
the need to create implicit understanding and mutual trust which are the product of
familiarity and stable working relationships.
Mission command and control requires the creation of self-reliant task groups capable
of acting semiautonomously. By task-organizing into self-reliant task groups, we
increase each commander’s freedom of action and at the same time decrease the need
for centralized coordination of support.
We should seek to strike a balance between "width" and "depth" so that the organization
is suited to the particular situation. The aim is to flatten the organization to the greatest
extent compatible with reasonable spans of control. Commanders should have the
flexibility to eliminate or bypass selected echelons of command or staff as appropriate
in order to improve operational tempo. Additionally, it is not necessary that all echelons
of command exercise all functions of command. Just as we task-organize our force, so
should we task-organize our command and control structure.
A word is in order about the size of staffs. The larger and more compartmented the staff,
the more information it requires to function. This increase in information in turn
requires an even larger staff, and the result is a spiraling increase in size. However, the
larger a command and control organization, the longer it generally takes that
organization to perform its functions. In the words of General William T. Sherman, "A
bulky staff implies a division of responsibility, slowness of action and indecision,
whereas a small staff implies activity and concentration of purpose." 7 Also, a large
staff takes up more space, emits a larger electromagnetic signature, and is less mobile
than a small one, and consequently is more vulnerable to detection and attack. A large
staff, with numerous specialists, may be more capable of detailed analysis and planning
than a small one, but we have already established that we generally value speed and
agility over precision and certainty. We should therefore seek to keep the size of staffs
to a minimum in order to facilitate a high operating tempo and to minimize the space
and facilities that the headquarters requires. The ideal staff would be so austere it could
not exercise fully detailed command and control.
Equipment, to include facilities, is an integral part of any command and control support
structure, but we must re- member that it is only one component. As we have mentioned,
there are two dangers in regard to command and control equipment, the first being an
overreliance on technology and the second being a failure to make proper use of
technological capabilities. The aim is to strike a balance that gets the most out of our
equipment and at the same time integrates technology properly with the other
components of the system.
We believe very strongly that the object of technology is not to reduce the role of people
in the command and control process, but rather to enhance their performance—although
technology should allow us to decrease the number of people involved in the process.
As a first priority, equipment and facilities should be user-friendly. Technology should
seek to automate routine functions which machines can accomplish more efficiently
than people in order to free people to focus on the aspects of command and control
which require judgment and intuition. We may even use technology to assist us in those
human activities so long as we do not make the mistake of trying to replace the person
who can think with the machine that cannot.
Command and control equipment should help improve the flow and value of
information within the system. But as we have said repeatedly, improving information
is not simply a matter of increasing volume; it is also a matter of quality, timing,
location, and form. To the greatest extent possible, communications equipment should
connect principals directly, minimizing the need for specialized operators. Additionally,
equipment should minimize the input burden placed on people; ideally, the input of
information into the system should be automatic. Last, but hardly least, technological
developments should focus on presenting information in a way that is most useful to
humans—that is, in the form of meaningful visual images rather than lists of data.
As with all the components of our command and control support structure, our
command and control equipment should be consistent with our overall approach to
command and control. For example, equipment that facilitates or encourages the
micromanagement of subordinate units is inconsistent with our command and control
philosophy. Moreover, such technological capability tends to fix the senior’s attention
at too low a level of detail. A regimental commander, for example, does not as a rule
need to keep track of the movements of every squad (although with position-locating
technology it may be a temptation); a regimental commander needs a more general
appreciation for the flow of action. Commanders who focus at too low a level of detail
(whether because the technology tempts them to or not) risk losing sight of the larger
picture.
The reality of technological development is that equipment which improves the ability
to monitor what is happening may also increase the temptation and the means to try to
direct what is happening. Consequently, increased capability on the part of equipment
brings with it the need for increased understanding and discipline on the part of users.
Just because our technology allows us to micromanage does not mean that we should.
CONCLUSION
Our approach to command and control recognizes and accepts war as a complex,
uncertain, disorderly, and time-competitive clash of wills and seeks to provide the
commander the best means to win in that environment. We seek to exploit trust,
cooperation, judgment, focus, and implicit understanding to lessen the effects of the
uncertainty and friction that are consequences of war’s nature. We rely on mission
command and control to provide the flexibility and responsiveness to deal with
uncertainty and to generate the tempo which we recognize is a key element of success
in war. We focus on the value and timeliness of information, rather than on the amount,
and on getting that information to the right people in the right form. We seek to strike
a workable balance among people, procedures, and technology, but we recognize that
our greatest command and control resource is the common ethos and the resulting bond
shared by all Marines.
Chapter 4
The 5 Pillars of Command and Control Warfare
The way of the warrior is to master the virtue of his weapons. -Myamoto Mushaski
Command and control warfare is the military strategy that implements information
warfare on the battlefield and integrates physical destruction into its litany of available
tools. Its objective is to "decapitate the enemy's command structure from its body of
combat forces."1 Tools used to perform this task, which can be referred to as the "five
pillars of C2W," include operations security, military deception, psychological
operations, electronic warfare, and physical destruction.
The key considerations underlying this strategy are that commanders must protect the
command and control of deployed friendly forces while at the same time seeking to
deny, deceive, disrupt, or, if necessary, destroy the command and control capabilities
of the enemy. The goal of this action is to get inside the decision-making cycle of the
opponent, thus forcing the enemy to lose the initiative and resort to a reactive mode of
operation. Prior to the fall of the Berlin Wall and the collapse of communism, allied
forces did not target the command and control of enemy forces to "prevent" escalation.
That focus meant that the enemy had the initiative and the opportunity to exploit his
highly valuable strategic and tactical advantage.
Today, nations must realize that previous focus was shortsighted. Without effective
command and control, units will be forced to commence autonomous operations that,
while locally may be very effective, in the long run will lose the synergistic advantage
of units fighting as a coordinated whole. For this reason, commanders must make the
denial, disruption, deception, and, if necessary, the destruction of the enemy
commander and his deployed command and control structure a primary objective. By
denying both command and control, friendly forces will gain an unpredictable, fleeting
advantage which can be exploited via operations security, military deception,
psychological operations, electronic warfare, and physical destruction. In the next few
pages, we will take a closer look That only five pillars are included in the present C2W
construct should not be considered as a limitation.
As new techniques or capabilities are developed and perfected they should be added by
the war fighter just like arrows in a quiver.
OPERATIONS SECURITY
First, we will look at Operations Security, the most passive of the five and the one that
is useful in any given situation ranging from peacetime to war. Operations Security
OPSEC is a process used for denying adversaries information about friendly intentions,
capabilities, or limitations. 2 It does this by identifying which actions can be observed
by an enemy collection system, determining which indicators 22 could be interpreted
or pieced together to derive friendly intent, and then developing and employing selected
measures that "eliminate" or reduce friendly vulnerabilities to such actions.3 Used
correctly, OPSEC is an excellent means to achieve strategic or tactical surprise.
Combined with deception, some elements of electronic warfare, and/or psychological
operations, OPSEC can be used to conceal friendly preparations for crisis or war.
Not systems dependent, the OPSEC process can protect US and allied forces from an
enemy C2W strategy, identify friendly actions that an adversary can observe, determine
indicators that an adversary could use to "derive critical information," and develop and
execute measures that eliminate or reduce friendly vulnerabilities to exploitation by
adversary collection means.5 It implies bringing along a "red" team in development of
a friendly C2W strategy. Applicable at every level and the responsibility of all
Department of Defense personnel, OPSEC provides for the protection of friendly
decision systems from enemy counter command and control efforts.6 During the
Persian Gulf War, OPSEC, combined with the other tools of C2W and an unrelenting
strategic air campaign, allowed the allies to move virtually undetected over 130,000
armed troops in preparation for the ground campaign.
From the command level, because of the effectiveness of this integrated effort, US and
allied forces were told to mount up in their vehicles, turn on their headlights, stay off
the radios, follow the flashing lights, and head north.7 This is a markedly different
situation from what occurred during the Vietnam conflict when B-52 bombers attacking
the northern portion of Vietnam had their flight plans passed to the North Vietnamese
air control facility in Hanoi. Included in these flight plans were details regarding the
time and place of proposed entry into the country, the number of aircraft in the
formation, and what their squawks would be. If the Vietnamese had a more effective
air defense network, crews following these questionable procedures may have been shot
down like ducks in a shooting gallery.
MILITARY DECEPTION
Military deception involves actions taken to mislead enemy decision makers or protect
friendly capabilities. Its stated goal is to cause the enemy decision maker to respond in
a manner that assists in the accomplishment of friendly objectives.9 During the
American Revolutionary War, Gen George Washington used military deception to
offset the numerical superiority of his British opponents. An example of this deception
was the use of fabricated documents to convince the British that his 3,000-strong army
at Philadelphia was "actually" 40,000. This deception, which included allowing
American couriers to be captured so that the "fabricated documents" could fall into
enemy hands and inserting forged documents into temporarily detained British
diplomatic pouches, provides an excellent example of how similar tactics could be used
on the battlefield."
During World War I, Colonel, later General, George Catlett Marshall did the detailed
planning for the Belfort Ruse, a comprehensive deception operation that ensured that
surprise was achieved during the first all-American offensive at Saint-Mihiel.11 By
1941, deception, as a mission area, had been relegated to the intelligence directorate in
the War Department, an asset poor support area, which would explain its strategic
disuse by US forces in the early portion of World War II. It was not until 1943 that the
British, our coalition allies, were able to gain American interest in this fine art that they
had learned by close study of the American Civil War campaigns of Confederate Gen
Thomas ("Stonewall") Jackson. General Jackson, during his short time as a leader in
the Confederate army, employed a large array of these same ruses-and coordinated them
with Gen Robert E. Lee's overall strategy.
During the Persian Gulf War, deception played a large part in the success of coalition
forces. During Desert Shield, Iraq was exposed to weekly aircraft sortie surges o-
periodic mass tanker launches that desensitized Iraqi collection assets a,,& decision
makers to the key indicators and actions that could have warned them that a coalition
attack was imminent. Likewise, the continuous use of amphibious rehearsals and
exercises along the Persian Gulf and associated deception operations convinced the
Iraqis that the coalition's primary intent was to mount an _amphibious assault and, thus,
they were not prepared when the coalition executed the "end around play" to the west.
Ideally, military deception will be used to inject ambiguity into the decision-making
processes of the enemy. The various means available to employ military deception
include portraying false friendly intentions, capabilities, and dispositions.
Key factors are:
1. The deception must have an objective,
2. The targeted enemy commander must have the decision authority to make the
desired decision,
3. a story complete with a notional order of battle must be available to back up the
executed deception, and
4. a means must exist to evaluate the effectiveness of the ongoing deception as the
scenario progresses.
PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS
Psychological operations convey specific information and indicators to an adversary
audience to affect or influence their "emotions, motives, objective reasoning, . . . and
behavior." Their objective is to cause or reinforce attitudes and behavior that will result
in the favorable attainment of friendly objectives. When used properly, PSYOP can
lower morale, reduce the efficiency of enemy forces, and cause "dissidence and
disaffection within their ranks.
As in military deception, psychological operations require extensive information from
intelligence sources regarding the location and identity of the target, their vulnerabilities
and susceptibilities, and existing "political, economic, social, cultural, and historic
conditions within the target area."17 PSYOP tools include political and diplomatic
communiques, leaflet drops, loudspeaker broadcasts, and "other means of transmitting
information" and 24 can be used to gain a strategic advantage or simply to encourage
enemy forces to "defect, desert, flee, or surrender."' 8 Taken alone, PSYOP can be a
very effective tool on the battlefield. When combined with physical destruction and
military deception, it can be extremely effective. Historically, US military interest in
psychological operations has been episodic at best. Following the success of Marshall's
Belfort Ruse during World War I, the War Department failed to establish a
psychological warfare point of contact in the interwar years from 1918 to 1941. During
World War II, the focus of US psychological operations evolved to a focus on the
dissemination of propaganda to "undermine the enemy's will to resist, demoralize his
forces and sustain the morale" of friendly supporters.'
Despite the success of these efforts during World Wars I and II, in the 1960s and 1970s
US capabilities to conduct psychological operations became seriously eroded.
Examples of this erosion included the lack of PSYOP trained officers to man the unit
when the 6th PSYOP Battalion was activated in 1965 and an active component that was
understrength, overcommitted, inadequately trained, and poorly equipped when
President Ronald Reagan took office in 1981.20 Following his election to office in
1980, President Reagan published an initial national security strategy that focused on
four basic components including information as a source of national power.
This refined focus led in 1984 to a presidential directive for the Department of Defense
to rebuild its military PSYOP capability and in 1985 the approval of a DOD PSYOP
Master Plan.21 During Desert Storm, PSYOP was used with spectacular success by US
and coalition forces. Perhaps the most vivid example was the employment of pamphlets
and leaflets combined with hard-kill assets like the BLU-82. These 15,000-pound
bombs, which were used to blast a path through Iraqi ground defenses, were considered
by PSYOP units as a means to cause mass defections within the ground forces of the
Iraqis. Successfully integrated with pre- and postdrop leaflet efforts, the psychological
impact of this highly destructive conventional attack was "a dramatic increase in the
number of defectors crossing the line to surrender."
An important aspect of psychological operations on today's battlefield is that the
message conveyed to an adversary must be based on fact, should be verifiable by
whatever means the adversary has available, and must consider the perceptions and
considerations of those who are targeted. If the enemy does not believe the message
conveyed or friendly forces cannot carry out the implied threat or stated action, then the
effectiveness of PSYOP will be greatly diminished.
ELECTRONIC WARFARE
Electronic warfare (EW) is any military action that involves the use of "electromagnetic
or directed energy" to attack an enemy or control the electromagnetic spectrum. Its three
major subdivisions are electronic attack (EA), electronic protection (EP), and electronic
warfare support (ES). The electromagnetic spectrum is "the entire range of wavelengths
or frequencies of electromagnetic radiation extending from gamma rays to the longest
radio waves and including visible light." The offensive arm of electronic warfare is
electronic attack. It involves the use of electromagnetic or directed energy "to attack
personnel, facilities, or equipment with the intent of degrading, neutralizing, or
destroying enemy combat capabilities." It includes actions taken to prevent the enemy's
use of the electromagnetic spectrum and employment of hard-kill weapons, like bombs
or missiles, that use either electromagnetic or directed energy to destroy targets.
Previously called electronic countermeasures (ECM), electronic attack employs either
hard-kill destructive agents like antiradiation missiles and directedenergy weapons or
soft-kill actions like electronic jamming or electronic deception to meet its targeting
goals. In either case, each action involves a targeting decision in which the cost and
benefit of employing the available means is weighed against the thought that perhaps
the selected target mnay be irrelevant to the task at hand and thus can be ignored.
The defensive arm of electronic warfare is electronic protection. It includes "actions
taken to protect personnel, facilities, and equipment from any effects of friendly or
enemy employment of electronic warfare."Examples of activities that are included in
electronic protection include the deconfliction of assigned communications frequencies
and clearance for jamming activities. The final division of electronic warfare is
electronic warfare support. It "provides information required for immediate decisions
involving electronic warfare operations and other tactical action such as threat
avoidance, targeting, and homing."During Desert Shield, US EP-3 and RC-135 aircraft
monitored Iraqi radar and communication networks to identify which nodes appeared
to be critical and the value each added to their assigned network.
This intense collection of Iraqi emissions allowed the coalition's planning staff to
develop the integrated counter-C2 campaign that was extremely successful in the early
portion of the air war.29 The success of this effort helped the coalition air forces gain
air supremacy as the conflict widened in intensity. Prior to Desert Storm, electronic
warfare was considered the primary soft-kill option of C2W. With its focus on
electronically jamming the enemy's communications and electronic sensors, it was
effective in disrupting the Iraqi command and control system, limiting its ability to
gather accurate information and to transmit decisions. Since the war, EW, with its
addition of a hard-kill capability, has become more offensive in outlook. It is no longer
just self-protection or a defensive jamming suite installed on an ingressing aircraft.
Today, in conjunction with the other pillars of C2W, EW can be used to introduce
delays into the enemy's decision-making cycle and decrease the reliability of the
information being collected by the enemy's intelligence assets, thus making their
perception of the evolving situation more suspect and the chosen course of action
probably more suspect.
PHYSICAL DESTRUCTION
Physical destruction requires the ability to identify, locate, and prioritize enemy targets
accurately and then to destroy them select;.bely. While physical destruction is arguably
the best way to delay command and control to the enemy, it can also be a great waste
of critical resources. C2W remains a strategy of options. In many cases, the use of
destructive means, such as bombs, artillery, or torpedoes, may not be the best solution.
'I.he idea is to integrate disruptive means, such as deception or jamming, without
expending large numbers of limited destructive resources. In some cases, hard kill may
not be required.32 During the Falklands War, except for a few Vulcan bombers
employing antiradiation missiles against radar sites located near Stanley, the British had
only a limited hard-kill capability to suppress Argentinean radar-directed ground fire.
This meant that despite being rapidly equipped with chaff and flare dispensers and some
active electronic countermeasures equipment, British Harriers were "regularly attacked
by heavy and accurate [radar-directed] ground fire." This, in turn, led the British
government and military to conclude in their lessons learned that there is a need for
local area suppression of enemy defenses. 33 Ideally, C2W targets can be separated into
targets which can be ignored, targets which can be suppressed through nonlethal means,
and targets which should be attacked. Once the decision is made to attack a target using
lethal munitions, the next question is which targets can be effectively suppressed by
attacking their sensors using antiradiation munitions and which targets must be
destroyed using hard-kill weaponry.
Once this decision is made, the proposed mission, with its optimized selection of
support assets, can be tasked and executed as assigned. Interrelationships Heraclitus of
Ephesus in the sixth century B.C. noted that 'if you do not expect the unexpected, you
will not find it."34 During the German invasion of the Soviet Union in June 1941, the
Germans recognized, but the Russians did not, various exploitable deficiencies in the
existing Soviet command and control system. Employing the various tools of C2W in
an interrelated fashion, the Germans were able to effectively disrupt, exploit, and
destroy the Soviet C2 system.
Using weapons built for that purpose, the Germans attacked the various elements of the
Soviet system by air, artillery, and sabotage. The results of these attacks were startling.
Due to cross-border German sabotage efforts, many of the Soviet units "did not receive
the war alert order when it was issued [from Moscow] on the night of 20-21 June 1941."
By 24 June, large gaps had already been torn in the Soviet communications network
thus forcing commanders to rely on easily exploitable unprotected radio networks. This,
in turn, led to the successful targeting of 27 exposed command posts and associated
units throughout the theater. These attacks, because of their effectiveness, led Soviet
commanders to prohibit the use of radios because they might give their positions away.
The synergistic effects of the coordinated use of the five pillars of C2W provide
commanders with the potential to deliver a decisive blow against an adversary both
before and after the outbreak of armed conflict. C2W allows commanders to observe
the situation, orient available forces to meet the perceived threat, and act in a quick and
effective manner (fig. 9). OPSEC, military deception, and PSYOP, when used together,
can effectively disrupt an enemy's perception of friendly intentions.
Physical destruction and electronic warfare, when used together, give a commander an
extended list of options regarding which targets should be destroyed and which targets
can be ignored. Intelligence and communications, the bedrock of the five pillars of
C2W, are critical today and will remain so for the foreseeable future. Commanders
can attain maximum military effectiveness when they integrate the employment of
all five pillars of C2W. It is also important to emphasize that in every case the best
option is to use the best mix of available assets to support the commander's concept of
operations. The key capabilities for recognizing this opportunity are intelligence and
communications. COUNTER COMMAND] [COMMAND AND AND CONTROL
CONTROL PROTECTION (COUNTE R-C2) (C2-PROTEC TION) OFFENSIVEI
DEFENSIVE ++ PHYSICAL MILITARY PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS
ELECTRONIC ++ DESTRUCTION DECEPTION OPERATIONS (PSYOP)
SECURITY WARFARE (EW) (OPSEC) INTELLIGENCE INFRASTRUCTURE /
COMMUNICATIONS INFRASTRUCTURE Figure 9. The Command and Control
Warfare Umbrella Intelligence In order for the five C2W tools to be effective,
intelligence must be integrated at the tactical, operational, and strategic levels and used
as part of campaign planning. Mutually supportive, intelligence enhances C2W effects
against the enemy. The intelligence must be timely to support the curre mission.
Out of date or inaccurate data could lead to disaster for the commander's overall
mission. Since it is the adversary's situations, intentions, and capabilities that are
targeted, time and accuracy is of the essence.
Achieving this accuracy and timeliness requires all-source intelligence and support
from all available intelligence-related agencies. Sources include human intelligence
(HUMINT), signals intelligence (SIGINT), imagery intelligence (IMINT), and
photographic intelligence (PHOTINT) provided not only by defense agencies but by
analysis centers and scientific and technical intelligence production centers.
Intelligence is the end product that results from the "collection, processing, integration,
analysis, evaluation and interpretation of available information [emphasis added].
A key distinction is the difference between data, which are the "representation of facts,
concepts, or instructions in a formalized manner," and information, which is
"unevaluated material of every description." This key distinction makes it readily
apparent why well-trained intelligence personnel, no matter how greatly their collection
functions are automated, are a critical requirement for war fighters in the field.
Intelligence, like command and control warfare, is a thinking person's activity. Without
the critical "man in the loop" it becomes a useless regurgitation of previously reported
"facts" that may or may not be relevant.
An early example of how a responsive intelligence capability enabled one side to use
tools of C2W, in this case deception and psychological operations, against two
substantial opponents occurred in 1094 when the emperor of Byzantine, Alexis, used
visual and verbal deception to deceive Raymond, a crusader, and the Turks during the
siege of Nicaea. Raymond, full of crusading zeal, was convinced that the city of Nicaea,
then occupied by the Turks, was an "outpost of the anti-Christ" and thus a reasonable
target for siege. Alexis, wanting Nicaea for himself and not wanting to be drawn into a
religious war with the Turks, set about to gain Nicaea.
First, at Raymond's request, Alexis supplied the crusaders with a fleet of ships and a
detachment of archers whose presence convinced the Turks that they should evacuate
the city. Then, he encouraged the crusaders to encircle the walls of Nicaea and attack
at sunrise while Alexis's fleet attacked from the lake. Unknown to the crusaders, based
on a previous arrangement, Alexis's waterborne warriors were admitted into the city
without a fight and the Turks prepared to abandon Nicaea. The next morning, after the
crusaders once again swarmed to attack, the banners and standards of Byzantine were
soon displayed all along the walls of Nicaea. Assuming that Nicaea had fallen under
Alexis's assault from the lake, the crusaders withdrew to their tents and rejoiced at the
great victory. Thus, empowered by his much more effective intelligence capability,
Alexis was able to placate both the Turks and the crusaders and achieve his desired
goal, the possession of the unravished Nicaea.
During World War II, information obtained through signals intelligence was fused with
other sources to prove the German vulnerability in oil. Based on these data, Gen Dwight
D. Eisenhower (in May 1944) made oil the targeted center of gravity. The impact of
this decision, from Germany's point of view, was catastrophic. As Albert Speer said, "It
meant the end of German armament production." Lessons regarding the applicability of
intelligence to the five pillars of C2W that arise out of the above examples include (1)
a firm foundation of intelligence support to operations is critical, (2) timely intelligence
support requires preparations focused on meeting the needs of the supported unit, (3)
success depends on good intelligence and the intelligence collector's ability to
communicate that intelligence to the decision makers at each level of war, and (4) all of
these efforts must be focused on the commander's intent.
It is important that intelligence agencies have a basic understanding of the commander's
operational plans and objectives. It is equally important that commanders and operators
1understand the basic capabilities and limitations of the intelligence agencies that
provide them support (fig. 10). At Nicaea, Alexis had the intelligence support necessary
to support his operational goals and the communications dominance necessary to make
these goals a reality.
By 1944, intelligence had provided General Eisenhower the conclusive evidence he
needed to confirm that the primary vulnerability of the German war-fighting machine
was its reliance on scarce oil resources. PHYSICAL ELECTRONIC OPERATIONS
MILITARY PSYCHOLOGICAL DESTRUCTION WARFARE SECURITY
DECEPTION OPERATIONS Target location Friendly Identification of Identification
of identification vulnerability deception targets enemy Electronic assessments
perceptions, Target location preparation of the Selection of strengths, and battlefield
Identification of C2 believable story vulnerabilities Time for optimal (enemy C2W)
attack Frequencies, threat Identification of Selection of a critical nodes, enemy order of
focus for PSYOP Battle damage modulations, and Denial of friendly battle to include
campaign efforts assessment link distances capabilities and intelligence intentions
collection system Identification of Intelligence Time for optimal enemy order of
preparation of the attack Evaluation of Placement of battle to include battlefield
deception efforts assets key commanders Battle damage and their assessment
Analysis/feedback associated C2 support systems Joint restricted frequency list
Placement of assets Analysis/feedback Figure 10. Intelligence Support to Command
and Control Warfare Intelligence is critical to C2W planning and execution. In striving
to achieve information dominance, the commander's goal is to extend the adversary's
decision-making and execution activity beyond that of friendly processes.
Intelligence assessments of vulnerabilities of command and control targets allow
planners to identify and select the appropriate tools for C2W operations. Intelligence
monitoring activities, prior to and during a military operation, provide planners with the
necessary information to tailor operations and to gauge the effectiveness of the overall
campaign. Estimates of adversary capabilities to exploit friendly vulnerabilities allow
planners to determine priorities of hostile targets while increasing protective measures.
43 Communications During World War I, the radio was the means to extend the
tentacles of command and control on the battlefield.
In response to this fact, various nations, including France, Austria, and the United
Kingdom established special units whose primary purpose was to exploit intercepted
radio message traffic. Throughout the war, the Russians cooperated in this effort by not
encoding their message traffic. This failure to practice reasonable communications or
operations security procedures led to the German victory over the Russians at the Battle
of Tannenberg. During the buildup to the battle, the Austrians intercepted and passed
to the Germans the entire Russian order of battle. This allowed the Germans to
preposition their forces to achieve maximum effectiveness at crucial points during the
ensuing battle.44 During the Persian Gulf War, another communications failure, ii this
case an "information glut," threatened US and coalition operations. In Riyadh alone,
over 7,000 personnel worked to put out a daily 300-page, 2,000-plus sortie air tasking
order.
This along with thousands of other "operationally essential" pieces of message traffic
sometimes resulted in a 70,000-message backlog which meant that even the highest
priority '"flash" messages took four or five days to deliver.45 This information glut
made it difficult for intelligence analysts to provide timely battle damage assessment
reports to the operational personnel who prepared the next day's air tasking order. This
meant in many cases targets that had been previously damaged or destroyed were either
retargeted or restricted. Also, in numerous cases, EF-111A and EA-6B aircraft
providing standoff jamming support were tasked to jam acquisition and threat radar
sites that no longer existed. This failure to perceive and communicate a change in the
existing electronic order of battle often meant that other equally high-priority threat
signals were possibly left uncovered and that, in a worst case, a supported aircraft may
have been shot down.