Lecture 10 - E-Voting and Public Policy
Lecture 10 - E-Voting and Public Policy
g Democracyy
Lecture 10 | E‐Voting
g and Public Policyy
J. Alex Halderman
University of Michigan
10.1 Election Policy in the U.S. Securing Digital Democracy
St t L
State Laws
Lack of uniformityy or consistencyy
Antiquated
t quated rules
u es
10.1 Election Policy in the U.S. Securing Digital Democracy
Requirements:
“Shake
Shake and bake
bake” tests
Weak software standards
Extremely weak security standards
10.1 Election Policy in the U.S. Securing Digital Democracy
10.1 Election Policy in the U.S. Securing Digital Democracy
H
Help
l AAmerica
i V Vote
t AActt (HAVA)
Replace
p p
punched cards and lever machines
>$2 billion to provided to states
Passed in 2002;; Deadline in 2006
V l t
Voluntary V
Voting
ti S System
t G
Guidelines
id li (VVSG)
Technical Guidelines Development Committee, managed by NIST
2005 Guidelines – became effective in 2007
Much more detailed guidelines
g
Large loopholes (e.g., COTS, doesn’t require paper trail)
Th Holt
The H lt Legislation
L i l ti
Require
q a voter‐verified p
paper
p record
(Later: a voter marked paper ballot)
Prohibit undisclosed software
Prohibit Internet connection
Mandatory random audits
State‐by‐State
State by State Efforts
I d
Independent
d t Testing
T ti Authorities
A th iti (ITAs)
(ITA )
Majority
j y of states incorporate
p Federal g
guidelines
Require machines to be tested for compliance by ITAs
pp
Small number of approved private companies
p p
A
Approaches
h tot Security
S it Testing
T ti
Conformance Testing Open ended Testing
Open‐ended
Checklist approach Adversarial approach
Mechanical inspection and Creative application of
application of tools security mindset
Presence of required Presence of exploitable
mechanisms vulnerabilities
10.2 Testing and Certification Securing Digital Democracy
Conformance Testing
ITA Certification
Open‐ended Testing
SAIC Report
R Ohi EVEREST
Ohio
10.3 Recommendations Securing Digital Democracy
Recommendations
10.3 Recommendations Securing Digital Democracy
St
Strengthened,
th d Uniform
U if Standards
St d d
Cover entire election system,
y not jjust equipment
q p
Address accuracy, security, accessibility, usability, transparency
Require public reporting and disclosure of problems
10.3 Recommendations Securing Digital Democracy
El ti Ad
Election Administration
i i t ti
Ensure transparency
p y and p
public p
participation
p
Provide adequate resources to election officials
Reduce number of races,
races simplify ballot design
10.3 Recommendations Securing Digital Democracy
R ti T
Routine Testing
ti and
d Auditing
A diti
Auditabilityy must be a technical requirement
q
Mandate realistic pre‐election testing of usability and function
Mandate risk‐limiting
risk limiting post‐election
post election audits to high confidence
Allow time to conduct audits and recounts before certification
10.3 Recommendations Securing Digital Democracy
C
Conservative
ti A Approach
h tto New
N Technology
T h l
Internet voting
g should be p
prohibited for the foreseeable future
Ensure new technology really solves an actual problem
Open technology to realistic,
realistic public,
public independent review
and simulated adversarial testing
S stems used
Systems sed for counting
co nting votes
otes must
m st be soft
software
are independent
10.3 Recommendations Securing Digital Democracy
L
Learn M
More V l t
Volunteer V t !
Vote!
about election security as a poll worker or and carefully watch
issues; links from the election observer; apply the process as you do;
course are a start the
h security mindset
d b a micro‐observer
be b
Securing g Digital
g Democracyy
Lecture 10 | E‐Voting
g and Public Policyy
J. Alex Halderman
University of Michigan