POSSESSION

DE LUNA vs. CA
Possession of a lessor redounds to the benefit of the owner since
possession may be exercised in one's own name or in that of another. The owner
then may file an action for forcible entry against a usurper.
If petitioner can prove prior possession in himself, he may recover such
possession from even the owner himself. Whatever may be the character of his
prior possession, if he has in his favor priority of time, he has the security that
entitles him to stay on the property until he is lawfully ejected by a person having
a better right by either accion publiciana or accion reivindicatoria.

GARCIA vs. CA
The records show that GARCIA occupied the property not in the concept of
an owner for his stay was merely tolerated by his parents. An owner's act of
allowing another to occupy his house, rent-free does not create a permanent and
indefeasible right of possession in the latter's favor.
Possession and ownership are distinct legal concepts. Ownership exists
when a thing pertaining to one person is completely subjected to his will in a
manner not prohibited by law and consistent with the rights of others. Ownership
confers certain rights to the owner, one of which is the right to dispose of the
thing by way of sale. Atty. Pedro Garcia and his wife Remedios exercised their
right to dispose of what they owned when they sold the subject property to the
SPOUSES MAGPAYO.
On the other hand, possession is defined as the holding of a thing or the
enjoyment of a right. Literally, to possess means to actually and physically
occupy a thing with or without right. Under Art. 542 of the Civil Code, possession
may be had in one of two ways: possession in the concept of an owner and
possession of a holder. A possessor in the concept of an owner may be the owner
himself or one who claims to be so. On the other hand, one who possesses as a
mere holder acknowledges in another a superior right which he believes to be
ownership, whether his belief be right or wrong.

MANGAHAS vs. CA
Acquisition of ownership under the law on prescription cannot be pleaded in
support of MANGAHAS' submission that subject land has ipso jure become his private
property.
MAGLUCOT-AU vs. MAGLUCOT
RESPONDENTS only possessed Lot D in the concept of a holder for the
reason that they had been paying rent as lessees thereon. Had they been of the
belief that they were co-owners of the entire Lot 1639, they would not have paid
rent. One who possesses as a mere holder acknowledges in another, a superior
right which he believes to be ownership, whether his belief be right or wrong.

EMBRADO vs. CA
The rule is settled that a buyer of real property which is in the possession
of persons other than the seller must be wary and should investigate the rights of
those in possession. Otherwise, without such inquiry, the buyer can hardly be
regarded as a buyer in good faith.

DBP vs.CA
Good faith of the possessor ceases when an action to recover possession
of the property is filed against him and he is served summons therefore. In the
present case, DBP was served summons in 1982. By that time, it was no longer in
possession of the disputed land as possession thereof was given back to the
PIÑEDAS after the foreclosure of DBP was declared null and void.
Therefore, any income collected by DBP after it consolidated its title and
took possession of the property in 1978 up to 1982 belonged to DBP as a
possessor in good faith since its possession was never legally interrupted.
By law and jurisprudence, a mistake upon a doubtful or difficult question of
law may properly be the basis of good faith.

EQUATORIAL REALTY vs. MAYFAIR THEATER

Although there was a constructive delivery of the property through a Deed
of Sale in favor of EQUATORIAL, it was not consummated since MAYFAIR, which
was in control and actual possession of it, impugned the sale in court. Hence, no
back rentals in favor of EQUATORIAL may be granted.
Ownership of the thing sold is a real right, which is not transferred by the
contract alone but the buyer acquires only upon delivery of the thing to. Delivery
may be actual or constructive.
 The sale to EQUATORIAL may have been valid from inception, but it was
judicially rescinded before it could be consummated. EQUATORIAL never
acquired ownership, not because the sale was void, as erroneously claimed by
the trial court, but because the sale was not consummated by a legally effective
delivery of the property sold.

WONG vs. CARPIO

Although a person purchased the land and was in actual possession
thereof, the sale could not have been consummated by reason of a prior deed of
sale over the property in favor of another. Said prior sale was an impediment for
the consummation of the sale since delivery of the property was impossible.
In fact, it was MERCADO who had material possession of the land and had
subjected it in his will he went there occasionally to make copra. There was also a
proper act and formality in his favor, that was the Pacto de Retro Sale executed
by William Giger in his favor. Wong’s entry to the property was characterized by
force, intimidation, threat, strategy, or stealth.

SOMODIO vs. CA
Possession in the eyes of the law does not mean that a man has to have
his feet on every square meter of ground before it can be said that he is in
possession. It is sufficient that the possessor was able to subject the property to
the action of his will i.e. planting trees and constructing a house though was
unfinished.
Under Art. 531, SOMODIO had possessed the property through material
occupation and having subjected it under his will.

DELA ROSA vs. CARLOS

The law does not require one in possession of a house to reside in the
house to maintain his possession. It is enough that the possessor subjects it to
the action of his will i.e., renovating and furnishing the house and constructing a
perimeter fence on the property.
The SPOUSES DELA ROSA had material possession over the property. The
SPOUSES DELA ROSA also subjected the property to the action of their will.
They renovated the house, furnished the same and constructed a perimeter
fence around the Property. Possession in the eyes of the law does not mean that
a man has to have his feet on every square meter of ground before it can be said
that he is in possession. It is sufficient that the SPOUSES DELA ROSA were able
to subject the property to the action of their will.
The SPOUSES DELA ROSA had a proper act and legal formality in their
favor.

EDCA PUBLISHING VS SANTOS

Art. 559 provides that the possession of movable property acquired in
good faith is equivalent to title (rule of reinvindicability), therefore there is no
need of showing further proof.
Santos acquired the books in good faith, she accepted the ownership of
the books from the EDCA invoice saying that it was sold to DC, who said he was
selling them for a discounted price as he was in financial need.

CEQUENA vs. BOLANTE

If there are 2 possessors of the land, the preferred possessor shall be the
one longer in possession. Possession here shall include not only the actual
possession made by the present possessor but also the possession made by her
predecessor-in-interest.
Based on Article 538 of the Civil Code, BOLANTE was the preferred
possessor because, benefiting from her father's tax declaration of the subject lot
since 1926, she has been in possession thereof for a longer period. On the other
hand, petitioners' father acquired joint possession only in 1952.
Possession acquired and enjoyed in the concept of a holder despite 32
years, could not ripen into ownership. Under Art. 540 of the Civil Code, "Only the
possession acquired and enjoyed in the concept of owner can serve as a title for
acquiring dominion."

SPOUSES RECTO VS. REPUBLIC

Before one can register his title over a parcel of land, the applicant must
show that – (a) he, by himself or through his predecessors-ininterest, has been in
open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of the
subject land under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945 or earlier;
and (b) the land subject of the application is alienable and disposable land of the
public domain.
 In the instant case, Rosita and Maria the predecessors-in-interest of the
SPOUSES RECTO, categorically testified that they, and prior to them their father,
had been cultivating and possessing Lot 806 in the concept of owners.

HEIRS OF GAMOS vs. HEIRS OF FRANDO

The mere application for a patent, coupled with the fact of exclusive, open,
continuous and notorious possession for the required period is sufficient to vest
in the applicant the grant applied for.
In sum, the application by Juliana Frando for a sales patent, coupled with
her open, exclusive, uninterrupted and notorious possession of the land applied
for is, for all purposes, equivalent to a patent already perfected and granted.

TITONG vs. CA
Titong did not acquire just title over the property because he was in bad
faith. His acts of converting the boundary line (Bugsayon River) into a ricefield
and thereafter claiming ownership thereof were acts constituting deprivation of
the rights of others and therefore "tantamount to bad faith."
Ordinary acquisitive prescription of things requires possession in good
faith and with just title for the time fixed by law. Hence, a prescriptive title to real
estate is not acquired by mere possession thereof under claim of ownership for a
period of ten years unless such possession was acquired with color of title and
good faith.

MARCELO vs. CA
There is, upon the other hand, just title when the adverse claimant comes
into possession of the property through any of the modes recognized by law for
the acquisition of ownership or other real rights, but that the grantor is neither
the owner nor in a position to transmit the right. The possessor only had to prove
colorable title.
Ordinary acquisitive prescription demands, as aforesaid, that the
possession be “in good faith and with just title.” The good faith of the possessor
consists in the reasonable belief that the person from whom the thing is received
has been the owner thereof and could thereby transmit that ownership.
Acquisitive prescription is a mode of acquiring ownership by a possessor
through the requisite lapse of time. In order to ripen into ownership, possession
must be in the concept of an owner, public peaceful and uninterrupted.
Possession, to constitute the foundation of a prescriptive right, must be en
concepto de dueno, or, to use the common law equivalent of the term, that
possession should be adverse; if not, such possessory acts, no matter how long,
do not start the running of the period of prescription.

PADA-KILARIO vs. CA (They are PBF and the kind of expenses they incurred here is
useful. Improvements are considered as useful expenses. So, what are they entitled to?
They are entitled to nothing.)

If a possessor were in possession of the property without paying any rental

as they only relied on the liberality and tolerance of the landowner are not
possessors nor builders in good faith because they know that their occupation of
the premises may be terminated any time. Hence, they are not entitled to
reimbursement of useful expenses.
It is well-settled that both Article 448 and Article 546 of the New Civil Code
which allow full reimbursement of useful improvements and retention of the
premises until reimbursement is made, apply only to a possessor in good faith,
i.e., one who builds on land with the belief that he is the owner thereof. Verily,
persons whose occupation of a realty is by sheer tolerance of its owners are not
possessors in good faith.

CHUA vs. CA
Reimbursement applies only to a possessor in good faith, i.e., one who
builds on a land in the belief that he is the owner thereof. This right does not
apply to a mere lessee, otherwise, it would always be in his power to "improve"
his landlord out of the latter's property.
Art. 448 of the Civil Code, in relation to Art. 546, which provides for full
reimbursement of useful improvements and retention of the premises until
reimbursement is made, applies only to a possessor in good faith, i.e., one who
builds on a land in the belief that he is the owner thereof.

U.S. vs. REY

Property can not be considered abandoned under the law if the possessor
did not know that the thing was lost until the spes recuperand (hope of recovery)i
is gone and the animus revertendi (intention to return) is finally given up.
There was absence of knowledge of the possessor that the thing was lost.
There was still intent on the part of the firms to recover the money.
REQUISITES:
1. That the abandoner must have been a possessor in the concept of an
owner;
2. The capacity to renounce; there must be physical relinquishment of the
thing;
3. No expectancy of recovery or no intent to return; and
4. The abandoner must have knowledge of the loss of his possession or
the thing.

YU vs. DE LARA
Land can never be an abandoned thing, especially registered land.
Indeed, abandonment which according to converts the thing into res
nullius, ownership of which may be acquired by occupation, can hardly apply to
land, as to which said mode of acquisition is not available, let alone to registered
land, to which "no title in derogation to that of the registered owner shall be
acquired by prescription or adverse possession".

DEL ROSARIO vs. LUCENA

A jewelry owner whose jewelries were pawned without her consent cannot
be compelled to reimburse the person to whom it is pawned in order to acquire
possession of the jewelries.
The exceptions to Art. 559 (then Art. 464) are therein contained, namely:
(1) If the possessor of personal property, lost or stolen, has acquired it at a
public sale;
(2) in favor of Montes de Piedad established under authorization of the
Government; and
(3) with regard to things acquired on exchange, or at fairs or markets, or
from a merchant lawfully engaged in similar business.
It was improper to compel DEL ROSARIO to reimburse VERCHES in the
sum P500, which PRAXEDES FLORES obtained through the commission of an
unlawful act, but that it is proper and in accordance with the law to compel
VERCHES to return to the DEL ROSARIO, absolutely and unconditionally, the
jewels in question.
VARELA vs. FINNICK
A pawnshop does not enjoy the privilege established by Art. 559. The
owner of a pawnshop, notwithstanding the fact that he acted in good faith, did not
acquire the Jewels at a public sale. Neither does, a pawnshop enjoy the privilege
granted to a Monte de Piedad. The owner of the jewels who was deprived of the
same in consequence of a crime is entitled to the recovery thereof.

ARENAS vs. RAYMUNDO

Because of the fact that Perello was not the legitimate owner of the jewelry
which she pledged to the Raymundo, the contract of pledge entered into by both
is, of course, null and void. hence, the jewelry so pawned could not serve as
security for the payment of the sum loaned, nor can the latter be collected out of
the value of the said jewelry.
In the case at bar, it was not proven that ARENAS authorized Perello to
pawn the jewelry given to her by Arenas to sell on commission. Because of the
mere fact of Perello's having been convicted and sentenced for estafa, the rest of
the dispositive part of the said sentence must be complied with, that is, the
jewelry misappropriated must be restored to its owner, which was in possession
of the pawnshop of RAYMUNDO, who acquired it by legal means.

AZNAR vs. YAPDIANGCO

If the owner has lost a thing, or if he has been unlawfully deprived of it, he
has a right to recover it, not only from the finder, thief or robber, but also from
third persons who may have acquired it in good faith from such finder, thief or
robber.
Here, TEODORO SANTOS had been illegally deprived of his car through the
ingenious scheme of Marella to enable the latter to dispose of it to AZNAR, as if
he were the owner thereof. TEODORO SANTOS, therefore, could still recover
possession of the car even if it is in the possession of AZNAR who had acquired
it in good faith from Marella. The maxim that "no man can transfer to another a
better title than he had himself" obtains in the civil as well as in the common law.

LEDESMA vs.CA
The sale entered by CITIWIDE and the impostor was valid. CITIWIDE was
not illegally deprived of the car simply because the check in payment therefor
was subsequently dishonored. Hence, the transfer of ownership from the
impostor to LEDESMA was valid as well. LEDESMA had a better right to possess
the vehicle because he was a purchaser in good faith and for value.
It is quite clear that a party who (a) has lost any movable or (b) has been
unlawfully deprived thereof can recover the same from the present possessor
even if the latter acquired it in good faith and has, therefore, title thereto for under
the first sentence of Article 559, such manner of acquisition is equivalent to a
title. There are three (3) requisites to make possession of movable property
equivalent to title, namely: (a) the possession should be in good faith; (b) the
owner voluntarily parted with the possession of the thing; and (c) the possession
is in the concept of owner.
Here, there was a perfected unconditional contract of sale between
CITIWIDE and the original vendee impostor. The former voluntarily caused the
transfer of the certificate of registration of the vehicle in the name of the first
vendee even if the said vendee was represented by someone who used a
fictitious name--and likewise voluntarily delivered the cars and the certificate of
registration to the vendee's alleged representative. Title thereto was forthwith
transferred to the vendee.

USUFRUCTUARY

ELEIZEGUI vs. MANILA LAWN TENNIS CLUB

Usufruct is a right of superior degree to that which arises from a lease. It is
a real right and includes all the jus utendi and jus fruendi. Nevertheless, the
utmost period for which a usufruct can endure, if constituted in favor of a natural
person, is the lifetime of the usufructuary; and if in favor of a juridical person, it
cannot be created for more than thirty years.

ALUNAN vs. VELOSO

It is incorrect to say that there can be no usufruct of money, because it is a
fungible thing.

BACHRACH vs. SEIFERT

 Shares of stocks dividends are civil fruits. The usufructuary then, being
entitled to civil fruits other than natural and industrial fruits shall be entitled to
shares of stocks dividends as well.

OROZCO vs. ALCANTARA

A dividend, whether in the form of cash or stock, is income and,
consequently, should go to the usufructuary, taking into consideration that a
stock dividend as well as a cash dividend can be declared only out of profits of
the corporation, for if it were declared out of the capital it would be a serious
violation of the law.
The stock dividends were income or fruits of the capital which should be
given to and enjoyed by the life usufructuary, OROZCO as his own exclusive
property