Muslim Question in Hitler's Balkans

THE 'MUSLIM QUESTION' IN HITLER'S BALKANS
Author(s): DAVID MOTADEL

Source: The Historical Journal , DECEMBER 2013, Vol. 56, No. 4 (DECEMBER 2013), pp.
1007-1039
Published by: Cambridge University Press
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The Historical Journal, 56, 4 (2013), pp. 1007-1039 © Cambridge University Press 2013
doi: 1 o. 1 o 17/S0018246X13000204
THE 'MUSLIM QUESTION' IN

HITLER'S BALKANS*
DAVID MOTADEL
Gonville and Caius College, Cambridge
abstract. This article examines Germany's efforts to instrume

during the Second World War. As German troops became more invo
1943 onwards, German officials began to engage with the Muslim pop
as the protector of Islam in south-eastern Europe. Focusing on Bosnia
ofNovi Pazar, the article explores the relations between German autho
the ground and enquires into the ways in which German propagandist
rhetoric, terminology, and iconography for political and military ends
with the history of military conflict, the article contributes more genera
politics of religion in the Second World War.
Advancing into the kingdom of Yugoslavia in the spring of 1941, German

troops were surprised by the enthusiastic welcome they received from large
parts of the Muslim population. Anton Bossi Fedrigotti, liaison officer of the
Foreign Office to Maximilian von Weichs's invading 2nd Army, reported that
the soldiers had been utterly astonished to be greeted jubilantly by the Muslims,
though he quickly explained that this reaction was 'only natural' as the Muslims
had always been the fiercest opponents of the Orthodox Serbs.1 In Sarajevo,
Fedrigotti noted, Islamic leaders had called upon their followers to decorate the
streets with flags to express their joy at the German invasion.2 The day after the
occupation of the city, a Muslim crowd cheered on as the Germans tore down
the plaque commemorating the assassination of Archduke Franz Ferdinand.
Afterwards, they participated in a German military parade that took place along
Gonville and Caius College, Cambridge, cb2 ita [email protected]

* The author wishes to thank Ivo Banac, Richard J. Evans, Rachel G. Hoffman,
Noel Malcolm, Nicholas Stargardt and the anonymous referees for their comments on earlier
versions of this article.
1 Fedrigotti to Foreign Office, 27 Apr. 1941, Belgrade, Political Archives of the Foreign
Office, Berlin (PA), R 60681.
2 Fedrigotti to Foreign Office, 21 Apr. 1941, Sarajevo, PA, R 60681 (also in PA, R 27363).
1007

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ioo8 DAVID MOTADEL
the banks of the Miljacka. 'The entire mood of the M

day demonstrated that here, too, far away from Germ
adoration for the Fiihrer', Fedrigotti rejoiced.'5 A few
of Hitler's birthday, Muslim leaders organized ma
prayers in the mosques, to which the German militar
To be sure, German reports about the enthusiasm
need to be read with caution. The Germans coul
saw, and those Muslims who were opposed to Axi
or expressed their concerns in private. But although
towards the invasion can hardly be generalized, mos
collapsing kingdom.
As, over the following months, the Balkans became
by civil war and partisan insurgency, German offic
the Muslim population as potential allies to support
in the region. Considering the Muslims as both a
community, German authorities ultimately began to
as the patron of Islam in the Balkans. Religion in fact
policies towards Muslims in the region. In their
support, the German army command and, more i
significant efforts to employ religiously charged
with religious dignitaries and leaders on the gro
Herzegovina, and the Sandzak, the following pag
involvement with the Islamic community during the
Scholarship has addressed Nazi Germany's military
for decades.4 The works of historians like Jozo Tom
Marko Attila Hoare have provided profound insig
and military involvement in the region, particularly
in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Over the last years,
shown an increasing interest in the social and politi
3 Fedrigotti to Foreign Office, 19 Apr. 1941, Kljuc, PA, R 6

Fedrigotti to Foreign Office, 27 Apr. 1941, Belgrade, PA, R 60
4 The most comprehensive work remains Jozo Tomasevich, W
1941-1945: occupation and collaboration (Stanford, CA, 2001)
particular, see Enver Redzic, Bosnia and Herzegovina in the Sec
2005); idem, Muslimansko Autonomastvo i 13. SS Divizija: Autonom
Treci Rajh (Sarajevo, 1987); and Marko Attila Hoare, Genocide an
partisans and the Chetniks, 1941-1943 (Oxford, 2006). Signifi
Shepherd, Terror in the Balkans: German armies and partisan
Stevan K. Pavlowitch, Hitler's new disorder: the Second World W
2008); Hermann Frank Meyer, Blutiges Edelweifi: Die 1. Gebirg
(Berlin, 2008); Klaus Schmider, Partisanenkrieg in Jugoslaw
Paul N. Hehn, The German struggle against Yugoslav guerri
NY, 1979); Gert Fricke, Kroatien, 1941-1944: Der 'Unabh
Deutschen Bevollmachtigten Generals inAgram Glaisev. Horstena
by Martin Broszat and Ladislaus Hory, Der Kroatische Ustas
1965).

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THE 'MUSLIM QUESTION' IN HITLER'S BALKANS lOOg
population and Islam in the region during the war years, reflected most notably
in Zlatko Hasanbegovic's account of the Muslims of Zagreb and Emily Greble's
study of wartime Sarajevo. ■*> The history of Germany's engagement with Muslims
and Islam in south-eastern Europe, however, has been studied less. In the
existing literature, discussions of Germany's policy towards the Muslim
population are usually limited to the history of the employment of Muslims in
the 13th SS Waffen Mountain Division, known as 'Handzar'.6 In what follows,
the division is only considered tangentially. The article instead shows that
Germany's engagement with the Muslims of the Balkans went much further
and included a significant, religiously charged, campaign, targeted at the civil
population. These policies may be seen as an episode in the wider story of
Germany's attempts to instrumentalize Islam in other parts of the Muslim
world during the Second World War. Indeed, as research has shown, German
authorities tried to employ religious policies and propaganda to rally the
faithful from North Africa to Central Asia.'
On a wider scale, the following pages address the politics of religion in the
Second World War, and may contribute more generally to our understanding of
the intersection of power and religion in war and military conflict. Throughout
the war, German authorities employed religious policies in the warzones.
■' Zlatko Hasanbegovic, Muslimani u Zagrebu, 1878-1945 (Zagreb, 2007), pp. 167-386; and
Emily Greble, Sarajevo, 1941-1945: Muslims, Christians, and Jews in Hitler's Europe (Ithaca NY,
2011); and, for an overview, Valeria Heuberger, islam and Muslims in Bosnia-Herzegovina
during World War II: a survey', in Lieve Gevers and Jan Bank, eds., Religion under siege, 11:
Protestant, Orthodox and Muslim communities in occupied Europe, 1939—1950 (Leuven et al., 2007),
pp. 175-93, esP- PP- 183-8; and on the Muslim population in the civil war, see also the
literature inn. 11.
11 The major studies on 'Handzar' are George Lepre, Himmler's Bosnian division: the Waffen-SS
Handschar Division, 1943-1944 (Atglen, PA, 1997); Amandine Rochas, La Handschar: histoire
d'une division de Waffen-SS bosniaque (Paris, 2007); Redzic, Mus'limansko Aulonomastvcr, Zija
Sulejmanpasic, >3. SSDivizija 'Handzar': Istine i Lazi (Zagreb, 2000); and Holm Sundhaussen,
'Zur Geschichte der Waffen-SS in Kroatien 1941-1945', Sudostforschungen, 30 (1971),
pp. 176-96, at pp. 192-6.
7 A comprehensive account of Germany's engagement with Islam on the North African,
Middle Eastern, Balkan, and Eastern fronts is provided by David Motadel, 'Germany's policy
towards Islam, 1941-1945' (Ph.D.. Cambridge, 2010); and, for some facets of this policy, see
Gerhard Hopp, 'Der Koran als "Geheime Reichssache": Bruchstiicke deutscher Islampolitik
zwischen 1938 und 1945'. in Holger PreiGler and Hubert Seiwert, eds., Gnosisforschung und
Religionsgeschichte: Festschrift fur Kurt Rudolph zum 65. Geburtstag (Marburg, 1994), pp. 435-46.
More specific studies, which have stressed the role of Islam in German war policies in different
regions, include, on the Eastern front, Patrik von zur Miihlen, Zwischen Hakenkreuz und
Sowjetstern: Der Nationalismus der Sojojetischen Orientvolker im Zweiten Weltkrieg (Diisseldorf, 1971);
and Joachim Hoffmann, Kaukasien, 1942/1943: Das deutsche Heer und Orientvoelker der
Sowjetunion (Freiburg, 1991); on the Arab world, Lukaz Hirszowicz, The Third Reich and the
Arab East (London, 1966); and Jeffrey Herf, Nazi propaganda to the Arab world (New Haven, CT,
2009); and, on the collaboration of the famous Mufti of Jerusalem, Joseph B. Schechtman,
The Mufti and the Fuehrer: the rise and fall of Haj Amin el-Husseini (New York, NY, et al., 1965);
Jennie Lebel, The Mufti of Jerusalem Haj-Amin el-Husseini and national-socialism (Belgrade,
2007); and Klaus Gensicke, The Mufti of Jerusalem and the Nazis: the Berlin years (London and
Portland, OR, 2011).

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ioio DAVID MOTADEL
German troops encountered Catholics, Protestants, Eas

Muslims, and, in the Kalmyk steppes of the southe
Buddhists.8 As they destroyed synagogues and kille
Germans ruled over thousands of Orthodox cathedrals, Protestant churches,
Catholic domes, and Islamic mosques. And although it was race, not religion,
that formed the basis of Nazi policy schemes, in most warzones German officials
soon became aware of the significant influence of religion among the
population and regularly engaged actively in confessional politics. Ranging
from suppression to support, German policies towards religion were usually
pragmatic and determined by local conditions, the military situation, and the
political and tactical considerations of the involved branches of the regime.
Religious structures were destroyed when suspected of generating resistance,
or actively employed to rule and pacify the rear areas and to win local support,
as in the case of the Muslims of the Balkans.
When studying the politics of religion under Nazi rule, historians have long
concentrated on the question of collaboration and resistance, while showing
less interest in the nature of German religious policies themselves. Drawing
on archival materials in both German and Bosnian, this article examines the
ways in which German authorities instrumentalized religious rhetoric, slogans,
8 Scholars have mostly studied religion on the Eastern front, see Harvey Fireside, Icon and
swastica: the Russian Orthodox Church under Nazi and Soviet control (Cambridge, 1971); Wassilij
Alexeev and Theofanis G. Stavrou, The great revival: the Russian Church under German occupation
(Minneapolis, MN, 1976); Hans-Heinrich Wilhelm, 'Der SD und die Kirchen in den besetzten
Ostgebieten 1941/1942', Militaergeschichtliche Mitteilungen, 29 (1981), pp. 55-99; Michail
Skarovskij, 'Deutsche Kirchenpolitik auf dem besetzten Territorium der USSR, 1941-1944', in
Gabriele Gorzka and Knut Stang, eds., Der Vernichtungskrieg im Osten: Verbrechen der Wehrmacht in
der Sowjetunion aus Sicht russischer Historiker (Kassel, 1999), pp. 69-85; Leonid Rein, 'The
Orthodox Church in Byelorussia under Nazi occupation, 1941-1944', East European Quarterly,
39 (2005), pp. 13-46; Friedrich Heyer, Die Orthodoxe Kirche in der Ukraine von 1917 bis 1945
(Cologne, 1953), pp. 170-227; Christoph KleBmann, 'Nationalsozialistische Kirchenpolitik
und Nationalitatenfrage im Generalgouvernement (1939-1945)', Jahrbiicher fur Geschichte
Osteuropas, 18 (1970), pp. 575-600; and Kazimierz Smigiel, Die katholische Kirche im Reichsgau
Wartheland 1939-1945 (Dortmund, 1984). On the Western front, see Jacques Duquesne, Les
catholiques frangais sous Voccupation (Paris, 1966); Vesna Drapac, War and religion: Catholics in the
churches of occupied Paris (Washington, DC, 1998); and Renee Bedarida, Les catholiques dans la
guerre, 1939-1945: entre Vichy et la Resistance (Paris 1998); Alain Dantoing, 'La hierarchie
catholique et la Belgique sous l'occupation allemande', Revue du Nord, 60 (1978), pp.
311-30; idem, La \collaboration' du cardinal: Veglise de Belgique dans la Guerre 40 (Brussels, 1991);
and A. F. Manning, 'De Nederlandse Katholieken in de eerste jaren van de Duitse bezetting',
Jaarboek van het Katholiek Documentatie Centrum, 8 (1978), pp. 105-29. On the Northern front,
see Eino Murtorinne, 'Die nordischen Kirchen im Zweiten Weltkrieg', in Carsten Nicolaisen,
ed., Nordische und deutsche Kirchen im 20. Jahrhundert (Gottingen, 1982), pp. 212-27. Overviews
of religions under German occupation are given by Xavier de Montclos, Les Chretiens face au
nazisme et au stalinisme: Vepreuve totalitaire, 1939-1945 (Paris, 1983); and by the articles in part 1
of Karl-Joseph Hummel and Christoph Kosters, eds., Kirchen im Krieg: Europa, 1939-1945
(Paderborn et al., 2007); and in Lieve Gevers and Jan Bank, eds., Religion under siege, 1: The
Roman Catholic church in occupied Europe, 1939-1950, and 11; Protestant, Orthodox and Muslim
communities in occupied Europe, 1939-1950 (Leuven et al., 2007), which contains one chapter on
Muslims, i.e. the quoted article on Muslims in the Ustasa state (see n. 5).

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THE 'MUSLIM QUESTION' IN HITLER'S BALKANS lOll
and imperatives in their propaganda, and employed religious dignitaries to

pacify the Balkans. At the same time, it looks at the ideas and notions about
Islam and the Muslim population that informed these policies. It first examines
the gradual involvement of German officials in the 'Muslim question' of the
Balkans between 1941 and 1943, subsequently explores various facets of this
involvement, including the use of religious propaganda and the engagement
with local religious authorities, and finally discusses the tense relation of these
policies and propaganda efforts with the violent nature of German warfare.
II
Hitler had initially not intended to get involved in the Muslim territories when
invading and dissolving the kingdom of Yugoslavia in the spring of 1941. While
German troops occupied Serbia, the Muslim areas fell under the administration
of the Italians (Montenegro, including the Sandzak of Novi Pazar), the
Bulgarians (Macedonia), and, most importantly, the newly created Croatian
Ustasa state (Bosnia and Herzegovina), which governed the majority of the
Muslims of the former Yugoslav kingdom. It was the escalation of the war in
late 1942 that would eventually lead to German political involvement with the
Muslims of the region.
The Muslims of Yugoslavia had, for most of their history, enjoyed special
rights and a certain level of autonomy in their religious life and organizations,
first under the Ottomans, then, from 1878, under the Habsburg monarchy,
and, after 1918, in the Yugoslav kingdom, although Yugoslav rule had quickly
proven to be less tolerant than that of its imperial predecessors.9 Although
9 On Islam in the Ottoman Balkans, see Peter F. Sugar, Southeastern Europe under Ottoman rule,
1354-1804 (Seattle, WA, 1977); and, for the later phase, Fikret Karcic, The Bosniaks and the
challenge of modernity: late Ottoman and Hapsburg times (Sarajevo, 1999), which also provides a
good overview of Islam under Habsburg rule. On Islam in the Habsburg era, see Robert J.
Donia, Islam under the Double Eagle: the Muslims of Bosnia and Hercegovina, 1978-1914 (New York,
NY, 1981); Ferdinand Hauptmann, 'Die Mohammedaner in Bosnien-Hercegovina', in Adam
Wandruszka and Peter Urbanitsch, eds., Die Habsburgermonarchie, 1848-1918, iv: Die
Konfessionen (Vienna, 1985), pp. 670-701; Srecko M. Dzaja, Bosnien-Herzegoiuina in der
Osterreichisch-Ungarischen Epoche, 1878-1918: Die Intelligentsia zwischen Tradition und Ideologie
(Munich, 1994); Muhamed Mufaku al-Arnaut, 'Islam and Muslims in Bosnia, 1878-1918: two
hijras and two fatwas',Journal of Islamic Studies, 5 (1994), pp. 242-53; Hasanbegovic, Muslimani
u Zagrebu, pp. 29-51; and Alexandre Popovic, L'Islam balkanique: les musulmans du sud-est
europeen dans la pbiode post-ottomane (Berlin, 1986), pp. 269-310. And on Islam in interwar
Yugoslavia, see Sabina Ferhadbegovic, 'Fez oder Hut? Der Islam in Bosnien zwischen den
Weltkriegen', Wiener Zeitschrift zur Geschichte der Neuzeit, 5 (2005), pp. 69-85; Xavier Bougarel,
'Farewell to the Ottoman legacy? Islamic reformism and revivalism in inter-war Bosnia
Herzegovina', in Clayer and Germain, eds., Islam in inter-war Europe, pp. 313-43; Muhammed
Arugi, 'The Muslim minority in Macedonia and its educational institutions during the inter-war
period', in Clayer and Germain, eds., Islam in inter-war Europe, pp. 344-61; Fikret Karcic, 'The
reform of Shari'a courts and Islamic law in Bosnia and Herzegovina, 1918-1941', in Clayer
and Germain, eds., Islam in inter-war Europe, pp. 253-70; idem, Seriatski Sudovi u Jugoslaviji,
1918-1941 (Serial courts in Yugoslavia, 1918-1941) (Sarajevo, 1986); Atif Purivatra,
Jugoslovenska Muslimanska Organizacija u Politickom Zivotu Kraljevine Srba, Hrvata i Slovenaca

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lOl 2 DAVID MO TAD EL
Muslims, under the leadership of Mehmed Spaho, he

'Yugoslav Muslim Organization' (Jugoslovenska Muslim
had retained much of their religious autonomy in the inter
repressed under Orthodox Serbian hegemony (as did m
and welcomed the fall of Yugoslavia in 1941, not anticipat
prelude to years of violence and bloodshed.
The Ustasa regime, with its fascist vision of a Cathol
respect for its Muslim subjects. And yet, while murdering
Orthodox Serbs, Ante Pavelic, Poglavnik of the Independe
did at least formally try to accommodate the Muslim
Islam the second state religion and Ustasa officials declare
'the flower of the Croatian people'.10 The regime also
of Islamic leaders, most prominently perhaps Ismet Muftic
who became a vigorous promoter of the Ustasa state, and
sustained serial courts, medresas and vakuf (waqf'm Arab
centre of Zagreb, the new government even opened t
Mosque (Poglavnikova Dzamija). Soon, however, the Mu
caught in the crossfire of a bitter civil war.
From early 1942, the Balkans became increasingly en
conflict between the Croatian regime, communist par
Serbian Cetniks.11 The partisans, led by the former H
Bolshevik revolutionary Josip Broz, better known as Tito
Ustasa troops and Cetniks. At the same time, the Cetn
(Sarajevo, 1974); Musnija Kamberovic, MehmedSpaho, 1883-1939: Polit

2009); Hasanbegovic, Muslimani u Zagrebu, pp. 53-166; and Pop
pp. 310-36.
On Islam in Ustasa state, see Tomasevich, War and revolution, pp. 488-94; Redzic, Bosnia
and Herzegovina, pp. 68, 85-7, 166-g and 172; idem, Muslimansko Autonomastvo, pp. 9-20;
Greble, Sarajevo, esp. pp. 58, 76-81, 84-5, 120-9, 192-5, 213-17, and 253; Hasanbegovic,
Muslimani u Zagrebu, pp. 167-386; and Popovic, L'Islam balkanique, pp. 336-42.
11 On the Muslim population in the civil war, see literature in n. 4, esp. Tomasevich, War and
revolution, esp. pp. 491-4; Redzic, Bosnia and Herzegovina, esp. pp. 63-118 and 169-77; and
idem, Muslimansko Autonomastvo, esp. pp. 29-62; as well as Edmond Paris, Genocide in satellite
Croatia, 1941—1945: a record of racial and religious persecutions and massacres (Chicago, IL, 1961),
pp. 119-26; Yeshayahu Jelinek, 'Nationalities and minorities in the independent state of
Croatia', Nationalities Papers, 8 (1980), pp. 195-210, esp. pp. 200-3; idem. 'Bosnia-Herzegovina
at war; relations between Moslems and non-Moslems', Holocaust and Genocide Studies, 5 (1990),
pp. 275-92; Tomislav Dulic, 'Mass killing in the independent state of Croatia, 1941-1945:
a case for comparative research', Journal of Genocide Research, 8 (2006), pp. 255-81, esp. pp.
265-70; and Damir Mirkovic, 'Victims and perpetrators in the Yugoslav genocide, 1941-1945;
some preliminary observations', Holocaust and Genocide Studies, 7 (1993), pp. 317-32, esp.
pp. 321-2. For excellent overviews of the Muslims in the civil war in Bosnia, see Noel Malcolm,
Bosyiia: a short history (London, 1994), pp. 174-92; Marko Attila Hoare, The history of Bosnia: from
the Middle Ages to the present day (London, 2007), pp. 197-308; and Robert J. Donia, Sarajevo: a
biography (London, 2006), pp. 168-203. Vladimir Dedijer and Antun Miletic, eds., Genocid nad
Muslimanima, 1941-1945: /bomik Dokumenata i Svedocenja (Sarajevo, 1990), provides a
selection of primary documents on the civil war and Cetnik violence against Muslims.

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THE 'MUSLIM QUESTION' IN HITLER'S BALKANS IOI3
under Dragoljub 'Draza' Mihailovic fought for a restoration of the monarchy
and a Greater Serbia, waged war against not only Ustasa troops and the Catholic
population, but also against Tito's partisans. The Muslim population was
repeatedly attacked by all three parties. Ustasa authorities had employed
Muslim army units to fight Tito's partisans as well as Cetnik militias, and had
used them to control Serbian Orthodox areas. Soon, Muslim villages became
targets of retaliatory attacks from both partisans and Cetniks. Particularly
violent were the Cetnik reprisals against Muslims in East and South Bosnia
and in parts of Herzegovina, where Ustasa authority had always been unstable.
Mihailovic burned down endre villages. His men became feared for killing
Muslims by cutting their throats. Estimates of the number of Muslim victims
grew into the tens of thousands. Despite Pavelic's warm words for Islam, Ustasa
authorities did little overall to prevent these massacres. Even worse, in areas
where Muslim leaders engaged in local ceasefire agreements with Cetnik and
partisan commanders, Catholic Ustasa units responded by repressing the
Muslim civil population. German military reports pointed to the mounting
discord between the Muslims and the Croatian Catholic state.12 More and
more Muslim leaders in Bosnia and Herzegovina pleaded for independence.
Attempts to build Muslim militias for self-defence were, on the whole, a failure.
As an ultima ratio, some leading Muslim representatives turned to the Germans.
In a memorandum of 1 November 1942, addressed to Hitler, they asked for
Muslim autonomy under a German protectorate in Bosnia and Herzegovina.'3
Remarkably, the Muslims tried to employ pan-Islamic references to strengthen
their case, emphasizing that the Bosnian Muslims were an integral part of
the '300 million Muslims' in the world, and that they were willing to align
themselves with the Axis against 'Judaism, Freemasonry, Bolshevism and the
English exploiters'.
12 On 18 Feb. 1942, the German envoy in Zagreb, Kasche, forwarded a number of appeals
from local Muslim groups to (Muslim) Ustasa authorities, complaining about their religious
persecution, to Berlin, see Kasche to Foreign Office, 18 Feb. 1942, Zagreb, PA, R 60608, and,
attached, Memorandum ('Beschwerde der muselmanischen Bezirksbeauftragten von Prijedor
an einige angesehene Muselmanen'), 23 Sept. 1941, Prijedor, PA, R 60608; and Memorandum
('Denkschrift des Sarajevo Ulema-Verein "El Hidaja'"), 12 Oct. 1941, PA, R 60608; and
Memorandum ('Denkschrift der muselmanischen Vertreter aus Banja Luka'), 12 Nov. 1941,
Banja Luka, PA, R 60608.
13 People's Committee ('Volkskomitee'), Memorandum, 1 Nov. 1942, Sarajevo, PA,
R 261144. The twenty-page memorandum was first assessed by army officials and then
forwarded to Hitler at the end of 1942, see Wehrmacht Intelligence (Amt Ausland/Abwehr) to
Reich Chancellery, 28 Dec. 1942, Berlin, PA, R 261144. On the memorandum and Muslim
appeals to the Germans and Italians, see Tomasevich, War and revolution, pp. 489 and 494-6;
Redzic, Bosnia and Herzegovina, pp. 19, 168, and 177-80; idem, Muslimansko Autonomastvo,
pp. 71-9; Greble, Sarajevo, pp. 163-6; and, for a Croatian translation of the complete
memorandum, Dedijer and Antun Miletic, eds., Genocid nad Muslimanima, pp. 249-64.
14 People's Committee ('Volkskomitee'), Memorandum, 1 Nov. 1942, Sarajevo, PA,
R 261144.

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1014 DAVID MOTADEL
The Germans were in a dilemma. Berlin

its rule over the Muslim territories of
only sent diplomatic and military represen
the Austrian Nazi veteran General Edmund Glaise von Horstenau, who
was accredited as the Wehrmacht's representative in Croatia, and SA
Obergruppenfuhrer Siegfried Kasche, Germany's envoy in Zagreb. Kasche had
little sympathy for the Muslims and would, until the end, support the Ustasa
regime.
In practice, however, the situation was changing.lr' From autumn 1942, as
parts of the Croatian state, particularly Bosnia and Herzegovina, seemed to be
spinning out of control, German troops became increasingly involved in the
Muslim territories. All operational areas were subsumed under German military
command, forcing Pavelic to give up de facto sovereignty of parts of Croatia. In
late 1942, Glaise-Horstenau was forced to share power with General Rudolf
Liiters, who became 'Commander of the German troops in Croatia'. In early
1943, a major offensive was launched against all insurgents in Central Croatia,
Bosnia, and Herzegovina. Soon, the SS would also become involved. In late
March 1943, Himmler sent SS-BrigadefuhrerKonsta.ntm Kammerhofer to Zagreb
as the official SS commissioner on the spot. Kammerhofer had limited respect
for the Ustasa authorities or for the German envoy, Kasche. Ignoring all
complaints, he instantly put parts of North Croatia under the authority of the
SS. Convinced that the SS would be more effective than the wavering Ustasa
security forces, the Wehrmacht did not resist. Kasche was increasingly sidelined
and isolated. By the end of 1943, the SS had further strengthened its influence.
Between spring and autumn 1944, it practically ruled over the Muslim areas
within Sava, Drina, Spreca, and Bosna.
Less concerned than Kasche and the Foreign Office about Ustasa authority,
the Wehrmacht and, more importantly, the SS saw the Muslims as welcomed
allies. Military reports and internal papers regularly referred to the alleged pro
German attitude of the Muslims from the Balkans and to their influence on the
wider Muslim world. It was the pan-Islamic character of the Muslims, Rudolf
Liiters assured in a report from spring 1943, that provoked the Cetniks. 'It is
especially the apparently supranational, religiously determined behavior which
angers the Serb with his overarching national pride.'16 A commander, who
would brief German troops fighting in Bosnia, emphasized not only the pro
German attitude of the Muslims, but also that the '950,000 Muslims' of Bosnia
and Herzegovina 'know very well that they represent the some 500,000,000
Mohammedans to the Greater German Reich and the Axis'.1'' German support
' On the intensified German involvement in the Balkans in 1942-3, see literature in n. 4.
,b Litters, Report ('Aufstandsbewegung der Cetniks'), 5 May 1943, n.p.. Federal Military
Archive, Freiburg (MA), RS 3-7/16.
17 Wurianek (Army), Report ('Bericht iiber Bosnien'), 10July 1943, Graz, MA, RH 31-III/5;
and Wurianek, Speech ('Vortrag vor der Mannschaft der Kampftruppe Ost- und West
Bosnien'), lojuly 1943, Graz, MA, RH 31-111/5.

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for the Muslim population would therefore have a propagandistic effect on
the other Mohammedan countries'. These views were shared by officers in
the SS intelligence and by other German officials on the ground.18 It was a set
of reasons - the idea of a pro-German attitude of the Muslim population as
well as considerations of their alleged significance within the wider Islamic
world-which prompted the Wehrmacht and SS to seek co-operation with the
Muslims when pacifying the region from early 1943 onwards.
Soon, as the German military stepped up their operations in the Balkans,
the Wehrmacht and SS extended this policy towards Muslims of the Italian
occupied regions. In early 1943, German troops got involved in the Sandzak
area, the Muslim mountain belt between Montenegro and Serbia which was
formally under the rule of the Italians, who had, as the civil war escalated,
turned a blind eye to Cetnik massacres of the Muslim population. The German
army command immediately ordered the soldiers to treat only the Muslims
as allies, while encouraging them to act ruthlessly towards the rest of the
population.*9 In September 1943, when Italy changed fronts and withdrew
from the Balkans, the Sandzak was formally taken over by German troops.
Moreover, the Muslim majority of Albania, which included Kosovo and had
been under Italian occupation since 1940, now too came under the control
of the Germans, who installed a puppet regime in the country.20 In the Epirus
area of north-western Greece, which bordered Albania and had also been
18 SS Reich Security Head Office, Intelligence Report ('Muselmanenproblem'), n.d., n.p.,

Federal Archives, Berlin-Lichterfelde (BA), R 58/92; and for views of other observers on the
ground, NSDAP Organization Croatia, Report ('Monatsbericht'), 31 Dec. 1942, Sarajevo, MA,
RH 31-H1/5, which was forwarded by the NSDAP Landesgruppenleiter Rudolf Empting to
Horstenau, 13 Jan. 1943, Zagreb, MA, RH 31-111/5; and Hille (Croatian representative of the
Einsatzstab Reichsleiter Rosenberg), Report, 19 Aug. 1942, Zagreb. Russian State Military Archive
(Rossiiskii Gosudarstvenni Voennyi Arkhiv), Moscow, Special Collection (Osobyi Archive),
accessed through Archives of the Center for Advanced Holocaust Studies, Washington
(USHMA), RG 11/Reel 131.
19 Meyer, Blutiges EdelweiJS, p. i19. Also representatives of the SS and the Foreign Office
agreed about the exploitation of the Muslims for the pacification of the Sandzak, see Gredler
(Foreign Office), Internal Note ('Bericht des Ustascha-Kommissars Murat Bayrovic uber die
Lage im Sandschak'), 12 Apr. 1943, Berlin, PA, R 100998. On a description of the co-operation
with Muslim militias on the ground, see the memoirs by Karl Wilhelm Thilo, 'Der Einsatz auf
dem Balkan', in Hubert Lanz, ed., Gebirgsjage)~:Die 1. Gebirgsdivision, 193 5—1945 (Bad Nauheim,
1954). PP- M2-77. esP- PP- 253 and 245-6.
20 On Albania under German control, see Bernd J. Fischer, Albania at war, 1939-1943
(London. 1999), pp. 157-256; idem, 'German political policy in Albania, 1943-1944', in
Richard B. Spence and Linda Nelson, eds., Scholar, patriot, mentor: historical essays in honor of
Dimitrije Djcrrdjevic (Boulder, CO, 1992), pp. 219-33; Hubert Neuwirth, Widerstand und
Kollaboration in Albanien, 1939-1944 (Wiesbaden, 2008); Christoph Stamm, 'Zur deutschen
Besetzung Albaniens, 1943-1944', Militargeschichtliche Mitteilungen, 30 (1981), pp. 99-120;
Noel Malcolm, Kosovo: a short history (London, igg8), pp. 304-13; and, on religion in wartime
Albania, Popovic, L'Islam balkanique, pp. 36-42; and Roberto Morozzo Delia Rocca, Nazione e
Religione in Albania, 1920-1944 (Bologna, ig9o), pp. 167-246, which points to German
non-interference in the country's Islamic institutions and the work of the ulema, headed by
Sherif Langu.

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ioi6 DAVID MOTADEL
under Italian rule, German military authorities sought

Albanian Muslim Cham minority, which provided militia
German involvement in these territories was overseen
as Hitler's Plenipotentiary for south-eastern Europe re
Montenegro, Serbia, and Greece and himself an ardent
with the Muslims of the Balkans.
Hitler fully endorsed German courtship of the Muslims. Neubacher, who

discussed the situation in south-eastern Europe regularly at the Fiihrer Head
quarters, recalled after the war that Hitler had firmly supported a 'positive
Muslim policy' (positive Muselmanenpolitik) in the region.22 According to
Neubacher, Hitler's view of the Muslims in the Balkans was also influenced by
considerations about pan-Islamic implications. Discussing 'the political signifi
cance of Balkan Islam in regard to the Middle East', Neubacher had tried to
explain the connection to Hitler in terms easy to understand: 'When you strike
a Sandzak Muslim, a student in Cairo reacts!' The phrase had apparently
impressed Hitler so much that he soon used it himself.
Indeed, when strategically mapping the region, the Germans defined
the Muslims primarily in terms of religion.23 This was to a certain extent
21 On the Muslims of the Epirus area, see Mark Mazower, 'Three forms of political justice:
Greece, 1944—1945', in idem, ed., After the war was over: reconstructing the family, nation and state in
Greece, 1943-1960 (Princeton, NJ, 2000), pp. 24-41, at pp. 24-6; Meyer, Blutiges Edelweifi,
pp. 151-2, 204, 463-76, 539, and 620-1; Fischer, Albania at war, pp. 70-6, 85, and 168-9; anc*>
for an account from the perspective of the Chams, Beqir Meta, The Cham tragedy (Tirana,
2007), pp. 59-105; and the documents in Robert Elsie and Bejtullah D. Destani, eds., The Cham
Albanians of Greece: a documentary history (London, 2013), pp. 335-94. Germany's policy towards
the Muslims of Greece will not be addressed in this article. It seems that Islam only played a
marginal role in the occupation policies in Greece, although, in the Aegean, army officials tried
to co-opt religious figures like the Mufti of Rhodes, Seyh Suleyman Kaslioglu, to stabilize the
late German occupation regime, see Headquarters of Commander East-Aegean, Report
('Stimmungsbericht'), 17 Nov. 1944, n.p., MA, RH 19XI/38, 221. Kaslioglu hid some
invaluable Torah scrolls in the pulpit of the island's Murat Reis Mosque during the war, see
Isaac Benatar, Rhodes and the Holocaust: the story of the Jewish community from the Mediterranean
island of Rhodes (Bloomington, IN, 2010), pp. 22-3 and 84. The German military authorities
estimated that c. 130,000 lived in occupied Greece, see Headquarters of High Command
Army Group E to Headquarters of Commander South-East, n.d. (Mar. 1944), n.p., MA, RH
i9XI/iob.
22 Hermann Neubacher, Sonderauftrag SiXdost, 1940-1945: Bericht eines fliegenden Diplomaten
(Gottingen et al., 1956), pp. 32-3 and, similarly, p. 160.
2;i On confessional bonds and politics in the Muslim areas of the Balkans, see Marco Dogo,
'The Balkan nation-states and the Muslim question', in idem and Stefano Bianchini, eds.,
Balkans: national identities in a historical perspective (Ravenna, 1998), pp. 61-74; Pedro Ramet,
'Religion and nationalism in Yugoslavia', in idem, ed., Religion and nationalism in Soviet and East
European politics (Durham, NC, 1984), pp. 149-69, esp. pp. 156-8; Ivo Banac, The national
question in Yugoslavia: origins, history, politics (Ithaca, NY, 1984), pp. 359-78; and, more
specifically, idem, 'Bosnian Muslims: from religious community to socialist nationhood and
post-communist statehood, 1918-1992', in Mark Pinson, ed., The Muslims of Bosnia and
Herzegovina: their historical development from the Middle Ages to the dissolution of Yugoslavia
(Cambridge, MA, 1994), pp. 129-53; a°d Mitja Velikonja, Religious separation and political
intolerance in Bosnia-Herzegovina (College Station, TX, 2003). Mark Mazower, The Balkans: a short

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a consequence of the situation 011 the ground. With ethnic and linguistic
distinctions being marginal, religion had long been a principal marker of
communal difference in the Balkans. Confessional bonds, be they Roman
Catholic, Eastern Orthodox, Jewish, or Muslim, were strong. Although of course
none of these communities was fully homogeneous and the lines between them
were not impermeable, they shaped the social landscape across the region. Even
in an age of shattering empires and rising nation-states, most Muslims
continued to see themselves primarily as 'Muslims'. While some had embraced
national affiliations (like 'Croatian' or even 'Serbian'), and many would also
emphasize their regional (like 'Bosnian' or 'Herzegovinian') or urban identities
(like 'Sarajevan' or 'Zagrebian'), religious loyalties (as 'Muslim') remained
crucial. Furthermore, religion had a political meaning, with religious leaders
and institutions exerting significant political influence. In the conflicts of the
Second World War, the political-confessional divisions came most radically
to the fore, and the Germans keenly fuelled and instrumentalized them for
their war effort.
Ill
In late March and early April 1943, the SS sent Amin al-Husseini, th
Mufti of Jerusalem, on a propaganda tour across the Balkans.24 Al-H
arrived in Germany in late 1941 and since then had become a promi
in Berlin's propaganda efforts towards the Muslim world. Carefull
the SS Head Office, the spectacle marked the beginning of German
campaign in the region. Its aim was to win Muslim popular sup
mobilize the male population into the Muslim SS Division, portrayin
Reich not only as the protector of Muslims in the Balkans, but also a
of Islam more generally. Al-Husseini's role as an Islamic figure was
religious legitimacy to the German war effort. Berlin thereby adh
conception (fostered by al-Husseini himself) that the Mufti was co
an Islamic pope, whose words would have authority among pio
across the world. The employment of the Palestinian religious lead
reflected the idea of global Islamic solidarity, it also underlined th
character of German efforts to win Muslim support in the Balkans.
Greedy for influence, al-Husseini had boasted in a conversation w
Berger, chief of the SS Head Office and responsible for the organiza
history (London, 2000), provides a brilliant account of the Balkan communit

after the nation-state.
a4 On the Balkan tour of the Mufti, see Schechtman, The Mufti and the Fuehrer, p. 139; Lebel,
The Mufti of Jerusalem, pp. 181-9; Gensicke, The Mufti of Jerusalem, pp. 132-5; Tomasevich, War
and revolution, p. 498; Redzic, Bosnia and Herzegovina, pp. 34, 39, and 182; idem, Muslimansko
Autonomastvo, pp. 91-102; Broszat and Hory, Kroatische Ustascha-Staat, p. 156; Greble, Sarajevo,
pp. 170-1; Hasanbegovic, Muslimani u Zagrebu, pp. 192-5, 208, 411, and for an Ustasha
security report about the visit, pp. 506-7.

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ioi8 DAVID MOTADEL
tour, about the great influence he had across the entir

cause of Muslims in south-eastern Europe, he claim
interest for a long time. Indeed, the Mufti had already
Islamic dignitaries led by the Mufti of Mostar, Omer Dz
of an Islamic state in the Balkans, in Rome in 1942.2
Yugoslav Muslims had also participated at the Muslim C
1931, where some had established ties with al-Hus
Muslims of the Balkans the Arab Mufti enjoyed remar
as August 1942, Osvit, a major Muslim newspaper in
an interview with al-Husseini which had aroused interest both in Croatia and
among German officials.28 Osvit remarked that the Mufti had become the
spearhead and protector of millions of suppressed Muslims. The Mufti affirmed
Hitler's and Germany's amity for Islam and claimed that the Muslim world
stood entirely on the side of Germany, Japan, and its allies. The British empire
would be fought until its collapse, just like Russia, which had been an enemy of
Islam for centuries. 'Recently, the Fiihrer confirmed to me that Germany
follows with great interest the fight of the Islamic world against its oppressors,
and does not intend to enslave or suppress any Islamic country.'29 The victory of
the Axis would be the victory of the Islamic peoples.
Officers of the SS Head Office planned the tour down to the minutest
detail and prepared the Mufti well in advance.30 His role was, of course,
limited to representational purposes. Berger had assured the Mufti that his
support was 'not only for practical reasons', but came 'from a full heart'. Yet,
he made no secret of his practical intentions, adding that the SS would 'not
believe in promises', but wanted to have 'proof' on the spot. On 30 March
1943, the Junkers 25 Tubo of Kurt Max Franz Daluege, head of the Order Police
(Ordnungspolizei), crossed the Alps.3' On board were the Mufti and a number of
SS officers, most importantly SS-Stumibannfiihrer Schulte and SS-Untersturmfuhrer
Rempel of the SS Head Office, and SS-Hauptsturmfuhrer Hermann, represent
ing the SS Reich Security Head Office. Moreover, two Gestapo officers
25 Berger to Himmler, 27 Mar. 1943, Berlin, BA, R19/2255.

2b Al-Husseini to Foreign Office, 30 Apr. 1943, Berlin, PA, R 27322 (also in PA, R 100998).
Muslim attempts to send a delegation to the Mufti in Berlin failed, see documents in PA,
R 60608. In his memoirs, al-Husseini claims that he had received telegraphs from the Balkans
asking for a reception in Berlin, but that the Foreign Office had not given permission, see Amin
al-Husseini, Mudhakkirat al-Hajj Muhammad Amin al-Husseini, ed., 'Abd al-Karim al-'Umar
(Damascus, 1999), pp. 137-8. On the visit of the delegation to Rome, see also Tomasevich, War
and revolution, pp. 494-5; Redzic, Bosnia and Herzegovina, pp. 175-6; and idem, Muslimansko
Autonomastvo, pp. 64-7.
27 Martin Kramer, Islam assembled: the advent of the Muslim Congress (New York, NY, 1986),
pp. 132 and 162; and, on the Mufti's own assessment of the relevance of these ties during the
war, Al-Husseini, Mudhakkirat, p. 137.
28 Kasche to Foreign Office, 13 Aug. 1942, Zagreb, PA, R 27327.
9 Quoted ibid. 6 Berger to Himmler, 27 Mar. 1943, Berlin, BA, R 19/2255.
31 Ibid.

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THE 'MUSLIM QUESTION' IN HITLER'S BALKANS lOig
accompanied the Mufti, as well as a pistol sniper.'52 The tour took two weeks.
After visiting Zagreb (1 to 2 April), the group flew to Banja Luka (3 to 4 April)
and set off from there to Sarajevo (5 to 9 April), before returning to Zagreb
(10 to 11 April).S3
During his travels, the Mufti met with Ustasa representatives, including
Pavelic, and German and Italian officials. More significant, however, were his
consultations with the local ulema in Zagreb, Banja Luka, and Sarajevo, which
underlined the religious character of the journey.34 In Sarajevo he would
receive Muslim leaders and dignitaries from the entire area of Bosnia and
Herzegovina, from Tuzla and Mostar, as well as delegations from the Sandzak
and from Albania. Al-Husseini was particularly impressed by the Friday prayers
in Sarajevo's grand Gazi Husrev Beg Mosque and his meeting with the religious
establishment afterwards, years later recalling in his memoirs the warm welcome
he had received.35 'For the Bosnian Mohammedans, the Mufti was first and
foremost significant as a Mohammedan', a German diplomat noted.36 'The
pious accepted him as a just Muslim; he was honored as a descendant of
the Prophet; friends from his theological studies in Cairo and from the
pilgrimage to Mecca welcomed him.' In the name of the Axis, al-Husseini
affirmed solidarity with the destiny of Muslims in the Balkans, emphasizing, as
the Germans observed, 'his deep repulsion' for atrocities committed against
'religious facilities like mosques' by partisans, whom, he claimed, were 'paid by
Moscow and London'.37
Throughout the tour, the Mufti made extensive use of religious rhetoric.
His speeches, sermons, and appeals were delivered in Arabic, with loca
interpreters translating them. When visiting the Gazi Husrev Beg Mosque, h
gave such an emotional speech about the torment Muslims had suffered that
parts of the audience burst into tears.38 Bemoaning the situation of the Musli
in the Balkans, he assured the faithful that only the inner refuge of Islam ma
life bearable. His sermon included the call for war on the side of the Axis.
Mustering all his religious authority, he warned throughout his visit that doubts
about an Axis victory would be a sin. Finally, the Mufti not only employed
religious language, he also used pan-Islamic rhetoric. German observers noted
32 Berger to Himmler, ig Apr. 1943, Berlin, BA, R ig/2255.

33 For a schedule of the tour, see Berger to Himmler, igApr. 1943, Berlin, BA, R ig/2255.
34 Ibid.; and, on his meetings, also Kasche to Foreign Office, 12 Apr. ig43, Zagreb, PA,
R 27322; Ettel, Internal Note, 16 Apr. 1943, Berlin, R 27322, as well as, on al-Husseini's own
account of his tour and his meetings with religious dignitaries, Al-Husseini, Mudhakkirat,
pp. 138-40 and 143. 35 Al-Husseini, Mudhakkirat, p. 143.
3fa Winkler, Report ('Die politische Lage der Mohammedaner Bosniens'), 4 May ig43,
Berlin, PA, R 67675.
37 German News Agency, Confidential Report ('Vertrauliches Rohmaterial'), 16 Apr. 1943,
Zagreb, PA, R 27327.
3 Winkler, Report ('Die politische Lage der Mohammedaner Bosniens'), 4 May 1943,
Berlin, PA, R 67675.

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1020 DAVID MOTADEL
with satisfaction that al-Husseini emphasized the comm

fought by both the Muslims of Croatia and the Muslims
Islamic world, in Palestine, Syria, or Egypt, who were t
'anti-Muslim elements', be they 'Muscovite arsonist
'American exploiters'.39 To the press, the Mufti annou
in the Islamic world' would follow the situation in the B
concern'. 'The outrage in the Islamic world' against the
allies was 'significant and bitter'.4° According to US in
condemned the Allies for massacres committed ag
Balkans, i1 His pan-Islamic rhetoric was exactly what t
hear. Not surprisingly, the Mufti later summed up in hi
'Islam fights Bolshevism and the Muslims know without do
linked with that of Germany and the Axis, and that the
Serbs, communists, and the Allies.'42
The SS reacted enthusiastically to the tour. 'The visit
been a success in every way; also politically it has been
well and positively, and may contribute quite consider
this area', Berger reported effusively.43 Emphasizing t
of the tour, he declared: 'It has proved anew that the
fully functioning intelligence apparatus and command
in the entire Mohammedan world.' Sustaining mis
Mufti's universal authority among Muslims and the pos
scale support through Islam, Berger even suggested sim
front: 'The Grand Mufti is also by all means prepared
Tatars, i.e. to the Mohammedans of the currently occu
and to activate them in every form for Germany.'
The Wehrmacht co-operated through the entire c
generals', Berger reported to Himmler, had done t
political and military service' when making the trip o
A month after the beginning of the campaign, in M
rejoiced that 'the treatment of Muslims [Muselmanenb
a propaganda weapon of the first order for Germany'.4
SS and Wehrmacht attempts to employ Islam in t
opponents. Well aware of the politics of the tour, the S
39 German News Agency, Confidential Report ('Vertrauliches

4" German News Agency, Confidential Report ('Vertrauliches
41 US Intelligence (FBIS), Report, 22 Apr. 1943, USNA, access
Reel 22. 42 Al-Husseini to Foreign Office, 30 Apr. 1943, Be
43 Berger to Himmler, 19 Apr. 1943, Berlin, BA, R ig/2255; a
Berger to Himmler, 29 Apr. 1943, Berlin, BA, NS 19/2601.
44 Berger to Himmler, 19 Apr. 1943, Berlin, BA, R 19/2255.
45 Liiters, Report ('Aufstandsbewegung der Cetniks'), 5 May

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THE 'MUSLIM QUESTION' IN HITLER'S BALKANS 1021
from Italian authorities and the Ustasa regime, both anxious to maintain their
respective spheres of influence. As soon as the Mufti's plane had landed in
Zagreb, the Italians tried to stage all kinds of plots to stop the tour. In his
memoirs, al-Husseini remembered that after his arrival in the Croatian capital, a
high-ranking Italian diplomat flew in from Rome to prevent his trip to Bosnia
and that he had been warned that they could not guarantee his safety should he
choose to travel to the war-torn area.4'' After the Mufti had returned to Berlin,
the Italians urged the Germans 'with respect for Italy's special Croatian and
Islamic interests', as Ernst Woermann, head of the political department of the
Foreign Office, reported, to ensure that any future contact between the Mufti
and the Muslims of the Balkans be organized through Italian channels.•IT
The SS could not have cared less. Equally unsuccessful was the intervention
of the Ustasa regime. The Croatian government had reacted 'quite dismissively'
to the tour, Berger noted.+8 However, Ustasa officials very quickly 'reversed'
their attitude, the head of the SS Head Office boasted in a letter to Himmler,
after he, Berger, had directly confronted the Croatian envoy in Berlin.
Ultimately, the Ustasa regime tried to control the Mufti throughout the
visit. On his tour from Zagreb to Sarajevo, the Mufti was escorted by two
representatives of the Ustasa regime.49 Croatian government officials tried to
isolate the Mufti from Muslim leaders who were not part of the regime.
Nonetheless, the SS officer Karl von Krempler, a former Habsburg officer
who was now responsible for Muslim affairs in the Balkans, sidelined the Ustasa
agencies and organized confidential meetings with various Islamic dignitaries
and separatist leaders.s° Officially, of course, the Germans tried to conceal
these frictions with the Ustasa leadership.
The SS also faced internal resistance. Kasche and the Foreign Office were
opposed to the trip. In their eyes, the courtship of Muslims in the Balkans would
only further undermine the Ustasa regime. When the Mufti visited Kasche's
office in Zagreb, the envoy did not receive him, and only sent his card.5'
Furious, Kasche internally complained that the tour had sparked rumours
among the Muslim population that Berlin was prepared to support the creation
of a Muslim state in the region.s2 In general, the new course of the SS
and Wehrmacht towards Islam in the Balkans, reflected in the Mufti's tour
4*' Al-Husseini, Mudhakkirat, p. 139. He also made the same complaint after his return
to Berlin to Ettel. Internal Note, 16 Apr. 1943, Berlin, PA, R 27322.
47 Woermann, Internal Note, 29 Apr. 1943, Berlin, USHMA, RG 71, Box 91.
4 Berger to Himmler, 19 Apr. 1943, Berlin, BA, R 19/2255. 40 Ibid.
5° Phleps (Commander of the 7th Volunteer SS Mountain Division 'Prinz Eugen') tojuttner
(Chief of the SS Leadership Head Office), igApr. 1943, n.p., BA, NS 19/2601; the report was
forwarded byjiittner to Himmler, 27 Apr. 1943, Berlin, BA, NS 19/2601.
51 Berger to Himmler, 19 Apr. 1943, Berlin, BA, R 19/2255. Kasche explained that he did
not receive the Mufti because he believed that the trip was of an entirely 'private character',
Kasche to Foreign Office, 12 Apr. 1943, Zagreb, PA, R 27322.
52 Kasche to Foreign Office, 28 Apr. 1943, Zagreb, PA, R 100998.

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1022 DAVID MO TAD EL
and the deployment of the Muslim division, was interpr

Office as an attempt to 'fortify' Islam in south-eastern Euro
Hans Alexander Winkler in Berlin, put it.53 In the immediat
Mufti's tour, Winkler had visited Zagreb and Sarajevo,
worked out an eight-page memorandum about Germany's po
in the Balkans, giving a highly concerned assessment of the
showed an understanding of why the military found the M
eyes were entirely pro-German and still remembered the tim
empire, as ideal allies on the ground. The SS must appre
material, the soldierly tradition and the anti-papal spirit', W
Yet, he sounded a note of caution with respect to German s
in the Balkans. First, he warned that German support for an
{autonomistisches Mohammedanertum) in the region would u
regime. The Mufti's tour had given a boost to 'Mohammedan
and the deployment of the Muslim division would give rise
with the 'utmost disruptive' effect on the Ustasa state
expressed his concerns about the 'pan-Islamic, non-Europ
Muslim collaborators in the Balkans. Unlike the SS, he perc
as a risk, not an opportunity. The tour of al-Husseini h
this risk. 'The Mufti regards the world situation under
Muhammedan perspective, which for us is completely alien
Winkler stated, was entirely 'anti-European'.55 Winkle
reflected a rare perception of Islam, expressing a classical E
the religion and the Occident, a view which did not really fi
and rationalized conceptions of SS officers like Berger or m
atives such as Luters, who were convinced of the usefulness of Islam for their
war effort. Winkler's warnings had little impact. He, Kasche, and the Foreign
Office had no significant influence anymore on the German political course
in the Balkans, whilst the SS and the Wehrmacht pursued their policy
towards Islam.
The Mufti's tour was framed by a wider campaign. It was followed not only
by the employment of the Muslim SS division, but also by a major religiously
charged propaganda campaign to win over the Muslim civil population for
Hitler's New Order.
Berlin, PA, R 67675. On Winkler's stay in Sarajevo and Zagreb between 14 and 22 Apr. 1943,
see Kasche to Foreign Office, 28 Apr. 1943, Zagreb, PA, R 100998; and, attached, German
Legation in Zagreb, Report ('Ubersicht iiber den Inhalt der einzelnen Gesprache wahrend
Reise Konsul Winkler, Dr. Katschinka und Herr Oertel'), n.d. (28 Apr. 1943), Zagreb, PA, R
100998.
Berlin, PA, R 67675. 55 Ibid.

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THE 'MUSLIM QUESTION' IN HITLER'S BALKANS IO23
IV
Considering Ustasa sensibilities, the Germans avoided employing Islam in their

propaganda in the Balkans before the spring of 1943. 'A propagandistic
influence of the Muslim population was withheld, as such is not wanted from
the Croatian side', a report of the Propaganda Squadron South-East remarked
in August 1942. 'Only', the report added, 10,000 copies of a 'small illustrated
brochure in the Croatian language' entitled 'The Life of the Muslims in
Germany' had been printed for distribution in West Bosnia, where German
units had begun fighting again.r>6 In fact, 'The Life of the Muslims in Germany'
('Zivot Muslimana u Njemackoj') was twenty-seven pages long.:"'' It contained
many photographs of Muslim life in the Reich, including pictures of the Berlin
Mosque, founded in the interwar period, and short texts about individuals
from all parts of the Muslim world who worked in Germany. Its aim was to
identify the Third Reich as the friend of Islam, assuming a pan-Islamic sense of
identification between Muslim peasants in West Bosnia and Muslim civilians in
Germany. The brochure was the first significant piece of German religious
propaganda launched in the Muslim areas of the Balkans.
With the beginning of further German military involvement, this kind of
propaganda intensified. Brochures and pamphlets were distributed in Muslim
towns and villages, propaganda posters were put up in streets and trains. The
print propaganda which survived the war, today mostly stored in the German
military archives in Freiburg, has, interestingly, never been examined in any
study about the Balkans during the Second World War. It paints a clear picture
of the ways in which German authorities employed religion as a political
instrument against their enemies. German propaganda pamphlets would
usually portray Jews, British, and Americans as the foes of Islam, who pulled
the strings behind the scenes of the Balkan theatre and were responsible for the
miserable situation of the Muslims there. Other pamphlets, which were
distributed on the spot in more specific tactical situations, characterized Tito's
partisans and Cetniks as the enemies of Islam. In any case, the Germans
repeatedly drew on religious sentiment.
First, German propaganda merged Islam with Jew-hatred. One of the most
significant examples of this kind of religiously charged antijewish propaganda
dispersed among Muslims of the Balkans was the brochure 'Islam and Judaism'
('Islam i Zidovstvo').58 It propagated the idea of an age-old history of hostility
between Islam and Judaism, beginning with the conflict between the Prophet
5b Propaganda Division South-East, Report ('Lage- und Tatigkeitsbericht fur den Monat
Aug. 1942'), 4 Sept. 1942, Belgrade, MA, RW 4/232.
57 Propaganda Brochure 'Zivot Muslimana u Njemackoj', n.d. (Feb. 1943), MA, RH 45/73.
58 Data Sheet on 'Islam i Zidovstvo', n.d. (Feb. 1943), MA, RH 45/76; and, on the content,
Thomas Casagrande, Die volksdeutsche SS-Division Prinz Eugen': Die Banaler Schwaben und die
nationalsozialistischen Kriegsverbrerhen (Frankfurt and New York, NY, 2003), p. 333; and
Lebel, The Mufti of Jerusalem, pp. 311-19, which includes the full translation of the booklet on
pp

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1024 DAVID MOTADEL
and the Jewish community of Khaybar.

10,000 copies of the publication on 21 Febr
circulated among Muslims by the local o
Croatia in Banja Luka; the remaining copies
Sarajevo.
Generally, however, it was British and Soviet imperialism that played
the central role in German propaganda towards the Muslim population.
A pamphlet circulated in the summer of 1943 proclaimed to 'Muslims' that the
culprits who brought 'misery and death, blood and tears' were none other than
the 'agitators in London and Moscow'. Only the victory of the Axis would 'mean
the end and the extermination of all enemies of Islam'. The Muslims of the SS
division were portrayed as part of a broader pan-Islamic mission, as 'the first

who could fight under these victorious banners, not only for the freedom of
your homeland, but also for the liberation of Islam from its enemies'. The
pamphlet was adorned with a flag depicting crescent and star. On 5 June,
15,000 copies were distributed by General Walter Stettner's infamous 1st
Mountain Division. The Luftwaffe dropped another 35,000 copies in the areas
of Konjic, Blagaj, Gorazde, Rogatica, Fojnica, Visoko, Travnik, and Maglaj on
7 June 1943. The pamphlet concluded with a simple message: 'Islam has one
enemy: England. Islam has one friend: Germany. Muslims: Your place in this
battle is set.'s" Typically, the leaflets would address the Allied powers jointly,
speaking of the 'danger of English, American and Soviet imperialism',6"
or warning of plots against Islam made in 'London and Moscow'.61 Yet, if one of
these powers was mentioned most frequently, it was the Soviet Union or, more
generally, Bolshevism, portrayed as the atheist enemy of Islam. A pamphlet
addressing the 'Muslims of Bosnia and Herzegovina' warned: 'A red wave from
the East threatens to swallow all peoples and religious communities in the
Balkans!'6-' Their 'brothers in faith' in the Soviet Union had, the pamphlet
declared, already been 'trampled down' by the Kremlin. Only if the Muslims
went to arms on the German side could they prevent their 'total extermination
by the Soviet fury', a fury which had already caused the deaths of 'hundreds of
thousands of Muslims in the Soviet Union'. 'To arms', it called the Muslims, and
praised the SS division 'Handzar'. Even more colorful language was used in
another pamphlet, which drew on the religious associations of the green flag
of the Prophet. It asked rhetorically: 'Must Stalin's plan become a reality? Must
the green flag of the Prophet run red with the blood of the Muslims?'6^ And it
referred to massacres of Muslims by Tito's partisans in the area of Capljina. 'The
59 Pamphlet 'Muslimani!', MA, RH 45/51; and, for the German translation, see Pamphlet
'Muselmanen!' (German translation), MA, RH 45/51; for details about the pamphlet and its
distribution, see Data Sheet on 'Muslimani!', June 1943, MA, RH 45/51
Pamphlet 'Kampfer des NOV!' (German translation), n.d.. MA, RH 45/49.
Pamphlet 'Braco muslimani!', n.d., MA, RH 45/51.
1,2 Pamphlet 'Muslimani Bosne i Hercegovine!', n.d., MA, RH 45/59.
<>:i Pamphlet 'Treba li Staljinov plan da bude stvarnost?', n.d., MA, RH 45/53.

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bloodsucker Stalin will allow his entrusted Tito to spill the blood of Muslims
elsewhere.' The reason for the alleged Soviet hatred against Muslims was also
given: 'Because every Muslim protects his faith, his old customs and conventions
against communist overthrow!' The pamphlet contained an image of a mosque
with a minaret and a (supposedly green) flag. In the front, it showed a depiction
of Stalin and below him a fictional quote: 'I will take care that this flag also turns
red. As is necessary, with the blood of the Muslims alone.'
On a more tactical level, German propaganda towards Muslims campaigned
against communist partisans and Cetniks. In fact, Muslim combatants in their
ranks were the first the Germans encouraged to change sides. A pamphlet
addressing the 'fighters of the Bosnian and Muslim brigades' of the partisans,
for instance, claimed that Tito had made empty promises to Muslims and was
now on the retreat, facing hunger and cold.b4 The Muslims were called upon
to change sides before it was too late. Another pamphlet referred to atrocities
committed by the partisans, remembering '353 murdered Muslims' from the
area of Vlasenica and giving a detailed two-page 'report' about the cruelty of the
communist partisans and their determination to kill all Muslims. It concluded
with a final call: 'Muslims! Do you want to continue watching your extermina
tion quietly?'6"' These texts would often be religiously charged as well. A
pamphlet which called for Muslims in Tito's ranks to change sides was prefaced
by a quotation: 'Fire at the mosque with the cannon!'I>b These were the alleged
words of Tito's commanders, when they had ordered the attack on the town of
Velika Kladusa. The (remains of the) mosque of Velika Kladusa, the pamphlet
explained, now evidenced the attack by the 'communists'. Employing religious
rhetoric, the pamphlet called those 'who believe in god' to 'take aim with the
weapons against the communists'. A pamphlet addressing 'Muslim fighters'
asked why Tito ridiculed their faith and customs, and insulted Muslim
women.1'' The answer was immediate: 'Because human and religious ideas,
customs and conventions are incompatible with communist ideas', and 'because
you and the people of the right faith will always be a plague upon godless
Bolshevism!'. At the top of the pamphlet was a picture of a mosque with a
crescent on its roof and a minaret. Similar propaganda was directed at the few
Muslims who fought in Cetnik ranks. A pamphlet addressing the 'Muslim
brothers!', for instance, counteracted Cetnik propaganda towards Muslims,
reminding Muslims that Mihailovic's troops had killed everything that was
'Islamic or Croatian'.1'8 'Muslims know very well who their enemy is', the
pamphlet read.
'■* Pamphlet 'Borci bosanskih i muslimanskih brigada!', n.d., MA, KII 45/61.
Pamphlet '353 ubijenih Muslimana obtuzuju Titu u podrucju Vlasenice', n.d., MA,
RH 45/53. Pamphlet 'Pucaj sa topom u dzamiju!', n.d., MA, RH 45/59.
('7 Pamphlet 'Borci Muslimani', n.d., MA, RH 45/59.
<>8 Pamphlet 'Braco Muslimani!', n.d., MA, RH 45/59.

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1026 DAVID MO TAD EL
Religious images and illustrations, especially those of mosq

played a remarkable role in many of these pamphlets. Visua
the advantage that it could also reach those who were illitera
illiteracy of the population here, a series of suitable drawing
at the instigation of the department in Agram', a report fr
Division South-East had stated as early as September 1942.60
pamphlets, Germans also distributed propaganda posters dep
One of them showed Roosevelt dropping bombs on Most
a skyline of roofs and minarets.
A high portion of the pamphlets addressed Muslims in rel
'Muslims' (Muslimani) or 'Muslim brothers' (Braco musliman
for example, 'Bosniaks' (Bosnjaci) or 'Bosnians' (Bosanci).
attempted to accommodate Muslims within other religious
for instance, 'Muslims, Catholics, Orthodox of Bosnia', or 'Croatians and
Serbians: Muslims, Catholics and Orthodox', or the 'honest Croatians, Muslims
and Orthodox in the partisan ranks!', exhorting them to change sides.7'
Another pamphlet asked 'Muslims, Catholics and Orthodox' to remember that
the Bolsheviks would not only spread 'murder and burning', but that they also
stood for the 'extermination of faith and religion'.72
After the employment of the 'Handzar' division, reports and pamphlets
about it became a strong instrument of German propaganda directed towards
Muslim civilians. Moreover, from early 1944, when the division was deployed
after several months of training abroad, its propaganda section also became
concerned with the ideological education of the civil population.73 In spring
1944, for instance, it put up charcoal drawn propaganda posters for the Mavlud
(birthday of the Prophet) celebrations across the occupied Muslim areas.74
'9 Propaganda Division South-East, Report ('Lage- und Tatigkeitsbericht fiir den Monat
Aug. 1942'), 4 Sept. 1942, Belgrade, MA, RW 4/232.
70 Propaganda Poster, n.d., MA, RH 45/54; the poster was printed 8,000 times on 7 Feb.
1944 and put up on 9 Feb. 1944 in Sarajevo, Banja Luka, Dubrovnik and other towns, see Data
Sheet in MA, RH 45/54; and, for the poster depicting Roosevelt, see Propaganda Poster, n.d.,
MA, RH 45/54; this poster was printed in 10,000 copies on 1 Mar. 1944 and put up on 8 Mar.
1944 in Sarajveo, Banja Luka, Dubrovnik, and other towns, see Data Sheet in MA, RH 45/54.
71 Pamphlet 'Muslimani, Katolici i Pravoslavci Bosne', n.d., MA, RH 45/48; and, for the
German translation, see Pamphlet 'Muselmanen, Katholiken, Pravoslaven Bosniens' (German
translation), n.d., MA, RH 45/48; Pamphlet 'Kroaten und Serben: Muselmanen, Katholiken
und Pravoslaven' (German translation), n.d. (Oct. 1943), MA, RH 37/6853; and Pamphlet
'Postenim Hrvatima, Muslimanima i Pravoslavcima u partizanskim redovima!', n.d., MA, RH
45/59
Pamphlet 'Muslimani, Katolici i Pravoslavci', n.d., MA, RH 45/48; and, for the German
translation, see Pamphlet 'Muselmanen, Katholiken und Pravoslaven' (German translation),
n.d., MA, RH 45/48.
73 Structure Plan, Office for Political and Ideological Education the 13th SS Waffen
Mountain Division 'Handzar', 2 Mar. 1944, n.p., BA, NS 19/2601.
7 ! Wangemann (Chief of the Office for Political and Ideological Education of the 13th
SS Waffen Mountain Division 'Handzar'), Report ('Tatigkeitsbericht der Abt. VI'), 4 Apr. 1944,
n.p., BA, NS 19/2601.

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Between 12 and 25 March 1944, it employed a loudspeaker van to address
three local Mavlud celebrations.75 The division also produced pictorial reports
of the religious celebrations of the soldiers. These were then used, for example,
in window displays.76 In autumn 1943, the SS had already given a photographic
report about the Ramadan Bajram (end of the Islamic fasting month) cel
ebrations of the soldiers to the Croatian press for publication. Concerned about
the SS campaign, Ustasa authorities turned to Kasche, complaining that the
article had been foisted upon them under duress.77
Soon, the German command would also use the military imams of the
division to conduct propaganda among Muslim civilians. Propagandistically
trained, the SS sent them into the mosques to lead the Friday prayers (diama
namaz) for the civil population in order to 'carry', as an SS report put it, the
'ideas of the division' to the civil population.78 The report further noted that
the 'imams continuously hold gatherings in the mosque for the civil population,
which are framed by Islamic prayers'. These religious gatherings were used to
spread political ideas and propaganda, especially to explain the work of the
division and to agitate against Tito.
Such meetings are held by the imams in all the larger towns in the area of the
division's employment. The imams also conducted the most diverse Mavlud
celebrations in these places, and have achieved a very good propagandistic effect
on the civil population as, during the solemn speeches, allusions were made to the
division and its aims.
Soldiers of the division were also used as propagandists. Pamphlets designed for
the civil population, which were created by the division's propaganda section,
were not just airdropped from planes, but were also given to the soldiers to be
sent, along with their field post, to their families, neighbours and friends.79
Soldiers were instructed to tell their relatives to forward the pamphlets in order
to achieve a maximum readership. Moreover, the SS created pamphlets signed
by Muslim soldiers calling for war against Tito. One such pamphlet, signed by
the SS man Halid Komic, not only turned against the partisans, but also carried
anti-Jewish stereotypes: 'It is the Jews and the Jews' menials. Who has had the
whole capital in their hands? The Jews. Who has lived at ease? Only the Jew.'
Now, he claimed, the SS division would bring back 'freedom, order and
75 Ibid.
/h Ibid.; and Wangemann to Sauberzweig (Commander of the 13th SS Waffen Mountain
Division 'Handzar'), 10 Apr. 1944, n.p., BA, NS 19/2601.
77 Propaganda Division (Waffen-SS Standarte 'Kurt Eggers') to Brandt (Himmler's Staff),
Berlin, 8 Nov. 1943, BA, NS 19/2601.
78 Wangemann, Report ('Tatigkeitsbericht der Abt. VI'), 4 Apr. 1944, n.p., BA, NS
19/2601.
79 Sauberzweig, Propaganda Letter 'Moji dragi momci!', 28 Feb. 1944, n.p., BA, NS19/
2601; and, for the German translation, see Sauberzweig, Propaganda Letter 'Meine lieben
Manner' (German translation), 25 Feb. 1944, n.p., BA, NS 19/2601.

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1028 DAVID MOTADEL
justice'.8" Another pamphlet, anonymously signed by

against the 'godless hordes of Tito' which had tur
tears'. 'Our unshaken belief in the great man [Hitler
loving peoples of Europe against the adversaries of g
the strength to cany out the fight and the tasks su
proclaimed. In the usual manner, religious impera
political appeals: 'Who is not for us and with us, is a
your holy duty to follow completely this, our call!...
Finally, the imams were to instruct the German
about religious customs and rules in Muslim areas.82
intermediaries during billets with the local populace
considered politically important by German official
Before 1943, German interactions with the religious leaders, the ulema, and
their institutions were rare. German Foreign Office officials dealt almost
exclusively with the Muslim representatives of the Ustasa state and faced the
problem that a powerful Muslim leader did not exist. The two most important
Muslim factions within the Ustasa regime were led by the Muslim vice-premier,
Dzafer Kulenovic, and by Hakija Hadzic, Pavelic's lackey in Bosnia and
Herzegovina.8^ A veteran politician, Kulenovic had already been a minister in
the kingdom of Yugoslavia and, following the death of Mehmed Spaho in 1939,
had become president of the 'Yugoslav Muslim Organization'. According to a
German diplomat, he drew first and foremost on religious slogans and only
second on Croatian nationalism, but was still accused by many Muslims of being
an Ustasa puppet. Hakija Hadzic, who promoted Croatian nationalist slogans
rather than religious ones, had only a small following, mostly among the
intelligentsia.8^ Another German official observed in March 1943 that there
was 'no personality' who could be considered a generally accepted leader.
'The solution to the Muslim question is mainly a leadership question', he stated.
Muslims of the Ustasa regime had little authority within the Muslim population.
The situation seemed clearer in the case of the religious establishment which
was believed to wield more genuine power and influence over the people.
8" Pamphlet (Draft) 'An alle Fluchtlinge!' (German translation), n.d., BA, NS 19/2601.
Sl Pamphlet 'Bosniaken und Bosniakinen!' (German translation), n.d., BA, NS 19/2601.
Sauberzweig, Order ('Stellung der Imame innerhalb der Division'), 8 Mar. 1944, n.p.,
BA, NS 19/2601.
3 On Kulenovic and Hadzic, see literature in n. 10.
4 Requard (German Legation in Zagreb). Report ('Bericht iiber Dienstreise nach
Sarajevo'), 2 June 1943, Zagreb, USHMA, RG 71, Box 237. Requard based his assessment on
consultations with Islamic leaders, especially Ali Aganovic.
5 Katschinka (German Legation in Zagreb), Report ('Muselmanen'), 27 Mar. 1943,
Zagreb, USHMA, RG 71, Box 237.

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THE 'MUSLIM QUESTION' IN HITLER'S BALKANS 102g
As religious structures were fully institutionalized, they could be understood,
and, possibly, utilized. Organized within the 'Islamic Religious Community', the
faithful were under the authority of the Reis-ul-Ulema (Head of the Ulema), the
highest religious leader.8'1 The Reis-ul-Ulema was assisted by the Ulema-Medzlis
(Council of the Ulema), the supreme council of the Islamic community, which
consisted of himself and four other eminent dignitaries and oversaw the vakuf
endowment, medresas and serial courts as well as the work of the local imams,
the ulema and hodzas. This administration had been introduced in 1882 by
Habsburg bureaucrats anxious to loosen the religious bonds with the Ottoman
empire and keen to monitor and control Islam in the Balkans, and had survived
in the Yugoslav kingdom and under the Ustasa regime. Eager to present
themselves as a protector of Islam, the Germans made no direct attempts
to interfere with the Islamic administration. As they became more involved in
the Muslim areas of the Balkans in early 1943, however, German officials
increasingly engaged with religious leaders. In the end, the SS even employed
an important member of the Ulema-Medzlis for their political aims.
At the time of the German invasion of Yugoslavia, the office of Reis-ul-Ulema
was held by Fehim Spaho, former president of the High Seriat Court in Sarajevo
and brother of Mehmed Spaho. Although Spaho initially enthusiastically
supported the Ustasa regime, hoping that it would allow him to realize his
own aims, he soon lost hope in Pave lie.8 7 Salih Safet Basic, who informally
replaced Spaho after his death in early 1942, had a rocky relationship with
the Ustasa.88 Concerned with the protection of their community, both leaders
sought good relations with the Germans. Spaho had in fact cultivated his
contacts with German officials already in the months leading up to the invasion
of the Balkans and kept them informed about atrocities against Muslims during
the war.8s Other members of the Ulema-Medzlis went further. As the situation of
the Muslims deteriorated in 1942 and 1943, many of them embraced the idea
of Muslim autonomy under Berlin's protection. Their hopes were fuelled by the
8b On the history of the Islamic institutions, see Donia, Islam under the Double Eagle,
pp. 19-22; Hauptmann, 'Die Mohammedaner in Bosnien-Hercegovina', pp. 685-90; Dzaja,
Bosnien-Herzegowina in der Osterreichisch-Ungarischen Epoche, pp. 58—64; Al-Arnaut, 'Islam and
Muslims in Bosnia, 1878-1918', pp. 250-1; Karcic, The Bosniaks and the challenge of modernity,
pp. 124-39; idem, 'The office of Ra'Ts al-'Ulama' among the Bosniaks (Bosnian Muslims)',
Intellectual Discourse, 5 (1997), pp. 109-20; idem, Seriatski Sudovi u Jugoslaviji, 1918-1941-, idem,
The reform of Shari'a courts and Islamic law'; Bougarel, 'Farewell to the Ottoman legacy?',
p. 317; Popovic, L'Islam balkanique, pp. 273-8, 316-19, and 339; and, for a general overview,
Ferhat Seta, Reis-ul-Uleme u Bosni i Hercegovini i Jugoslaviji od 1882 do 799/ Godine (Sarajevo,
1991)
7 On Spaho, see Tomasevich, War and revolution, pp. 467 and 490; Redzic, Bosnia and
Herzegovina, pp. 78 and 86-7; Bougarel, 'Farewell to the Ottoman legacy?', passim; Greble,
Sarajevo, esp. pp. 30-7, 64-5, 76-81, 85, 96, 99, 101, 112-13, 115, 124, 126, and 166;
Hasanbegovic, Muslimani u Zagrebu, passim; and Popovic, L'Islam balkanique, p. 339.
88 On Basic, see Redzic, Bosnia and Herzegovina, p. 174; idem, Muslimansko Autonomastvo,
p. 91; Greble, Sarajevo, pp. 161-2 and 217; Hasanbegovic, Muslimani u Zagrebu, p. 293; and
Popovic, L'Islam balkanique, p. 339. 89 Greble, Sarajevo, pp. 32 and 166.

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IO3O DAVID MOTADEL
tour of the Mufti, the establishment of th

massive religious propaganda campaign.
Both Fehim Spaho and Salih Basic were op
more fundamentalist members of the Ulem
Handzic. Al-Azhar educated, Handzic wa
pan-Islamic leanings who taught at a medre
librarian of the grand Gazi Husrevbegov
El-Hidaje ('The Right Path'), a society of Sa
the Mladi Muslimani ('Young Muslims'),
Handzic and his supporters had quickly bec
and were now advocating an autonomist
During al-Husseini's tour, Handzic had met
a warm welcome address at a banquet in the
an article about the visit in El-Hidaje, the
consultations with German diplomats in Sa
urged for a more extensive German interv
and murder of Muslims, he blamed the Ust
regime had adopted the same policy towar
in the Yugoslav kingdom, he claimed - a p
in Pavelic's government were not true rep
been bought, he told the Germans. Althou
foundation of the Muslim SS division, he m
The only solution was an independent M
Germany. Handzic even suggested a rel
purified Muslim areas. The Muslim populat
German soldiers had fallen in battle against
of the Mufti had also sent the right sig
assured the Germans, that the Muslims were the natural allies of the Third
Reich. Handzic was well aware of what the Germans wanted to hear. Giving
9° On Handzic, see Redzic, Bosnia and Herzegovina, p. 189; Bougarel, 'Farewell to the
Ottoman legacy?', passim; Greble, Sarajevo, pp. 34, 78, 126, and 214; and Hasanbegovic,
Muslimani u Zagrebu, pp. 119, 205-7, 210, and 261.
91 On El-Hidaje and the Young Muslims, see Redzic, Bosnia and Herzegovina, pp. 103, 105,
and 169; idem, Muslimansko Autonomastvo, pp. 16, 123, 142-3, and 205-6; Karcic, The reform
of Shari'a courts and Islamic law', p. 268; Bougarel, 'Farewell to the Ottoman Legacy?', passim;
Greble, Saravejo, esp. pp. 33-4, 78, 160-3, x75_6> 184-5. 200-1, 214, 217, and 235;
Hasanbegovic, Muslimani u Zagrebu, passim; and Popovic, L'Islam balkanique, pp. 321, 328,
and 340.
92 Mehmed Handzic, 'Palestinski veliki muftija u Sarajevu' ('The Palestinian Grand Mufti in
Sarajevo'), El-Hidaje, 6 (5 May 1943), pp. 250-2; the article includes the text of the speech
given by al-Husseini after the Friday prayers in the Gazi Husrev Beg Mosque of Sarajevo
(p. 251); and a portrait photo of the Mufti was printed on the front page of the issue. El-Hidaje
is stored in the Gazi Husrev Beg Library (Gazi Husrev-Begova Biblioteka), Sarajevo.
93 German Legation in Zagreb, Report ('Ubersicht iiber den Inhalt der einzelnen
Gesprache wahrend Reise Konsul Winkler, Dr. Katschinka und Herr Oertel'), n.d. (28 Apr.
1943), Zagreb, PA, R 100998.

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THE 'MUSLIM QUESTION' IN HITLER'S BALKANS IO3I
them the impression that their religiously charged propaganda had fallen on
fertile soil, he pushed his own agenda, most notably the strengthening of self
defence and the establishment, de facto and, if possible, de jure, autonomy
from the Ustasa.
Handzic was not the only member of the ulema to seek a tighter alliance with
the Germans. Ali Aganovic, a widely respected member of Ulema-Medzlis who
repeatedly consulted with German officials, also followed this line.94 Although
he paid public lip service to the Ustasa regime until the end, he too had soon
lost faith in Pavelic and had begun to urge the Germans for a stronger
involvement in the Muslim Balkans.9® At a meeting in the spring of 1943,
Aganovic assured the officials from the German legation in Zagreb that Muslim
religious autonomy could only be achieved through political independence.96
Emphasizing the importance of the Muslims of the Balkans within the wider
Islamic world, he also discussed pan-Islamic policies and the re-establishment of
the Caliphate, an office he believed should be given to the Mufti of Jerusalem.
While Handzic and Aganovic made their appeals for an alliance with the Third
Reich behind closed doors, other members of the ulema stood openly in the
service of the German authorities.
The most important collaborator of the Ulema-Medzlis was Muhamed Pandza,

a leading religious dignitary and a member of El-Hidaje.97 From a prominent
Sarajevo family of religious leaders and educated at the most prestigious Islamic
institutions in the country, Pandza had always kept a certain distance from the
Ustasa regime and was now publicly pleading for Muslim autonomy under
German protection. His strong pro-German attitude made him an ideal
collaborator for the Wehrmacht and the SS. At once, the SS employed him for
the recruitment of Muslim volunteers, a mission which he would carry out with
all his religious authority. Pandza was described by a field imam of the Muslim
SS unit, Hasan Bajrakitarovic, as the 'true initiator, greatest propagandist,
recruiter and fighter for the foundation and replenishment of this division'.98
According to the imam, it was Pandza who had convinced the 'Muslim clerical
leadership' to support the deployment of the division. 'Everybody knew',
Bajrakitarovic explained, that what Pandza recommended must be 'genuinely
94 On Aganovic, see Tomasevich, War and revolution, p. 491; Greble, Sarajevo, p. 128; and
Hasanbegovic, Muslimani u Zagrebu, pp. 293 and 341.
95 Requard, Report ('Bericht uber Dienstreise nach Sarajevo'), 2 June 1943, Zagreb,
USHMA, RG 71, Box 237.
•)b German Legation in Zagreb, Report ('Ubersicht uber den Inhalt der einzelnen
Gesprache wahrend Reise Konsul Winkler, Dr. Katschinka und Herr Oertel'), n.d. (28 Apr.
1943), Zagreb, PA, R 100998.
97 On Pandza, see Tomasevich, War and revolution, pp. 411, 495, and 503-4; Redzic, Bosnia
and Herzegovina, pp. 103, 174, 184-5, anc^ 2245 idem, Muslimansko Autonomastvo, pp. 22-3,
139-43, and 147; Broszat and Hory, Kroatische Ustascha-Staat, p. 157; Bougarel, 'Farewell to the
Ottoman legacy?', pp. 324-5; Greble, Sarajevo, pp. 173-4, L84-6, 192, and 237; and
Hasanbegovic, Muslimani u Zagrebu, pp. 79-81, 205-10, and 345-6.
98 Bajrakitarovic to Phelps, 15 Nov. 1943, Mostar, BA, NS 19/2601.

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IO32 DAVID MOTADEL
Islamic and patriotic'. In some towns, be

the enlisting office of the division, they w
prepared them mentally for their mission.
the Germans would also use Pandza as an i
to pacify the Muslim areas.
A significant role in this respect was play
Merhamet-also known as the 'Muslim Charitable Society Merhamet'
(Muslimansko Dobrotvorno Drustvo Merhamet)-in Sarajevo, which was led
by Pandza.100 Merhamet became a major body providing humanitarian aid
during the war years, running soup kitchens, orphanages, and refugee camps,
and it also got politically more and more involved. For the Germans, Merhamet
became a valued partner, and they were cautious to retain good relations
with the organization. When, for instance, Merhamet requested the return of a
Muslim orphan who had been adopted by a German Catholic family, brought to
Germany and converted to Catholicism, German authorities swiftly intervened,
returned the child and entrusted it to a Muslim family in Sarajevo.101 On the
ground, military officials soon regarded Merhamet as the most important
representative body of the Muslims in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Merhamet
repeatedly negotiated the food situation with the German Police Area
Commander, Sarajevo, SS-Oberfuhrer Werner From in.102 And when Berlin
started a relief fund in early 1944, Berger suggested that clothes for Muslim
refugees be distributed through Merhamet. 103 Himmler was only too happy to
employ the local Muslim structures, and authorized Merhamet to make the
distribution.'°4
The SS perceived Merhamet as a strong partner. Yet, it was not fully

controlled by the Germans and would follow its own interests. In September
1943, the second secretary of the organization, Mehmed Tokic, who had
actually been hired by the SS as a covert informer, would threaten Germa
officers with an open rebellion against the Croatian state.10® The Muslims
99 Ibid.
100 On Merhamet, see Tomasevich, War and revolution, pp. 409, 411, and 495; Redzic, Bosnia
and Herzegovina, p. 174; idem, Muslimansko Autonomastvo, pp. 123 and 142-3; Greble, Sarajevo,
esp. pp. 34, 106, 139-41, 173-6, 213-17, 235, and 245-6; and Popovic, L'Islam balkanique
pp. 285, 287, 321, and 340. 101 Greble, Sarajevo, p. 174.
102 Langenberger (Headquaters of the 369th Infantry Division), Report ('Niederschrift
iiber eine Besprechung am 17.9.43 dem 2. Sekretar der "Muslimansko Dobrotvorno
Drustvo: Merhamet Sarajevo" namens Mechmed Tokitsch'), 17 Sept. 1943, n.p., BA, NS19/
3893 (also in MA, N 756/ 183b).
103 Berger to Himmler, n.d. (Jan. 1944), Berlin, BA, NS 19/319; and, similarly,
Berger to Himmler, 12 Jan. 1944, Berlin, BA, NS 19/2601.
104 Meine (Himmler's Staff) to Berger, n.d. (Jan. 1944), n.p., BA, NS 19/319.
105 Langenberger, Report ('Niederschrift iiber eine Besprechung am 17.9.43 dem
2. Sekretar der "Muslimansko Dobrotvorno Drustvo: Merhamet Sarajevo" namens Mechmed
Tokitsch'), 17 Sept. 1943, n.p., BA, NS19/3893 (also in MA, N 756/183^. This report was
forwarded by Phleps (Commander of the 5th SS Mountain Corps) to Himmler, 5 Nov. 1943, n.
p., BA, NSi9/3893.

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Tokic made clear, despised the Ustasa regime and sought to live in a German
protectorate instead, as in Austrian-Hungarian times. Berger tried to ameliorate
the situation, rejecting any threats levied by the 'Muslim leadership', and
warning that violent uprisings such as these would make things even worse for
the Muslims.106 The leaders of Merhamet soon became disillusioned with
the Germans. In the end, also, Muhamed Pandza lost his hope in the Third
Reich. He went into the woods, founded the 'Muslim Liberation Movement'
(Muslimanski Oslobodilacki Pokret), and called for armed self-defence and
Muslim autonomy.'°7 Addressing his 'Muslim Brothers!' in a propaganda
pamphlet, Pandza now declared war against Ustasa and Celinks.108 He
announced: 'Everything we serve is the wellbeing of the Islamic community
and our nation.' 'Muslims', he proclaimed, in his usual religious rhetoric, now
had to fight 'with faith in god and his help, bravely and dauntlessly' for survival.
Although some SS circles in Berlin were concerned about these developments,
Krempler, who had repeatedly dealt with Pandza in the field, emphasized that
he was still pro-German. '°9 Hitler, whose trust in the Muslims remained
unbroken, excused Pandza's defection with the remark that the Muslims
needed to protect themselves.11" Pandza, who later made contact with Tito's
partisans, was finally captured by German troops in eastern Bosnia and handed
over to the Ustasa authorities. He was not the only Islamic leader who had
become disillusioned.
VI
Promises made to Muslims by the Germans, eager to present themselves as

the protector of Islam, contrasted sharply with the realities of war. In practice,
the Germans were not able to pacify the Muslim areas. The collaboration
between Muslim leaders and the Germans nurtured the hatred directed against
them by partisans and Cetniks. Although the Germans had promised that the
sole purpose of the Muslim division was the protection and pacification of the
Muslim areas of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Himmler had sent it for training to
France and, later, Germany. Unprotected, the Muslim population became the
object of retaliatory attacks. In the autumn of 1943, Tito's partisans initiated a
1(>b Schulte to Brandt, 11 Jan. 1944, Berlin, BA, NS19/3893 (also in MA, N 7567183b).
107 On the Muslim Liberation Movement, see Tomasevich, War and revolution, pp. 503-4;
Redzic, Bosnia and Herzegovina, pp. 103, 184-5, an<^ 224' idem, Muslimansko Autonomastvo,
pp. 139-43; Greble, Sarajevo, pp. 184-6 and 192; and Hasanbegovic, Muslimani u Tagrebu,
pp. 208-10.
108 Pandza, Pamphlet (German Translation), n.d. (10 Jan. 1944), MA, RH 19 Xl/ioa
(also in BA, NS 19/2601).
109 Headquarters of the 2nd Panzer Army to Headquarters of Army Group F, 8 Jan. 1944,
n.p., MA, RH 19XI/10a; and, for a similar assessment, Bajrakitarovic to Phelps, 15 Nov. 1943,
Mostar, BA, NS 19/2601.
110 Kasche, Internal Note ('Unterhaltung mit dem Fiihrer am 29.10.1943 im
Hauptquartier'), 11 Nov. 1943, Zagreb, PA, Nachlass Kasche, vol. 23.

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DAVID MOTADEL
i°34
major offensive in Bosnia. Thousands were killed. Te

on die run. The relatives of Muslim volunteers in pa
partisans. Muslim refugees gathered in the hundred
and basements, an SS field report noted.111 Man
clothes and suffered malnutrition. Across the Islamic
followed closely. On 11 January 1944, the SS re
Konstantin Kammerhofer, wrote to Himmler, a
only about the local situation, but also the effe
Muslim world:
As a consequence of the partisan struggle in Croatia about 230,000 people, around

210,000 of them from the area of Bosnia, are currently on the run. The situation
of these people is the worst possible that could be imagined. At the present time, no
human being can describe the tragedies that take place among these masses ... The
majority of the refugees comprises Muslims... With regard to the Muslims in
the 13th SS Bosnian-Herzegovinian Volunteer Mountain Division as well as to the
problem of World-Islam (Weltmuselmanen-Problem) it has to be considered anew if
you, Reichsfiihrer, should call for a special support to provide relief needed by the
refugees.112
Himmler was convinced. On the occasion of the Bajram celebration in autumn

1943, the SS had already organized a collection of money for the Muslim
population in Bosnia and, shortly after, Himmler had ordered a second relief
fund.1'3 During the second collection alone, more than 120,000 Reichsmarks
were raised.114 Himmler would add another 100,000 from his own funds.115 In
January 1944, Berger reported that 225,000 Reichsmarks had been amassed.116
The money was mainly used for clothing, which was then distributed.1^ Still,
these projects were only a drop in the ocean. SS policies towards Muslims had
compromised the Muslim population, while providing it with no military
protection.
Finally, in late February 1944, the SS sent the 'Handzar' division back to the
Balkans, launching another major propaganda campaign. For a short period,
the situation for Muslims eased. The Muslims responded with hope and thanks.
On 20 April 1944, for instance, Krempler reported that prayers for Hitler took
Posch (Waffen-SS), Report ('Abschlussbericht uber die Tatigkeit als F. O. in Kroatien

vom 10.3.1943-1.1.1944'), 30 Dec. 1943, Zagreb, BA, NS ig/319.
1.2 Kammerhofer to Himmler, 11 Jan. 1944, Zagreb, BA, NS 19/319.
1.3 Sauberzweig to Berger, 5 Nov. 1943, n.p., BA, NS 19/2601; and, on the second
collection, Himmler to Berger andjiittner, 16 Nov. 1943, n.p., BA, NS 19/2601.
"4 Berger to Himmler, i2jan. 1944, Berlin, BA, NS 19/2601.
"5 Brandt to Berger, 31 Jan. 1944, n.p., BA, NS ig/2601; and on the actual transfer,
documents in BA, NS 19/2601.
11' Berger to Himmler, n.d. (Jan. 1944), Berlin, BA, NS 19/319.
117 Wangemann, Report ('Tatigkeitsbericht der Abt. VI'), 4 Apr. 1944, n.p., BA. NS
19/2601.

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place in all the towns of the Sandzak.118 A Muslim delegation from the area sent
Hitler a telegram of obeisance:
The Muslims of the Sandzak, who shoulder on shoulder with the brave German
soldiers participate in the battle against the bandits, celebrate today your birthday
and send fervent prayers to the almighty Allah for your personal long life and
happiness, in the unshakable and deep trust in the final victory of the German
people and the salvation of us Muslims.1^
Hitler thanked the Muslims, in return letting them know that he had been 'very
delighted' by the letter.120 Similar demonstrations of loyalty followed. In July
1944, Muslims from the Sandzak area sent a gramophone record containing a
prayer of thanks and praise in Arabic for Hitler.121 In Berlin, Brandt, head of
Himmler's personal staff, sent the record to the SS propaganda section to be
exploited by the SS or by Goebbels's Propaganda Ministry.122
In spring 1944, northern and eastern Bosnia effectively came under the
control of the SS and Himmler's Muslim division. The infamous SS 'Guidelines
for the Securing of Public Peace in Bosnia' ('Richtlinien fur die Sicherung des
Landfriedens in Bosnien') give a good idea of the intended occupational
regime in the area and of the utilization of religion to support it.123 In the towns
and villages, SS officers were to install reliable local leaders who functioned
as intermediaries between the population and the Germans. Every Friday, the
day of the dzuma-namaz, these representatives had to read out the weekly
propaganda slogans of the SS. Schools were to be put under the command of
trustworthy locals-'teachers, imams, particularly suited women', but 'no
intelligentsia', as the SS specified. More importantly, the SS scheme envisaged
a massive religious resettlement with the aim of creating homogeneous
Islamic towns and villages. 'It is the aim, under any circumstances, to create in
the country communities a population of the same confession', it was stated.
Moreover, the SS guidelines endorsed a war of extermination against partisans,
1,8 Krempler to Neubacher and Behrends (Higher SS and Police Leader Serbia), 20 Apr.
1944, n.p., BA, NS 19/3630.
"9 Muslim Representatives of the Sandzak (Landesausschuss der Muselmanischen
Volksvereinigung Sandschak) to Hitler (German translation), n.d. (spring 1944), n.p., BA, NS
] 9/3630. The letter was forwarded by Krempler to Neubacher and Behrends, 20 Apr. 1944, n.
p., BA, NS ig/3630; and then from Behrends to Brandt, 24 Apr. 1944, Belgrade, BA, NS
19/3630; Brandt to Behrends, I5june 1944, n.p., BA, NS 19/3630; and Himmler ordered it
to be forwarded to Hitler with the wish that an answer be written: Brandt to Fegelein (Hitler's
Staff), i3june 1944, n.p., BA, NS 19/3630.
120 Brandt to Behrends, 7 July 1944, n.p., BA, NS 19/3630.
121 Behrends to Himmler, 31 July 1944, Belgrade, BA, NS 19/3630.
122 Brandt to Behrends, 18 Sept. 1944, n.p., BA, NS 19/3630; and Venn (Himmler's Staff)
to Propaganda Division (Wafl'en-SS Standarte 'Kurt Eggers'), 18 Sept. 1944, n.p., BA, NS
!9/3630
123 Sauberzweig, Guidelines ('Richtlinien fur die Sicherung des Landfriedens in Bosnien'),
9 Mar. 1944, n.p., BA, NS19/2145 (also in PA, R 100998). On the guidelines, see also
Tomasevich, War and revolution, p. 499; and Redzic, Bosnia and Herzegovina, pp. 45-6; and idem,
Muslimansko Aulonomastvo, pp. 166-7.

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IO36 DAVID MOTADEL
Cetniks, and other hostile groups as well as an aggr
civilian population. 'The point is to annihilate the en
clear, encouraging field commanders to be particula
the reign of the SS in the area was too short-li
bureaucracy too chaotic for schemes to be fully i
soldiers of the Muslim division became notoriou
brutally, spreading fear and terror.
To some extent, the population relocations envis
the SS mirrored the demands of some Islamic au
Himmler internally toyed with the idea of the crea
protectorate, or 'military frontier' (Wehrgrenze
Habsburg era, for the time being, the SS was in
hopes of the Muslim autonomists in Bosnia and H
when, in the final months of the war, Bedri Pej
Muslim politician, sought help from the Mufti of Je
of a Muslim state in the Balkans, uniting Kosovo, cl
and the Sandzak with Bosnia and Herzegovina, a
quickly thwarted these ambitions. 125
As the German military situation deteriorated, man
Axis victory. In July 1944, a Wehrmacht report de
Muslim population towards the Germans as inconsist
them 'in every respect unreliable'.126 In the final m
not count on German help any more and looked for
defence groups, like Pandza's 'Muslim Liberation Mo
young Muslims, a German army report noted i
themselves into local self-defence units, so-called
the militias, most importantly the 'Green Cadre
German warlord Nesad Topcic, attracted more
Supported by religious leaders like Mehmed Handzic
Muslim villages but also committed ferocious atroci
population. Attempts by the Cetniks to recruit Mu
unsurprisingly, only little success. 129 Tito's par
124 Brandt to Phleps, 20 Nov. 1943, n.p., BA, ^19/3893. Hi

response to Phleps's letter of 5 Nov. 1943 about Tokic and t
125 Neubacher to Foreign Office, 9 Apr. 1944, Belgrade, P
12lJ Winkelbrandt (Headquarters of the 373rd I
('Feindnachrichtenblatt Nr. 7'), 16 July 1944, n.p., MA, RH
127 On Muslim self-defence groups and the green cadr
revolution, p.504; and Redzic, Bosnia and Herzegovina, esp. p
Muslimansko Autonomastvo, esp. pp. 120-3, 147-9, 185-6, an
128 Winkelbrandt, Report ('Feindnachrichtenblatt Nr. 6')
37/6931; and, for a general military assessment of the Mu
Winkelbrandt in MA, RH 37/6931.
129 On Cetnik recruitment of Muslims, see Tomasevich, War
idem, The Chetniks (Stanford, CA, 1975), p. 105 and 240; Redz

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seemed to be a viable alternative to both the Germans and the Muslim militias.
As the war situation worsened in the winter of 1943-4, increasing numbers of

Muslims joined their ranks, though the proportion of Muslims in Tito's ranks
should not be overestimated. In spring 1944, according to Tito's own
assessment, only 25 per cent of his men were Muslims.^0 A first Muslim
partisan unit had already been formed in the summer of 1941, and Marshal
Tito willingly repeated Moscow's religious wartime propaganda that portrayed
communism as the only hope for Islam. In the brochure 'Muslims in the Soviet
Union: Religion in the Soviet Union' ('Muslimani u Sovjetskom Savezu: Religija
u Sovjetskom Savezu'), distributed by the partisan propagandists in the autumn
of 1944, Stalin's state was depicted as a paradise for the pious.'31
The Germans dealt with those Muslims whom they suspected of betrayal with
great brutality.'32 In a number of punitive missions against Muslim villages and
settlements whose inhabitants were accused of sheltering partisans, German
troops executed Muslim women and children. Even mosques were attacked.
In late 1944, German forces broke into the building of El-Hidaje in Sarajevo to
search for evidence against a number of members of the Young Muslims who
were suspected of working with the enemy. And despite all official efforts
to promote Germany as the protector of Balkan Islam, ordinary soldiers in the
field often had little respect for Muslims and their religion.
After the war, Muslims across the Balkans were widely stigmatized as
collaborators. Nevertheless, the communist regime in Yugoslavia did initially
refrain from direct attacks on Islam.'33 Only the most notorious Islamic
collaborators, like Ismet Muftic, Pavelic's Mufti of Zagreb, were executed, while
pp. 97-8, 143-6, and 174; and idem, Muslimansko Autonomastvo, esp. pp. 105-8, 168-9,
and 207-11.
130 Anonymous, 'Marshal Tito's supporters', Times (16 May 1944), states that Tito's army
was comprised of 44 per cent Serbs, 30 per cent Croats, 10 per cent Slovenes, 6 per cent other
nationals (including Italians), 5 per cent Montenegrins, 2.5 per cent Macedonians, and 2.5 per
cent Muslims, although it has to be taken into account that the proportion of Muslims in the
population was overall much smaller than that of Serbs or Croats.
131 On Tito's recruitment of Muslims, see Tomasevich, War and revolution, pp. 502-4 and
506-10; Redzic, Bosnia and Herzegovina, esp. pp. 170, 183—91, and 206-g; idem, Muslimansko
Autonomastvo, esp. pp. 108-10, 127-8, 157-9. and 211-12; and, on the propaganda brochure,
Popovic, L'Islam balkanique, pp. 341-2.
132 On German massacres of Muslims and attacks on Islamic institutions, see Tomasevich,
War and revolution, pp. 503-4; Redzic, Bosnia and Herzegovina, pp. 35 and 188; Greble, Sarajevo,
pp. 183 and 213-14; and Jonathan Gumz, 'German counterinsurgency policy in independent
Croatia, 1941-1944', Historian, 61 (igg8), pp. 33-50, at pp. 48-g.
133 On Islam in Tito's Yugoslavia, see Banac, 'Bosnian Muslims', pp. 144-6; Popovic, L'Islam
balkanique, pp. 343-65; Greble, Sarajevo, pp. 234-5, 237> an<^ 244- Donia, Sarajevo, pp. 215-21;
Zachary T. Irwin, 'The fate of Islam in the Balkans: a comparison of four state policies', in
Ramet, ed., Religion and nationalism in Soviet and East European politics, pp. 207-25, at p. 216;
Smail Balic, 'Der bosnisch-herzegowinische Islam', Der Islam, 44 (1968), pp. 115-37, esp.
pp. 121-2; and, on the arrests of Islamic dignitaries for wartime collaboration, Isma'il Balic,
'The present position of the Muslims of Bosnia and Herzegovina', Islamic Review, 37 (1949),
pp. 22-5, at p. 24.

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IO38 DAVID MOTADEL
other religious leaders, like Salih Basic, remained in of
and Ali Aganovic received long prison sentences (M
already died in 1944). The Poglavnik Mosque was shut d
blown up. After the consolidation of power, the new r
rigorous crackdown on Islam, which culminated in the
campaign of Tito's Antifascist Women's Front. In the
Republic of Albania, Enver Hoxha launched an even fie
institutions, rivalling the Stalinist terror against re
years.'34 Accused of treachery, the Muslim Cham A
area were targeted by the nationalist militias of Na
Republican Greek League', which massacred many,
down villages, and expelled the survivors to Albania. '35
To conclude, Berlin's attempts to promote Germany as
the Balkans was not the result of a long-term strategy
escalation of the war which led to increased German m
the Muslim areas in early 1943. The civil war had brou
frictions, which the German authorities eagerly tried
seemed to be an ideal ally not only because they were
and hostile to the Western allies and communism, but
notions of Islam and geopolitical considerations, m
belief that regional policies in the south-east of Eu
pan-Islamic, resonances. The previous pages have sh
German officials tried to use Islam in their policies
ground, further politicizing the religious in the re
terminology, and imperatives were employed in milit
religious legitimacy to an alliance with the Third Reic
enemies. German officials also got involved with religio
to pursue their own agenda, most notably the aim of M
from the beginning Muslim leaders played an im
policies towards Islam in the region, which was, aft
Muslim appeals and memoranda. In the end, German c
was less successful than officials in the Wehrmacht and
German advances had initially raised the hopes of m
suffering from the civil war, it soon became apparent
134 On Islam in Hoxha's Albania, see James S. O'Donnell, A comin

Hoxha (Boulder, CO, 1999), pp. 137-44; Raymond Zickel and Wa
a country study (Washington, DC, 1992), pp. 85-7; Popovic, L'lslam
on the arrests or executions of the Muftis of Tirana, Durres, and Shkoder and others for
wartime collaboration, Irwin, 'The fate of Islam in the Balkans', p. 212; and Peter Prifti,
'Albania: towards an atheist society', in Bohdan R. Bociurkiw and John W. Strong, eds., Religion
and atheism in the USSR and Eastern Europe (Toronto, 1975), pp. 388-404, at p. 391.
135 On the expulsion of the Albanian Muslim Cham minority, see Mazower, 'Three forms of
political justice', pp. 24-6; Meyer, Blutiges Edeliueifi, pp. 620—1; and, from the Cham perspective,
Meta, The Cham tragedy, esp. pp. 59-105; and the documents in Elsie and Destani, eds.,
The Cham Albanians of Greece, pp. 335-94.

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the violent realities of German warfare. Moreover, Berlin's propaganda
campaign lacked credibility and authenticity. It was all too obvious that the
Germans wanted to instrumentalize Islam for their political and military
interests. Attempts to solve the problem of authenticity by employing trusted
Muslim intermediaries had only limited effect.
The story of Germany's engagement with the 'Muslim question' in the
Balkans, overall, fits into the larger history of Berlin's more general attempts to
promote the Third Reich as a patron of Islam. Indeed, constant references to
the wider Muslim world and the global dimension of German policies towards
Islam in the Balkans were apparent not only in the internal writings of German
officials, but also in their communications with local Muslim leaders and in
their field propaganda. And yet, with their involvement in the 'Muslim
question' in the Balkans, the Germans encountered a very particular situation,
a highly complex, religiously charged conflict that can hardly be compared with
the situation in any other Muslim war zone.
Finally, the previous pages have also shed some light on the intersection
of religion, politics, and propaganda in the Second World War. The studied
episode has shown that religion could be crucial-and at times even more
important than ethnic and racial categories - for German political and military
officials when mapping the populations in the warzones and drafting policies
towards them. Assuming that religious communities, no matter how pious their
members or how fluid their communal lines, were governed by a distinctive set
of values and doctrines, religious policies were designed to manipulate and
instrumentalize the sacred for political and military purposes. Indeed, the story
of Germany's involvement with the 'Muslim question' in the Balkans constitutes
one of the most striking examples of the significance of the politics of religion
in the Second World War.

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Muslim Question in Hitler's Balkans

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Muslim Question in Hitler's Balkans

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THE 'MUSLIM QUESTION' IN HITLER'S BALKANS

Author(s): DAVID MOTADEL

Stable URL: https://www.jstor.org/stable/24528859

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THE 'MUSLIM QUESTION' IN

Gonville and Caius College, Cambridge

abstract. This article examines Germany's efforts to instrume

Advancing into the kingdom of Yugoslavia in the spring of 1941, German

Gonville and Caius College, Cambridge, cb2 ita [email protected]

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the banks of the Miljacka. 'The entire mood of the M

3 Fedrigotti to Foreign Office, 19 Apr. 1941, Kljuc, PA, R 6

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German troops encountered Catholics, Protestants, Eas

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and imperatives in their propaganda, and employed religious dignitaries to

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Muslims, under the leadership of Mehmed Spaho, he

(Sarajevo, 1974); Musnija Kamberovic, MehmedSpaho, 1883-1939: Polit

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The Germans were in a dilemma. Berlin

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18 SS Reich Security Head Office, Intelligence Report ('Muselmanenproblem'), n.d., n.p.,

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under Italian rule, German military authorities sought

Hitler fully endorsed German courtship of the Muslims. Neubacher, who

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history (London, 2000), provides a brilliant account of the Balkan communit

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tour, about the great influence he had across the entir

25 Berger to Himmler, 27 Mar. 1943, Berlin, BA, R19/2255.

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32 Berger to Himmler, ig Apr. 1943, Berlin, BA, R ig/2255.

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with satisfaction that al-Husseini emphasized the comm

39 German News Agency, Confidential Report ('Vertrauliches

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and the deployment of the Muslim division, was interpr

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Considering Ustasa sensibilities, the Germans avoided employing Islam in their

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and the Jewish community of Khaybar.

division were portrayed as part of a broader pan-Islamic mission, as 'the first

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Religious images and illustrations, especially those of mosq

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justice'.8" Another pamphlet, anonymously signed by

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tour of the Mufti, the establishment of th

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The most important collaborator of the Ulema-Medzlis was Muhamed Pandza,

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Islamic and patriotic'. In some towns, be

The SS perceived Merhamet as a strong partner. Yet, it was not fully