Models in Cooperative Game Theory

Rodica Branzei · Dinko Dimitrov · Stef Tijs

Models in Cooperative
Game Theory

Second Edition

123
Professor Dr. Rodica Branzei Professor Dr. Stef Tijs
Faculty of Computer Science CentER and Department of Econometrics
Alexandru Ioan Cuza University and Operations Research
16 Berthelot St. Tilburg University
700483 Iasi 5000 LE Tilburg
Romania Netherlands
[email protected] [email protected]

PD Dr. Dinko Dimitrov

Chair of Microeconomics
Faculty of Law and Economics
University of Bayreuth
95440 Bayreuth
Germany
[email protected]

Originally published as Volume 556 in our Series ‘Lecture Notes in Economics and Mathematical Systems’

ISBN 978-3-540-77953-7 e-ISBN 978-3-540-77954-4

DOI 10.1007/978-3-540-77954-4
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Preface

Cooperative game theory is a booming research area with many new

developments in the last few years. So, our main purpose when prepar-
ing the second edition was to incorporate as much of these new devel-
opments as possible without changing the structure of the book. First,
this offered us the opportunity to enhance and expand the treatment of
traditional cooperative games, called here crisp games, and, especially,
that of multi-choice games, in the idea to make the three parts of the
monograph more balanced. Second, we have used the opportunity of a
second edition to update and enlarge the list of references regarding the
three models of cooperative games. Finally, we have benefited from this
opportunity by removing typos and a few less important results from
the first edition of the book, and by slightly polishing the English style
and the punctuation, for the sake of consistency along the monograph.
The main changes are:
(1) Chapter 3 contains an additional section, Section 3.3, on the av-
erage lexicographic value, which is a recent one-point solution concept
defined on the class of balanced crisp games.
(2) Chapter 4 is new. It offers a brief overview on solution con-
cepts for crisp games from the point of view of egalitarian criteria, and
presents in Section 4.2 a recent set-valued solution concept based on
egalitarian considerations, namely the equal split-off set.
(3) Chapter 5 is basically an enlarged version of Chapter 4 of the first
edition because Section 5.4 dealing with the relation between convex
games and clan games with crisp coalitions is new. Additionally, the
structure of Section 4.2 of the first edition has been changed for the
sake of consistency with the other two models, resulting in the actual
Section 5.2.
VI Preface

(4) Chapter 7 contains an additional section on generalized cores

and stable sets, Section 7.3.
(5) Chapter 8 has a slightly modified structure in comparison to its
corresponding chapter in the first edition, but its contents remained in
fact unchanged.
(6) Chapter 10 is an enlarged version of Chapter 9 of the first edition
due to the enhancing and enlarging of Chapters 11 and 12, where we
use improved notation as well.
(7) Chapter 11, dealing with solution concepts for multi-choice
games, has a new structure as to better incorporate the new text re-
garding Shapley-like values. Section 11.4 is new and contains the multi-
choice version of the equal split-off set for crisp games (cf. Section 4.2).
(8) Chapter 12, originated from Chapter 11 of the first edition, con-
tains several new notions and results on three classes of multi-choice
games: balanced, convex and clan games. In particular, Section 12.1.2
introduces the notion of (level-increase) monotonic allocation schemes
for whose existence the total balancedness of a multi-choice game is a
necessary condition. Section 12.2 is almost entirely new. Specifically,
Section 12.2.2 dealing with monotonic allocation schemes for convex
multi-choice games is new, as well as Section 12.2.3 where the multi-
choice version of the constrained egalitarian solution for convex crisp
games (cf. Section 5.2.3) is introduced and studied, whereas Section
12.2.4 focuses on properties of all the foregoing solutions for convex
games with multi-choice coalitions. Section 12.3 is entirely new. First,
in Section 12.3.1 the notions of clan multi-choice game and total clan
multi-choice games are introduced, and characterizations of total clan
multi-choice games are provided. Second, in Section 12.3.2 we intro-
duce and study bi-monotonic allocation schemes for a subclass of total
clan multi-choice games, where suitably defined compensation-sharing
rules play a key role.
We hope that this updated and enlarged edition will prove even
more beneficial than the first edition for our readers. We express our
gratitude to Katharina Wetzel-Vandai who encouraged us to prepare
a second edition of our Springer 2005 book, and to Luis G. González
Morales for transforming the manuscript into this final version.

Nijmegen, Rodica Branzei

January 2008 Dinko Dimitrov
Stef Tijs
Preface to the First Edition

This book investigates the classical model of cooperative games with

transferable utility (TU-games) and models in cooperative game theory
in which the players have the possibility to cooperate partially, namely
fuzzy games and multi-choice games. In a cooperative TU-game the
agents are either fully involved or not involved at all in cooperation
with some other agents, while in a fuzzy game players are allowed to co-
operate with infinitely many different participation levels, varying from
non-cooperation to full cooperation. A multi-choice game describes an
“intermediate” case in the sense that each player may have a fixed finite
number of activity levels.
Part I of the book is devoted to the most developed model in the
theory of cooperative games, that of cooperative games in characteris-
tic function form or cooperative games with transferable utility (TU-
games), which we call here cooperative games with crisp coalitions or,
simply, crisp games. It presents basic notions, solutions concepts and
classes of cooperative crisp games in such a way that it allows the reader
to use this part as a reference toolbox when studying the corresponding
concepts from the theory of fuzzy games (Part II) and from the theory
of multi-choice games (Part III).
The work on this book started while we were research fellows at ZiF
(Bielefeld) for the project “Procedural Approaches to Conflict Res-
olution”, 2002. We thank our hosts Matthias Raith and Olaf Gaus
for giving us the possibility to freely structure our research plans and
also the officials from the ZiF administration for their kind hospital-
ity. The work of Dinko Dimitrov was generously supported by a Marie
Curie Research Fellowship of the European Community programme
“Improving the Human Research Potential and the Socio-Economic
Knowledge Base” under contract number HPMF-CT-2002-02121 con-
VIII Preface

ducted at Tilburg University. Thanks are also due to Luis G. González

Morales for transforming the manuscript into this final version.

Tilburg, Rodica Branzei

May 2005 Dinko Dimitrov
Stef Tijs
Contents

Part I Cooperative Games with Crisp Coalitions

1 Preliminaries . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5

2 Cores and Related Solution Concepts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13

2.1 Imputations, Cores and Stable Sets . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
2.2 The Core Cover, the Reasonable Set and the Weber Set . 20

3 The Shapley Value, the τ -value, and the Average

Lexicographic Value . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
3.1 The Shapley Value . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
3.2 The τ -value . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
3.3 The Average Lexicographic Value . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33

4 Egalitarianism-based Solution Concepts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37

4.1 Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
4.2 The Equal Split-Off Set . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
4.2.1 The Equal Split-Off Set for General Games . . . . . . 39
4.2.2 The Equal Split-Off Set for Superadditive Games . 41

5 Classes of Cooperative Crisp Games . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43

5.1 Totally Balanced Games . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43
5.1.1 Basic Characterizations and Properties of
Solution Concepts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43
5.1.2 Totally Balanced Games and Population
Monotonic Allocation Schemes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45
5.2 Convex Games . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46
5.2.1 Basic Characterizations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46
X Contents

5.2.2 Convex Games and Population Monotonic

Allocation Schemes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49
5.2.3 The Constrained Egalitarian Solution for Convex
Games . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50
5.2.4 Properties of Solution Concepts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53
5.3 Clan Games . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59
5.3.1 Basic Characterizations and Properties of
Solution Concepts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59
5.3.2 Total Clan Games and Monotonic Allocation
Schemes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 62
5.4 Convex Games versus Clan Games . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65
5.4.1 Characterizations via Marginal Games . . . . . . . . . . 66
5.4.2 Dual Transformations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 68
5.4.3 The Core versus the Weber Set . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 70

Part II Cooperative Games with Fuzzy Coalitions

6 Preliminaries . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 77

7 Solution Concepts for Fuzzy Games . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 83

7.1 Imputations and the Aubin Core . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 83
7.2 Cores and Stable Sets . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 85
7.3 Generalized Cores and Stable Sets . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 89
7.4 The Shapley Value and the Weber Set . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 94
7.5 Path Solutions and the Path Solution Cover . . . . . . . . . . . 96
7.6 Compromise Values . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 100

8 Convex Fuzzy Games . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 103

8.1 Basic Characterizations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 103
8.2 Egalitarianism in Convex Fuzzy Games . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 110
8.3 Participation Monotonic Allocation Schemes . . . . . . . . . . . 116
8.4 Properties of Solution Concepts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 119

9 Fuzzy Clan Games . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 127

9.1 The Cone of Fuzzy Clan Games . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 127
9.2 Cores and Stable Sets for Fuzzy Clan Games . . . . . . . . . . 131
9.3 Bi-Monotonic Participation Allocation Rules . . . . . . . . . . . 135
 Contents XI

Part III Multi-Choice Games

10 Preliminaries . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 145

11 Solution Concepts for Multi-Choice Games . . . . . . . . . . 149

11.1 Imputations, Cores and Stable Sets . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 149
11.2 Marginal Vectors and the Weber Set . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 155
11.3 Shapley-like Values . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 159
11.4 The Equal Split-Off Set for Multi-Choice Games . . . . . . . 163

12 Classes of Multi-Choice Games . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 165

12.1 Balanced Multi-Choice Games . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 165
12.1.1 Basic Characterizations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 165
12.1.2 Totally Balanced Games and Monotonic
Allocation Schemes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 169
12.2 Convex Multi-Choice Games . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 170
12.2.1 Basic Characterizations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 170
12.2.2 Monotonic Allocation Schemes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 173
12.2.3 The Constrained Egalitarian Solution . . . . . . . . . . . 174
12.2.4 Properties of Solution Concepts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 180
12.3 Multi-Choice Clan Games . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 182
12.3.1 Basic Characterizations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 182
12.3.2 Bi-Monotonic Allocation Schemes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 186

References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 193

Index . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 201
 Part I

Cooperative Games with Crisp Coalitions

 Cooperative game theory is concerned primarily with coalitions -
groups of players - who coordinate their actions and pool their win-
nings. Consequently, one of the problems here is how to divide the
extra earnings (or cost savings) among the members of the formed
coalition. The basis of this theory was laid by John von Neumann and
Oskar Morgenstern in [78] with coalitional games in characteristic func-
tion form, known also as transferable utility games (TU-games). Since
then various solution concepts for cooperative TU-games have been
proposed and several interesting subclasses of TU-games have been in-
troduced. In what follows in this part we present a selection of basic
notions, solution concepts and classes of cooperative TU-games that
will be extensively used in the next two parts of the book. More de-
tailed introductory books on the theory of (cooperative) games include
[86] and [110], where also non-transferable utility games (NTU-games)
are treated. The list can be enlarged by the very recent monographs
[79], [87], [91], [123].
This part of the book is devoted to the most developed model in
the theory of cooperative games, that of cooperative games in char-
acteristic function form or cooperative games with transferable utility
(TU-games), which we call here cooperative games with crisp coalitions
or, simply, crisp games. It is organized as follows. Chapter 1 introduces
basic notation, definitions and notions from cooperative game theory
dealing with TU-games. In Chapter 2 we consider set-valued solution
concepts like the core, the dominance core and stable sets, and dif-
ferent core catchers. The relations among these solution concepts are
extensively studied. Chapter 3 is devoted to two well known one-point
solutions concepts - the Shapley value and the τ -value, and to the
average lexicographic value recently introduced in [111]. We present
different formulations of these values, discuss some of their properties
and axiomatic characterizations. In Chapter 4 we present an overview
of egalitarianism-based solution concepts and introduce the equal split-
off set for cooperative games, while in Chapter 5 we study three classes
of cooperative games with crisp coalitions - totally balanced games,
convex games and clan games. We discuss specific properties of the
solution concepts introduced in Chapters 3 and 4 on these classes of
games and present specific solution concepts like the concept of a pop-
ulation monotonic allocation scheme for totally balanced games, the
constrained egalitarian solution for convex games, the concept of a bi-
monotonic allocation scheme for clan games.
1
Preliminaries

Let N be a non-empty finite set of agents who consider different co-

operation possibilities. Each subset S ⊂ N is referred to as a crisp
coalition. The set N is called the grand coalition and ∅ is called the
empty coalition. We denote the collection of coalitions, i.e. the set of all
subsets of N by 2N . For each S ∈ 2N we denote by |S| the number of

i
elements of S, and by eS the characteristic vector of S with eS = 1 if

i
i ∈ S, and eS = 0 if i ∈ N \ S. In the following often N = {1, . . . , n}.

Definition 1.1. A cooperative game in characteristic function form

is an ordered pair N, v consisting of the player set N and the char-
acteristic function v : 2N → R with v (∅) = 0.

The real number v (S) can be interpreted as the maximal worth or

cost savings that the members of S can obtain when they cooperate.
Often we identify the game N, v with its characteristic function v.
A cooperative game in characteristic function form is usually re-
ferred to as a transferable utility game (TU-game). A cooperative game
might be a non-transferable utility game (NTU-game); the reader is re-
ferred to [87] and [110] for an introduction to NTU-games.

Example 1.2. (Glove game) Let N = {1, . . . , n} be divided into two

disjoint subsets L and R. Members of L possess a left hand glove,
members of R a right hand glove. A single glove is worth nothing, a
right-left pair of gloves has value of one euro. This situation can be
modeled as a game N, v, where for each S ∈ 2N we have v(S) :=
min {|L ∩ S| , |R ∩ S|}.

The set GN of characteristic functions of coalitional games with

player set N forms with the usual operations of addition and scalar
6 1 Preliminaries


multiplication of functions a 2|N | − 1 -dimensional linear space; a basis
of this space is supplied by the unanimity games uT , T ∈ 2N \ {∅}, that
are defined by

1 if T ⊂ S,
uT (S) = (1.1)
0 otherwise.
One can easily check that for each v ∈ GN we have
 
v= cT uT with cT = (−1)|T |−|S| v (S) . (1.2)
T ∈2N \{∅} S:S⊂T

The interpretation of the unanimity game uT is that a gain (or cost

savings) of 1 can be obtained if and only if all players in coalition S
are involved in cooperation.
Definition 1.3. A game v ∈ GN is called simple1 if v (S) ∈ {0, 1} for
all S ∈ 2N \ {∅} and v (∅) = 0, v(N ) = 1.
Note that the unanimity game uT , T ∈ 2N \ {∅}, is a special simple
game.
Definition 1.4. A coalition S is winning in the simple game v ∈ GN
if v(S) = 1.
Definition 1.5. A coalition S is minimal winning in the simple
game v ∈ GN if v(S) = 1 and v(T ) = 0 for all T ⊂ S, T = S.
Definition 1.6. A player i ∈ N is a dictator in the simple game
v ∈ GN if the coalition {i} is minimal winning and there are no other
minimal winning coalitions.
Definition 1.7. Let v ∈ GN . For each i ∈ N and for each S ∈ 2N
with i ∈ S, the marginal contribution of player i to the coalition S
is Mi (S, v) := v (S) − v (S \ {i}).
Let π (N )be the set of all permutations
 σ : N → N of N . The
set P σ (i) := r ∈ N |σ −1 (r) < σ −1 (i) consists of all predecessors of i
with respect to the permutation σ.
Definition 1.8. Let v ∈ GN and σ ∈ π (N ). The marginal contribu-
tion vector mσ (v) ∈ Rn with respect to σ and v has the i-th coordinate
mσi (v) := v (P σ (i) ∪ {i}) − v (P σ (i)) for each i ∈ N .
1
In some game theory literature a game is simple if it is additionally monotonic
(cf. Definition 1.11).
 1 Preliminaries 7

In what follows, we often write mσ instead of mσ (v) when it is clear

which game v we have in mind.
Definition 1.9. For a game v ∈ GN and a coalition T ∈ 2N \ {∅}, the
subgame with player set T is the game vT defined by vT (S) := v (S)
for all S ∈ 2T .
Hence, vT is the restriction of v to the set 2T .
Definition 1.10. A game v ∗ ∈ GN is called the dual game of v ∈ GN
if v ∗ (S) = v(N ) − v(N \ S) for all S ⊆ N .
Definition 1.11. A game v ∈ GN is said to be monotonic if v (S) ≤
v (T ) for all S, T ∈ 2N with S ⊂ T .
Definition 1.12. A game v ∈ GN is called non-negative if for each
S ∈ 2N we have v (S) ≥ 0.
Definition 1.13. A game v ∈ GN is additive if v (S ∪ T ) = v (S) +
v (T ) for all S, T ∈ 2N with S ∩ T = ∅.
An additive game v ∈ GN is determined by the vector

a = (v ({1}) , ..., v ({n})) ∈ Rn (1.3)


i∈S ai for all S ∈ 2 . Additive games form an n-
since v (S) = N

dimensional linear subspace of GN . A game v ∈ GN is called inessential

if it is an additive game. For an inessential
 game there is no problem
how
 to divide v (N ) because v (N ) = i∈N v ({i}) (and also v (S) =
v ({i}) for all S ⊂ N )2.
i∈S
Most of the cooperative games arising from real life situations are
superadditive games.
Definition 1.14. A game v ∈ GN is superadditive if v (S ∪ T ) ≥
v (S) + v (T ) for all S, T ∈ 2N with S ∩ T = ∅.
Definition 1.15. A game v ∈ GN is subadditive if −v is superaddi-
tive.

 
Of course, in a superadditive game we have v ∪ki=1 Si ≥ ki=1 v(Si )

if S1 , . . . , Sk are pairwise disjoint coalitions. Especially v (N ) ≥ ki=1
v(Si ) for each partition (S1 , . . . , Sk ) of N ; in particular v (N ) ≥
 n
i=1 v(i). Note that the game in Example 1.2 is superadditive. In a
2
Given a game v ∈ GN and a coalition {i, . . . , k} ⊂ N , we will often write
v(i, . . . , k) instead of v({i, . . . , k}).
8 1 Preliminaries

superadditive game it is advantageous for the players to cooperate. The

set of (characteristic functions of) superadditive games form a cone in
GN , i.e. for all v and w that are superadditive we have that αv + βw
is also a superadditive game, where α, β ∈ R+ .

Definition 1.16. A game v ∈ GN for which v (N ) > ni=1 v (i) is said
to be an N -essential game.

In what follows in Part I, the notion of a balanced game will play

an important role.

Definition
 1.17. A map λ : 2N \ {∅} → R+ is called a balanced map
if S∈2N \{∅} λ (S) eS = eN .

Definition 1.18. A collection B of coalitions

 is called balanced
 if
there is a balanced map λ such that B = S ∈ 2N | λ (S) > 0 .

Definition 1.19. A game v ∈ GN is balanced if for each balanced

map λ : 2N \ {∅} → R+ we have

λ (S) v (S) ≤ v (N ) . (1.4)
S∈2N \{∅}

Let us consider now two games v, w ∈ GN and answer the question

“When can we say that v and w are ’essentially’ the same?”

Definition 1.20. Let v, w ∈ GN . The game w is strategically equiv-

alent to the game v if there exist
k > 0 and an additive game a (cf.
(1.3)) such that w (S) = kv (S) + i∈S ai for all S ∈ 2N \ {∅}.

One may think that w arises out of v by the following changes:

• the unit of payoffs is changed, where the exchange rate is k;
• in the game w each player is given either a bonus (if ai > 0) or a
fee (if ai < 0) before the distribution of kv (N ) among the players
starts.
Notice that the strategic equivalence is an equivalence relation on
the set GN , i.e. we have:
• (Reflexivity) The game v is strategically equivalent to itself (take
k = 1 and ai = 0 for each i ∈ N );
• (Symmetry) If w is strategically equivalent to v, then v is strate-
gically equivalent
 to w (if for all coalitions
 S ⊂ N , w (S) =
kv (S) + i∈S ai , then v (S) = k1 w (S) − i∈S aki and k1 > 0);
 1 Preliminaries 9

• (Transitivity) If w is strategically equivalent to v and u is strate-

gically equivalent to w, then u is strategically equivalent to v
(w (S) = kv (S) + a (S) and u (S) = lw (S)  + b (S) imply u (S) =
lkv (S) + (la (S) + b (S)), where a (S) := i∈S ai ).
For most solution concepts − as we will see later − it is sufficient to
look only at one of the games in an (strategic) equivalence class. One
considers often games in an equivalence class that are in (α, β)-form
for α, β ∈ R.

Definition 1.21. Let α, β ∈ R. A game v ∈ GN is called a game in

(α, β)-form if v (i) = α for all i ∈ N and v (N ) = β.

Theorem 1.22. Each N -essential game v ∈ GN is strategically equiv-

alent to a game w ∈ GN in (0, 1)-form. This game is unique.

Proof. For some k > 0 and a1 , ..., an ∈ R we try to find a game w with
w (S) = kv (S) + a (S) for all S ∈ 2N \ {∅}, w ({i}) = 0 for all i ∈ N ,
and w (N ) = 1. Then necessarily

w (i) = 0 = kv (i) + ai , (1.5)


w (N ) = 1 = kv (N ) + ai . (1.6)
i∈N

 
Then w (N ) − i∈N w (i) = 1 = k v (N ) − i∈N v (i) by (1.5)
and (1.6). Hence, k = v(N )−P1 v(i) . From (1.5) we derive ai =
i∈N

P
v(S)− v(i)
− v(N )−v(i)
P . If we take for all S ∈ 2N \ {∅}, w (S) = v(N )−Pi∈S v(i) ,
i∈N v(i) i∈N
then we obtain the unique game w in (0, 1)-form, which is strategically
equivalent to v.

Definition 1.23. A game v ∈ GN is called zero-normalized if for all

i ∈ N we have v (i) = 0.

One can easily check that each game v ∈ GN is strategically equiv-

alent to a zero-normalized game w ∈ GN , where w (S) = v (S) −

i∈S v (i).

Definition 1.24. A game v ∈ GN is said to be zero-monotonic if its

zero-normalization is monotonic.
10 1 Preliminaries

It holds that a game which is strategically equivalent to a zero-

monotonic game is also zero-monotonic.
We turn now to one of the basic questions in the theory of coopera-
tive TU-games: “If the grand coalition forms, how to divide the profit
or cost savings v (N )?”
This question is approached with the aid of solution concepts in
cooperative game theory like cores, stable sets, bargaining sets, the
Shapley value, the τ -value, the nucleolus. A solution concept gives an
answer to the question of how the reward (cost savings) obtained when
all players in N cooperate should be distributed among the individual
players while taking account of the potential reward (cost savings) of
all different coalitions of players. Hence, a solution concept assigns to a
coalitional game at least one payoff vector x = (xi )i∈N ∈ Rn , where xi
is the payoff allocated to player i ∈ N . A selection of (set-valued and
one-point) solution concepts which will be used along this book, their
axiomatic characterizations and interrelations will be given in Chapters
2-4.

Definition 1.25. A set-valued solution (or a multisolution) is a

multifunction F : GN →→ Rn .

Definition 1.26. An one-point solution (or a single-valued rule) is

a map f : GN → Rn .

We mention now some desirable properties for one-point solution

concepts. Extensions of these properties to set-valued solution concepts
are straightforward.

Definition 1.27. Let f : GN → Rn . Then f satisfies

(i) individual rationality
n if fi (v) ≥ v (i) for all v ∈ GN and i ∈ N .
(ii) efficiency if i=1 fi (v) = v (N ) for all v ∈ GN .
(iii) relative invariance with respect to strategic equivalence if
for all v, w ∈ GN , all additive games a ∈ GN , and all k > 0 we have
that w = kv + a implies f (kv + a) = kf (v) + a.
(iv) the dummy player property if fi (v) = v (i) for all v ∈ GN
and for all dummy players i in v, i.e. players i ∈ N such that
v (S ∪ {i}) = v (S) + v (i) for all S ∈ 2N \{i} .
(v) the anonymity property if f (v σ ) = σ ∗ (f (v)) for all σ ∈ π (N ) .
Here v σ is
the game σ
 with v (σ (U N )) := v (U ) for all U ∈ 2N or
v (S) = v σ (S) for all S ∈ 2 and σ ∗ : Rn → Rn is defined
σ −1

by (σ ∗ (x))σ(k) := xk for all x ∈ Rn and k ∈ N .

(vi) additivity if f (v + w) = f (v) + f (w) for all v, w ∈ GN .
 1 Preliminaries 11

We end this chapter by recalling some definitions and results from

linear algebra which are used later.

Definition 1.28. Let V and W be vector spaces over R. Let L : V →

W be a map. Then L is called a linear transformation (linear map,
linear operator) from V into W if for all x, y ∈ V and all α, β ∈ R we
have L (αx + βy) = αL (x) + βL (y).

Definition 1.29. A set W is a (linear) subspace of the vector space

V if W ⊂ V , 0 ∈ W , and W is closed with respect to addition and
scalar multiplication, i.e. for all x, y ∈ W we have x + y ∈ W , and for
each x ∈ W and α ∈ R, also αx ∈ W holds.

Definition 1.30. A subset C of a vector space V over R is called con-

vex if for all x, y ∈ C and all α ∈ (0, 1) we have αx + (1 − α) y ∈ C.

A geometric interpretation of a convex set is that with each pair x,

y of points in it, the line segment with x, y as endpoints is also in the
set.

Definition 1.31. Let C be a convex set. A point x ∈ C is called an

extreme point of C if there do not exist x1 , x2 ∈ C with x1 = x,
x2 = x and α ∈ (0, 1) such that x = αx1 + (1 − α) x2 . The set of
extreme points of a convex set C will be denoted by ext (C).

Definition 1.32. A set H of points in Rn is called a hyperplane if it

is the set of solutions of a linear equation a1 x1 + ... + an xn = b, with
(a1 , ..., an ) ∈ Rn \ {0} and b ∈ R. A hyperplane separates a (linear)
space in two  (linear) halfspaces.
 Let A be an n × p matrix and b ∈ Rp ;
a set P = x ∈ Rn | xT A ≥ bT is called a polyhedral set.

The following theorem gives a characterization of extreme points of

a polyhedral set.

Theorem 1.33. Let A be an n × p matrix, b ∈ Rp and let P be the

 j Tx Aj ≥ b . For
polyhedral set of solutions of the set of inequalities T T

x ∈ R let tight (x) be the set of columns Ae | x Ae = bj of A

n

where the corresponding inequalities are equalities for x, and where for
each j ∈ N , ej is the j-th standard basis vector in Rn . Then x is an
extreme point of P iff tight (x) is a complete system of vectors in Rn .

The next theorem is known as the duality theorem from linear pro-
gramming theory.
12 1 Preliminaries

Theorem
 T 1.34. n × p matrix, b ∈ R
Let A be an  p and c ∈ Rn . Then

min x c | x A ≥ b  = max b y | Ay = c, y ≥ 0 if

T T T

x ∈ Rn | xT A ≥ bT = ∅ and {y ∈ Rp | Ay = c, y ≥ 0} = ∅.

Definition 1.35. Let V be a vector space and A ⊂ V . The convex

hull co (A) of A is the set


p
x ∈ V | ∃p ∈ N, α ∈ ∆p , v1 , ..., vp ∈ A s.t. αi vi = x ,
i=1
  
where ∆p = q ∈ Rp+ | pi=1 qi = 1 is the (p − 1) dimensional unit
simplex.
2
Cores and Related Solution Concepts

In this chapter we consider payoff vectors x = (xi )i∈N ∈ Rn , with

xi being the payoff to be given to player i ∈ N , under the condition
that cooperation in the grand coalition is reached. Clearly, the actual
formation of the grand coalition is based on the agreement of all players
upon a proposed payoff in the game. Such an agreement is, or should
be, based on all other cooperation possibilities for the players and their
corresponding payoffs.

2.1 Imputations, Cores and Stable Sets


We note first that only payoff vectors x ∈ Rn satisfying i∈N xi ≤
v(N ) are reachable in the game v ∈ GN and the set of such payoff
vectors is nonempty and convex. More precisely, it is a halfspace of Rn .
We denote this set by I ∗∗ (v), i.e.


∗∗
I (v) := x ∈ Rn | xi ≤ v(N ) .
i∈N

However, to have any chance of being agreed upon, a payoff vector

should satisfy efficiency, i.e.

xi = v(N ).
i∈N

To motivate the efficiency condition we argue that i∈N xi ≥ v(N )
should also hold. 
Suppose that i∈N xi < v(N ). In this case we would have
14 2 Cores and Related Solution Concepts

a = v(N ) − xi > 0.
i∈N

Then the players can still form the grand coalition and receive the
better payoff y = (y1 , . . . , yn ) with yi = xi + na for all i ∈ N .
We denote by I ∗ (v) the set of efficient payoff vectors in the coali-
tional game v ∈ GN , i.e.


∗
I (v) := x ∈ Rn | xi = v(N )
i∈N

and, clearly, I ∗ (v)

= ∅. This convex set is referred to as the preim-
putation set of the game v ∈ GN . It is a hyperplane in Rn . Clearly,
I ∗ (v) ⊂ I ∗∗ (v).
Now, note that if the proposed allocation x ∈ I ∗ (v) is such that
there is at least one player i ∈ N whose payoff xi satisfies xi < v (i),
the grand coalition would never form. The reason is that such a player
would prefer not to cooperate since acting on his own he can obtain
more.
Hence, the individual rationality condition
xi ≥ v (i) for all i ∈ N
should hold in order that a payoff vector has a real chance to be realized
in the game.
Definition 2.1. A payoff vector x ∈ Rn is an imputation for the
 v ∈ G if it is efficient and individually rational, i.e.
game N

(i) i∈N xi = v(N );

(ii) xi ≥ v (i) for all i ∈ N .
of imputations of v ∈ GN . Clearly, I(v) is
We denote by I(v) the set 
empty if and only if v(N ) < i∈N v (i). Further, for an additive game
(cf. Definition 1.13),
I(v) = {(v (1) , . . . , v (n))} .
The next theorem shows that N -essential games (cf. Definition 1.16)
always have infinitely many imputations. Moreover, I(v) is a simplex
with extreme points f 1 (v) , . . . , f n (v), where for each i ∈ N , f i (v) =
f1i (v) , . . . , fji (v) , . . . , fni (v) with

v (i)  if i = j,
fji (v) = (2.1)
v(N ) − k∈N \{i} v (k) if i = j.
 2.1 Imputations, Cores and Stable Sets 15

Theorem 2.2. Let v ∈ GN . If v is N -essential, then

(i) I(v) is an infinite set.
(ii) I(v) is the convex hull of the points f 1 (v) , . . . , f n (v).
Proof.
 (i) Since v ∈ GN is an N -essential game we have a = v(N ) −
i∈N xi > 0. For any n-tuple b = (b1 , . . . , bn ) of nonnegative numbers
such that i∈N bi = a, the payoff vector x = (x1 , . . . , xn ) with xi =
v (i) + bi for all i ∈ N is an imputation.
(ii) This follows from Theorem 1.33 by noting that
 
I(v) = x ∈ Rn | xT A ≥ bT ,

where A is the n × (n + 2)-matrix with columns e1 , . . . , en , 1n , −1n and

b = (v (1) , . . . , v (n) , v(N ), −v(N )) ,

where for each i ∈ N , ei is the i-th standard basis in Rn and 1n is the

vector in Rn with all coordinates equal to 1.
Since the imputation set of an N -essential game is too large accord-
ing to the above theorem, there is a need for some criteria to single
out those imputations that are most likely to occur. In this way one
obtains subsets of I(v) as solution concepts.
The first (set-valued) solution concept we would like to study is the
core of a game (cf. [52]).
Definition 2.3. The core C(v) of a game v ∈ GN is the set


x ∈ I(v) | xi ≥ v(S) for all S ∈ 2N \ {∅} .
i∈S

If x ∈ C(v), then no coalition S has an incentive to split off

if x is
the proposed reward allocation in N , because the total amount i∈S xi
allocated to S is not smaller than the amount v(S) which the players
can obtain by forming the subcoalition. If C(v) = ∅, then elements of
C(v) can easily be obtained because the core is defined with the aid of
a finite system of linear inequalities. The core is a polytope.
In [16] and [103] one can find a characterization of games with a
nonempty core that we present in the next theorem.
Theorem 2.4. Let v ∈ GN . Then the following two assertions are
equivalent:
(i) C(v) = ∅,
(ii) The game v is balanced (cf. Definition 1.19).
16 2 Cores and Related Solution Concepts

Proof. First we note that C(v) = ∅ iff


 
v(N ) = min xi | xi ≥ v(S) for all S ∈ 2N \ {∅} . (2.2)
i∈N i∈S

By Theorem 1.34, equality (2.2) holds iff

⎧ ⎫
⎨   ⎬
v(N ) = max λ(S)v(S) | λ(S)eS = eN , λ ≥ 0
⎩ N N
⎭
S∈2 \{∅} S∈2 \{∅}
(2.3)
(take for A the matrix with the characteristic vectors eS
as columns).
Now, (2.3) holds iff (1.4) holds. Hence, (i) and (ii) are equivalent.

Now, we reformulate this Bondareva-Shapley result in geometric

terms (cf. [26]). Let for a subsimplex∆(S, v) = conv{f i (v) | i ∈ S} of
1 i
I(v) = ∆(N, v), the barycenter |S| i∈S f (v) be denoted by b(S, v).
Then we obtain the following characterization of games with a non-
empty core.

Theorem 2.5. A game v ∈ GN has a non-empty core iff


µS b(S, v) = b(N, v)
S∈2N \{∅}

  v(S) v(N )
with µS ≥ 0 and S∈2N \{∅} µS = 1 implies S∈2N \{∅} µS |S| ≤ |N | .

Proof. For λ = (λS )S∈2N \{∅} , let µ = (µS )S∈2N \{∅} be defined by µS =
n−1 |S|λS . Then

λS ≥ 0, λS eS = eN iff
S∈2N \{∅}

 eS eN 
µS = , µS ≥ 0, µS = 1.
|S| |N |
S∈2N \{∅} S∈2N \{∅}

This implies  
(i) λS ≥ 0, S∈2N \{∅} λS eS = eN iff S∈2N \{∅} µS b(S, v) = b(N, v),
since b(S, v) = (v({1}), v({2}), ..., v({n})) + α|S|−1 eS for each S ∈ 2N \

{∅}, where α = v(N ) − i∈N v({i}).
  v(N )
(ii) S∈2N \{∅} λS v(S) ≤ v(N ) iff S∈2N \{∅} µS v(S) |S| ≤ |N | .
 2.1 Imputations, Cores and Stable Sets 17

The theorem tells us that a game v ∈ GN has a non-empty core if

and only if for each way of writing the barycenter of the imputation set
as a convex combination of barycenters of subsimplices, the per capita
value v(N )/ |N | of N is at least as large as the corresponding convex
combination of the per capita values of the subcoalitions (v(S)/ |S|).

Remark 2.6. The core is relative invariant with respect to strategic

equivalence (cf. Definition 1.27(iii)): if w ∈ GN is strategically equiva-
lent to v ∈ GN , say w = kv + a, then

C(w) = kC(v) + a (:= {x ∈ Rn | x = ky + a for some y ∈ C(v)}) .

For axiomatic characterizations of the core, we refer the reader to

[67], [85], and [87].
Other subsets of imputations which are solution concepts for coali-
tional games are the dominance core (D-core) and stable sets (cf. [78]).
They are defined based on the following dominance relation over vectors
in Rn .

Definition 2.7. Let v ∈ GN , x, y ∈ I(v), and S ∈ 2N \ {∅}. We say

that x dominates y via coalition S, and denote it by x domS y if
i > yi for all i ∈ S,
(i) x
(ii) i∈S xi ≤ v(S).

Note that if (i) holds, then the payoff x is better than the payoff
y for all members of S; condition (ii) guarantees that the payoff x is
reachable for S.

Definition 2.8. Let v ∈ GN and x, y ∈ I(v). We say that x domi-

nates y, and denote it by x dom y if there exists S ∈ 2N \ {∅} such that
x domS y.

Proposition 2.9. Let v ∈ GN and S ∈ 2N \ {∅}. Then the relations

domS and dom are irreflexive. Moreover, domS is transitive and anti-
symmetric.

Proof. That domS and dom are irreflexive follows from the fact that
for x ∈ I(v) there is no S ∈ 2N \ {∅} such that xi > xi for all i ∈ S.
To prove that domS is transitive take x, y, z ∈ I(v) such that
x domS y and y domS z. Then xi > zi for all i ∈ S. So x domS z.
To prove that domS is antisymmetric, suppose x domS y. Then xi >
yi for all i ∈ S, i.e. there is no i ∈ S such that yi > xi . Hence, y domS x
does not hold.
18 2 Cores and Related Solution Concepts

For S ∈ 2N \ {∅} we denote by D(S) the set of imputations which

are dominated via S; note that players in S can successfully protest
against any imputation in D(S).

Definition 2.10. The dominance core (D-core) DC(v) of a game

v ∈ GN consists of all undominated elements in I(v), i.e. the set I(v) \
∪S∈2N \{∅} D(S).

It turns out that DC(v) is also a convex set; moreover, it is a poly-

tope and relative invariant with respect to strategic equivalence. We
refer to [67] for an axiomatic framework to compare the D-core and
the core of a cooperative game.
For v ∈ GN and A ⊂ I(v) we denote by dom (A) the set consisting
of all imputations that are dominated by some element in A. Note that
DC(v) = I(v) \ dom(I(v)).

Definition 2.11. For v ∈ GN a subset K of I(v) is called a stable set

if the following conditions hold:
(i) (Internal stability) K ∩ dom(K) = ∅,
(ii) (External stability) I(v) \ K ⊂ dom(K).

This notion was introduced by von Neumann and Morgenstern (cf.

[78]) with the interpretation that a stable set corresponds to a “stan-
dard of behavior”, which, if generally accepted, is self-enforcing.
The two conditions in Definition 2.11 can be interpreted as follows:
• By external stability, an imputation outside a stable set K seems
unlikely to become established: there is always a coalition that
prefers one of the achievable imputations inside K, implying that
there would exist a tendency to shift to an imputation in K;
• By internal stability, all imputations in K are “equal” with respect
to the dominance relation via coalitions, i.e. there is no imputation
in K that is dominated by another imputation in K.
Note that for a game v ∈ GN the set K is a stable set if and only
if K and dom(K) form a partition of I(v). In principle, a game may
have many stable sets or no stable set.

Theorem 2.12. Let v ∈ GN and K be a stable set of v. Then

(i) C(v) ⊂ DC(v) ⊂ K;
(ii) If v is superadditive, then DC(v) = C(v);
(iii) If DC(v) is a stable set, then there is no other stable set.
 2.1 Imputations, Cores and Stable Sets 19

Proof. (i) In order to show that C(v) ⊂ DC(v), let us suppose that
there is x ∈ C(v) such that x ∈ / DC(v). Then there is an y ∈I(v) and
acoalition S ∈ 2N \ {∅} such that y domS x. Then v(S) ≥ i∈S yi >
i∈S xi which implies that x ∈ / C(v).
To prove next that DC(v) ⊂ K it is sufficient to show that I(v)\K ⊂
I(v) \ DC(v). Take x ∈ I(v) \ K. By the external stability of K there
is a y ∈ K with y dom x. The elements in DC(v) are not dominated.
So x ∈ / DC(v), i.e. x ∈ I(v) \ DC(v).
(ii) We divide the proof of this assertion into
 two parts.
(ii.1) We show that for an x ∈ I(v) with i∈S xi < v(S) for some
S ∈ 2N \ {∅}, there is y ∈ I(v) such
P that y domS x. Define y as follows.
v(S)− i∈S xi
If i ∈ S, then yi := xi + |S| . If i ∈
/ S, then yi := v (i) +
P
v(N )−v(S)− i∈N \S v(i)
|N \S| Then y ∈ I(v), where for the proof of yi ≥ v (i)
.
for i ∈ N \ S we use the superadditivity of the game. Furthermore,
y domS x.
(ii.2) In order to show DC(v) = C(v) we have, in view of (i), only
to prove that DC(v) ⊂ C(v). Suppose x ∈ DC(v). Then there  is no
y ∈ I(v) such that y dom x. In view of (ii.1) we then have i∈S xi ≥
v(S) for all S ∈ 2N \ {∅}. Hence, x ∈ C(v).
(iii) Suppose DC(v) is a stable set. Let K also be stable. By (i)
we have DC(v) ⊂ K. To prove K = DC(v), we have to show that
K \ DC(v) = ∅. Suppose, to the contrary, that there is x ∈ K \ DC(v).
By the external stability of DC(v) there is y ∈ DC(v) (⊂ K) such that
y dom x. This is a contradiction to the internal stability of K. Hence
K \ DC(v) = ∅ holds.

In addition to the relations among the core, the dominance core and
the stable sets as established in Theorem 2.12, we state next without
proof some additional results that will be used in the next parts of the
book.

Theorem 2.13. Let v ∈ GN . Then 

(i) If DC(v) = ∅ and v(N ) ≥ v(S) + i∈N \S v (i) for each S ⊂ N ,
then C(v) = DC(v).
(ii) If C(v) = DC(v), then C(v) = ∅.

For details with respect to these relations the reader is referred to

[42], [90], [105], and [110].
Another core-like solution concept which is related to the norm of
equity is the equal division core introduced in [98].
20 2 Cores and Related Solution Concepts

Definition 2.14. The equal division core EDC(v) of a game v ∈

GN is the set
 
v(S)
x ∈ I(v) |
S ∈ 2N \ {∅} s.t. > xi for all i ∈ S .
|S|
In other words, the equal division core of a game consists of efficient
payoff vectors for the grand coalition which cannot be improved upon
by the equal division allocation of any subcoalition. It is clear that the
core of a cooperative game is included in the equal division core of that
game. The reader can find axiomatic characterizations of this solution
concept on two classes of cooperative games in [13].

2.2 The Core Cover, the Reasonable Set and the Weber
Set

In this section we introduce three sets related to the core, namely the
core cover (cf. [116]), the reasonable set (cf. [51], [69], and [72]), and
the Weber set (cf. [124]). All these sets can be seen as “core catchers”
in the sense that they all contain the core of the corresponding game
as a subset.
In the definition of the core cover the upper vector M (N, v) and the
lower vector m(v) of a game v ∈ GN play a role.
For each i ∈ N , the i-th coordinate Mi (N, v) of the upper vector
M (N, v) is the marginal contribution of player i to the grand coalition
(cf. Definition 1.7); it is also called the utopia payoff for player i in
the grand coalition in the sense that if player i wants more, then it is
advantageous for the other players in N to throw player i out.

Definition 2.15. Let S ∈ 2N \ {∅} and i ∈ S. The remainder R(S, i)

of player i in the coalition S is the amount which remains for player i if
coalition S forms and all other players in S obtain their utopia payoffs,
i.e. 
R (S, i) := v(S) − Mj (N, v).
j∈S\{i}

For each i ∈ N , the i-th coordinate mi (v) of the lower vector m(v)
is then defined by
mi (v) := max R(S, i).
S:i∈S

We refer to mi (v) also as the minimum right payoff for player i, since
this player has a reason to ask at least mi (v) in the grand coalition
 2.2 The Core Cover, the Reasonable Set and the Weber Set 21

N , by arguing that he can obtain that amount also by drumming up

a coalition S with mi (v) = R(S, i) and making all other players in S
happy with their utopia payoffs.

Definition 2.16. The core cover CC(v) of v ∈ GN consists of all

imputations which are between m(v) and M (N, v) (in the usual partial
order of Rn ), i.e.

CC(v) := {x ∈ I(v) | m(v) ≤ x ≤ M (N, v)} .

That CC(v) is a core catcher follows from the following theorem,

which tells us that the lower (upper) vector is a lower (upper) bound
for the core.

Theorem 2.17. Let v ∈ GN and x ∈ C(v). Then m(v) ≤ x ≤ M (N, v)

i.e. mi (v) ≤ xi ≤ Mi (N, v) for all i ∈ N .

Proof. (i) xi = x(N ) − x (N \ {i}) = v(N ) − x (N \ {i}) ≤ v(N ) −

v (N \ {i}) = Mi (N, v) for each i ∈ N .
(ii) In view of (i), for each S ⊂ N and each i ∈ S we have

xi = x(S) − x (S \ {i}) ≥ v(S) − Mj (N, v) = R(S, i).
j∈S\{i}

So, xi ≥ maxS:i∈S R(S, i) = mi (v) for each i ∈ S.

Another core catcher for a game v ∈ GN is introduced (cf. [72]) as

follows.

Definition 2.18. The reasonable set R(v) of a game v ∈ GN is the

set  
x ∈ R | v(i) ≤ xi ≤ max (v(S) − v (S \ {i})) .
n
S:i∈S

Obviously, C(v) ⊂ CC(v) ⊂ R(v). For an axiomatic characteriza-

tion of the reasonable set we refer to [51].
The last core catcher for a game v ∈ GN we introduce (cf. [124]) is
the Weber set. In its definition the marginal contribution vectors (cf.
Definition 1.8) play a role.

Definition 2.19. The Weber set W (v) of a game v ∈ GN is the

convex hull of the n! marginal vectors mσ (v), corresponding to the n!
permutations σ ∈ π(N ).
22 2 Cores and Related Solution Concepts

Here mσ (v) is the vector with

mσσ(1) (v) : = v (σ (1)) ,

mσσ(2) (v) : = v (σ (1) , σ (2)) − v (σ (1)) ,
...
mσσ(k) (v) : = v (σ (1) , . . . , σ (k)) − v (σ (1) , . . . , σ (k − 1))

for each k ∈ N . The payoff vector mσ can be created as follows. Let

the players enter a room one by one in the order σ (1), . . . , σ (n) and
give each player the marginal contribution he creates by entering.
The Weber set is a core catcher as shown in

Theorem 2.20. Let v ∈ GN . Then C(v) ⊂ W (v).

Proof. If |N | = 1, then I(v) = C(v) = W (v) = {(v(1))}.

For |N | = 2 we consider two cases: I(v) = ∅ and I(v) = ∅. If
I(v) = ∅, then C(v) ⊂ I(v) = ∅ ⊂ W (v). If I(v) = ∅, then we let

x = (v(1), v(1, 2) − v(1))

and
x = (v(2), v(1, 2) − v(2)) ,
and note that
 
C(v) = I(v) = co x , x
= co {mσ (v) | σ : {1, 2} → {1, 2}} = W (v).

We proceed by induction on the number of players. So, suppose

|N | = n > 2 and suppose that the core is a subset of the Weber set for
all games with number of players smaller than n.
Since C(v) and W (v) are convex sets we need only to show that
x ∈ ext (C(v)) implies x ∈ W (v). Take x ∈ ext(C(v)). Then it follows
from Theorem 1.33 that there exists T ∈ 2N \ {∅, N } with x(T ) =
v(T ). Consider the |T |-person game u and the (n − |T |)-person game
w defined by

u(S) = v(S) for each S ∈ 2T ,

w(S) = v (T ∪ S) − v(T ) for each S ∈ 2N \T .

Then, obviously, xT ∈ C(u), and also xN \T ∈ C(w) because xN \T (S) =

x(S) = x (T ∪ S)−x (T ) ≥ v (T ∪ S)−x(T ) = v (T ∪ S)−v(T ) = w(S)
for all S ∈ 2N \T and
 2.2 The Core Cover, the Reasonable Set and the Weber Set 23
 N \T
xi = x(N ) − x(T ) = v(N ) − v(T ) = w (N \ T ) .
i∈N \T

Since |T | < n, |N \ T | < n, the induction hypothesis implies that

xT ∈ W (u) and xN \T ∈ W (w).
Then x = xT × xN \T ∈ W (u) × W (w) ⊂ W (v). This last inclu-
sion can be seen as follows. The extreme points of W (u) × W (w)
are of the form (mρ , mτ ), where ρ : {1, 2, . . . , |T |} → T and τ :
{1, 2, . . . , |N \ T |} → N \ T are bijections and mρ ∈ R|T | , mτ ∈ R|N \T |
are given by
mρρ(1) := u (ρ(1)) = v (ρ(1)) ,
mρρ(2) := u (ρ(1), ρ(2)) − u (ρ(1)) = v (ρ(1), ρ(2)) − v (ρ(1)) ,
...
mρρ(|T |) := u(T ) − u (T \ {ρ (|T |)}) = v (T ) − v (T \ {ρ (|T |)}) ,
mττ (1) := w (τ (1)) = v (T ∪ {τ (1)}) − v(T ),
mττ (2) := w (τ (1), τ (2))−w (τ (1)) = v (T ∪ {τ (1), τ (2)})−v(T ∪{τ (1)}),
...
mττ (|N \T |) := w (N \ T ) − w ((N \ T ) \ {τ (|N \ T |)}) = v (N ) − v(N \
{τ (|N \ T |)}).
Hence, (mρ , mτ ) ∈ Rn corresponds to the marginal vector mσ in
W (v) where σ : N → N is defined by

ρ(i) if 1 ≤ i ≤ |T | ,
σ(i) :=
τ (i − |T |) if |T | + 1 ≤ i ≤ n.

So, we have proved that ext (W (u) × W (w)) ⊂ W (v). Since W (v) is
convex, W (u) × W (w) ⊂ W (v). We have proved that x ∈ ext (C(v))
implies x ∈ W (v).

For another proof of Theorem 2.20 the reader is referred to [38].

3
The Shapley Value, the τ -value, and the
Average Lexicographic Value

The Shapley value, the τ -value and the average lexicographic value
recently introduced in [111] are three interesting one-point solution
concepts in cooperative game theory. In this chapter we discuss different
formulations of these values, some of their properties and give axiomatic
characterizations of the Shapley value.

3.1 The Shapley Value

The Shapley value (cf. [102]) associates to each game v ∈ GN one

payoff vector in Rn . For a very extensive and interesting discussion on
this value the reader is referred to [93].
The first formulation of the Shapley value uses the marginal vectors
(see Definition 1.8) of a cooperative TU-game.

Definition 3.1. The Shapley value Φ(v) of a game v ∈ GN is the

average of the marginal vectors of the game, i.e.,
1 
Φ(v) := mσ (v). (3.1)
n!
σ∈π(N )

With the aid of (3.1) one can provide a probabilistic interpretation of

the Shapley value as follows. Suppose we draw from an urn, containing
1
the elements of π(N ), a permutation σ (with probability n! ). Then
we let the players enter a room one by one in the order σ and give
each player the marginal contribution created by him. Then, for each
i ∈ N , the i-th coordinate Φi (v) of Φ(v) is the expected payoff of player
i according to this random procedure.
By using Definition 1.8 one can rewrite (3.1) obtaining
26 3 The Shapley Value, the τ -value, and the Average Lexicographic Value
1 
Φi (v) = (v (P σ
(i) ∪ {i}) − v (P σ
(i))) . (3.2)
n!
σ∈π(N )

Example 3.2. Let N = {1, 2, 3}, v (1, 2) = −2, v(S) = 0 if S = {1, 2}.
Then the Shapley value is the average of the vectors (0, −2, 2), (0, 0, 0),
(−2, 0, 2), (0, 0, 0), (0, 0, 0), and (0, 0, 0), i.e.
 
1 1 2
Φ(v) = − , − , .
3 3 3
Remark 3.3. The game in Example 3.2 shows that the Shapley value
needs not to be individually rational (cf. Definition 1.27(i)); note that
Φ1 (v) = − 13 < 0 = v(1).
The terms after the summation sign in (3.2) are of the form
v (S ∪ {i}) − v (S), where S is a subset of N not containing i. Note
that there are exactly |S|! (n − 1 − |S|)! orderings for which one has P
σ (i) = S. The first factor |S|! corresponds to the number of orderings

of S and the second factor (n − 1 − |S|)! corresponds to the number of

orderings of N \ (S ∪ {i}). Using this, we can rewrite (3.2) and obtain
 |S|! (n − 1 − |S|)!
Φi (v) = (v (S ∪ {i}) − v (S)) . (3.3)
n!
S:i∈S
/
 −1
|S|!(n−1−|S|)! n−1
1
Note that = . This gives rise to a second
n! |S|
n
probabilistic interpretation of the Shapley value. Create a subset S with
i∈/ S in the following way. First, draw at random a number out of the
urn consisting of possible sizes 0, . . . , n − 1, where each number (i.e.
size) has probability n1 to be drawn. If size s is chosen, draw a set out
of the urn consisting of subsets of N \ {i} of size s, where each set has
 −1
n−1
the same probability to be drawn. If S is drawn, then one
s
pays player i the amount v (S ∪ {i}) − v (S). Then, obviously, in view
of (3.3), the expected payoff for player i in this random procedure is
the Shapley value for player i in the game v ∈ GN .
Example 3.4. (i) For v ∈ G{1,2} we have
v(1, 2) − v(1) − v(2)
Φi (v) = v(i) + for each i ∈ {1, 2} .
2
(ii) The Shapley value Φ(v) for an additive game v ∈ GN is equal to
(v (1) , . . . , v(n)).
 3.1 The Shapley Value 27

(iii) Let uS be the unanimity game for S ⊂ N (cf. (1.1)). Then Φ(uS ) =
1 S
|S| e .

The Shapley value satisfies some reasonable properties as introduced

in Definition 1.27. More precisely

Proposition 3.5. The Shapley value satisfies additivity, anonymity,

the dummy player property, and efficiency.

Proof. (Additivity) This follows from the fact that mσ (v+w) = mσ (v)+
mσ (w) for all v, w ∈ GN .
(Anonymity) We divide the proof into two parts.
(a) First we show that

ρ∗ (mσ (v)) = mρσ (v ρ ) for all v ∈ GN and all ρ, σ ∈ π(N ).

This follows because for all i ∈ N :

(mρσ (v ρ ))ρσ(i)
= v ρ (ρσ(1), . . . , ρσ(i)) − v ρ (ρσ(1), . . . , ρσ(i − 1))
= v (σ(1), . . . , σ(i)) − v (σ(1), . . . , σ(i − 1))
= (mσ (v))σ(i) = ρ∗ (mσ (v))ρσ(i) .

(b) Take v ∈ GN and ρ ∈ π(N ). Then, using (a), the fact that
ρ → ρσ is a surjection on π(N ) and the linearity of ρ∗ , we obtain
1  1 
Φ (v ρ ) = mσ (v ρ ) = mρσ (v ρ )
n! n!
σ∈π(N ) σ∈π(N )
⎛ ⎞
1  ∗ σ 1 
= ρ (m (v)) = ρ∗ ⎝ mσ (v)⎠
n! n!
σ∈π(N ) σ∈π(N )
∗
= ρ (Φ (v)) .

This proves the anonymity of Φ.

(Dummy player property) This follows from (3.3) by noting that
 |S|!(n−1−|S|)!
S:i∈S
/ n! = 1.
 (Efficiency) Note that Φ is a convex combination of mσ ’s and
i∈N mi (v) = v(N ) for each σ ∈ π(N ).
σ

By using the properties listed in Proposition 3.5 one can provide an

axiomatic characterization of the Shapley value.
28 3 The Shapley Value, the τ -value, and the Average Lexicographic Value

Theorem 3.6. ([102]) A solution f : GN → Rn satisfies additivity,

anonymity, the dummy player property, and efficiency if and only if it
is the Shapley value.

Proof. In view of Proposition 3.5 we have only to show that if f satisfies

the four properties, then f =Φ.
Take v ∈ GN . Then v = T ∈2N \{∅} cT uT with uT being the una-
nimity game for coalition T ∈ 2N \ {∅} and

cT = (−1)|T |−|S| v(S)
S:S⊂T

(cf. (1.2)). Then by additivity we have f (v) = T ∈2N \{∅} f (cT uT ),

Φ (v) = T ∈2N \{∅} Φ (cT uT ). So we have only to show that for all
T ∈ 2 \ {∅} and c ∈ R :
N

f (cuT ) = Φ (cuT ) . (3.4)

Take T ∈ 2N \ {∅} and c ∈ R. Note first that for all i ∈ N \ T :

cuT (S ∪ {i}) − cuT (S) = 0 = cuT (i) for all S ∈ 2N \ {∅} .

So, by the dummy player property, we have

fi (cuT ) = Φi (cuT ) = 0 for all i ∈ N \ T. (3.5)

Now, suppose that i, j ∈ T , i = j. Then there is a σ ∈ π(N ) with

σ(i) = j, σ(j) = i, σ(k) = k for k = N \ {i, j}. It easily follows that
cuT = σ (cuT ). Then anonymity implies that Φ (cuT ) = Φ (σ (cuT )) =
σ ∗ Φ (cuT ), Φσ(i) (cuT ) = Φi (cuT ). So

Φi (cuT ) = Φj (cuT ) for all i, j ∈ T , (3.6)

and similarly fi (cuT ) = fj (cuT ) for all i, j ∈ T .

Then efficiency, (3.5) and (3.6) imply that
c
fi (cuT ) = Φi (cuT ) = for all i ∈ T. (3.7)
|T |

Now, (3.5) and (3.7) imply (3.4). So, f (v) = Φ(v) for all v ∈ GN .
 3.1 The Shapley Value 29

For other axiomatic characterizations of the Shapley value the

reader is referred to [56], [74], and [128].
An alternative formula for the Shapley value is in terms of dividends
(cf. [55]). The dividends dT for each nonempty coalition T in a game
v ∈ GN are defined in a recursive manner as follows:
dT (v) : = v(T ) for all T with |T | = 1,

v(T ) − S⊂T,S=T |S| dS (v)
dT (v) : = if |T | > 1.
|T |
The relation between dividends and the Shapley value is described
in the next theorem. It turns out that the Shapley value of a player
in a game is the sum of all dividends of coalitions to which the player
belongs.

Theorem 3.7. Let v ∈ GN and v = T ∈2N \{∅} cT uT . Then
= cT for all T ∈ 2N \ {∅}.
(i) |T | dT (v) 
(ii) Φi (v) = T :i∈T dT (v) for all i ∈ N .
cT T
Proof. We have seen in the proof of Theorem 3.6 that Φ (cT uT ) = |T | e
for each T ∈ 2N \ {∅}, so by additivity,
 cT T
Φ (v) = e .
N
|T |
T ∈2 \{∅}
 cT
Hence, Φi (v) = T :i∈T |T | . The only thing we have to show is that
cT
= dT for all T ∈ 2N \ {∅} . (3.8)
|T |
We prove this by induction. If |T | = 1, then cT = v(T ) = dT (v).
Suppose(3.8) holds for all S ⊂ T ,  S = T . Then |T | dT (v) =
v(T ) − S⊂T,S=T |S| dS (v) = v(T ) − S⊂T,S=T cS = cT because

v(T ) = S⊂T cS .
Now, we turn to the description of the Shapley value by means of
the multilinear extension of a game (cf. [83] and [84]).
Let v ∈ GN . Consider the function f : [0, 1]n → R on the hypercube
[0, 1]n defined by
⎛ ⎞
  
f (x1 , . . . , xn ) = ⎝ xi (1 − xi )⎠ v(S). (3.9)
S∈2N i∈S i∈N \S

InSview of Theorem
 1.33, the set of extreme points of [0, 1]n is equal
to e | S ∈ 2N .
30 3 The Shapley Value, the τ -value, and the Average Lexicographic Value


Proposition 3.8. Let v ∈ GN and f be as above. Then f eS = v(S)
for each S ∈ 2N .

i 
T i
Proof. Note that i∈S eT i∈N \S 1 − e = 1 if S = T and the
product is equal to 0 otherwise. Then by (3.9) we have
⎛ ⎞

T  
i 

f e = ⎝ eT 1 − eT
i
⎠ v(S) = v(T ).
S∈2N i∈S i∈N \S

One can give a probabilistic interpretation of f (x). Suppose that

each player i ∈ N , independently, decides whether to cooperate (with
 xi ) or not (with probability 1 − xi ). Then with probability
probability

x
i∈S i i∈N \S (1 − xi ) the coalition S forms, which has worth v(S).
Consequentially, f (x) as given in (3.9) can be seen as the expectation
of the worth of the formed coalition.
We denote by Dk f (x) the derivative of f with respect to the k-
th coordinate of x. Then we have the following result, describing the
Shapley value Φk (v) of a game v ∈ GN as the integral along the main
diagonal of [0, 1]n of Dk f .
Theorem 3.9. ([83]) Let v ∈ GN and f be defined as in (3.9). Then
1
Φk (v) = 0 (Dk f ) (t, . . . , t) dt for each k ∈ N .
Proof. Note that
Dk f (x)
⎛ ⎞
  
= ⎝ xi (1 − xi )⎠ v(T )
T :k∈T i∈T \{k} i∈N \T
⎛ ⎞
  
− ⎝ xi (1 − xi )⎠ v(S)
S:k∈S
/ i∈S i∈N \(S∪{k})
⎛ ⎞
  
= ⎝ xi (1 − xi )⎠ (v (S ∪ {k}) − v(S)) .
S:k∈S
/ i∈S i∈N \(S∪{k})

Hence,
 1
(Dk f ) (t, t, . . . , t) dt
0
  1 
|S| n−|S|−1
= t (1 − t) dt (v (S ∪ {k}) − v(S)) .
S:k∈S
/ 0
 3.2 The τ -value 31

Using the well known (beta)-integral formula

 1
|S|! (n − 1 − |S|)!
t|S| (1 − t)n−|S|−1 dt =
0 n!
we obtain by (3.3)
 1
(Dk f ) (t, t, . . . , t) dt
0
 |S|! (n − 1 − |S|)!
= (v (S ∪ {k}) − v(S))
n!
S:k∈S
/
= Φk (v).
Example 3.10. Let v ∈ G{1,2,3} with v(1) = v(2) = v(1, 2) = 0,
v(1, 3) = 1, v(2, 3) = 2, v(N ) = 4. Then f (x1 , x2 , x3 ) = x1 (1 − x2 ) x3 +
2 (1 − x1 ) x2 x3 + 4x1 x2 x3 = x1 x3 + 2x2 x3 + x1 x2 x3 for all x1 , x2 , x3 ∈
[0, 1]. So D1 f (x) = x3 + x2 x3 . By Theorem 3.9 we obtain
 1  1

 5
Φ1 (v) = D1 f (t, t, t) dt = t + t2 dt = .
0 0 6

3.2 The τ -value

The τ -value was introduced in [108] and it is defined for each quasi-
balanced game. This value is based on the upper vector M (N, v) and
the lower vector m(v) of a game v ∈ GN (cf. Section 2.2).
Definition 3.11. A game v ∈ GN is called quasi-balanced if
 ≤ M (N, v) and 
(i) m(v)
(ii) ni=1 mi (v) ≤ v(N ) ≤ ni=1 Mi (N, v).
The set of |N |-person quasi-balanced games will be denoted by QN .
Proposition 3.12. If v ∈ GN is balanced, then v ∈ QN .
Proof. Let v ∈ GN be balanced. Then, by Theorem 2.4, it has a non-
empty core.
Let x ∈ C(v). By Theorem 2.17 we have m(v) ≤ x ≤ M (N, v).
From this it follows m(v) ≤ M (N, v) and
 n 
 n  
n
mi (v) ≤ xi = v(N ) ≤ Mi (N, v).
i=1 i=1 i=1

Hence, v ∈ QN .
32 3 The Shapley Value, the τ -value, and the Average Lexicographic Value

Definition 3.13. For a game v ∈ QN the τ -value τ (v) is defined by

τ (v) := αm(v) + (1 − α) M (N, v)


where α ∈ [0, 1] is uniquely determined by i∈N τi (v) = v(N ).

Example 3.14. Let v ∈ G{1,2,3} with v (N ) = 5, v(i) = 0 for all i ∈ N ,

v (1, 2) = v (1, 3) = 2, and v (2, 3) = 3. Then M (N, v) = (2, 3, 3),
m1 (v) = max {0, −1, −1, −1} = 0, m2 (v) = m3 (v) = max {0, 0, 0, 0} =
0. So m(v) = 0 and v ∈ Q{1,2,3} . Hence, τ (v) = αm(v)+(1 − α) M (N, v)
= 85 (2, 3, 3) = 58 M (N, v).

Proposition 3.15. Let v ∈ Q{1,2} . Then

(i) C(v) = I(v),
(ii) τ (v) = Φ(v),
(ii) τ (v) is in the middle of the core C(v).
Proof. (i) For the lower and upper vectors we have

m1 (v) = max {v (1) , v (1, 2) − M2 (N, v)}

= max {v (1) , v (1, 2) − (v (1, 2) − v (1))}
= v (1) ,
M1 (N, v) = v (1, 2) − v (2) .

From v ∈ Q{1,2} it follows v (1) = m1 (v) ≤ M1 (N, v) = v (1, 2) −

v (2), i.e. v is superadditive and its imputation set I(v) is non-empty.
Then


C(v) = x ∈ I(v) | xi ≥ v(S) for each S ⊂ N = I(v).
i∈S

(ii) For the Shapley value and for the τ -value we have Φ (v) =
(Φi (v))i∈{1,2} with Φi (v) = 12 v (i) + 12 (v (1, 2) − v (3 − i)), and
τ (v) = 12 (M (N, v) + m(v))
= 12 ((v (1, 2) − v (2) , v (1, 2) − v (1)) + v (1) , v (2))
= Φ (v) .

(iii) From (ii) it follows that Φ (v) = τ (v) = 12 f 1 + f 2 (cf. (2.1)),
which is in the middle of the core C(v).
Example 3.16. Let v be the 99-person game with
v(N ) = 1, v(S) = 12 if {1, 2} ⊂ S = N ,
v(2, 3, 4, . . . , 99) = v (1, 3, 4, . . . , 99) = 14 , and v(S) = 0 otherwise.
For the upper and lower vectors we have
 3.3 The Average Lexicographic Value 33
 
3 3 1 1
M (N, v) = , , ,...,
4 4 2 2
and
m(v) = (0, . . . , 0) .
4
So, τ (v) = (1 − α) M (N, v) with 1 − α = 200 . Hence,
 
4 3 3 2 2 1
τ (v) = , , ,..., = (3, 3, 2, . . . , 2) .
200 4 4 4 4 200

Remark 3.17. The game in Example 3.16 shows that the τ -value may
6
not be in the core C(v) of a game: note that τ1 (v) + τ2 (v) = 200 < 12 =
v (1, 2).
Remark 3.18. For an axiomatic characterization of the τ -value the
reader is referred to [109].

3.3 The Average Lexicographic Value

In this section we concentrate on balanced cooperative games, which
are games with a non-empty core (cf. Definition 1.19 and Theorem
2.4), and introduce for such games the average lexicographic value or
AL-value (cf. [111]). Just as in the definition of the Shapley value (cf.
Definition 3.1) an averaging of n! vectors takes place which correspond
to the n! possible orders of the players in an n-person game. For the
Shapley value the vectors are the marginal vectors of the game, while
for the AL-value the vectors are the lexicographically optimal points
in the core.
Given a game v ∈ GN that is balanced and an ordering σ =
(σ(1), . . . , σ(n)) of the players in N , the lexicographic maximum of
the core C(v) of v with respect to σ is denoted by Lσ (v). It is the
unique point in C(v) with

(Lσ (v))σ(1) = max{xσ(1) | x ∈ C(v)},

(Lσ (v))σ(2) = max{xσ(2) | x ∈ C(v) with xσ(1) = (Lσ (v))σ(1) },
...
(Lσ (v))σ(n) = max{xσ(n) | x ∈ C(v)
with xσ(i) = (Lσ (v))σ(i) , i = 1, . . . , n − 1}.
Note that for each σ ∈ π(N ) the vector Lσ (v) is an extreme point of
C(v).
34 3 The Shapley Value, the τ -value, and the Average Lexicographic Value

Definition 3.19. The average lexicographic value AL(v) of a bal-

anced game v ∈ GN is the average of all lexicographically maximal
vectors of the core of the game, i.e.,
1 
AL(v) = Lσ (v).
n!
σ∈π(N )

Example 3.20. Let v ∈ G{1,2} be balanced. Then v (1, 2) ≥ v(1) + v(2)

and C(v) = co({f 1 , f 2 }) with f 1 = (v(N ) − v(2), v(2)) and f 2 =
(v(1), v(N ) − v(1)). Further π(N ) = {(1, 2), (2,

1)} and L(1,2) (v) = f 1 ,
(2,1) 2 1 1 2 1
L (v) = f . So, AL(v) = 2 (f + f ) = v(1) + 2 (v(1, 2) − v(1)−
v(2)), v(2) + 12 (v(1, 2) − v(1) − v(2)) , the standard solution for 2-
person games.

The next two theorems give properties of the AL-value for two spe-
cial classes of balanced games, namely simplex games and dual sim-
plex games. A game v ∈ GN is a balanced simplex game (cf. [25]
and [26]) if its core C(v) equals its non-empty imputation set I(v).
A game v ∈ GN is a balanced dual simplex game (cf. [25] and [26]) if its
core C(v) is equal to its non-empty dual imputation set Id (v), where
Id (v) = co({g 1 (v), . . . , g n (v)}) with
 ∗
v (k) = v(N) − v(N \{k}) if i = k,
(g k (v))i = v(N ) − v ∗ (i) otherwise.
i∈N \{k}

As it turns out, on these classes of games, the AL-value is closely

related with two other single valued solutions concepts: the center of
the imputation set (CIS) and the equal split of nonseparable rewards
(ESN R). Let I N be the set of all games with non-empty imputation
set and IdN be the set of all games with non-empty dual imputation

n
set. Then, CIS : I N → Rn is defined by CIS(v) = n1 f k (v) and
k=1
1 
n
ESN R : IdN → Rn is defined by ESN R(v) = n g k (v).
k=1

Theorem 3.21. Let v ∈ GN be a balanced simplex game. Then AL(v) =

CIS(v).

1 
n
Proof. Note that I(v) = co{f 1 (v), . . . , f n (v)} and CIS(v) = n f k (v)

k=1
where (f k (v))i = v(i) for i ∈ N \{k} and (f k (v))k = v(N )− v(i).
i∈N \{k}
 3.3 The Average Lexicographic Value 35

Because Lσ (v) = f σ(1) (v) for each σ ∈ π(N ) we obtain AL(v) =

1  
n
n! f σ(1) (v) = n1 f k (v) = CIS(v).
σ∈π(N ) k=1

For dual simplex games (also called 1-convex games) (cf. [26] and
[43]) we give without proof the following results.

Theorem 3.22. Let v ∈ GN be a balanced dual simplex game. Then

AL(v) = ESN R(v). Moreover, AL(v) = τ (v).

It is easy to see that the AL-value satisfies the following proper-

ties: individual rationality, efficiency, core selection, S-equivalence, and
symmetry. Also the dummy player property holds for the AL-value be-
cause AL(v) is an element of the core for each balanced game v ∈ GN
and for each x ∈ C(v),

n 
v(i) ≤ xi = xk − xk ≤ v(N ) − v(N \ {i}).
k=1 k∈N \{i}

So, if i ∈ N is a dummy player, then xi = v(i) for each core element

and, in particular, ALi (v) = v(i). Other properties of the average lexi-
cographic value will be discussed in Section 5.2.4.
4
Egalitarianism-based Solution Concepts

4.1 Overview

The principle of egalitarianism is related to the notion of equal share.

A completely equal division of v(N ) among the players in a game v
has little chance to be accepted by all players because it ignores the
claims over v(N ) of all coalitions S ∈ 2N \ {∅, N }. Communities that
believe in the egalitarian principle will rather accept an allocation that
divides the value of the grand coalition as equally as possible. Such al-
locations might result using the comparison of coalitions’ worth, equal
share within groups with high worth being highly desirable. The av-
erage worth a(S, v) of S ∈ 2N \ {∅} with respect to v, defined by
a(S, v) := v(S)
|S| and called also the per capita value, has played a key
role in defining several egalitarian solution concepts. We mention here
the equal division core (cf. Definition 2.14), the equal split-off set (cf.
Section 4.2), and the constrained egalitarian solution (cf. Subsection
5.2.3).
An alternative way to introduce egalitarian solution concepts is
to use egalitarian criteria for comparing income distributions like the
Lorenz criterion (cf. [99]) and the Rawlsian criterion (cf. [92]). These
criteria use specific binary relations to compare income distributions
in order to select one that maximizes the welfare of the worst off play-
ers. More precisely, consider a society of n individuals with aggregate
income fixed at I units. For any x ∈ Rn+ denote by x  = ( n )
x1 , . . . , x
the vector obtained by rearranging its coordinates in a non-decreasing
order, that 
 is, x1 ≤ x 2 ≤ . . . ≤ x n . For any x, y ∈ Rn+ with
n n
i=1 xi = i=1 yi = I,
we say that
px Lorenz dominates y, and de-
note it by x L y, iff pi=1 x i ≥ i for all p ∈ {1, . . . , n − 1},
i=1 y
with at least one strict inequality. The Rawlsian criterion is based on
38 4 Egalitarianism-based Solution Concepts

a leximin domination. We say that x leximin dominates y, denoted by

x lex y, if there exists k ∈ {0, 1, . . . , n − 1} such that x̂i = ŷi for
i = 1, . . . , k and x̂k+1 > ŷk+1 .
In most of the game theory literature about egalitarianism it is
agreed upon the fact that in order to call an allocation egalitarian it
should be necessarily maximal according to the Lorenz criterion. For
arbitrary TU games existing egalitarianism-based solution concepts us-
ing the Lorenz domination with respect to distributions of v(N ) are the
constrained egalitarian solution (cf. [46]), the strong-constrained egal-
itarian allocations (cf. [47]), the egalitarian set, the pre-egalitarian set
and the stable egalitarian set (cf. [3]). For balanced games the Lorenz
criterion plays a central role for the Lorenz solution (cf. [59]), the Lorenz
stable set and the egalitarian core (cf. [2]).
It is also interesting to look at solution concepts which are not qual-
ified as egalitarian and disclose whether they apply some egalitarian
treatment to players or coalitions. We refer the reader interested in
egalitarian ideas behind the notions of the prenucleolus (cf. [96]), the
λ-prenucleolus (cf. [94]), the nucleolus (cf. [96]) and the Shapley value
(cf. [102]) to [1].

4.2 The Equal Split-Off Set

We introduce now a new set valued solution concept for coopera-

tive games with transferable utility that we call the equal split-off
set (cf. [21]). More precisely, we consider a world N of n players,
N = {1, . . . , n}, who believe in equal share cooperation and play the
game v ∈ GN . We assume that the entire set of players will cooperate
and deal with the question how the whole amount of money v(N ) gen-
erated by N should be divided among the players by considering the
following step-wise process.
First, one of the coalitions with maximal average worth, say T1 ,
forms and the players in T1 divide equally the worth v(T1 ). In step 2 one
of the coalitions in N \ T1 with maximal average marginal worth w.r.t.
T1 , say T2 , forms, joins costless T1 , and divides equally the increase in
value v(T2 ∪ T1 ) − v(T1 ) among its members. The process stops when a
partition of N of the form T1 , . . . , TK  for some 1 ≤ K ≤ n is reached.
This procedure generates an efficient payoff vector x ∈ Rn which we
call an equal split-off allocation. The equal split-off set is then defined
as consisting of all equal split-off allocations.
 4.2 The Equal Split-Off Set 39

4.2.1 The Equal Split-Off Set for General Games

Let v ∈ GN and π = T1 , . . . , TK  be an ordered partition of the player
set N . We set v1 := v, and for each k ∈ {2, . . . , K} we define the
marginal game
k−1
vk : 2N \(∪s=1 Ts ) → R
by
vk (S) := vk−1 (Tk−1 ∪ S) − vk−1 (Tk−1 )
= v ∪k−1
s=1 Ts ∪ S − v ∪s=1 Ts .
k−1
(4.1)

We call the partition π = T1 , . . . , TK  of N a suitable ordered par-

tition with respect to the game v ∈ GN if
vk (S)
Tk ∈ arg max
k−1 |S|
S∈2 ( s=1 s ) \{∅}
N\ ∪ T

for all k ∈ {1, . . . , K}.

Given such a partition π, the equal split-off allocation for v generated
by π is the efficient payoff vector x = (xi )i∈N ∈ Rn , where for all Tk ∈ π
and all i ∈ Tk , xi = vk|T(Tk k| ) .

Definition 4.1. The equal split-off set ESOS(v) of a game v ∈ GN

is the set
{x ∈ Rn | ∃π s.t. x is an equal split-off allocation for v generated by π} .
In order to illustrate this solution concept, let us have a look at the
following examples:
Example 4.2. (2-person superadditive games) Let v be a game on the
player set N = {1, 2} satisfying v (1, 2) ≥ v (1)+v (2). Suppose without
loss of generality that v(1) ≥ v(2) and consider the following four cases:
(i) v (1) > 12 v (1, 2). Then {1} , {2} is the unique suitable ordered
partition and
ESOS(v) = {(v (1) , v (1, 2) − v (1))} ;
(ii) v (2) < v (1) = 12 v (1, 2). In this case
 
1 1
ESOS(v) = v (1, 2) , v (1, 2)
2 2
corresponding to the suitable ordered partitions {1} , {2} and
{1, 2};
40 4 Egalitarianism-based Solution Concepts

(iii) v (2) = v (1) = 12 v (1, 2). Also here

 
1 1
ESOS(v) = v (1, 2) , v (1, 2) = {(v (1) , v (2))} ,
2 2
corresponding to the three suitable ordered partitions
{1} , {2}, {2} , {1}, and {1, 2};
(iv) v (1) < 12 v (1, 2). Then {1, 2} is the unique suitable ordered par-
tition and
 
1 1
ESOS(v) = v (1, 2) , v (1, 2) .
2 2
Example 4.3. (Simple games) Given a simple game v on player set N
(cf. Definition 1.3), we denote the set of all minimal winning coalitions
(cf. Definition 1.5) with a smallest !cardinality by W s . In this case we
1 S
have ESOS(v) = |S| e | S ∈ W s because for any suitable ordered
partition T1 , . . . , TK  we will have T1 ∈ W s , and all players in T1 will
receive |T11 | whereas the players in N \ T1 will receive payoff 0.

Example 4.4. (Glove games) Let v be a glove game


on player set N (see
Example 1.2). If |L| = |R|, then ESOS(v) = 12 , . . . , 12 that can be
generated by many suitable ordered partitions, where each element Tk
of such a partition has the property that |Tk ∩ L| = |Tk ∩ R|. In case
|L| > |R| each element x ∈ ESOS(v) satisfies xi = 12 for each i ∈ R
and for |R| elements of L, and xi = 0 for the other elements of L.
Conversely, all elements of this type belong to ESOS(v).
Example 4.5. (A 2-person non-superadditive game) Let v be a game on
the player set N = {1, 2} satisfying v (∅) = v (1, 2) = 0, v (1) = 3, and
v (2) = 2. Then {1} , {2} is the unique suitable ordered partition and
ESOS(v) = {(3, −3)}.
One can easily check that the suitable ordered partitions generating
equal split-off allocations in the above examples satisfy a monotonicity
property w.r.t. average worth as stated in
Proposition 4.6. Let v ∈ GN and T1 , . . . , TK  be a suitable ordered
partition of N w.r.t. v. Then
vk (S) vk+1 (S)
max ≥ max
N \ ∪k−1 T |S| N \ ∪k |S|
S∈2 ( s=1 s ) \{∅} S∈2 ( s=1 s ) \{∅}
T

for all k ∈ {1, . . . , K − 1}.

 4.2 The Equal Split-Off Set 41

Proof. It follows from the definition of Tk that


v ∪ks=1 Ts − v ∪k−1
s=1 Ts s=1 Ts − v ∪s=1 Ts
v ∪k+1 k−1
≥ .
|Tk | |Tk | + |Tk+1 |

By adding and subtracting v(∪ks=1 Ts ) in the numerator of the right-

hand term, we obtain


v ∪ks=1 Ts − v ∪k−1
s=1 Ts
≥
|Tk |
v ∪k+1
s=1 Ts − v(∪s=1 Ts ) + v(∪s=1 Ts ) − v ∪s=1 Ts
k k k−1
.
|Tk | + |Tk+1 |
This inequality is equivalent to

v ∪ks=1 Ts − v ∪k−1
s=1 Ts |Tk | + v ∪ks=1 Ts − v ∪k−1
s=1 Ts |Tk+1 |

≥ v ∪k+1
s=1 Ts − v ∪s=1 Ts
k
|Tk | + v ∪ks=1 Ts − v ∪k−1
s=1 Ts |Tk | ,

which is at its turn equivalent to

v ∪ks=1 Ts − v ∪k−1
s=1 Ts |Tk+1 | ≥ v ∪k+1
s=1 Ts − v ∪s=1 Ts
k
|Tk | .

We refer the reader to [127] for an axiomatic characterization of

the equal split-off set on the class of arbitrary crisp games that uses a
consistency property à la Hart-Mas-Colell (cf. [56]).

4.2.2 The Equal Split-Off Set for Superadditive Games

We consider now an interesting additional property of our solution

concept on the class of superadditive games (cf. Definition 1.14). As it
turns out, the equal split-off set of a superadditive game is a refinement
of the equal division core of that game (cf. Definition 2.14).
Theorem 4.7. Let v be a superadditive game. Then ESOS(v) ⊂
EDC(v).
Proof. Let x ∈ ESOS(v) be generated by the suitable ordered partition
T1 , . . . , TK . Take S ∈ 2N \ {∅}. We have to prove that there is i ∈ S
such that xi ≥ v(S) |S| .
Let m ∈ {1, . . . , K} be the smallest number such that Tm ∩ S = ∅.
Then
42 4 Egalitarianism-based Solution Concepts


 
m−1 
v(S) v ∪m−1
s=1 Ts ∪ S − v ∪s=1 Ts
≤
|S| |S|

m−1 
s=1 Ts ) − v ∪s=1 Ts
v (∪m
≤
|Tm |
vm (Tm ) vm (T )
= = max ,
|Tm | m−1
N \(∪s=1 Ts ) |T |
T ∈2 \{∅}

where the first inequality follows from the superadditivity of v and the
second inequality from the definition of Tm . Note that
vm (T ) v(S)
xi = max ≥
N \ ∪m−1
( s=1 Ts ) \{∅} |T | |S|
T ∈2

for each i ∈ Tm ∩ S. So, x ∈ EDC(v) implying that ESOS(v) ⊂

EDC(v).

The next example provides a game for which the equal split-off set
is a strict subset of the equal division core.

Example 4.8. Let N = {1, 2, 3} and v be a glove game

 with L = {1, 12} 
and R = {3} (see

Example 1.2).

Then
 EDC(v) = x ∈ I(v) | x 3 ≥ 2
and ESOS(v) = 12 , 0, 12 , 0, 12 , 12 .

Remark 4.9. Clearly, by Theorem 4.7, each equal split-off allocation for
a superadditive game is individually rational. As illustrated in Example
4.5, this needs not be the case for non-superadditive games.
5
Classes of Cooperative Crisp Games

In this chapter we consider three classes of cooperative crisp games:

totally balanced games, convex games, and clan games. We introduce
basic characterizations of these games and discuss special properties
of the set-valued and one-point solution concepts introduced so far.
Moreover, we relate the corresponding games with the concept of a
population monotonic allocation scheme as introduced in [107]. We
present the notion of a bi-monotonic allocation scheme for total clan
games and the constrained egalitarian solution (cf. [45] and [46]) for
convex games.

5.1 Totally Balanced Games

5.1.1 Basic Characterizations and Properties of Solution

Concepts

Let v ∈ GN . The game v is called totally balanced if all its subgames

(cf. Definition 1.9) are balanced (cf. Definition 1.19). Equivalently, the
game v is totally balanced if C(vT ) = ∅ for all T ∈ 2N \{∅} (cf. Theorem
2.4).

Example 5.1. Let v ∈ G{1,2,3,4} with v (S) = 0, 0, 1, 2 if |S| = 0, 1, 3, 4

respectively, and v
(1, 2) = v (1, 3) = v (2, 3) = 1, v (1, 4) = v (2, 4) =
v (3, 4) = 0. Then 21 , 12 , 12 , 12 ∈ C(v), so v is balanced, but the subgame
vT with T = {1, 2, 3} is not balanced, so the game v is not totally
balanced.

Example 5.2. Let v ∈ G{1,2,3,4} with v (1, 2) = v (3, 4) = 12 , v (1, 2, 3) =

v (2, 3, 4) = v (1, 2, 4) = v (1, 3, 4) = 12 , v (1, 2, 3, 4) = 1, and v(S) = 0
44 5 Classes of Cooperative Crisp Games



for all other S ∈ 2N . Then 14 , 14 , 14 , 14 ∈ C(v). Furthermore, 0, 12 , 0
is an element of the core of the 3-person subgames and it easily follows
that also the one- and two-person games have non-empty cores. Hence,
the game v is totally balanced.

The following theorem relates totally balanced games that are non-
negative (cf. Definition 1.12) and additive games (cf. Definition 1.13).

Theorem 5.3. ([64]) Let v ∈ GN be totally balanced and non-negative.

Then v is the intersection of 2n − 1 additive games.

Proof. Let v ∈ GN be as above. For each T ∈ 2N \ {∅} consider the cor-

responding subgame vT and take xT ∈ C(vT ). Define yT ∈ Rn by yTi :=
xiT if i ∈ T and yTi := α if i ∈ N \ T , where

α := maxS∈2N v(S). We

prove that v is equal to ∧T ∈2N \{∅} wT := min wT | T ∈ 2N \ {∅} ,
where wT is the additive game with wT (i) = yTi for all i ∈ N .
We have to show that for S ∈ 2N \ {∅},
 
min wT (S) | T ∈ 2N \ {∅} = v(S).

This follows from

 
(a) wS (S) = i∈S ySi = i∈S xiS = vS (S) = v(S),
(b) wT (S) ≥ α ≥ v(S) if S \ T = ∅, where the first inequality follows
from the non-negativity
 of the game,
(c) wT (S) = i∈S xiS ≥ vT (S) = v(S) if S ⊂ T .

Nice examples of totally balanced games are games arising from

flow situations with dictatorial control. A flow situation consists of
a directed network with two special nodes called the source and the
sink. For each arc there are a capacity constraint and a constraint with
respect to the allowance to use that arc. Furthermore, with the aid of
a simple game (cf. Definition 1.3) for each arc, one can describe which
coalitions are allowed to use the arc. These are the coalitions which
are winning (cf. Definition 1.4). Such games are called control games
in this context. The value of a coalition S is the maximal flow per unit
of time through the network from source to sink, where one uses only
arcs which are controlled by S. Clearly, a dictatorial control game is a
control game in which the arcs are controlled by dictators (cf. Definition
1.6).
One can show (cf. [64]) that each flow game with dictatorial control
is totally balanced and non-negative. The converse is also true as shown
in
 5.1 Totally Balanced Games 45

Theorem 5.4. ([64]) Let v ∈ GN be totally balanced and non-negative.

Then v is a flow game with dictatorial control.

Proof. The minimum v∧w of two flow games v, w ∈ GN with dictatorial

control is again such a flow game: make a series connection of the flow
networks of v and w. Also an additive game v is a flow game with
dictatorial control. Combining these facts with Theorem 5.3 completes
the proof.

5.1.2 Totally Balanced Games and Population Monotonic

Allocation Schemes

The class of totally balanced games includes the class of games with
a population monotonic allocation scheme (pmas). The latter concept
was introduced in [107]. The idea here is that because of the complexity
of the coalition formation process, players may not necessarily achieve
full efficiency (if the game is superadditive it is efficient for the players
to form the grand coalition). In order to take the possibility of partial
cooperation into account, a pmas specifies not only how to allocate
v(N ) but also how to allocate the value v(S) of every coalition S ∈
2N \ {∅}. Moreover, it reflects the intuition that there is “strength in
numbers”: the share allocated to each member is nondecreasing in the
coalition size.

Definition 5.5. Let v ∈ GN . A scheme a = (aiS )i∈S,S∈2N \{∅} of real

numbers is a population monotonic allocation scheme (pmas) of
v if

(i) i∈S aiS = v(S) for all S ∈ 2N \ {∅},
(ii) aiS ≤ aiT for all S, T ∈ 2N \ {∅} with S ⊂ T and i ∈ S.

Definition 5.6. Let v ∈ GN . An imputation b ∈ I(v) is pmas ex-

tendable if there exist a pmas a = (aiS )i∈S,S∈2N \{∅} such that aiN = bi
for each player i ∈ N .

As it can be easily derived from Definition 5.5, a necessary condi-

tion for a game to posses a pmas is that the game is totally balanced.
This condition is also a sufficient one for games with at most three
players: one can easily show that every core element of such a game is
pmas extendable. However, if the number of players is at least four, the
existence of a pmas is not guaranteed as the next example shows (cf.
[107]).
46 5 Classes of Cooperative Crisp Games

Example 5.7. Let v ∈ G{1,2,3,4} with v (i) = 0 for i = 1, . . . , 4, v (1, 2) =

v (3, 4) = 0, v (1, 3) = v (1, 4) = v (2, 3) = v (2, 4) = 1, v(S) = 1 for
all S with |S| = 3, and v(N ) = 2. The core of this game is the line
segment joining (0, 0, 1, 1) and (1, 1, 0, 0). One can easily see that each
subgame of this game has a nonempty core, i.e. the game is totally
balanced. However, the game lacks a pmas as it can be shown by the
following argument: every pmas must satisfy a1N ≥ a1{1,3,4} = 1, a2N ≥
a2{2,3,4} = 1, a3N ≥ a3{1,2,3} = 1, and a4N ≥ a4{1,2,4} = 1. Hence,

i∈N aiN ≥ 4, which is not feasible.

For general necessary and sufficient conditions for a game to possess

a pmas the reader is referred to [107].

5.2 Convex Games

This class of cooperative games was introduced in [104]. In addition to

many equivalent characterizations of convex games, these games have
nice properties: the core of such a game is the unique stable set, its
extreme points can be easily described and it is additive on the cone of
convex games (cf. [41] and [112]). Moreover, the Shapley value coincides
with the barycenter of the core in the sense that it is the average of
the marginal vectors. It turns out that on the cone of convex games
the AL-value and the Shapley value coincide. Furthermore, the equal
split-off set of a convex game coincides with the constrained egalitarian
solution of the game (cf. Subsection 5.2.3).

5.2.1 Basic Characterizations

Definition 5.8. A game v ∈ GN is called convex iff

v(S ∪ T ) + v (S ∩ T ) ≥ v(S) + v(T ) for all S, T ∈ 2N . (5.1)

Definition 5.9. A game v ∈ GN is called concave iff −v is convex.

In what follows the set of convex games on player set N will be

denoted by CGN .
In the next theorem we give five characterizations of convex games.
Characterizations (ii) and (iii) show that for convex games the gain
made when individuals or groups join larger coalitions is higher than
when they join smaller coalitions. Characterizations (iv) and (v) deal
with the relation between the core and the Weber set (cf. [104], [62],
[37], [36]).
 5.2 Convex Games 47

Theorem 5.10. Let v ∈ GN . The following five assertions are equiva-

lent.
(i) v ∈ CGN ;
(ii) For all S1 , S2 , U ∈ 2N with S1 ⊂ S2 ⊂ N \ U we have

v (S1 ∪ U ) − v(S1 ) ≤ v (S2 ∪ U ) − v(S2 ); (5.2)

(iii) For all S1 , S2 ∈ 2N and i ∈ N such that S1 ⊂ S2 ⊂ N \ {i} we have

v (S1 ∪ {i}) − v(S1 ) ≤ v (S2 ∪ {i}) − v(S2 ); (5.3)

(iv) All n! marginal vectors mσ (v) of v are elements of the core C(v) of
v;
(v) W (v) = C(v).

Proof. We show (i) ⇒ (ii), (ii) ⇒ (iii), (iii) ⇒ (iv), (iv) ⇒ (v), (v) ⇒
(i).
(a) Suppose that (i) holds. Take S1 , S2 , U ∈ 2N with S1 ⊂ S2 ⊂ N \ U .
From (5.1) with S1 ∪ U in the role of S and S2 in the role of T we
obtain (5.2) by noting that S ∪ T = S2 ∪ U , S ∩ T = S1 . Hence, (i)
implies (ii).
(b) That (ii) implies (iii) is trivial (take U = {i}).
Suppose that (iii) holds. Let σ ∈ π(N ) and take mσ . Then
(c) 
n
 ). Toσ prove that m ∈ C(v) we have to show that
σ σ
k=1 mk = v(N
for S ∈ 2 : k∈S mk ≥ v(S).
N

Let S = {σ (i1 ) , . . . , σ (ik )} with i1 < . . . < ik . Then

v(S)

k
= (v (σ (i1 ) , . . . , σ (ir )) − v (σ (i1 ) , . . . , σ (ir−1 )))
r=1
k
≤ (v (σ (1) , . . . , σ (ir )) − v (σ (1) , . . . , σ (ir − 1)))
r=1

k 
= mσσ(ir ) = mσk ,
r=1 k∈S

where the inequality follows from (iii) applied to i := σ (ir ) and

S1 := {σ (i1 ) , . . . , σ (ir−1 )} ⊂ S2 := {σ (1) , . . . , σ (ir − 1)} for r ∈
{1, . . . , k}. This proves that (iii) implies (iv).
48 5 Classes of Cooperative Crisp Games

(d) Suppose that (iv) holds. Since C(v) is a convex set, we have C(v) ⊃
co {mσ | σ ∈ π(N )} = W (v). From Theorem 2.20 we know that
C(v) ⊂ W (v). Hence, (v) follows from (iv).
(e) Finally, we prove that (v) implies (i). Take S, T ∈ 2N . Then, there
is σ ∈ π(N ) and d, t, u ∈ N with 0 ≤ d ≤ t ≤ u ≤ n such that
S ∩ T = {σ (i1 ) , . . . , σ (d)}, T \ S = {σ (d + 1) , . . . , σ (t)}, S \ T =
{σ (t + 1) , . . . , σ (u)}, N \ (S ∪ T ) = {σ (u + 1) , . . . , σ (n)}. From
(v) follows that mσ ∈ C(v); hence,

v(S) ≤ mσi . (5.4)
i∈S

We have also that


mσi (5.5)
i∈S

d 
u−t
= (v (Ar ) − v (Ar−1 )) + v (T ∪ Bt+k ) − v (T ∪ Bt+k−1 )
r=1 k=1
= v(S ∩ T ) + v (S ∪ T ) − v(T ),

where
Ar = {σ (1) , . . . , σ (r)} ,
Ar−1 = Ar \ {σ (r)} ,
Bt+k = {σ (t + 1) , . . . , σ (t + k)} ,
and
Bt+k−1 = Bt+k \ {σ (t + k)} .
Combining (5.4) and (5.5) yields (5.1). This completes the proof.

Definition 5.11. ([97]) A game v ∈ G N is called exact if for each

S ∈ 2N \ {∅} there is an x ∈ C(v) with i∈S xi = v(S).

Remark 5.12. It is not difficult to see that a convex game is exact.

Remark 5.13. A characterization of convex games using the exactness

of its subgames (cf. Definition 1.9) can be found in [15] and [8].
 5.2 Convex Games 49

5.2.2 Convex Games and Population Monotonic Allocation

Schemes

As we have pointed out in Section 5.1.2, a necessary condition for the

existence of a pmas (cf. Definition 5.5) is the total balancedness of the
game. A sufficient condition for the existence of a pmas is the convexity
of the game. In order to see this we will need the following definitions.
For all ρ ∈ π(N ) and all i ∈ N , let

N (ρ, i) = {j ∈ N | ρ (j) ≤ ρ(i)} .

One generalizes the definition of a marginal contribution vector (cf.

Definition 1.8) as follows.
Definition 5.14. Let v ∈ GN and ρ ∈ π(N ). The extended vec-
tor ρ

ρ of marginal contributions associated with ρ is the vector a =
aiS i∈S,S∈2N \{∅} defined component-wise by

aρiS = v (N (ρ, i) ∩ S) − v ((N (ρ, i) ∩ S) \ {i}) .

Proposition 5.15. ([107]) Let v ∈ CGN . Then every extended vector

of marginal contributions is a pmas for v.
Proof. Take v ∈ CGN , ρ ∈ π(N ), and aρ . Pick an arbitrary S ∈ 2N \{∅}
and rank all players i ∈ S in increasing order of ρ(i). Let i, i ∈ S be
two players such that i immediately follows i. Observe that

aρiS = v (N (ρ, i) ∩ S) − v ((N (ρ, i) ∩ S) \ {i}) ,

and



  
aρi S = v N (ρ, i ) ∩ S − v N (ρ, i ) ∩ S \ i


= v N (ρ, i ) ∩ S − v ((N (ρ, i) ∩ S)) .

Therefore, aρiS + aρi S = v (N (ρ, 

 i ) ∩ρS) − v ((N (ρ, i) ∩ S) \ {i}). Re-
peating this argument leads to i∈S aiS = v(S), which establishes the
feasibility of aρ .
As for the monotonicity property in Definition 5.5, note that if i ∈
S ⊂ T ⊂ N , then S ∩ N (ρ, i) ⊂ T ∩ N (ρ, i) for all i ∈ N . Hence, by the
convexity of v we have aρiS ≤ aρiT . This completes the proof.
According to [104] the core of a convex game is a polytope whose
extreme points are the (usual) marginal contribution vectors (cf. The-
orem 5.10). Because every convex combination of pmas of a game v is
itself a pmas for that game, one obtains
50 5 Classes of Cooperative Crisp Games

Proposition 5.16. Let v ∈ CGN and b = (bi )i∈N ∈ C(v). Then b is

pmas extendable.

Definition 5.17. Let v ∈ GN . The extended Shapley value of v is

"
the vector Φ(v) defined component-wise as follows: for all S ∈ 2N \ {∅}
and all i ∈ S,
"iS (v) = Φi (vS ),
Φ
where Φ(vS ) = (Φi (vS ))i∈S is the Shapley value of the game vS .

As shown in [107], the extended Shapley value is the aritmethic

average of the extended vectors of marginal contributions (cf. Definition
5.14). Therefore, one obtains

Proposition 5.18. Let v ∈ CGN . Then the extended Shapley value of

v is a pmas for v.

5.2.3 The Constrained Egalitarian Solution for Convex

Games

Another interesting element of the core of a game v ∈ CGN is the

constrained egalitarian allocation E (v) introduced in [46] which can
be described in a simple way and found easily in a finite number of
steps. Two lemmas in which the average worth v(S) |S| of a nonempty
coalition S with respect to the characteristic function v plays a role,
are used further.
v(C)
Lemma 5.19. Let v ∈ CGN and L(v) := arg maxC∈2N \{∅} |C| . Then
(i) The set L(v) ∪ {∅} is a lattice, i.e. for all S1 , S2 ∈ L(v) ∪ {∅} we
have S1 ∩ S2 ∈ L(v) ∪ {∅} and S1 ∪ S2 ∈ L(v) ∪ {∅};
(ii) In L(v) there is a maximal element with respect to ⊂ namely

∪ {S | S ∈ L(v)} .
v(S1 ) v(S2 )
Proof. (i) Let α := maxC∈2N \{∅} v(C)
|C| and suppose |S1 | = α = |S2 |
for some S1 , S2 ∈ 2N \ {∅}. We have to prove that
v(S1 ∪ S2 )
= α and v(S1 ∩ S2 ) = α |S1 ∩ S2 | . (5.6)
|S1 ∪ S2 |
We have
 5.2 Convex Games 51

v(S1 ∪ S2 ) + v (S1 ∩ S2 )
v(S1 ∪ S2 ) v(S1 ∩ S2 )
= |S1 ∪ S2 | + |S1 ∩ S2 |
|S1 ∪ S2 | |S1 ∩ S2 |
≤ α |S1 ∪ S2 | + α |S1 ∩ S2 | = α |S1 | + α |S1 |
= v(S1 ) + v(S2 ) ≤ v(S1 ∪ S2 ) + v(S1 ∩ S2 ),

where the first inequality follows from the definition of α and the
second inequality follows from v ∈ CGN . So everywhere we have
equalities, which proves (5.6).
(ii) This assertion follows immediately from (i) and the finiteness of
L(v).

Lemma 5.20. Let v ∈ CGN and S ⊂ N, S = N . Then v −S ∈ CGN \S ,

where
v −S (T ) := v (S ∪ T ) − v(S) for all T ∈ 2N \S .

Proof. Let T1 ⊂ T2 ⊂ (N \ S) \ {i} where i ∈ N \ S. We have to prove

that v −S (T1 ∪ {i}) − v(T1 ) ≤ v −S (T2 ∪ {i}) − v(T2 ). Notice that this is
equivalent to prove that v (S ∪ T1 ∪ {i})−v(S ∪T1 ) ≤ v (S ∪ T2 ∪ {i})−
v(S ∪ T2 ) which follows by the convexity of v.

Remark 5.21. It is easy to see that v −S is a marginal game (cf. (4.1)).

Given these two lemmas, one can find the egalitarian allocation E (v)
of a game v ∈ CGN according to the following algorithm (cf. [46]).
In Step 1 of the algorithm one considers the game N1 , v1  with
N1 := N , v1 := v, and the per capita value v1|T(T| ) for each non-empty
subcoalition T of N1 . Then the largest element T1 ∈ 2N1 \ {∅} in
arg maxT ∈2N1 \{∅} v1|T(T| ) is taken (such an element exists according to
Lemma 5.19) and Ei (N, v) = v1|T(T| ) for all i ∈ T1 is defined. If T1 = N ,
then we stop.
In case T1 = N , then in Step 2 of the algorithm one considers the
convex game N2 , v2  where N2 := N1 \ T1 and v2 (S) = v1 (S ∪ T1 ) −
v1 (T1 ) for each S ∈ 2N2 \{∅} (cf. Lemma 5.20) takes the largest element
T2 in arg maxT ∈2N2 \{∅} v2|T(T| ) and defines Ei (v) = v2|T(T| ) for all i ∈ T2 .
If T1 ∪ T2 = N we stop; otherwise we continue by considering the
game N3 , v3  with N3 := N2 \ T2 and v3 (S) = v2 (S ∪ T2 ) − v2 (T2 ) for
each S ∈ 2N3 \ {∅}, etc. After a finite number of steps the algorithm
stops, and the obtained allocation E (v) ∈ Rn is called the constrained
egalitarian solution of the game v ∈ CGN .
52 5 Classes of Cooperative Crisp Games

Theorem 5.22. Let v ∈ CGN and let E (v) be the constrained egali-
tarian solution. Then E (v) ∈ C(v).
Proof. Suppose that S1 , . . . , Sm is the ordered partition of N on which
E (v) is based. So,
1
Ei (v) = v(S1 ) if i ∈ S1 ,
|S1 |
and for k ≥ 2:
1
Ei (v) = v ∪kr=1 Sr − v ∪k−1
r=1 Sr if i ∈ Sk ,
|Sk |

r=k Sr (k ≥ 1):
and for all T ⊂ ∪m


v ∪k−1
r=1 Sr ∪ T − v ∪r=1 Sr
k−1
v ∪kr=1 Sr − v ∪k−1
r=1 Sr
≤ . (5.7)
|T | |Sr |
n
First, we prove that E(v) is efficient, i.e. i=1 Ei (v) = v(N ). This
follows by noting that

n  
m 
Ei (N, v) = Ei (v) + Ei (v)
i=1 i∈S1 k=2 i∈Sk

m
= v(S1 ) + v ∪kr=1 Sr − v ∪k−1
r=1 Sr
k=2
= v (∪m
r=1 Sr ) = v(N ).

 we prove the stability of E(v). Take S ⊂ N . We have to prove

Now,
that i∈S Ei (v) ≥ v(S).
Note first that S = ∪mr=1 Tr , where Tr := S ∩ Sr (r = 1, . . . , m).
Then
  
m 
Ei (v) = Ei (v) + Ei (v)
i∈S i∈T1 k=2 i∈Tk


v(S1 ) 
m v ∪kr=1 Sr − v ∪k−1
r=1 Sr
= |T1 | + |Tk |
|S1 | |Sk |
k=2

v(T1 ) 
m v ∪k−1
r=1 Sr ∪ Tk − v ∪r=1 Sr
k−1
≥ |T1 | + |Tk |
|T1 | |Tk |
k=2
 5.2 Convex Games 53

m
≥ v(T1 ) + v ∪k−1
r=1 Tr ∪ Tk − v ∪r=1 Tr
k−1

k=2
= v (∪m
r=1 Tr ) = v(S),

where the first inequality follows from (5.7), and the second inequality
follows by the convexity of v by noting that ∪k−1
r=1 Sr ⊃ ∪r=1 Tr for all
k−1

k ∈ {2, . . . , m}.
Since the constrained egalitarian solution is in the core of the corre-
sponding convex game, it has been interesting to study the interrelation
between E(v) and every other core allocation in terms of the Lorenz
criterion introduced in Section 4.1. It turns out that for convex games
the constrained egalitarian solution Lorenz dominates every other core
allocation; for a proof the reader is referred to [46].
Finally, we mention the population monotonicity of the constrained
egalitarian solution on the domain of convex games (see [45] and [58]
for details).

5.2.4 Properties of Solution Concepts

We turn now to properties of solution concepts on the class of convex
games.
Notice first that it easily follows from Theorem 5.10 that for each
game v ∈ CGN the Shapley value Φ(v) coincides with the barycenter
of the core C(v). Moreover, on the cone of convex games the AL-value
introduced in Section 3.3 and the Shapley value coincide.
Example 5.23. Let v ∈ CG{1,2,3} with v(i) = 0 for each i ∈ N , v(S) =
10 if |S| = 2 and v(N ) = 30. Then L(1,2,3) (v) = (20, 10, 0) = m(3,2,1) (v),
L(1,3,2) (v) = (20, 0, 10) = m(2,3,1) (v), . . .
, L(3,2,1) (v) = (0,
10, 20) =
(1,2,3) 1 σ 1
m (v). So, AL(v) = (10, 10, 10) = 3! L (v) = 3! mσ̄ (v)
σ∈π(N ) σ∈π(N )
= φ(v) where σ̄ = (σ(3), σ(2), σ(1)) is the reverse order of σ.
Theorem 5.24. If v ∈ CGN , then AL(v) = Φ(v).
Proof. Note that for each σ ∈ π(N ) : Lσ (v) = mσ̄ (v), where σ̄ =
(σ(n), σ(n − 1), . . . σ(2), σ(1)).
Exact games (cf Definition 5.11) also play an interesting role in
relation with the AL-value. Let us denote by EX N the set of exact
games with player set N. In fact, EX N is a cone of games and one
easily sees that AL : EX N → Rn is additive on subcones of EX N ,
where the core correspondence is additive.
 54 5 Classes of Cooperative Crisp Games

For each balanced game v ∈ GN there is a unique exact game v E ∈

EX N with the same core as the original game. This exactification v E
of v is defined by v E (∅) = 0 and for each S ∈ 2N \ {∅},


v E (S) = min xi | x ∈ C(v) .
i∈S

So, C(v E ) = C(v) for each balanced game v and v E = v if and only
if v is exact. Note the following interesting property of the AL-value:
C(v) = C(w) = ∅ for v, w ∈ GN implies AL(v) = AL(w). This property
is equivalent to the invariance with respect to exactification: AL(v) =
AL(v E ) for each balanced game v ∈ GN .
The invariance with respect to exactification property of the AL-
value gives us the possibility to prove that for some games v ∈ GN
the AL-value of v coincides with the Shapley value of the exactification
v E of v. This is always the case for a game v ∈ GN for which its
exactification is convex.
Theorem 5.25. Let v ∈ GN .
(i) If v is a balanced 2-person game or 3-person game, then AL(v) =
Φ(v E );
(ii) If v is a simplex game, then AL(v) = Φ(v E );
(iii) If v is a dual simplex game, then AL(v) = Φ(v E ).

 1(ii). Let vn ∈ G be a simplex

Proof. We show only N game. Then
C(v) = I(v) = co f (v), . . . , f (v) . Further, v E (N ) = v(N ) and
 

for each S ∈ 2 \ {∅, N } : v (S) = min
N E xi | x ∈ C(v) =
   i∈S
 k  
min fi (v) | k ∈ {1, . . . , n} = min v(i), v(N ) − v(i)
i∈S i∈S i∈N \S

= v(i). This implies that v E is a sum of convex games, namely
i∈S  
n n
E
v = v(i)u{i} + v(N ) − v(k) uN (where uS denotes the una-
i=1 k=1
nimity game on S (cf. (1.1))). So, v E is a convex game and, by Theorem
5.24, AL(v) = AL(v E ) = φ(v E ).
Now, we give a 4-person exact game v, where Φ(v) = Φ(v E ) =
AL(v). This game is a slight variant of an example in [39] on p. 91.
Example 5.26. Let ε ∈ (0, 1] and let v ∈ G{1,2,3,4} with v(S) = 7, 12, 22
if |S| = 2, 3, 4, respectively, and v(1) = ε, v(2) = v(3) = v(4) = 0. Note
 5.2 Convex Games 55

that v ∈ / CGN because v(1, 2, 3) − v(1, 2) = 5 < v(1, 3) − v(1) = 7 − ε.

Note further that the set of extreme points of C(v) consists of (the
maximum number of) 24 extreme points for a 4-person game:
(i) 12 extreme points which are permutations of (10, 5, 5, 2),
(ii) 9 extreme points which are permutations of (7, 7, 8, 0) but with first
coordinate unequal to 0,
(iii) (ε, 7 − ε, 7 − ε, 8 + ε), (ε, 7 − ε, 8 − ε, 7 − ε) and (ε, 8 − ε, 7 − ε, 7 − ε).
From this follows that v is an exact game, and that each lexico-
graphic maximum Lσ (v) is equal to a permutation of the vector
(10, 5, 5, 2), where

1 each such permutation
 corresponds to two orders.
1 1 1
So,

1 AL(v) = 5 2 , 5 2 , 5 2 , 5 2 and is unequal
 to Φ(v E ) = Φ(v) =
1 1 1 1 1 1 1
5 2 + 4 ε, 5 2 − 12 ε, 5 2 − 12 ε, 5 2 − 12 ε .

We show next that the equal split-off set (cf. Section 4.2) and the
core (cf. Definition 2.3) of a cooperative game have additional nice
properties when the game is convex. We start by proving that the
equal split-off set consists of a single allocation which is the Dutta-Ray
egalitarian solution of that game.
Let D1 , . . . , DP  be the ordered partition of N according to the
Dutta-Ray algorithm for finding the constrained egalitarian solution
E(v) of a game v ∈ CGN . In each step p ∈ {1, . . . , P } of the Dutta-
Ray algorithm, the coalition Dp is the largest element in the set

v S ∪ ∪p−1
i=1 Di − v ∪p−1
i=1 Di
p
M := arg max .
p−1
S∈2N \∪i=1 Di \{∅}
|S|

We recall that for each p ∈ {1, . . . , P } the set M p has a lattice

structure w.r.t. the partial ordering of inclusion (cf. Lemma 5.19). So,

Dp = ∪ {D | D ∈ M p } .

For further use, we let

v Dp ∪ ∪p−1
r=1 Dr − v ∪p−1
r=1 Dr
dp := for each p ∈ {1, . . . , P } .
|Dp |

Suppose now that we are given a game v ∈ CGN , its ordered par-
tition D1 , . . . , DP  according to the Dutta-Ray algorithm, and an al-
location x = (xi )i∈N in the equal split-off set ESOS(v) of v that is
generated by the suitable ordered partition T1 , . . . , TK  (cf. Definition
4.1). Then we have the following
56 5 Classes of Cooperative Crisp Games
v1 (T1 )
Lemma 5.27. Let |T1 | = a1 and k1 ∈ {1, . . . , K} be the largest num-
vk1 (Tk1 )
ber for which = a1 . Then a1 = d1 and D1 = ∪kj=1
1
Tj .
|Tk1 |
 
Proof. Since T1 ∈ M 1 and D1 = ∪ D | D ∈ M 1 , we have T1 ⊆ D1
and a1 = v1|T(T1 1| ) = v(T 1) k1
|T1 | = d1 . Next we show that ∪j=1 Tj ⊆ D1 by

proving by induction that ∪kj=1 Tj ⊆ D1 for each k  ∈ {1, . . . , k1 }.
For k  = 1 the inclusion is correct. Suppose that for some k  ∈
 k +1
{1, . . . , k1 − 1} it holds that ∪kj=1 Tj ⊆ D1 . We show that ∪j=1 Tj ⊆ D1 .
We have

k +1 
d1 |Tk +1 | = vk +1 (Tk +1 ) = v1 (∪j=1 Tj ) − v1 (∪kj=1 Tj )
# #
k +1 #  #
= v1 (∪j=1 Tj ) − d1 #∪kj=1 Tj # ,

i.e., #  #
# k +1 # k +1
d1 #∪j=1 Tj # = v1 (∪j=1 Tj ),

k +1
implying that ∪j=1 Tj ⊆ D1 . Hence, ∪kj=1
1
Tj ⊆ D1 .
k1
Next we prove that ∪j=1 Tj = D1 . Suppose that we have V = D1 \
k1
∪j=1 Tj = ∅. First, from the selection of k1 and Proposition 4.6 it follows
that
vk1 +1 (S) k1
< a1 = d1 for each S ∈ 2N \∪j=1 Tj \ {∅} ,
|S|
implying
vk1 +1 (V )
< d1 . (5.8)
|V |
On the other hand,

vk1 +1 (V ) v1 (D1 ) − v1 ∪kj=11

Tj
=
|V | |V |
# #
# #
d1 |D1 | − d1 # ∪kj=1
1
Tj # d1 |V |
= =
|V | |V |
= d1

which contradicts (5.8). Hence, we have proved that ∪kj=1

1
Tj = D1 .

Theorem 5.28. Let v ∈ CGN . Then ESOS(v) = {E(v)}.

 5.2 Convex Games 57

Proof. Let D1 , . . . , DP  be the ordered partition of N according to the

Dutta-Ray algorithm for finding the constrained egalitarian solution
E(v) = (Ei (v))i∈N of v. Take an arbitrary allocation x = (xi )i∈N
in the equal split-off set ESOS(v) of v, and let it be generated by
the suitable ordered partition T1 , . . . , TK . We show by induction on
p ∈ {1, . . . , P } that there exist k1∗ , . . . , kp∗ , . . . , kP∗ ∈ {1, . . . , K} with
1 ≤ k1∗ < . . . < kp∗ < . . . < kP∗ ≤ K such that for each p ∈ {1, . . . , P }
 ∗ 
and each j ∈ kp−1 + 1, . . . , kp∗ we have

k∗
p vj (Tj )
∪j=k ∗ Tj = Dp and = dp . (5.9)
p−1 +1 |Tj |
For p = 1, let k1∗ = k1 where k1 ∈ {1, . . . , K} is the largest number for
vk1 (Tk1 )
which = a1 = v1|T(T1 1| ) . By Lemma 5.27 we have ∪kj=1
1
T j = D1
|Tk1 |
vj (Tj ) ∗
and |Tj | = d1 for each j ∈ {1, . . . , k1 }.
Suppose that for some p ∈ {1, . . . , P − 1} there exists kp∗ such that
kp−1 < kp∗ < K for which (5.9) holds. We show that there exists kp+1
∗ ∗ ,
k∗ vj (Tj )
such that kp∗ < kp+1
∗ ≤ K, for which ∪j=kp+1
∗ Tj = Dp+1 and =
 ∗  p +1 |Tj |
∗
dp+1 for each j ∈ kp + 1, . . . , kp+1 .
k∗
p
Notice that ∪j=1 Tj = ∪pl=1 Dl implying that the game vkp∗ +1 :
„ «
k∗
p
N \∪j=1 Tj
2 → R defined by
k∗
p p k∗
vkp∗ +1 (S) := v ∪j=1 Tj ∪ S − v ∪j=1 Tj ,
p
and the game vp+1 : 2(N \∪l=1 Dl ) → R defined by


 

vp+1 (S) := v ∪pl=1 Dl ∪ S − v ∪pl=1 Dl

coincide.
vkp∗ +1 (Tkp∗ +1 )  
Let akp∗ +1 = ˛
˛
˛
˛ and kp+1 ∈ kp∗ + 1, . . . , K be the largest
˛Tkp∗ +1 ˛
vk (Tkp+1 ) ∗
number for which p+1 ˛
˛
˛
˛ = akp∗ +1 . Take kp+1 = kp+1 . Given the
˛Tkp+1 ˛
coincidence of the games vkp∗ +1 and vp+1 and their convexity (cf. [46]),
we can apply the same argument as in Lemma 5.27 to conclude that
(5.9) holds also for p + 1.
It follows then that the suitable ordered partition T1 , . . . , TK  is a
refinement of D1 , . . . , DP  of the form
58 5 Classes of Cooperative Crisp Games
$% & % & $ ''
T1 , . . . , Tk1∗ , Tk1∗ +1 , . . . , Tk2∗ , . . . , TkP∗ −1 +1 , . . . , TkP∗
$ '
with TkP∗ = TK , and for each partition Tkp−1 ∗ +1 , . . . , Tkp∗ of Dp , p ∈
 ∗ 
{1, . . . , P }, the members of each element Tk , k ∈ kp−1 + 1, . . . , kp∗
with k0∗ = 0, receive the same payoff dp . Thus, we have x = E(v)
implying that ESOS(v) = {E(v)} for v ∈ CGN .

Finally, with respect to convex games the following result is well

known.

Theorem 5.29. ([104]) Let v ∈ CGN . Then C(v) is the unique stable
set.

Proof. In view of Theorem 2.12 we only have to show that C(v) is

stable. This is true if v is additive. So we suppose that v is not additive.
Let y ∈ I(v) \ C(v). Take an S ∈ 2N \ {∅} such that
 
v(S) − i∈S yi v(C) − i∈C yi
= max . (5.10)
|S| C∈2N \{∅} |C|

Further take z ∈ C(v) such that i∈S zi = v(S). This is possible in
view of Remark 5.12.
Let x ∈ Rn be the vector with
 P
v(S)− i∈S yi
yi + |S| if i ∈ S,
xi :=
zi otherwise.

Then x ∈ I(v) and x domS y. To prove that x ∈ C(v), note first of all
that for T ∈ 2N with T ∩ S = ∅ we have
  
xi = (xi − yi ) + yi
i∈T ∩S i∈T ∩S i∈T ∩S

v(S) − yi 
i∈S
= |T ∩ S| + yi
|S|
i∈T ∩S
 
 
≥ v(T ∩ S) − yi + yi
i∈T ∩S i∈T ∩S
= v(T ∩ S),

where the inequality follows from (5.10).

But then
 5.3 Clan Games 59
  
xi = xi + zi
i∈T i∈T ∩S i∈T \S
 
≥ v(T ∩ S) + zi − zi
i∈T ∪S i∈S
≥ v(T ∩ S) + v(T ∪ S) − v(S)
≥ v(T )

because z ∈ C(v), i∈S zi = v(S) and v ∈ CGN .
 
For T ∈ 2N \ {∅} with T ∩ S = ∅ we have i∈T xi = i∈T zi ≥ v(T )
because z ∈ C(v). So we have proved that x ∈ C(v).
Then I(v) = C(v) ∪ dom (C(v)) and C(v) ∩ dom(C(v)) = ∅. Hence,
C(v) is a stable set.

5.3 Clan Games

Clan games were introduced in [89] to model social conflicts between

“powerful” players (clan members) and “powerless” players (non-clan
members). In a clan game the powerful players have veto power and the
powerless players operate more profitably in unions than on their own.
Economic applications of such clan games to bankruptcy problems,
production economies, holding situations and information acquisition
are provided in [27], [77], [89], [117], and [122].

5.3.1 Basic Characterizations and Properties of Solution

Concepts

Definition 5.30. A game v ∈ GN is a clan game with clan C ∈

2N \ {∅, N } if it satisfies the following four conditions:
(a) Nonnegativity: v(S) ≥ 0 for all S ⊂ N ;
(b) Nonnegative marginal contributions to the grand coalition: Mi (N, v)
≥ 0 for each player i ∈ N ;
(c) Clan property: every player i ∈ C is a veto player, i.e. v(S) = 0 for
each coalition S that does not contain
 C;
(d) Union property: v(N ) − v(S) ≥ i∈N \S Mi (N, v) if C ⊂ S.

If the clan consists of a single member, the corresponding game is

called a big boss game (cf. [77]).
The next proposition shows that the core of a clan game has an
interesting shape.
60 5 Classes of Cooperative Crisp Games

Proposition 5.31. ([89]) Let v ∈ GN be a clan game. Then

C(v) = {x ∈ I(v) | xi ≤ Mi (N, v) for all i ∈ N \ C} .


Proof. Suppose x ∈ C(v). Then j∈N \{i} xj ≥ v(N \ {i}) for all i ∈
 
N \ C. Since v(N ) = i∈N xi = j∈N \{i} xj + xi one has

xi = v(N ) − xj ≤ v(N ) − v(N \ {i})
j∈N \{i}
= Mi (N, v) for all i ∈ N \ C.

Conversely, if x ∈ I(v) and xi ≤ Mi (N, v) for all i ∈ N 

\ C, then,
for a coalition S which does not contain C, one finds that i∈S xi ≥
0 = v(S). If C ⊂ S, then, by using condition (d) in Definition 5.30, one
has  
v(N ) − v(S) ≥ Mi (N, v) ≥ xi .
i∈N \S i∈N \S
 
Since v(N ) = i∈N xi , one finally obtains i∈S xi ≥ v(S), i.e.
x ∈ C(v).

In fact, a clan game can be fully described by the shape of the core
as indicated in

Proposition 5.32. ([89]) Let v ∈ GN and v ≥ 0. The game v is a clan

game iff
(i) v(N )ej ∈ C(v) for all j ∈ C;
(ii) There is at least one element x ∈ C(v) such that xi = Mi (N, v) for
all i ∈ N \ C.

Proof. One needs to prove only sufficiency. Suppose S ∈ 2N \ {∅} does

not contain C. Take j ∈ C \ S. Because x := v(N )ej ∈ C(v), one has

i∈S xi = 0 ≥ v(S) and from v ≥ 0 one finds the clan property in
Definition 5.30.
If C ⊂ S and x ∈ C(v) with xi = Mi (N, v) for all i ∈ N \ C, then
   
v(S) ≤ xi = xi − xi = v(N ) − Mi (N, v),
i∈S i∈N i∈N \S i∈N \S

proving the union property in Definition 5.30.

Furthermore, Mi (N, v) = xi ≥ v (i) = 0 for all i ∈ N \ C.
 5.3 Clan Games 61

Now, we focus on the AL-value (cf. Section 3.3) for big boss games.
Note that, according to Proposition 5.31, the extreme points of the
core of a big boss game v with n as big boss are of the form P T where
T ⊆ N \ {n} and PiT = Mi (v) if i ∈ T , PiT = 0 if i ∈ N \ (T ∪ {n}) and
PnT = v(N )− Mi (v). For each σ ∈ π(N ) the lexicographic maximum
i∈T
Lσ (v) equals P T (σ) , where T (σ) = {i ∈ N \ {n} | σ(i) < σ(n)}.

Theorem 5.33. Let v ∈ GN be a big boss game with n as big boss.

Then AL(v) = τ (v).
1 
Proof. For each i ∈ N \ {n} we have ALi (v) = n! (Lσ (v))i =
σ∈π(N )
1 
n! (P T (σ) )i = n! Mi (v)|{σ ∈ π(N ) | σ(i) < σ(n)}| = 12 Mi (v) =
1
σ∈π(N )
τi (v).
Finally, since the τ -value and the AL-value are efficient, we obtain
that ALn (v) = τn (v), too.

Let us now look at the exactification v E (cf. Section 5.2.1) of the

big boss game v with n as a big boss. For S ⊆ N \ {n} we have
 
v E (S) = min PiT = PiΦ = 0,
T ⊆N \{n}
i∈S i∈S

while for S ⊆ N with n ∈ S we have

 T 
v E (S) = minT ⊆N \{n} Pi = minT ⊆N \{n} (v(N ) − Mi (v))
i∈S i∈T \S
 N \{n} 
n−1 
= Pi = (v(N ) − Mi (v)) + Mi (v).
i∈S i=1 i∈S

This implies that v E is a non-negative combination of convex unanimity

games:
 

n−1 
v E = v(N ) − Mi (v) u{n} + Mi (v)u{i,n} .
i=1 i∈N \{n}

So, v E is a convex game (and also a big boss game) and the extreme
points of C(v) and of C(v E ) coincide. We obtain then that τ (v) =
AL(v) = AL(v E ) = Φ(v E ).

E v ∈ G be a big boss game with n as big boss.

Theorem 5.34. Let N

Then AL (v) = Φ v .
 62 5 Classes of Cooperative Crisp Games

5.3.2 Total Clan Games and Monotonic Allocation Schemes

The subgames in a total clan game inherit the structure of the original
(clan) game. This leads to the following
Definition 5.35. A game v ∈ GN is a total clan game with clan
C ∈ 2N \ {∅, N } if vS is a clan game (with clan C) for every coalition
S ⊃ C.
Note that in Definition 5.35 attention is restricted to coalitions that
contain the clan C, since the clan property of v implies that in the
other subgames the characteristic function is simply the zero function.
The next theorem provides a characterization of total clan games.
The reader is referred to [122] for its proof.
Theorem 5.36. Let v ∈ GN and C ∈ 2N \{∅, N }. The following claims
are equivalent:
(i) v is a total clan game with clan C;
(ii) v is monotonic, every player i ∈ C is a veto player, and for all
coalitions S and T with S ⊃ C and T ⊃ C :

S ⊂ T implies v(T ) − v(S) ≥ Mi (T, v); (5.11)
i∈T \S

(iii) v is monotonic, every player i ∈ C is a veto player, and for all

coalitions S and T with S ⊃ C and T ⊃ C :
S ⊂ T and i ∈ S \ C imply Mi (S, v) ≥ Mi (T, v). (5.12)
One can study also the question whether a total clan game possesses
a pmas (cf. Definitions 5.5, 5.6). The attention in [122] is restricted to
the allocation of v(S) for coalitions S ⊃ C, since other coalitions have
value zero by the clan property.
Theorem 5.37. ([122]) Let v ∈ GN be a total clan game with clan
C ∈ 2N \ {∅, N } and let b ∈ C(v). Then b is pmas extendable.
Proof. According to Proposition 5.31 we have
C(v) = {x ∈ I(v) | xi ≤ Mi (N, v) for all i ∈ N \ C} .

 there exists, for each player i ∈ N , a number αi ∈ [0, 1] such

Hence,
that i∈C αi = 1 and
αi M
( i (N, v)  ) if i ∈ N \ C,
bi =
αi v(N ) − j∈N \C αj Mj (N, v) if i ∈ C.
 5.3 Clan Games 63

In other words, each non-clan member receives a fraction of his

marginal contribution to the grand coalition, whereas the clan members
divide the remainder.
Definefor each S ⊃ C and i ∈ S :
αi M
( i (N, v) ) if i ∈ S \ C,
aiS =
αi v(S) − j∈S\C αj Mj (N, v) if i ∈ C.
Clearly, aiN = bi for each player i ∈ N. We proceed to prove that
the vector (aiS )i∈S,S⊃C is a pmas. Since i∈C αi = 1, it follows that

i∈S aiS = v(S). Now let S ⊃ C, T ⊃ C and i ∈ S ⊂ T .
- If i ∈
/ C, then aiS = aiT = αi Mi (N, v).
- If i ∈ C, then

aiT − aiS
⎡ ⎤ ⎡ ⎤
 
= αi ⎣v(T ) − αj Mj (N, v)⎦ − αi ⎣v(S) − αj Mj (N, v)⎦
j∈T \C j∈S\C
⎡ ⎤

= αi ⎣v(T ) − v(S) − αj Mj (N, v)⎦
j∈T \S
⎡ ⎤

≥ αi ⎣v(T ) − v(S) − Mj (N, v)⎦
j∈T \S
⎡ ⎤

≥ αi ⎣v(T ) − v(S) − Mj (T, v)⎦
j∈T \S
≥ 0,

where the first inequality follows from nonnegativity of the marginal

contributions and the fact that αj ≤ 1 for each j ∈ N \ C, the second
inequality follows from (5.12), and the final inequality from (5.11) and
nonnegativity of αi for each i ∈ C. Consequently, (aiS )i∈S,S⊃C is a
pmas.

Whereas a pmas allocates a larger payoff to each player as the coali-

tions grow larger, property (5.12) suggests a slightly different approach
in total clan games: the marginal contribution of each non-clan mem-
ber actually decreases in a larger coalition. Taking this into account,
one might actually allocate a smaller amount to the non-clan members
in larger coalitions. Moreover, to still maintain some stability, such al-
locations should still give rise to core allocations in the subgames. An
 64 5 Classes of Cooperative Crisp Games

allocation scheme that satisfies these properties is called bi-monotonic

allocation scheme (cf. [122]).

Definition 5.38. Let v ∈ GN be a total clan game with clan C ∈

2N \ {∅, N }. A bi-monotonic allocation scheme (bi-mas) for the
game v is a vector a = (aiS )i∈S,S⊃C of real numbers such that

(i) i∈S aiS = v(S) for all S ∈ 2C \ {∅},
(ii) aiS ≤ aiT for all S ⊃ C, T ⊃ C with S ⊂ T and i ∈ S ∩ C,
(iii) aiS ≥ aiT for all S ⊃ C, T ⊃ C with S ⊂ T and i ∈ S \ C,
(iv) (aiS )i∈S is a core element of the subgame vS for each coalition
S ⊃ C.

Definition 5.39. Let v ∈ GN be a total clan game with clan C ∈

2N \ {∅, N }. An imputation b ∈ I(v) is bi-mas extendable if there
exist a bi-mas a = (aiS )i∈S,S⊃C such that aiN = bi for each player
i ∈ N.

Theorem 5.40. ([122]) Let v ∈ GN be a total clan game with clan

C ∈ 2N \ {∅, N } and let b ∈ C(v). Then b is bi-mas extendable.

Proof. Take (αi )i∈N ∈ [0, 1]N as in the proof of Theorem 5.37. Define
for each S ⊃ C and i ∈ S :

αi M
( i (S, v)  ) if i ∈ S \ C,
aiS =
αi v(S) − j∈S\C αj Mj (S, v) if i ∈ C.

We proceed to prove that (aiS )i∈S,S⊃C is a bi-mas. Since i∈C αi = 1,

it follows that i∈S aiS = v(S). Now let S ⊃ C, T ⊃ C and i ∈ S ⊂ T .
- If i ∈ N \ C, then aiS = αi Mi (S, v) ≥ αi Mi (T, v) = aiT by (5.12).
- If i ∈ C, then

aiT − aiS
⎡ ⎤ ⎡ ⎤
 
= αi ⎣v(T ) − αj Mj (T, v)⎦ − αi ⎣v(S) − αj Mj (S, v)⎦
j∈T \C j∈S\C
 5.4 Convex Games versus Clan Games 65
⎡ ⎤

= αi ⎣v(T ) − v(S) − αj Mj (T, v)⎦
j∈T \S
⎡ ⎤

+ αi ⎣ αj (Mj (S, v) − Mj (T, v))⎦
j∈S\C
⎡ ⎤

≥ αi ⎣v(T ) − v(S) − αj Mj (T, v)⎦
j∈T \S
≥0

where the first inequality follows from (5.12) and nonnegativity of

(αj )j∈T \S , and the second inequality follows from (5.11) and nonnega-
tivity of αi for each i ∈ C.
Finally, for each coalition S ⊃ C, the vector (aiS )i∈S,S⊃C is shown
to be a core allocation of the clan game vS . Let S ⊃ C. According to
Proposition 5.31 we have

C(v) = {x ∈ I(v) | xi ≤ Mi (N, v) for all i ∈ N \ C} .


Let i ∈ S \ C. Then aiS = αi Mi (S, v) ≤ Mi (S, v). Also, i∈S aiS =
v(S), so (aiS )i∈S satisfies efficiency.
To prove individual rationality, consider the following three cases:
– Let i ∈ S \ C. Then aiS = αi Mi (S, v) ≥ 0 = v (i);
– Let i ∈ S ∩ C and |C| = 1. Then C = {i} and by construction
αi = j∈C αj = 1. Hence aiS ≥ aiC = αi v(C) = v (i);
– Let i ∈ S ∩ C and |C| > 1. Then aiS ≥ aiC = αi v(C) ≥ 0 = v (i),
since every player in C is a veto player.
Consequently, (aiS )i∈S,S⊃C is a bi-mas.

5.4 Convex Games versus Clan Games

In this section we identify common features of the class of convex games

and the class of clan games ([22]). We start by showing that each game
in the corresponding class can be characterized by means of certain
properties of appropriately defined marginal games. Further, we study
the duality between general convex games and total clan games and
show that, starting with a total clan game with zero worth for the clan
we make use of its dual game and restrict it to the non-clan members
in order to induce a monotonic convex game. Conversely, we can start
66 5 Classes of Cooperative Crisp Games

with a monotonic convex game, use its dual game and assign zero worth
to each coalition not containing a certain group of players as to reach a
total clan game with zero worth for the clan. Finally, the way in which
the corresponding games are constructed (“dualize and restrict” versus
“dualize and extend”) is also useful for providing relations between core
elements and elements of the Weber set of the corresponding games.
Since the player set on which a game v is played will be of special
importance for what follows, we write (N, v) for v ∈ GN .

5.4.1 Characterizations via Marginal Games

Given a game (N, v) and a coalition T ⊆ N , the T -marginal game

v T : 2N \T → R is defined by

v T (S) := v(S ∪ T ) − v(T )

for each S ⊆ N \ T (see also (4.1)).

As we already know if a game is convex then all its marginal games
are also convex (cf. Lemma 5.20). The next example shows that the su-
peradditivity (cf. Definition 1.14) of a game is not necessarily inherited
by its marginal games.
Example 5.41. Let N = {1, 2, 3} and v ({1}) = 10, v ({1, 2}) = 12,
v ({1, 3}) = 11, v ({1, 2, 3}) = 12 12 , and v(S) = 0 for all other S ⊂ N .
Clearly, the game (N, v) is superadditive. Its {1}-marginal game is
given by v {1} ({2}) = v ({1, 2}) − v ({1}) = 2, v {1} ({3}) = 11 − 10 = 1,
and v {1} ({2, 3}) = 2 12 . Since v {1} ({2, 3}) = 2 12 < 3 = v {1} ({2}) +


v {1} ({3}), the marginal game {2, 3} , v {1} is not superadditive.
As it turns out, the superadditivity of all marginal games of a game
(N, v) assures a stronger property than the superadditivity of (N, v),
namely the convexity of (N, v). This result, which we give without
proof, has been independently obtained in [20] and [71].
Proposition 5.42. A game (N,

v) is convex
 if and only if for each
T ∈ 2N the T -marginal game N \ T, v T is superadditive.
Remark 5.43. In view of Proposition 5.42, a game (N, v) is concave

(cf. Definition
 5.9) if and only if for each T ∈ 2N the marginal game
N \ T, v is subadditive (cf. Definition 1.15).
T

Let us now focus on total clan games (cf. Definition 5.35) and their
characterization using suitably defined marginal games. For a clan game
(N, v) with clan C ∈ 2N \ {∅, N }, define P C := {S ⊆ N | C ⊆ S} as
 5.4 Convex Games versus Clan Games 67

the collection of all coalitions containing C. By Theorem 5.36(iii), a

game (N, v) is a total clan game with clan C if and only if (N, v) is
monotonic, every player i ∈ C is a veto player, and for all coalitions
S1 , S2 ∈ P C the following C-concavity property holds:

S1 ⊆ S2 and i ∈ S1 \ C imply Mi (S1 , v) ≥ Mi (S2 , v).

In what follows we denote by M V N,C the set of all monotonic games

on N satisfying the veto player property with respect to each player
i ∈ C.
Proposition 5.44. Let (N, v) ∈ M V N,C . Then (N, v)

is a total clan
game with clan C if and only if the marginal game N \ C, v C is a
concave game.

Proof. Let (N, v) ∈ M V N,C be a total clan game with clan C. Then
for i ∈ S ⊆ T ⊆ N we have

v C (S) − v C (S \ {i}) = v (C ∪ S) − v ((C ∪ S) \ {i})

≥ v (C ∪ T ) − v ((C ∪ T ) \ {i})
= v C (T ) − v C (T \ {i}) ,

where the inequality follows from the C-concavity of (N, v). Hence,
(N, v) is a concave game.


Suppose now that N \ C, v C is a concave game. Let S1 , S2 ∈ P C ,
S1 ⊆ S2 , and i ∈ S1 \ C. Then

Mi (S1 , v) = v (S1 ) − v (S1 \ {i})

= v C (S1 \ C) − v C ((S1 \ C) \ {i})
≥ v C (S2 \ C) − v C ((S2 \ C) \ {i})
= Mi (S2 , v),


where the inequality follows from the concavity of N \ C, v C . Thus,
(N, v) is a total clan game with clan C.

Given a game (N, v) ∈ M V N,C and a coalition T ∈ 2N \C , the C-

T
based T -marginal game v C : 2N \T → R is defined by

T
vC (S) := v(S ∪ T ∪ C) − v(T ∪ C)

for each S ⊆ N \ T .
We have then the following result.
68 5 Classes of Cooperative Crisp Games

Proposition 5.45. Let (N, v) ∈ M V N,C . Then the following asser-

tions are equivalent:
(a) (N,

v) is a total clan game with clan C;
(b) N \ C, v C is a concave game;

T
(c) N \ (C ∪ T ) , v C is a subadditive game for each T ⊆ N \ C;


(d) N \ (C ∪ T ) , v C∪T is a subadditive game for each T ⊆ N \ C.

Proof. Notice that (a) ⇐⇒ (b) follows from Proposition 5.44, and (b)
⇐⇒ (c) holds by Remark 5.43. Finally, (c) ⇐⇒ (d) follows easily from
the definition of a C-based T -marginal game.

5.4.2 Dual Transformations

We present now a useful relation between total clan games with zero
worth for the clan and monotonic convex games, being interested in
transformations that work across these two classes of games. As it turns
out, we can always construct monotonic convex games from total clan
games with zero worth for the clan, and total clan games with zero
worth for the clan from monotonic convex games. We call the corre-
sponding transformation procedures “dualize and restrict” and “dualize
and extend”, respectively.
Let N = {1, . . . , n} and C ∈ 2N \ {∅, N } be fixed. We denote by
CLAN0N,C the set of all total clan games on N with clan C for which
v (C) = 0 is valid. The set of all games on N \C will be denoted by GN \C
and the set of all monotonic convex games on N \ C by M CON V N \C .
The “dualize and restrict” operator Dr : CLAN0N,C → GN \C is
defined by

Dr (N, v) = (N \ C, w) for each (N, v) ∈ CLAN0N,C ,

where w (S) := v ∗ (S) for all S ⊆ N \ C (cf. Definition 1.10).

Proposition 5.46. Let (N, v) ∈ CLAN0N,C . Then

Dr (N, v) ∈ M CON V N \C .

Proof. Let (N \ C, w) := Dr (N, v). To show that (N \ C, w) is convex,

let i ∈ N \ C and S1 ⊆ S2 ⊆ (N \ C) \ {i}. Then
 5.4 Convex Games versus Clan Games 69

w (S2 ∪ {i}) − w (S2 ) = v (N ) − v (N \ (S2 ∪ {i})) − v(N ) + v (N \ S2 )

= v (N \ S2 ) − v (N \ (S2 ∪ {i}))
≥ v (N \ S1 ) − v (N \ (S1 ∪ {i}))
= v (N ) − v (N \ (S1 ∪ {i})) − v(N ) + v (N \ S1 )
= w (S1 ∪ {i}) − w (S1 ) ,

where the inequality follows from the C-concavity of (N, v).

By the monotonicity property of (N, v) we have that w(S1 ) =
v (N ) − v (N \ S1 ) ≤ v(N ) − v (N \ S2 ) = w(S2 ) for S1 ⊆ S2 ⊆ N \ C,
i.e., the game (N \ C, w) is monotonic as well.

The “dualize and extend” operator De : M CON V N \C → GN is

defined by

De (N \ C, w) = (N, v) for each (N \ C, w) ∈ M CON V N \C ,

where

0 if C  S,
v(S) =
w(N \ C) − w ((N \ C) \ (S ∩ (N \ C))) otherwise,

for all S ⊆ N .

Proposition 5.47. Let (N \ C, w) ∈ M CON V N \C . Then

De (N \ C, w) ∈ CLAN0N,C .

Proof. Notice that, by the definition of v, each player i ∈ C is a veto

player in the game (N, v) := De (N \ C, w). To prove that (N, v) is
monotonic, let S ⊂ N and i ∈ N \ S.
If C  S and either i ∈
/ C, or i ∈ C is such that C  S ∪ {i}, then
v(S) = 0 = v(S ∪ {i}) follows by the definition of v.
If C  S and i ∈ C is such that C ⊆ S ∪ {i}, then we have

v (S ∪ {i}) = w (N \ C) − w ((N \ C) \ ((S ∪ {i}) ∩ (N \ C)))

= w (N \ C) − w ((N \ C) \ (S ∩ (N \ C)))
= v(S).

If C ⊆ S, then

v (S ∪ {i}) = w (N \ C) − w ((N \ C) \ ((S ∪ {i}) ∩ (N \ C)))

≥ w (N \ C) − w ((N \ C) \ (S ∩ (N \ C)))
= v(S),
70 5 Classes of Cooperative Crisp Games

where the inequality follows by the monotonicity of (N \ C, w).

It remains to show that (N, v) is C-concave. For this, let S1 ⊆ S2 ⊆
N and i ∈ S1 \ C. Then

v (S1 ) − v (S1 \ {i})

= w ((N \ C) \ ((S1 \ {i}) ∩ (N \ C))) − w ((N \ C) \ (S1 ∩ (N \ C)))
≥ w ((N \ C) \ ((S2 \ {i}) ∩ (N \ C))) − w ((N \ C) \ (S2 ∩ (N \ C))))
= v (S2 ) − v (S2 \ {i}) ,

where the inequality follows by the convexity of (N \ C, w).

Notice finally that it is straightforward to prove the following result.
Proposition 5.48. Let Dr and De be the “dualize and restrict” and
the “dualize and extend” operators, respectively, as introduced above.
Then,
(a) De ◦ Dr is the identity map on CLAN0N,C , and
(b) Dr ◦ De is the identity map on M CON V N \C .

5.4.3 The Core versus the Weber Set

We now show how to use the “dualize and restrict” and the “dualize
and extend” procedures to relate core elements and elements of the
Weber set (cf. Definitions 2.3 and 2.19) of corresponding (total clan
and monotonic convex) games.
In order to state our results, we will need some additional notation.
Let the player set N and C ∈ 2N \ {∅, N } be fixed, and let Π (C)
and Π (N \ C) denote the set of all permutations of C and N \ C,
respectively. For each (τ, σ) ∈ Π (C)×Π (N \ C), we write m(τ,σ) (N, v)
to denote the marginal contribution vector with respect to (N, v) ∈
CLAN0N,C and to the permutation (τ, σ) of N according to which the
set of all predecessors of each non-clan member includes the clan. We
let
!
W  (N, v) := co m(τ,σ) (N, v) | (τ, σ) ∈ Π (C) × Π (N \ C) .

Finally, let m(τ,σ) (N, v)|N \C denote the projection of m(τ,σ) (N, v) on
N \ C and
!
W  (N, v)|N \C := co m(τ,σ) (N, v)|N \C | (τ, σ) ∈ Π (C) × Π (N \ C) .

We have the following result.

 5.4 Convex Games versus Clan Games 71

Proposition 5.49. Let (N, v) ∈ CLAN0N,C . Then Core (Dr (N, v)) =
W  (N, v)|N \C .

Proof. Let (N \ C, w) := Dr (N, v). By Proposition 5.46, (N \ C, w) ∈

M CON V N \C and, hence, Core (N \ C, w) = W (N \ C, w). Thus, it
is sufficient to prove that W (N \ C, w) = W  (N, v)|N \C . For this, we
show that mσ (N \ C, w) = m(τ,σ) (N, v)|N \C for each σ ∈ Π (N \ C)
and any τ ∈ Π(C), where

mσ (N \ C, w) ∈ W (N \ C, w) ,

m(τ,σ) (N, v)|N \C ∈ W  (N, v)|N \C ,

and σ is the reverse order of σ.
For each i ∈ N \ C we have
(τ,σ)
mi (N, v)|N \C = v P (τ,σ) (i) ∪ {i} − v P (τ,σ) (i)



= v C ∪ P σ (i) ∪ {i} − v C ∪ P σ (i)
= v (N \ P σ (i)) − v (N \ (P σ (i) ∪ {i}))
= v(N ) − v (N \ (P σ (i) ∪ {i})) − v(N )
+v (N \ P σ (i))
= w (P σ (i) ∪ {i}) − w (P σ (i))
= mσi (N \ C, w) .

Thus, the assertion follows.

Let mσ (N \ C, w) be the marginal contributions vector with respect

σ
to (N \ C, w) and σ ∈ Π (N \ C). In what follows, let xm (N \C,w) ∈ Rn
be defined by

mσ (N \C,w) 0 if i ∈ C,
xi =
mσi (N \ C, w) if i ∈ N \ C,

and let
σ (N \C,w)
!
X (N \C,w) = co xm | σ ∈ Π (N \ C) .

We are ready now to present our last result.

Proposition 5.50. Let (N \ C, w) ∈ M CON V N \C . Then

W  (De (N \ C, w)) = X (N \C,w) .
72 5 Classes of Cooperative Crisp Games

Proof. Let (N, v) := De (N \ C, w). Since, by Proposition 5.47, (N, v) ∈

σ
CLAN0N,C , it is sufficient to show that xm (N \C,w) = m(τ,σ) (N, v) for
each σ ∈ Π (N \ C) and any τ ∈ Π(C), where σ is the reverse order of
σ. We distinguish two cases:
(a) i ∈ N \ C. In view of Proposition 5.49,
(τ,σ) (τ,σ) mσ (N \C,w)
mi (N, v) = mi (N, v)|N \C = mσi (N \ C, w) = xi .

(b) i ∈ C. We have
(τ,σ) mσ (N \C,w)
mi (N, v) = v P (τ,σ) (i) ∪ {i} −v P (τ,σ) (i) = 0 = xi ,

where the second equality follows from (N, v) ∈ CLAN0N,C and

P (τ,σ) (i) ∪ {i} ⊆ C.
Hence, the assertion follows.
 Part II

Cooperative Games with Fuzzy Coalitions

 Cooperative games with fuzzy coalitions are introduced in [4] and
[5] to model situations where agents have the possibility to cooper-
ate with different participation levels, varying from non-cooperation to
full cooperation, and where the obtained reward depends on the levels
of participation. A fuzzy coalition describes the participation levels at
which each player is involved in cooperation. The use of fuzzy coalitions
is especially appealing in joint projects where cooperating players pos-
sess some (divisible) private resources such as (divisible) commodities,
time, money, and have to decide about the amount to be invested in the
joint project. Another motivation for the use of fuzzy coalitions relies
on a “large economy” issue: a fuzzy coalition in every finite economy
becomes a crisp coalition in the related infinite non-atomic economy
obtained by replacing each agent of the original finite economy by a
continuum of identical agents. A cooperative fuzzy game with fuzzy
coalitions (or fuzzy game) with a fixed set of players is represented
by its characteristic function. The characteristic function of a fuzzy
game specifies the worth of each fuzzy coalition as a real number. Since
in classical cooperative games, which we henceforth refer to as crisp
games, agents are either fully involved or not involved at all in coop-
eration with some other agents, one can look at the classical model of
cooperative games as a rough (discrete) version of the model of coop-
erative fuzzy games.
Games with fuzzy coalitions and their applications have been receiv-
ing increased attention in the game theory literature. Basic monographs
include [31] where attention is paid to triangular norm-based measures
and special extensions of the diagonal Aumann-Shapley value (cf. [7]),
and [14] where the stress in on noncooperative games. Fuzzy and mul-
tiobjective games are object of analysis also in [80]. Research in the
theory of fuzzy games and their applications has also had as a result a
significant number of scientific papers dealing with: solution concepts,
their axiomatic characterizations and relations between them (cf. [17],
[18], [19], [73], [76], [95], [114], [119], [120], [121]); special classes of fuzzy
games and their interrelations (cf. [9], [17], [18], [19], [113], [114], [115],
[119], [120], [121]); applications of fuzzy games in different situations
(cf. [50], [66]); new interpretations of the model of a cooperative fuzzy
game (cf. [10]).
We start this part with the definitions of a fuzzy coalition and a
cooperative fuzzy game, and develop the theory of cooperative fuzzy
games without paying extensively attention to the ways in which a
game with crisp coalitions can be extended to a game with fuzzy coali-
tions. One possibility is to consider the multilinear extension of a crisp
76

game introduced in [83] or to consider extensions that are given using

the Choquet integral (cf. [35]). The reader who is interested in this
extension problem is referred to [125] and [126].
This part is organized as follows. Chapter 6 introduces basic nota-
tion and notions from cooperative game theory with fuzzy coalitions.
In Chapter 7 we have collected various set-valued and one-point solu-
tion concepts for fuzzy games like the Aubin core, the dominance core
and stable sets, generalized cores and stable sets, as well as different
core catchers and compromise values. Relations among these solution
concepts are extensively studied. Chapter 8 is devoted to the notion of
convexity of a cooperative fuzzy game. We present several characteri-
zations of convex fuzzy games and study special properties of solution
concepts. For this class of fuzzy games we also introduce and study
the notion of participation monotonic allocation scheme and that of
constrained egalitarian solution. In Chapter 9 we study the cone of
fuzzy clan games together with related set-valued solution concepts for
these games; the new solution concept of a bi-monotonic participation
allocation scheme is introduced.
6
Preliminaries

Let N be a non-empty set of players usually of the form {1, . . . , n}.

From now on we systematically refer to elements of 2N as crisp coali-
tions, and to cooperative games in GN as crisp games.

Definition 6.1. A fuzzy coalition is a vector s ∈ [0, 1]N .

The i-th coordinate si of s is the participation level of player i in

the fuzzy coalition s. Instead of [0, 1]N we will also write F N for the
set of fuzzy coalitions on player set N .
A crisp coalition S ∈ 2N corresponds in a canonical way with the

i
fuzzy
coalition
 eS , where eS ∈ F N is the vector with eS = 1 if i ∈ S,
and eS i = 0 if i ∈ N \ S. The fuzzy coalition eS corresponds to the
situation where the players in S fully cooperate (i.e. with participation
levels 1) and the players outside S are not involved at all (i.e. they have
participation levels 0). In this part of the book we often refer to fuzzy
coalitions eS with S ∈ 2N as crisp-like coalitions. We denote by ei the
fuzzy coalition corresponding to the crisp coalition S = {i} (and also
the i-th standard basis vector in Rn ). The fuzzy coalition eN is called
the grand coalition, and the fuzzy coalition (the n-dimensional vector)
e∅ = (0, . . . , 0) corresponds to the empty crisp coalition.
 ∅We
 denote the
set of all non-empty fuzzy coalitions by F0 = F \ e . Notice that
N N

we can identify the fuzzy coalitions with points in the hypercube [0, 1]N
and the crisp coalitions with the 2|N | extreme points (vertices) of this
hypercube. For N = {1, 2} we have a square with vertices (0, 0), (0, 1),
(1, 0), (1, 1). The corresponding geometric picture for N = {1, 2, 3} is
that of a cube.
For s ∈ F N we define the carrier of s by car(s) = {i ∈ N | si > 0}
and call s a proper fuzzy coalition if car(s) = N . The set of proper
78 6 Preliminaries

fuzzy coalitions on player set N is denoted by PF N , and the set of

non-empty proper fuzzy coalitions on player set N by PF0N .
For s, t ∈ F N we use the notation s ≤ t iff si ≤ ti for each
i ∈ N . We define s ∧ t = (min (s1 , t1 ) , . . . , min(sn , tn )) and s ∨ t =
(max (s1 , t1 ) , . . . , max(sn , tn )). The set operations ∨ and ∧ play the
same role for the fuzzy coalitions as the union and intersection for
crisp coalitions.

For s ∈ F N and t ∈ [0, 1], we set s−i  t to be the element in F N



with s−i  t j = sj for each j ∈ N \ {i} and s−i  t i = t.
For each s ∈ F N we introduce the degree of fuzziness ϕ (s) of s
by ϕ (s) = |{i ∈ N | si ∈ (0, 1)}|. Note that ϕ (s) = 0 implies that s
corresponds to a crisp coalition, and that in a coalition s with ϕ (s) = n
no participation level equals 0 or 1.

Definition 6.2. A cooperative fuzzy game with player set N is a

map v : F N → R with the property v(e∅ ) = 0.

The map v assigns to each fuzzy coalition a real number, telling

what such a coalition can achieve in cooperation.
The set of fuzzy games with player set N will be denoted by F GN .
Note that F GN is an infinite dimensional linear space.

Example 6.3. Let v ∈ F G{1,2,3} with

v(s1 , s2 , s3 ) = min {s1 + s2 , s3 }

for each s = (s1 , s2 , s3 ) ∈ F {1,2,3} . One can think of a situation where

players 1, 2, and 3 have one unit of the infinitely divisible goods A,
A, and B, respectively, where A and B are complementary goods, and
where combining a fraction α of a unit of A and of B leads to a gain
α.

Example 6.4. Let v ∈ F G{1,2} be defined by


1 if s1 ≥ 12 , s2 ≥ 12 ,
v (s1 , s2 ) =
0 otherwise,

for each s = (s1 , s2 ) ∈ F {1,2} . This game corresponds to a situation is

which only coalitions with participation levels of the players of at least
1
2 are winning, and all other coalitions are losing.

Example 6.5. (A public good game) Suppose n agents want to create

a facility for joint use. The cost of the facility depends on thesum of
n
the participation levels of the agents and it is described by k ( i=1 si ),
 6 Preliminaries 79

where k is a continuous monotonic increasing function on [0, n], with

k(0) = 0, and where s1 , . . . , sn ∈ [0, 1] are the participation levels of
the agents. The gain of an agent i with participation level si is given
by gi (si ), where the function gi : [0, 1] → R is continuously monotonic
increasing with situation leads to a fuzzy game v ∈ F GN
gni (0) = 0. This 
where v(s) = i=1 gi (si ) − k ( ni=1 si ) for each s ∈ F N .

For each s ∈ F N , let s := ni=1 si be the aggregated participation
level of the players in N with respect to s. Given v ∈ F GN and s ∈ F0N
we denote by α (s, v) the average worth of s with respect to s, that
is
v (s)
α (s, v) := . (6.1)
s
Note that α (s, v) can be interpreted as a per participation-level-unit
value of coalition s.
As it is well known, the notion of a subgame plays an important
role in the theory of cooperative crisp games. In what follows, the role
of subgames of a crisp game will be taken over by restricted games of
a fuzzy game.
For s, t ∈ [0, 1]N let s ∗ t denote the coordinate-wise product of s and
t, i.e. (s ∗ t)i = si ti for all i ∈ N .

Definition 6.6. Let v ∈ F GN and t ∈ F0N . The t-restricted game of

v is the game vt : F0N → R given by vt (s) = v(t ∗ s) for all s ∈ F0N .

In a t-restricted game, t ∈ F0N plays the role of the grand coalition

in the sense that the t-restricted game considers only the subset FtN
of F0N consisting of fuzzy coalitions with
 participation  levels of the
corresponding players at most t, FtN = s ∈ F0N | s ≤ t .

 
Remark 6.7. When t = eT then vt (s) = v(eT ∗ s) = v i∈T si e
i for

each s ∈ F N , and for s = eS we obtain vt (eS ) = v(eS∩T ).

Special attention will be paid to fuzzy unanimity games. In the

theory of cooperative crisp games unanimity games play an important
role not only because they form a natural basis of the linear space GN ,
but also since various interesting classes of games are nicely described
with the aid of unanimity games.
For t ∈ F0N , we denote by ut the fuzzy game defined by

1 if s ≥ t,
ut (s) = (6.2)
0 otherwise.
80 6 Preliminaries

We call this game the unanimity game based on t: a fuzzy coalition

s is winning if the participation levels of s exceed weakly the corre-
sponding participation levels of t; otherwise the coalition is losing, i.e.
it has value zero.
Remark

6.8.
 The game in Example 6.4 is the unanimity game with
t = 12 , 12 .
Of course, the theory of cooperative crisp games has been an inspi-
ration source for the development of the theory of cooperative fuzzy
games. In the next chapters we will use operators from F GN to GN
and from GN to F GN (cf. [83], [125], and [126]). In particular, we shall
consider the multilinear operator ml : GN → F GN (cf. [83] and (3.9))
and the crisp operator cr : F GN → GN . Here for a crisp game v ∈ GN ,
the multilinear extension ml(v) ∈ F GN is defined by
⎛ ⎞
  
ml(v)(s) = ⎝ si (1 − si )⎠ v(S) for each s ∈ F N .
S∈2N \{∅} i∈S i∈N \S

For a fuzzy game v ∈ F GN , the corresponding crisp game cr(v) ∈

GN is given by

cr(v)(S) = v(eS ) for each S ∈ 2N .

Remark 6.9. In view of Remark 6.7, the restriction of cr(veT ) : 2N → R

to 2T is the subgame of cr(v) on the player set T .
Example 6.10. For the crisp unanimity  game uT the multilinear ex-
tension is given by ml (uT ) (s) = i∈T si (cf. [125] and [126]) and
cr (ml (uT )) = uT . For the games v, w ∈ F G{1,2} , where v (s1 , s2 ) =
√
s1 (s2 )2 and w (s1 , s2 ) = s1 s2 for each s ∈ F {1,2} , we have cr (v) =
cr (w).
In general the composition cr ◦ ml : GN → GN is the identity map
on GN . But ml ◦ cr : F GN → F GN is not the identity map on F GN if
|N | ≥ 2.
Example 6.11. Let N = {1, 2} and let v ∈ F G{1,2} be given by
v(s1 , s2 ) = 5 min {s1 , 2s2 } for each s = (s1 , s2 ) ∈ F {1,2} . Then for
the crisp game cr(v) we have cr(v)({1}) = cr(v)({2}) = 0 and
cr(v)({1, 2}) = 5. For the multilinear
extension

1  ml(cr(v)) we

1have

1
ml(cr(v) (s)) = 5s1 s2 . Notice that ml cr (v) 1, 2 = 2 2 but v 1, 2 =
5 implying that v = ml(cr(v)).
 6 Preliminaries 81

Remark 6.12. Note that for a unanimity game ut , the corresponding

crisp game cr(ut ) is equal to uT , where uT is the crisp unanimity
game based on T = car(t). Conversely, ml(uT ) is for no T ∈ 2N \ {∅}
a fuzzy unanimity
 game because ml(uT ) has a continuum of values:
ml(uT ) (s) = i∈T si for each s ∈ F N .
7
Solution Concepts for Fuzzy Games

In this chapter we introduce several solution concepts for fuzzy games

and study their properties and interrelations. Sections 7.1-7.3 are de-
voted to various core concepts and stable sets. The Aubin core intro-
duced in Section 7.1 plays a key role in the rest of this chapter. Section
7.4 presents the Shapley value and the Weber set for fuzzy games which
are based on crisp cooperation and serve as an inspiration source for
the path solutions and the path solution cover introduced in Section
7.5. Compromise values for fuzzy games are introduced and studied in
Section 7.6.

7.1 Imputations and the Aubin Core

Definition 7.1. The imputation set I(v) of v ∈ F GN is the set



x ∈ Rn | xi = v(eN ), xi ≥ v(ei ) for each i ∈ N .
i∈N

Definition 7.2. The Aubin core (cf. [4], [5], and [6]) C(v) of a fuzzy
game v ∈ F GN is the set


C(v) = x ∈ I(v) | si xi ≥ v(s) for each s ∈ F N .
i∈N

So, x ∈ C(v) can be seen as a distribution of the value of the grand

coalition eN , where for each fuzzy coalition s the total payoff is not
smaller than v(s); thus, C(v) is the subset of imputations which are
stable against any possible deviation by fuzzy coalitions. Notice that
84 7 Solution Concepts for Fuzzy Games

each player i ∈ N is supposed to gain a payoff proportional to his par-

ticipation level when he partially cooperates. That is, if player i gains
xi for full cooperation then his gain will be si xi in case he participates
at level si .
 Note that the Aubin core C (v) of v ∈ F N GN can be also defined as
x ∈ I(v) | i∈N si xi ≥ v(s) for each s ∈ F0 and this is more in the
spirit of the definition of the core of a crisp game (cf. Definition 2.3).
Remark 7.3. The core C (cr (v)) of the crisp game corresponding to v
includes C (v) : C (v) ⊂ C (cr (v)). We will see in the next chapter that
for convex fuzzy games the two cores coincide.
Clearly, the Aubin core C(v) of a fuzzy game v is a closed convex
subset of Rn for each v ∈ F GN . Of course, the Aubin core may be
empty as Example 7.4 shows or can consist of a single element as in
Example 7.5.
Example 7.4. Consider again the game v in Example 6.4. The core
C
(v) is empty because for a core element

x it should hold x1 + x2 =
v e{1,2} = 1 and also 12 x1 + 12 x2 ≥ v 12 , 12 = 1, which is impossible.
Example 7.5. For the game in Example 6.3, good B is scarce in the
grand coalition which is reflected in the fact that the core consists of
one point (0, 0, 1), corresponding to the situation where all gains go to
player 3 who possesses the scarce good.
The next proposition shows that for a unanimity game ut (cf. (6.2))
every arbitrary division of 1 among players who have participation level
1 in t generates a core element (cf. [17]).
Proposition 7.6. Let ut ∈ F GN be the unanimity game based on the
fuzzy coalition t ∈ F0N . Then the Aubin core C(ut ) is non-empty iff
tk = 1 for some k ∈ N . In fact
!
C(ut ) = co ek | k ∈ N, tk = 1 .

 k If tk = 1 for some k ∈ N , then e ∈ C(ut ). Therefore,

Proof. k

co e | k ∈ N, tk = 1 ⊂ C(ut ).
 n
Conversely, x ∈ C(ut ) implies that ni=1 xi = 1 = u N
t (e ), i=1 ti xi
≥ 1 = ut (t), xi ≥ ut (ei ) ≥ 0 for each i ∈ N . So x ≥ 0, ni=1 xi (1 − ti ) ≤
0, which implies that xi (1−ti ) = 0 for all i ∈ N  . Hence, {xi | xi > 0} ⊂
{i ∈ N | ti = 1} and, consequently, x ∈ co ek | k ∈ N, tk = 1 . So,
 
C(ut ) ⊂ co ek | k ∈ N, tk = 1 .
In what follows, we denote by F GN
∗ the set of fuzzy games with a
non-empty (Aubin) core.
 7.2 Cores and Stable Sets 85

7.2 Cores and Stable Sets

Now, we introduce two other cores for a fuzzy game v ∈ F GN , namely

the proper core and the crisp core, by weakening the stability conditions
in the definition of the Aubin core (cf. [114]).

Definition 7.7. The proper core C P (v) of v ∈ F GN is the set



C P (v) = x ∈ I(v) | si xi ≥ v(s) for each s ∈ PF N .
i∈N

Note that in the definition of C P (v) only stability regarding proper

fuzzy coalitions is considered (cf. Chapter 6, page 78). The set C P (v)
can be also defined as


x ∈ I(v) | si xi ≥ v(s) for each s ∈ PF0N .
i∈N

Further, we can consider only crisp-like coalitions eS in the stability

conditions.

Definition 7.8. The crisp core C cr (v) of v ∈ F GN is the set



C cr (v) = x ∈ I(v) | xi ≥ v(eS ) for each S ∈ 2N .
i∈S

cr
Clearly, thecrisp core C S(v) of a fuzzy game v can
 be also defined
as x ∈ I(v) | i∈S xi ≥ v(e ) for each S ∈ 2N \ {∅} and it is also the
core of the crisp game cr(v). One can easily see that both cores C P (v)
and C cr (v) are convex sets.
Let v ∈ F GN , x, y ∈ I(v) and let s ∈ F0N . We say that x dominates
y via s, denoted by x doms y, if
i > yi for all i ∈ car(s), and
(i) x
(ii) i∈N si xi ≤ v(s).
The two above conditions are interpreted as follows:
• xi > yi implies si xi > si yi for each i ∈ car(s), which means that
the imputation x = (x1 , ..., xn ) is better than the imputation y =
1 , ..., yn ) for all (active) players i ∈ car(s);
(y 
• i∈N si xi ≤ v(s) means that the payoff i∈N si xi is reachable by
the fuzzy coalition s.
86 7 Solution Concepts for Fuzzy Games

 s y impliess ∈ PF0 because from xi > yi

Remark 7.9. Note that x dom N

for all i ∈ N it follows i∈N xi > i∈N yi , in contradiction with

x, y ∈ I(v). It is, however, to be noted that |car(s)| = 1 is possible.

We simply say x dominates y, denoted by x dom y, if there is a non-

empty (proper) fuzzy coalition s such that x doms y. The negation of
x dom y is denoted by ¬ x dom y.

Definition 7.10. The dominance core DC(v) of a fuzzy game v ∈

F GN is the set of imputations which are not dominated by any other
imputation,

DC(v) = {x ∈ I(v) | ¬ y dom x for all y ∈ I(v)}.

Definition 7.11. A stable set of a fuzzy game v ∈ F GN is a nonempty

set K of imputations satisfying the properties:
(i) (Internal stability) For all x, y ∈ K, ¬ x dom y;
(ii) (External stability) For all z ∈ I(v) \ K, there is an imputation
x ∈ K such that x dom z.

Theorem 7.12. Let v ∈ F GN . Then

(i) C(v) ⊂ C P (v) ⊂ C cr (v);
(ii) C P (v) ⊂ DC(v);
(iii) for each stable set K it holds that DC(v) ⊂ K.

Proof. The theorem is trivially true if I(v) = ∅. So, suppose in the

following that I(v) = ∅.
(i) This follows straightforwardly from the definitions.
(ii) Let x ∈ I(v) \ DC(v). Then there are y ∈ I(v) and s ∈ PF0N
satisfying yi > xi for each i ∈ car(s) and i∈N si yi ≤ v(s). Then
 
s x
i∈car(s) i i < s y
i∈car(s) i i ≤ v(s). Hence x ∈ I(v) \ C P (v). We
conclude that C P (v) ⊂ DC(v).
(iii) Let K be a stable set. Since DC(v) consists of undominated
imputations and each imputation in I(v) \ K is dominated by some
imputation by the external stability property, it follows that DC(v) ⊂
K.

In the next theorem we give sufficient conditions for the coincidence

of the proper core and the dominance core for fuzzy games.

 

Theorem 7.13. Let v ∈ F GN . Suppose v eN − i∈N \car(s) v ei −
≥ 0 for each s ∈ F0N , where s∗ = mini∈car(s) si . Then C P (v) =
v(s)
s∗
DC(v).
 7.2 Cores and Stable Sets 87

Proof. Note that C P (v) = DC(v) = ∅ if I(v) = ∅. Suppose I(v) =

∅. From Theorem 7.12 it follows that C P (v) ⊂ DC(v). We show the
converse inclusion by proving that x ∈ x ∈
/ C P (v) implies / DC(v). Let
x ∈ I(v) \ C (v). Then there is s ∈ PF0N such
P
 that i∈N si xi < v(s).
For each i ∈ car(s) take εi > 0 such that i∈car(s) si (xi + εi ) = v(s).
Since
  si (xi + εi ) v(s)
(xi + εi ) ≤ ∗
= ∗ ,
s s
i∈car(s) i∈car(s)
 v(s)
we can take δi ≥ 0 for each i ∈ / car(s) such that i∈car(s) δi = s∗ −
 /
i∈car(s) (xi + εi ). Define y ∈ R by
N


xi + εi for each i ∈ car(s),
yi =
i  v(eN )−Pi∈N \car(s) v(ei )− v(s)
∗
v e + |N \car(s)|
s
+ δi for each i ∈
/ car(s).

Note that i∈N yi = v(eN ), yi > xi > v(ei ) for each i ∈ car(s) and,

since v(eN ) − i∈N \car(s) v(ei ) − v(s)
s∗ ≥ 0, we have yi ≥ v(e ) for each
i

i∈N \ car(s). Hence y ∈ I(v). Now, since yi > xi for all i ∈ car(s)
and i∈N si yi = v(s) we have y doms x; thus x ∈ I(v) \ DC(v).

Remark 7.14. Let v ∈ F GN . Take the crisp game w = cr(v). Then


v(eN ) ≥ v(s) + i∈N \car(s) v(ei ) for each s ∈ F0N implies w(N ) ≥
 s∗
w(S) + i∈N \S w(i), for each S ⊆ N . So, Theorem 7.13 can be seen as
an extension of the corresponding property for cooperative crisp games
(cf. Theorem 2.13(i)).

Now, we give two examples to illustrate the results in the above

theorems.

Example 7.15. Let N = {1, 2} and let v : F {1,2} → R be given by

{1,2}
v(s1 , s2 ) = s1 + s2 − 1 for each s ∈ F0 and v(e∅ ) = 0. Further, let


v(s) if s = 0, 12 ,
v1 (s) =

4 if s = 0, 12 .


v(s) if s = 12 , 12 ,
v2 (s) =

4 if s = 12 , 12 .
Let ∆ = {x ∈ R2 | x1 ≥ 0, x2 ≥ 0, x1 + x2 = 1}. Then
(i) C(v) = C P (v) = DC(v) = I(v) = ∆,
(ii) C(v1 ) = C P (v1 ) = ∅, DC(v1 ) = I(v1 ) = ∆,
88 7 Solution Concepts for Fuzzy Games

(iii) C(v2 ) = ∅, C P (v2 ) = DC(v2 ) = I(v2 ) = ∆,

(iv) for v, v1 , and v2
, the imputation set ∆ is the unique stable

set.

Note that 2v2 (s) + i∈N \car(s)v2 (ei ) > v2 (eN ) for s = 12 , 12 and
C P (v2 ) = DC(v2 ). Hence, the sufficient condition in Theorem 7.13
for the equality C P (v) = DC(v) is not a necessary condition.
In the next example we give a fuzzy game v with C(v) = DC(v)
and C(v) = ∅. Notice that for a crisp game w we have that C(w) = ∅
if C(w) = DC(w) (cf. Theorem 2.13(ii)).
Example 7.16. Let N = {1, 2} and let v : F {1,2} → R be given by
√
v(s1 , 1) = s1 for all (s1 , 1) ∈ F {1,2}, and v(s1 , 
s2 ) = 0 otherwise. Then

I(v) = (x1 , x2 ) ∈ R+ | x1 + x2 = 1 , C(v) = x ∈ I(v) | 0 ≤ x1 ≤ 12
2

= I(v), and C P (v) = DC(v) = I(v). Further, I(v) is the unique stable
set.
By using the average worth of a coalition s ∈ F0N in a game v ∈ F GN
(cf. (6.1)), we define another core concept for fuzzy games.
Definition 7.17. The equal division core EDC(v) of v ∈ F GN is
the set
 
x ∈ I(v) |
s ∈ F0N s.t. α (s, v) > xi for all i ∈ car(s) .
So x ∈ EDC(v) can be seen as a distribution of the value of the
grand coalition eN , where for each fuzzy coalition s, there is a player i
with a positive participation level for which the payoff xi is at least as
good as the equal division share α (s, v) of v(s) in s.
Proposition 7.18. Let v ∈ F GN . Then
(i) EDC(v) ⊂ EDC(cr(v));
(ii) C(v) ⊂ EDC(cr(v)).
Proof. (i) Suppose x ∈ EDC
(v).
 Then by the definition of EDC(v)
there is no eS ∈ F0N s.t. α
eS ,v > xi for all i ∈ car(eS ). Taking into
account that cr(v) (S) = v eS for all S ∈ 2N , there is no S = ∅ s.t.
cr(v)(S)
|S| > xi for all i ∈ S. Hence, x ∈ EDC (cr(v)).
(ii) Suppose x ∈/ EDC(v). Then there exists s ∈ F0N s.t. α (s, v) > xi
for all i ∈ car(s). Then

n 
n
si xi < α (s, v) si = v(s)
i=1 i=1

which implies that x ∈

/ C(v). So C (v) ⊂ EDC (v).
 7.3 Generalized Cores and Stable Sets 89

The next example shows that EDC(v) and EDC(cr(v)) are not
necessarily equal.
√
Example 7.19. Let N = {1, 2, 3} and v(s1 , s2 , s3 ) = s1 + s2 + s3 for
each s = (s1 , s2 , s3 ) ∈ F {1,2,3} . For this game we have
√ √ √
3 3 3
EDC(cr(v)) = , , and EDC(v) = ∅.
3 3 3

7.3 Generalized Cores and Stable Sets

As investigated in [76], core elements (à la Aubin) of a fuzzy game can
be associated with additive separable supporting functions of fuzzy
games. Thus, these authors introduced generalized cores whose ele-
ments consist of more general separable supporting functions of the
game and studied their properties and relations to stable sets.
The main results on cores and stable sets of a fuzzy game from
the previous sections have been extended based on some families of
separable supporting functions for fuzzy games which are monotonic,
i.e., for any s, s ∈ F N , if si ≤ si for all i ∈ N then v(s) ≤ v(s ). Since
v(e∅ ) = 0, the monotonicity of v implies that v(s) ≥ 0 for all s ∈ F N .
We assume throughout this section that v is monotonic.
Looking with a geometrical eye to the Aubin core, we note first that
to each x ∈ Rn one can associate in a canonical way a linear function
∗ Rn the real number x∗ (s) =
 : R → R, assigning to each s ∈
x n

i∈N si xi . For a fuzzy game v ∈ F G we have then x ∈ C(v) if and

N

only if x∗ (eN ) = v(eN ) and x∗ (s) ≥ v(s) for each s ∈ F N . In geometric

terms: x ∈ C(v) if and only if graph(x∗ ) = {(s, α) ∈ Rn ×R |α = x∗ (s)}
lies ‘above’ graph(v) = {(s, α) ∈ F N ×R |α = v(s)} and the two graphs
touch each other at the points (e∅ , v(e∅ )), (eN , v(eN )) ∈ Rn ×R. Since x∗
is a linear function, graph(x∗ ) is a supporting hyperplane at (eN , v(eN ))
of graph(v) in case x = 0. Note furtherthat x∗ : Rn → R given above
is a special class of the separable form ni=1 p(si )xi for s ∈ F N , where
p : [0, 1] → [0, 1] with p(0) = 0 and p(1) = 1, with p(si ) = si ∈ [0, 1] for
each i ∈ N .
In the following we will consider also non-linear functions p : [0, 1] →
[0, 1] with p(0) = 0 and p(1) = 1. The function p is called mono-
tonic if for any a, b ∈ [0, 1] with a ≤ b, p(a) ≤ p(b) holds. Let
P = {p : [0, 1] → [0, 1] | p is monotonic and p(0) = 0, p(1) = 1}. The
function p is a payment scheme in case of partial cooperation. That is,
if a player i ∈ N gains xi in case of full cooperation, then he gains
p(si )xi when he participates at level si .
90 7 Solution Concepts for Fuzzy Games

Definition 7.20. Given a payment scheme p ∈ P, the core based on p

of a fuzzy game v, henceforth called the p-core of v, is given by

 
Cp (v) = x ∈ Rn | xi = v(eN ), p(si )xi ≥ v(s) for each s ∈ F N .
i∈N i∈N

The Aubin core is a special case of the p-core, where p is given

by p(si ) = si for each i ∈ N . While the Aubin core assumes only a
payment proportional to players’ participation level, the p-core allows
much wider payment schemes for partial participation.
The following example may help for a better understanding of the
notion of the p-core. Suppose that full participation for a worker means
that he works for thirty days and his total reward is $3,000. The Aubin
core assumes that a portion of $3,000 is paid in proportion to the
worker’s participation level. A typical example is a daily wage of $100.
However, other payment schemes are common practice in the economies
as well. For instance, the full amount of $3,000 can be paid at the
beginning, or half of this amount is paid at the beginning and the rest
after the job is completed the job, and so on. This motivates the study
of general payment rules.
The two extreme payment rules, i.e., the one which gives the whole
amount to a player when he starts participating, and the other which
gives the whole amount after full cooperation is reached, are denoted
by p+ and p− , respectively:

+ 1 for 0 < a ≤ 1,
p (a) =
0 for a = 0;

1 for a = 1,
p− (a) =
0 for 0 ≤ a < 1.

In an obvious way one can define the proper p-core of v ∈ F GN ,

i.e.,

 
CpP (v) = x ∈ Rn | xi = v(eN ), p(si )xi ≥ v(s) for each s ∈ P F N
i∈N i∈N

and the crisp p-core of v ∈ F GN , i.e.,


 
Cpcr (v) = x ∈ Rn | xi = v(eN ), p(1)xi ≥ v(eS ) for each S ∈ 2N .
i∈N i∈S

Since p(1) = 1, the crisp p-core is the same as the crisp core C cr (v).
 7.3 Generalized Cores and Stable Sets 91

Remark 7.21. It is easily noticed that Cp (v), CpP (v), and Cpcr (v)
(= C cr (v)) are all convex sets.

For the p-core and the proper p-core, the following properties hold.

Theorem 7.22. Let v ∈ F GN . Then,

(i) For any p, p ∈ P, if p(a) ≤ p (a) for all a ∈ [0, 1], then Cp (v) ⊆
Cp (v) and CpP (v) ⊆ CpP (v). Thus, Cp− (v) ⊆ Cp (v) ⊆ Cp+ (v) and
CpP− (v) ⊆ CpP (v) ⊆ CpP+ (v) for all p ∈ P;
(ii) For any p ∈ P, Cp (v) ⊆ CpP (v) ⊆ C cr (v);
(iii) Cp+ (v) = CpP+ (v) = C cr (v).
 
Proof. (i) Take any x ∈ Cp (v). Then i∈N xi = v(eN ) and i∈N p(si )xi
≥ v(s) for all s ∈ F N . Since x ∈ I(v) implies xi ≥ v(ei ) ≥ 0, if
p(a) ≤  p (a) for all a ∈ [0, 1], then p(si )xi ≤ p (si )xi for all i ∈ N .
Hence, i∈N p (si )xi ≥ v(s) for all s ∈ F N , which implies x ∈ Cp (v).
A similar proof applies to CpP (v) ⊆ CpP (v).
(ii) It is clear from the definitions of Cp (v), CpP (v) and C cr (v).
(iii) Cp+ (v) ⊆ C cr (v) follows from (ii). To show the reverse inclu-
 
sion, take any x ∈ C cr (v). Then N
i∈N xi = v(e ) and i∈S xi ≥
v(e S ) for all S ⊆ N . Take any s ∈ F N . It suffices to show that
 +
i∈car(p+ (s)) p (si )xi ≥ v(s). From the definition of p+ , p+ (si ) = 1 if

si > 0 and p+ (si ) = 0 if si = 0. Thus, we obtain i∈car(p+ (s)) p+ (si )xi =
  
i:si >0 xi . Let S = {i | si > 0}. Then i∈car(p(s)) p(si )xi = i:si >0 xi =

i∈S xi ≥ v(e ) ≥ v(s). The last inequality follows from the mono-
S

tonicity of v.

Furthermore, the p-core of a unanimity game is nonempty when

p = p+ . However, the Aubin core may be empty for unanimity games,
as shown in Example 7.4 (see also Proposition 7.6). In fact, we have
the following theorem.

Theorem 7.23. Let ut be a unanimity game on the player set N . Then

Cp+ (ut ) = ∅.

Proof. Take x ∈ I(ut ), that is x ∈ Rn where ni=1 xi = ut (eN ) = 1 and
xi ≥ ut (ei ) = 0 for i ∈ N . For p+ , we have then x ∈ Cp+ (ut ). Take any
fuzzy coalition s ∈ F N . The following two situations may appear:
– If si > ti for all i ∈ N , then ut (s) = 1. From the definition of p+ ,
we have p(si ) = 1 for all i∈ N since si ≥ ti and ti > 0 for all i ∈ N .
Hence, ni=1 p+ (si )xi = ni=1 xi = 1 = ut (s).
92 7 Solution Concepts for Fuzzy Games

– If si < ti for some i ∈ N , then +

nut (s)+ = 0. Since p (a) ≥ 0 for all
a ∈ [0, 1] and xi ≥ 0, we have i=1 p (si )xi ≥ 0 = ut (s).
Remark 7.24. There exist various p ∈ P other than p+ satisfying
Cp (ut ) = ∅. An example is p ∈ P given by
1
a if a ∈ [0, t∗ ],
p(a) = t∗
1 if a ∈ (t∗ , 1],
where t∗ = min(t1 , . . . , tn ). In a similar manner to the proof above, one
may show that Cp (ut ) is not empty.
Now, we define generalized domination relations. Take a fuzzy game
v ∈ F GN and a function p ∈ P. For any two imputations x, y ∈ I(v)
and any fuzzy coalition s ∈ F N , we say that x p-dominates y via s,
 denote it by x doms y, if p(si )xi > p(si )yi for allNi ∈ car(p(s)), pand
p
and
i∈N p(si )xi ≤ v(s). If there is at least one s ∈ F with x doms y,
p
we simply say x p-dominates y and denote it by x dom y. Similarly to
the case of x doms y, we must have |car(s)| < n if x domps y.
Definition 7.25. The p-dominance core DCp (v) of a fuzzy game v
is a set of imputations which are not p-dominated by any other impu-
tation.
Definition 7.26. A p-stable set Kp of a fuzzy game v is a set of
imputations satisfying the following properties:
(i) (p-internal stability) For all x, y ∈ Kp , ¬x domp y;
(ii) (p-external stability) For all z ∈ I(v) \ Kp , there is an imputation
x ∈ Kp such that x domp z.
Then, trivially, we have the extension of Theorem 7.12 (ii) and (iii).
Theorem 7.27. Let v ∈ F GN and p ∈ P. Then,
(i) CpP (v) ⊆ DCp (v);
(ii) For each stable set Kp : DCp (v) ⊆ Kp ;
+
(iii) x domp y in v if and only if x dom y in w = cr(v). Thus,
DCp+ (v) = DC(w) and K is a stable set in v under p− if and
only if K is a stable set in w.
Proof. (i) The theorem is trivially true if DCp (v) = I(v). So, sup-
pose DCp (v) ⊂ I(v). Let x ∈ I(v) \ DCp (v). Then there are y ∈ I(v)
 s ∈ PF satisfying p(si )yi >  p(si )xi for each i ∈ car(p(s))
and N and

i∈car(p(s)) p(s )y
i i ≤ v(s). Then p (s )x
i∈car(p(s)) i i i < i∈car(p(s))
p(si )yi ≤ v(s). Hence, x ∈ I(v) \ CpP (v). We conclude that CpP (v) ⊂
DCp (v).
 7.3 Generalized Cores and Stable Sets 93

(ii) Let Kp be a stable set. Since DCp (v) consists of undominated

imputations and each imputation in I(v) \ Kp is dominated by some
imputation by the external stability property, it follows that DCp (v) ⊂
Kp .
+  +
(iii) Suppose x domps y in v. Then i∈car(p(s)) p (si )xi ≤ v(s)
and p+ (si )xi > p+ (si )yi for all i ∈ car(p(s)). Since p+ (si ) = 1 if and
only if si > 0, from the monotonicity of v we obtain i∈car(p(s)) xi ≤
v(ecar(p(s)) ) and xi > yi for all i ∈ car(p(s)). Thus, x dom y in w. The
+
reverse direction holds true, since by x domS y in w we have x dompeS y
in v. Then the latter half of (iii) easily follows.

In the next theorem we give a sufficient condition for the coincidence

of the proper p-core and the p-dominance core.

Theorem 7.28. Let v ∈ F GN and p ∈ P with p(a) > 0 for all

a ∈ (0, 1]. For each s ∈ F N with car(p(s)) = ∅, let p∗ (s) =
mini∈car(p(s)) p(si ) and vp∗ (s) = pv(s)
∗ (s) . Suppose


v(eN ) − vp∗ (s) − v(ei ) ≥ 0
i∈N \car(p(s))

for each s ∈ PF N . Then CpP (v) = DCp (v), and thus DCp (v) is a
convex set.

Proof. By Theorem 7.27(i), CpP (v) ⊆ DCp (v). We show the converse
inclusion by proving that x ∈ / CpP (v) implies x ∈ / DCp (v). If I(v) =
Cp (v), then we easily have Cp (v) = DCp (v) since CpP (v) ⊆ DCp (v) ⊆
P P

I(v). We assume now CpP (v) ⊂ I(v) and take x ∈ I(v) \ CpP (v).

Then there is s ∈ PF N such that p(si )xi < v(s). Then
 ∗
 i∈car(p(s))
i∈car(p(s)) p (s)xi < v(s), and thus xi < vp∗ (s). Hence, for
i∈car(p(s)) 
each i ∈ car(p(s)), we can take i > 0 such that i∈car(p(s)) (xi + i ) <

vp∗ (s) and i∈car(p(s)) p(si )(xi + i ) < v(s). Define y ∈ Rn by

xi + i if i ∈ car(p(s)),
P
yi = v(eN )−vp∗ (s)− j∈N \car(p(s)) v(ej )
v(ei ) + |N \car(p(s))| + δi if i ∈ N \ car(p(s)),

whereδi > 0 for all i ∈ N \ car(p(s)) are such that i∈N yi = v(eN ).
Since i∈car(p(s)) (xi +i ) < vp∗ (s), we can take such δi , i ∈ N \car(p(s)).
i ≥ v(e ) for each i ∈ car(p(s)). Furthermore, since
Note that yi > x i
∗
v(e ) − vp (s) − i∈\car(p(s)) v(ei ) ≥ 0, we have yi > v(ei ) for each
N
 94 7 Solution Concepts for Fuzzy Games

i ∈ N \ car(p(s)). Hence, y ∈ I(v). Now, since yi > xi for all i ∈

car(p(s)), we have p(si )yi > p(si )xi for all i ∈ car(p(s)). Moreover,

i∈car(p(s)) p(si )yi < v(s), and thus y dom x. Hence, we obtain x ∈
p

I(v) \ DC p (v). Finally, by Remark 7.21, DC p (v) is a convex set.

7.4 The Shapley Value and the Weber Set

Let π(N ) be the set of linear orderings of N . We introduce for v ∈ F GN

the marginal vectors mσ (v) for each σ ∈ π(N ), the fuzzy Shapley value
φ(v) and the fuzzy Weber set W (v) as follows (cf. [17]):
(i) mσ (v) = m σ (cr(v)) for each σ ∈ π(N );
1
(ii) φ(v) = |N |! σ∈π(N ) mσ (v);
(iii) W (v) = co {mσ (v) | σ ∈ π(N )}.
Note that φ(v) = φ(cr(v)), W (v) = W (cr(v)). Note further that for
i = σ(k), the i-th coordinate mσi (v) of the marginal vector mσ (v) is
given by  k  k−1 
 
mσi (v) = v eσ(r) − v eσ(r) .
r=1 r=1
One can identify each σ ∈ π(N ) with an n-step walk along the
edges of the hypercube of fuzzy coalitions starting ine∅ and ending
in eN by passing the vertices eσ(1) , eσ(1) + eσ(2) , . . . , n−1
r=1 e
σ(r) . The
σ
vector m (v) records the changes in value from vertex to vertex. The
result in [124] that the core of a crisp game is a subset of the Weber
set of the game can be extended for fuzzy games as we see in
Proposition 7.29. Let v ∈ F GN . Then C(v) ⊂ W (v).
Proof. By Remark 7.3 we have C(v) ⊂ C(cr(v)) and by Theorem 2.20,
C(cr(v)) ⊂ W (cr(v)). Since W (cr(v)) = W (v) we obtain C(v) ⊂ W (v).
Note that the Weber set and the fuzzy Shapley value of a fuzzy game
are very robust solution concepts since they are completely determined
by the possibilities of crisp cooperation, regardless of what are the
extra options that players could have as a result of graduating their
participation rates. More specific solution concepts for fuzzy games
will be introduced in the next sections of this chapter.
Inspired by [83] one can define the diagonal value δ(v) for a C 1 -fuzzy
game v (i.e. a game whose characteristic function is differentiable with
continuous derivatives) as follows: for each i ∈ N the i-th coordinate
δi (v) of δ(v) is given by
 7.4 The Shapley Value and the Weber Set 95
 1
δi (v) = Di v(t, t, . . . , t)dt,
0

where Di is the partial derivative of v with respect to the i-th coor-

dinate. According to Theorem 3.9 we have that for each crisp game
v ∈ GN :
φi (v) = δi (ml(v)) for each i ∈ N .
The next example shows that for a fuzzy game v, δ(v) and φ(cr(v))
may differ.

Example 7.30. Let v ∈ F G{1,2} with v(s1 , s2 ) = s1 (s2 )2 for each s =

(s1 , s2 ) ∈ F {1,2} . Then

m(1,2) = (v(1, 0) − v(0, 0), v(1, 1) − v(1, 0)) = (0, 1),

m(2,1) = (v(1, 1) − v(0, 1), v(0, 1) − v(0, 0)) = (1, 0);

so,  
1 1 1
φ(v) = ((0, 1) + (1, 0)) = , .
2 2 2
Further,
D1 v(s1 , s2 ) = (s2 )2 , D2 v(s1 , s2 ) = 2s1 s2 ;
so,  
1 1
1 2
δ1 (v) = t2 dt = , δ2 (v) = 2t2 dt = .
0 3 0 3
Hence,    
1 2 1 1
δ(v) = , = , = φ(v).
3 3 2 2

The diagonal value is in fact the fuzzy value studied in [5], [6]. For
extensions of this value the reader is referred to [31].
 96 7 Solution Concepts for Fuzzy Games

7.5 Path Solutions and the Path Solution Cover

Let us consider paths in the hypercube [0, 1]N of fuzzy coalitions, which
connect e∅ with eN in a special
% way (cf. [19]). &
Formally, a sequence q = p0 , p1 , . . . , pm of m + 1 different points
in F N will be called a path (of length m) in [0, 1]N if
(i) p0 = (0, 0, . . . , 0), and pm = (1, 1, . . . , 1);
(ii) pk ≤ pk+1 for each k ∈ {0, . . . , m − 1};
(iii) for each k ∈ {0, . . . , m − 1}, there

 is one  i ∈ N (the acting

player
player in point pk ) such that pk j = pk+1 j for all j ∈ N \ {i},

k

p i < pk+1 i .
% &
For a path q = p0 , p1 , . . . , pm let us denote by Qi (q) the set of



points pk , where player i is acting, i.e. where pk i < pk+1 i . Given a
game v ∈ F GN and a path q, the payoff vector xq (v) ∈ Rn correspond-
ing to v and q has the i-th coordinate

xqi (v) = v(pk+1 ) − v(pk ) ,
k:pk ∈Qi (q)

for each i ∈ N . % &

Given such a path p0 , p1 , . . . , pm of length m and v ∈ F GN , one
can imagine
the situation,
 where the players in
N , starting
 from non-
0
cooperation p = 0 arrive to full cooperation p = e m N in m steps,
where in each step one of the players increases his participation level.
If the increase in value in such a step is given to the acting player, the
resulting aggregate payoffs lead to the vector xq (v) = (xqi (v))i∈N . Note


that xq (v) is an efficient vector, i.e. ni=1 xqi (v) = v eN . We call xq (v)
a path solution.
Let us denote by Q(N ) the set of paths in [0, 1]N . Then we denote
by Q(v) the convex hull of the set of path solutions and call it the path
solution cover. Hence,

Q(v) = co {xq (v) ∈ Rn | q ∈ Q(N )} .

Note that all paths q ∈ Q(N ) have length at least n. There are
n! paths with length exactly n; each of these paths corresponds to a
situation where one by one the players − say in the order σ(1), . . . , σ(n)
− increase their participation from level 0 to level 1. Let us denote such
a path along n edges by q σ . Then
$ '
q σ = 0, eσ(1) , eσ(1) + eσ(2) , . . . , eN .
 7.5 Path Solutions and the Path Solution Cover 97
σ
Clearly, xq (v) = mσ (v). Hence,
 σ 
W (v) = co xq (v) | σ is an ordering of N ⊂ Q(v).
According to Proposition 7.29, the core of a fuzzy game is a subset
of the Weber set. Hence
Proposition 7.31. For each v ∈ F GN we have C(v) ⊂ W (v) ⊂ Q(v).
Example 7.32. Let v ∈ F G{1,2} be given by v(s1 , s2 ) = s1 (s2 )2 +
s1 + 2s2 for each s = (s1%, s2 ) ∈
F {1,2} 
1and let q &∈ Q(N ) be the
1 q
path


1  of length 3 given

by (0, 0) , , 0

13  3 , , 1 , (1, 1) . Then
11  =
x (v)
2 q
v
3 , 0 − v (0, 0)
+ v (1, 1) − v 3 , 1 = 1 3 , x2 (v) = v 3 , 1 −
1 1 2 1
v 3 , 0 = 2 3 . So 1 3 , 2 3 ∈ Q(v). The two shortest paths of length 2
given by q (1,2) = (0, 0) , (1, 0) , (1, 1) and q (2,1) = (0, 0) , (0, 1) , (1, 1)
have payoff vectors m(1,2) (v) = (1, 3), and m(2,1) (v) = (2, 2), respec-
tively.
Keeping in mind the interrelations among the Aubin core, the fuzzy
Weber set and the path solution cover, one can try to introduce lower
and upper bounds for payoff vectors in these sets. A lower (upper)
bound is a payoff vector whose i-th coordinate is at most (at least) as
good as the payoff given to player i when a “least desirable” (“most
convenient”) situation for him is achieved. By using pairs consisting of
a lower bound and an upper bound, we obtain hypercubes which are
catchers of the Aubin core, the fuzzy Weber set, and the path solution
cover, respectively. In the next section we obtain compromise values
for fuzzy games by taking a feasible compromise between the lower
and upper bounds of the three catchers.
Formally, a hypercube in Rn is a set of vectors of the form
[a, b] = {x ∈ Rn | ai ≤ xi ≤ bi for each i ∈ N } ,
where a, b ∈ Rn , a ≤ b (and the order ≤ is the standard partial order in
Rn ). The vectors a and b are called bounding vectors of the hypercube
[a, b], where, more explicitly, a is called the lower vector and b the upper
vector of [a, b]. Given a set A ⊂ Rn we say that the hypercube [a, b] is
a catcher of A if A ⊂ [a, b], and [a, b] is called a tight catcher of A if
there is no hypercube strictly included in [a, b] which also catches A.
A hypercube of reasonable outcomes for a cooperative crisp game
plays a role in [72] (see also [51]) and this hypercube can be seen as a
tight catcher of the Weber set for crisp games (cf. Section 2.2). Also
in [108] and [116] hypercubes are considered which are catchers of the
core of crisp games.
98 7 Solution Concepts for Fuzzy Games

Our aim is to introduce and study catchers of the Aubin core, the
fuzzy Weber set and the path solution cover for games with a non-
empty Aubin core, i.e. games which belong to F GN∗ .
Let us first introduce a core catcher

HC(v) = [l (C(v)) , u (C(v))]

∗ , where for each k ∈ N :

for a game v ∈ F GN
!
lk (C (v)) = sup ε−1 v εek | ε ∈ (0, 1] ,

and
!
uk (C (v)) = inf ε−1 v(eN ) − v eN − εek | ε ∈ (0, 1] .

∗ and each k ∈ N :
Proposition 7.33. For each v ∈ F GN

−∞ < lk (C(v)) ≤ uk (C(v)) < ∞ and C(v) ⊂ HC(v).

Proof. Let x ∈ C(v).

(i ) For each k ∈ N and ε ∈ (0, 1] we have


v eN − v eN − εek
⎛ ⎞
 
≥ xi − ⎝(1 − ε) xk + xi ⎠ = εxk .
i∈N i∈N \{k}

So,
xk ≤ ε−1 v(eN ) − v eN − εek

implying that
xk ≤ uk (C(v)) < ∞.


(ii ) For each ε ∈ (0, 1] we have εxk ≥ v εek . Hence,
!
xk ≥ sup ε−1 v εek | ε ∈ (0, 1] = lk (C (v)) > −∞.

By using (i ) and (ii ) one obtains the inequalities in the proposition

and the fact that HC(v) is a catcher of C(v).
 7.5 Path Solutions and the Path Solution Cover 99

Now, we introduce for each v ∈ F GN

∗ a fuzzy variant HW (v) of the
hypercube of reasonable outcomes introduced in [72],

HW (v) = [l (W (v)) , u (W (v))] ,

where for each k ∈ N :

 !
lk (W (v)) = min v eS∪{k} − v eS | S ⊂ N \ {k} ,

and

 !
uk (W (v)) = max v eS∪{k} − v eS | S ⊂ N \ {k} .

Then we have

Proposition 7.34. For each v ∈ F GN

∗ the hypercube HW (v) is a tight
catcher of W (v).

Proof. Left to the reader.

Let us call a set [a, b] with a ≤ b, a ∈ (R ∪ {−∞})n and b ∈

(R ∪ {∞})n a generalized hypercube.
Now, we introduce for v ∈ F GN∗ the generalized hypercube

HQ(v) = [l (Q(v)) , u (Q(v))] ,

which catches the path solution cover Q(v) as we see in Theorem 7.35,
where for k ∈ N :

lk (Q(v)) =
!
inf ε−1 v s + εek − v(s) | s ∈ F N , sk < 1, ε ∈ (0, 1 − sk ] ,

uk (Q(v)) =
!
sup ε−1 v s + εek − v(s) | s ∈ F N , sk < 1, ε ∈ (0, 1 − sk ] ,

where lk (Q(v)) ∈ [−∞, ∞) and uk (Q(v)) ∈ (−∞, ∞].

Note that u (Q(v)) ≥ u (C(v)), l (Q(v)) ≤ l (C(v)).

Theorem 7.35. For v ∈ F GN

∗ , HQ(v) is a catcher of Q(v).
100 7 Solution Concepts for Fuzzy Games

Proof. This assertion follows from the fact that for each path q ∈ Q (N )
and any i ∈ N

xqi (v) = v pk + pk+1i − pki ei − v pk
k:pk ∈Qi (q)

≤ pk+1
i − pki ui (Q(v)) = ui (Q(v)) ,
k:pk ∈Qi (q)

and, similarly,
xqi (v) ≥ li (Q(v)) .

Note that the lower and upper bounds of the catcher of the fuzzy
Weber set are obtained by using a finite number of value differences,
where only coalitions corresponding to crisp coalitions play a role. The
calculation of the lower and upper bounds of the catchers of the Aubin
core and of the path solution cover is based on infinite value differences.

7.6 Compromise Values

We introduce now for fuzzy games compromise values of σ-type and

of τ -type with respect to each of the set-valued solutions C, W and
Q. For the first type use is made directly of the bounding vectors of
HC(v), HW (v) and HQ(v), while for the τ -type compromise values
the upper vector is used together with the remainder vector derived
from the upper vector (cf. [19]).
To start with the first type, consider a hypercube [a, b] in Rn and a
game v ∈ F GN ∗ such that the hypercube contains at least one efficient
vector, i.e. 

n


[a, b] ∩ x ∈ Rn | xi = v eN = ∅.
i=1

Then there is a unique point c (a,

b) on the line through

 a and b which
is also efficient in the sense that ni=1 ci (a, b) = v eN . So c (a, b) is
the convex combination of a and b, which is efficient. We call c(a, b) the
feasible compromise between a and b.
Now we introduce the following three σ-like compromises for v ∈
F GN∗ :
σ
valC (v) = c (HC(v)) = c ([l (C(v)) , u (C(v))]) ,
σ
valW (v) = c (HW (v)) = c ([l (W (v)) , u (W (v))]) ,
and
 7.6 Compromise Values 101
σ
valQ (v) = c (HQ(v)) = c ([l (Q(v)) , u (Q(v))])
if the generalized hypercube HQ(v) is a hypercube.
Note that
∅ = C(v) ⊂ HC(v) ⊂ HQ(v), (7.1)
and
∅ = C(v) ⊂ W (v) ⊂ HW (v), (7.2)
so all hypercubes contain efficient vectors and the first two compromise
value vectors are always well defined.
For the τ -like compromise values inspired by the definition of min-
imal right vectors for crisp games (cf. [11], [44], and Section 2.2) we
define the fuzzy minimal right operator mv : Rn → Rn for v ∈ F GN ∗ by
⎧ ⎛ ⎞ ⎫
⎨  ⎬
mvi (z) = sup s−1 ⎝v(s) − s z
j j ⎠ | s ∈ F0
N
, si > 0
⎩ i ⎭
j∈N \{i}

for each i ∈ N and each z ∈ Rn .

The following proposition shows that mv assigns to each upper
bound z of the Aubin core (i.e. z ≥ x for each x ∈ C(v)) a lower
bound mv (z) of C(v), called the remainder vector corresponding to z.
Proposition 7.36. Let v ∈ F GN∗ and let z ∈ R be an upper bound of
n
v
C(v). Then m (z) is a lower bound of C(v).
Proof. Let i ∈ N and x ∈ C(v). For each s ∈ F N with si > 0 we have
⎛ ⎞ ⎛ ⎞
  
s−1 ⎝v(s) − sj zj ⎠ ≤ s−1 ⎝ sj xj − sj zj ⎠
i i
j∈N \{i} j∈N j∈N \{i}

= xi + s−1
i sj (xj − zj )
j∈N \{i}
≤ xi ,

where the first inequality follows from x ∈ C(v) and the second in-
equality from the fact that z is an upper bound for C(v), and then
z ≥ x. Hence mvi (z) ≤ xi for each i ∈ N , which means that mv (z) is a
lower bound for C(v).
Now we are able to introduce the τ -like compromise values taking
into account that all upper vectors of HC(v), HW (v) and HQ(v) are
upper bounds for the Aubin core of v ∈ F GN∗ as follows from (7.1) and
(7.2).
102 7 Solution Concepts for Fuzzy Games

So the following definitions make sense for v ∈ F GN

∗ :
τ
valC (v) = c ([mv (u (C(v))) , u (C(v))]) ,
τ
valW (v) = c ([mv (u (W (v))) , u (W (v))]) ,
and
τ
valQ (v) = c ([mv (u (Q(v))) , u (Q(v))])
if the generalized hypercube HQ(v) is a hypercube.
The compromise value valC τ (v) is in the spirit of the τ -value intro-

duced in [108] for cooperative crisp games (see Section 3.2), and the
compromise value valW τ (v) is in the spirit of the χ-value in [12], the

µ-value in [57] and one of the values in [29] and [30] for cooperative
crisp games.
8
Convex Fuzzy Games

An interesting class of fuzzy games is generated when the notion of con-

vexity is considered. Convex fuzzy games can be successfully used for
solving sharing problems arising from many economic situations where
“cooperation” is the main benefit/cost savings generator; all the solu-
tion concepts treated in Chapter 7 have nice properties for such games.
Moreover, for convex fuzzy games one can use additional sharing rules
which are based on more specific solution concepts like participation
monotonic allocation schemes and egalitarian solutions.

8.1 Basic Characterizations

Let v : [0, 1]n → R. Then v satisfies
(i) supermodularity (SM) if

v (s ∨ t) + v (s ∧ t) ≥ v(s) + v(t) for all s, t ∈ [0, 1]N , and (8.1)

(ii) coordinate-wise convexity (CwC) if for each i ∈ N and each s−i ∈
[0, 1]N \{i} the function gs−i : [0, 1] → R with gs−i (t) = v(s−i  t) for
each t ∈ [0, 1] is a convex function (see page 78).
Now, we introduce our definition of convex cooperative fuzzy games
(cf. [17]).
Definition 8.1. Let v ∈ F GN . Then v is called a convex fuzzy game
if v : [0, 1]N → R satisfies SM and CwC.
Remark 8.2. Convex fuzzy games form a convex cone.
Remark 8.3. For a weaker definition of a convex fuzzy game we refer to
[120], where only the supermodularity property is used.
104 8 Convex Fuzzy Games

As shown in Proposition 8.4, a nice example of convex fuzzy games

is a unanimity game in which the minimal wining coalition corresponds
to a crisp-like coalition.
Proposition 8.4. Let ut ∈ F GN be the unanimity game based on the
fuzzy coalition t ∈ F0N . Then the game ut is convex if and only if t = eT
for some T ∈ 2N \ {∅}.
Proof. Suppose t = eT for some T ∈ 2N \ {∅}. Then there is a k ∈ N
such that ε = min {tk , 1 − tk } > 0 and 0 = ut (t + εek ) − ut (t) <
ut (t) − ut (t − εek ) = 1, implying that ut is not convex.
Conversely, suppose that t = eT for some T ∈ 2N \ {∅}. Then we
show that ut has the supermodularity property and the coordinate-wise
convexity property. Take s, k ∈ F N . We can distinguish three cases.
(1) If ut (s ∨ k) + ut (s ∧ k) = 2, then ut (s ∧ k) = 1. Thus, the supermod-
ularity condition (8.1) follows from ut (s) + ut (k) ≥ 2ut (s ∧ k) = 2.
(2) If ut (s ∨ k) + ut (s ∧ k) = 0, then ut (s ∨ k) = 0. Hence ut (s) + ut (k) ≤
2ut (s ∨ k) = 0, ut (s) + ut (k) = 0.
(3) If ut (s ∨ k) + ut (s ∧ k) = 1, then ut (s ∨ k) = 1 and ut (s ∧ k) = 0.
Therefore, ut (s) or ut (k) must be equal to 0, and, consequently,
ut (s)+ut (k) ≤ 1 and the supermodularity condition (8.1) is fulfilled.
Hence, the supermodularity property holds for ueT .
To prove the coordinate-wise convexity of ueT , note that all func-
tions gs−i in the definition of coordinate-wise convexity are convex be-
cause they are either constant with value 0 or with value 1, or they
have value 0 on [0, 1) and value 1 in 1. So, ueT is a convex game.
In the following the set of convex fuzzy games with player set N
will be denoted by CF GN . Clearly, CF GN ⊂ F GN . Remember that
the set of convex crisp games with player set N was denoted by CGN .
Proposition 8.5. Let v ∈ CF GN . Then cr(v) ∈ CGN .
Proof. We will prove that cr(v) satisfies SM for crisp games (cf.
(5.1)). Take S, T ∈ 2N and apply SM for fuzzy games (8.1) with
eS , eT , eS∪T , eS∩T in the roles of s, t, s ∨ t, s ∧ t, respectively, obtain-
ing
cr(v) (S ∪ T ) + cr(v)(S ∩ T ) ≥ cr(v)(S) + cr(v)(T ).
The next property for convex fuzzy games is related with the in-
creasing marginal contribution property for players in crisp games (cf.
Theorem 5.10(iii)). It states that a level increase of a player in a fuzzy
coalition has more beneficial effect in a larger coalition than in a smaller
coalition.
 8.1 Basic Characterizations 105

Proposition 8.6. Let v ∈ CF GN . Let i ∈ N , s1 , s2 ∈ F N with s1 ≤ s2

and let ε ∈ R+ with 0 ≤ ε ≤ 1 − s2i . Then





v s1 + εei − v s1 ≤ v s2 + εei − v s2 . (8.2)
Proof. Suppose N = {1, . . . , n}.

2 Define the fuzzy coalitions c0 , c1 , . . . , cn
0 1 k
by c = s , and c = c k−1 1
+ sk − sk e for k ∈ {1, . . . , n}. Then cn =
k
2

it is sufficient to show that for each k ∈ {1, . . . , n}
s . To prove (8.2)
the inequality I k holds

v ck + εei − v ck ≥ v ck−1 + εei − v ck−1 . (I k )



Note that I i follows from the coordinate-wise convexity of v and I k
for k = i follows from SM with ck−1 + εei in the role of s and ck in the
role of t. Then s ∨ t = ck + εei , s ∧ t = ck−1 .
Also an analogue of the increasing marginal contribution property
for coalitions (cf. Theorem 5.10(ii)) holds as we see in
Proposition 8.7. Let v ∈ CF GN . Let s, t ∈ F N and z ∈ Rn+ such that
s ≤ t ≤ t + z ≤ eN . Then
v(s + z) − v(s) ≤ v(t + z) − v(t). (8.3)
Proof. For each k ∈ {1, . . . , n} it follows from Proposition 8.6 (with
 1
k−1 2
s + k−1 r
r=1 zr e in the role of s , t +
r
r=1 zr e in the role of s , k in the
role of i, and zk in the role of ε) that
   
 k 
k−1
v s+ zr er − v s + zr er
r=1 r=1
   

k 
k−1
≤v t+ zr er −v t+ zr er .
r=1 r=1

By adding these n inequalities we obtain inequality (8.3).

The next proposition introduces a characterizing property for con-
vex fuzzy games which we call the increasing average marginal return
property (IAMR). This property expresses the fact that for a convex
game an increase in participation level of any player in a smaller coali-
tion yields per unit of level less than an increase in a larger coalition
under the condition that the reached level of participation in the first
case is still not bigger than the reached participation level in the second
case.
106 8 Convex Fuzzy Games

Proposition 8.8. Let v ∈ CF GN . Let i ∈ N , s1 , s2 ∈ F N with s1 ≤ s2

and let ε1 , ε2 > 0 with s1i + ε1 ≤ s2i + ε2 ≤ 1. Then


1 


2 

ε−1
1 v s + ε1 ei − v s1 ≤ ε−1 2 v s + ε2 ei − v s2 . (8.4)


 
Proof. From Proposition 8.6 (with s1 , s2 + s1i − s2i ei and ε1 in the
roles of s1 , s2 and ε, respectively) it follows that


2
1  

 
ε−1
1 v s + si − s2i + ε1 ei − v s2 + s1i − s2i ei


1 

≥ ε−1
1 v s + ε1 ei − v s1 .


Further,
from CwC
 (by noting that s2i + ε2 ≥ s2i + s1i − s2i + ε1 ,
s2i ≥ s2i + s1i − s2i ) it follows that


2 

ε−1
2 v s + ε2 ei − v s2


2
1  

 
≥ ε−11 v s + si − s2i + ε1 ei − v s2 + s1i − s2i ei ,

resulting in the desired inequality.

Theorem 8.9. Let v ∈ F GN . Then the following assertions are equiv-
alent:
(i) v ∈ CF GN ;
(ii) v satisfies IAMR.
Proof. We know from Proposition 8.8 that a convex game satisfies
IAMR. On the other hand it is clear that IAMR implies the CwC.
Hence, we only have to prove that IAMR implies SM. So, given
s, t ∈ F N we have to prove inequality (8.1).
Let P = {i ∈ N | ti < si }. If P = ∅, then (8.1) follows from the fact
that s ∨ t = t, s ∧ t = s. For P = ∅, arrange the elements of P in a
sequence σ(1), . . . , σ(p), where p = |P |, and put εσ(k) = sσ(k) −tσ(k) > 0
for k ∈ {1, . . . , p}. Note that in this case

p 
p
s=s∧t+ σ(k)
εσ(k) e , s∨t=t+ εσ(k) eσ(k) .
k=1 k=1

Hence,
v(s) − v(s ∧ t) =
p
r  r−1
r=1 v s ∧ t +
σ(k) − v s ∧ t + σ(k)
k=1 εσ(k) e k=1 εσ(k) e ,
and
v(s ∨ t) − v(t) =
p
r 
σ(k) − v t +
r−1 σ(k)
r=1 v t + k=1 εσ(k) e k=1 εσ(k) e .
 8.1 Basic Characterizations 107

From these equalities the relation (8.1) follows because IAMR im-
plies for each r ∈ {1, . . . , p} :
   
 r 
r−1
v s∧t+ εσ(k) eσ(k) − v s ∧ t + εσ(k) eσ(k)
k=1 k=1
   
r 
r−1
≤v t+ σ(k)
εσ(k) e −v t+ σ(k)
εσ(k) e .
k=1 k=1

Next, we study the implications of two other properties a function

v : [0, 1]N → R may satisfy (cf. [113]). The first one we call monotonicity
of the first partial derivatives property (MOPAD), and the second one
is the directional convexity property (DICOV) introduced in [70].
Let i ∈ N and s ∈ [0, 1]N . We say that the left derivative Di− v(s) of
v in the i-th direction at s with 0 < si ≤ 1 exists if limε→0 ε−1 (v(s) −
ε>0
v(s − εei )) exists and is finite; then
Di− v(s) := lim ε−1 (v(s) − v(s − εei )).
ε→0
ε>0

Similarly, the right derivative of v in the i-th direction at s with

0 ≤ si < 1, denoted by Di+ v(s), is limε→0 ε−1 (v(s + εei ) − v(s)) if
ε>0
this limit exists and is finite. We put for convenience Di− v(s) = −∞ if
si = 0 and Di+ v(s) = ∞ if si = 1.
Definition 8.10. We say that v : [0, 1]N → R satisfies MOPAD if for
each i ∈ N the following four conditions hold:
(Ma) Di− v(s) exists for each s ∈ [0, 1]N with 0 < si ≤ 1;
(Mb) Di+ v(s) exists for each s ∈ [0, 1]N with 0 ≤ si < 1;
(Mc) Di− v(s) ≤ Di+ v(s);
(Md) Di− v(s1 ) ≤ Di− v(s2 ) and Di+ v(s1 ) ≤ Di+ v(s2 ) for each s1 , s2 ∈
[0, 1]N with s1 ≤ s2 .
Definition 8.11. Let [a, b] = {x ∈ [0, 1]N | ai ≤ xi ≤ bi for each
i ∈ N }. We say that v : [0, 1]N → R satisfies DICOV if for each
a, b ∈ [0, 1]N with a ≤ b and each pair c, d ∈ [a, b] with c + d = a + b it
follows that
v(a) + v(b) ≥ v(c) + v(d).
Lemma 8.12. Let s ∈ [0, 1]N and i ∈ N with 0 ≤ si < 1 and 0 < ε1 ≤
ε2 < ε3 ≤ 1 − si . If v : [0, 1]N → R satisfies MOPAD then
ε−1 i −1
1 (v(s + ε1 e ) − v(s)) ≤ (ε3 − ε2 ) (v(s + ε3 e ) − v(s + ε2 e )).
i i
 108 8 Convex Fuzzy Games

Proof. From the definition of the  left derivative and by (M4) it follows
ε−1 (v(s + ε 1 ei ) − v(s)) = ε−1 ε1 D − v(s + xei )dx
1  ε1 − 1 0 i
≤ ε−11 0 Di v(s ε + ε1 ei )dx = D − v(s + ε ei ) ≤ D − v(s + ε ei )
i 1 i 2
= (ε3 − ε2 )−1 ε23 Di− v(s + ε2 ei )dx ≤ (ε3 − ε2 )−1 ε23 Di− v(s + xei )dx
ε

=(ε3 − ε2 )−1 (v(s + ε3 ei ) − v(s + ε2 ei )).

The following theorem establishes the equivalence among the intro-

duced properties provided that the characteristic function v is contin-
uous.

Theorem 8.13. Let v : [0, 1]N → R be a continuous function. The

following assertions are equivalent:
(i) v satisfies SM and CwC;
(ii) v satisfies MOPAD;
(iii) v satisfies IAMR;
(iv) v satisfies DICOV.

Proof. (i) → (ii): The validity of (M1), (M2), and (M3) in the definition
of MOPAD follows by CwC. To prove (M4) note first that for s1 with
s1i = 0 we have Di− v(s1 ) = −∞ ≤ Di− v(s2 ). If s1i > 0, then CwC
implies (cf. Proposition 8.6) that

v(s1 ) − v(s1 − εei ) ≤ v(s2 ) − v(s2 − εei )

for ε > 0 such that s1i − ε ≥ 0. By multiplying the left and right sides of
the above inequality with ε−1 and then taking the limit for ε going to
0, we obtain Di− v(s1 ) ≤ Di− v(s2 ). The second inequality in (M4) can
be proved in a similar way.
(ii) → (iii): Suppose that v satisfies MOPAD. We have to prove
that for each a, b ∈ [0, 1]N with a ≤ b, each i ∈ N, δ ∈ (0, 1 − ai ],
ε ∈ (0, 1 − bi ] such that ai + δ ≤ bi + ε ≤ 1 it follows that

δ −1 (v(a + δei ) − v(a)) ≤ ε−1 (v(b + εei ) − v(b)). (8.5)

Take a, b, i, δ, ε as above. Let c = a+(bi −ai )ei and d = b+(ai +δ −bi )ei .
We consider two cases:
(α) ai + δ ≤ bi . Then
δ
δ −1 (v(a + δei ) − v(a)) = δ −1 0 Di− v(a + xei )dx ≤
δ
δ −1 0 Di− v(a + δei )dx = Di− v(a + δei ) ≤ Di− v(b) ≤
ε−1 0 Di− v(b + xei )dx = ε−1 (v(b + εei ) − v(b)),
ε

where the inequalities follow by (M4).

(β) ai + δ ∈ (bi , bi + ε]. Then
 8.1 Basic Characterizations 109

δ −1 (v(a + δei ) − v(a)) = δ −1 (v(c) − v(a)) + δ −1 (v(a + δei ) − v(c)) ≤

δ −1 (ci −ai )(ai +δ −ci )−1 (v(a+δei )−v(c))+δ −1 (v(a+δei )−v(c)) =
(ai + δ − ci )−1 (v(a + δei ) − v(c)),
where the inequality follows by Lemma 8.12, with s = a, ε1 = ε2 =
ci − ai < δ = ε3 .
Thus, we have

δ −1 (v(a + δei ) − v(a)) ≤ (ai + δ − ci )−1 (v(a + δei ) − v(c)). (8.6)

Similarly, by applying Lemma 8.12 with s = b, ε1 = ε2 = di − bi <

ε = ε3 , it follows that

(di − bi )−1 (v(d) − v(b)) ≤ ε−1 (v(b + εei ) − v(b)). (8.7)

Further, using (M4) with (a−i , t) = (a1 , . . . , ai−1 , t, ai+1 , . . . , an ) and

(b−i , t) = (b1 , . . . , bi−1 , t, bi+1 , . . . , bn ) in the role of s1 and s2 , respec-
tively, and the equalities ai a++δ δ = di and ci = bi we obtain

d
v a + δei − v(c) = cii Di− v(a−i , t)dt ≤ bii Di− v(b−i , t)dt ≤
v(d) − v(b).
Now, since ai + δ − ci = di − bi , we have


 
(ai + δ − ci )−1 v a + δei − v(c) ≤ (di − bi )−1 (v(d) − v(b)) . (8.8)

Combining (8.6) and (8.7) via (8.8) (by using the transitivity property
of the inequality relation), (8.5) follows.
(iii) → (iv): Assume that v satisfies IAMR. Take a, b ∈ [0, 1]N with
a ≤ b and c, d ∈ [a, b] with c+d = a+b. Define h = b−c. Then b = c+h
and d = a + h. We nhave  
v(b) − v(c) = r=1 (v(c + ri=1 hi ei ) − v(c + r−1 i=1 hi e )) ≥
i
n r r−1
i=1 hi e ) − v(a + i=1 hi e )) = f (d) − f (a),
i i
r=1 (v(a +
where the inequality follows by applying IAMR n times.
(iv) → (i): Let v satisfy DICOV. To prove that v satisfies CwC as
well, note that for s−i ∈ [0, 1]N \{i} and 0 ≤ p < 12 (p + q) < q ≤ 1, we
have (s−i  12 (p + q)) ∈ [(s−i  p), (s−i  q)]. So, (iv) with a = (s−i  p),
b = (s−i  q), c = d = (s−i  12 (p + q)) implies v(s−i  p) + v(s−i  q) ≥
2v(s−i  12 (p + q)).
To prove that v satisfies SM, let c, d ∈ [0, 1]N . Then c, d ∈ [c ∧ d,
c ∨ d]. By (iv) one obtains v(c ∨ d) + v(c ∧ d) ≥ v(c) + v(d).

Finally, we introduce a fifth property that allows for a very simple

characterization of a convex fuzzy game. It requires that all second
partial derivatives of v : [0, 1]N → R are non-negative (NNSPAD).
110 8 Convex Fuzzy Games

Definition 8.14. Let v ∈ C 2 . Then v satisfies NNSPAD on [0, 1]N if

for all i, j ∈ N we have
∂2v
≥ 0.
∂si ∂sj
Obviously, the properties MOPAD and NNSPAD are equivalent on
the class of C 2 -functions.

Remark 8.15. In [101] it is shown that if v ∈ C 2 , then DICOV implies

NNSPAD.

Remark 8.16. For each  r ∈ {1, . . . , m}, let µr be defined for each s ∈
 1] by µr (s) = i∈N si µr 1(i}) with µr (i}) ≥ 0 for each i ∈ N and
[0, N

i∈N µr (i}) ≤ 1. If f ∈ C satisfies DICOV, then v with v(s) =

f (µ1 (s), . . . , µm (s)) is a convex game (cf. [70]).

8.2 Egalitarianism in Convex Fuzzy Games

In this section we are interested in introducing an egalitarian solution

for convex fuzzy games. We do this in a constructive way by adjusting
the classical Dutta-Ray algorithm for a convex crisp game (cf. [46]).
As mentioned in Subsection 5.2.3, at each step of the Dutta-Ray
algorithm for convex crisp games a largest element exists. Note that
for the crisp case the supermodularity of the characteristic function is
equivalent to the convexity of the corresponding game.
Although the cores of a convex fuzzy game and its related (con-
vex) crisp game coincide and the Dutta-Ray constrained egalitarian
solution is a core element, finding the egalitarian solution of a con-
vex fuzzy game is a task on itself. As we show in Lemma 8.17, su-
permodularity of a fuzzy game implies a semilattice structure of the
corresponding (possibly infinite) set of fuzzy coalitions with maximal
average worth (cf. (6.1)), but it is not enough to ensure the existence
of a maximal element. Different difficulties which can arise in fuzzy
games satisfying only the supermodularity property are illustrated by
means of three examples. According to Lemma 8.21 it turns out that
adding coordinate-wise convexity to supermodularity is sufficient for
the existence of such a maximal element; moreover, this element corre-
sponds to a crisp coalition. Then, a simple method becomes available
to calculate the egalitarian solution of a convex fuzzy game (cf. [18]).

Lemma 8.17. Let v ∈ F GN be a supermodular game. Then the set

 8.2 Egalitarianism in Convex Fuzzy Games 111

A (N, v) := t ∈ F0N | α (t, v) = sup α (s, v)
s∈F0N

is closed with respect to the join operation ∨.

Proof. Let α = sups∈F N α (s, v). If α = ∞, then A(N, v) = ∅, so

0
A(N, v) is closed w.r.t. the join operation.
Suppose now α ∈ R. Take
t1 , t2 ∈A (N, v). We have to prove that
t1 ∨ t2 ∈ A
(N, v), that 1 2
. 1 /is α t
∨2t , v = . α.
/
Since v t = α t and v t = α t2 we obtain
1

. / . /




α t1 + α t2 = v t1 + v t2 ≤ v t1 ∨ t2 + v t1 ∧ t2
. / . / . / . /
≤ α t 1 ∨ t2 + α t 1 ∧ t2 = α t 1 + α t 2 ,

where the first inequality follows from SM and the second inequality
follows
from the
 definition
. of/ α and the fact that v(e∅ ) = 0. This implies
that v t1 ∨ t2 = α t1 ∨ t2 , so t1 ∨ t2 ∈ A (N, v).

We can conclude from the proof of Lemma 8.17 that in case t1 , t2 ∈

A(N, v) not only t1 ∨ t2 ∈ A (N, v) but also t1 ∧ t2 ∈ A (N, v) if t1 ∧ t2 =
e∅ . Further, A (N, v) is closed w.r.t. finite ”unions”, where t1 ∨t2 is seen
as the ”union” of t1 and t2 .
If we try to introduce in a way similar to that of [46] an egalitarian
rule for supermodular fuzzy games, then problems may arise since the
set of non-empty fuzzy coalitions is infinite and it is not clear if there
exists a maximal fuzzy coalition with “maximum value per unit of
participation level”. To be more precise, if v ∈ F GN is a supermodular
fuzzy game then crucial questions are:
(1) Is sups∈F N α (s, v) finite or not? Example 8.18 presents a fuzzy
0
game for which sups∈F N α (s, v) is infinite.
0
(2) In case that sups∈F N α (s, v) is finite, is there a t ∈ F0N s.t.
0
α (t, v) = sups∈F N α (s, v)? A fuzzy game for which the set
0
arg sups∈F N α (s, v) is empty is given in Example 8.19. Note that
0
if the set arg sups∈F N α (s, v) is non-empty then sups∈F N α (s, v) =
0 0
maxs∈F N α (s, v).
0
(3) Let ≥ be the standard partial order on [0, 1]N . Suppose that
maxs∈F N α (s, v) exists. Does the set arg maxs∈F N α (s, v) have a maxi-
0 0
mal element in F0N w.r.t. ≥? That this does not always hold for a fuzzy
game is shown in Example 8.20.
112 8 Convex Fuzzy Games

Example 8.18. Let v ∈ F G{1,2} be given by


s2 tg πs2 1 if s1 ∈ [0, 1) ,
v(s1 , s2 ) =
0 otherwise,

for each s = (s1 , s2 ) ∈ F {1,2} . For this game sups∈F {1,2} α (s, v) = ∞.
0

Example 8.19. Let v ∈ F G{1,2,3} with


(s1 + s2 + s3 )2 if s1 , s2 , s3 ∈ [0, 1) ,
v(s1 , s2 , s3 ) =
0 otherwise,

for each s = (s1 , s2 , s3 ) ∈ F {1,2,3} . For this game sups∈F {1,2,3} α (s, v) =
0
3, and arg sups∈F {1,2,3} α (s, v) = ∅.
0

Example 8.20. Let v ∈ F G{1,2} be given by


s1 + s2 if s1 , s2 ∈ [0, 1) ,
v(s1 , s2 ) =
0 otherwise,

for each s = (s1 , s2 ) ∈ F {1,2} . For this game maxs∈F {1,2} α (s, v) = 1,
0
arg maxs∈F {1,2} α (s, v) = [0, 1)×[0, 1)\{0}, but this set has no maximal
0
element w.r.t. ≥.

One can easily check that the games in Examples 8.18, 8.19, and 8.20
are supermodular, but not convex (CwC is not satisfied). For convex
fuzzy games all three questions mentioned above are answered affirma-
tively in Theorem 8.23. By using this theorem, the following additional
problems can also be overcome: “How to define the reduced games in
the steps of the adjusted algorithm, and whether this algorithm has
only a finite number of steps?”
In the proof of Lemma 8.21 we will use the notion of degree of
fuzziness of a coalition (cf. page 78). Note that for s ∈ F N

0S with
 degree
of fuzziness ϕ (s) = 0 we have α (s, v) ≤ maxS∈2N \{∅} α e , v , because
s is equal to eT for some T ∈ 2N \ {∅}.

Lemma 8.21. Let v ∈ CF GN and s ∈ F0N . If ϕ (s) > 0, then there is

a t ∈ F0N with ϕ (t) = ϕ (s) − 1, car(t) ⊂ car(s), and α (t, v) ≥ α (s, v);
if α (t, v) = α (s, v) then t ≥ s.
 8.2 Egalitarianism in Convex Fuzzy Games 113

Proof. Take s ∈
F
N with ϕ (s) > 0, and i ∈ N such that s ∈ (0, 1).
0 

 i

Consider t = s , 0 and t1 = s−i , 1 . Note that ϕ t0 = ϕ t1 =
0 −i

ϕ (s) − 1 and car(t0 ) ⊂ car(t1 ) = car(s).



If t0 = e∅ , then t1 = ei and then α ei , v ≥ α si ei , v = α (s, v)
follows from CwC. We i

0 then
 take t = e .
If t = e and α t , v > α (s, v), then we take t = t0 .
0 ∅


Now, we treat the case t0 = e∅ and α t0 , v ≤ α (s, v). From the
last inequality and from the fact that v(s) s is a convex combination of
v (t0 ) v(s)−v (t0 )
t0 
and s−t0 
, i.e.
. 0/
0 . /

v (s) t v t s − t0 v (s) − v t0
α (s, v) = = . + . ,
s s t0  s s − t0 
we obtain

v (s) − v t0 v (s)
0
≥ = α (s, v) . (8.9)
s − t  s
. / . /
From the fact that v satisfies IAMR (with t0 , s, s − t0 , t1 − s in
the roles of s1 , s2 , ε1 , ε2 , respectively) it follows



v t1 − v (s) v (s) − v t0
≥ . (8.10)
t1 − s s − t0 
Now, from (8.9) and (8.10) we have


v t1 − v (s) v (s)
1
≥ = α (s, v) . (8.11)
t − s s
Then, by applying (8.11), we obtain

 .1 /


1  v t1 t − s v t1 − v (s) s v (s)
α t ,v = 1
= 1
. 1
+ 1 . ≥
t  t  t − s t  s
.1 /
t − s v (s) s v (s) v (s)
≥ 1
. + 1 . = = α (s, v) .
t  s t  s s

So, we can take t = t1 .

From Lemma 8.21 it follows that for each s ∈ F0N , there is a
sequence

s0 , . . . , sk
in F0N
, where
 s 0 = s and k = ϕ (s) such that ϕ sr+1 =


ϕ (sr ) − 1, car sr+1 ⊂ car (sr ), and α sr+1 , v ≥ α (sr , v) for each

k
r ∈ {0, . . . , k − 1}. Since ϕ s = 0, sk corresponds to a crisp coalition,
say T . So, we have proved
 114 8 Convex Fuzzy Games

Corollary 8.22. Let v ∈ CF GN . Then
for all s ∈ F0N there exists

T ∈ 2N \ {∅} such that T ⊂ car(s) and α eT , v ≥ α (s, v).

From Corollary 8.22 it follows immediately

Theorem 8.23. Let v ∈ CF GN . Then


(i) sups∈F N α (s, v) = maxT ∈2N \{∅} α eT , v ;
0


(ii) T ∗ = max arg maxT ∈2N \{∅} α eT , v generates the largest ele-
∗
ment in arg sups∈F N α (s, v), namely eT .
0

In view of this result it is easy to adjust the Dutta-Ray algorithm

to a convex fuzzy game v. In Step 1 one puts N1 := N , v1 := v and
considers arg sups∈F N1 α (s, v1 ). According to Theorem 8.23, there is a
0
unique maximal element in arg sups∈F N1 α (s, v), which corresponds to
0

a crisp coalition, say S1 . Define Ei (v) = α eS1 , v1 for each i ∈ S1 . If
S1 = N , then we stop.
In case S1 = N , then in Step 2 one considers the convex fuzzy game
v2 with N2 := N1 \ S1 and, for each s ∈ [0, 1]N \S1 ,



v2 (s) = v1 eS1  s − v1 eS1 ,


where eS1  s is the element in [0, 1]N with


S1  1 if i ∈ S1 ,
e s i=
si if i ∈ N \ S1 .

Once again, by using Theorem

 8.23, one can take the largest

element

eS2 in arg maxS∈2N2 \{∅} α eS , v2 and defines Ei (v) = α eS2 , v2 for all
i ∈ S2 . If S1 ∪S2 = N we stop; otherwise, we continue by considering the
convex fuzzy game v3 , etc. After a finite number of steps the algorithm
stops, and the obtained allocation E (v) is called the egalitarian solution
of the convex fuzzy game v.

Theorem 8.24. Let v ∈ CF GN . Then

(i) E (v) = E (cr (v));
(ii) E (v) ∈ C (v);
(iii) E (v) Lorenz dominates every other allocation in the Aubin core
C(v).
 8.2 Egalitarianism in Convex Fuzzy Games 115

Proof. (i) This assertion follows directly from Theorem 8.23 and the
adjusted Dutta-Ray algorithm given above.
(ii) Note that E (v) = E (cr(v)) ∈ C (cr (v)) = C (v), where the
first equality follows from (i), the second equality follows from Theorem
8.38(iii), and the relation E (cr(v)) ∈ C (cr (v)) is a main result in [46]
for convex crisp games.
(iii) It is a fact that E (cr (v)) Lorenz dominates every other element
of C (cr (v)) (cf. [46]). Since E (v) = E (cr (v)) and C (cr (v)) = C (v),
our assertion (iii) follows.

Theorem 8.24 should be interpreted as strengthening Dutta and

Ray’s result. One can also think that the egalitarian solution for a
convex crisp game will keep the Lorenz domination property in any
fuzzy extension satisfying IAMR.
The Dutta-Ray egalitarian solution for convex fuzzy games is also
related to the equal division core (cf. page 88) for convex fuzzy games
as Theorem 8.25 shows.

Theorem 8.25. Let v ∈ CF GN . Then

(i) E (v) ∈ EDC (v);
(ii) EDC (v) = EDC (cr (v)).

Proof. (i) According to Proposition 7.18(ii) and Theorem 8.24(ii), we

have E (v) ∈ C (v) ⊆ EDC (v).
(ii) The relation EDC(v) ⊂ EDC(cr(v)) follows from Proposition
7.18(i). Suppose x ∈ EDC (cr(v)). We prove that for each s ∈ F0N
there is i ∈ car(s) s.t. xi ≥ α (s, v).
Take T as in Corollary

 8.22. Since x ∈ EDC (cr(v)), there is an
i ∈ T s.t. xi ≥ α eT , v . Now, from Corollary 8.22 it follows that
xi ≥ α (s, v) for i ∈ T ⊂ car(s).

The next example is meant to illustrate the various interrelations

among the egalitarian solution, the core, and the equal division core
for convex fuzzy games as stated in Theorems 8.24 and 8.25.

Example 8.26. Let N = {1, 2, 3} and T = {1, 2}. Consider the unanim-
ity fuzzy game ueT with

1 if s1 = s2 = 1,
ueT (s) =
0 otherwise,

for each s = (s1 , s2 , s3 ) ∈ F {1,2,3} . According to Proposition 8.4, the

game ueT is convex. Its Aubin core is given by
116 8 Convex Fuzzy Games
 
C (ueT ) = co e1 , e2 = co {(1, 0, 0) , (0, 1, 0)} ,

and the egalitarian allocation is given by

 
1 1
E (ueT ) = , , 0 ∈ C (ueT ) .
2 2
It is easy to see that E (ueT ) Lorenz dominates every other alloca-
tion in C (ueT ). Moreover, the equal
division core

EDC (ueT ) is the
setB
1 ∪ B2 , where
B1 = co e1 , 12 e1 + e2 , 12 e1 + e3 and B2 =
1 1 2 2 1 2 3
co 2 e + e , e , 2 e + e . Note that C (ueT ) ⊂ EDC (ueT ) =
EDC (cr (ueT )).

8.3 Participation Monotonic Allocation Schemes

In this section we introduce for convex fuzzy games the notion of a

participation monotonic allocation scheme (pamas). This notion is in-
spired by [107] where population monotonic allocation schemes (pmas)
for cooperative crisp games which are necessarily totally balanced (cf.
Subsections 5.1.2 and 5.2.2) are introduced. Recall that a pmas for a
crisp game is a bundle of core elements, one for each subgame and the
game itself, which are related via a monotonicity condition guarantee-
ing that each player is better off when more other players join him.
In our approach (cf. [17]) the role of subgames of a crisp game will
be taken over by the t-restricted games vt ∈ F GN of a fuzzy game
v ∈ F GN (cf. Definition 6.6).

Remark 8.27. Note that for each core element x ∈ C(vt ) we have xi = 0
for each i ∈
/ car(t). This follows from

0 = v(e∅ )
 
= vt (ei ) ≤ xi = xk − xk ≤ vt (eN ) − vt (eN \{i} ) = 0,
k∈N k∈N \{i}

where we use that i ∈/ car(t) in the second and last equalities, and that
x ∈ C(vt ) in the two inequalities.

Remark 8.28. If v ∈ CF GN , then also vt ∈ CF GN for each t ∈ F N .

 8.3 Participation Monotonic Allocation Schemes 117

Definition 8.29. Let v ∈ F GN . A scheme (ai,t )i∈N,t∈F N is called a

0
participation monotonic allocation scheme (pamas) if
(i) (ai,t )i∈N ∈ C(vt ) for each t ∈ F0N (stability condition);
(ii) t−1 −1
i ai,t ≥ si ai,s for each s, t ∈ F0 with s ≤ t and each i ∈ car(s)
N

(participation monotonicity condition).

Remark 8.30. Note that such a pamas is an n × ∞-matrix, where the

columns correspond to the players and the rows to the fuzzy coalitions.
In each row corresponding to t there is a core element of the game vt .
The participation monotonicity condition implies that, if the scheme
is used as regulator for the payoff distributions in the restricted fuzzy
games, players are paid per unit of participation more in larger coali-
tions than in smaller coalitions.

Remark 8.31. Note that the collection of participation monotonic allo-

cation schemes of a fuzzy game v is a convex set of n × ∞-matrices.

Remark 8.32. In [120] inspired by [107], the notion of fuzzy population

monotonic allocation scheme (FPMAS) is introduced. The relation be-
tween such a scheme and core elements is not studied there.

Remark 8.33. A necessary condition for the existence of a pamas for v

is the existence of core elements for vt for each t ∈ F0N . But this is not
sufficient as Example 8.34 shows. A sufficient condition is the convexity
of a game as we see in Theorem 8.36.

Example 8.34. Consider the game v ∈ F GN with N = {1, 2, 3, 4} and

v(s) = min {s1 + s2 , s3 + s4 } for each s = (s1 , s2 , s3 , s4 ) ∈ F N . Sup-
pose for a moment that (ai,t )i∈N,t∈F N is a pamas. Then for t1 = eN \{2} ,
0  
t2 = eN \{1} , t3 = eN \{4} , and t4 = eN \{3} we have C (vtk ) = ek , and

  
so ai,tk i∈N = ek for k ∈ N . But then k∈N ak,eN ≥ k∈N ak,tk =

N
4 > 2 = v e , and this implies that there does not exist a pamas.
Note that C (vt ) = ∅ holds for any t = (t1 , t2 , t3 , t4 ) ∈ F0N , because
(t1 , t2 , 0, 0) ∈ C (vt ) if t1 + t2 ≤ t3 + t4 ; and (0, 0, t3 , t4 ) ∈ C (vt ) other-
wise.

Definition 8.35. Let v ∈ F GN and x ∈ C(v). Then we call x pamas

extendable if there exists a pamas (ai,t )i∈N,t∈F N such that ai,eN = xi
0
for each i ∈ N .

In the next theorem we see that convex games have a pamas. More-
over, each core element is pamas extendable.
118 8 Convex Fuzzy Games

Theorem 8.36. Let v ∈ CF GN and x ∈ C(v). Then x is pamas-

extendable.
Proof. We know from Theorem 8.38 that x is in the convex hull of the
marginal vectors mσ (v) with σ ∈ π(N ). In view of Remark 8.31 we only
need to prove that each marginal vector mσ (v) is pamas extendable,
because then the right convex combination of these pamas extensions
gives a pamas extension of x.
So, take σ ∈ π (N ) and define (ai,t )i∈N,t∈F N by ai,t = mσi (vt ) for
0
each i ∈ N , t ∈ F0N . We claim that this scheme is a pamas extension
of mσ (v).
Clearly, ai,eN = mσi (v) for each i ∈ N since veN = v. Further, by
Remark 8.28, each t-restricted game vt is a convex fuzzy game, and
from Theorem 8.38 it follows that (ai,t )i∈N ∈ C(vt ). Hence, the scheme
satisfies the stability condition.
To prove the participation monotonicity condition, take s, t ∈ F0N
with s ≤ t and i ∈ car(s) and let k be the element in N such that
i = σ(k). We have to prove that t−1 −1
i ai,t ≥ si ai,s . Now,

t−1 −1 σ
i ai,t = tσ(k) mσ(k) (vt )
  k  k−1 
 
= t−1
σ(k) v tσ(r) eσ(r) − v tσ(r) eσ(r)
r=1 r=1
  k  k−1 
 
−1
≥ sσ(k) v sσ(r) eσ(r)
−v sσ(r) eσ(r)

r=1 r=1
= s−1 σ −1
σ(k) mσ(k) (vs ) = si ai,s ,

where the inequality follows from the convexity of v (i.e. v satisfies

IAMR). So (ai,t )i∈N,t∈F N is a pamas extension of mσ (v).
0

Further, the total fuzzy Shapley value of a game v ∈ CF GN , which is

the scheme (φi,t )i∈N,t∈F N with the fuzzy Shapley value of the restricted
0
game vt in each row corresponding to t, is a pamas. The total fuzzy
Shapley value is a Shapley function (in the sense of [120]) on the class
of n-person fuzzy games. For a study of a Shapley function in relation
with FPMAS we refer the reader to [120].
Example 8.37. Let v ∈ F G{1,2} be given by v(s1 , s2 ) = 4s1 (s1 −
2) + 10(s2 )2 for each s = (s1 , s2 ) ∈ F {1,2} . Then v is convex and
m(1,2) (v) = m(2,1) (v) = φ(v) = (−4, 10) because in fact v is additive:
v(s1 , s2 ) = v(s1 , 0) + v(0, s2 ). For each t ∈ F0N the fuzzy Shapley value
 8.4 Properties of Solution Concepts 119

φ(vt ) equals (4t1 (t1 − 2), 10(t2 )2 ), and the scheme (ai,t )i∈{1,2},t∈F N with
0
a1,t = 4t1 (t1 − 2), a2,t = 10(t2 )2 is a pamas extension of φ(v), with the
fuzzy Shapley value of vt in each row corresponding to t of the scheme,
so (ai,t )i∈{1,2},t∈F N is the total fuzzy Shapley value of v.
0

8.4 Properties of Solution Concepts

This section is devoted to special properties of the solution concepts

introduced so far on the class of convex fuzzy games. First, we focus
on the Aubin core, the fuzzy Shapley value and the fuzzy Weber set.
As we see in the following theorem the stable marginal vector property
(cf. Theorem 5.10(iv)) also holds for convex fuzzy games and the fuzzy
Weber set coincides with the Aubin core. Hence, the Aubin core is
large; moreover it coincides with the core of the corresponding crisp
game (cf. [17]).
Theorem 8.38. Let v ∈ CF GN . Then
(i) mσ (v) ∈ C(v) for each σ ∈ π(N );
(ii) C(v) = W (v);
(iii) C(v) = C(cr(v)).


Proof. (i) For each σ ∈ π(N ) we have i∈N mσi (v) = v eN . Further,
for each σ ∈ π(N ) and s ∈ F N
 
n
si mσi (v) = sσ(k) mσσ(k) (v)
i∈N k=1
  k  k−1 

n  
= sσ(k) v eσ(r) − v eσ(r)
k=1 r=1 r=1
  k  k−1 
n  
≥ v sσ(r) e σ(r)
−v σ(r)
sσ(r) e
k=1 r=1 r=1
 n 

=v sσ(r) eσ(r) = v(s),
r=1

where the inequality follows by applying n times Proposition 8.8.

Hence, mσ (v) ∈ C(v) for each σ ∈ π(N ).
(ii) From assertion (i) and the convexity of the core we obtain
W (v) = co {mσ (v) | σ ∈ π(N )} ⊂ C(v). The reverse inclusion follows
from Proposition 7.29.
120 8 Convex Fuzzy Games

(iii) Since cr(v) is a convex crisp game by Proposition 8.5, we have

C(cr(v)) = W (cr(v)), and W (cr(v)) = W (v) = C(v) by (ii).

It follows from Theorem 8.38 that φ(v) has a central position in

the Aubin core C(v) if v is a convex fuzzy game. For crisp games it
holds that a game v is convex if and only if C(v) = W (v) (cf. Theorem
5.10(v)). For fuzzy games the implication is only in one direction. Ex-
ample 8.39 presents a fuzzy game which is not convex and where the
Aubin core and the fuzzy Weber set coincide.
{1,2} with v(s , s ) = s s if (s , s ) =
Example

1 1  8.39.
1Let 1
v ∈ F G 1 2 1 2 1 2 
{1,2} , but C(v) = W (v) =
,
2 2 and v ,
2 2 = 0. Then v ∈
/ CF G
co {(0, 1) , (1, 0)}.

Example 8.40. Consider the public good game in Example 6.5. If the
functions g1 , . . . , gn and −k are convex, then we have v ∈ CF GN .

For fuzzy games the core is a superadditive solution, i.e.

C(v + w) ⊃ C(v) + C(w) for all v, w ∈ F GN ,

and the fuzzy games with a non-empty Aubin core form a cone.
On the set of convex fuzzy games the Aubin core turns out to be an
additive correspondence as we see in

Proposition 8.41. The Aubin core of a convex fuzzy game and the
fuzzy Shapley value are additive solutions.

Proof. Let v, w be convex fuzzy games. Then

C(v + w) = C(cr(v + w)) =

C(cr(v) + cr(w)) = C(cr(v)) + C(cr(w)) = C(v) + C(w),

where the first equality follows from Theorem 8.38(iii) and the third
equality follows from the additivity of the core for convex crisp games
(cf. [25]). Further, from φ(v) = φ(cr(v)) and the additivity of the Shap-
ley value for convex crisp games it follows that φ(v + w) = φ(v) + φ(w).

Now, we study properties of other cores and stable sets for convex
fuzzy games (cf. [114]).

Lemma 8.42. Let v ∈ CF GN . Take x, y ∈ I(v) and suppose x doms y

for some s ∈ F0N . Then |car(s)| ≥ 2.
 8.4 Properties of Solution Concepts 121

Proof. Take x, y ∈ I(v) and suppose x doms y for some s ∈ F0N with
car(s) = {i}. Then xi > yi and si xi ≤ v(si ei ). By the convexity of v,
i
we obtain si v(ei ) ≥ v(si ei ). Thus, we have yi < xi ≤ v(ssiie ) ≤ v(ei )
which is a contradiction with the individual rationality of y.
Theorem 8.43. Let v ∈ CF GN and w = cr(v). Then, for all x, y ∈
I(v) = I(w), we have x dom y in v if and only if x dom y in w.
Proof. First, we note that



I(v) = x ∈ Rn | xi = v eN , xi ≥ v(ei ) for each i ∈ N
i∈N

and


I(w) = x ∈ Rn | xi = w (N ) , xi ≥ w({i}) for each i ∈ N
i∈N

coincide because w(N ) = v(eN ) and w(i) = v(ei ) for each i ∈ N .

To prove the ‘if’ part, let x, y ∈ I(w) = I(v) and x domS y for some
S ∈ 2N \ {∅}. Then it implies x domeS y in v.
Now, we prove the ‘only if’ part. Let x, y ∈ I(v) = I(w) and x doms y
for some s ∈ F0N . Let ϕ(s) = |{i ∈ N | 0 < si < 1}|. By Remark 7.9,
ϕ(s) < n. It is sufficient to prove by induction on ϕ(s) ∈ {0, . . . , n − 1},
that x doms y implies x dom y in w.
Clearly, if ϕ(s) = 0 then x domcar(s) y because ϕ(s) = 0 implies that
s is a crisp-like coalition.
Suppose now that the assertion “x doms y in v with ϕ(s) = k implies
x dom y in w” holds for each k with 0 ≤ k < r < n. Take s ∈ F0N with
ϕ(s) = r, and i ∈ N such that 0 < si < 1, and take x, y ∈ I(v)
such that x doms y. Then xi > yi for each i ∈ car(s) and s · x ≤ v(s).
Further, |car(s)| ≥ 2 by Lemma 8.42. We note that s can be represented
by a convex combination of a = s − si ei and b = s + (1 − si )ei , i.e.
s = (1 − si )a + si b. Note that ϕ(a) = r − 1 and ϕ(b) = r − 1. Further,
|car(a)| = |car(s)| − 1, |car(b)| = |car(s)|.
The inequality s · x ≤ v(s) implies (1 − si )a · x + si b · x ≤ v(s). On
the other hand, the (coordinate-wise) convexity of v induces v(s) ≤
(1 − si )v(a) + si v(b).
Hence, (1 − si )a · x + si b · x ≤ v(s) ≤ (1 − si )v(a) + si v(b) which
implies (1 − si )(a · x − v(a)) + si (b · x − v(b)) ≤ 0; thus a · x ≤ v(a) or
b · x ≤ v(b). We want to show that
x doma y or x domb y. (8.12)
122 8 Convex Fuzzy Games

The following three cases should be considered:

(1) b · x ≤ v(b). Then x domb y, since |car(b)| ≥ 2.
(2) b · x > v(b) and |car(s)| ≥ 3. Then a · x ≤ v(a); thus x doma y, since
|car(a)| ≥ 2.
(3) b · x > v(b) and |car(s)| = 2. Then we have a · x ≤ v(a) and
|car(b)| = 1.
By the convexity of v and the individual rationality, we obtain a · x ≥
v(a). In fact, let a = sj ej . Then the convexity of v induces sj v(ej ) ≥
v(sj ej ). By the individual rationality, we obtain xj ≥ v(ej ). Hence,
a · x = sj xj ≥ sj v(ej ) ≥ v(sj ej ) = v(a). So, a · x = v(a), which is
contradictory to (1 − si )(a · x − v(a)) + si (b · x − v(b)) ≤ 0, implying
that case (3) does not occur.
Hence, (8.12) holds. Since ϕ(a) = ϕ(b) = r − 1, the induction hy-
pothesis implies that x dom y in w.
Theorem 8.44. Let v ∈ CF GN . Then
(i) C(v) = C P (v) = C cr (v);
(ii) DC(v) = DC(cr(v));
(iii) C(v) = DC(v).
Proof. (i) For convex fuzzy games C(v) = C(cr(v)) (see Theorem
8.38(iii)). Now, we use Theorem 7.12(i).
(ii) From Theorem 8.43 we conclude that DC(v) = DC(cr(v)).
(iii) Since v ∈ CF GN we have v(eN ) ≥ v(s) + i∈N \car(s) v(ei ) for
each s ∈ F N . We obtain by Theorem 7.13 that C P (v) = DC(v). Now,
we use (i).
The next theorem extends the result in [104] that each crisp convex
game has a unique stable set coinciding with the dominance core.
Theorem 8.45. Let v ∈ CF GN . Then there is a unique stable set,
namely DC(v).
Proof. By Theorem 2.12(iii), DC(cr(v)) is the unique stable set of
cr(v). In view of Theorem 8.43, the set of stable sets of v and cr(v)
coincide, and by Theorem 8.44(ii), we have DC(v) = DC(cr(v)). So,
the unique stable set of v is DC(v).
Note that the game v in Example 7.15 is convex, but v1 and v2 are
not.
Remark 8.46. The relations among the Aubin core, the proper core,
the crisp core, the dominance core, and the stable sets discussed above
remain valid if one uses the corresponding generalized versions of these
notions as presented in Section 7.3 (for details see Section 3 in [76]).
 8.4 Properties of Solution Concepts 123

We describe now the implications of convexity on the structure of

the tight catchers and compromise values introduced in Sections 7.5
and 7.6.

Let Dk v(0) and Dk v eN for each k ∈ N be the right and left
partial derivative in the direction ek in 0 and eN , respectively.

Theorem 8.47. Let v ∈ CF GN . Then

0
1
HQ(v) = Dv(0), Dv eN .

Proof. From the fact that v satisfies IAMR (cf. Proposition 8.8) it
follows that
!
lk (Q(v)) = inf ε−1 v εek − v(0) | ε ∈ (0, 1]
= Dk v(0),

and

 !
uk (Q(v)) = sup ε−1 v eN − v eN − εek | ε ∈ (0, 1]


= D k v eN .

Theorem 8.48. Let v ∈ CF GN . Then HC(v) = HW (v) and this

hypercube is a tight catcher for C(v) = W (v). Further

lk (C(v)) = v ek ,


uk (C(v)) = v eN − v eN \{k}

for each k ∈ N .

Proof. For v ∈ CF GN the IAMR property implies

ε−1 v εek − v(0) ≤ v ek − v(0) for each ε ∈ (0, 1]

and


v ek − v(0) ≤ v eS + ek − v eS for each S ⊂ N \ {k} .

The first inequality corresponds to s1 = s2 = 0, ε1 = ε, and ε2 = 1,

while the second inequality is obtained by taking s1 = 0, s2 = eS , and
ε1 = ε2 = 1.
So, we obtain
124 8 Convex Fuzzy Games
!
lk (C(v)) = sup ε−1 v εek | ε ∈ (0, 1] = v ek

 !
= min v eS∪{k} − v eS | S ⊂ N \ {k}
= lk (W (v)) .
Similarly, from IAMR it follows

N !
−1
uk (C(v)) = inf ε v e − v e − εe
N k
| ε ∈ (0, 1]

N
= v e − v eN \{k}

 !
= max v eS∪{k} − v eS | S ⊂ N \ {k}
= uk (W (v)) .
This implies that HC(v) = HW (v).
That this hypercube is a tight catcher of C(v) = W (v) (see Theorem
8.38(ii)) follows from the facts that

lk (W (v)) = v ek = mσk (v),


uk (W (v)) = v eN − v eN \{k} = mτk (v),

where σ and τ are orderings of N with σ(1) = k and τ (n) = k, respec-

tively.
For convex fuzzy games this theorem has consequences with respect
to the coincidence of some of the compromise values introduced in
Section 7.6. This can be seen in our next theorem.
Theorem 8.49. Let v ∈ CF GN . Then


(i) mvk (u (C(v))) = mvk (u (W (v))) = v ek for each k ∈ N ;
τ (v) = valσ (v) = valτ (v) = valσ (v).
(ii) valC C W W


Proof. (i) By Theorem 8.48, uk (C(v)) = uk (W (v)) = v eN −


v eN \{k} for each k ∈ N . So, to prove (i), we have to show that
for k ∈ N ,
mvk (u (C(v)))
⎧ ⎛ ⎞⎫
⎨ 
 ⎬
= sup s−1 ⎝v(s) − sj v eN − v eN \{j} ⎠
⎩ k ⎭
j∈N \{k}

= v ek ,
 8.4 Properties of Solution Concepts 125

where the sup is taken over s ∈ F N , sk > 0.

Equivalently, we have to show that for each s ∈ F N with sk > 0


sk v ek ≥ sj v eN − v eN \{j} . (8.13)
j∈N \{k}

Let σ be an ordering on N with σ(1) = k. Then

  t   t−1 
n  
v(s) = v sσ(r) eσ(r) − v sσ(r) eσ(r)
t=1 r=1 r=1
  t   t−1 

n  
= v sk ek + v sσ(r) eσ(r)
−v sσ(r) eσ(r)
.
t=2 r=1 r=1

Now, note that for each t ∈ {2, . . . , n} IAMR implies

t−1 t−1
s−1
σ(t) v r=1 sσ(r) e
σ(r) + s
σ(t) e
σ(t) − v
r=1 sσ(r) e
σ(r)



≤ v eN \{σ(t)} + 1.eσ(t) − v eN \{σ(t)} .
So, we obtain


v(s) ≤ sk v ek + sj v eN − v eN \{j}
j∈N \{k}

from which (8.13) follows.

v

(ii)
 Since, by (i) and Theorem 8.48, τlk (C(v)) =σ mk (u (C(v))) =
v e for each k ∈ N , it follows that valC (v) = valC (v) = valW
k τ (v) =

valWσ (v).

Remark 8.50. Let v ∈ CF GN . Because u (Q(v)) ≥ u (C(v)), it
follows


from (i) in the proof of Theorem 8.49 that mk (u (Q(v))) = v ek for
each k ∈ N . But in general this remainder vector is not equal to Dv(0)
τ (v) and valσ (v) do not coincide.
(cf. Theorem 8.47), so in general valQ Q

Example 8.51. Let v ∈ CF G{1,2} with v (s1 , s2 ) = s1 (s2 )5 for each s =

{1,2} . Then, by Theorems 8.38(ii) and 8.48, C(v) = W (v) =
(s1 , s2) ∈ F 
conv m (1,2) (v), m(2,1) (v) = {(0, 1), (1, 0)}
and HC(v) = HW (v) =
[(0, 0), (1, 1)]. Hence, valC σ (v) = valσ (v) = 1 , 1 . Further, valσ (v) =

1 5 W 2 02
Q 1
, because, by Theorem 8.47, HQ(v) = Dv(e ∅ ), Dv e{1,2}
6 6
τ τ

1 1 =
[(0, 0), (1, 5)]. By Theorem 8.49, valC (v) = valW (v) = 2 , 2 =
valC σ (v) = valσ (v). Further, valτ (v) is the compromise between
W Q
mv (1, 5) = (0, 0) and (1, 5), so in this case also valQ τ (v) = valσ (v) =

1 5 Q
,
6 6 .
9
Fuzzy Clan Games

In this chapter we consider fuzzy games of the form v : [0, 1]N1 ×

{0, 1}N2 → R, where the players in N1 have participation levels which
may vary between 0 and 1, while the players in N2 are crisp players in
the sense that they can fully cooperate or not cooperate at all. With
this kind of games we can model various economic situations where the
group of agents involved is divided into two subgroups with different
status: a “clan” consisting of “powerful” agents and a set of available
agents willing to cooperate with the clan. This cooperation generates a
positive reward only for coalitions where all clan members are present.
Such situations are modeled in the classical theory of cooperative games
with transferable utility by means of (total) clan games where only the
full cooperation and non-cooperation at all of non-clan members with
the clan are taken into account (cf. Section 5.3). Here we take over this
simplifying assumption and allow non-clan members to cooperate with
all clan members and some other non-clan members to a certain extent.
As a result the notion of a fuzzy clan game is introduced.

9.1 The Cone of Fuzzy Clan Games

Let N = {1, ..., n} be a finite set of players. We denote the non-empty

set of clan members by C, and treat clan members as crisp players. In
the following we denote the set of crisp subcoalitions of C by {0, 1}C ,
the set of fuzzy coalitions on N \C by [0, 1]N \C (equivalent to F N \C ),
and denote [0, 1]N \C × {0, 1}C by FCN . For each s ∈ FCN , sN \C and sC
will denote its restriction to N \C and C, respectively. We denote the
vector (eN )C by 1C in the following. Further we denote by F1NC the
set [0, 1]N \C × {1C } of fuzzy coalitions on N where all clan members
 128 9 Fuzzy Clan Games

have participation level 1, and where the participation level of non-clan

members may vary between 0 and 1 (cf. [115]).
We define fuzzy clan games by using veto power of clan members,
monotonicity, and a condition reflecting the fact that a decrease in par-
ticipation level of a non-clan member in growing coalitions containing
at least all clan members with full participation level results in a de-
crease of the average marginal return of that player (DAMR-property).

Definition 9.1. A game v : FCN → R is a fuzzy clan game if v satisfies

the following three properties:
(i) (veto-power of clan members) v(s) = 0 if sC = 1C ;
(ii) (Monotonicity) v(s) ≤ v(t) for all s, t ∈ FCN with s ≤ t;
(iii) (DAMR-property for non-clan members) For each i ∈ N \C, all
s1 , s2 ∈ F1NC and all ε1 , ε2 > 0 such that s1 ≤ s2 and 0 ≤ s1 − ε1 ei ≤
s2 − ε2 ei we have

ε−1 1 1 −1 2 2
1 (v(s ) − v(s − ε1 e )) ≥ ε2 (v(s ) − v(s − ε2 e )).
i i

Property (i) expresses the fact that the full participation level of all
clan members is a necessary condition for generating a positive reward
for coalitions.
Fuzzy clan games for which the clan consists of a single player are
called fuzzy big boss games, with the single clan member as the big
boss.

Remark 9.2. One can see a fuzzy clan game as a special mixed action-
set game, the latter being introduced in [34].

As an introduction we give two examples of interactive situations

one of them leading to a fuzzy clan game, but the other one not.

Example 9.3. (A production situation with owners and gradually avail-

able workers) Let N \C = {1, . . . , m}, C = {m + 1, . . . , n}. Let f :
[0, 1]N \C → R be a monotonic non-decreasing function with f (0) = 0
that satisfies the DAMR-property. Then v : [0, 1]N \C × {0, 1}C → R
defined by v(s) = 0 if sC = 1C and v(s) = f (s1 , . . . , sm ) otherwise, is a
fuzzy clan game with clan C. One can think of a production situation
where the clan members are providers of different (complementary) es-
sential tools needed for the production and the production function
measures the gains if all clan members are cooperating with the set of
workers N \C (cf. [89]), where each worker i can participate at level si
which may vary from lack of participation to full participation.
 9.1 The Cone of Fuzzy Clan Games 129

Example 9.4. (A fuzzy voting situation with a fixed group with veto
power) Let N and C be as in Example 9.3, and 0 < k < |N \C|. Let
v : [0, 1]N \C × {0, 1}C → R with
 m
v(s) =
1 if sC = 1C and i=1 si ≥ k,
0 otherwise.
Then v has the veto power property for members in C and the mono-
tonicity property, but not the DAMR-property with respect to members
of N \C, hence it is not a fuzzy clan game. This game can be seen as
arising from a voting situation where to pass a bill all members
 of C
have to (fully) agree upon and the sum of the support levels i∈N \C si
of N \ C should exceed a fixed threshold k, where si = 1 (si = 0) corre-
spond to full support (no support) of the bill, but also partial supports
count.
In the following the set of all fuzzy clan games with a fixed non-
empty set of players N and a fixed clan C is denoted by F CGN C . We
notice that F CGN is a convex cone in F G N , that is for all v, w ∈
C
F CGN C and p, q ∈ R+ , pv + qw ∈ F CGC , where R+ denotes the set of
N

non-negative real numbers.

Now, we show that for each game v ∈ F CGN C the corresponding
crisp game w = cr(v) is a total clan game if |C| ≥ 2, and a total big
boss game if |C| = 1.
Let v ∈ F CGN C . The corresponding crisp game w has the following
properties which follow straightforwardly from the properties of v:
• w(S) = 0 if C ⊂ S;
• w(S) ≤ w(T ) for all S, T with S ⊂ T ⊂ N ;
• for all S, T with C ⊂ S ⊂ T and each i ∈ S \ C, w(S) − w(S\{i}) ≥
w(T ) − w(T \ {i}).
So, w is a total clan game in the terminology of [122] if | C | ≥ 2
(cf. Subsection 5.3.2) and a total big boss game in the terminology of
[27] if | C | = 1.
Fuzzy clan games can be seen as an extension of crisp clan games
in what concerns the possibilities of cooperation available to non-clan
members. Specifically, in a fuzzy clan game each non-clan member can
be involved in cooperation at each extent between 0 and 1, whereas in
a crisp clan game a non-clan member can only be or not a member of
a (crisp) coalition containing all clan members.
In the following we consider t-restricted games corresponding to a
fuzzy clan game and prove, in Proposition 9.5, that these games are
also fuzzy clan games.
130 9 Fuzzy Clan Games

Let v ∈ F CGN C and t ∈ F1C . Recall that the t-restricted game vt of

N

v with respect to t is given by vt (s) = v(t ∗ s) for each s ∈ FCN .

Proposition 9.5. Let vt be the t-restricted game of v ∈ F CGN

C , with
t ∈ F1NC . Then vt ∈ F CGN
C .

Proof. First, note that for each s ∈ FCN with sC = 1C we have (t∗s)C =
1C , and then the veto-power property of v implies vt (s) = v(t ∗ s) = 0.
To prove the monotonicity property, let s1 , s2 ∈ FCN with s1 ≤ s2 . Then
vt (s1 ) = v(t ∗ s1 ) ≤ v(t ∗ s2 ) = vt (s2 ), where the inequality follows from
the monotonicity of v. Now, we focus on DAMR regarding non-clan
members. Let i ∈ N \C, s1 , s2 ∈ F1NC , and let ε1 > 0, ε2 > 0 such that
s1 ≤ s2 and 0 ≤ s1 − ε1 ei ≤ s2 − ε2 ei . Then

ε−1 2 2 −1 2 2
2 (vt (s ) − vt (s − ε2 e )) = ε2 (v(t ∗ s ) − v(t ∗ s − ti ε2 e ))
i i

≤ ε−1 1 1
1 (v(t ∗ s ) − v(t ∗ s − ti ε1 e ))
i

= ε−1 1 1
1 (vt (s ) − vt (s − ε1 e ),
i

where the inequality follows from the fact that v satisfies the DAMR-
property.

For each i ∈ N \C, x ∈ [0, 1] and t ∈ FCN , let (t−i || x) be the element
in FCN such that (t−i || x)j = tj for each j ∈ N \{i} and (t−i || x)i =
x. The function v : [0, 1]N \C × {0, 1}C → R is called coordinate-wise
concave regarding non-clan members if for each i ∈ N \ C the function
gt−i : [0, 1] → R with gt−i (x) = v(t−i || x) for each x ∈ [0, 1] is a
concave function. Intuitively, this means that the function v is concave
in each coordinate corresponding to (the participation level of) a non-
clan member when all other coordinates are kept fixed.
The function v : [0, 1]N \C × {0, 1}C → R is said to have the submod-
ularity property on [0, 1]N \C if v(s ∨ t) + v(s ∧ t) ≤ v(s) + v(t) for all
s, t ∈ F1NC , where s ∨ t and s ∧ t are those elements of [0, 1]N \C × {1C }
with the i-th coordinate equal, for each i ∈ N \ C, to max{si , ti } and
min{si , ti }, respectively.

Remark 9.6. The DAMR-property regarding non-clan members im-

plies two important properties of v, namely coordinate-wise concav-
ity and submodularity. Note that the coordinate-wise concavity follows
straightforwardly from the DAMR-property of v. The proof of the sub-
modularity follows the same line as in the proof of Theorem 8.9 where
it was shown that the IAMR-property implies supermodularity.
 9.2 Cores and Stable Sets for Fuzzy Clan Games 131

Let ε > 0 and s ∈ FCN . For each i ∈ N \ C we denote by Di v(s) the

i-th left derivative of v in s if si > 0, and the i-th right derivative of
v in s if si = 0, i.e. Di v(s) = lim ε→0 ε−1 (v(s) − v(s − ε ei )), if si > 0,
ε>0
and Di v(s) = lim ε→0 ε−1 (v(s + ε ei ) − v(s)), if si = 0. It is well known
ε>0
that for a concave real-valued function each tangent line to the graph
lies above the graph of the function. Based on this property we state
Lemma 9.7. Let v ∈ F CGN C , t ∈ F1C , and i ∈ N \ C. Then, for
N

si ∈ [0, ti ], v(t−i || ti ) − v(t−i || si ) ≥ (ti − si )Di v(t).

Proof. Applying the coordinate-wise concavity of v and the property of
tangent lines to the graph of g−i in (ti , g−i (ti )) one obtains v(t−i || ti )−
(ti − si )Di v(t) ≥ v(t−i || si ).

9.2 Cores and Stable Sets for Fuzzy Clan Games

We provide an explicit description of the Aubin core of a fuzzy clan
game and give some insight into its geometrical shape (cf. [114] and
[115]). We start with the following
Lemma 9.8. Let v ∈ F CGN C and s ∈ F1C . Then v(e ) − v(s) ≥
N N

i∈N \C (1 − si )Di v(e ).
N

Proof. Suppose that |N \ C| = m and denote N \ C = {1, . . . , m},

C = {m + 1, . . . , n}. Let a0 , . . . , am and b1 , . . . , bm be the sequences
r
of fuzzy coalitions on N given by a0 = eN , ar = eN − (1 − sk )ek ,
k=1
br = eN − (1 − sr )er for each r ∈ {1, . . . , m}. Note that am = s ∈ F1NC ,
and ar−1 ∨ br = eN , ar−1 ∧ br = ar for each r ∈ {1, . . . , m}. Then

m


r−1   m
v(eN ) − v(s) = v a − v (ar ) ≥ (v(eN ) − v(br )), (9.1)
r=1 r=1

where the inequality follows from the submodularity property of v ap-

plied for each r ∈ {1, . . . , m}. Now, for each r ∈ {1, . . . , m}, we have
by Lemma 9.7
Dr v(eN ) ≤ (1 − sr )−1 (v(eN ) − v(eN − (1 − sr )er )),
thus obtaining
v(eN ) − v(br ) = v(eN ) − v(eN − (1 − sr )er ) ≥ (1 − sr )Dr v(eN ). (9.2)
Now, we combine (9.1) and (9.2).
132 9 Fuzzy Clan Games

Theorem 9.9. Let v ∈ F CGN C . Then

n
(i) C(v) = {x ∈ R | i=1 xi = v(eN ), 0 ≤ xi ≤ Di v(eN ) for each
n

i ∈ N \ C, 0 ≤ xi for
neach i ∈ C},N if |C| > 1;
(ii) C(v) = {x ∈ R | i=1 xi = v(e ), 0 ≤ xi ≤ Di v(eN ) for each
n

i ∈ N \ {n}, v(en ) ≤ xn }, if C = {n}.

Proof. We only prove (i).
(a) Let x ∈ C(v). Then xi = ei · x ≥ v(ei ) = 0 for each i ∈ N and
n
xi = v(eN ). Further, for each i ∈ N \ C and each ε ∈ (0, 1), we have
i=1

xi = ε−1 (eN · x − (eN − ε ei ) · x) ≤ ε−1 (v(eN ) − v(eN − ε ei )).

We use now the monotonicity property and the coordinate-wise concav-
ity property of v obtaining that limε→0 ε−1 (v(eN ) − v(eN − εei )) exists
ε>0
and this limit is equal to Di v(eN ). Hence, xi ≤ Di v(eN ), thus implying
that C(v) is a subset of the set on the right side of the equality n in (i).
(b) To prove the converse inclusion, let x ∈ Rn with i=1 xi =
v(eN ), 0 ≤ xi ≤ Di v(eN ) for each i ∈ N \ C, and 0 ≤ xi for each i ∈ C.
We have to show that the inequality s · x ≥ v(s) holds for each s ∈
[0, 1]N . First, if s ∈ [0, 1]N is such that sC = 1C , then v(s) = 0 ≤ s · x.
Now, let s ∈ [0, 1]N , with sC = 1C . Then,
  
s·x= xi + si xi = v(eN ) − (1 − si )xi
i∈C i∈N \C i∈N \C

≥ v(eN ) − (1 − si )Di v(eN ).
i∈N \C

The inequality s · x ≥ v(s) follows then from Lemma 9.8.

The Aubin core of a fuzzy clan game has an interesting geometric
shape. It is the intersection of a simplex with “hyperbands” correspond-
ing to the non-clan members. To be more precise, for fuzzy clan games,
we have C(v) = ∆(v(eN )) ∩ B1 (v) ∩ · · · ∩ Bm (v), where ∆(v(eN )) is the
n
simplex {x ∈ Rn+ | xi = v(eN )}, and for each player i ∈ {1, . . . , m},
i=1
Bi (v) = {x ∈ Rn | 0 ≤ xi ≤ Di v(eN )} is the region between the two par-
allel hyperplanes in Rn , {x ∈ Rn | xi = 0} and {x ∈ Rn | xi = Di v(eN )},
which we call the “hyperband” corresponding to i. An interesting core
element is
 
D1 v(eN ) Dm v(eN )
b(v) = ,..., , t, . . . , t ,
2 2
 9.2 Cores and Stable Sets for Fuzzy Clan Games 133

with  
−1

m
Di v(eN )
t = |C| v(e ) −
N
,
2
i=1
which corresponds to the point with a central location in this geometric
structure. Note that b(v) is in the intersection of middle-hyperplanes
of all hyperbands Bi (v), i = 1, . . . , m, and it has the property that the
coordinates corresponding to clan members are equal.
Example 9.10. For a three-person fuzzy big boss game with player 3
as the big boss and v(e3 ) = 0 the Aubin core has the shape of a
parallelogram (in the imputation set) with vertices: (0, 0, v(eN )),
(D1 v(eN ), 0, v(eN ) − D1 v(eN )), (0, D2 v(eN ), v(eN ) − D2 v(eN )),
(D1 v(eN ), D2 v(eN ), v(eN ) − D1 v(eN ) − D2 v(eN )). Note that
 
D1 v(eN ) D2 v(eN )
N  D1 v(eN ) + D2 v(eN )
b(v) = , , e −
2 2 2
is the middle point of this parallelogram.
For v ∈ CF GN we know that C(v) = C(cr(v)) (cf. Theorem 8.38(iii)).
This is not the case in general for fuzzy clan games as the next example
shows.
Example 9.11. Let N = {1, 2}, let v : [0, 1] × {0, 1} → R be given by
√
v(s1 , 1) = s1 , v(s1 , 0) = 0 for each s1 ∈ [0, 1], and let w = cr(v).
Then v is a fuzzy big boss 0 game
1 with player 2 as the big boss, and
1
C(v) = (α, 1 − α) | α ∈ 0, 2 , C(w) = {(α, 1 − α) | α ∈ [0, 1]}. So,
C(v) = C(w).
The next lemma plays a role in what follows.
Lemma 9.12. Let v ∈ F CGN C . Let t ∈ F1C and vt be the t-restricted
N

game of v. Then, for each non-clan member i ∈ car(t), Di vt (eN ) =

ti Di v(t).
Proof. We have that
Di vt (eN ) = lim ε→0 ε−1 (vt (eN ) − vt (eN − ε ei ))
ε>0
= lim ε→0 ε−1 (v(t) − v(t − εti ei )
ε>0
= ti Di v(t).
Theorem 9.13. Let v ∈ F CGN C . Then for each t ∈ F1C the Aubin core
N

C(vt ) of the t-restricted game vt is described by

134 9 Fuzzy Clan Games

(i) C(vt ) = {x ∈ Rn | xi = v(t), 0 ≤ xi ≤ ti Di v(t) for each i ∈
i∈N
N \ C, 0 ≤ xi for each
 i ∈ C}, if |C| > 1;
(ii) C(vt ) = {x ∈ Rn | xi = v(t), 0 ≤ xi ≤ ti Di v(t) for each i ∈
i∈N
N \ {n}, v(tn en ) ≤ xn }, if C = {n}.

Proof. We only prove (i). Let t ∈ F1NC , with |C| > 1. Then, by the
definition of the Aubin core of a fuzzy game, C(vt ) = {x ∈ Rn | xi =
 i∈N
vt (eN ), si xi ≥ vt (s) for each s ∈ FCN }. Since vt (eN ) = v(t) and
i∈N
since, by Proposition 9.5, vt is itself a fuzzy clan game,
 we can apply
Theorem (ii)(i), thus obtaining C(vt ) = {x ∈ R | n xi = v(t), 0 ≤
i∈N
xi ≤ Di vt (eN ) for each i ∈ N \ C, 0 ≤ xi for each i ∈ C}. Now, we
apply Lemma 9.12.

In addition to the interrelations among the different core notions

and stable sets for general fuzzy games (cf. Section 7.2) the dominance
core and the proper core of a fuzzy clan game coincide.

Theorem 9.14. Let v ∈ F CGN P

C . Then DC(v) = C (v).

Proof. From the veto-power property we have that v(ei ) = 0 for

 i ∈ N if |C|
each > 1. Then the monotonicity of v implies v(eN ) −
i∈N \car(s) v(e ) − v(s) = v(e ) − v(s) ≥ 0 for each s ∈ F . One can
i N N

easily check that in the case |C| = 1, v(eN )− i∈N \car(s) v(ei )−v(s) ≥ 0
for each s ∈ F N , too. The equality DC(v) = C P (v) follows then from
Theorem 7.12(ii).

Now, we give two examples of fuzzy clan games v to illustrate situ-

ations in which DC(v) = C(v) and DC(v) is not a stable set, respec-
tively.

Example 9.15. Let N = {1, 2} and let v : [0, 1] × {0, 1} → R be given

√
for all s1 ∈ [0, 1] by v(s1 , 1) = s1 and v(s1 , 0) = 0. This is a big
boss game with player 2 as the big boss, so C(v) = ∅. Moreover,
 as
in Example 7.16, we obtain C(v) = x ∈ I(v) | 0 ≤ x1 ≤ 12 , DC(v) =
{(x1 , x2 ) ∈ R2+ | x1 + x2 = 1}, so DC(v) = C(v). Note that I(v) =
{(x1 , x2 ) ∈ R2+ | x1 + x2 = 1} is the unique stable set.

The following example shows that DC(v) can be a proper subset of

a stable set.
 9.3 Bi-Monotonic Participation Allocation Rules 135

Example 9.16. Let N = {1, 2, 3} and v be given by v(s1 , s2 , 0) = 0 and

v(s1 , s2 , 1) = min{s1 + s2 , 1} for all (s1 , s2 ) ∈ [0, 1]2 . Then DC(v) =
{(0, 0, 1)}, and no element in I(v) is dominated by (0, 0, 1). So, DC(v)
is not a stable set. The set K a,b = {(εa, εb, 1 − ε) | 0 ≤ ε ≤ 1} when
a, b ∈ R+ with a + b = 1 is a stable set of v.

9.3 Bi-Monotonic Participation Allocation Rules

We present in this section the fuzzy counterpart of a bi-monotonic

allocation scheme (bi-mas) for total clan games (cf. Section 5.3.2). We
call the corresponding scheme a bi-monotonic participation allocation
scheme (bi-pamas) and study this kind of schemes with the help of a
compensation-sharing rule we introduce now (cf. [115]).
Let N \ C = {1, · · · , m} and C = {m + 1, . . . , n}. We introduce
for each α ∈ [0, 1]m and β ∈ ∆(C) = ∆({m + 1, . . . , n}) = {z ∈
n
Rn−m
+ , C → R whose i-th
zi = 1} an allocation rule ψ α,β : F CGN n
i=m+1
coordinate ψiα,β (v) for each v ∈ F CGNC is given by

N
αi Di v e if i ∈ {1, . . . , m} ,


N  m
N 
βi v e − k=1 αk Dk v e if i ∈ {m + 1, . . . , n} .
We call this rule the compensation-sharing rule with compensation
vector α and sharing vector β. The i-th coordinate αi of the compen-
sation vector α indicates that player i ∈ {1, . . . , m} obtains the part
αi Di v(eN ) of his marginal contribution Di v(eN ) to eN . Then, for each
i ∈ {m + 1, . . . , n}, the i-th coordinate βi of the sharing vector β de-
termines the share
 

N  m

N
βi v e − αk Dk v e
k=1

for the clan member i from what is left for the group of clan members
in eN .
Theorem 9.17. Let v ∈ F CGN
C . Then

C → R is stable (i.e. ψ
(i) ψ α,β : F CGN n α,β (v) ∈ C(v) for each v ∈

F CGC ) and additive for each α ∈ [0, 1]m and each β ∈ ∆(C);
N

(ii) C(v) = {ψ α,β (v) | α ∈ [0, 1]N \C , β ∈ ∆(C)};

(iii) the multi-function C : F CGN C →→ R which assigns to each v ∈
n

F CGC the subset C(v) of R is additive.

N n
136 9 Fuzzy Clan Games

Proof. (i) ψ α,β (pv + qw) = pψ α,β (v) + qψ α,β (w) for all v, w ∈ F CGN C
and all p, q ∈ R+ , so ψ α,β is additive on the cone of fuzzy clan games.
The stability follows from Theorem (ii).
(ii) Clearly, each ψ α,β (v) ∈ C(v). Conversely, let x ∈ C(v). Then,
according to Theorem (ii), xi ∈ [0, Di v(eN )] for each i ∈ N \ C. Hence,
for each i ∈ {1, . . . , m} there is αi ∈ [0, 1] such that xi = αi Di v(eN ).
Now, we show that

m
v(e ) −
N
αi Di v(eN ) ≥ 0. (9.3)
i=1

Note that eC ∈ F1NC is the fuzzy coalition where each non-clan member
has participation level 0 and each clan-member has participation level
1. We have
  i   i−1 
m  
v(eN ) − v(eC ) = v ek + eC − v ek + eC
i=1 k=1 k=1

m


N  m
≥ v e − v(e − e ) ≥
N i
Di v(eN )
i=1 i=1

m
≥ αi Di v(eN ),
i=1

where the first inequality follows from the DAMR-property of v by tak-

i
ing s1 = ek +eC , s2 = eN , ε1 = ε2 = 1, the second inequality follows
k=1
from Lemma 9.7 with t = eN and si = 1, and the third inequality since
Di v(eN ) ≥ 0 in view of the monotonicity property of v. Hence, (9.3)
holds.
Inequality (9.3) expresses the fact that the group of clan members
is left a non-negative amount in the grand coalition.
The fact that xi ≥ v(ei ) for each i ∈ C implies that xi ≥ 0 for each
i ∈ {m + 1, . . . , n}. But then there is a vector β ∈ ∆(C) such that
 

N  m

N
xi = βi v e − αk Dk v e
k=1

m
(take β ∈ ∆(C) arbitrarily if v(eN ) − Di v(eN ) = 0, and βi =


 
N −1 i=1
xi v eN − m i=1 αi Di v e for each i ∈ C, otherwise). Hence,
α,β
x = ψ (v).
 9.3 Bi-Monotonic Participation Allocation Rules 137

(iii) Trivially, C(v+w) ⊃ C(v)+C(w) for all v, w ∈ F CGN

C . Conversely,
let v, w ∈ F CGN C . Then

C(v + w) = {ψ α,β (v + w) | α ∈ [0, 1]N \C , β ∈ ∆(C)}

= {ψ α,β (v) + ψ α,β (w) | α ∈ [0, 1]N \C , β ∈ ∆(C)}
⊂ {ψ α,β (v) | α ∈ [0, 1]N \C , β ∈ ∆(C)}
+ {ψ α,β (w) | α ∈ [0, 1]N \C , β ∈ ∆(C)}
= C(v) + C(w),

where the equalities follow from (ii).

For fuzzy clan games the notion of bi-monotonic participation allo-

cation scheme which we introduce now plays a similar role as pamas
for convex fuzzy games (see Section 8.3).

Definition 9.18. Let v ∈ F CGN

C . A scheme (bi,t )i∈N,t∈F N is called a
1C
bi-monotonic participation allocation scheme (bi-pamas) for v if
the following conditions hold:
(i) (Stability) (bi,t )i∈N ∈ C(vt ) for each t ∈ F1NC ;
(ii) (Bi-monotonicity w.r.t. participation levels) For all s, t ∈ F1NC with
s ≤ t we have:
(ii.1) s−1 −1
i bi,s ≥ ti bi,t for each i ∈ (N \ C) ∩ car(s);
(ii.2) bi,s ≤ bi,t for each i ∈ C.

Remark 9.19. The restriction of (bi,t )i∈N,t∈F N to a crisp environment

1C
(where only the crisp coalitions are considered) is a bi-monotonic allo-
cation scheme as studied in Subsection 5.3.2.

Lemma 9.20. Let v ∈ F CGN C . Let s, t ∈ F1C with s ≤ t and let i ∈

N

car(s) be a non-clan member. Then Di v(s) ≥ Di v(t).

Proof. We have that Di v(s) = limε→0 ε−1 (v(s) − v(s − εei )) ≥

ε>0
limε→0 ε−1 (v(t) − v(t − ε ei )) = Di v(t), where the inequality follows
ε>0
from the DAMR-property of v, with ε1 = ε2 = ε.

Theorem 9.21. Let v ∈ F CGN C , with N \C = {1, . . . , m}. Then for each
α ∈ [0, 1]m and β ∈ ∆(C) = ∆({m + 1, . . . , n}) the compensation-sharing
rule ψ α,β generates a bi-pamas for v, namely ψiα,β (vt ) N
.
i∈N,t∈F1
C
138 9 Fuzzy Clan Games

Proof. We treat only the case |C| > 1. In Theorem (ii)(i) we have
proved that for each t ∈ F1NC the Aubin core  C(vt ) of the t-restricted
game vt is given by C(vt ) = {x ∈ Rn | i∈N xi = v(t), 0 ≤ xi ≤
ti Di v(t) for each i ∈ N \ C, 0 ≤ xi for each i ∈ C}. Then, for each
non-clan member i the α-based compensation (regardless of β) in the
“grand coalition” t of the t-restricted game vt is ψiα,β = αi ti Di v(t),

i ∈ {1, . . . , m}. Hence, ψiα,β = βi (v (t) − m i=1 αi ti Di v (t)) for each
i ∈ {m + 1, . . . , n}.
First, we prove that for each non-clan member i the compensation
per unit of participation level is weakly decreasing when the coalition
containing all clan members with full participation level and in which
player i is active (i.e. si > 0) becomes larger.
Let s, t ∈ F1NC with s ≤ t and i ∈ car(s) ∩ (N \C). We have

ψiα,β (vs ) = αi Di vs (eN ) = αi si Di (vs )

≥ αi si Di (vt ) = αi si (ti )−1 Di vt (eN ) = si (ti )−1 ψiα,β (vt ),
where the inequality follows from Lemma 9.20 and the second and third
equalities by Lemma 9.12. Hence, for each s, t ∈ F1NC with s ≤ t and
each non-clan member i ∈ car(s)

s−1 α,β −1 α,β

i ψi (vs ) ≥ ti ψi (vt ).

Now, denote by Rα (vt ) the α-based remainder for the clan members
in the “grand coalition” t of the t-restricted game vt . Formally,
 
Rα (vt ) = vt (eN ) − αi Di vt (eN ) = v(t) − αi Di v(t).
i∈N \C i∈N \C

First, we prove that for each s, t ∈ F1NC with s ≤ t

Rα (vt ) ≥ Rα (vs ). (9.4)
Inequality (9.4) expresses the fact that the remainder for the clan mem-
bers is weakly larger in larger coalitions (when non-clan members in-
crease their participation level).
Let s, t ∈ F1NC with s ≤ t. Then
    
 m k 
k−1
v(t) − v(s) = v s+ (ti − si )e − v s +
i
(ti − si ) e i

k=1 i=1 i=1

 
m 
k
≥ (tk − sk )Dk v s + (ti − si ) ei
k=1 i=1
 9.3 Bi-Monotonic Participation Allocation Rules 139

m 
m
≥ (tk − sk )Dk v(t) ≥ (tk − sk )αk Dk v(t),
k=1 k=1

where the first inequality follows from Lemma 9.7 and the second in-
equality from Lemma 9.20. This implies

m 
m
v(t) − tk αk Dk v(t) ≥ v(s) − sk αk Dk v(t)
k=1 k=1
m
≥ v(s) − sk αk Dk v(s),
k=1

where the last inequality follows from Lemma 9.20. So, we proved that
Rα (vt ) ≥ Rα (vs ) for all s, t ∈ F1NC with s ≤ t.
Now, note that inequality (9.4) implies that for each clan member
the individual share (of the remainder for the whole group of clan
members) in vt , that is βi Rα (vt ), is weakly increasing when non-clan
members increase their participation level.

Definition 9.22. Let v ∈ F CGN C and x ∈ C(v). We call x bi-pamas

extendable if there exists a bi-pamas (bi,t )i∈N,t∈F N such that bi,eN =
1C
xi for each i ∈ N .

In the next theorem we show that each core element of a fuzzy clan
game is bi-pamas extendable.

Theorem 9.23. Let v ∈ F CGN

C and x ∈ C(v). Then x is bi-pamas
extendable.

Proof. Let x ∈ C(v). Then, according to Theorem 9.17(ii), x is of the

form ψ α,β (veN ). Take now ψiα,β (vt ) N
, which is a bi-pamas by
i∈N,t∈F1
C
Theorem 9.21.
 Part III

Multi-Choice Games
 In a multi-choice game each player has a finite number of activity
levels to participate with when cooperating with other players. Roughly
speaking, cooperative crisp games can be seen as multi-choice games
where each player has only two activity levels: full participation and no
participation at all.
Multi-choice games were introduced in [60], [61] and extensively
studied also in [23], [24], [28], [33], [32], [40], [53], [54], [65], [81], [82],
and [88]. In this part we basically follow [23], [24], [28], and [82].
This third part of the book is organized as follows. Chapter 10
contains basic notation and notions for multi-choice games. In Chapter
11 solution concepts for multi-choice games are introduced inspired
by classical solution concepts for crisp games. In Chapter 12 balanced
multi-choice games, convex multi-choice games and multi-choice clan
games are presented and special properties of solution concepts on these
classes of games are studied.
10
Preliminaries

Let N be a non-empty finite set of players, usually of the form

{1, . . . , n}. In a multi-choice game each player i ∈ N has a finite number
of activity levels at which he or she can choose to play. In particular,
any two players may have different numbers of activity levels. The re-
ward which a group of players can obtain depends on the effort of the
cooperating players. This is formalized by supposing that each player
i ∈ N has mi + 1 activity levels at which he can play, where mi ∈ N.
We set Mi := {0, . . . , mi } as the action space of player i, where ac-
tion 0 means not participating. Elements of MN := Πi∈N Mi are called
(multi-choice) coalitions. The coalition m = (m1 , . . . , mn ) plays the
role of the grand coalition. The empty coalition (0, . . . , 0) is also de-
noted by 0. For further use we introduce the notation Mi+ := Mi \ {0}
and MN + := M \ {(0, . . . , 0)}. For s ∈ M
N N we denote by (s , k)
−i
the participation profile where all players except player i play at levels
defined by s, while player i plays at level k ∈ Mi . A particular case
is (0−i , k), where only player i is active (at level k). For s ∈ MN we
define the carrier of s by car(s) = {i ∈ N | si > 0}. Let u ∈ MN + . We
denote by MN u the subset of MN consisting of multi-choice coalitions

s ≤ u. For t ∈ MN we also need the notation Mit = {1, ..., ti } for each
+ 
i ∈ N and MN t = i∈N Mi . A characteristic function v : M
t N → R

with v(0, . . . , 0) = 0 gives for each coalition s = (s1 , . . . , sn ) ∈ MN

the worth that the players can obtain when each player i plays at level
si ∈ Mi .

Definition 10.1. A multi-choice game is a triple (N, m, v) where N

is the set of players, m ∈ (N ∪ {0})N is the vector describing the number
of activity levels for all players, and v : MN → R is the characteristic
function.
146 10 Preliminaries

If there will be no confusion, we will denote a game (N, m, v) by

v. We denote the set of all multi-choice games with player set N and
vector of activity levels m by M C N,m .
Example 10.2. Consider a large building project with a deadline and a
penalty for every day this deadline is exceeded. Obviously, the date of
completion depends on the effort of all people involved in the project:
the greater their effort the sooner the project will be completed. This
situation gives rise to a multi-choice game. The worth of a coalition
where each player works at a certain activity level is defined as minus
the penalty that is to be paid given the completion date of the project
when every player makes the corresponding effort.
Example 10.3. Suppose we are given a large company with many di-
visions, where the profits of the company depend on the performance
of the divisions. This gives rise to a multi-choice game in which the
players are the divisions and the worth of a coalition where each di-
vision functions at a certain level is the corresponding profit made by
the company.
Multi-choice games can also be seen as an appropriate analytical
tool for modeling cost allocation situations in which commodities are
indivisible goods that are only available at a certain finite number of
levels (cf. [33]).
Definition 10.4. A game v ∈ M C N,m is called simple if v(s) ∈ {0, 1}
for all s ∈ MN and v(m) = 1.
Definition 10.5. A game v ∈ M C N,m is called zero-normalized

 if
no player can gain anything by working alone, i.e. v jei = 0 for all
i ∈ N and j ∈ Mi .
Definition 10.6. A game v ∈ M C N,m is called additive if the worth
of each coalition s equals the sum of the worths of the players
 when
they
all work alone at the level they work at in s, i.e. v(s) = i∈N v si ei
for all s ∈ MN .
In most interesting economic applications of multi-choice games, the
characteristic function v is superadditive, so that it is efficient for the
players to form the grand coalition m.
Definition 10.7. A game v ∈ M C N,m is called superadditive if v(s∨
t) ≥ v(s) + v(t) for all s, t ∈ MN with s ∧ t = 0, where (s ∧ t)i :=
min {si , ti } and (s ∨ t)i := max {si , ti } for all i ∈ N .
 10 Preliminaries 147

Definition 10.8. For a game v ∈ M C N,m the zero-normalization

of v is the game

v0 that
is obtained
 by subtracting from v the additive
game a with a jei := v jei for all i ∈ N and j ∈ Mi+ .
Definition 10.9. A game v ∈ M C N,m is called zero-monotonic if its
zero-normalization is monotonic, i.e. v0 (s) ≤ v0 (t) for all s, t ∈ MN
with s ≤ t.
Definition 10.10. The subgame of v ∈ M C N,m with respect to u ∈
MN+ , vu , is defined by vu (s) := v(s) for each s ∈ Mu .
N

Definition 10.11. The marginal game of v ∈ M C N,m based on u ∈

MN −u , is defined by v −u (s) := v(s +
+ (or the u-marginal game of v), v
u) − v(u) for each s ∈ Mm−u .
N

The analogue of a crisp unanimity game in the multi-choice setting

is the notion of a minimal effort game.
Definition 10.12. The minimal effort game us ∈ M C N,m with s ∈
MN+ is defined by

1 if ti ≥ si for all i ∈ N,
us (t) :=
0 otherwise,

for all t ∈ MN .
For two sets A and B in the same vector space we set A + B =
{x + y | x ∈ A and y ∈ B}. By convention, the empty sum is zero.
N,m . We define M := {(i, j) | i ∈ N, j ∈ M } and M + :=
 Let v ∈ M C  i
(i, j) | i ∈ N, j ∈ Mi+ . A (level) payoff vector for the game v is a
function x : M → R, where, for all i ∈ N and j ∈ Mi+ , xij denotes the
increase in payoff to player i corresponding to a change of activity level
j − 1 to j by this player, and xi0 = 0 for all i ∈ N .
Let x and y be two payoff vectors for the game v. We say that x is
weakly smaller than y if for each s ∈ MN ,
 
si 
si 
X(s) := Xisi = xik ≤ yik = Yisi =: Y (s).
i∈N i∈N k=0 i∈N k=0 i∈N

Note that this does not imply that xij ≤ yij for all i ∈ N and j ∈ Mi .
The next example illustrates this point. To simplify the notation in the
example we represent a payoff vector x : M → R by a deficient matrix
[aij ] with i = 1, . . . , n and j = 1, . . . , max {m1 , . . . , mn }. In this matrix
aij := xij if i ∈ N and j ∈ Mi+ , and aij is left out (∗) if i ∈ N and
j > mi .
148 10 Preliminaries

Example 10.13. Let a multi-choice game be given with N = {1, 2},

m = (2, 1) and v ((1, 0)) = v ((0, 1)) = 1, v ((2, 0)) = 2, v ((1, 1)) = 3
and v ((2, 1)) = 5. Consider the two payoff vectors x and y defined by
2 3 2 3
12 21
x= , y= .
2∗ 2∗

Then x is weakly smaller than y, since X ((1, 0)) ≤ Y ((1, 0)), X ((1, 1))
≤ Y ((1, 1)) and X (s) ≤ Y (s) for all other s. The reason here is that
player 1 gets 3 for playing at his second level according to both payoff
vectors , while according to y player 1 gets 2 for playing at his first
level and according to x player 1 gets only 1 at the first level.

we can represent a payoff vector for a game v ∈

Alternatively,
M C N,m as a i∈N mi -dimensional vector whose coordinates are
numbered by corresponding elements of M + , where the first m1 co-
ordinates represent payoffs for successive levels of player 1, the next
m2 coordinates are payoffs for successive levels of player 2, and so on.
Finally, we introduce different notions of marginal contributions of
players to the grand coalition m in a game v ∈ M C N,m .

Definition 10.14. For each player i ∈ N , the marginal contribution

of i to m in v is wi (m, v) = v(m) − v(m−i , 0). For each i ∈ N and
j ∈ {1, . . . , mi − 1}, the marginal contribution of player i’s levels which
are higher than j to the grand coalition m in the game v is wij + (m, v) =
v(m) − v(m−i , j); wi0+ (m, v) = wi (m, v). For each i ∈ N and j ∈ Mi+ ,
the marginal contribution of i to the coalition (m−i , j) is wij (m, v) =
v(m−i , j) − v(m−i , j − 1).

We notice that for each i ∈ N the marginal contribution wi (m, v)

of player i to m in v is equal to the sum of all marginal contribu-
tions wij (m, v) of individual levels j ∈ Mi+ of i to coalition m, that is

mi
wi (m, v) = wij (m, v).
j=1
11
Solution Concepts for Multi-Choice Games

In this chapter we present extensions of solution concepts for cooper-

ative crisp games to multi-choice games. Special attention is paid to
imputations, cores and stable sets, and to solution concepts based on
the marginal vectors of a multi-choice game. Shapley-like values re-
cently introduced in the game theory literature are briefly presented.

11.1 Imputations, Cores and Stable Sets

Let v ∈  M C N,m
. A payoff vector x : M → R is called efficient if
X(m) = i∈N m i
j=1 ij = v(m) and it is called level-increase rational
x
if, for all i ∈ N and j ∈ Mi+ , xij is at least the increase in worth
that player i can obtain when he works alone

and changes

his activity
from level j − 1 to level j, i.e. xij ≥ v jei − v (j − 1) ei . Notice
that the level increase rationality property for (level) payoff vectors is
the analogue of the individual rationality property of payoff vectors for
cooperative crisp games (cf. Definition 1.27(i)).

Definition 11.1. Let v ∈ M C N,m . A payoff vector x : M → R is an

imputation of v if it is efficient and level-increase rational.

We denote the set of imputations of a game v ∈ M C N,m by I(v). It

can be easily seen that


I(v) = ∅ ⇔ v mi ei ≤ v(m). (11.1)
i∈N

Definition 11.2. The core C(v) of a game v ∈ M C N,m consists of all

x ∈ I(v) that satisfy X(s) ≥ v(s) for all s ∈ MN .
150 11 Solution Concepts for Multi-Choice Games

A notion related to the core, which is a direct generalization of the

core for traditional cooperative games, was introduced in [54].

Definition 11.3. The precore PC(v) of v ∈ M C N,m is defined by

PC(v) = {x : M → R | X(m) = v(m) and X(s) ≥ v(s) for all s ∈ MN }.

Remark 11.4. The precore PC(v) of v is a convex polyhedron with in-

finite directions which includes the set C(v). Note that precore alloca-
tions are not necessarily imputations.

Let s ∈ MN + and x, y ∈ I(v). The imputation y dominates the

imputation x via coalition s, denoted by y doms x, if Y (s) ≤ v(s) and
Yisi > Xisi for all i ∈ car(s). We say that the imputation y dominates
the imputation x if there exists s ∈ MN + such that y doms x.

Definition 11.5. The dominance core DC(v) of a game v ∈ M C N,m

consists of all x ∈ I(v) for which there exists no y such that y dominates
x.

In Theorems 11.6, 11.8 and 11.9 we deal with the relations between
the core and the dominance core of a multi-choice game.

Theorem 11.6. For each game v ∈ M C N,m , we have C(v) ⊂ DC(v).

Proof. Let x ∈ C(v) and suppose y ∈ I(v) and s ∈ MN + , such that

y doms x. Then
 
v(s) ≥ Y (s) = Yisi > Xisi = X(s) ≥ v(s),
i∈N i∈N

which clearly gives a contradiction. Therefore, x is not dominated.

Let v ∈ M C N,m be a zero-normalized game (cf. Definition 10.8) and

x a payoff vector for v. Then the condition of level increase rationality
boils down to the condition x ≥ 0. For an additive game a we have
C(a) = DC(a)
=I(a)
= {x}, where
 x : M → R is the payoff vector
with xij := a jei − a (j − 1) ei for all i ∈ N and j ∈ Mi+ . Now we
have the following

Proposition 11.7. Let v ∈ M C N,m and v0 be the zero-normalization

of v. Let

x  be a
payoff vector
 for v. Define y : M → R by yij :=
xij − v je + v (j − 1) e for all i ∈ N and j ∈ Mi+ . Then we have
i i

(i) x ∈ I(v) ⇔ y ∈ I(v0 ),

(ii) x ∈ C(v) ⇔ y ∈ C(v0 ),
 11.1 Imputations, Cores and Stable Sets 151

(iii) x ∈ DC(v) ⇔ y ∈ DC(v0 ).

We leave the proof of this proposition as an exercise to the reader.

Theorem 11.8. Let v ∈ M C N,m with DC(v) = ∅. Then C(v) =

DC(v) if and only if the zero-normalization v0 of v satisfies v0 (s) ≤
v0 (m) for all s ∈ MN .

Proof. By Proposition 11.7 it suffices to prove this theorem for zero-

normalized games. So, suppose v is zero-normalized. Further, suppose
C(v) = DC(v) and let x ∈ C(v). Then

si  
mi
v(m) = X(m) = xij + xij ≥ v(s)
i∈N j=1 i∈N j=si +1

for all s ∈ MN .
Now, suppose v(s) ≤ v(m) for all s ∈ MN . Since C(v) ⊂ DC(v)
(cf. Theorem 11.6), it suffices to prove that x ∈ / DC(v) for all x ∈
I(v) \ C(v). Let x ∈ I(v) \ C(v) and s ∈ MN + such that X(s) < v(s).
+
Define y : M → R as follows
⎧
⎨ xij + v(s)−X(s)
P if i ∈ N and j ∈ {1, . . . , si } ,
k∈N sk
yij :=
⎩ P (m −s ) if i ∈ N and j ∈ {si + 1, . . . , mi } .
v(m)−v(s)
k∈N k k

It follows readily from the definition of y that y is efficient. Since x ≥ 0,

v(s) > X(s) and v(m) ≥ v(s), it follows that y ≥ 0. Hence, y is also
level increase rational and we conclude that y ∈ I(v).
For i ∈ N and j ∈ {1, . . . , si } we have that yij > xij . Hence, Yisi >
Xisi for all i ∈ N . This and the fact that

si
v(s) − X(s)
Y (s) = X(s) +  = v(s)
k∈N sk
i∈N j=1

imply that y doms x. Hence, x ∈

/ DC(v).

Using Theorems 11.6 and 11.8 we can easily prove Theorem 11.9.
Note that this theorem also holds for cooperative crisp games, because
the class of multi-choice games contains the class of cooperative crisp
games.

Theorem 11.9. Let v ∈ M C N,m with C(v) = ∅. Then C(v) = DC(v).

152 11 Solution Concepts for Multi-Choice Games

Proof. It suffices to prove the theorem for zero-normalized games (cf.

Proposition 11.7). So, suppose that v is zero-normalized. From the first
part of the proof of Theorem 11.8 we see that the fact that C(v) = ∅
implies that v(s) ≤ v(m) for all s ∈ MN . Because C(v) ⊂ DC(v)
(cf. Theorem 11.6), we know that DC(v) = ∅. Now, Theorem 11.8
immediately implies C(v) = DC(v).
Considering Theorem 11.9 one might ask oneself if there actually
exist games where the core is not equal to the dominance core. The
answer to this question is given in Example 11.10, where we provide
a multi-choice game with an empty core and a non-empty dominance
core.
Example 11.10. Let a multi-choice game be given with N = {1, 2}, m =
(2, 1) and v ((1, 0)) = v ((0, 1)) = 0, v ((2, 0)) = 41 and v ((1, 1)) = v ((2, 1))
= 1. An imputation x should satisfy the following (in)equalities:
1
x11 + x12 + x21 = 1, x11 ≥ 0, x21 ≥ 0, x12 ≥ .
4
Hence, we obtain
2 1
3 23 13 2 3
0 4 4 4 01
I(v) = co 3 , , .
4 ∗ 0∗ 0∗
Note that for this game an imputation can only dominate another im-
putation via the coalition (1, 1) and, since x11 +x21 ≤ 34 for all x ∈ I(v),
this gives us 2 1 3 2 3 1 3
0 4
DC(v) = co 3 , 4 4 .
4 ∗ 0∗
Finally, for none of the elements x of the dominance core x11 + x21 ≥
v ((1, 1)). Since C(v) ⊂ DC(v) one obtains C(v) = ∅. Note that for the
zero-normalization v0 of v it holds that v0 ((1, 1)) = 1 > 34 = v0 ((2, 1)).
We leave it to the reader to find an example of a cooperative crisp
game for which the core is not equal to the dominance core (a game
with three players will suffice).
For the game in Example 11.10 both the core and the dominance
core are convex sets. This is generally true, as it is stated next.
Theorem 11.11. Let v ∈ M C N,m . Then the following two assertions
hold:
(i) C(v) is convex,
(ii) DC(v) is convex.
 11.1 Imputations, Cores and Stable Sets 153

Proof. We omit the proof of part (i) because it is a simple exercise. In

order to prove part (ii) it suffices to prove that DC(v) is convex if v
is zero-normalized. So, suppose that v is zero-normalized. Obviously, if
DC(v) = ∅, then it is convex. Now, suppose DC(v) = ∅. We define a
game w ∈ M C N,m by w(s) := min {v(s), v(m)} for all s ∈ MN . It can
be easily seen that
w(m) = v(m). (11.2)
We show that DC(v) = DC(w) = C(w). Since DC(v) = ∅, we know
that I(v) = ∅. Since v is zero-normalized, this implies v(m) ≥ 0 (cf.
(11.1)) and
 
 
w jei = min v jei , v(m) = 0 (11.3)
for all i ∈ N and j ∈ Mi .
Using (11.2) and (11.3) we see that I(w) = I(v).
Now, let s ∈ MN + and let x, y ∈ I(v) = I(w). Since w(s) ≤ v(s)
we see that if x doms y in w, then x doms y in v. On the other hand, if
x doms y in v, then X(s) ≤ v(s) and

mi  
mi
X(s) = xij − xij ≤ v(m)
i∈N j=1 i∈N j=si +1

and therefore X(s) ≤ w(s) and x doms y in w.

We conclude that
DC(w) = DC(v). (11.4)
This implies that DC(w) = ∅. Since w is zero-normalized (cf. (11.3))
and
w(s) = min {v(s), v(m)} ≤ v(m) = w(m),
by Theorem 11.8,
C(w) = DC(w). (11.5)
Now, (11.4), (11.5) and part (i) of this theorem immediately imply
that DC(v) is convex.

Other sets of payoff vectors for multi-choice games which are based
on the notion of domination are introduced in [81] as follows.
Let v ∈ M C N,m and 2I(v) := {A | A ⊂ I(v)}. We introduce two
maps, D : 2I(v) → 2I(v) and U : 2I(v) → 2I(v) , given for all A ⊂ I(v) by

D(A) : = {x ∈ I(v) | there exists a ∈ A that dominates x} ;

U (A) : = I(v) \ D(A).
154 11 Solution Concepts for Multi-Choice Games

The set D(A) consists of all imputations that are dominated by some
element of A. The set U (A) consists of all imputations that are undom-
inated by elements of A. Hence, DC(v) = U (I(v)).
A set A ⊂ I(v) is internally stable if elements of A do not dom-
inate each other, i.e. A ∩ D(A) = ∅, and it is externally stable if
all imputations not in A are dominated by an imputation in A, i.e.
I(v) \ A ⊂ D(A). A set A ⊂ I(v) is a stable set (cf. [78]) if it is both
internally and externally stable.
It can be easily seen that a set A ⊂ I(v) is stable if and only if A is a
fixed point of U , i.e. U (A) = A. The following theorem is an extension
towards multichoice games of Theorem 2.12.

Theorem 11.12. Let v ∈ M C N,m . Then the following two assertions

hold:
(i) Every stable set contains the dominance core as a subset;
(ii) If the dominance core is a stable set, then there are no other stable
sets.

It has been shown in [68] that there exist cooperative crisp games
without a stable set. Therefore, since all our definitions are consistent
with the corresponding definitions for cooperative crisp games, we may
conclude that multi-choice games do not always have a stable set.
In the following, we introduce the multi-choice version of the equal
division core for traditional
n games (cf. [28]). Let v ∈ M C N,m and s ∈
M . Let s1 = i=1 si be the cumulate number of levels of players
N

according to the participation profile s. Given v ∈ M C N,m and s ∈

MN + , we denote by α(s, v) the (per level) average worth of s with
respect to v, i.e.,
v(s)
α(s, v) := .
s1
Note that α(s, v) can be interpreted as a per one-unit level increase
value of coalition s.

Definition 11.13. The equal division core EDC(v) of v ∈ M C N,m

is the set {x : M → R | X(m) = v(m);
s ∈ MN
+ s.t. α(s, v) > xij for
all i ∈ car(s), j ∈ Mi+ }.

So, x ∈ EDC(v) can be seen as a distribution of the value of the

grand coalition m, where for each multi-choice coalition s, there exists
a player i with a positive participation level in s and an activity level
j ∈ Mi+ such that the payoff xij is at least as good as the equal division
share α(s, v) of v(s).
 11.2 Marginal Vectors and the Weber Set 155

The next theorem copes with the relation between the equal division
core of a game v ∈ M C N,m and the precore of that game.
Theorem 11.14. Let v ∈ M C N,m . Then PC(v) ⊂ EDC(v).
Proof. We show that x ∈ / EDC(v) implies x ∈ / PC(v). Suppose x ∈ /
EDC(v). Then there exists s ∈ MN + such that α(s, v) > xij for all
i ∈ car(s) and j ∈ {1, ..., si }. We obtain

si
Xisi = xij < si α(s, v),
j=1

implying that
  
X(s) = Xisi < si α(s, v) = α(s, v) si = v(s).
i∈N i∈N i∈N

So, x ∈
/ PC(v).

We notice that the inclusion relation in Theorem 11.14 may be strict,

as in the case of cooperative crisp games.

11.2 Marginal Vectors and the Weber Set

Let v ∈ M C N,m . Suppose the grand coalition m = (m1 , . . . , mn ) forms

step by step, starting from the coalition (0, . . . , 0) and where in each
step the level
 of one of the players is increased by 1. So, in particular,
there are i∈N mi steps in this procedure. Now assign for every player
to each level the marginal value that is created when the player reaches
that particular level from the level directly below. This is formalized
as follows.
 An admissible
 ordering (for v) is a bijection σ : M + → {1, . . . ,
i∈N mi satisfying σ ((i, j)) < σ ((i, j + 1)) for all i ∈ NPand j ∈
( i∈N mi )!
{1, . . . , mi − 1}. The number of admissible orderings for v is Πi∈N (mi !) .
The set of all admissible orderingsfor a game
 v willbe denoted by Ξ(v).
Now let σ ∈ Ξ (v) and let k ∈ 1, . . . , i∈N mi . The coalition that
is present after k steps according to σ, denoted by sσ,k , is given by

sσ,k
i := max ({j ∈ Mi | σ ((i, j)) ≤ k} ∪ {0})

for all i ∈ N , and the marginal vector wσ : M → R corresponding to σ

is defined by
156 11 Solution Concepts for Multi-Choice Games

σ
wij := v sσ,σ((i,j)) − v sσ,σ((i,j))−1

for all i ∈ N and j ∈ Mi+ .

In general the marginal vectors of a multi-choice game are not nec-
essarily imputations, but for zero-monotonic games they are.
Theorem 11.15. Let v ∈ M C N,m be zero-monotonic. Then for every
σ ∈ Ξ(v) the marginal vector corresponding to σ is an imputation of v.
In the sequel we consider the convex hull of the marginal vectors of
a multi-choice game, i.e., its Weber set.
Definition 11.16. ([82]) The Weber set W (v) of a game v ∈ M C N,m
is defined as
W (v) := co {wσ | σ ∈ Ξ(v)} .
The next theorem shows a relation between the core C(v) and the
Weber set W (v) of a multi-choice game v.
Theorem 11.17. Let v ∈ M C N,m and x ∈ C(v). Then there is a
y ∈ W (v) that is weakly smaller than x.
Proof. It will be actually proved that for each game v ∈ M C N,m and
"
each x ∈ C(v) there is a vector y ∈ W (v) such that y is weakly smaller
"
than x, where C(v) "
is a core catcher of C(v) C(v) ⊂ C(v) given by
 
x ∈ I(v) | X(s) ≥ v(s) ∀s ∈ MN , xi0 = 0 ∀i ∈ N .

We will do so by induction on the number of levels involved in the game

v. Two basic steps, (i) and (ii), can be distinguished.
(i) Let v ∈ M C {1},m with m1 ∈ N being arbitrary. Then there is
only one marginal vector y, which satisfies



y1j = v je1 − v (j − 1) e1
"
for all j ∈ {1, . . . , m1 }. Suppose x ∈ C(v). Then




X m1 e1 = v m1 e1 = Y m1 e1

and



X je1 ≥ v je1 = Y je1 for all j ∈ {1, . . . , m1 } .
Hence, y is weakly smaller than x.
(ii) Let v ∈ M C {1,2},m with m = (1, 1). Then there are two marginal
vectors,
 11.2 Marginal Vectors and the Weber Set 157
2
1 3 2
1 
3
2 − v e2
1 v
e 
 and y =
2 v e

+ e
y = .
v e1 + e2 − v e1 v e2

"
Suppose x ∈ C(v). Then

1


x11 ≥ v e , x21 ≥ v e2 and x11 + x21 = v e1 + e2 .

Hence, x is a convex combination of y 1 and y 2 . We conclude that

x ∈ W (v).
Now, we focus on the induction
 step. Let v ∈ M C N,m be such that
|{i ∈ N | mi > 0}| ≥ 2 and i∈N mi > 2. Suppose we already proved
 
the statement for all games v ∈ M C N ,m with i∈N mi < i∈N mi .
"
Since, obviously, C(v) and W (v) are both convex sets, it suffices to
prove that for all extreme points x of C(v) " we can find y ∈ W (v)
such that y is weakly smaller than x. So, let x be an extreme point of
"
C(v). Then let t ∈ MN be such that 1 ≤ i∈N ti ≤ i∈N mi − 1 and
X(t) = v(t). The game v can be split up into a game u with vector
of activity levels t and a game w with vector of activity levels m − t,
defined by
u(s) := v(s) for all s ∈ MN with s ≤ t
and

w(s) := v(s + t) − v(t) for all s ∈ MN with s ≤ m − t.

The payoff x can be also split up into two parts,

xu : {(i, j) | i ∈ N, j ∈ {0, . . . , ti }} → R

and
xw : {(i, j) | i ∈ N, j ∈ {0, . . . , mi − ti }} → R
defined by

xuij := xij for all i ∈ N and j ∈ {0, . . . , ti }

and 
xi,j+ti if i ∈ N and j ∈ {1, . . . , mi − ti } ,
xw :=
ij 0 if i ∈ N and j = 0.
"
Now, xu ∈ C(u) because X u (t) = X(t) = v(t) = u(t) and X u (s) =
X(s) ≥ v(s) = u(s) for all s ∈ MN with s ≤ t. Further, xw ∈ C(w)"
because
158 11 Solution Concepts for Multi-Choice Games
i −ti
 m
X w (m − t) = xi,j+ti
i∈N j=1
= X(m) − X(t) = v(m) − v(t) = w(m − t)

and

si
w
X (s) = xi,j+ti
i∈N j=1
= X(s + t) − X(t) ≥ v(s + t) − v(t) = w(s)

for all s ∈ MN with s ≤ m − t.

Using the induction hypothesis, one can find y u ∈ W (u) such that
y u is weakly smaller than xu , and one can find y w ∈ W (w) such that y w
is weakly smaller than xw . Then y := (y u , y w ) is weakly smaller than
x := (xu , xw ). Hence, the only thing to prove still is that y ∈ W (v).
For the payoff vector

z 1 : {(i, j) | i ∈ N, j ∈ {0, . . . , ti }} → R

for u and the payoff vector

z 2 : {(i, j) | i ∈ N, j ∈ {0, . . . , mi − ti }} → R


for w one defines the payoff vector z 1 , z 2 : M → R for v as follows:
 1

1 2 zij if i ∈ N and j ∈ {0, . . . , ti } ,
z , z ij := 2 if i ∈ N and j ∈ {t + 1, . . . , m } .
zij i i

We prove that

 
(W (u), W (w)) := z 1 , z 2 | z 1 ∈ W (u), z 2 ∈ W (w)

is a subset of W (v). Note that (W (u), W (w)) and W (v) are convex sets.
Hence, it suffices to prove that
the extreme points of (W (u), W (w)) are
elements of W (v). Suppose z 1 , z 2 is an extreme point of (W (u),W (w)).
Then, obviously, z 1 is a marginal vector of u and z 2 is a marginal vector
of w. Let σ ∈ Ξ(u) and ρ ∈ Ξ(w) be such that z 1 is the marginal vector
of u corresponding 2

1 to2 σ and z is the marginal vector of w correspond-
ing to ρ. Then z , z is the marginal vector of v corresponding to the
admissible ordering τ for v defined by τ ((i, j)) := σ ((i, j)) if i ∈ N
and j ∈ {1, . . . , ti }, and τ ((i, j)) := ρ ((i, j − ti )) + i∈N ti if i ∈ N
and j ∈ {ti
+ 1, . . . , mi }.
Hence, z 1 , z 2 ∈ W (v) and this completes the proof.
 11.3 Shapley-like Values 159

11.3 Shapley-like Values

It turns out that there is more than one reasonable extension of the
definition of the Shapley value for cooperative crisp games to multi-
choice games. First, we present the solution proposed in [82] where the
average of the marginal vectors of a multi-choice game is considered to
obtain an extension of the Shapley value for crisp games to multi-choice
games.

Definition 11.18. ([82]) Let v ∈ M C N,m . Then the Shapley value

Φ(v) is the average of all marginal vectors of v, in formula
Πi∈N (mi !)  σ
Φ(v) :=
  w .
i∈N mi ! σ∈Ξ(v)

The value Φ introduced in Definition 11.18 can be characterized by

additivity, the carrier property and the hierarchical strength property.
The hierarchical strength hs ((i, j)) in s ∈ MN + with
+ of (i, j) ∈ M
j ≤ si is defined by the average number of σ ∈ Ξ(v) in which (i, j) is
s-maximal, i.e. hs ((i, j)) equals
# #
Πi∈N (mi !) ## #

  # σ ∈ Ξ(v) | σ ((i, j)) = max σ ((k, l)) ## .
i∈N mi ! (k,l):l≤sk

+
• An allocation rule γ : M C N,m → RM satisfies the hierarchical
strength property if for each v ∈ M C N,m which is a multiple of a
minimal effort game, say v = βus with s ∈ MN + and β ∈ R, we
have that for all (i1 , j1 ) , (i2 , j2 ) ∈ M +

γi1 ,j1 (v) · hs (i2 , j2 ) = γi2 ,j2 (v) · hs (i1 , j1 ) .

Next, the additivity and the carrier property of an allocation rule

+
γ : M C N,m → RM are introduced as follows.
• Additivity property: For all v, w ∈ M C N,m

γ (v + w) = γ (v) + γ(w).

• Carrier property: If t is a carrier of v ∈ M C N,m , i.e. v(s) = v (s ∧ t)

for all s ∈ MN , then

 
ti
γij (v) = v(m).
i∈car(t) j=1
160 11 Solution Concepts for Multi-Choice Games

The reader is referred to [49] for the proof of the following

Theorem 11.19. The value Φ is the unique allocation rule on M C N,m

satisfying the additivity property, the carrier property and the hierar-
chical strength property.

Now, following [81] we will focus on Shapley-like values introduced

in [61]. These values were defined by using weights on the actions,
thereby extending ideas of weighted Shapley values (cf. [63]).
When introducing the values of [61], we must restrict ourselves to
multi-choice games where all players have the same number of activity
levels. So, let M C∗N,m denote the subclass of M C N,m with the property
that mi = mj for all i, j ∈ N . For v ∈ M C∗N,m set m " := mi (i ∈
N arbitrarily) and let for each j ∈ {0, . . . , m}
" a weight wj ∈ R be
associated with level j such that higher levels have larger weights, i.e.
0 = w0 < w1 < . . . < wm e . The value Ψ is defined with respect to the
weights w.

Definition 11.20. ([61]) For s ∈ MN w

+ , the value Ψ (us ) of the mini-
mal effort game us is given by
 P wj
w if j = si ,
Ψij (us ) = i∈N wsi
0 otherwise,
for all i ∈ N and j ∈ Mi .

The definition of the Shapley-like value Ψ w (v) of an arbitrary game

v ∈ M C∗N,m is based on the expression of v in terms of related minimal
effort games (cf. Theorem 11.21) by means of the dividends of that
multi-choice game. The definition of dividends for crisp games (cf. [55])
can be extended to multi-choice games as follows: for v ∈ M C N,m ,

v (0) : = 0 (11.6)

v (s) : = v(s) − v (t).
t≤s,t=s

Theorem 11.21. The minimal effort games us ∈ M C N,m , s ∈ MN +,

form a basis of the space M C N,m . Moreover, for v ∈ M C N,m it holds
that 
v= v (s)us .
s∈MN
+
 11.3 Shapley-like Values 161

Then, the value Ψ w (v) of an arbitrary game v ∈ M C∗N,m is deter-

mined by 
Ψ w (v) := v (s)Ψ w (us ) .
s∈MN
+

An axiomatic characterization of this value has been provided in

[61], using additivity, the carrier property, the minimal effort property
and a fourth axiom that explicitly uses weights. We describe the new
+
properties of an allocation rule γ : M C N,m → RM below.
• Minimal effort property: If v ∈ M C N,m and t ∈ MN are such that
v(s) = 0 for all s with s  t, then for all i ∈ N and j < ti

γij (v) = 0.

• Weight property: Suppose that the weights 0 = w0 < w1 < . . . <

N,m
wme are given. If a game v ∈ M C∗ is a multiple of a minimal
effort game, say v = βus , s ∈ MN , then for all i, j ∈ N

γi,si (v) · wsj = γj,sj (v) · wsi .

The reader is referred to [61] for the proof of the following

Theorem 11.22. Consider the class M C∗N,m . Let weights 0 = w0 <

. . . < wm w is the unique allocation rule on M C N,m
e be given. Then Ψ ∗
satisfying additivity, the carrier property, the minimal effort property
and the weight property.

Remark 11.23. The hierarchical strength property used to axiomati-

cally characterize the value Φ introduced in Definition 11.18 incorpo-
rates the minimal effort property and the weight property, where the
difference lies in the fact that the ’weights’ that are used are now de-
termined by the numbers of the activity levels of the players (cf. [49]).

An interesting question that arises now is whether the value Φ is

related to the values Ψ w . We provide an example of a multichoice game
for which the value Φ is not equal to any of the values Ψ w .

Example 11.24. Let v ∈ M C {1,2},m with m = (3, 3) and let v = u(1,2) +

u(3,1) + u(2,3) . There are 20 admissible orderings for this game. Some
calculation shows that
2 4 4 19 3
Φ(v) = 20 20 20
1 16 16 .
20 20 20
162 11 Solution Concepts for Multi-Choice Games

Now, suppose we have weights w1 < w2 < w3 associated with the

activity levels. Then the corresponding value Ψ w is
2 w1 w2 w3 3
w
Ψ (v) = w 1 +w 2 w 2 +w 3 w 1 +w3 .
w1 w2 w3
w1 +w3 w1 +w2 w2 +w3

Hence, if we want to find weights w such that Ψ w (v) = Φ(v), then these
weights should satisfy the conditions 0 < w1 < w2 < w3 , w2 = 4w1 ,
w3 = 4w2 and w3 = 19w1 . Clearly, it is impossible to find weights
satisfying all these conditions.

The Shapley value Φ was further studied in [33] where the focus is
on players’ total payoffs instead of level payoff vectors. It is shown there
that Φ corresponds to the discrete Aumann-Shapley method proposed
in [75], and that the Aumann-Shapley value for games with a continuum
of players (cf. [7]) can be obtained as the limit of multi-choice values
Φ for admissible sequences of multi-choice games that converge to the
continuum game.
Another extension of the Shapley value for crisp games to multi-
choice games, the Shapley value Θ, was introduced in [40]. In [65] it
is proved that Θ can be seen as the (level) payoff vector of average
marginal contributions of the elements in MN + and it is shown via
an example that in some situations Θ seems to be more appropriate
than Φ. The Shapley value Θ was axiomatically characterized in [81]
by extending the characterization for the Shapley value for crisp games
provided in [128]. Several other characterizations of Θ were provided
in [65].
A fourth Shapley-like value for multi-choice games is the egalitarian
multi-choice solution ε introduced in [88]. We notice that this Shapley
value makes incomplete use of information regarding the characteristic
function. Specifically, the solution ε is defined using the values of those
multi-choice coalitions where only one player acts at an intermediary
level, while the other players are either inactive (i.e. their participation
level is 0) or act at their maximum participation level. This value was
axiomatically characterized in [88] by the properties of efficiency, zero
contribution, additivity, anonymity, and level-symmetry.
Finally, we refer the reader to [53] for other reasonable extensions
of the definition of the Shapley value for crisp games to multi-choice
games.
 11.4 The Equal Split-Off Set for Multi-Choice Games 163

11.4 The Equal Split-Off Set for Multi-Choice Games

In this section we focus on the multi-choice version of the equal split-

off set for traditional cooperative games (cf. Section 4.2). Specifically,
the equal split-off set ESOS (v) of a multi-choice game v ∈ M C N,m
is obtained by a procedure at each step of which one of the multi-
choice coalitions with the highest (per one-unit level increase) average
value is chosen and the corresponding levels divide equally the worth
of that coalition. We note that such multi-choice coalitions need not be
the largest coalitions with the highest average worth. Let us formally
describe this algorithm which will generate multi-choice equal split-off
allocations.
Step 1: Consider m1 := m, v1 := v. Select an element in
arg maxs∈MN \{0} α(s, v1 ) with the maximal cumulate number of levels,
m1
1
say s1 . Define eij := α(s1 , v1 ) for each i ∈ car(s1 ) and j ∈ Mis . If
s1 = m, then stop; otherwise go on.
Step k: Suppose that s1 , s2 , ..., sk−1 have been defined recursively
based on the (level) equal share principle and s1 + s2 + ... + sk−1 =
m. Define a new multi-choice game  with player set N and maximal
participation profile mk := m− k−1 i=1 m i , and v (s) := v
k k−1 (s+s
k−1 )−

vk−1 (sk−1 ) for each multi-choice coalition s ∈ MN mk

. Select an element
sk in arg maxs∈MN \{0} α(s, vk ) and define eij := α(sk , vk ) for all i ∈
mk
k−1 p k !
p
car(s ) and j ∈
k
p=1 si + 1, . . . , p=1 si .
In a finite number of steps, say K, where K ≤ |M + |, the algorithm
will end, and the constructed (level) payoff vector (eij )(i,j)∈M + is called
an equal split-off allocation, denoted by e(v), of the multi-choice game
v.

Definition 11.25. The equal split-off set ESOS(v) of v ∈ M C N,m is

the set consisting of all equal split-off allocations e(v).

Remark 11.26. Note that the above described multi-choice version of

the Dutta-Ray algorithm determines in K steps for each v ∈ M C N,m a
sequence of (per one-unit level increase) average values α1 , α2 , . . . , αK
with αk := α(sk , vk ) for each k ∈ {1, . . . , K}, and a sequence of multi-
choice coalitions in M+N , which we denote by t1 := s1 , t2 := s1 + s2 ,
k 1 k K 1 K
%...,0 t 1 := s K+
& . . . + s ,0 ..., t := s + . . . + s = m. Thus, a path
t ,t ,...,t , with t = 0 from 0 to m is obtained, to which we
can associate a suitable ordered partition T 1 , T 2 , . . . , T K of M , such
that for all k ∈ {1, . . . , K}, T k := {(i, j) | i ∈ car(tk − tk−1 ), j ∈
164 11 Solution Concepts for Multi-Choice Games

{tk−1
i + 1, . . . , tki }, where for each (i, j) ∈ T k , eij = αk , and the coali-
tion t − tk−1 is the maximal participation profile in the ”box” T k with
k

average worth αk . Note that each other participation profile in T k can

be expressed as s ∧ tk − s ∧ tk−1 + tk−1 , where s ∈ MN + . Clearly, the
average worth of such a participation profile is weakly smaller than
αk . Since in each step of the algorithm more than one coalition with
maximal average worth might exist, each choice of such coalition will
generate a suitable ordered partition. Notice that some αk might coin-
cide.
The next example illustrates the Dutta-Ray algorithm for multi-
choice games.
Example 11.27. Consider the game v ∈ M C {1,2},m with m = (2, 1),
v(0, 0) = 0, v(1, 0) = 3, v(2, 0) = 4, v(0, 1) = 2, v(1, 1) = 8, v(2, 1) =
10. The game is convex and we apply the above described Dutta-Ray
algorithm. In Step 1, α1 = 4, t1 = s1 = (1, 1), and we have e11 = e21 =
4. In Step 2, α2 = 2, t2 = (1, 1) + (1, 0) and we have e12 = 2. We obtain
e(v) = (4, 2, 4). Note that α1 > α2 . This is true in general, as we show
in Proposition 11.28.
vk (s)
Proposition 11.28. Let v ∈ M C N,m and αk = maxs∈MN \{0} s1 be
mk
the (level) equal share determined in Step k of the Dutta-Ray algorithm.
Then αk ≥ αk+1 for all k ∈ {1, . . . , K − 1}.
Proof. By definition of vk and αk , and in view of Remark 11.26, we
have
v(tk ) − v(tk−1 ) v(tk+1 ) − v(tk−1 )
≥ .
tk − tk−1 1 tk − tk−1 1 + tk+1 − tk 1
By adding and subtracting v(tk ) in the numerator of the right-hand
term, we obtain
v(tk ) − v(tk−1 ) v(tk+1 ) − v(tk ) + v(tk ) − v(tk−1 )
≥ .
tk − tk−1 1 tk − tk−1 1 + tk+1 − tk 1
This inequality is equivalent to
(v(tk ) − v(tk−1 ))tk − tk−1 1 + (v(tk ) − v(tk−1 ))tk+1 − tk 1
≥ (v(tk+1 ) − v(tk ))tk − tk−1 1 + (v(tk ) − v(tk−1 ))tk − tk−1 1 ,
which is, in turn, equivalent to
(v(tk ) − v(tk−1 ))tk+1 − tk 1 ≥ (v(tk+1 ) − v(tk ))tk − tk−1 1 .
Remark 11.29. In a straightforward way by following the proof of Theo-
rem 4.7 we can show that ESOS (v) ⊂ EDC (v) for v ∈ M C N,m being
superadditive.
12
Classes of Multi-Choice Games

12.1 Balanced Multi-Choice Games

12.1.1 Basic Characterizations

In [82] a notion of balancedness for multi-choice games is introduced

and a theorem in the spirit of Theorem 2.4 is proved, which we present
in the following.

Definition 12.1. A game v ∈ M C N,m is called balanced if for all

maps λ : MN
+ → R+ satisfying

λ(s)ecar(s) = eN (12.1)
s∈MN
+


it holds that s∈MN λ(s)v0 (s) ≤ v0 (m), where v0 is the zero-normaliza-
+
tion of v.

Note that this definition coincides with the familiar definition of bal-
ancedness for cooperative crisp games v ∈ M C N,m with m = (1, . . . , 1)
(cf. Definition 1.19).
The next theorem is an extension to multi-choice games of a theorem
proved in [16] and [103] which gives a necessary and sufficient condition
for the nonemptiness of the core of a game.

Theorem 12.2. Let v ∈ M C N,m . Then C(v) = ∅ if and only if v is

balanced.

Proof. It suffices to prove the theorem for zero-normalized games.

Suppose v is zero-normalized, C(v) = ∅ and x ∈ C(v). Then we
define a payoff vector y : M + → R by
166 12 Classes of Multi-Choice Games

0 if i ∈ N and j ∈ {2, . . . , mi } ,
yij := mi
l=1 xil if i ∈ N and j = 1.

Then, obviously, y ∈ C(v). Further, one can identify y with the vector
(y11 , . . . , yn1 ). This proves that C(v) = ∅ if and only if there exist
z1 , . . . , zn ∈ R+ such that

zi = v(m) (12.2)
i∈N

and 
zi ≥ v(s) (12.3)
i∈car(s)

for all s ∈ MN0 .

Obviously, there exist z1 , . . . , zn ∈ R+ satisfying (12.2) and (12.3) if
and only if for all i ∈ N and all s ∈ MN + we have
⎧ ⎫
⎨  ⎬
v(m) = min zi | zi ∈ R, zi ≥ v(s) . (12.4)
⎩ ⎭
i∈N i∈car(s)

From the duality theorem of linear programing theory (cf. Theorem

1.33) we know that (12.4) is equivalent to
⎧ ⎫
⎪
⎨  ⎪
⎬
v(m) = max λ(s)v(s) | (12.1) holds and λ(s) ≥ 0 . (12.5)
⎪
⎩s∈MN ⎪
⎭
+

It can be easily seen that (12.5) is equivalent to v being balanced.

The rest of this section deals with multi-choice flow games arising
from flow situations with committee control and their relations with
balanced multi-choice games. Our presentation of the results is accord-
ing to [82]. Using multi-choice games to model flow situations with
committee control allows one to require a coalition to make a certain
effort in order to be allowed to use the corresponding arcs, for example
to do a necessary amount of maintenance of the used arcs. Flow situa-
tions with committee control generate either crisp flow games when the
control games on the arcs are crisp games or they generate multi-choice
games when the control games on the arcs are multi-choice games. For
an introduction to crisp flow games we refer the reader to [64].
Let N be a set of players and let m ∈ (N ∪ {0})N . A flow situa-
tion consists of a directed network with two special nodes called the
 12.1 Balanced Multi-Choice Games 167

source and the sink. For each arc there are a capacity constraint and
a constraint with respect to the allowance to use that arc. If l is an
arc in the network and w is the (simple) control game for arc l, then a
coalition s is allowed to use arc l if and only if w(s) = 1. The capacity
of an arc l in the network is denoted by cl ∈ (0, ∞). The flow game
corresponding to a flow situation assigns to a coalition s the maximal
flow that coalition s can send through the network from the source to
the sink.
For cooperative crisp games it was shown in [64] that a nonnegative
cooperative crisp game is totally balanced if and only if it is a flow
game corresponding to a flow situation in which all arcs are controlled
by a single player (cf. Theorem 5.4). The corresponding definitions of
a dictatorial simple game and of a totally balanced game for the multi-
choice case are given below.

Definition 12.3. A simple game v ∈ M C N,m is called dictatorial if

there exist i ∈ N and j ∈ Mi+ such that v(s) = 1 if and only if si ≥ j
for all s ∈ MN +.

Definition 12.4. A game v ∈ M C N,m is called totally balanced if

for every s ∈ MN
+ the subgame vs is balanced, where vs (t) := v(t) for
all t ∈ M with t ≤ s.
N

However, as exemplified in [82], one cannot generalize Theorem 5.4

to multi-choice games. In order to reach balancedness, we will restrict
ourselves to zero-normalized games. Then we have the following

Theorem 12.5. Consider a flow situation in which all control games

are zero-normalized and balanced. Then the corresponding flow game
v ∈ M C N,m is non-negative, zero-normalized and balanced.

Proof. It is obvious that v is zero-normalized and non-negative. Now,

in order to prove that v is balanced, let L = {l1 , . . . , lp } be a set of arcs
with capacities c1 , . . . , cp and control games w1 , . . . , wp such that every
directed path from
 the source to the sink contains an arc in L and the
capacityof L, pr=1 cr , is minimal. From a theorem in [48] we find that
v(m) = pr=1 cr and v(s) ≤ pr=1 cr wr (s) for all s ∈ MN . 
Now, let xr ∈ C (wr ) for all r ∈ {1, . . . , p}. Define y := pr=1 cr xr .
Then
 p p
r
Y (m) = cr X (m) = cr wr (m) = v(m) (12.6)
r=1 r=1
and
168 12 Classes of Multi-Choice Games


p 
p
Y (s) = cr X (s) ≥
r
cr wr (s) ≥ v(m), (12.7)
r=1 r=1

for all s ∈ MN .
Now, let i ∈ N and j ∈ Mi+ . Since cr ≥ 0 and xrij ≥ 0 for all
r ∈ {1, . . . , p} it easily follows that

p
yij = cr xrij ≥ 0. (12.8)
r=1

Now (12.6), (12.7) and (12.8) imply y ∈ C(v). Hence, v is balanced.

We can prove the converse of Theorem 12.5 using
Theorem 12.6. Each non-negative zero-normalized balanced multi-
choice game is a non-negative linear combination of zero-normalized
balanced simple games.
Proof. Let v ∈ M C N,m be non-negative, zero-normalized and balanced.
We provide an algorithm to write v as a non-negative linear combina-
tion of zero-normalized balanced simple games.
Suppose v = 0 and let x ∈ C(v). Let k ∈ N be the smallest integer
in
{i ∈ N | ∃j ∈ N s.t. xij > 0}
 
and let l be the smallest integer in j ∈ Mk+ | xkj > 0 .
Further, let
  
β := min xkl , min v(s) | s ∈ MN + , sk ≥ l, v(s) > 0

and let w be defined by


1 if sk ≥ l and v(s) > 0,
w(s) :=
0 otherwise,

for each s ∈ MN . Then w is a zero-normalized balanced simple game

and β > 0.
Let v := v − βw and let x : M → R be defined by

xkl − β if i = k and j = l,
xij :=
xij otherwise.

Note that v is a non-negative zero-normalized game, v = v + βw,

and x ∈ C(v).
Further,
 12.1 Balanced Multi-Choice Games 169

|{(i, j) ∈ M } | xij > 0| < |{(i, j) ∈ M } | xij > 0|

or # # # #
# s ∈ MN | v(s) > 0 # < # s ∈ MN | v(s) > 0 # .

If v = 0 we follow the same procedure with v in the role of v and x

in the role of x. It can be easily seen that if we keep on repeating this
procedure, then after finitely many steps we will obtain the zero game.
Suppose this happens after q steps. Then we have found β1 , . . . , βq > 0
and zero-normalized balanced simple games w1 , . . . , wq such that v =
 q
r=1 βr wr .

Theorem 12.7. Let v ∈ M C N,m be non-negative, zero-normalized and

balanced. Then v is a flow game corresponding to a flow situation in
which all control games are zero-normalized and balanced.

Proof. According to Theorem 12.6 we can find k ∈ N, β1 , . . . , βk >

0 and zero-normalized balanced games w1 , . . . , wk such that v =
k
r=1 βr wr .
Consider now a flow situation with k arcs, where for each r ∈
{1, . . . , k} the capacity restriction of arc lr is given by βr and the control
game of lr is wr . It can be easily seen that the flow game corresponding
to the described flow situation is the game v.

Combining Theorems 12.5 and 12.7 we obtain

Corollary 12.8. Let v ∈ M C N,m be non-negative and zero-normalized.

Then v is balanced if and only if v is a flow game corresponding to a flow
situation in which all control games are zero-normalized and balanced.

12.1.2 Totally Balanced Games and Monotonic Allocation

Schemes

The notion of level-increase monotonic allocation schemes (limas) for

totally balanced multi-choice games is introduced in [28] and has been
inspired by the concept of population monotonic allocation schemes for
cooperative crisp games (cf. [107]).

Definition 12.9. Let v ∈ M C N,m be totally balanced and t ∈ MN

+ . We
t∈MN +
say that a = [atij ]i∈N,j∈M t is a level-increase monotonic allocation
i
scheme (limas) if
(i) at ∈ C(vt ) for all t ∈ MN
+ (stability condition), and
170 12 Classes of Multi-Choice Games

(ii) asij ≤ atij for all s, t ∈ MN

+ with s ≤ t, for all i ∈ car(s) and for all
j ∈ Mis (level-increase monotonicity condition).

Remark 12.10. The level-increase monotonicity condition implies that,

if the scheme is used as regulator for the (level) payoff distributions
in the multi-choice subgames players are paid for each one-unit level
increase (weakly) more in larger coalitions than in smaller coalitions.

Total balancedness of a multi-choice game is a necessary condition

for the existence of a limas. A sufficient condition is the convexity of
the game as we show in Section 12.2.2.

12.2 Convex Multi-Choice Games

12.2.1 Basic Characterizations

A game v ∈ M C N,m is called convex if

v (s ∧ t) + v (s ∨ t) ≥ v(s) + v(t) (12.9)

for all s, t ∈ MN .
For a convex game v ∈ M C N,m it holds that

v (s + t) − v(s) ≥ v (s + t) − v (s) (12.10)

for all s, s, t ∈ MN satisfying s ≤ s, si = si for all i ∈ car(t) and

s + t ∈ MN . This can be obtained by putting s and s + t in the roles of
s and t, respectively, in expression (12.9). In fact, every game satisfying
expression (12.10) is convex.
Relation (12.10) can be seen as the multi-choice extension of the
property of increasing marginal contributions for coalitions in tradi-
tional convex games. As a particular case, specifically when t is of the
form (0−i , ti ) with ti ∈ Mi+ , we obtain that the property of increasing
marginal contributions for players holds true for convex multi-choice
games as well, even at a more refined extent, because players can grad-
ually increase there participation levels. For other characterizations of
convex multi-choice games we refer to [28].
In the following we denote the class of convex multi-choice games
with player set N and maximal participation profile m by CM C N,m .
For these games we can say more about the relation between the core
and the Weber set.

Theorem 12.11. Let v ∈ CM C N,m . Then W (v) ⊂ C(v).

 12.2 Convex Multi-Choice Games 171

Proof. Note that convexity of both C(v) and W (v) implies that it suf-
fices to prove that wσ ∈ C(v) for all σ ∈ Ξ(v). So, let σ ∈ Ξ(v).
Efficiency of wσ follows immediately from its definition. That wσ is
level increase rational follows directly when we use expression (12.10).
Now, let s ∈ MN . The ordering σ induces  an admissible
  ordering
σ  : {(i, j) | i ∈ N, j ∈ {1, . . . , si }} → 1, . . . , i∈N si in an obvious
 
way. Since sσ ,σ ((i,j)) ≤ sσ,σ((i,j)) for all i ∈ N and j ∈ {1, . . . , si }, the
convexity of v implies wij σ  ≤ w σ for all i ∈ N and j ∈ {1, . . . , s }.
ij i
Hence,
 si  si
σ
σ
wij ≥ wij = v(s).
i∈N j=0 i∈N j=0

We conclude that wσ ∈ C(v).

In contrast with convex crisp games for which C(v) = W (v) holds
(cf. Theorem 5.10(v)), the converse of Theorem 12.11 is not true for
convex multi-choice games. We provide an example of a game v ∈
CM C N,m with W (v) ⊂ C(v), W (v) = C(v).

Example 12.12. Let v ∈ CM C {1,2},m with m = (2, 1) and v ((1, 0)) =

v ((2, 0)) = v ((0, 1)) = 0, v ((1, 1)) = 2 and v ((2, 1)) = 3. There are
three marginal vectors,
2 3 2 3 2 3
00 01 21
w1 = , w2 = , w3 = .
3∗ 2∗ 0∗

Some
2 3 calculation shows that C(v) = co {w1 , w2 , w3 , x}, where x =
30
. We see that x ∈
/ co {w1 , w2 , w3 } = W (v).
0∗
The core element x in Example 12.12 seems to be too large: note
that w3 is weakly smaller than x and w3 is still in the core C(v). This
inspires the following

Definition 12.13. For a game v ∈ M C N,m the set Cmin (v) of mini-
mal core elements is defined as follows

{x ∈ C(v) |
y ∈ C(v) s.t. y = x and y is weakly smaller than x} .

Now, we can formulate

Theorem 12.14. Let v ∈ CM C N,m . Then W (v) = co (Cmin (v)).

172 12 Classes of Multi-Choice Games

Proof. We start by proving that all marginal vectors are minimal core
elements. Let σ ∈ Ξ(v). Then wσ ∈ C(v) (cf. Theorem 12.11). Suppose
y ∈ C(v) is such that y = wσ and y is weakly smaller than wσ . Let

 j
i ∈ N and j ∈ Mi+ be such that Y jei < σ
l=1 wil and consider
t := sσ,σ((i,j)) . Then,
 
tk
Y (t) = Y tk ek < σ
wkl = v(t), (12.11)
k∈N k∈N l=0

where the inequality follows from the fact that ti = j and the last
equality follows from the definitions of t and wσ . Now, (12.11) implies
that y ∈/ C(v). Hence, we see that wσ ∈ Cmin (v). This immediately
implies that
W (v) ⊂ co (Cmin (v)) . (12.12)
Now, let x be a minimal core element. We prove that x ∈ W (v).
According to Theorem 11.17 we can find a payoff vector y ∈ W (v) that
is weakly smaller than x. Using (12.12) we see that y ∈ co (Cmin (v)) ⊂
C(v). Since x is minimal we may conclude that x = y ∈ W (v). Hence,
W (v) = co (Cmin (v)).
Note that Theorem 12.14 implies that for a convex crisp game the
core coincides with the Weber set. The converse of Theorem 12.14 also
holds, as shown in
Theorem 12.15. Let v ∈ M C N,m with W (v) = co (Cmin (v)). Then
v ∈ CM C N,m .
Proof. Let s, t ∈ MN . Clearly, there is an order σ that is admissible
for vand that has the property that there exist k, l with 0 ≤ k ≤
l ≤ i∈N mi such that s ∧ t = sσ,k and s ∨ t = sσ,l . Note that for the
corresponding marginal vector wσ we have that wσ ∈ co (Cmin (v)) ⊂
C(v). Using this we see

si 
ti
v(s) + v(t) ≤ σ
wij + σ
wij
i∈N j=1 i∈N j=1
(s∧t)i
   (s∨t)
i
σ σ
= wij + wij
i∈N j=1 i∈N j=1
= v (s ∧ t) + v (s ∨ t) ,
where the last equality follows from the definition of wσ . Hence, v is
convex.
 12.2 Convex Multi-Choice Games 173

From Theorems 12.14 and 12.15 we immediately obtain

Corollary 12.16. Let v ∈ M C N,m . Then v ∈ CM C N,m if and only if
W (v) = co (Cmin (v)).

12.2.2 Monotonic Allocation Schemes

In this section we focus on level-increase monotonic allocation schemes

(limas) and show that convexity of a multi-choice game is a sufficient
condition for their existence.
Definition 12.17. Let v ∈ M C N,m and x ∈ I(v). We say that x is
+t∈MN
limas extendable if there exists a limas [atij ]i∈N,j∈M m
t such that aij = xij
i
for each i ∈ N and j ∈ Mi+ .
In the next theorem we prove that each element in the convex hull
of the minimal core of a convex multi-choice game is limas extendable.
In the proof, restrictions of σ ∈ Ξ(v) to subgames vt of v will play a
role.
Theorem 12.18. Let v ∈ CM C N,m and x ∈ co (Cmin (v)). Then x is
limas extendable.
Proof. Let x ∈ co(Cmin (v)). By Theorem 12.14, x is a convex combina-
tion of marginal vectors mσ,v for σ ∈ Ξ(v). Then, it suffices to prove
that each marginal vector mσ,v of v is limas extendable.
t∈MN σt ,vt
Take σ ∈ Ξ(v) and define [atij ]i∈N,j∈M
+ t
t by aij := wij for each
i
t ∈ MN + , i ∈ N and j ∈ Mi , where σt is the restriction of σ to t. Next,
t

we prove that this scheme is a limas extension of wσ,v .

σ,v +
Clearly, am ij = wij for each i ∈ N and j ∈ Mi since vm = v.
Further, each multi-choice subgame vt , t ∈ MN + , is a convex game,
and since mσt ,vt ∈ W (vt ) ⊂ C(vt ) (cf. Theorem 12.11), it follows that
(atij )i∈N,j∈Mit ∈ C(vt ). Hence, the scheme satisfies the stability condi-
tion.
To prove the participation monotonicity condition, take s, t ∈ MN +
with s ≤ t, i ∈ car(s), and j ∈ Mis ⊂ Mit . We have to show that
σs ,vs
asij ≤ atij . Now, asij = wij = v(u−i , j) − v(u−i , j − 1), where (u−i , j) is
the intermediary multi-choice coalition in the maximal chain generated
by the restriction of σ to s, when player i increased his participation
σt ,vt
level from j − 1 to j. Similarly, atij = wij = v(ū−i , j) − v(ū−i , j − 1).
Note that, since s ≤ t, in the maximal chain generated by σs the
turn of i to increase his participation level from j − 1 to j will come
174 12 Classes of Multi-Choice Games

not later than the same turn in the maximal chain generated by σt ,
implying that (u−i , j) ≤ (ū−i , j). Furthermore, (ū−i , j) ≤ m. Then,

asij = v(u−i , j) − v(u−i , j − 1) ≤ v(ū−i , j) − v(ū−i , j − 1) = atij ,

where the inequality follows from the convexity of v.

Specifically, we used relation (12.10) with (u−i , j − 1) in the role
of s̄, (u−i , j − 1) in the role of s, and (0−i , 1) in the role of t. Hence,
t∈MN +
[atij ]i∈N,j∈M t is a limas extension of w
σ,v .
i

Since the Shapley value (cf. Definition 11.18) of a convex multi-

choice game is the average of the marginal vectors, we obtain from
Theorem 12.18 that the total Shapley value of a convex multi-choice
+ t∈MN
game, which is the scheme [Φtij ]i∈N,j∈M t with the Shapley value of the
i
multi-choice subgame vt in each row t, is a limas (see Example 4.2 in
[28]) for v.

12.2.3 The Constrained Egalitarian Solution

Now, we introduce (cf. [23]) the multi-choice counterpart of the con-

strained egalitarian solution of a game v ∈ CGN by using an adjusted
version of the Dutta-Ray algorithm (cf. [46]). The next proposition will
play a key role since it shows that for each convex multi-choice game
there exists a unique multi-choice coalition with the largest cumulate
number of levels of players among all coalitions with the highest (per
one-unit level increase) average worth.

Proposition 12.19. Let v ∈ CM C N,m and let


A(v) := t ∈ MN
+ | α(t, v) = max α(s, v) .
s∈MN
+

The set A(v) is closed with respect to the join operator ∨ and there exists
a unique element in arg maxs∈MN α(s, v) with the maximal cumulate
+
number of levels.

Proof. Let ᾱ = maxs∈MN α(s, v) and take t1 , t2 ∈ A(v). We have to

+
prove that t1 ∨ t2 ∈ A(v), that is α(t1 ∨ t2 , v) = ᾱ. Since v(t1 ) = ᾱt1 1
and v(t2 ) = ᾱt2 1 , we obtain
 12.2 Convex Multi-Choice Games 175

ᾱt1 1 + ᾱt2 1 = v(t1 ) + v(t2 )

≤ v(t1 ∨ t2 ) + v(t1 ∧ t2 )
≤ ᾱt1 ∨ t2 1 + ᾱt1 ∧ t2 1
= ᾱt1 1 + ᾱt2 1 ,

where the first inequality follows from the convexity of v, and the second
inequality follows from the definition of ᾱ and the fact that v(0) = 0
(in case t1 ∧ t2 = 0). This implies that v(t1 ∨ t2 ) = ᾱt1 ∨ t2 1 . Hence,
t1 ∨ t2 ∈ A(v), in case t1 ∧ t2 ∈ A(v) as well as in case t1 ∧ t2 1 = 0.
We can conclude that for any t1 , t2 ∈ A(v) not only t1 ∨ t2 ∈ A(v) holds
true, but also t1 ∧ t2 ∈ A(v) if t1 ∧ t2 = 0. Further, A(v) is closed with
respect to finite ”unions”, where t1 ∨ t2 is seen as the ”union” of t1 and
t2 . Now, we note that the set A(v) ∪ {0} has a lattice structure and
5
t∈A(v) t is the largest element in A(v).

Now, we are able to formulate the Dutta-Ray algorithm for convex

multi-choice games.
Step 1: Consider m1 := m, v1 := v. Select the unique element
in arg maxs∈MN \{0} α(s, v1 ) with the maximal cumulate number of
m1
1
levels, say s1 . Define dij := α(s1 , v1 ) for each i ∈ car(s1 ) and j ∈ Mis .
If s1 = m, then stop; otherwise, go on.
Step p: Suppose that s1 , s2 , ..., sp−1 have been defined recursively
and s1 + s2 + ... + sp−1 = m. Define a new multi-choice game  with
player set N and maximal participation profile mp := m − p−1 i=1 m .
i

For each multi-choice coalition s ∈ Mmp , define vp (s) := vp−1 (s +

N
p
sp−1 ) − vp−1 (sp−1 ). The game vp ∈ M C N,m is convex. Denote by sp
the (unique) largest element in arg maxs∈MN p \{0} α(s, vp ) and define
m p !
p−1 k
dij := α(s , vp ) for all i ∈ car(s ) and j ∈
p p
k=1 si + 1, . . . ,
k
k=1 si .
In a finite number of steps, say P , where P ≤ |M + |, the algo-
rithm will end, and the constructed (level) payoff vector (dij )(i,j)∈M +
is called the (Dutta-Ray) constrained egalitarian solution d(v) of the
convex multi-choice game v.
The next example illustrates that the constrained egalitarian solu-
tion of a convex multi-choice game does not necessarily belong to the
imputation set of the game.

Example 12.20. Consider the multi-choice game v ∈ CM C {1,2},m with

m = (3, 2), v(0, 0) = 0, v(1, 0) = v(0, 1) = 1, v(2, 0) = v(1, 1) =
v(0, 2) = 2, v(2, 1) = v(1, 2) = 3, v(3, 0) = v(2, 2) = 5, v(3, 1) =
6, v(3, 2) = 12. The constrained egalitarian allocation is d(v) =
176 12 Classes of Multi-Choice Games

(2.4, 2.4, 2.4, 2.4, 2.4). Note that d13 = 2.4 < v(3e1 )−v(2e1 ) = 5−2 = 3.
Hence, d(v) ∈ / I(v).
Remark 12.21. Note that the above described Dutta-Ray algorithm
determines in P steps for each v ∈ CM C N,m a unique sequence
of (per one-unit level increase) average values α1 , α2 , . . . , αP with
αp := α(sp , vp ) for each p ∈ {1, . . . , P }, and a unique sequence of multi-
choice coalitions in MN 1 1 2 1 2
+ , which we denote by t := s , t := s + s ,...,
p 1 p P 1 P
%t 0:=1 s + .P. .&+ s ,..., 0t := s + . . . + s = m. Thus, a unique path
t , t , . . . , t , with t = 0 from 0 to m is obtained, to which we can
associate a suitable ordered partition D1 , D2 , . . . , DP of M , such that
for all p ∈ {1, . . . , P },
!
Dp := (i, j) | i ∈ car(tp − tp−1 ), j ∈ {tp−1 i + 1, . . . , tpi } ,

where for each (i, j) ∈ Dp , dij = αp , and the coalition tp − tp−1 is the
maximal participation profile in the ”box” Dp with average worth αp .
Note that each other participation profile in Dp can be expressed as
s ∧ tp − s ∧ tp−1 + tp−1 , where s ∈ MN + . Clearly, the average worth of
such a participation profile is weakly smaller than αp , and Proposition
11.28 holds true, too. Hence, αp ≥ αp+1 for all p ∈ {1, ..., P − 1}.
Next, we prove in Theorem 12.23 that the constrained egalitarian
solution for convex multi-choice games has similar properties as the
constrained egalitarian solution for traditional convex games. We need
the following lemma.
Lemma 12.22. Let v ∈ CM C N,m . Let P be the number of steps in
the Dutta-Ray algorithm for constructing the constrained egalitarian
solution d(v) of v, and let t1 , t2 , . . . , tP be the corresponding sequence
of multi-choice coalitions in MN + . Then, for each s ∈ M+ and each
N

p ∈ {1, ..., P },
v(s ∧ tp − s ∧ tp−1 + tp−1 ) − v(tp−1 ) ≥ v(s ∧ tp ) − v(s ∧ tp−1 ).
Proof. First, notice that, for each i ∈ N ,
min{si , tp−1
i } = min{min{si , tpi }, tp−1
i }

because tpi ≥ tp−1

i , implying that s ∧ tp−1 = (s ∧ tp ) ∧ tp−1 .
Second, notice that, for i ∈ N , either min{si , tp−1 i } = tp−1
i or
p−1
min{si , ti } = si , and in both situations we have

min{si , tpi } − min{si , tp−1

i } + tp−1
i = max{min{si , tpi }, tp−1
i },
 12.2 Convex Multi-Choice Games 177

implying that

(s ∧ tp ) − (s ∧ tp−1 ) + tp−1 = (s ∧ tp ) ∨ tp−1 .

Now, by convexity of v (with s ∧ tp in the role of s and tp−1 in the

role of t), we obtain

v((s ∧ tp ) ∨ tp−1 ) + v(s ∧ tp−1 ) ≥ v(s ∧ tp ) + v(tp−1 ).

Theorem 12.23. Let v ∈ CM C N,m . Then the constrained egalitarian

allocation d(v) = (dij )i∈N,j∈M + satisfies the following properties:
i

(i) d(v) ∈ PC(v);

(ii) d(v) Lorenz dominates each x ∈ PC(v);
(iii) d(v) ∈ EDC(v).

Proof. (i) Let P be the number of steps in Dutta-Ray algorithm,

t1 , t2 , . . . , tP be the corresponding sequence of multi-choice coalitions
in MN + , and α1 , α2 , . . . , αP be the sequence of average values of these
coalitions. Note that each s ∈ MN + can be expressed as

s = (s ∧ t1 ) + (s ∧ t2 − s ∧ t1 ) + . . . + (s ∧ tP − s ∧ tP −1 ),

where some of the terms could be zero. Then, by definition of D(s) and
αp , p ∈ {1, . . . , P }, D(s) can be rewritten as follows:

si
D(s) = dij
i∈N j=1

= s ∧ t 1 α1 + s ∧ t2 − s ∧ t1 1 α2 + . . . + s ∧ tP − s ∧ tP −1 1 αP
1

v(t1 ) v(t2 ) − v(t1 )

= s ∧ t1 1 1 + s ∧ t2 − s ∧ t1 1
t 1 t2 − t1 1
v(tP ) − v(tP −1 )
+ . . . + s ∧ tP − s ∧ tP −1 1 .
tP − tP −1 1
Now, in view of Remark 12.21, we obtain
178 12 Classes of Multi-Choice Games

v(t1 )
D(s) ≥ s ∧ t1 1
s ∧ t1 1
v((s ∧ t2 ) − (s ∧ t1 ) + t1 ) − v(t1 )
+s ∧ t2 − s ∧ t1 1 + ...
s ∧ t2 − s ∧ t1 1
v((s ∧ tP ) − (s ∧ tP −1 ) − tP −1 ) − v(tP −1 )
+s ∧ tP − s ∧ tP −1 1
s ∧ tP − s ∧ tP −1 1
1
v(s ∧ t ) 2 1
1 v(s ∧ t ) − v(s ∧ t )
≥ s ∧ t1 1 + s ∧ t 2
− s ∧ t  1 + ...
s ∧ t1 1 s ∧ t2 − s ∧ t1 
v(s ∧ tP ) − v(s ∧ tP −1 )
+s ∧ tP − s ∧ tP −1 1
s ∧ tP − s ∧ tP −1 1
= v(s ∧ t1 ) + (v(s ∧ t2 ) − v(s ∧ t1 )) + . . .
+(v(s ∧ tP ) − v(s ∧ tP −1 ))
= v(s ∧ tP ) = v(s),
where the last inequality follows from Lemma 12.22. Hence, D(s) ≥
v(s) for each s ∈ MN + . Finally, D(m) = v(m) follows from the con-
structive definition of d, too.
(ii) Let x ∈ PC(v). We notice that the Lorenz domination relation
(cf. Section 4.1) can be directly extended to level payoff vectors and
prove by backward induction that x L d implies x = d. Suppose
that 0 = t0 , t1 , . . . , tP = m is the sequence of the Dutta-Ray multi-
choice coalitions in MN for d (see Remark 11.26). First, we prove the
induction basis, i.e.,
dij = xij for each (i, j) ∈ (tP −1 , tP ],
i.e., for all j s.t. tPi −1 < j ≤ tPi , i ∈ N. (12.13)
By Proposition 11.28 (see Remark 12.21), the smallest elements of
d = (dij )i∈N,j∈M + correspond precisely to elements (i, j) ∈ (tP −1 , tP ],
i
and there
v(tP ) − v(tP −1 )
dij = = αP .
tP − tP −1 1
Since x L d, it follows that xij ≥ dij for all (i, j) ∈ (tP −1 , tP ], implying
that

x((tP −1 , tP ]) = xij
(i,j)∈(tP −1 ,tP ]

≥ dij = d((tP −1 , tP ])
(i,j)∈(tP −1 ,tP ]

= αP tP − tP −1 1 .
 12.2 Convex Multi-Choice Games 179

Suppose that (12.13) does not hold. Then, we obtain

x((tP −1 , tP ]) > d(tP −1 , tP ] = v(tP ) − v(tP −1 ).
But, since x ∈ PC(v), we also have
x((tP −1 , tP ]) = x((0, tP ]) − x((0, tP −1 ])
= v(tP ) − x((0, tP −1 ])
≤ v(tP ) − v(tP −1 )
= αP tP − tP −1 1 ,
where the second equality follows from the efficiency condition for pre-
core elements and the inequality from the stability conditions for pre-
core elements. So, we conclude that (12.13) holds true.
Now, we prove the induction step, i.e., for each k ∈ {P − 1, . . . , 1}
it holds true that
if dij = xij for each (i, j) ∈ (tk , tP ], then (12.14)
dij = xij for each (i, j) ∈ (t k−1 P
, t ].
Suppose d = x on (tk , tP ]. Then, by Proposition 11.28, the worst
tP − tk 1 elements of d and x are in (tk , tP ] and ”coincide”. Since
x L d we have:
(*) xij ≥ αk = dij  for all (i, j) ∈ (tk−1 , tk ], k ∈ {1, ..., P }, and
(i,j)∈(0,tk ] xij =
v(t ) because v(t ) − v(t ) =
k
(**) x((0, t ]) = k P k

d((tk , tP ]) = x((tk , tP ]) and v(tP ) = x (0, tP ] .

Then, x ∈ PC(v) implies
(***) x((tk−1 , tk ]) = x((0, tk ]) − x((0, tk−1 ]) ≤ v(tk ) − v(tk−1 ) =
αk tk − tk−1 1 ,
where the inequality follows from (**) and the stability conditions.
Then, from (*) and (***) it follows that xij = dij for (i, j) ∈ (tk−1 , tk ],
and so, x = d on (tk−1 , tP ].
(iii) According to (i) and Theorem 11.14, we have d(v) ∈ PC(v) ⊂
EDC(v).
The next theorem provides an axiomatic characterization of the con-
strained egalitarian solution on the class of convex multi-choice games
in line with Theorem 3.3 in [65], using the following multi-choice ver-
sions of the properties of efficiency, equal division stability and max-
consistency. P
Given a single-valued solution Λ : CM C N,m → R i∈N mi , we denote
by sm the multi-choice coalition such that for each i ∈ N , for all k ∈
{1, . . . , sm
i }, Λik (v) = max(i,j)∈M + Λij (v). We say that Λ satisfies
180 12 Classes of Multi-Choice Games
 mi
• Efficiency, if for all v ∈ CM C N,m : i∈N j=1 Λij (v) = v(m);
• Equal division stability, if for all v ∈ CM C N,m : Λ(v) ∈ EDC(v);
• Max-consistency, if for all v ∈ CM C N,m and all (i, j) ∈ M + ,
m m
Λij (v) = Λij (v −s ), where v −s is the multi-choice game defined
m
by v −s (t) = v(t + sm ) − v(sm ) for all t ∈ MNm−sm .

Theorem 12.24. There is a unique solution on CM C N,m satisfying

the properties efficiency, equal division stability and max consistency,
and it is the constrained egalitarian solution.

12.2.4 Properties of Solution Concepts

As in the case of convex crisp games, solution concepts on convex multi-

choice games have nice properties.
First, note that by Theorem 12.11 the Shapley value Φ(v) (cf. Defi-
nition 11.18) of v ∈ CM C N,m belongs to the core C (v) of v. Moreover,
we have already seen that the corresponding extended Shapley value is
a limas of the game and hence, the convexity of a multi-choice game
is a sufficient condition for the existence of such monotonic allocation
schemes.
Second, the core of a convex multi-choice game is the unique stable
set of the game.
Theorem 12.25. Let v ∈ CM C N,m . Then C(v) is the unique stable
set.
Proof. Using Corollary 12.16 we see that C(v) = ∅. Hence, it follows
from Theorem 11.9 that C(v) = DC(v). So, by Theorem 11.12(ii) we
know that it suffices to prove that C(v) is a stable set.
Internal stability of C(v) is obvious. To show external stability, let
x ∈ I(v) \ C(v). We construct z ∈ C(v) that dominates x. First, we
choose s ∈ MN + such that

|car(s)|−1 (v(s) − X(s)) = max |car(t)|−1 (v(t) − X(t)) .

t∈MN
+

Since x ∈
/ C(v) it holds that
# #
#car(s)−1 # (v(s) − X(s)) > 0. (12.15)

Now, let σ be an order that is admissible for v with the property

that there exists k such that s = sσ,k . Then (cf. Theorem 12.11) the
correspondingmarginal
si vector wσ is an element of C(v) and, moreover,
it holds that i∈N j=1 wij σ = v(s). For notational convenience we set
 12.2 Convex Multi-Choice Games 181

y := wσ . We define the payoff vector z by zij = xij if i ∈ car(s) and

2 ≤ j ≤ si ; zij = xi1 + |car(s)|−1 (v(s) − X(s)) if i ∈ car(s) and j = 1;
zij = yij if i ∈
/ car(s) or i ∈ car(s) and j > si ; zi0 = 0.
Using the fact that x, y ∈ I(v) and recalling (12.15), it can be
easily seen that z is level increase rational. Further, Z(m) = X(s) +
(v(s) − X(s)) + (Y (m) − Y (s)) = v(s) + (v(m) − v(s)) = v(m), where
the second equality follows from the way we choose y. This shows
that z is also efficient and, hence, z ∈ I(v). Since Z(s) = v(s) and
Zisi = Xisi + |car(s)|−1 (v(s) − X(s)) > Xisi for all i ∈ car(s), it holds
that z doms x.
The only part that is left to prove is z ∈ C(v). So, let t ∈ MN + . We
distinguish two cases.
(a) If car(t) ∩ car(s) = ∅, then Z(t) = Y (t) ≥ v(t) since y ∈ C(v).
(b) If car(t) ∩ car(s) = ∅, then
Z(s ∧ t) = (Z − X) (s ∧ t) + X (s ∧ t) (12.16)
−1
= |car(s) ∩ car(t)| . |car(s)| (v(s) − X(s)) + X (s ∧ t)
≥ v(s ∧ t) − X (s ∧ t) + X (s ∧ t) = v (s ∧ t) ,

where the inequality follows from (12.15). Hence,

i ∧ti
 s  
ti
Z(t) = zij + yij (12.17)
i∈N j=1 i∈N :ti >si j=si +1
i ∨ti
 s  
si  
si
= Z (s ∧ t) + yij − yij − yij
i∈N j=1 i∈N :si ≥ti j=1 i∈N :si <ti j=1
= Z (s ∧ t) + Y (s ∨ t) − Y (s)
≥ v (s ∧ t) + v (s ∨ t) − v(s),
where the last equality follows from (12.16) and the fact that y ∈ C(v)
is such that Y (s) = v(s). Using convexity of v, we see that the last
expression in (12.17) is larger or equal of v(t). This completes the proof
of the theorem.
Finally, in a straightforward way, but technically cumbersome, we
can extend the properties of the equal split-off set for convex crisp
games (cf. Subsection 5.2.4) to convex multi-choice games. Specifically,
for each game v ∈ CM C N,m , the equal split-off set ESOS(v) consists
of a single element which is the constrained egalitarian solution d (v)
of the game v. The proof of this result follows the lines of Lemma 5.27
and Theorem 5.28.
 182 12 Classes of Multi-Choice Games

12.3 Multi-Choice Clan Games

12.3.1 Basic Characterizations

In this section we introduce a new class of multi-choice games, which we

call multi-choice clan games. As in the traditional model of clan games
(cf. Section 5.3), the set of players consists of two disjoint groups, a fixed
(powerful) clan with ”yes-or-no” choices and a group of (non-powerful)
non-clan members, but in the multi-choice clan game non-clan mem-
bers may have more options for cooperation. Specifically, each non-clan
member can participate at any level in a given finite set, whereas each
clan member can be either active or abstain from cooperation. How-
ever, the active status (i.e. participation level 1) for all clan members is
a necessary condition for generating a positive reward for any coalition
containing the clan and at least one non-clan member.
Let N = (N \ C, C) be the set of players, where C stands for the
clan and N \ C for the group of non-clan members. For further use, we
denote by MN,C the set of multi-choice coalitions with player set N
and fixed clan C. For each s ∈ MN,C we denote its restrictions to N \C
and C, by sN \C and sC , respectively. Note that, in a multi-choice clan
game, the maximal participation profile is of the form m = (mN \C , 1C ).
We also denote by MN,1C the set of multi-choice coalitions s ∈
M N,C with sC = 1C , that is coalitions in which all clan members fully
participate. We also use the notation MN,1 +
C
= MN,1C \{0}. Multi-
choice clan games are defined here by using the veto power of clan
members, the monotonicity property of the characteristic function and
a (level) union property regarding non-clan members’ participation in
multi-choice coalitions containing at least all clan members at partici-
pation level 1.
% &
Definition 12.26. A game N, (mN \C , 1C ), v is a multi-choice clan
game if the characteristic function v : MN,C → R satisfies
(i) Clan property: v(s) = 0 if sC = 1C ;
(ii) Monotonicity property: v(s) ≤ v(t) for all s, t ∈ MN,C with s ≤ t;
(iii) (Level) Union property: For each s ∈ MN,1C ,

v(m) − v(s) ≥ wis+ (m, v),
i
i∈N \C

where, for each i ∈ N \ C, wis+ (m, v) denotes the marginal contri-

i
bution of the bundle of those levels of player i which are higher than
the participation level of i in s.
 12.3 Multi-Choice Clan Games 183
% &
In the sequel, we simply use v instead of N, (mN \C , 1C ), v . For
further use, we denote by M CCN,m the set of multi-choice games with
a fixed non-empty and finite set of players N , fixed non-empty clan
C, and maximal participation profile m. We notice that M CCN,m is
a convex cone in M C N,m , that is for all v, w ∈ M CCN,m and for all
p, q ∈ R+ , pv +qw ∈ M CCN,m , where R+ denotes the set of non-negative
real numbers.
The next theorem gives an explicit description of the core of a multi-
choice clan game.

Theorem 12.27. Let v ∈ M CCN,m . Then,

C(v) = {x : M → R+ | X(m) = v(m);


mi
xik ≤ v(m) − v(m−i , j − 1), ∀i ∈ N \ C, j ∈ Mi+ }.
k=j

Proof. We denote by B(v) the set in the right-hand side of the above
equality. We prove first that C(v) ⊂ B(v). Let v ∈ M CCN,m and let
x ∈ C(v). Note that non-negativity of x follows from the clan property
and the monotonicity property; so, xij ≥ 0 for all i ∈ N and j ∈
Mi+ . Clearly, the efficiency condition holds true. To prove the upper
boundness of the cumulate payoffs for each bundle of highest levels of
each non-clan member, we note first that the payoff of each multi-choice
coalition s̃ = (m−i , j − 1) ∈ MN,1C , i ∈ N \ C, j ∈ {1, . . . , mi }, can be
expressed as

mi 
mi
X(s̃) = X(m) − xik = v(m) − xik ,
k=j k=j

where the second equality follows from the efficiency of x.

Now, the stability condition X(s̃) ≥ v(s̃) implies that

mi
v(m) − xik ≥ v(m−i , j − 1),
k=j

or, equivalently,

mi
xik ≤ v(m) − v(m−i , j − 1).
k=j

Hence, x ∈ B(v).
184 12 Classes of Multi-Choice Games

Now, we prove the converse inclusion. Let x ∈ B(v). The level-

increase rationality of x follows from the clan property, since xij ≥ 0 =
v(0−i , j) − v(0−i , j − 1) for all i ∈ N and j ∈ Mi+ . We only need to
prove that X(s) ≥ v(s) for each s ∈ MN,C .
Clearly, for each s ∈ MN,C with sC = 1C , we have, by the clan
  si
property, X(s) = xij ≥ 0 = v(s).
i∈N j=1
We focus now on stability conditions for multi-choice coalitions s ∈
MN,C with sC = 1C .
By the (level) union property, we obtain

v(m) − v(s) ≥ wis+ (m, v).
i
i∈N \C

Further,
 
mi
X(s) + xik − v(s) = X(m) − v(s) = v(m) − v(s)
i∈N \C k=si +1

≥ wis+ (m, v),
i
i∈N \C

implying that
 
mi
X(s) ≥ v(s) + (wis+ (m, v) − xik ).
i
i∈N \C k=si +1


mi
Note that wis+ (m, v) = v(m) − v(m−i , si ) ≥ xik , for each i ∈
i
k=si +1

mi
N \ C, since x ∈ B(v). Therefore, we obtain wis+ (m, v) − xik ≥ 0
i
k=si +1
for each i ∈ N \ C. Hence, X(s) ≥ v(s) for each s ∈ MN,1C .

Corollary 12.28. Let v ∈ M CCN,m and let t ∈ MN,1C . If the subgame

vt is a clan game, then its core is described by

C(vt ) = {x : M t → R+ | X(t) = v(t);


ti
xik ≤ v(t) − v(t−i , j − 1), ∀i ∈ car(tN \C ), j ∈ Mit },
k=j

where Mit = {1, . . . , ti } and M t = {(i, j) | i ∈ car(t), j ∈ Mit }.

 12.3 Multi-Choice Clan Games 185

Proof. It follows straightforwardly from Theorem 12.27, by taking into

account that t = (tN \C , 1C ) is the ”grand coalition” in the subgame vt .

Multi-choice clan games for which the clan consists of one player are
called multi-choice big boss games; we notice that in case mN \C = 1N \C
these games are big boss games in the terminology of [27]. The model
of a multi-choice clan game where the clan consists of at least two
members is an extension of the model of a clan game (cf. [122]).
In the rest of this section, we focus on total clan games with multi-
choice coalitions.

Definition 12.29. A game v ∈ M CCN,m is a multi-choice total clan

game with clan C if all its subgames vt , t ∈ MN,1C , are clan games
with clan C.

We denote the set of all multi-choice total clan games v ∈ M CCN,m

by T M CCN,m .
The next theorem provides a characterization of multi-choice total
clan games.

Theorem 12.30. Let v ∈ M C N,m and C ∈ 2N \{∅} with mC = 1C .

Then, the following assertions are equivalent:
(i) v ∈ T M CCN,m ;
(ii) v is monotonic, each player i ∈ C is a veto player, and for all
s, t ∈ MN,1C with s ≤ t,

v(t) − v(s) ≥ wis+ (t, v); (12.18)
i
i∈car(tN \C )

(iii) v is monotonic, each player i ∈ C is a veto player, and for each

i ∈ car(sN \C ) and for all s, t ∈ MN,1C with s ≤ t and si = ti ,

v(t) − v(t − ei ) ≤ v(s) − v(s − ei ). (12.19)

Proof. (i)↔(ii): Relation (12.18) simply writes out the (level) union
property of multi-choice subgames. In the sequel, we refer to relation
(12.18) as the total (level) union property of v.
(ii)→(iii): It suffices to prove that (12.18)→(12.19). We note that
inequality (12.19) expresses a total concavity property of v which reflects
the fact that the same one-unit level decrease of a non-clan member
in coalitions containing at least all clan members at participation level
1 and where that non-clan member has the same participation level,
could be more beneficial in smaller such coalitions than in larger ones.
186 12 Classes of Multi-Choice Games

Let s ∈ MN,1C and let i ∈ car(sN \C ). Consider the coalition s + ek

obtained from s when one the other non-clan members, say k, increases
his participation with one unit. We prove first
wisi (s, v) ≥ wisi (s + ek , v). (12.20)

wisi (s, v) + wk,sk +1 (s + ek , v) (12.21)

= (v(s) − v(s−i , si − 1)) + (v(s + e ) − v(s−k , sk ))
k

= v(s + ek ) − v(s−i , si − 1).

The total union property (with s + ek in the role of t and (s−i , si − 1)
in the role of s) yields
v(s + ek ) − v(s−i , si − 1) ≥ wisi (s + ek , v) + wk,sk +1 (s + ek , v). (12.22)
From (12.21) and (12.22) we conclude that (12.20) holds true. Denote
by {i1 , . . . , iq } the set of levels which are involved in t but not in s.
Repeated application of (12.20) yields
wisi (s, v) ≥ wisi (s + ei1 , v) ≥ . . . ≥ wisi (s + (ei1 + . . . + eiq )) = wisi (t, v).
Hence, the total concavity property (12.19) holds true.
(iii)→(ii): We simply prove that (12.19)→(12.18). Let s, t ∈ MN,1C
with s ≤ t. Denote by {i1 , . . . , iq } the set of levels which are involved
in t but not in s.
Then,
 
q
v(t) − v(s) = wi,ik (s + (ei1 + . . . + eik ), v)
i∈car(tN \C ) k=1

 
q 
≥ wi,ik (t, v) = wis+ (t, v).
i
i∈car(tN \C ) k=1 i∈car(tN \C )

Hence, the total union property (12.18) holds true.

12.3.2 Bi-Monotonic Allocation Schemes

The notion of a level-increase monotonic allocation scheme (limas) for
a multi-choice game was recently introduced in [28] where it was also
shown that convexity of the game is a sufficient condition for the exis-
tence of a limas. Inspired by [27] and [122] who study the existence of
bi-monotonic allocation schemes for a total big boss and clan games,
we focus now on bi-(level-increase) monotonic allocation schemes (bi-
limas) for multi-choice total clan games.
 12.3 Multi-Choice Clan Games 187

Definition 12.31. Let v ∈ T M CCN,m and let t ∈ MN,1C . A scheme,

N,1C
[atij ]t∈M
i∈N,j∈Mit
where Mit = {1, . . . , ti }, is called a bi-(level-increase)
monotonic allocation scheme (bi-limas) if the following two condi-
tions hold:
(i) stability: at ∈ C(vt ) for all t ∈ MN,1C ;
(ii) bi-monotonicity w.r.t. one-unit level increase: For all s, t ∈ MN,1C
with s ≤ t, we have:
(ii.1) asi1 ≤ ati1 for each i ∈ C;
(ii.2) asij ≥ atij for each i ∈ car(sN \C ) and each j ∈ {1, . . . , si }.
We study this kind of bi-monotonic allocation schemes by means of
suitably defined compensation-sharing rules on the class of multi-choice
(total) clan games.
Definition 12.32. Let N \ C = {1, . . . , q} and C = {q + 1, . . . , n}.
n−q
For each α ∈ [0, 1]q and β ∈ ∆(C) = ∆({q + 1, . . . , n}) = {z+ |
n
zi = 1}, the compensation-sharing rule based on α and β,
i=q+1
+
ψ α,β : M CCN,m → RM , is defined by
⎧
⎪
⎪ αi (v(m) − v(m−i , 0)) , i ∈ N \ C, j = 1;
⎪
⎪
⎪
⎪
⎪
⎨0 , i ∈ N \ C,
α,β
ψij (v) =
⎪ j ∈ Mi+ \ {1};
⎪
⎪
⎪
⎪ 
⎪
⎪
⎩ βi [v(m) − αj (v(m) − v(m−j , 0))] , i ∈ C, j = 1
j∈N \C

for each i ∈ N and j ∈ Mi+ .

The i-th coordinate of the compensation vector α indicates that
level 1 of non-clan member i gets as payoff, in view of its decisive role
for multi-choice cooperation, the part αi wi (m, v) of the marginal con-
tribution of
this player to the grand coalition m. Then, the remainder,
v(m) − αj wj (m, v), is distributed over the clan members. For
j∈N \C
each clan member i, the i-th coordinate
 βi of the sharing vector β
determines the share βi [v(m) − αj wj (m, v)].
j∈N \C

Theorem 12.33. Let M CCN,m be the cone of multi-choice clan games

with clan C. Then,
(i) ψ α,β is additive for each α ∈ [0, 1]N \C and each β ∈ ∆(C);
(ii) ψ α,β is stable, that is ψ α,β (v) ∈ C(v) for each v ∈ M CCN,m .
188 12 Classes of Multi-Choice Games

Proof. (i) Let α ∈ [0, 1]N \C and β ∈ ∆(C). For all v, w ∈ M CCN,m and
all p, q ∈ R+ , it holds

ψ α,β (pv + qw) = pψ α,β (v) + qψ α,β (w).

Hence, ψ α,β is additive on the cone of multi-choice

clan games.
(ii) Let v ∈ M CCN,m . From Theorem 12.27 and βi = 1 we obtain
i∈C
that ψ α,β (v) ∈ C(v).

In Theorem 12.36 we prove that the family of compensation-sharing

rules ψ α,β plays a key role for the existence of bi-limas for a subclass
of multi-choice total clan games. However, we need to establish some
preliminary results.

Lemma 12.34. Let v ∈ T M CCN,m and s, t ∈ MN,1C with s ≤ t. Then,


v(t) − v(s) ≥ wi (t, v).
i∈car((t−s)N \C )

Proof. Note that s ≤ t implies car(sN \C ) ⊂ car(tN \C ). We denote

car(tN \C ) − car(sN \C ) by car((t − s)N \C ). From the total (level) union
property we obtain

v(t) − v(s) ≥ wis+ (t, v)
i
i∈car(tN \C )
 
= wis+ (t, v) + wi0+ (t, v)
i
i∈car(sN \C ) i∈car((t−s)N \C )
 
= (v(t) − v(t−i , si )) + wis+ (t, v)
i
i∈car(sN \C ) i∈car((t−s)N \C )

≥ wis+ (t, v),
i
i∈car((t−s)N \C )

where the last inequality holds true because, by monotonicity of v,

v(t) − v(t−i , si ) ≥ 0 for each i ∈ car(sN \C ).

Lemma 12.35. Let v ∈ T M CCN,m and s, t ∈ MN,1C such that s ≤ t.

Then, 
v(t) − v(s) − αi wi (t, v) ≥ 0.
i∈car((t−s)N \C )
 12.3 Multi-Choice Clan Games 189

Proof. First, by non-negativity of αi and wi (t, v), and since αi ≤ 1 for

each i ∈ N \ C and t ∈ MN,1C , we have αi wi (t, v) ≤ wi (t, v), implying
that  
− αi wi (t, v) ≥ − wi (t, v).
i∈car((t−s)N \C ) i∈car((t−s)N \C )

Second, by Lemma 12.34 we have


v(t) − v(s) − wi (t, v) ≥ 0.
i∈car((t−s)N \C )

Therefore,

v(t) − v(s) − αi wi (t, v)
i∈car((t−s)N \C )

≥ v(t) − v(s) − wi (t, v) ≥ 0.
i∈car((t−s)N \C )

It turns out that for a subclass of multi-choice total clan games

compensation-sharing rules ψ α,β with α ∈ [0, 1]N \C and β ∈ ∆(C)
generate bi-(level-increase) monotonic allocation schemes.

Theorem 12.36. Let v ∈ T M CCN,m be such that, for each s, t ∈ MN,1C

with s ≤ t and each i ∈ car(sN \C ),
v(t) − v(t−i , 0) ≤ v(s) − v(s−i , 0). (12.23)
Then, for each α ∈ [0, 1]N \C and β ∈ ∆(C) the compensation-sharing
rule ψ α,β generates a bi-limas for v, namely
α,β N,1
C
[ψij (vt )]t∈M
i∈N,j∈M t
.
i

Proof. Let α ∈ [0, 1]N \C and β ∈ ∆(C). For each t ∈ MN,1C , in the
subgame vt , the α-based compensation (regardless of β) for each non-
clan member i ∈ car(tN \C ), αi wi (t, v), is fully assigned as payoff to
level 1 of that player. So, the α-based compensation for each other
level of each non-clan member i ∈ car(t
 N \C ) is simply equal to 0. The
amount left for the clan, v(t) − αj wj (t, v), is shared based
j∈car(tN \C )

member i ∈ C, the β-based

on β. For each clan  share in the subgame
vt is βi [v(t) − αj wj (t, v)], with βi = 1.
j∈car(tN \C ) i∈C
Since vt is a clan game, by Theorem 12.33(ii) and Corollary 12.28,
we have ψ α,β (vt ) ∈ C(vt ).
190 12 Classes of Multi-Choice Games

Now, we focus on the bi-monotonicity property. Let s, t ∈ MN,1C

with s ≤ t. First, we prove that, for each player i ∈ car(sN \C ) and for
α,β
each level j ∈ {1, . . . , si } the compensation ψij (vs ) is weakly better
α,β α,β α,β
than the compensation ψij (vt ). Clearly, ψik (vs ) = 0 = ψik (vt ) for
k ∈ {2, . . . , si }. Further, by (12.23) and non-negativity of αi , we obtain
α,β α,β
ψi1 (vs ) = αi wi (s, v) ≥ αi wi (t, v) = ψi1 (vs ) for each i ∈ car(sN \C ).
In the sequel, we cope with the monotonicity condition regarding
shares of clan members. Denote by Rα (vt ) the α-based remainder for
the clan members in the ”grand coalition” (tN \C , 1C ) of the multi-
choice clan game vt . We prove first that, for each s, t ∈ MN,1C with
s ≤ t,
Rα (vt ) ≥ Rα (vs ). (12.24)
We have

Rα (vt ) − Rα (vs )
⎛ ⎞ ⎛ ⎞
 
= ⎝v(t) − αi wi (t, v)⎠ − ⎝v(s) − αi wi (s, v)⎠
i∈car(tN \C ) i∈car(sN \C )
⎛ ⎞

= ⎝v(t) − v(s) − αi wi (t, v)⎠
i∈car((t−s)N \C )

+ αi (wi (s, v) − wi (t, v))
i∈car(sN \C )

≥ v(t) − v(s) − αi wi (t, v) ≥ 0,
i∈car((t−s)N \C )

where the first inequality follows from (12.23) and the non-negativity
of αi , and the last inequality follows from Lemma 12.35.
Hence, relation (12.24) holds true. Now, from the non-negativity of
α,β α,β
βi and (12.24) we obtain ψi1 (vt ) ≥ ψi1 (vs ), for each i ∈ C.

Remark 12.37. Let v ∈ T CMCN,m and let s, t ∈ MN,1C such that s ≤ t.

Then, for each i ∈ car(sN \C ) such that si = ti , it holds

wi (t, v) ≤ wi (s, v). (12.25)

Proof. Let s, t ∈ MN,1C with s ≤ t, and let i ∈ car(sN \C ) such that

si = ti . Repeated application of the total concavity property yields
 12.3 Multi-Choice Clan Games 191

v(t−i , si ) − v(t−i , si − 1) ≤ v(s−i , si ) − v(s−i , si − 1),

..
.
v(t−i , 1) − v(t−i , 0) ≤ v(s−i , 1) − v(s−i , 0).
By summing these inequalities, we obtain v(t) − v(t−i , 0) ≤ v(s) −
v(s−i , 0). Hence, (12.25) holds.
For arbitrary multi-choice total clan games bi-limas does not nec-
essarily exist, even if we consider a weaker version of bi-limas where
the (level) monotonicity condition regarding the non-clan members is
defined by:
For all s, t ∈ MN,1C with s ≤ t, we have asij ≥ atij for each i ∈
car(sN \C ) such that si = ti and each j ∈ {1, . . . , si }.
Then, by Remark 12.37, the (level) monotonicity condition for non-
clan members as defined above holds true. However, the (level) mono-
tonicity condition for clan members does not necessarily hold, because
the remainder for the clan in larger subgames vt might be less than the
remainder for the clan in smaller subgames vs .
Definition 12.38. Let v ∈ T M CCN,m . A (level) payoff vector b ∈ C(v)
N,1C
is bi-limas extendable if there exists a bi-limas [atij ]t∈M
j∈N,j∈M t
such
i
+
ij for each i ∈ N and j ∈ Mi .
that bij = am

Theorem 12.39. Let v ∈ T M CCN,m be such that inequality (12.23)

holds for all s, t ∈ MN,1C such that s ≤ t and for each i ∈ car(sN \C ).
Then, there exist (level) payoff vectors b ∈ C(v) which are extendable
to a bi-limas.
Proof. By Theorem 12.27 each (level) payoff vector b ∈ C(v) is of the
form
⎧
⎪
⎪ αimi (v(m) − v(m−i , mi − 1)) , i ∈ N \ C, j = mi ;
⎪
⎪
⎪
⎪
⎪
⎨ αij (v(m−i , j) − v(m−i , j − 1)) , i ∈ N \ C,
bij =
⎪
−αi,j+1 (v(m−i , j + 1) − v(m−i , j)) j ∈ Mi+ \ {mi };
⎪
⎪
⎪
⎪ 
⎪
⎪
⎩ βi [v(m) − αi1 (v(m) − v(m−i , 0))] , i ∈ C, j = 1,
i∈N \C

where αij ∈ [0, 1] for each i∈ N \ C and j ∈ Mi+ , and β ∈ ∆(C),
i.e. βi ≥ 0 for each i ∈ C and βi = 1.
i∈C
Consider the particular matrix α = (αij )i∈N \C,j∈M + with αij = 0
i
for each i ∈ N \ C and each j ∈ Mi+ \ {1}. Denote (αi1 )i∈N \C by α̃.
192 12 Classes of Multi-Choice Games

Consider a core element b̃ ∈ C(v) corresponding to α̃ and β. Note that

b̃ = ψ α,β (v). Define for each s ∈ MN,1C , each i ∈ car(sN \C ) and each
j ∈ Mis :
⎧
⎪ αi1 (v(s) − v(s−i , 0)) , i ∈ car(sN \C ), j = 1;
⎪
⎪
⎪
⎪
⎪
⎪
⎨0 , i ∈ car(sN \C ),
s
aij =
⎪ j ∈ {2, . . . , si };
⎪
⎪
⎪
⎪ 
⎪
⎪
⎩ βi [v(s) − αk1 (v(s) − v(s−k , 0))] , i ∈ C, j = 1.
k∈N \C

N,1
C
By Theorem 12.27, [asij ]s∈M
i∈N \C,j∈M +
is a bi-limas. Now, note that b̃ij =
i
+
ij for each i ∈ N \C and each j ∈ Mi . Hence, b̃ is bi-limas extendable.
am

Clearly, in case mN \C = 1N \C , a bi-limas coincides with a bi-mas

and thus, the subclass of multi-choice total clan games considered in
Theorem 12.36 coincides with the class of traditional total clan games.
Hence, Theorem 12.39 says in this case that each core element of such
a game is extendable to a bi-mas.
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Index

additive crisp game, 7 concave game, 46

additive multi-choice game, 146 constrained egalitarian solution of a
additivity, 10 convex crisp game, 51
admissible ordering for a multi-choice constrained egalitarian solution of a
game, 155 convex fuzzy game, 114
aggregated participation level, 79 constrained egalitarian solution of a
average lexicographic value , 34 convex multi-choice game, 175
average worth, 37 control game, 44
convex fuzzy game, 103
balanced collection of coalitions, 8 convex game, 46
balanced crisp game, 8 convex hull, 12
balanced dual simplex game, 34 convex multi-choice game, 170
balanced map, 8 convex set, 11
balanced multi-choice game, 165 cooperative crisp game, 5
balanced simplex game, 34 cooperative fuzzy game, 78
bi-(level-increase) monotonic coordinate-wise convexity for fuzzy
allocation scheme, 187 games, 103
bi-limas extendable imputation, 191 coordinate-wise product, 79
bi-mas extendable imputation, 64 core cover of a crisp game, 21
bi-monotonic allocation scheme, 64
core of a crisp game, 15
bi-monotonic participation allocation
core of a fuzzy game, 83
scheme, 137
core of a multi-choice game, 149
bi-pamas extendable imputation, 139
crisp coalition, 5, 77
big boss game, 59
crisp core, 85
carrier property, 159 crisp game, 77, 80
catcher, 97 crisp-like coalition, 77
clan game, 59
compromise value of a crisp game, 32 degree of fuzziness, 78
compromise values for fuzzy games, diagonal value of a fuzzy game, 94
100 dictator, 6
202 Index

dictatorial simple multi-choice game, hierarchical strength property, 159

167 hypercube, 97
directional convexity property, 107
dividends, 29 imputation of a crisp game, 14
dominance core of a crisp game, 18 imputation of a multi-choice game,
dominance core of a fuzzy game, 86 149
dominance core of a multi-choice imputation set of a crisp game, 14
game, 150 imputation set of a fuzzy game, 83
dual game, 7 increasing marginal return property,
dualize and extend operator, 69 105
dualize and restrict operator, 68 individual rationality, 10, 14
dummy player property, 10 level-increase monotonic allocation
scheme, 169
efficiency, 10, 13 level-increase rational payoff vector
efficient payoff vector of a multi- of a multi-choice game, 149
choice game, 149 leximin domination, 38
empty coalition, 5 linear subspace, 11
equal division core of a crisp game, linear transformation, 11
20 Lorenz domination, 37
equal division core of a fuzzy game, lower vector of a crisp game, 20
88 lower vector of a hypercube, 97
equal division core of a multi-choice
game, 154 marginal contribution, 6
equal split-off allocation for a crisp marginal contribution vector, 6
game, 39 marginal game, 39
equal split-off allocation for a marginal game of a multi-choice
multi-choice game, 163 game, 147
equal split-off set of a crisp game, 39 marginal vector of a multi-choice
equal split-off set of a multi-choice game, 155
game, 163 marginal vectors of a fuzzy game, 94
exact game, 48 minimal core elements of a multi-
extended Shapley value of a crisp choice game, 171
game, 50 minimal effort game, 147
extended vector of marginal con- minimal effort property, 161
tributions of a crisp game, minimal winning coalition, 6
49 monotonic crisp game, 7
extreme point, 11 monotonic fuzzy game, 89
monotonicity of the first partial
feasible compromise, 100 derivatives property, 107
fuzzy clan game, 128 multi-choice clan game, 182
fuzzy coalition, 77 multi-choice coalition, 145
fuzzy Shapley value, 94 multi-choice game, 145
fuzzy Weber set, 94 multi-choice total clan game, 185
multilinear extension of a crisp game,
grand coalition, 5 29, 80
 Index 203

N-essential game, 8 stable sets of a crisp game, 18

non-negative crisp game, 7 stable sets of a fuzzy game, 86
stable sets of a multichoice game,
one-point solution, 10 154
strategic equivalence, 8
p-core of a fuzzy game, 90
subadditive game, 7
p-dominance core of a fuzzy game,
subgame, 7
92
subgame of a multi-choice game, 147
p-stable set of a fuzzy game, 92
suitable ordered partition, 39
pamas extendable imputation, 117
superadditive game, 7
participation level, 77
superadditive multi-choice game, 146
participation monotonic allocation
supermodularity for fuzzy games,
scheme, 117
103
path, 96
path solution, 96
t-restricted game, 79
payment scheme for partial coopera-
tight catcher, 97
tion, 89
total clan game, 62
pmas extendable imputation, 45
total fuzzy Shapley value, 118
polyhedral set, 11
totally balanced game, 43
population monotonic allocation
totally balanced multi-choice game,
scheme, 45
167
precore of a multi-choice game, 150
preimputation set, 14 unanimity crisp game, 6
proper core, 85 unanimity fuzzy game, 80
proper fuzzy coalition, 77
upper vector of a crisp game, 20
quasi-balanced game, 31 upper vector of a hypercube, 97

reasonable set of a crisp game, 21 Weber set of a crisp game, 21

relative invariance with respect to Weber set of a multi-choice game,
strategic equivalence, 10 156
remainder of a player in a crisp weight property, 161
coalition, 20 winning coalition, 6

set-valued solution, 10 zero-monotonic crisp game, 9

Shapley value of a crisp game, 25 zero-monotonic multi-choice game,
Shapley value of a multi-choice 147
game, 159 zero-normalized crisp game, 9
simple crisp game, 6 zero-normalized multi-choice game,
simple multi-choice game, 146 146