Study Notes
Study Notes
Section A
Week 1 Readings
1. Federalism in Africa: An Indigenous Idea with a
Colonial History by Sara Jordan
Key concepts:
1. Federalism
Federalism is not indigenous to Africa, however the continent’s diverse ethnic groups and
historical kingdoms often had decentralised governance structures, resembling federalism in
some ways. However, the modern from of federalism in Africa has roots in colonial history
where European powers imposed centralised administrative structures on diverse nations
regions without regard for local governance traditions.
Post-colonial African nations adopted federalism as a way to manage ethnic diversity and
promote regional autonomy within the framework inherited from colonial rule. However, the
implementation and success of federalism in Africa have varied widely due to factors such as
ethnic tensions, resource distribution, and political stability.
2. Confederation
A confederation is a political arrangement where independent states or entities come together
for mutual benefit, usually for purposes such as defense, trade, or governance, while retaining
a significant degree of sovereignty. Unlike a federation, where power is centralized with a
federal government, in a confederation, member states typically delegate limited authority to
a central body while maintaining a large degree of autonomy. Examples include the European
Union and the Swiss Confederation.
3. Empire
An empire is a large political entity consisting of multiple territories or nations, usually under
the control or influence of a single ruler, government, or state. Empires often extend their
authority through conquest, colonization, or alliances. They typically have a centralized
government that exercises significant power over the territories they encompass. Examples of
historical empires include the Roman Empire, the British Empire, and the Ottoman Empire.
4. Confederative Cycle:
• Cycle explained
Recent innovations
1. Hybrid Structures:
o The post-Maastricht institutional structure of the European Union combines
features of both a confederation and a federation.
o Confederal features include intergovernmental decision-making in the Council
of Ministers and the role of national governments in implementing Union law.
o Federal features include the Commission's role in proposing legislation, the
use of qualified majorities for some legislation, and the supremacy of Union
law over national law.
o However, the lack of direct electoral and fiscal bases for federal institutions
has led to a perceived "democratic deficit" and undermined public support for
the EU.
2. Multi-level Federal Organization:
o There's a growing trend for federations to become constituent members of
wider federations or supra-national organizations.
o Germany has adjusted its internal federal relations to its EU membership,
influencing debates in other EU member states like Belgium, Spain, and
Austria.
o NAFTA's three member countries are federations, impacting their internal
federal-provincial relations, as seen in Canada.
3. Constitutional Asymmetry:
o Constitutional asymmetry, where member units have different relationships
with federations or supra-national organizations, is increasingly accepted to
facilitate political integration.
o Examples include Malaysia, India, Spain, and Belgium, as well as the EU's
move towards a Union of "variable speeds" and "variable geometry."
o Constitutional asymmetry introduces complexity and challenges but may be
necessary to accommodate varied regional pressures for autonomy.
These innovations reflect efforts to adapt federal principles to contemporary political and
economic realities, but they also present challenges in maintaining coherence and
effectiveness within multi-level governance structures.
Week 2 Readings:
Federalism in Nigeria: The Nigerian Experience in
Comparative Perspective by Rotimu Suberu
Introduction
Democratic Politics
Conclusion
The conclusions drawn from the analysis of Nigeria's federal system highlight both its
successes and challenges:
1. Resourceful Design: Nigeria stands out in Africa for its creative approach to
combining self-rule with shared government, despite facing imperfections and
tensions within its federal system.
2. Territorial Reconfiguration: Similar to India, Nigeria has adapted its internal
boundaries to manage ethnic conflicts effectively, leveraging the fluid nature of
African ethnic divisions to prevent domination by core regions or ethnicities.
3. Ethnically Inclusive Central Authority: Nigeria's federal institutions include
mechanisms to promote an ethnically inclusive central authority, fostering multiethnic
cabinets and reducing conflict-driven ethnic entrepreneurship.
4. Economic Governance Challenges: The revenue-sharing system in Nigeria has
decentralized corruption while exacerbating tensions between oil-rich and non-oil-
producing regions and the central government.
5. Redeeming Features: Despite its challenges, Nigeria's federal system centralizes
major taxation powers for national redistribution and stabilization while granting
subnational authorities access to centrally collected revenues.
6. Managing Diversity: The Nigerian federal system has provided a framework for
managing diversity rather than resolving it entirely, holding the country together
despite ongoing challenges.
7. Potential for Evolution: Similar to Canada and India, Nigeria's federal system has
the potential to evolve into a robust and stable model of multicultural democratic
federalism, especially if it transitions into a truly competitive electoral democracy.
In summary, while Nigeria's federal system faces significant hurdles, it also holds promise as
a model for successful federal governance in Africa and beyond, particularly if it continues to
evolve in a democratic direction.
De/Centralisation in Nigeria, 1954-2020 by Rotimi Suberu
Introduction: Background, brief literature review, and theoretical expectation
1. Roots of Centralization: The study acknowledges that while military rule and oil
revenues have been significant factors contributing to centralization in Nigeria, it
argues that centralization predates the era of military autocracy. It suggests that
Nigeria's unitary colonial foundations played a role in shaping centralization
tendencies within the federation.
2. Complex Intergovernmental Dynamics: Nigeria's diverse cultural landscape and the
presence of civilian political institutions have led to intricate intergovernmental
dynamics. These dynamics have influenced shifts in policies and institutional spheres
over time, challenging simplistic narratives that attribute centralization solely to
military rule or oil revenues.
3. Challenges to Prevailing Narratives: While some analyses portray Nigeria's
federalism as deteriorating under military rule, others argue that Nigerian states enjoy
significant autonomy. This perspective challenges the prevailing narrative of over-
centralization and suggests that Nigeria's federal system may exhibit characteristics of
decentralization in certain aspects.
4. Methodology: The study employs a systematic measurement approach to assess
de/centralization across various domains, including politico-institutional, policy, and
fiscal dimensions. It uses qualitative interpretation and analysis of indicators derived
from Nigerian constitutions, legislations, court rulings, and governmental data
sources.
5. Theoretical Expectations: The study anticipates finding a significant bias towards
both static and dynamic centralization in Nigeria. It expects that Nigeria's complex
historical, economic, and cultural context will influence the trajectory of
de/centralization over time, with factors such as colonial legacies, economic
dependencies, and cultural diversity playing crucial roles.
6. Comparative Context: The study draws on comparative literature to contextualize
Nigeria's experience within the broader framework of post-colonial federations. It
highlights the challenges faced by ethnically diverse countries in implementing
decentralized governance arrangements and emphasizes the importance of
understanding Nigeria's federal evolution within this comparative context.
The 'Nigeria (Constitution) Order in Council, 1954' marked a significant moment in Nigerian
federalism, ushering in a relatively decentralized era as Nigeria transitioned toward
independence in 1960. The 1954 Constitution aimed to accommodate rising sub-nationalisms
among Nigeria's diverse ethnicities while maintaining the unity of the colonial entity.
• Regions were empowered to make laws on matters other than those included in the
exclusive legislative list.
• Accommodation of regional interests even in exclusive federal subjects, such as
policing and external relations.
• Shared concurrent legislative powers in numerous policy fields, with varying degrees
of federal primacy and administrative control.
Overall, the 1954 Constitution laid the foundation for central dominance over time, despite
the initial decentralist features embedded in Nigeria's federal structure.
Frequency:
• Economic activity, elections, external affairs, and tertiary education experienced the
most frequent shifts in de/centralization, with each field undergoing between nine and
seven code changes.
• Agriculture, culture, pre-tertiary education, environmental protection, finance and
securities, law enforcement, media, restriction on own source revenues, and public
sector borrowing each witnessed between six and four code changes.
• The fewest shifts, between one and three code changes, occurred in domains such as
national citizenship, employment relations, healthcare, language policy, social
welfare, transport, proportion of own source revenues, and proportion of federal
conditional transfers.
• Military rule and civil/military transitions often influenced these shifts, with
significant changes coinciding with regime transitions.
Direction:
• Legislative power became mildly more centralized during the First Republic (1961-
65) before experiencing more extensive centralization under military rule (1966–98).
• Following the restoration of civilian rule in 1999, legislative power became slightly
less centralized.
• A similar pattern is observed for policy administration, politico-institutional, and
fiscal values, with centralization peaking under military rule.
Instruments:
• Changes in Nigerian federalism involved constitutional means, legislation, and the use
of emergency powers.
• Military decree-laws, such as the Constitution (Suspension and Modification) Decree
No. 1 of 1966, advanced centralization by granting sweeping powers to the Federal
Military Government.
• Emergency powers were used on a national scale, particularly during the Nigerian
civil war, to reorganize the federation and undermine secessionism.
• Military decrees were used to reorganize states, increasing their number from 12 to
36.
• Ouster clauses and the doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty prevented judicial
review of intergovernmental relations.
• International treaties had limited impact on dynamic de/centralization, with the center
already enjoying broad powers under presidential constitutions.
1. Significant Centralization:
o Policy and fiscal fields such as pre-tertiary education, agriculture, finance and
securities, employment relations, environmental protection, law enforcement,
public sector borrowing, and elections and voting experienced significant
centralization.
o Legislative authority in these fields predominantly resided with the federal
government, altering the historical regional autonomy seen in some areas.
o Examples include federal control over agricultural grants, establishment of
federally owned secondary schools, centralization of finance and securities,
and exclusive federal regulation of law enforcement and elections.
2. Mild Centralization:
o Policy areas like external affairs, media, and culture experienced relatively
modest centralization.
o While central authority increased in these fields, states still maintained some
autonomy, such as in state broadcasting and television.
o Centralization in health care, transportation, and social welfare was also
moderate, with legislative or administrative shifts towards central authority.
3. Stable De/Centralization:
o Some areas, like currency and money supply, defense, and natural resources,
maintained stable de/centralization over time.
o Legislative and administrative authority remained largely unchanged in these
exclusive federal or concurrent fields.
o The level of state constitutional autonomy, federal conditional transfers, and
federal restrictions on state own-source revenues also exhibited stability.
4. Decentralization:
o Certain policy fields witnessed a tendency towards greater decentralization
over time, defying the overall centralizing trend.
o Examples include citizenship and immigration, tertiary education, language
policy, and institutional autonomy.
o Administrative decentralization in tertiary education, for instance, saw an
increase in the number of state-owned universities and polytechnics, while
language policy embraced multilingualism.
Conclusion
The passage challenges the simplistic narrative of Nigeria's federal evolution as a binary
between decentralized pre-military rule and hyper-centralized military/post-military periods.
Instead, it emphasizes the nuanced dynamics of centralization and decentralization
throughout Nigeria's history:
Overall, the Nigerian experience underscores the complex interplay of historical, political,
economic, and social factors in shaping centralization and decentralization in federal systems,
offering valuable insights for comparative studies and the understanding of federalism in
diverse contexts.
1. Kerala, India:
o Key Concepts: Kerala has been lauded for its successful implementation of
democratic decentralization through the institution of local self-government
bodies known as Panchayats. These Panchayats operate at the village, block,
and district levels and are responsible for local planning, development, and
service delivery.
o Analysis: Kerala's experience highlights the importance of grassroots
democracy and citizen engagement in decision-making processes. The state
has achieved remarkable success in social development indicators by
empowering local communities to address their own needs and priorities.
However, challenges remain, including issues of resource allocation, capacity
building at the local level, and ensuring equitable participation across diverse
socio-economic groups.
2. South Africa:
o Key Concepts: After the end of apartheid, South Africa embarked on a
process of democratic decentralization to address historical inequalities and
promote local democracy. This involved the establishment of municipalities as
the primary units of local government, with significant powers and
responsibilities devolved to them.
o Analysis: South Africa's experience with democratic decentralization reflects
the country's transition from authoritarian rule to democratic governance.
Decentralization has aimed to promote inclusive development, improve
service delivery, and foster citizen participation. However, challenges such as
institutional capacity constraints, political fragmentation, and persistent socio-
economic disparities have hindered the effective implementation of
decentralization reforms.
3. Porto Alegre, Brazil:
o Key Concepts: Porto Alegre is renowned for its innovative participatory
budgeting process, which allows residents to directly participate in allocating a
portion of the municipal budget to community projects and priorities. This
grassroots initiative has been hailed as a model of democratic governance and
citizen empowerment.
o Analysis: Porto Alegre's experience demonstrates the transformative potential
of participatory democracy at the local level. By involving citizens in
decision-making processes and budget allocation, the city has enhanced
transparency, accountability, and social equity. Participatory budgeting has
also contributed to community mobilization, civic education, and the
strengthening of local governance structures. However, challenges persist,
including the need for continuous citizen engagement, ensuring
representativeness, and addressing power imbalances.
In summary, the politics of democratic decentralization in Kerala, South Africa, and Porto
Alegre illustrate the diverse approaches, challenges, and opportunities associated with
devolving power to the local level. These cases emphasize the importance of citizen
participation, institutional capacity building, and inclusive governance processes in realizing
the potential benefits of decentralization for democratic development and social
transformation.
1. South Africa:
o Ethnic Diversity: South Africa is a diverse nation with a population
comprising various ethnic groups, including Black Africans (comprising
several ethnicities such as Zulu, Xhosa, and Sotho), White South Africans
(mainly of European descent), Coloureds (mixed-race ancestry), and
Indians/Asians.
o Federalism in Constitutional Making: During the constitutional making
process in South Africa, which culminated in the adoption of the current
Constitution in 1996, federalism was considered but ultimately rejected in
favor of a unitary system. This decision was influenced by the desire to
overcome the legacy of apartheid and promote national unity and integration.
2. Ethiopia:
o Ethnic Diversity: Ethiopia is known for its rich ethnic diversity, with over 80
ethnic groups, each with its own language, culture, and identity. The largest
ethnic groups include the Oromo, Amhara, Tigray, and Somali.
o Federalism in Constitutional Making: Ethiopia's current federal system was
established in the early 1990s following the overthrow of the Derg regime.
The Constitution adopted in 1995 enshrines the principles of ethnic-based
federalism, aiming to accommodate the diverse ethnic identities and promote
self-governance at the regional level. The country is divided into nine
ethnically defined regional states and two self-governing cities.
Comparison:
• Approach to Diversity: While both South Africa and Ethiopia are ethnically diverse
countries, their approaches to managing diversity in constitutional making differed
significantly. South Africa opted for a unitary system to promote national unity and
reconciliation, whereas Ethiopia embraced ethnic federalism to accommodate diverse
identities and promote self-governance.
• Historical Context: The historical context played a crucial role in shaping the
decisions regarding federalism in each country. In South Africa, the legacy of
apartheid and the need to overcome racial divisions influenced the rejection of
federalism. In contrast, Ethiopia's history of centralization and authoritarian rule led to
the adoption of ethnic federalism as a means of addressing historical marginalization
and promoting inclusivity.
• Implementation Challenges: Both countries have faced challenges in implementing
their respective approaches to federalism. In South Africa, issues such as provincial
autonomy, resource allocation, and intergovernmental relations have posed challenges
to effective governance. In Ethiopia, concerns have been raised about ethnic tensions,
regional autonomy, and the balance between ethnic identity and national unity.
Conclusion:
In conclusion, South Africa and Ethiopia offer contrasting examples of how ethnic diversity
can be addressed in constitutional making and federalism. While South Africa chose a unitary
system to promote national unity, Ethiopia embraced ethnic federalism to accommodate
diverse identities and promote self-governance at the regional level. The experiences of both
countries highlight the complex interplay between ethnicity, governance, and constitutional
design in diverse societies.
Week 3 Readings:
Institutional complexity an unanticipated consequences:
the failure of decentralisation in South Africa by Thomas
A. Koelble & Andrew Siddle
Introduction
Decentralization was introduced to the South African constitution with the aim of promoting
democratic decision-making, citizen participation, and democratic legitimacy in the new
democratic dispensation. However, 16 years after its adoption, municipal governance in
South Africa is plagued by paralysis, service delivery failure, and dysfunction, leading to
widespread dissatisfaction among citizens and frequent service delivery protests.
Possible Explanations for the Crisis:
1. Lack of Funding: Some argue that a lack of funding, stemming from early
commitment to neo-liberal policies in the 1990s, lies at the heart of the crisis.
2. Institutional Capacity: Others suggest that a lack of institutional capacity within
municipalities is the root cause of the problem, indicating a deficiency in social
capital.
3. Centralist Bias of the Ruling ANC: There are viewpoints suggesting that the ruling
African National Congress (ANC) harbors a centralist bias, undermining
decentralization efforts.
This study focuses on institutional design as an explanation for the current malaise in South
African local government. It suggests that the complexity of the system adopted, based on
international best-practice experience, does not align with the country's context. Instead, it
argues for the need for "good enough governance" rather than striving for "best practice."
Studies of other countries, such as Italy, highlight that painstaking design does not always
ensure good performance. The absence of effective local institutions, accountable political
processes, local autonomy, and adequate resources can hinder the translation of institutional
design into effective governance.
Primary Argument:
The primary argument of this study is that the lack of a functioning civil service at the local
level is a primary reason for the failure of municipalities to fulfill their statutory and
constitutional obligations. It calls for a reassessment of the role of municipalities and
emphasizes the urgent need to equip them with technical, financial, and administrative
capacities for effective policy implementation.
Conclusion:
The absence of a functioning administrative and technical apparatus at the local level,
coupled with the proliferation of patronage opportunities, has contributed to the
dysfunctionality of South African municipalities. Addressing these challenges requires a
reevaluation of decentralization efforts and a concerted effort to build institutional capacity at
the local level.
This study aimed to assess the extent to which South Africa applies the precepts of
decentralization, drawing on key analyses by scholars such as Putnam, Bardhan and
Mookerjee, Shah and Thompson, Grindle, and Falletti. The researchers developed a set of
dimensions to measure decentralization, reflecting requirements for effective local
government functioning.
Dimensions of Decentralization:
1. Constitutional and Legal Basis: Municipalities must have a solid constitutional and
legal basis for existence and functioning, adequately provided for in South Africa's
constitution and legislative acts.
2. Defined Functions and Authority: Municipalities should have defined functions and
the legislative and executive authority to perform these functions.
3. Mechanisms and Systems: They must have rules, mechanisms, and systems to guide
their processes and a communication strategy to identify citizen demands.
4. Access to Resources: Municipalities need access to resources from their areas of
jurisdiction or other sources.
5. Accountability and Responsiveness: Municipalities should be accessible,
accountable, and responsive to their populations.
Research Findings:
Sample Selection:
The study encompassed more than 50 municipalities, from which a sample of 37 was drawn
for specific analysis. Municipalities were selected from all nine provinces in South Africa and
categorized based on criteria from three classification spectrums: National Treasury's
capacity categorization, the Department of Cooperative Governance and Traditional Affairs'
vulnerability/performance spectrum, and the Municipal Infrastructure Investment
Framework.
Data Collection:
Data were obtained from archival public records and directly from municipalities. Archival
records included Annual Capacity Assessment Reports, summarized budgets, and Auditor-
General reports. Direct data collection involved discussions, interviews with officials,
councillors, and citizens, and examination of documentation kept by municipalities. The
process extended over five years, with a focus on the period from 2009 to 2010.
Conclusion:
The research process involved comprehensive data collection to assess various dimensions of
decentralization in South African municipalities, shedding light on their institutional capacity,
governance mechanisms, and compliance with legal requirements.
Institutional Capacity
Public Participation
Jurisdictional Scope
Legislative Authority
• By-laws: Only a few municipalities had adopted by-laws, and many operated in a
legislative vacuum, affecting the legality of municipal activities.
• Council Authority: Municipal councils often neglected their authority to legislate,
leading to ineffective governance.
Revenue Raising
• Revenue Sources: Municipalities have the authority to raise revenue through various
sources, but compliance with statutory requirements was poor.
• Tariff Policies: Many municipalities lacked tariff policies, credit control, and debt
collection policies, impacting revenue collection.
• Grant Dependency: Grant funding accounted for a significant portion of municipal
revenue, leading to accountability and responsibility challenges.
Conclusion
The challenges facing local government in South Africa regarding financial management are
multifaceted and deeply entrenched:
Audit Outcomes:
The audit opinions issued by the Auditor General provide insights into the extent of financial
mismanagement within municipalities:
Conclusion:
Conclusion:
1. Improved Efficiency:
• Sub-national governments, being closer to the people, can better understand local
needs and allocate resources efficiently.
• Local governments have access to local information and context, enabling them to
tailor public services to meet the specific needs of their constituents.
• However, it's essential to consider that certain services may require centralized
provision for economies of scale or to address cross-jurisdictional issues.
2. Improved Governance:
3. Improved Equity:
• Local governments, familiar with local circumstances, can more effectively distribute
resources and target poverty within their jurisdictions.
• While local governments play a role in intra-area redistribution, central governments
are responsible for inter-jurisdictional redistribution to ensure equity across regions.
• Equitable distribution of resources and services is crucial for addressing disparities
and promoting social inclusion at the local level.
1. Fiscal Decentralisation:
2. Institutional/Administrative Decentralisation:
• Institutional decentralisation refers to the administrative bodies, systems, and
mechanisms at both local and intergovernmental levels.
• It includes structures that facilitate collaboration between formal government bodies
and other local stakeholders.
• Effective institutional arrangements are crucial for managing intergovernmental
relations and ensuring efficient service delivery.
• Adequate local capacity and organizational structures are necessary for sub-national
governments to fulfill their obligations.
• Institutional concerns are addressed in various articles, highlighting the importance of
well-designed structures and processes.
3. Political Decentralisation:
Conclusion
Key challenges include defining decentralisation within each country's context, coordinating
multiple actors involved, and developing a coherent implementation strategy. Sequencing
decentralisation to incorporate various dimensions simultaneously, starting with modest
funding and technical assistance, and gradually increasing autonomy based on performance
are recommended strategies.
Week 4 Readings
Federalism and Decentralisation in Sub-Saharan Africa:
Five Patterns of Evolution by Jan Erk
Abstract
This study examines the trajectory of decentralization and federalism in Sub-Saharan Africa
since the 1990s, emphasizing the discrepancy between the intended reforms and their actual
implementation. It proposes five benchmarks to track the evolution of decentralization and
federalism in the region.
Introduction
The introduction provides an overview of decentralization and federalism as governance
frameworks and highlights the gap between the envisioned reforms and their realization in
Sub-Saharan Africa. It introduces the five benchmarks proposed to map the evolution of
decentralisation.
Conceptual Distinctions
This section clarifies the definitions of federalism and decentralization, distinguishing
between constituent entities with autonomous powers and the devolution of powers without
constitutional protection. It discusses how these distinctions blur in Sub-Saharan Africa due
to top-down creation of new entities alongside reforms.
Five Benchmarks
1. Symmetrical Recentralization: The study discusses the phenomenon of recentralization
despite decentralization reforms, noting a reversion to nation-wide politics and a focus on
national goals in infrastructural projects. Administrative deficiencies and patronage networks
contribute to recentralisation.
4. Politicizing Local Conflicts: This part of the study investigates the politicization of local
conflicts over resources, leading to heightened tensions and violent confrontations. It
explores the complex interplay between decentralization and resource management at the
local level.
5. Federal Extinction: The study examines short-lived or unsuccessful decentralization
efforts in Sub-Saharan Africa, highlighting the challenges in reconciling unity and diversity
through formal institutional arrangements. It emphasizes the need for nuanced evaluations of
decentralization outcomes beyond mere survival
Conclusion
In conclusion, the study underscores decentralization and federalism as mechanisms to
manage, rather than solve, societal divisions. It emphasizes the importance of understanding
local context in shaping decentralization outcomes and advocates for prudence and realistic
expectations in governance reform efforts.
The chapter also examines the impact of post-independence efforts to reform local
governance in Africa. The authors discuss how newly independent African states attempted
to decentralize power and strengthen local governance institutions to promote development
and democratization. However, these efforts were often hindered by political instability,
bureaucratic inertia, and resistance from central governments reluctant to relinquish control.
For instance, in countries like Ghana and Tanzania, decentralization initiatives faced
challenges due to the entrenched power of ruling elites and the legacy of authoritarian rule.
In Chapter 2 of "Local Governance in Africa" by Dele Olowu and James S. Wunsch, the
authors discuss the four phases of local government development in Africa and their
corresponding characteristics:
1. Colonial Period (Phase 1): During this phase, local governance systems were
primarily designed to serve the interests of colonial powers. Local authorities were
often appointed by colonial administrators and were used as instruments for
implementing colonial policies and extracting resources from local communities. The
focus was on maintaining control and exploiting local resources rather than promoting
local development or citizen participation.
2. Independence and Nation-Building (Phase 2): Following independence, many
African countries embarked on nation-building efforts aimed at consolidating state
power and promoting national unity. Local governance structures were often
centralized and bureaucratic, with limited autonomy for local authorities. The
emphasis was on state-led development and modernization, with local governments
playing a subordinate role in implementing national policies.
3. Decentralization Reforms (Phase 3): In response to challenges such as state
inefficiency, corruption, and lack of accountability, many African countries initiated
decentralization reforms during the late 20th and early 21st centuries. These reforms
aimed to devolve power from central governments to local authorities, enhance citizen
participation, and improve service delivery at the local level. However,
decentralization processes varied widely across countries, with some implementing
deconcentration (centralization of administrative functions) rather than genuine
decentralization.
4. Current Trends and Challenges (Phase 4): The authors highlight the diverse trends
and challenges facing local governance in Africa in the current phase. While
decentralization reforms have led to some progress in terms of citizen participation
and local development, they have also faced implementation challenges such as
limited financial resources, bureaucratic resistance, and political interference.
Moreover, issues such as corruption, ethnic politics, and social inequalities continue
to pose significant obstacles to effective local governance in many African countries.
Overall, the authors argue that understanding the historical evolution of local governance in
Africa and the various phases it has undergone is crucial for analyzing the current state of
local government structures and identifying strategies for addressing existing challenges and
promoting inclusive and responsive governance on the continent.
The chapter's main focus is the contribution of political decentralisation to local citizen
involvement and democracy. The authors talk about how decentralisation measures, which
transfer authority from national to local governments, can improve governance by making it
more inclusive, accountable, and responsive. For example, constitutional revisions in South
Africa and Uganda have boosted citizen participation in decision-making processes and
introduced systems for local government elections.
The authors also examine how economic variables affect African local governance. They talk
about how fiscal decentralisation can enable local governments to better serve their
communities and address development priorities at the local level by giving them more
financial resources and revenue-raising authority.
Nevertheless, they also draw attention to issues that restrict the independence and efficacy of
local governance institutions, such as financial limitations, insufficient ability to generate
revenue, and reliance on transfers from the federal government. The writers also examine
how social dynamics influence the results of local governance in Africa. They look at issues
of community involvement, ethnic diversity, and social cohesion, highlighting the
significance of creating inclusive and representative local governance institutions that take
into account the diversity of the local populace. For instance, initiatives to support ethnic
reconciliation and community-based decision-making have aided in the localization of
peacekeeping and social cohesion in nations like Rwanda and Burundi. The writers also cover
the administrative issues that African local governance institutions face, such as capacity
limitations, ineffective bureaucracy, and corruption.
They highlight the need for institutional reforms, capacity-building initiatives, and anti-
corruption measures to strengthen local government administration and enhance service
delivery. For instance, in countries like Ghana and Senegal, initiatives such as
decentralization training programs and e-governance platforms have been implemented to
improve administrative efficiency and accountability at the local level.
SECTION B
Week 5 Readings
Democracy. Participatory Politics and
Development: Some Comparative Lessons
from Brazil, India and South Africa by
Patrick Heller
Abstract
This article suggests that when addressing inclusive democratic development in the global
south, we should focus on citizens' ability to effectively utilize their political and civic rights.
It emphasizes the need to analyze participatory aspects of democracy, particularly
decentralized participatory governance, and examines the political and institutional
conditions that support it. The reading reviews research on participatory governance projects
in Brazil, India (Kerala), and South Africa, drawing comparative lessons that underscore the
interaction between political parties and civil society.
Introduction
Heller's article delves into the complexities of inclusive democratic development in the global
south, emphasizing the importance of effective citizenship and participatory governance.
Drawing on comparative literature on European welfare states, Heller notes the correlation
between working class mobilization, welfare state size, and socio-economic justice. However,
he points out that the classic patterns of working class formation are absent in the global
south due to unfavorable conditions of capitalist development and fragmented working class
politics. Despite transitions to electoral democracies, pervasive inequalities persist, limiting
the effective representativeness of democratic institutions and hindering the formation of
effective welfare states.
Heller, on the other hand, criticises participatistas for assuming that communities have
associational potential by default, ignoring the function of institutional design in fostering
citizen engagement. He thinks that, while participatory initiatives are beneficial, they must be
backed by strong institutional structures in order to translate public ideas into concrete
results. Heller's point is highlighted by the difficulties encountered in South Africa, where
participatory mechanisms formed after apartheid have been hollowed out as a result of the
ANC government's emphasis on centralization and managerialism. Despite initial efforts to
encourage involvement, citizen influence in municipal governance has declined.
Heller observed that PB cities had more associational activity and citizen engagement than
non-PB cities, indicating a shift away from clientelistic ties and towards direct citizen
involvement in decision-making processes. Even when PB was criticised for being essentially
consultative, it increased transparency and public oversight of local governance.
Similarly, the Kerala People's Campaign empowers residents through layered participatory
exercises at the community level. Citizens actively participate in gramme sabhas, task forces,
and development planning since decision-making powers have been delegated significantly.
The Campaign's institutional architecture ensures meaningful community participation, with
gramme sabhas setting priorities that are translated into Panchayat-approved budgeted
initiatives. Notably, the Campaign has promoted inclusive engagement, with significant
participation from marginalised groups such as Dalits and women.
While there are complaints of the Campaign's bureaucratic processes, the overall influence on
civil society participation and democratisation is clear. Heller's analysis highlights how
participatory governance projects in Brazil and Kerala have reinvented local democracy by
decentralising decision-making, encouraging inclusive involvement, and empowering
marginalised communities, ultimately strengthening the democratic fabric of these areas.
In contrast, Brazil and Kerala successfully implemented participatory democracy in the face
of political crises and threats to conventional power structures. Participatory budgeting
evolved in Brazil as an alternative to clientelistic politics, fighting oligarchical party
dominance.
Similarly, the Kerala People's Campaign sought to eliminate patronage networks and involve
citizens in decision-making processes. Instead of focusing only on development objectives,
both movements saw institutional transformation as a means of mobilising civil society and
encouraging citizen participation in governance.
Furthermore, Heller recognises the differences within each scenario, emphasising the
importance of existing civil society strength and political mobilisation in shaping the success
of participatory efforts. In both Brazil and Kerala, the strength of civil society organisations
determined the extent of democratic reform. The flexibility of participation emphasises its
reliance on political possibilities and social movement dynamics, underlining the complex
interplay between institutional changes and civil society capacities.
Finally, Heller calls for a more nuanced definition of participatory democracy, emphasising
the ability of ordinary persons to participate in decision-making processes and the
significance of specialised institutional methods to create meaningful citizen engagement.
DPG is a massive reform initiative, but it has achieved unexpected traction in a variety of
situations throughout the global south. On the one hand, it entails devolving considerable
resources downwards, which by definition constitutes a significant rescaling of public power
organisation. On the other hand, elaborate institutional arrangements are required to prevent
local elite capture while yet providing authentic and effective ways of interaction for
subordinate groups. Despite these hurdles, both Brazil and Kerala have made tremendous
strides in implementing DPG. Even if the redistributive impacts of these reforms are limited,
simply opening up new avenues for public participation is a crucial step towards reducing the
gap between nominal representation and actual results.However, the case of South Africa
serves as a reminder that simply establishing proper institutions is insufficient. The ultimate
success of DPG is dependent on getting the politics right, specifically achieving a good
balance between political authority and civil society.
Week 6 Readings
The Political Economy of Decentralisation
Reforms: Implications for Aid Effectiveness
by Kent Eaton
Abstract
The article "Applied Political Economy of Decentralization: An Overview" presents a
comprehensive analysis of the challenges and complexities surrounding decentralization
reforms in developing countries. It argues that despite being a significant focus of
development support, decentralization often fails to achieve its intended objectives, such as
efficient service delivery, democratic reform, and poverty reduction, due to the mismatch
between official policy goals and the motivations of political and bureaucratic actors. This
misalignment is exacerbated by the heterogeneous nature of central governments pursuing
decentralization, where the goals and behaviors of various actors vary considerably.
Moreover, the influence of development partners on decentralization reforms adds another
layer of complexity, as their incentives may not always align with those of government
actors, leading to potential conflicts and inconsistencies in reform outcomes. The article
highlights the need for a deeper understanding of the political economy dynamics driving
decentralization reforms, advocating for a framework that guides development partners in
analyzing these dynamics. Key elements to consider include the initial context and
motivations for reform, the actors involved, the stage of reform, and the role of external
development partners. By integrating political economy analysis into decentralization support
activities, the article suggests that development partners can better design interventions that
lead to sustainable reform outcomes aligned with development objectives.
Initial Context and Motivation: The article delineates various contexts driving
decentralization reforms, ranging from responses to political or economic crises to efforts to
strengthen state legitimacy or transition from authoritarian to democratic rule. Understanding
the initial conditions under which decentralization arises is crucial for assessing the genuine
reasons for pursuing it, its implications, and potential durability.
Key Actors and Incentives: It emphasizes the importance of considering the incentives
facing elected politicians and national-level bureaucrats in driving or constraining
decentralization reforms. Political motivations, institutional power consolidation, career
trajectories, and agency rivalry all heavily influence the shape and pace of decentralization.
Introduction
The article delves into the multifaceted nature of decentralization, highlighting its political
and institutional underpinnings as key drivers and shapers of the reform process. Despite
lofty normative goals often cited by politicians and officials, decentralization is deeply
entrenched in politics, reflecting struggles between and within government entities over
power, authority, and resource allocation. This political reality persists across various forms,
targets, generality, and transformation types of decentralization. While recognizing the
complexity and diversity of decentralization dynamics, the article underscores the need for
development partners to move beyond treating it as a purely technical exercise and to engage
more deeply with its political dimensions. It argues for a pragmatic approach that
acknowledges the inherent political nature of decentralization and offers a framework for
understanding the political economy factors influencing reform trajectories. By focusing on
political and bureaucratic incentives, development partners can better navigate the reform
landscape, identify windows of opportunity, and adapt their approaches to support sustainable
decentralization outcomes. The article calls for a shift away from simplistic notions of
"political will" and towards a nuanced understanding of the incentives shaping actors'
behaviors and decisions. Additionally, it acknowledges the influence of structural factors on
decentralization processes and advocates for a flexible and pragmatic approach that accounts
for evolving political and economic conditions. Through a political economy lens,
development partners can better tailor their support to align with the complex realities of
decentralization in diverse country contexts.
Outlining a framework
Eaton's analysis emphasizes the multifaceted nature of decentralization, starting with the
diverse contexts driving initial reforms. For instance, crises in countries like the Philippines
and Indonesia prompt drastic decentralization measures, while decentralization in Bolivia and
Colombia aims to bolster state legitimacy and address post-conflict challenges. These diverse
motivations underscore the importance of understanding the historical, institutional, and
cultural contexts shaping reform trajectories. Moreover, Eaton highlights the pivotal role of
incentives for key actors like elected politicians and national-level bureaucrats. Examples
abound, such as electoral motivations driving politicians to pursue or resist decentralization,
while bureaucrats seek to consolidate power or advance their careers through reform efforts.
This intricate interplay of incentives influences reform trajectories, where adjustments are
made in response to changing political and economic conditions, as seen in countries
transitioning from authoritarian to democratic rule. Eaton also delves into the complex
dynamics involving development partners, citing instances of fragmented donor behavior and
varying objectives within the international development community. These examples
illustrate the need for coherence and collaboration among donors to effectively support
decentralization initiatives and address overarching questions about its desirability and
efficacy.
2. Partisan Incentives:
3. Institutional Incentives:
4. Coalitional Incentives:
• Centralization Bias: Labor unions, such as teachers' unions in Thailand, often resist
decentralization efforts due to concerns about losing collective leverage and authority.
In centralized systems, unions wield significant power over national decision-making
processes and fear that decentralization might dilute their influence.
o Example: Teachers' unions in Thailand strongly opposed the transfer of
teachers to local governments during the country's education decentralization
efforts, fearing a loss of control and bargaining power at the national level.
Impact on Policymaking:
• Influence on Policy Design: Labor unions have historically influenced policymaking
by resisting decentralization measures that could weaken their authority or disrupt
established power structures. Their opposition can hinder the smooth implementation
of decentralization reforms.
o Example: In the Philippines, public sector unions successfully lobbied against
the devolution of education services under the 1991 Local Government Code,
citing concerns about job security and working conditions.
Political Dynamics:
• Capacity and Fiscal Concerns: Despite potential benefits, business associations may
oppose decentralization if they perceive it as leading to fiscal irresponsibility,
inadequate local government capacity, or insufficient provision of essential
infrastructure. Concerns about potential disruptions to business operations or
investment climates may also drive opposition.
o Example: Business associations in certain countries may express concerns
about the fiscal autonomy of local governments, fearing that decentralized
decision-making could result in fiscal profligacy or inefficient resource
allocation, ultimately hindering economic growth and investment
opportunities.
China's Approach:
Vietnam's Experience:
Interdepartmental Bodies:
Conclusion:
In essence, PEDIA represents a critical tool for navigating the complex landscape of
decentralization, ensuring that interventions are evidence-based, contextually relevant, and
conducive to sustainable development outcomes. By integrating political economy analysis
into their strategies, development partners can enhance the effectiveness and impact of their
support for decentralization initiatives.
1. Spectrum of Entry Points: Fritz, Kaiser, and Levy (2009) present a spectrum of
generic entry points informed by political economy insights, ranging from feasible
actions in the present to those requiring changes in underlying conditions. The focus
is on identifying reform space and opportunities, such as through coalition building,
rather than solely assessing intervention viability.
2. Actionable Implications of PED Analysis: A typology is adopted to delineate
actionable implications of PED analysis in decentralization, both in the present and
future contexts. This framework aims to systematically guide the transition from
analysis to operational interventions, providing a structured approach to harness
future examples and strengthen the PED framework.
3. Feasibility Assessment: PED analysis entails assessing the feasibility of technical
proposals. While some desired reforms may not be immediately feasible, the intent is
to encourage innovation and nurture reforms over time by either designing feasible
measures or changing underlying conditions.
4. Case Examples: Case examples from Peru and the Philippines illustrate scenarios
where certain decentralization reforms face resistance or limitations due to political
environments. Instead of pursuing infeasible reforms, emphasis is placed on
promoting feasible measures or preparing for future opportunities.
5. Creativity in Engagement: Development partners are encouraged to think creatively
about engaging in feasible actions rather than pushing for unrealistic reforms. For
instance, technical budgeting reforms could be linked to local service provision to
incentivize their adoption by local governments.
6. Future Opportunities: PED analysis identifies future opportunities for devolution or
decentralization, emphasizing sustained efforts to strengthen local capacity and
anticipate political shifts that may open windows of opportunity.
7. Policy Implications and Dynamics: Understanding emerging actors and dynamics is
crucial for anticipating decentralization trajectories. Development partners need to
support reform trajectories that build toward promising outcomes and address gaps in
decentralization reforms.
8. Challenges and Considerations: Development partners must confront challenges in
decentralization support, including conflicting organizational objectives and the need
for better coordination. The volume advocates for a broader-based and more careful
analysis to inform decisions about engaging in decentralization reform.
9. Learning and Progress: The passage concludes by acknowledging the need for
ongoing learning-by-doing at the country level to enhance the effectiveness of
decentralization support. It emphasizes the importance of flexible frameworks and
pragmatic analysis to inform informed decision-making and strengthen
decentralization efforts.
Introduction
This article examines the evolution of provincial government in South Africa since the
constitutional compromise of 1994. Despite the constitutional provision for meaningful
provincial roles and functions, the ANC provinces have not lobbied for increased powers.
The lack of a federal mindset and ideology of provincialism is apparent, yet provinces remain
politically influential entities.
The article highlights two contradictory threads: poor governmental performance at the
provincial level and increased political influence of provincial elites. While provinces
struggle with weak governance, financial mismanagement, and corruption, provincial elites
have gained control over state resources, leveraging the 'equitable share' provision in the
Constitution. They have become king-makers at the national level, focusing on resource
control and appointments rather than expanding provincial powers.
The rush for jobs in the provinces after 1994 led to the creation of a new 'bureaucratic
bourgeoisie', primarily concerned with personal prosperity and upward social mobility.
Patronage networks and cadre deployment practices further entrenched personalistic
governance, contributing to financial mismanagement and corruption.
Despite some improvements in reporting and accounting, many provincial departments lack
the political will to address these issues, perpetuating weak governance operations. The
guaranteed funding flow to provinces, known as the 'equitable share', has enabled financial
mismanagement and patronage practices to persist unchecked.
In conclusion, the article underscores the intertwined nature of poor governance, patronage
politics, and personalistic governance in South Africa's provincial governments, challenging
the initial vision of meaningful provincial roles outlined in the 1994 constitutional
compromise.
Overall, the pervasive influence of patronage networks, coupled with weak governance
structures and oversight mechanisms, poses significant challenges to effective governance
and state-building efforts in South Africa's provinces.
Week 9 Readings
African Decentralisation: Local Actors,
Powers and Accountability by Jesse C.
Ribot
Defining Decentralisation
“…. is any act in which a central government formally cedes powers to actors and
institutions at lower levels in a political-administrative and territorial hierarchy (Mawhood
1983; Smith 1985).”
Decentralization encompasses various forms and concepts, each with its own implications
and objectives:
Think of the South African context and the power assumed by local councillors.
1. Deconcentration or Administrative Decentralization: This form entails transferring
power to local branches of the central state, such as administrative bodies or local
technical agents. These local units remain upwardly accountable to the central
government and primarily serve its interests.
2. Fiscal Decentralization: Involves the decentralization of fiscal resources and
revenue-generating powers. While fiscal transfers are important, they are often
considered as part of both deconcentration and political decentralization rather than a
separate category.
3. Devolution: While often used interchangeably with decentralization, devolution
specifically refers to the transfer of powers from the central government to non-
central government bodies, including local elected governments, NGOs, customary
authorities, and private entities.
4. Delegation: This occurs when public functions are transferred to lower levels of
government, public corporations, or other authorities outside the regular political-
administrative structure to implement programs on behalf of a government agency.
5. Privatisation: Unlike decentralization, privatization involves the permanent transfer
of powers to non-state entities, such as individuals, corporations, or NGOs. It operates
on an exclusive logic rather than the inclusive public logic of decentralisation.
Summary
Ribot’s reading focuses on the evolution of decentralization reforms in African governments,
particularly focusing on the recent shift towards emphasizing democratization, pluralism, and
rights. While decentralization aims to strengthen both central and local governance to support
national objectives, the reading primarily examines local government and institutions as key
recipients of decentralized powers.
The underlying logic of decentralization is that local institutions are better positioned to
discern and respond to local needs and aspirations, leading to greater equity and efficiency.
However, there is limited research assessing whether such conditions exist or lead to desired
outcomes. Many reforms initiated in the name of decentralization may not deliver the
presumed benefits and could undermine efforts to create sustainable and inclusive rural
institutions.
The author argues that decentralization reforms often lack clarity and may not entrust
downwardly accountable local authorities with sufficient powers. Many reforms may retain
central control rather than genuinely transferring power to local levels. As a result, the
decentralization experiment has made timid progress, with many reforms existing more in
discourse than in practice.
The review highlights the need for decentralization reforms to entrust downwardly
accountable representative actors with significant domains of autonomous discretionary
power. It suggests that the current decentralization efforts in Africa vary in terms of legal
reform, scale of local government, types of local authorities engaged, mix of powers
devolved, and motives of governments. However, the author emphasizes the importance of
assessing these decentralization efforts to identify those that genuinely empower local
authorities and lead to positive outcomes.
Introduction
The introduction delineates the prevalence of decentralization reforms across African nations,
underscored by explicit support in constitutions for local governance and a shift towards
emphasizing democratization and rights. It defines decentralization as the formal ceding of
powers from central to lower levels of governance, aiming to strengthen local institutions for
better service provision and democratic governance. While decentralization has been
promoted as part of neoliberal agendas, the review focuses on enhancing local governance
rather than diminishing central authority. It asserts the underlying logic that local institutions,
being closer to the populace, can better discern and respond to local needs, fostering equity
and efficiency. However, confusion often arises regarding what constitutes decentralization,
and many reforms may not yield intended benefits. The review aims to dissect design and
implementation challenges, offering insights into policy research and analysis to ensure
decentralization reforms entrust local authorities with meaningful autonomy and power,
ultimately leading to desired outcomes.
After gaining independence, African governments inherited and largely perpetuated these
centralized governance structures. Therkildsen (1993) points out that local governments
became tools of administrative control, with ruling groups seeking to maintain authority over
local affairs. Despite promises of autonomy, local institutions were often sidelined, and major
functions like healthcare and education were centralized. For instance, in Kenya,
decentralization efforts in the 1960s and 1970s reduced the significance of local government,
reflecting a broader trend towards centralization. Similarly, Ghana and Nigeria implemented
decentralization reforms in the 1970s and 1980s, yet these initiatives were often characterized
by growing central government control rather than genuine devolution of power to local
authorities. Even in cases where democratic decentralization was written into constitutions, as
in Ghana and Nigeria, reforms frequently fell short of empowering local institutions,
perpetuating a cycle of centralization.
The late 20th century saw a renewed interest in decentralization, driven in part by structural
adjustment programs and democratization efforts. However, despite the rhetoric of
democratic decentralization, reforms often failed to translate into meaningful empowerment
of local governments. Donor agencies and scholars increasingly advocated for democratic
decentralization, emphasizing the need for autonomous and accountable local institutions.
Nevertheless, Oyugi (2000) notes that centralizing tendencies persisted, rendering genuine
political decentralization elusive across the continent. The prevailing challenge remains the
implementation gap, where decentralization rhetoric often diverges from practice,
highlighting the complex dynamics of governance reform in Africa.
Why decentralise?
Most decentralisation efforts have both explicit and implicit objectives. Those objectives
likely to appeal to the general public, such as local empowerment and administrative
efficiency, are generally explicitly stated, while less popular ones, such as increasing central
control and “passing the buck”, are unlikely to be voiced. Diana Conyers (2000:9)
Ribot delves into the multifaceted reasons driving decentralisation across African countries.
Economic crises serve as catalysts, prompting central governments to share fiscal and
administrative burdens with local authorities. For instance, Guinea's decentralisation was
propelled by the government's desire to respond to populist political success, framing it as a
project for societal solidarity. Similarly, administrative burdens and donor pressures
contribute to decentralisation efforts. In Uganda, decentralisation reforms were spurred by
economic crises, aiming to alleviate the strain on the central government while also
addressing local needs. Additionally, tensions between central and local authorities can
prompt decentralization as a means of redistributing power and fostering collaboration.
Ribot explores the diverse expectations and objectives associated with decentralisation
reforms. In Burkina Faso, decentralisation is envisioned as reinforcing local democracy,
grassroots participation, and overall development. However, the expectations vary across
regions and political contexts. Senegal, for example, emphasises rural development through
decentralisation, reflecting its unique priorities and challenges. Each country's perspective
reflects its distinct historical, cultural, and socioeconomic factors, shaping the perceived
benefits and goals of decentralisation.
Efficiency:
Equity:
The relationship between decentralization and service delivery is explored, with a focus on
responsiveness and effectiveness. While decentralization is expected to improve service
provision by tailoring decision-making to local needs, evidence regarding its impact remains
mixed. Uganda's experience illustrates improved resource control for civil service staff but
indicates discrepancies in perceived service quality. Tensions between central mandates and
local priorities underscore the complexities of decentralized service delivery.
Ribot investigates the role of participation in decentralization efforts and its connection to
democratization. Decentralization is touted as a means to increase citizen participation in
governance, fostering inclusivity and accountability. Zimbabwe's advocacy for participation
in development planning exemplifies efforts to empower local communities in decision-
making processes. However, challenges persist in institutionalizing meaningful participation
and ensuring representative local governance structures.
Decentralization serves as a tool for maintaining political stability and national unity amidst
local demands for autonomy. Ethiopia's use of decentralization to address secessionist
tendencies highlights its role in peace negotiations and state legitimacy. Moreover,
decentralization reinforces ruling party control over local activities, especially in one-party
states like Zambia and Uganda.
Ribot's framework emphasizes the importance of local actors, the powers they wield, and the
accountability relations they operate in decentralization processes. Various actors, including
elected bodies, traditional authorities, and NGOs, receive powers in the name of
decentralization, shaping outcomes and accountability mechanisms. Elected councils, chiefs,
NGOs, and administrative bodies play significant roles, with their inclusion posing questions
about representativeness and accountability. Establishing representative local governance
structures is crucial for sustainable participation and democratic decentralization,
necessitating robust accountability mechanisms and inclusive decision-making processes.
Ribot emphasizes the importance of legitimate, empowered local governance structures and
effective dispute resolution mechanisms to address conflicts during decentralisation
processes. Legitimacy is crucial for governance effectiveness, derived from local
government's ability to tax and make meaningful decisions. Elite capture, central control, and
implementation challenges pose significant hurdles, underscoring the need for context-
specific approaches to empower communities and ensure equitable governance.
Conclusion:
Introduction
Decentralisation efforts in Mali, Niger, and Burkina Faso are crucial for addressing
longstanding governance challenges and navigating complex security crises in the Sahel
region. Historically, these countries have operated under highly centralised unitary states
inherited from colonial rule, which have often led to marginalisation, inequality, and conflict.
By devolving power and resources to local governments, decentralisation aims to empower
communities, improve service delivery, and foster participatory democracy.
However, the path to decentralisation is fraught with challenges. Weak institutional capacity
at the local level, elite capture, corruption, and competition for resources and political power
can hinder progress. Additionally, security threats exacerbate these issues, making effective
governance and conflict resolution even more challenging.
To overcome these obstacles, policymakers must ensure sustained financial and human
resources to support decentralisation efforts. This includes investing in capacity-building
initiatives and providing technical assistance to strengthen local governance structures.
Moreover, active engagement with local governments in conflict resolution processes is
essential for building trust and promoting stability.
Furthermore, decentralisation should not be viewed solely as a means to an end but rather as
a valuable process in itself. Enhancing local governance carries intrinsic value in promoting
community participation, accountability, and social cohesion.
Strategic support for key service delivery sectors is also crucial. Prioritising sectors such as
education, healthcare, and infrastructure can have a transformative impact on local
communities and contribute to peacebuilding and development.
Drawing lessons from past decentralisation processes in similar contexts can provide valuable
insights into effective reform strategies and potential pitfalls to avoid. By learning from both
successes and failures, policymakers can craft informed policies and initiatives tailored to the
specific needs and challenges of Mali, Niger, and Burkina Faso. Ultimately, decentralisation
offers a promising pathway towards inclusive governance and conflict resolution in the Sahel,
but its success depends on careful planning, sustained commitment, and adaptive
implementation.
Two main conceptions of the role of decentralised local governments in fragile settings
emerge: one sees them as crucial for service delivery and social cohesion, while the other
views them as conflict resolution actors. The former emphasizes enhancing service delivery,
tailoring policies to local needs, and promoting citizen participation to bolster democracy and
inclusive governance. The latter focuses on managing conflict, addressing group cleavages,
and preventing violence by providing autonomy and self-governance to local communities.
However, the reality of decentralisation often falls short of its promises, leading to several
challenges on the ground. One major dilemma lies in the differential between duties and
means, where subnational governments lack autonomy, resources, and capacity to effectively
implement decentralisation. This discrepancy can stem from central governments' reluctance
to grant real autonomy, insufficient resources allocated to subnational units, unequal
distribution of resources among regions, and imbalances in the relationship between central
and local governments.
Another dilemma arises from the politicisation of local conflicts and disruption of the status
quo. Decentralisation, especially when accompanied by the institutional recognition of ethnic
identities, can exacerbate tensions and create new fault lines within regions. It may also
empower traditional elites, leading to patronage networks and reinforcing existing power
structures.
In summary, while decentralisation holds potential benefits for inclusive governance and
conflict resolution, its implementation is fraught with challenges that require careful
consideration of institutional design, resource allocation, and local dynamics.
Examples
1. Senegal: In Senegal, the central state initially maintained strong oversight over
decentralised territorial entities, depriving local governments of competences legally
transferred to them. Real empowerment of decentralised units only occurred when the
state fully committed to granting them autonomy.
2. Ethiopia: Despite granting regional governments wide-ranging powers, Ethiopia has
failed to provide sufficient financial resources for effective implementation. This
imbalance in the constitution has hindered the ability of local governments to
administer their newfound competences effectively.
3. Uganda: Uganda's decentralisation efforts, which included creating new local
government districts, suffered from a lack of resources and infrastructure, resulting in
a proliferation of government units with insufficient capacity to deliver services.
4. Cameroon: The introduction of decentralisation in Cameroon, particularly in forestry
management, led to conflicts between communities over access to resources. The
transfer of management responsibilities to local communities sparked violence as
different groups competed for control.
5. Benin: Decentralisation reforms in Benin, initiated in the early 1990s, failed to
incorporate accountability and better governance, leading to increased power for
customary or neo-traditionalist actors within local jurisdictions.
6. Pakistan: In Pakistan, despite providing basic services like free healthcare and
education, legitimacy and stability were measured primarily by the right to manage
land ownership. Land reform clashed with customary land tenure systems, causing
armed contestation between different social groups.
Week 10 Readings
Decentralisation and Development: The
Malawian Experience
Abstract
The reorientation of the local government system towards decentralisation has been at the
centre stage in most developing countries, including Malawi, since the advent of multiparty
democracy in the 1990s. The justification for the adoption of some form of decentralisation is
to promote democratic governance and participatory approaches in development. The
primary purpose in this article is to analyse the context within which decentralisation
initiatives are undertaken in Malawi and to assess the extent to which decentralisation
promotes participatory approaches in development. This paper is based primarily on
documentary research and supplemented by interviews conducted with senior officials from
local authorities and with selected members of the public.
Introduction:
The introduction sets the stage by contextualizing decentralization within Malawi's historical
and political landscape. It notes that decentralization initiatives have roots dating back to the
colonial era but primarily focuses on developments since independence in 1964. Following
the transition to multiparty democracy in the 1990s, there was a notable shift towards
reorienting the local governance system towards decentralization or devolution. This period
saw significant legislative efforts, including the adoption of key laws such as the Republic of
Malawi Constitution Act No.7 of 1995 and the Local Government Act No. 42 of 1998,
alongside the formulation of the Malawi Decentralization Policy.
Development, a complex and multifaceted concept, defies standard definition due to its
association with diverse interpretations. Economists often focus on economic growth,
quantifiable indicators like gross national product, and per capita income. However,
development extends beyond economic metrics to encompass structural transformation,
public welfare, poverty reduction, and citizen participation. In the Malawian context,
development is intertwined with modernization, access to essential services, and citizen
involvement in decision-making processes. This broader view of development emphasizes
social well-being, citizen empowerment, and grassroots participation in partnership with the
government to enhance political and socio-economic conditions.
Decentralisation in Africa-Overview
Decentralization initiatives in Africa have evolved over time, initially emerging as a
component of nation-building efforts at the dawn of independence. Development committees
were established at the district level to facilitate planning and development. From the 1960s
to the 1980s, decentralization initiatives were closely tied to nation-building endeavors. The
introduction of Structural Adjustment Programs (SAPs) in subsequent years led to the
implementation of district-focused rural development programs aimed at enhancing citizen
participation in decision-making.
The wave of democratization and globalization since the 1980s has further propelled African
countries to adopt political and administrative decentralization policies. These policies
involve delegating responsibilities for service provision and infrastructure development to
sub-national institutions such as district councils, community-based groups, and NGOs.
However, the interpretation and implementation of decentralization vary across countries,
reflecting prevailing ideologies of development. Despite diverse approaches, decentralization
is generally viewed as promoting citizen participation in decision-making, a fundamental
aspect of political democracy.
In practice, the outcomes of decentralization initiatives in African countries have often fallen
short of expectations. Many decentralized structures have failed to effectively involve
citizens in decision-making processes related to development. Instead, they have operated as
extensions of central agencies, lacking autonomy and functioning primarily as instruments of
central control. Centralized management remains predominant in many countries, despite
political rhetoric favoring decentralization. Challenges faced by local governments include a
lack of autonomy, heavy reliance on central government policies, insufficient financial
resources, and administrative capacity constraints.
Decentralization has not only failed to promote democratic governance and participatory
development but has also exacerbated regional inequalities. Financially better-off areas have
prospered, while rural areas have lagged behind. Success in decentralization depends on
various internal and external factors, including institutional capacity, technology, economic
factors, and political dynamics. Consequently, there is no automatic relationship between
decentralization and development, and the success of decentralization efforts hinges on the
unique circumstances of each country. In the case of Malawi, the following section will
examine the specific situation regarding decentralization.
Many grassroots structures exist only on paper, with limited awareness and capacity among
local
Political Factors:
Socio-economic Factors:
• Poverty and Illiteracy: High levels of poverty and illiteracy contribute to apathy and
lack of active participation in development activities. Many citizens rely on
government handouts, affecting their political awareness and engagement.
• Lack of Awareness: Limited understanding of the roles and responsibilities of local
governance structures hampers effective participation. Education and awareness
programs are crucial for empowering citizens to engage meaningfully in local affairs.
Administrative Factors:
Conclusion:
Overall, while decentralization initiatives have raised awareness and expectations for
participatory governance, significant challenges persist in translating these ideals into
effective local governance and development practices.
Presentation:
Abstract:
Decentralisation in Malawi since the 1990s aims to promote democratic governance and
participatory approaches in development. This analysis examines the context of
decentralisation initiatives in Malawi and assesses their impact on promoting participatory
approaches in development, drawing from documentary research and interviews.
Introduction:
Malawi's decentralisation efforts date back to the colonial era but gained momentum with the
transition to multiparty democracy. Legislative measures, including key laws and the Malawi
Decentralisation Policy, signify the government's commitment to empowering local
governance structures. This introduction sets the stage for exploring Malawi's experience
with decentralisation, highlighting challenges, successes, and lessons learned.
Decentralisation in Africa-Overview:
Malawi's history of decentralisation dates back to the Banda regime, with subsequent
initiatives aimed at strengthening local governance structures. However, challenges such as
political intolerance and administrative constraints hinder effective citizen participation.
Despite legal frameworks supporting decentralisation, translating ideals into practice remains
a challenge.
Conclusion:
Week 11 Reading
Decentralisation and recentralisation in
South Africa’s local government: case
studies of two municipalities in Limpopo by
Dr. Thokozani Chilenga-Butao
Abstract
Democratic decentralisation was introduced in South Africa during the transition to
democracy (1990-1994). It followed a long trajectory of centralisation and decentralisation
processes that took place during apartheid. This paper argues that in order to more adequately
understand the prospects for decentralisation to achieve its intended outcomes in South
African local government, one has to understand some of the complexities and political
dynamics present in this sphere of government. In so doing, it shows that the intended
outcomes of decentralisation are far from the realities of local government on the ground,
specifically municipalities. Case studies of two Limpopo mining town municipalities,
Lephalale and Mogalakwena, are used to demonstrate some of these complexities and
political dynamics.
The Mogalakwena case study will show that, despite the codification of recentralisation in the
South African constitution, regional and political party elites misuse the policy to politically
interfere in municipalities. The effects of this are that service delivery slows down and local
government is subjected to localised national and provincial political battles. The Lephalale
case study shows how the layers of decentralisation between apartheid and democracy have
led to this municipality being dependent on private and parastatal mining companies for the
provision of and access to public goods and services.
Introduction
National Level
Provincial Level
Role in Recentralisation: Provincial governments in South Africa are pivotal in the process
of recentralisation, which involves rescinding the devolved powers of local governments
when they fail to provide services effectively. When local municipalities struggle, provincial
governments often intervene. However, this intervention can have mixed results. While it can
address immediate service delivery failures, it can also lead to slower service delivery overall
and entangle local governance in broader national and provincial political conflicts.
Political Interference: Provincial governments are not immune to the influence of political
dynamics. In some cases, provincial elites misuse legislated recentralisation powers to
interfere politically in municipal governance. This interference can derail local governance
efforts, slowing down service delivery and complicating the political landscape. The political
battles that play out at the provincial level often manifest locally, further disrupting the ability
of municipalities to function effectively and meet their obligations to their communities.
Case Studies and Provincial Impact: Case studies of municipalities like Mogalakwena and
Lephalale illustrate the impact of provincial governance on local municipalities. In
Mogalakwena, political interference by provincial elites has led to significant governance
challenges, disrupting service delivery and complicating local administration. In Lephalale,
the municipality's dependency on private and parastatal mining companies for service
provision highlights the need for strategic recentralisation by provincial authorities. This case
underscores the importance of coordinated efforts to ensure sustainable and effective local
governance, free from undue political interference.
Local Level
Empirical Findings from Case Studies: Research into the Mogalakwena and Lephalale
municipalities provides empirical evidence of the challenges faced by local governments in
South Africa. In Mogalakwena, political interference has significantly hindered governance
and slowed down service delivery. The municipality has become a battleground for
provincial and national political conflicts, detracting from its primary role of serving the
community. In Lephalale, the reliance on mining companies for public goods and services
highlights the inadequacies of local governance and the need for a more strategic approach to
recentralisation. These case studies illustrate the nuanced realities and dynamics of
decentralisation, offering valuable insights into the administrative and political hurdles that
local governments must navigate.
Conclusion
In conclusion, the process of decentralisation in South Africa, while well-intentioned and
legally supported, faces significant challenges in practice. The historical legacies of
apartheid, combined with fiscal constraints, capacity issues, and political interference, create
a complex environment for local governance. The cases of Mogalakwena and Lephalale
municipalities highlight these challenges, showing how local governments struggle with both
internal and external pressures. To achieve the intended outcomes of decentralisation,
continuous improvement and strategic recentralisation efforts are necessary. This approach
must balance empowering local governments with providing the oversight and support
needed to ensure effective and sustainable service delivery.
Collapse of Apartheid and Transitional Reforms: During the final phase of apartheid
(1982-1994), the government attempted to introduce reforms aimed at 'power sharing'
between different racial groups through the establishment of nine development regions and
multiracial Regional Services Councils. These efforts were designed to mitigate resistance to
the apartheid regime and address the demands for its end. However, structures like the Black
Local Authorities, established under the Black Local Authorities Act of 1982, were
underfunded and led by individuals approved by the national government, making them
targets of anti-apartheid resistance . Consequently, decentralisation during apartheid served
more as a mechanism for maintaining control rather than fostering genuine local governance.
Implementation and Challenges in the Democratic Era: The democratic government took
political decentralisation seriously initially, encouraging participatory democracy in local
governance through mechanisms like Integrated Development Plans (IDPs). These were
intended to involve local communities in developmental policymaking . However, over time,
this enthusiasm waned due to the ANC's electoral dominance, which reduced the incentive
for sustained community participation. The government increasingly outsourced local
planning to consultants, marginalising community structures and diminishing the
effectiveness of participatory governance .
Conclusion
The historical legacies of local government in South Africa and its intricate political
dynamics have greatly complicated the implementation of democratic decentralisation. This
issue is further elucidated by theories suggesting that recentralisation—the re-imposition of
national authority—has failed to adequately empower local governments. However, in South
Africa, recentralisation serves dual purposes: political motives and restorative measures for
municipalities unable to fulfill their mandates (Chilenga-Butao 2019). This phenomenon is
often a consequence of poorly planned and executed decentralisation reforms, which fail to
translate idealised outcomes into reality.
Olowu and Wunsch describe the gap between the ‘idealised’ and ‘actual’ results of
decentralisation reforms. Ideally, decentralisation should lead to the devolution of powers,
enhanced local accountability, greater public participation, and improved service provision.
However, the actual process is often marred by incomplete statutory reforms, retention of
resources by central actors, consumption of local resources by salaries, ineffective local
councils due to low education levels, internal divisions, executive dominance, and designs
that maintain central control or allow local elites to dominate governance (Olowu and
Wunsch 2003). These issues, summarized as ‘elite capture’, ‘capacity constraints’, and
‘financial constraints’, necessitate increased oversight and dependence on national
government (Siddle and Koelble 2012).
Political dynamics further complicate local governance. Manor points out that the White
Paper on Local Government 1998 falls short in providing the necessary implementation
details for successful democratic decentralisation. Essential prerequisites, such as significant
financial resources, substantial powers for local governments, and accountability
mechanisms, are often lacking (Manor 2001). Local government resources are predominantly
controlled by national and provincial spheres, leaving local governments to perform complex
tasks with limited resources. Furthermore, elected officials, who should be accountable to
their constituents, are often beholden to bureaucrats, diminishing their effectiveness (Manor
2001).
Siddle and Koelble highlight that local government executive structures are frequently
targeted by political elites, leading to interference in municipal operations. This political
meddling manifests through the suspension and sidelining of officials who do not align with
the prevailing political faction, undue pressure on officials, and politically motivated
appointments. Such interference creates tensions between good governance and party-
political demands (Siddle and Koelble 2012). Provincial and party elites exploit interventions
to manipulate executive positions in local municipalities, undermining the intentions of
decentralisation and facilitating recentralisation.
Conclusion
The persistent challenges facing South Africa’s local government are rooted in a complex
interplay of historical legacies, political dynamics, and structural inefficiencies. Despite the
transition to democratic decentralisation, the ideal outcomes envisioned have not materialized
due to poorly executed reforms, capacity constraints, financial limitations, and political
interference. These factors have necessitated recentralisation as both a corrective and a
politically motivated measure, further complicating the realisation of effective and
autonomous local governance. Understanding these intricate dynamics is crucial for
addressing the ongoing issues and achieving the intended benefits of decentralisation in South
Africa.
Lephalale, formerly known as Ellisras, developed into a mining hub in the late 1950s with
coal mining initiated by the Iron and Steel Corporation (ISCOR), a parastatal entity. The
town’s administration was effectively controlled by ISCOR, which resisted municipalisation
under both apartheid and democratic regimes. The privatisation of ISCOR in 1989 and
subsequent formation of Kumba Iron Ore and Exxaro Limited in 2006, along with the
construction of the Medupi Power Station by Eskom, entrenched the town's economic
reliance on these entities. This dependence hampers the municipality's effectiveness in
delivering services independently of these corporations (Phadi and Pearson 2017).
Conclusion
Through the case study of Mogalakwena, it becomes evident that recentralisation, intended
as a restorative measure for administrative dysfunction, is often exploited for political
interference. This misuse limits municipalities' capacity to deliver essential services. Despite
being framed as beneficial for subnational governments, the actions and outcomes of
recentralisation have political ramifications that divert focus from service delivery. Political
battles at the national level are effectively ‘decentralised’ to local governments, creating
highly politicised and polarised work environments. This significantly hampers the ability of
local governments to provide public goods and services, illustrating how provincial and
regional political interference exacerbates the disparity between the intentions and outcomes
of decentralised local governance.
In conclusion, addressing the gap between the intended outcomes of decentralisation and the
actual realities within municipalities is crucial for improving the lives of people in these
localities. This requires a careful and context-specific application of recentralisation measures
to ensure they support rather than undermine local governance, thereby fulfilling the promise
of democratic decentralisation.