Beijing Law Review, 2023, 14, 2230-2240

https://www.scirp.org/journal/blr
ISSN Online: 2159-4635
ISSN Print: 2159-4627

Western Sahara Legal Case: The International

Law Narrative of Unresolved Conflict

Jamal Ait Laadam1, Yasmine Hasnaoui2, Paul Wang3

1
International Relations & Law Department, Faculty of Government and Economic and Social Science, Poly-Tech Marrakech,
Marrakech, Morocco
2
Political Science Studies, American International University, Al Jahra, Kuwait
3
Public Law & International Relations Department, Shi Liang School of Law, Changzhou University, Changzhou, China

How to cite this paper: Laadam, J. A., Abstract

Hasnaoui, Y., & Wang, P. (2023). Western
Sahara Legal Case: The International Law The legally and internationally labeled Spanish Sahara is the oldest colonized
Narrative of Unresolved Conflict. Beijing territory in Africa. Colonized by Spain in 1884, Western Sahara has been an
Law Review, 14, 2230-2240.
unchallengeable statutory case file in the UN tasks of the dispute between
https://doi.org/10.4236/blr.2023.144123
various actors at different times. Following trilateral negotiations, Spain ceded
Received: November 23, 2023 control of this territory to Morocco and Mauritania under the Madrid Agree-
Accepted: December 24, 2023 ment of 1976. The Polisario fully refused this treaty and with the help of Al-
Published: December 27, 2023
geria waged an armed group to struggle specifically against Morocco. After
Copyright © 2023 by author(s) and fifteen years of an intense military fight, the United Nations (UN) brokered a
Scientific Research Publishing Inc. ceasefire in 1991 that terminated the war and established a new phase of a
This work is licensed under the Creative
long and pointless peace process. After outlining the history of the Western
Commons Attribution International
License (CC BY 4.0). Sahara conflict, this paper analyzes the question of legality case starting from
http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ the settlement plan process through the Baker plans to the 2007 proposals by
Open Access both parties, and finally clarifies the reasons and motives behind the deadlock
in the Western Sahara. Therefore, the United Nations has been fastened in
the middle of a perplexed conflict that several parties are directly or indirectly
involved in. The key reason for the failure of this statutory question was the
lack of management and supervision of serious diplomatic negotiations.

Keywords
Western Sahara, Morocco, Legal Case, ICJ, Polisario Front, OAU,
Self-Determination

1. Introduction
Formerly a Spanish colony known as Spanish Sahara, the area is characterized by

DOI: 10.4236/blr.2023.144123 Dec. 27, 2023 2230 Beijing Law Review

 J. A. Laadam et al.

an historical and on-going territorial conflict between the Kingdom of Morocco

and the Sahrawi rebel movement Polisario (the Frente Popular de Liberación de
Saguía el Hamra y Río de Oro), which is backed by Algeria. A dispute marked by
colonization, decolonization, invasion, and an intermittent political stalemate
has given rise to “one of the longest, most intractable conflicts in Africa” (Mun-
dy, 2009: pp. 115-122).
In 1884, Spain, a latecomer to the colonial scramble for Africa, occupied
Western Sahara. Local tribes refused to accept this territorial claim, instead
choosing to engage in a 50-year fight against the colonial power for control of
the land. After Morocco won independence of its northern territory in 1956,
Spain maintained control over the coastal region of the country known as West-
ern Sahara. June and July 1956 marked the start of the Morocco Liberation Ar-
my’s (MLA) actions and two major Saharan tribes, Tekna and Reguibat, against
Spanish rule to have Western Sahara reintegrated into Morocco (Attillio, 1972:
pp. 195-205).
Western Sahara’s settlement has been undermined by the conflicting interests
of involved actors at the expense of the Moroccan Saharawi people, this opens
up larger discussions on the integrity of international law and reveals a weakness
in the ability of international organizations especially the United Nations (UN)
to ensure the significant right of the states which is sovereignty. The conflict in
Western Sahara commenced in 1975 (Jensen, 2005: pp. 56-59) after the Spanish
withdrew as a colonial power, allowing the Kingdom of Morocco to legalize the
region of Western Sahara territory. Morocco’s possession was challenged by the
Polisario Front (SADR) group that had been created to fight for independence
from Spain (Hodges, 1982). Originally, the Polisario (SADR) began effective
guerrilla warfare against the Moroccan forces, with extraneous support from
Algeria (Harvey, 1988: pp. 12-13).
The United Nations (UN) was involved in and brokered a ceasefire in 1991
that prevented the war between Morocco and the Polisario Front (SADR) and
began a new adventure of diplomatic scenes and ineffective peace settlement
resolutions to the Western Sahara dispute.
The United Nations has indeed been so keen on promoting its resolutions of
peace and stability in the conflict of Western Sahara, even if that meant peaceful
instability and the stop of decisive diplomatic talks. In response to all the United
Nations (UN) resolutions to solve this issue, the UN was trapped on the edge of
a puzzling conflict that required regional states’ efforts to end this protracted
territorial issue. All these circumstances explore the reasons that caused the United
Nations (UN) failure of the peace settlement in terms of international law doc-
trine.
Due to this complicated Western Sahara’s status, this peace agreement brought
about an end to active confrontation, but in the end, it did not resolve the dis-
pute. Voting on the referendum was frequently delayed, and diplomatic discus-
sions still existed, making the Western Sahara conflict remain neglected and

DOI: 10.4236/blr.2023.144123 2231 Beijing Law Review

J. A. Laadam et al.

generally unresolved for decades (Hodges, 1982).

2. The UN Vision through Western Sahara Dispute

Under the UN supervision, the Western Sahara conflict has seen ineffective legal
mechanisms including unsuccessful dispute resolution, and a lack of autonomy.
By 1963, the Kingdom of Morocco positioned the Western Sahara dispute, then
under Spanish occupation, in the hands of the United Nations. The UN was pre-
viously asked to study the Western Sahara conflict as a case falling under the
branch of decolonization. This is deemed to be lawful involvement, during
which the UN attempted to define the legal and institutional structure of the
dispute (Hanauer, 1995: Rev 133). By that time, the UN General Assembly an-
nounced a resolution approving the provisions of a resolution issued on October
16, 1964, of the UN “Special Committee on the situation about the Implementa-
tion of the Declaration of the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries
and Peoples relating to Ifni and Spanish Sahara”. This mainly encouraged Spain
to give up these regions from colonial occupation and, to this end, to enter into
negotiations on the problems concerning sovereignty given by these two territo-
ries.
The UN’s focus then moved from reshaping the principles of the legitimate
structure of the conflict in the early 1960s and 1970s to a phase of conflict man-
agement which was taken over by the Security Council. Even though the Security
Council was not responsible for resolving the Western Sahara dispute, its in-
volvement in this issue implemented new and lasting criteria for its settlement.
The Kingdom of Morocco’s backing for self-determination was established on
a well-structured hypothesis that the population of Western Sahara, if given the
chance, would go for reunification with the Moroccan mainland (Hannum &
Babbitt, 2006: pp. 135-157).
In 1976, the Western Sahara dispute was assessed by the United Nations Gen-
eral Assembly which recognized the position of the Organization of African Un-
ity (OAU) in solving the dispute as an African issue. The United Nations Gener-
al Assembly, advocated by the OAU Resolution, approved the parties to the con-
flict, the Kingdom of Morocco and the POLISARIO Front, to engage in direct
negotiations with an opinion of bringing about a cease-fire to set up the essential
circumstances for a peaceful and legal referendum for self-determination (Paz-
zanita, 2006: p. 138) of the people of Western Sahara, under the accords of the
OAU and the UN.
Morocco was an important force in the establishment of the Organization of
African Unity (OAU) known today as the African Union (AU), through “The
Casablanca Group”—an organisation composed of Algeria, Egypt, Ghana, Gui-
nea, Libya, Mali and Morocco—which merged with its rival, the Monrovia
Group, and eventually led to the creation of the OAU in 1963. Within the same
year, Morocco successfully lobbied to have the United Nations formally declare
the Western Sahara a non-self-governing territory and requested Spain to deco-

DOI: 10.4236/blr.2023.144123 2232 Beijing Law Review

 J. A. Laadam et al.

lonize it. A year later the OAU gave its first sign of its involvement in the con-
flict.
In October 1966, the OAU’s political committee called for the region’s inde-
pendence. In 1979, in order to resolve the Western Sahara conflict, the OAU
adopted a decision that called for a cease-fire and the holding of a free referen-
dum during which the voters would decide between total independence and
preservation of the status quo. During this period, Morocco faced the unfavora-
ble circumstances of having the OAU be a great supporter of the Polisario and
the independence of the Western Sahara. The main parties that helped the SADR
take lead within this organization were Algeria and Libya. These two countries
tried all they could to undermine Morocco’s lobbying for international en-
dorsement of its legitimate claim to the territory. Additionally, these govern-
ments have also actively helped the Polisario gain international recognition as
the government-in-exile.
The following year, the question of the SADR’s admission as a member of the
OAU was broached. In June 1981, King Hassan II proposed a referendum in
conformity with the OAU ad-hoc committee recommendations. King Hassan II
presented what he suggested as a referendum that would take into account
“Morocco’s historical rights to the territory” (Gupte, 1981: p. 1; Damis, 2003: pp.
99-101). The Algerian president Chadli Bendjedid came to the first session of the
OAU Implementation Committee in Nairobi during the same month holding a
91-page memorandum citing King Hassan II Referendum pledge as no more
than “a glimmer of hope, as yet a tenuous one,” and enumerating the conditions
which would have to be abided by to allow the committee to conduct its mandate
in order to “guarantee the exercise of a general and regular referendum of
self-determination”.
At the OAU, Algeria had a hand in every decision made by the Polisario; it
was indeed the most important party dictating and guiding SADR’s moves. The
second session of the Nairobi summit on February 8-9, 1982, culminated in the
decision that stipulates inter alia that the committee and the Chairman would set
up a date for the cease-fire and a peace-keeping force and/or a military observer
group would supervise the confinement of troops to their bases. An interim ad-
ministration lead by a Commissioner was in charge of the legislative and admin-
istrative powers necessary for the implementation of the referendum in the
presence of the Moroccan administration; the latter would be invited to coope-
rate whenever it was needed (OAU Doc. AHG/IMP.C/WS/Dec.2).
As a matter of fact when the Secretary General of the OAU Edem Kodjo made
the unilateral decision to allow the SADR to take part in the deliberations as a
member state without consulting with the Implementation Committee or the
OAU chairman, a decision which was borne of back room deals, confusion
arose, and 19 states left angrily staunchly protesting at the Secretary General’s
ignorance for the ongoing efforts by the Chairman, and the Implementation
Committee to resolve this matter. Even furthermore, Edem Kodjo allowed the
proceedings to pursue in the presence of the SADR’s representatives despite the

DOI: 10.4236/blr.2023.144123 2233 Beijing Law Review

J. A. Laadam et al.

absence of the quorum (Bahaijoub, 2010: p. 351).

This unexpected act pushed the OAU into chaos and threatened not only the
end of the Implementation Committee’s mandate but also the advancement of
its work (Shelley, 2004: p. 36). Kodjo’s move was intended to bring the work of
the Committee to a halt. In actual fact, the motives behind Kodjo’s act were that
his term of office was coming to an end with no hope of reelection, Gaddafi
made him an irresistible offer to change the course of events. Strong evidence
suggests that Kodjo exceeded his mandate in determining the legal basis for
Western Sahara’s admission, specifically by allowing, without prior consultation
with OAU chairman, Kenyan president Daniel Arap Moi, or the newly estab-
lished Implementation Committee on the territory’s future—a self-proclaimed
republic to take a seat as a member before a referendum on its status orga-
nised and supervised by the organisation was held. His diplomatic coup was
masterminded by skillful Algerian and Libyan lobbying within the OAU and
arm-twisting of some African heads of state dependent upon aid from Algeria
and Libya (Bahaijoub, 2010: p. 352). One may even deduce the reasons behind
this coup de force as being ascribed to the fact that Libya and Bendjedid, in par-
ticular, were rather dissatisfied about the outcome of the referendum. Indeed, if
the results of the referendum were in favor of Morocco, this would have jeopar-
dized all of Algeria’s longstanding efforts in helping the Polisario in its fight
against Morocco. Thus, President Bendjedid would have found himself in a
complicated and embarrassing position.
Algeria and Libya were capable at the time of such policies due to the two
countries’ extensive wealth from oil income, whereas, their neighbor, Morocco,
endured a difficult complex economic period that witnessed chronic drought.
Libya and Algeria did all they could to have the SADR’s admission secured
and were not bothered about the division in the OAU. Indeed, by this time, the
Pan-African Organization was almost split by country leaders—led by Algeria
and Libya on one hand, and, led by Morocco on the other. The OAU was almost
so equally divided that it was unable to simply hold a summit meeting, let alone
to come up to terms with issues on the Agenda regarding the Western Sahara.
Nothing more occurred until the OAU summit, which took place in Addis
Ababa on November 12-15, 1984. Most African state leaders had become in-
tensely confused over the Saharan issue; for many, it jeopardized OAU progress
and resulted in a split of opinions within the organization. The SADR delegation
was eventually seated in the Conference Hall in AddisAbaba. Moroccan officials
left without asking their supporters to join them. Before the Moroccan delega-
tion left the conference, King Hassan’s advisor, Guedira, delivered a message
from King Hassan to OAU members that SADR’s presence was unacceptable
and left Morocco no choice but to resign from the Pan-African Organization.
Under Bendjedid’s term, given the pressure from the Algerian Military toward
the Republic President, the OAU witnessed a staunch push by Algerian diplo-
macy for self-determination of Western Sahara and to have the SADR admitted
within the organization through Algerian-sponsored resolutions. Indeed, this

DOI: 10.4236/blr.2023.144123 2234 Beijing Law Review

 J. A. Laadam et al.

episode ended the OAU’s authority to handle the Western Sahara conflict by the
OAU, as the problem was then handed off to the United Nations. Hence, the
African Union’s role has been to support and accompany the United Nations
efforts in strict compliance with its prerogatives defined by resolution 693 (Deci-
sion on the Report of the Chairperson of the Commission of the African Union
on the issue of Western Sahara Doc. Assembly/AU/4 (XXXI)).

3. The International Community Stand and ICJ Advisory

View
Spain issued plans to hold a referendum in early 1975, the kingdom of Morocco
reported its opposition and proposed along with Mauritania mediation by the
ICJ to determine to whom the sovereignty of the territory belongs. The court
was required to investigate “whether the territory, first to the Spanish coloniza-
tion, was nobody’s territory, or without legitimate relation to a sovereign, or
whether such relations sustained, and if they existed, whether such titles ap-
proved in either Morocco or Mauritania or both. The ICJ reported its termina-
tions on October 16, 1975, and as pointed out in the formal document, “the
documents and information given on the Court show the existence, at the time
of Spanish colonization, of legitimate relations of loyalty between the Sultan of
Morocco and some of the Saharan tribes living in the territory of Western Saha-
ra (Hodges, 1982: p. 12). The ICJ emphasized that Rio de Oro and Saguia
el-Hamra were not unoccupied and uninhabited territory before their coloniza-
tion by Spain and that there existed legal relations of loyalty between the Sultan
of Morocco and some of the entities living in the territory of Western Sahara
(Advisory Opinion, I.C.J. Reports 1971: pp. 31-32, paras. 52-53).
Thus, the ties between Morocco and Western Sahara were regarded to be
chronologically puissant and only broken and divided by colonial rule. It is cer-
tain that at that time when Spain colonized Western Sahara, the Kingdom of
Morocco had its own character, and this special character stemmed from the fact
that this state was founded on a common bond of Islam, as well as the allegiance
of Saharaoui tribes through their caids or Sheikhs to the Sultan. Conversely, the
ICJ stated that its findings are insufficient to Morocco’s claims to have excised
territorial sovereignty over the Western Sahara. Here, the difference appears
clear between the Western and Moroccan concepts of the meaning of sovereign-
ty. Sovereignty is represented by the person of the Sultan in which his subjects
accept his political and religious authorities, and his legal authority on the land
in through his influence on the people residing in it. This was completely disre-
garded by the ICJ.

4. A Critique of the ICJ through the Western Sahara Dispute

The interpretation of the Advisory Opinion in the international court has not
been specifically positive towards the Western Sahara case. From a general point
of view, as Carrillo Salcedo highlighted in the “Libre determinación Journal…,”

DOI: 10.4236/blr.2023.144123 2235 Beijing Law Review

J. A. Laadam et al.

it is very wrong that the court made the possibilities offered by the call for an
opinion to escape, since it could have been an excellent occasion, which had not
been fully taken advantage of, for the ICJ to specify certain unclear aspects of the
Law on decolonization though, at least in law doctrine, this was the objective
engaged by the recall from the General Assembly. From a deep understanding
and, it should be questioned to what extent the General Assembly would have
been able to debate its policy, created through an endless sort of resolutions, in
response to an opinion of the ICJ which it had demanded. Indeed, if, after twen-
ty years of action by the General Assembly in the struggle for the rights of the
peoples of Western Sahara, (Ben-Meir, 2010: pp. 63-86) the opinion had dis-
proved the concept of the General Assembly, the Assembly would have discov-
ered itself in a very hard position, particularly taking into account the fact that,
even if the Advisory Opinions of the ICJ are not of a mandate nature, if the deci-
sions of the latter set up the existence and the content of the international rule
with authority, it seems only rational that the requesting organ should adapt its
conduct to the legitimate decision unless it wants to disprove this rule. Mean-
while, the view of an Advisory Opinion of the ICJ is not officially necessary for
the parties. Its objectives are to identify “the legal issues involved in conflicts
among States,” and in this norm to support the General Assembly in negotiating
the dispute. Advisory opinions do, after all, have influential aspects and real au-
thority (Rockower, 2002: p. 12). They represent in the end the legal statements of
the Supreme International Court; both the Court itself and the General Assem-
bly have viewed advisory opinions as authoritative expressions of law shaping
authority equal to that of judgment. Therefore, the Court was incapable of com-
ing up with any relationship creating ties of sovereignty between either of the
challenging states and the Western Sahara, in impact returned the dispute to the
General Assembly, rendering the non-binding character of the advisory opinion
of no real meaning.

5. The Right of Self Determination in the Frameworks of

International Law
The doctrine of the right to self-determination is a right of people to engage in
their political administration, far from the unnecessary influence of external ac-
tors. In some circumstances, for instance, when a territory is coming out of
occupation or colonial control, or rationally, its people are subject to signifi-
cant positions of injustice and coercion within their current state structure,
self-determination describes the right of the people to establish an independent
state and decide its government for itself (de Cherif, 1991: pp. 49-58). In other
cases, a state’s right to territorial integrity under international law doctrine may
demand that people who at the present remain within a recognized state practice
their rights to self-determination internally and domestically, signifying within
the remaining state’s governmental framework.
A conclusion that the right to self-determination is a basic principle of custo-

DOI: 10.4236/blr.2023.144123 2236 Beijing Law Review

 J. A. Laadam et al.

mary international law has shaped the basis of a total of opinions, resolutions,
and judgments of the ICJ both first and following the Western Sahara Case. It
was indicated in the Court’s Advisory Opinion in legitimate constitutional cir-
cumstances for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia
notwithstanding the Security Council Resolution. It was also noted and tested to
another Non-Self-Governing Territory in the Judgment.
As stressed upon, Regarding the Western Sahara Conflict, the notion of
self-determination which came into the context of resolutions 1514, 1541 and
2625 does not stipulate that self-determination applies to a part or a region of a
sovereign UN Member State on the contrary , it states that it is applicable to
peoples, who are geographically separate, or ethnically, culturally or linguistical-
ly distinct from the country administering them and in western sahara more
than 80% of the Saharaoui population live there, they participate in the political
life, they are part of the public policies of the regions.
In addition, the implementation of self-determination is framed by a funda-
mental principle, namely that of territorial integrity which is inscribed in the
United Nations Charter.
Specifically paragraph 6 of resolution 1514, states that “any attempt aimed at
partially or totally destroying the national unity and the territorial integrity of a
country is incompatible with the aims and the principles of the United Nations”.
The Moroccan endorsement of self-determination was built on a well-grounded
assumption that the population of Western Sahara, if given the opportunity,
would choose reunification with the Moroccan motherland. The links between
Morocco and Western Sahara were considered historically strong and only bro-
ken and divided by colonial rule (UN. General Assembly (29th Sess. A/9631),
1975: pp. 103-104).

6. The UN Peace Settlement Process in Western Sahara Case

between Morocco and Polisario Front (SADR)
In terms of a peaceful legal settlement process in the Western Sahara case, the
dispute on voting acceptability and efforts to advance voter drafts delayed the
referendum that was at the end released in 2000. The peace settlement procedure
would take another direction when James Baker II, former US Secretary of State,
was selected as UN Secretary Personal Envoy to Western Sahara in 1997. Baker
would come up with two alternatives during the time of his presence: the Baker
Plan I in 2001 and the Baker Plan II in 2003. Despite common intermediation
and negotiation works, Baker failed to get the two parties together to agree on
his plans. In 2004, Baker fully failed his mission leaving the peace process in an
unsolvable stalemate (Zunes & Mundy, 2010). In pursuit of filling the gap made
by the lack of a clear settlement process of this dispute, the UN Security Council
(1997) has been frequently calling upon the parties and countries of the North
African region to cooperate with the United Nations to break up the current
deadlock and to reach progress through a political solution. By 2007, particular-
ly, both parties presented their propositions and suggestions to the United Na-

DOI: 10.4236/blr.2023.144123 2237 Beijing Law Review

J. A. Laadam et al.

tions. On April 10, 2007, the Polisario didn’t bring anything new to the table and
presented to the UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-Moon his same proposal; a draft
called “Proposal of the Frente Polisario for a jointly acceptable Political Resolu-
tion convincing the Self-Determination of the people of Western Sahara.” On
the other hand, the Kingdom of Morocco, had submitted a new proposal to the
United Nations, in response to Security Council calls for a definitive political
solution. Morocco named the proposal the “Moroccan Initiative for Negotiating
an Autonomy Status for the Sahara within the Moroccan Sovereignty”, which
would see some administrative, legislative and judicial powers transferred to
residents, who would themselves run their affairs democratically.
Finally, for a long-standing dispute in North Africa on one hand and among
the Maghreb region on the other, the United Nations has been working hard to
find a definite resolution to the Western Sahara case, and attempting to bring
together the protagonist parties into a table of negotiations and effective diplo-
matic attitudes no matter how autonomy, sovereignty or self-determination. For
the current situation of Western Sahara status quo, the upcoming outcomes
would be seen in two following points: First of all, the outcomes of this conflict
are not very attractive, despite the ongoing significant increases of terrorist sects
in the Sahel region, where affiliated between Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb
region (AQIM) and the Polisario Front (SADR) have been exposed (Martin
2004: pp. 651-660). Similarly, since Morocco’s reintegration of Western Sahara,
Algeria has contested the move and in retaliation, began supporting the Polisario
militarily, diplomatically, and financially. The Algerian Republic was determined
that by challenging Morocco’s claim to Western Sahara, it would prevent it from
strengthening and enriching its position in North Africa, paving the way for Al-
geria to become the pre-eminent power in the region (Laadam, 2019: pp. 92-99).
For the Moroccan side, the solution to this Western Sahara dispute increases
from a legal surges of the Algerian regime that must, genuinely, give the essential
political attitude to end the unresolved case over Western Sahara. Finally, the
international actors are incapable of coming up with a compatible solution for
the rational reason that there are no international outcomes in the conflict.

7. Conclusion
The Western Sahara case from the international law approach refers to the on-
going dispute over the sovereignty of the Western Sahara region, a territory si-
tuated in Northwest Africa. This issue involves examining the legal aspects and
principles of international law that apply to the regional conflict.
The case has been brought by various international actors, including the In-
ternational Court of Justice (ICJ) and the African Union. The ICJ issued an ad-
visory opinion in 1975 stating that there were legal relations of allegiance be-
tween the Sahrawi people of Western Sahara and the Kingdom of Morocco, but
it did not determine the sovereignty of the territory due to the involvement of
the Algerian government to undermine Moroccan foreign policy in Northern

DOI: 10.4236/blr.2023.144123 2238 Beijing Law Review

 J. A. Laadam et al.

Africa.
Based on this statutory case, the UN has been engaging in facilitating negotia-
tions among the conflictual parties, including Morocco, the SADR, and the
neighboring country Algeria. Thus, the UN has established the United Nations
Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara (MINURSO) to monitor the
ceasefire between Morocco and the Polisario Front. Despite numerous attempts
to resolve, the Western Sahara dispute remains unresolved.
Understandably, the failure of the Security Council to resolve Western Sahara
dispute is characterized by the following: the UN member states’ failure to agree
to a peaceful resolution of the conflict from the outset and to hold the Polisario
Front (SADR) along with Algeria solely responsible for maintaining the status
quo by impending any resolution outcome from Morocco and thus cutting off
the political negotiations (Kleiboer, 1996: pp. 360-389). This means in practice
more refugees suffering in Tindouf camps as well as human violations. These
two parties, the Polisario and Algeria weakened the efficiency of the Security
Council and made it part of the crisis and not an important part of the peaceful
settlement.

Conflicts of Interest
The authors declare no conflicts of interest regarding the publication of this pa-
per.

References
Advisory Opinion, I.C.J. Reports 1971, pp. 31-32, paras. 52-53; and Western Sahara, Ad-
visory Opinion, I.C.J. Reports 1975, pp. 31-33, paras. 54-59) and Stated That It
Was—One of the Essential Principles of Contemporary International Law.
Attillio, G. (1972). Allal Al Fassi ou l`Histoire de l`Istiqlal. Edition Alain Moreau.
Bahaijoub, A. (2010). Western Sahara Conflict: Historical, Regional and International
Dimension. North-South Publications.
Ben-Meir, Y. (2010). Morocco’s Regionalization “Roadmap” and the Western Sahara. In-
ternational Journal on World Peace, 27, 63-86.
https://doi.org/10.1215/10474552-2010-027
Damis, J. (2003). The Western Sahara Dispute as a Source of Regional Conflict in North
Africa. Barakat Note.
De Cherif, T. K. S. (1991). Peace in Western Sahara? Africa Today, 38, 49-58.
Gupte, P. B. (1981). Morocco, in Reversal, Proposes Cease-Fire and Vote For Western
Sahara. New York Times.
https://www.nytimes.com/1981/06/27/world/morocco-in-reversal-proposes-cease-fire-
and-vote-for-western-sahara.html
Hanauer, L. (1995). The Irrelevance of Self-Determination Law to Ethno-National Con-
flict: A New Look at the Western Sahara Case. Emory International Law Review, 9,
133-134.
Hannum, H., & Babbitt, E. F. (Eds.) (2006). Negotiating Self-Determination (pp. 135-157).
Lanham.
Harvey, D. (1988). The Regan Doctrine, Morocco, and the Conflict in the Western Saha-

DOI: 10.4236/blr.2023.144123 2239 Beijing Law Review

J. A. Laadam et al.

ra: An Appraisal of United States Policy (pp. 12-13). University of Utah.

Hodges, T. (1982). Historical Dictionary of Western Sahara. The Scarecrow Press, Inc.
Jensen, E. (2005). Western Sahara: Anatomy of a Stalemate (pp. 56, 59). Lynne Rienner.
https://doi.org/10.1515/9781685859763
Kleiboer, M. (1996). Understanding Success and Failure of International Mediation. The
Journal of Conflict Resolution, 40, 360-389.
https://doi.org/10.1177/0022002796040002007
Laadam, J. A. (2019). The Role of Non-State Actors in Foreign Policy: Impact of Interest
Group in Algeria on Morocco’s Leaving OAU. International Journal of African &
Asian Studies, 58, 92-99.
Martin, P. S. (2004). Briefing: Western Sahara: Road to Perdition? African Affairs, 103,
651-660. https://doi.org/10.1093/afraf/adh087
Mundy, J. (2009). Out with the Old, in With the New: Western Sahara Back to Square
One? Mediterranean Politics. Routledge
Pazzanita, A. G. (2006). Historical Dictionary of Western Sahara (3rd ed.) Scarecroz
Press.
Resolutions Adopted by the General Assembly during Its 29th Session. Volume 1, 17
September-18 December 1974. A/9631. 1975. p. 103-104. (GAOR, 29th Sess., Suppl.
No. 31) UN. General Assembly (29th Sess.: 1974-1975).
Rockower, P. (2002). Possibilities of Peace in Western Sahara. Independent Study Project,
School for International Training, Rabat, Morocco.
Shelley, T. (2004). Endgame in the Western Sahara.
UN Security Council. S/1997/882 (1997, November 13). Report of the Secretary-General
on the Situation Concerning Western Sahara.
Zunes, S., & Mundy, J. (2010). Western Sahara: War, Nationalism, and Conflict
(Ir)resolution. Syracuse University Press. https://doi.org/10.2307/j.ctt1j2n9vz

DOI: 10.4236/blr.2023.144123 2240 Beijing Law Review