Cyberus Summer School Program v6
Cyberus Summer School Program v6
Cyberus Summer School Program v6
1/11
MONDAY, JULY 3: SESSION 1
Fault attacks and countermeasures
Moderator: Vianney LAPÔTRE, UBS
2/11
15:00 – 15:45 PENSEC William, UBS
Fault Injection Attacks Against an In-Core DIFT Mechanism
Internet of Things (IoT) devices manipulate sensitive data leading to strict security needs.
They face both software and physical attacks due to their network connectivity and their
proximity to attackers. These devices are usually built around low-cost and low-power
processors. In this paper, we study the impact of Fault Injection Attacks (FIA) on the D-
RI5CY processor integrating a Dynamic Information Flow Tracking (DIFT) mechanism
against software threats. Our results highlight the high sensitivity of the target to multiple
fault types at multiple spatial and temporal locations.
3/11
TUESDAY, JULY 4: SESSION 2
Wireless and software security
Moderator: Jacques KLEIN, UL
4/11
15:00 – 16:00 REBATCHI Hocine, UL
Dependabot and Security pull requests: a large empirical study
Modern software development is a complex engineering process where developer code
cohabits with an increasingly larger number of external open-source components. Even
though these components facilitate sharing and reusing code along with other benefits
related to maintenance and code quality, they are often the seeds of vulnerabilities in
software supply chains leading to attacks with severe consequences. It is thus important
to keep dependencies updated in a software development project. Unfortunately, several
prior studies have highlighted that, to a large extent, developers struggle to keep track of
dependency updates, and do not quickly incorporate security patches. Therefore,
automated dependency-update bots have been proposed to mitigate the impact and the
emergence of vulnerabilities in open-source projects.
In our study, we investigate the appropriateness and the limits of the current tools and
security measures related to dependency updates and the management of security
vulnerabilities in GitHub that lead to threatening the software supply chain. We also
attempt to identify the factors and the features that motivate the adoption of such tools. In
addition, our study aims to provide a better understanding of the practices used by
developers and security experts with regards to mitigating the threat of security
vulnerabilities, as well as discovering the dominance and lifetime of these vulnerabilities
in dependencies. Our main discoveries show that bots have enabled an improvement in
the monitoring of outdated dependencies, alleviating the difficulty of handling them
manually. Yet, developers use different strategies to identify and fix vulnerabilities in
dependencies. Besides, even though some tools enable quick reaction to vulnerable
dependencies after their disclosure, threat remains unknown in GitHub for 512 days, and
patches are disclosed after 362 days from 0-day, leading to a huge window of exposure,
especially that vulnerabilities with serious severity levels are the most occurring.
5/11
WEDNESDAY, JULY 5: SESSION 3 ante
Embedded systems security
Moderator: Guy GOGNAT, UBS
6/11
WEDNESDAY, JULY 5: SESSION 3
Deep learning for software repair and systems of systems
security
Moderator: Philippe TANGUY, UBS
7/11
14:45 – 15:30 SADOU Salah, UBS
Security of systems of systems
Modern society is critically dependent on a wide range of systems, and in particular
Systems of Systems (SoS). SoS are made from a collaboration of existing systems. As
any system, they are developed to meet their functional requirements while ensuring
correctness as well as safety, reliability, and performance, among other -ilities, it is equally
fundamental to ensure their security.
However, traditionally, security has only been considered after the design and more often
the implementation and even the deployment of software-reliant systems, meaning that
security is fitted into pre-existing designs or code or executable. In practice, a fit-all
solution is habitually assumed where security mechanisms are inserted into the system
with very little consideration of the implications of inserting such mechanisms into the
existing system design. As a result, security may conflict with the system requirements
and this can raise problems, which most of the times translate into security vulnerabilities.
In this presentation, I will define SoS and describe the raised challenges in security
perspective. By the way, I will present some of our team's work on these challenges.
8/11
THURSDAY, JULY 6: SESSION 4
Post-quantum cryptography and statistics for big data
Moderator: Olivier MARKOWITCH, ULB
9/11
FRIDAY, JULY 7: SESSION 5
New technologies and attacks on microcontrollers
Moderator: Guy GOGNIAT, UBS
10/11
14:45 – 15:30 GAUDIN Nicolas, UBS
Thwarting Timing Attacks in Microcontrollers using Fine-grained Hardware
Protections
Timing side-channels are an identified threat for security critical software. Existing
countermeasures have a cost either on the hardware requirements or execution time. We
focus on low-cost microcontrollers that have a very low computational capacity. Although
these processors do not feature out-of-order execution or speculation, they remain
vulnerable to timing attacks exploiting the varying latencies of ALU operations or memory
accesses. We propose to augment the RISC-V ISA with security primitives that have a
guaranteed timing behavior. These primitives allow constant time ALU operations and
memory accesses that do not alter the state of the cache. Our approach has a low
overhead in terms of hardware cost, binary code size, and execution time both for the
constant time secure program and other programs running concurrently on the same
hardware.
Contact: [email protected]
11/11