Criminal Law Notes by Tenywa Joseph Micheal

1
CRIMINAL LAW NOTES

COMPILED
BY
TENYWA JOSEPH MICHEAL LLB (UCU)
What is Criminal Law?
Criminal law is defined as the law body of law defining offenses against the
community at large, regulating how suspect are investigated, changed, and tried
and establishing punishments for convicted offenders. Criminal law is the
foundation of the Criminal Justice system. It is aimed at defining/ protecting the
society from substantive harm. The Laws are accompanied by sanctions. It also
provides for crimes and punishments.
It can also be defined as a body of specific rules regarding human code which
have been promulgated by political authority which applies uniformly to all
members of the class to which the ruler refer and is enforced and punishment
administered by the state. The above definition brings out four major elements of
criminal law.
Types of Criminal Law
Substantive Criminal Law: This is the definition of specific crimes and the general
principles that apply to those crimes. This is usually the starting point of studying
criminal law and later on the procedural criminal law is taught.
Procedural Criminal Law: This helps us study the legal standards of governing the
detection, investigation and prosecution of a crime.
Reasons for Development of Criminal Law
1. It developed as an institution of social control in society.

2. It also developed because of conflict in society. This is because every
member would like to have something which belongs to another member
and this may lead to conflict.
3. It developed to protect society against anti-social behavior by setting Do-
es and Don’ts.
Compiled by TENYWA JOSEPH MICHEAL LLB (UCU) 2023

2
The purpose of criminal law
 To forbid and prevent conduct that unjustifiably inflicts or threatens

substantive harm to the individual or public interests.
 To subject to public control persons whose conduct indicates that they are
disposed to commit crimes.
 To safeguard conduct that is without fault from condemnation as criminal.
 To give a fair warning of the nature of the conduct declared to an offence.
 To differentiate on reasonable grounds between serious and minor
offences
Differences between Criminal Law and Civil Law
 Criminal law is categorized as public law. This is because it is intended to

serve societal or public interest .while civil law is invariable on the private
law side.
 Secondly in criminal law, criminal proceedings are brought in the name of
the crown or state e.g. Rex V Job. While on civil law, civil suit are usually
brought by the aggrieved party, e.g. Smith V Joseph
 In criminal law the wrong is usually referred to as a crime, while in civil law it
is considered to be civil wrong.
 In criminal law a person (state) who intends to sue usually states the offence
or crime in a document referred to as a charge sheet or indictment. While
in civil suit, the claim is usually contained in a declaration. (In English law
plaint.)
 In criminal law the prosecutor pursues the case on behalf of the crown or
state. On the other hand in civil law, civil action or suits are usually brought
by the plaintiff on his or her behalf.
 In criminal matters the standard of proof is beyond reasonable doubt. While
in civil law, the standard of proof is on the balance of probabilities.
 In criminal matters a person can either be referred to as accused or
defendant before court. While on civil matters the person is usually referred
to as defendant.
 Finally, in criminal matter when a person is found to be guilty, he or she can
be sentenced, imprisoned or fined or both. While in civil matters a person
can only be found to be liable and court may usually order the liable person
to pay damages and costs.

3
CRIMINAL LIABILITY
Criminal Liability is simply the grounds upon which an accused can be found
liable of any criminal offence. The law on criminal liability is mainly categorized in
to two main principles. Actus Reus and Mens Rea. The cardinal principle of
criminal law is embodied in Latin maxims “actus non facit reum, nisi mens sit rea”.
Thus two points are involved in this maxim.
The outward conduct which must be proved against the accused which is known
as ACTUS REUS
The state of mind which the accused must be proved to have had at the time of
the act (MENSREA)
Literally, the Latin maxim “Actus non Facit reum, nisi mens sit rea” is translated as
“An act does not make a man guilty of a crime unless his mind also be guilty” 1.
This was defined by Haughton v Smith (1993) UK HL 4, in which Lord Hailsham LC
presented the above definition of the maxim. This serves as a general rule in
criminal law which explains that for any act to be criminal in nature it must be
done with a guilty mind. Both the criminal act and the criminal mind are necessary
to a firm criminal liability2.
While as the actus reus constitutes the physical element of the crime, the mesn
rea constitutes the mental element of the crime; hence, these two elements must
be proved with the same degree of strictness.3 It is important to note that a crime
is “an act that the law makes punishable; the breach of a legal duty treated as
the subject-matter of a criminal proceeding.”4 Similarly, it is also referred to as a
criminal wrong where the terms ‘crime’ ‘offense’ and ‘criminal offenses’ are all
said to be synonymous, and ordinarily used interchangeably.
In the case of R v Tolson (1889) 23 QBD 168, 187, defendant was charged with
bigamy and Stephene J. held that;-
“The full definition of every crime contains expressly or by implication a

proposition as to a state of mind. Therefore, if the mental element of any
conduct alleged to be a crime is proved to have been absent in any given
case, the crime so defined is not committed; or, again, if a crime if fully
1
Smith and Hogans Criminal Law; Cases and Materials, (7th ed., Butterworths Publishers, London, 1999) 3
2
Catherine Eliot Frances Qinn, Criminal Law, (8th ed., Pearson, England, 2010) p.10
3
Smith and Hogans (n1) 5 Black’s Law Dictionary, Bryan A.Garner, e.d. (11th ed., West Publishing Co., United
States of America, 2019) p.466
4
Blacks’ Law Dictionary, Bryan A. Garner, e.d (11th e.d., West Publishing Co. United States of America, 2019) P.466

4
defined, nothing amounts to that crime which does not satisfy that
definition.”
From the above case, it is logical to conclude that a mere breach of the law is
not enough to constitute a criminal offense. However, it is important to note that
no breach of the law goes unpunishable.5 Consequently, this maxim helps to
alleviate the degree of punishment if the defendant did not have an evil intent
to commit crime as it was held in the case of Woolmington v DPP (1935) All ER.
Swift J, advised the jury that if the death of a person at the hands of another was
not planned, then the punishment can be alleviated.
1. ACTUS REUS
Every criminal act has its own actus reus as the physical element and it is important
to note is the act committed must have been voluntary in nature. The Penal Code
Act Chapter 120 of the republic of Uganda highlights the actus reus of every crime
that is punishable by law. An example can be given of murder in section 188
where a knife is used, cutting or stubbing is the actus reus if the victim dies. It is
important to note from the start that actus reus is not merely an act but can as
well include a state of affairs or circumstances in which the accused was found.
In regards to a state of affairs, the definition of offences often specifies
surrounding circumstances such as time of place which are essential to render
the act criminal. Importantly, the actus reus may be constituted by a failure to act
(Omission).
1.1. Types of Actus Reus
i. Result crimes
Result crimes are also referred to as conduct and consequence crimes where the
mere behavior of the accused must produce a particular result.6 The common
example is murder where stubbing or strangulation lead to the death of the
another human being. Other examples may include strangulation, aiming a gun
and pulling the trigger and pushing a victim from the top of a building.
In talking about the consequence, your conduct must have resulted into the
death of a person. The conduct and the consequence are part of the physical
elements (actus reus) of the crime. However in crimes like malicious wounding,
the conduct and the consequence are inseparable. The conduct is the pushing
of a knife or broken bottle into someone’s’ body and as long as this act of pushing
happens, there is no need of a consequence.
5
Catherine Eliot (n3)
6
Catherine Eliot (n3) p. 11

5
ii. Action crimes
These are also referred to as conduct and no consequence crimes. The

consequences of an act are immaterial to establishing criminal liability. A
common example is in situation of rape where according to Section 123, Penal
Code Act mere having carnal knowledge of a woman or a girl constitutes a crime
despite the consequences.
The actus reus here is simply an act, the consequences of that act being
immaterial. For example, perjury is committed whenever someone makes a
statement which they do not believe to be true while on oath. Whether or not
that statement makes a difference to the trial is not important to whether the
offence of perjury has been committed.
A conduct does not require a consequence such as in buttery, when you box
someone, even if they do not go the hospital, as long as you exerted an unlawful
force, you are criminally liable.
In theft, as long as you took what does not belong to you, there is no need of a
consequence.
iii. State of affairs crimes
The actus reus in state of affairs crimes rests on circumstances, and sometimes
consequences. These refer mainly to a state of being as opposed to doing of
criminal acts. An example can be given of prostitution where a defendant may
not be arrested in the act but by the circumstances such as the place, the
dressing cord, or the material they possess or the magazines they poses. An
example is the case of Shaw v DPP (1962)AC 220 where the defendant was
charged from benefiting from the proceeds of prostitution by mere possession of
magazines that had lists and photos of prostitutes.
In R V Larsonner the accused was a foreigner who was found in Britain without
permission and was found guilty. In cases relating to prostitution, you may not
need to get someone in the act but may be according to the place where they
are standing or the dressing code.r
1.2. Actus and Omission
In such circumstances, the actus reus can be as a result of failure to carry out a
duty where the failure becomes an act.7 For example, if an individual gets an
accident, a by stander has no legal duty to help the accident victims though may
be having a moral duty. On the other hand, a person riding a boda boda and
7
Card, Cross and Jones, Criminal Law (20th e.d, Oxford University Press, United Kingdom, 2012) 45

6
knocks down a pedestrian has a duty to help the pedestrian. There are different
situation under which one can commit a criminal act by omission and these
include;-
i. Imposition of duty to act
Before one commits a crime by failing to act under duty, the defendant must
have a duty to act under the law. An example is the case of R v Khan and Khan
(1998) EWCA Crm 171 where the defendants sold heroin to a 15 year old and she
got into coma yet they never took her to the hospital until she died. The
defendants were charged because they had a duty to act. It is however
important to note that the defendant must be having a duty to act.
ii. Duty arising from creating a dangerous situation
One can be held criminally liable for creating a dangerous situation. This was held
in the case of Evans [2009] EWCA Crim 650 or [2000] 1WLR 1999. The mother
bought heroin and a doughter injected herself with an overdose and died in the
night. The mother and the sister were charged with gross negligence and man
slaughter.
Similarly, in the case of R V Miller [1983]2AC 161 who created a dangerous

situation and failed to act. The facts of the case were that the defendant was a
vagrant who had spent the evening drinking before returning to the property
where he was squatting. He fell asleep with a lit cigarette in his hand, which
started a fire. The defendant woke and, seeing the fire, took no steps to extinguish
it but simply moved to sleep in a different room. Eventually the whole house
caught fire, causing over £800 worth of damage. The defendant was charged
with arson.
The prosecution relied on the ground that the defendant had failed to take any
action to extinguish the fire in addition to the fact that he had been reckless in
starting the fire by falling asleep with a lit cigarette, the question arose whether
the defendant could be liable for an omission.
The court concluded that as he was responsible for having created the
dangerous situation, the defendant was under a duty to take action to resolve it
once he became aware of the fire. It was not necessary that the defendant was
subjectively aware of the risk of damage posed by the fire, provided that this
would be obvious to a reasonable person who troubled to turn his mind to the
matter. The defendant was therefore liable for his omission to take any steps to
put out the fire or seek held, and was accordingly convicted of arson.

7
iii. Duty arising out of contractual liability
This arises when an individual omits to do what he/ she is supposed to do under a
given contract and it leads to a criminal act such as death of another person. In
R V Pitwood (1902) 19 TLR 37, where the defendant was employed at a railway
company to operate the gate. He left the gate open where during his absence,
a horse and cart crossed the track through the open gate, and was hit by a
passing train. The defendant was charged because he neglected his contractual
duty. Other categories of acts by omission may include, duty arising out of a
relationship, Duty arising from the creation of a dangerous situation, duty arising
from assumption of care of another and breach of duty to act. Under such
scenarios, a defendant can be charged of a criminal offense by omission where
the actus reus is based on the failure to act.
Similarly, in the case of R v Adomako [1995] 1 A.C. 171, the facts of the case were
that the defendant, Mr Adomako, was an anaesthetist. He was undertaking his
role during an eye operation during which the patient was required to be placed
under a general anaesthetic. During the operation, and whilst under Mr.
Adomako’s supervision, a crucial tube became disconnected from the ventilator
and the patient suffered a fatal cardiac arrest. Mr Adomako was convicted of
the manslaughter by breach of duty.
iv. Duty arising out of a Relationship

Parental Relationship;-
Parents are under a duty to care for their children. For example section 157 of the
penal code and 156 (cap 120) laws of Uganda.
Desertion of children ‘Any person who being the parent, guardian or other person
having the lawful care or charge of child under the age of fourteen years and
being able to maintain such child willfully and without lawful or reasonable cause
deserts the child and leaves it without means of support commits a
misdemeanor’.
Neglecting to provide food, etc for children ‘Any person who being the parent of
guardian or other person having the lawful care or charge of any child of tender
years and unable to provide for itself, refuses or neglects being able to do so to
provide sufficient food, clothes, bedding and other necessaries for such child, so
as thereby to injure the health of the child commits a misdemeanor’
In the Case of Gibson V Proctor (1918) 13 Crim App, A man and a woman in whom
they were living together were held guilty of murder of the man’s child. The

8
woman withheld food from the child intending it to die or suffer grievous bodily
harm. They were convicted of murder.
Relationship to a Relative;-
In R V Stone and Dobinson [1977]1 QB 354, Stone’s sister called Bardy at 61 years
came to live with them. Bardy was suffering from Anorexia, her condition
deteriorated. She came in 1972 but in 1975, she was confined in a small room.
Stone was 91 years and Dobinson was 43 years. Given the fact that Stone and
Dobinson assumed responsibility over a relative and failed to act by offering the
necessary medical support they were charged.
Relationship to a Spouse;-
In the case of R V Smith (1979)Crm LR 251, Smith’s wife gave birth to a dead child,
she hated doctors and when she fell sick, she refused to go to the hospital. She
also refused Smith to call the doctors. She finally died and Smith was held
criminally liable.
In the case of R V Hood (2003) EWCA Crm 2772
The defendant’s wife was injured in a fall. She suffered from osteoporosis and
brittle bone disease. The defendant was his wife’s sole carer, but he failed to get
her medical attention for several weeks. By this point, the wife’s condition had
deteriorated and she died in hospital. The defendant was convicted of gross
negligence manslaughter and sentenced to four years in prison. He appealed his
sentence. During the appeal, he argued that his wife was capable of calling
assistance herself, and had told him that she did not want to go to hospital. Since
he was not completely responsible for her death, he argued that four years was
an excessive sentence. The Court of Appeal agreed that the defendant was not
wholly responsible for his wife’s death and that four years was therefore excessive.
The defendant was resentenced to 30 months in prison.
v. Duty arising from Assumption of Care for another
A duty will be imposed on a person who voluntarily undertakes to care for another
person. This is so common in times of infirmity/ sickness.
In the case of R V Instan [1873]1 QB 450, the facts of the case were that Instan
was cared for and maintained by her seventy-three-year-old aunt who was the
deceased in this case. The deceased was healthy until shortly before her death
before she contracted gangrene in her leg which prevented her from moving
and caring for herself. During this time, Instan lived in the house, took in food from
traders (of which she gave the deceased none), omitted to procure medical
assistance and even conducted conversations with neighbours about the

9
deceased without disclosing her dire condition. The jury found Instan guilty of
manslaughter in the first instance. Instan appealed.
Whilst she had the gangrene infection, the victim could only be aided by Instan
and it was only Instan that had knowledge of her condition in the final days of her
life. On this basis, it was held that Instan owed the victim a duty of care and that
she did not discharge this duty with the actions mentioned in the facts. The failure
to do so was deemed to at least accelerate the death of the deceased. Appeal
dismissed and the conviction was affirmed.
In the case of R V Stone and Dobinson. The facts of the case were that the
defendants, S and D, were a couple who took in the victim, S’s sister, as a lodger.
S had severe disabilities, being partially deaf and blind. D had learning
difficulties. Whilst staying with the defendants, the victim became unable to care
for herself, having long struggled with mental health issues and obsession about
her weight. D made some efforts to care for her, bringing her food and washing
her with the held of a neighbour. However, her attempts were not sustained and
inadequate, and the victim passed away. The defendants were charged with
manslaughter.
The issue was the jury were entitled to find that the defendants owed a duty of
care to the victim. The jury were entitled to find that a duty of care was owed on
the grounds that the victim was not only a lodger in the home of the defendants
but also had closer ties to each. In Stone’s case, a duty of care was owed on the
basis that she was a blood relative, whilst Dobinson had undertaken a duty of
care by washing her and providing food.
You can also see the case of R V Nicholls [1874]13 COX 75 (Where Nicholls took
on a child after the grand mother died).
vi. Breach of Duty to Act
In the case of R V Dytham [1979] QB 722, the defendant was a police officer on
duty at 1 am. He was standing at about 30 yards from, the club, the bouncer
pushed a person out of the club. The 3 men beat up the person to death and the
officer told some people around and drove away saying that he was going for
duty. He was held liable because of a misconduct to uphold the duty of keeping
peace.

10
Exceptions to Breach of Duty

Release from Duty
In Airedale NHS Trust V Brant [1993] AC 789, the House of Lords provided guidance
on when a duty can be withdrawn. Sanctity of life was to be respected but also
human dignity had to be respected in regard to the quality of life. These
exceptions are however granted by courts of law not the discretion of the
doctors.
Rebby [2002] 2 All ER- If the doctor knows that the patient is rational where they
ask to be deprived of a life support machine or medicine, it can be removed.
2. MENS REA
The mens rea is the criminal intention which is the mental element of a criminal
offence. Just like Actus rea, the mens rea equally varies according to offenses. In
the case of Bratty V A.G of Northern Ireland, Lord Denning said that “The
requirement is that no act is punishable if it wasn’t done voluntarily”.
Consequently, there must be an intention to commit a crime for one to be
criminally liable. The mens rea is also referred to as malice aforethought or a
conscious planning. It may also include a less deliberate act such as recklessness
of negligence. In the case of Sweet v Parsley [1970] AC 132, the defendant was
charged with being concerned in the management of any premises used for”
smoking cannabis, contrary to section 5 of the Dangerous Drugs Act 1965 despite
being unaware that her premises were being used. However court held that there
was no way a landlord would know everything done by the tenants.
2.1. Forms of Mens rea
i. Intention
While as we found out that the act or omission is a principle requirement of an

offence, defining of some offences liability can be based on intention and it is in
this that the question of what is meant by law by intention is of crucial. Intention
refers to what a defendant was thinking of at the time of committing a crime.
There is no definition of intention in the statutes and the penal code does not
define the word intention. Nevertheless, intention was defined in R V Mohan
(1976)QB 1 case, as a decision to bring about in as far as it lies within the
accused’s power a particular consequence no matter whether the accused
desired that consequence of his act or not.
Alternatively intention can be described as the accused purpose or aim. Section

8(2) of the Penal Code Act states that “Unless the intention to cause a particular
result is expressly declared to be an element of the offence constituted, in whole

11
or in part, by an act or omission, the result intended to be caused by an act or

omission is immaterial.” This position was also held in the case of R V Inglis [2011] 1
WLR 1110. In this case, Thomas surffered terminal illness and had several injuries
and operations that deformed him. Thomas was the son of Inglis and out of the
desire to stop the surffering of Thomas, Inglis killed her son. She was held liable for
the death of her son despite having what she thought to be a good intention.
In Muhammed V R the appellant a driver was convicted of stealing a load of

maize. He said in evidence that he had taken the maize to his own house and
there off loaded it. Because it was raining, he further said that he had kept it for
some days because he was expecting it to dry. He kept it for 9 days without telling
the owner or his employer. He was convicted of theft by the magistrate court. On
appeal to the high court it was held that there was no sufficient evidence for
which could show that he had necessary fraudulent intention. The appeal was
allowed.
Intention can be divided into two categories including;-
Direct intention; in which the consequences of an act are as intended. In the

case of R v Calhaem (1985) 1 QB 808, the defendant was convicted of murder
under s.8 of the Accessories and Abettors Act 1861. The defendant had
counseled Z to murder the victim. Z decided not to carry out the murder but had
gone berserk and eventually killed the victim anyway. Upon appeal, the appeal
was dismissed.
Indirect intention/ Oblique intent; The defendant commits a crime not necessarily
aiming to kill but there are more likely consequences. It occurs where the
defendant does not necessarily desire an outcome but an undesired result comes
out of a criminal act. In the case of R v Woollin (1999) AC 82, the defendant was
charged with murder after throwing his three months baby on the ground and
died after sustaining a fracture on the scale. However, upon appeal, the House
of Lords overturned the ruling and changed the offense from murder to
manslaughter asserting that the defendant could not see a substantial risk. This
qualified the case under indirect intention.
ii. Recklessness
This is the deliberately taking of unjustified risk. A man is reckless in respect of the
consequence of his act, when he foresees that it may occur but does not desire
it nor foresee it as virtually certain. Coincidence of actus reus and mens rea. The
mens rea must coincide in point with the act which causes the actus reus. Mens
rea implies an intention to do a present act not a future act.

12
Until the case of R v G and another, the leading case on subjective recklessness
was R v Cunningham (1957). In R v Cunningham, the defendant broke a gas
meter to steal the money in it, and the gas seeped out into the house next door.
Cunningham’s prospective mother-in-law was sleeping there, and became so ill
that her life was endangered. Cunningham was charged under s. 23 of the
Offences Against the Person Act 1861 with ‘maliciously administering a noxious
thing so as to endanger life’.
The Court of Appeal said that ‘maliciously’ meant intentionally or recklessly. They
defined recklessness as where: ‘the accused has foreseen that the particular kind
of harm might be done and yet has gone on to take the risk of it’. This is called a
subjective test: the accused must actually have had the required foresight.
Cunningham would therefore have been reckless if he realised there was a risk of
the gas escaping and endangering someone, and went ahead anyway. His
conviction was in fact quashed because of a misdirection at the trial.
iii. Negligence
In criminal law, when the action of a defendant falls below standards of a

reasonable person. A person acts negligently when he brings about a
consequence which a reasonable and prudent man would have foreseen and
avoided e.g. if x a notorious car thief offers to sell to D at an absolutely low price
a car which is hidden in the forest, the possibility that it is a stolen car does not
occur to him. If a reasonable man would have avoided that risk, D is negligent
with respect to the circumstance if the car had been stolen.
In McCrone v Riding 21 (1938) 1 All ER 137, the facts state that the defendant was
charged of careless driving where it was held that the accused’s driving could be
considered careless if he had failed to come up to the standard of a reasonably
experienced driver given his short experience. While as in 1981, Lord Diplock
created the objective form of recklessness in the case of MPC v Caldwell, though
it was abolished in 2003 in the case of R v G and another.
There is one important common law crime where negligence is an element of the
offence: gross negligence manslaughter. Because this is a very serious offence,
the courts are not just looking for negligence but for gross negligence. The leading
case on the meaning of gross negligence is the House of Lords judgment of R v
Adomako (1994). In that case the House stated that the question of whether gross
negligence existed was a jury issue to be determined taking into account all the
circumstances. The jury had to consider whether the defendant had been so
negligent that their conduct went beyond a mere matter of compensation for
the civil courts and justified criminal liability.

13
2.2. Principles of Mens Rea

i. Subjectivity
The subjective test concerns what the judges believe the defendant was thinking
about. In the case of R v G and another [2003] UKHL 50, Lord Bingham held that
“it is a satutary principle that conviction of serious crime should depend on proof
not simply that the defendant caused (by act or omission) an injurious result to
another but that his state of mind when so acting was culpable”.
In R V Hyams (1975) AC 55, The defendant was having a relationship with Mr.
Jones. Jones was in another relationship with Booths. Hyam spread petrol on the
house of Booths and lit it with a newspaper for the purpose of threatening another
woman in a house into leaving the neighborhood. Booths’ children were killed by
the fire. The subjective test was applied in this case and it was held that the
defendant had knowledge that setting the house on fire at 2:00am leads to
death. She was held liable.
ii. Objectivity
An objective test of mens rea considers what a reasonable person in the position
of the defendant would have thought at that time of the commission of the crime.
The court asks, “Would a reasonable person have foreseen the degree of
probability accruing from the defendant’s actions?” In mens rea, we need the
highest degree of proof. The more heinous the crime, the higher the degree to be
proved. In Metropolitan Commissioner V Caldwel (1982)AC 341, the hotel worker
was demanding the hotel his salary. He burnt a hotel with 10 guests inside though
they survived to be burnt. The court applied the objective test of what a
reasonable person would have done and the defendant was held liable.
CAUSATION
Result crimes such as murder raise the issue of causation. The result must be
proved to have been caused by the accused‘s act. If the result is caused by an
intervening act or event, which was completely unconnected with the accused‘s
act and which could not have been foreseen, the accused will not be liable.
Where the result is caused by a continuation of the accused‘s act and the
intervening act, and the accused‘s act remains a substantial cause, then he or
she will still be liable. Much of the case law on the issue of causation has arisen in
the context of murder. It should be remembered that the issue of causation is
relevant to all result crimes.

14
Types of Causation
1. Legal Causation
2. Factual Causation
LEGAL CAUSATION
In R V Whatsson [1989] 2 All ER 865, the defendant had been convicted of

manslaughter. The defendant was a burglar and 90 minutes after breaking into
the house, the victim died of a heart attack. The defendant appealed and the
case was over turned because death of the victim was remote to the burglary.
The death could not be directly linked to the heart attack.
FACTUAL CAUSATION
In cases such as murder, the prosecution must prove that the accused’s actions
caused the death of the victim. We explain it using the “But for Test”. This can
precisely mean that “What happened to the victim would not have happened
without the conduct of the defendant”. If the consequence would have
happened anyway, them the defendant is not liable.
In the case of R V White [1910]2KB 124, the facts of the case were that the
accused put potassium cyanide in his mothers’ milk intending to kill her. Shortly
after wards the mother was found dead with the glass partly full besides her, the
medical evidence was that she died of heart attack and not from poisoning and
that the quality of potassium cyanide administered was insufficient to cause her
death. The accused was acquitted of murder but accused of attempted murder.
This was because although the intended consequence had occurred, it had not
been caused by his conduct and thus an element of actus reus of murder was
missing.
The leading case is R v Roberts (1971) where the defendant had given a lift to a
young woman and had touched her clothes. She panicked, thinking that he was
about to sexually assault her and jumped out of the moving car injuring herself.
He was found to have caused her injuries as her reaction was foreseeable and
not so daft as to be extraordinary. In the words of the Court of Appeal:
Was [the victim’s reaction] the natural result of what the alleged assailant
said or did, in the sense that it was something that could reasonably have
been foreseen as the consequence of what he was saying or doing? If the
victim does something so ‘daft’ or so unexpected that no reasonable man
could be expected to foresee it, then it is only in a very remote and unreal
sense a consequence of his assault.

15
Circumstances where we establish the Causal Link
1. Circumstances of the third parties

2. Actions of the victim
a. Deliberate acts
b. Fright
c. Self-Neglect
d. Where the Doctor provides medical mistreatment
Circumstances of the third parties
In the case of Benge [1865]4 F&F 504, the defendant D, the foreman of a track-
laying crew, misread the railway timetable, so that the track was up at the time
the train was due. He realized his error and placed a signalman with a flag 540
yards up the line, although statutory regulations specified a distance of at least
1,000 yards. However, the train driver was not keeping proper lookout and failed
to stop. Several deaths were caused. Thus, the deaths were a combination of:
■ D’s misreading of the train timetable
■ The signalman’s failure to stand 460 yards further up the line
■ The train driver’s failure to keep a proper lookout
Nevertheless, the jury were directed to convict D if they were satisfied that his
conduct mainly or substantially caused the deaths (they were so satisfied, and D
was convicted).
Similarly, in the case of Pagett (1983)Crm LR 393, the facts of the case were that
the defendant was attempting to escape being captured by armed police, using
his girlfriend as a human shield. He shot at the police and his girlfriend was killed
by shots fired at him in self-defence by the policemen. The defendant was found
liable for the girl’s death as it was a natural result of the defendant’s behaviour
that the police shot back and hit her in response to his shots.
Lord Robert Goff said that “Simply in law, the accused act need not to be the
sole or even main cause of the victim’s death it being enough that his acts
contributed to the results”. The judge used 2 principles
- The defendants conduct was the factual cause of the victim’s death
- The defendants conduct was the legal cause of the victim’s death

16
Actions of the victim

Deliberate acts
These are common with cases involving drugs such as heroin. If the defendant
injects the victim, he will be responsible for the overdose but if the victim is handed
the heroin and injects himself overdose and dies, then it is upon the victim unless
in cases of children who cannot make a rational decision.
Under the traditional principles of causation, the free voluntary conduct of the
victim (or a third party) breaks the chain of causation. This general principle was
confirmed by the House of Lords in R v Kennedy (No. 2) (2007). In this case the
defendant had supplied the victim with heroin. The victim had injected himself
and died of an overdose. The House of Lords held that the chain of causation had
been broken because of the free and voluntary conduct of the victim which had
intervened between the act of supply and the death of the victim. The chain of
causation was broken despite the fact that the victim’s intervening conduct was
completely foreseeable.
The respected criminal law academic, Glanville Williams, wrote in his Textbook of
Criminal Law (1983):
Underlying this rule [that the victim’s voluntary conduct breaks the chain of
causation] is, undoubtedly, a philosophical attitude. Moralists and lawyers
regard the individual’s will as the autonomous prime cause of his behaviour.
What a person does (if he reaches adult years, is of sound mind and is not
acting under mistake, intimidation or similar pressure) is his own
responsibility, and is not regarded as having been caused by other people.
An intervening act of this kind, therefore, breaks the causal connection that
would otherwise have been perceived between previous acts and the
forbidden consequences.
Fright
The Latin maxim “Novus actus interveniense-“a new intervening act” demands
that for one to be held criminally liable, there must have been no intervening act.
In cases where there is an intervening act by the victim, the defendant is not
criminally liable.
In the case of R V Marjorm (2000) Crm 372, the defendant had been shouting and
kicking the victim’s door. She jumped through the window and injured herself. The
defendant claimed that he heard the victim’s window and thought it was a
suicide attempt so he came to rescue. However court held that if the victim does

17
something no reasonable man could do, it would be remote; hence, the

defendant was held criminally liable.
In contrast, the case of William and Davis [1992]2 All ER 183, the jury could not
establish the causal link. The facts of the case were that the two defendants gave
a lift to a hitch hicker, after 5 miles, the victim opened the rare door and jumped
out and died. The defendants were charged of robbery. Upon appeal, there was
no causation and the jury could not establish why the victim jumped.
In R v Blaue [1975] 3 All ER 446, the defendant approached the female friend and
asked her for sex and she refused. He stubbed her 4 times. She was take n to the
hospital but she refused blood transfusion because she was a Jehovah’s Witness,
a church which, among other things, forbids its members to have blood
transfusions. As a result of her refusal to accept a transfusion, the victim died of
her wounds. The Court of Appeal rejected the defendant’s argument that her
refusal broke the chain of causation, on the ground that the accused had to take
his victim as he found her. However due the intervening act of the victim (refusing
blood transfusion), the defendant was charged with manslaughter instead of
murder.
Where the Doctor provides medical mistreatment
There are 2 circumstances where the doctors may be accused of causing death.
Where doctors act in palliative care
Where the doctor is administering palliative care to a patient with a naturally

occurring disease, the doctor must do what is professionally recommended to
support the life of the patient. If the doctor chooses between the pain of the
victim or administer the drug which may take the life of the patient, he can be
held criminally liable.
The case of R V Adams (1957) Crm LR 365, involved a doctor who was treating a
terminally ill patient. The trial judge directed the jury that if the patient’s life was
cut short by weeks or months, it was as important as cutting their life to years. The
doctor who terminates ge life of a patient not even the time matters to take up
one’s life. If the restoration of life is not possible, there is a lot a doctor can do to
alleviate pain and prolong the life of the patient. In such cases, the objective test
is also applied to see what any other doctor would do at such a time.
Where the Doctor Acts Negligently
In R v Smith [1959] 2 QB 35, a soldier was stabbed in a barrack-room brawl. He was

dropped twice as he was being taken to the medical officer, and then there was
a long delay before he was seen by a doctor, as the doctor mistakenly thought

18
that his case was not urgent. When he did eventually receive treatment it was
inappropriate for the injuries he was suffering from and the doctors did not see
another wound in the back. The issue before court was whether the victim had
died of the stubbing or the negligence of the doctors. The doctors were held
liable for negligence but nonetheless the court took the view that these
intervening factors had not broken the chain of causation so that the original
wound was still an operative cause and the accused was liable for murder.
In R v Cheshire (1991), a dispute developed in a fish and chip shop, ending with
the defendant shooting his victim in the leg and stomach, and seriously wounding
him. The victim was taken to hospital, where his injuries were operated on, and he
was placed in intensive care. As a result of negligent treatment by the medical
staff, he developed complications affecting his breathing, and eventually died.
His leg and stomach wounds were no longer life-threatening at the time of his
death. The court stated that the critical question for the jury to answer was: ‘Has
the Crown proved that the injuries inflicted by the defendant were a significant
cause of death?’ Negligent medical treatment could only break the chain of
causation if it was so independent of the accused’s acts, and such a powerful
cause of death in itself, that the contribution made by the defendant’s conduct
was insignificant. This means that medical treatment can only break the chain of
causation in the most extraordinary cases; incompetent or even grossly abnormal
treatment will not suffice if the original injury is still an operative cause of death;
hence, the defendant was held liable for the death of the victim.
Life support Machine
The same principle was followed in R v Malcherek and Steel. The victims of two
separate attacks had been kept on life-support machines; these were switched
off in accordance with established medical practice when tests showed that they
were braindead. The two defendants argued that when the hospital switched off
the machines the chain of causation was broken, thereby relieving the
defendants of liability for murder. The court rejected this argument on the grounds
that the original injuries were still an operative cause of their victims’ deaths.
“Actus non Facit reum, nisi mens sit rea” is a general rule to criminal liability. It
emphasizes the coincidence between a criminal action and a criminal intention.
These act as both the physical and mental element of a crime. Inchoate offences
are not exceptions to this general rule, however, offenses of strict liability and
vicarious liability are exceptions to this rule. Hence, one is criminally liable without
coincidence of the actus reus and mens rea.

19
THE PRINCIPLE OF LEGALITY
This is expressed in Latin word called nulla poena sine lege i.e. no punishment
except in accordance with the law. If a person is charged and convicted of an
offence, he is seen as a wrong person in society thus he suffers embarrassment
and his integrity is generally affected. Further, society has to be governed in
accordance with specific principles to avoid anarchy. Therefore, it is important
that no person is to be punished unless he has breached a specific provision of
criminal law. The above Maxim expresses the idea that a person should not suffer
except for a distinctive breach of Criminal Law that is laid before him in precise
and definite terms. This Maxim further signifies that no person can be found guilty
of an offence, but only for an act which had been forbidden.
Nullum crimen sine lege is sometimes called the legality principle. It is also
interchangeable with "nullum poena sine lege," which translates to "no
punishment without law".
There are four elements essential to the principle of legality.
Nullum crimen sine lege scripta (Written)
Nullum crimen sine lege certa (Certain/Defined)
Nullum crimen sine lege stricta (Strict law/ exact)
Nullum crimen sine lege praevia (Previous Legislation)
The principle of Legality is primarily enshrined in Article 28 of the Constitution of

Uganda.
1. Defined offence and Penalty Prescribed
Article 28(12) “Except for contempt of court, no person shall be convicted of a

criminal offence unless the offence is defined and the penalty for it prescribed by
law”.
It also requires that a crime must be written so that each person understands it, ie.
The law must be accessible to every citizen. This provision of the law emphasizes
that you cannot accuse someone of an offence which is not written down in the
law and the punishment prescribed.
Even for any offences whose punishment might not have been listed in the
particular law, section 22 of the Penal Code Act provides punishment for all such
offences. Section 22 of the penal Code Act notes that “When in this Code no
punishment is specially provided for any misdemeanour, it shall be punishable
with imprisonment for a period not exceeding two years.”

20
Consequently, there should be no penalty without an exact law. This prohibits the
application by analogy of statutory provisions in criminal law.
In the case of Uganda V Hussein Hassan Agade and 12 others (Crim Session 1 of
2010)[2016] UGHICD, the facts of the case were that the defendants were jointly
accused of the offence of terrorism belonging to a terrorist group known as Al-
Shabaab and murder of victims at Kyadondo Rugby Grounds during the 2010
World Cup finals. Section 2 of the Anti Terrorism Act stated that ‘Terrorist
organization’ means an organization specified in the 2nd schedule of the act.
However in 2010, when the Kampala bombings took place, Al-Shabaab was not
among the organizations listed in the 2nd schedule of the Anti-Terrorism Act as a
terrorist organization. The defendants were not held liable for belonging to a
terrorist group in accordance with Article 28 (12). Justice Alfonse Chigamoyo
Owiny-Dollo had this to say-
“It therefore follows that an organization to qualify or be treated as belonging

to a terrorist organization within the meaning assigned to the term by the Act,
it must either be listed in the 2nd schedule to the Act, or alternatively pass under
a name mentioned in that schedule. Unfortunately, at the material time, Al-
Shabaab was not listed in the 2nd Schedule to the Act and did not pass under
a name of any of the organizations list in the said schedule”
2. Non-retroactivity
Article 28(7) “No person shall be charged with or convicted of a criminal offence
which is founded on an act or omission that did not at the time it took place
constitute a criminal offence.” This principle can be stated as the “non-
retroactivity of the law; hence, there should be no crime without a previous
legislation. It outlaws retrospective application of laws. This means if an act is done
before the law was made, the person cannot be convicted on the basis of that
act.
In the case of Francis Atugonza v DPP (Criminal Case 37 of 2010) [2011] UGHC 72,
the facts of the case were that Francis Atugonza was charged with acts of
corruption which he committed between December 2007 and December 2008.
He was charged with corruption according to Sec 11 (1) of the Anti –Corruption
Act 2009 which came into effect in December 2009. Francis Atugonza argued
that this was contrary to Article 28(7) of the constitution since the Anti-Corruption
Act 2009 came into force after he committed the alleged crimes.

21
Previously, there had been “The Prevention of Corruption Act but in December
2009, The Prevention of Corruption Act was repealed and replaced by the Anti –
Corruption Act 2009.
The preamble to the Anti –Corruption Act was stating that it was a continuation
of The Prevention of Corruption Act. The re-enactment is thus a continuation of
the old law. It is important to note that when a statute is repealed and part of it
or all of its parts are re-enacted, it is taken to be a continuation of the old law.
Francis Atugonza’s claim was thus referred to the Constitutiional Court for
interpretation as Uganda v Atugonza (Constitutional Reference No. 31 of 2010)
[2011] UGCC 14. Court held that;-
“it is a general rule that when a statute is repealed and all or some of its provisions
are at the same time re-enacted, the re-enactment is considered a reaffirmation
of the old law, and a neutralization of the repeal, so that the provisions of the
repealed Act which are thus re-enacted continue in force without interruption.”
Court thus referred back the case to the High Court to continue with the criminal
proceedings against Francis Atugonza.
3. Severity of the Punishment
Article 28(8) “No penalty shall be imposed for a criminal offence that is severer in
degree or description than the maximum penalty that could have been imposed
for that offence at the time when it was commit”. Every law that aggravates a
crime is not allowed. (Article 28 (8) of the Constitution).
It is however important to note that when the law is maintained but the penalty
changed, then courts will charge the accused according to the new law but will
retain the punishment outlined in the old law. A case in a point is where the old
law says 5 years of imprisonment but the new law prescribes 8 years of
imprisonment, then the punishment under Article 28(8) shall be as per the old law.
15.2 BURDEN OF PROOF
It is important to not right away that conviction results in the right of the accused
being affected and conviction gives rise to a record, which stigmatizes the life of
the individual. Additionally, a crime is an offence against society and before
society can show that accused has injured it, the crown, representing society;
should prove it, hence the adage that “ it is better for guilty persons to be freed
than innocent person to be convicted.
According to article 28 (3) (a) of the Constitution, any person charged with a
criminal offence is presumed innocent until proved guilty or until he pleads guilty.
This means that an accused person is innocent until the court proves otherwise. In

22
the case of Uganda V Hussein Hassan Agade and 12 others, Justice Alfonse
Chigamoyo Owiny-Dollo pointed out that “In law, it is incumbent on the
Prosecution to prove the guilt of the Accused person as charged. This burden of
proof perpetually rests on the Prosecution, and does not shift to the Accused
person; except where there is a specific statutory provision to the contrary”.
That the prosecution must produce evidence against the accused so as to prove
that the accused committed an offence. In other words the prosecution has to
prove that it is the accused who committed the offence otherwise he has no case
to answer. Some scholars categorize the burden of proof into the persuasive
burden which is the act of persuading court to believe that the accused is
criminally liable and the evidential burden which is the act of adducing evidence.
Summarily, the prosecution has bears both the evidential burden and persuasive
burden which constitute the burden of proof.
In Woolmington V DPP (1935) AC 44, the court initiated change regarding the
burden of proof, which hitherto was accused. The court observed that the burden
of proof should shift from the accused to the prosecution to prove (a) the act, (b)
unlawfulness and (c) the state of mind. The importance of this rule cannot be
overemphasized because:
In the case of Woolmington V DPP, Reginald Woolmington was a 21-year-old farm

labourer. On November 22, 1934, three months after his marriage to 17-year-old
Violet Kathleen Woolmington, his wife left him and went to live with her mother.
On December 10 Woolmington stole a double-barrelled shotgun and cartridges
from his employer and went to his mother-in-law where he shot and killed Violet.
He was arrested on January23 the following year and charged with the wilful
murder of his wife. Woolmington claimed he did not intend to kill her. He wanted
to win her back so he planned to scare her by threatening to kill himself if she did
not come back. While questioning her about returning, he attempted to show her
the gun that he was to use to kill himself. By accident, the gun went off shooting
Violet in the heart. The Trial judge ruled that the case was so strong against
Woolmington that the burden of proof was on him to show that the shooting was
accidental.
On February14,1935 Woolmington was convicted and sentenced to death. On

appeal to the Court of Criminal Appeal, Woolmington argued that the Trial judge
misdirected the jury. The appeal judge discounted the argument using the
common-law precedent as stated in Foster’s Crown Law (1762).
“In every charge of murder, the fact of killing being first proved, all the
circumstances of accident, necessity, or infirmity are to be satisfactorily
proved by the prisoner, unless they arise out of the evidence produced

23
against him; for the law presumes the fact to have been founded in malice,
unless the contrary appears”
The issue brought to the House of Lords was whether the statement of law in
Foster’s Crown Law was correct when it said that if a death occurred, it is
presumed to be murder unless proved otherwise. In articulating the ruling, Lord
Sankey made his famous “Golden thread” speech:
“Throughout the web of the English Criminal Law one golden thread is
always to be seen that it is the duty of the prosecution to prove the
prisoner’s guilt subject to... the defence of insanity and subject also to any
statutory exception. If, at the end of and on the whole of the case, there is
a reasonable doubt, created by the evidence given by either the
prosecution or the prisoner... the prosecution has not made out the case
and the prisoner is entitled to an acquittal. No matter what the charge or
where the trial, the principle that the prosecution must prove the guilt of the
prisoner is part of the common law of England and no attempt to whittle it
down can be entertained.”
The conviction was overturned, and Woolmington was acquitted. He was

released three days before his scheduled execution date.
Furthermore, in the case of Uganda v Isabirye & 3 Anor (Criminal Session 78 of

2011) [2013] UGHCCRD 47, the facts of the case were that the accused were
charged of the murder of Bakaki Bumali during the night of 21.01.11 at Kiyunga
Trading Centre, Luuka Town Council in Luuka District. Lady Flavia Senoga Anglin
pointed out that;-
“…the established principle of law is that the burden of proof rests upon
the prosecution throughout and never shifts except in a few instances
provided for by law. It has further been plaid down by decided cases that,
in all indictments for murder, the standard of proof is even higher than in
the ordinary criminal cases”
The above position was also upheld in the case of A. Abonyo & Another vs. R.
[1962] EA and in the case of Uganda vs. Adonia Zoreka & No. 7770 DC Kikwenba
Criminal case 103/87.
It can not be emphasised any further that the burden of prrof rests on the
prosecution and even in situations where the lower courts have misdirected
themselves on the principle of burden of prrof, upon appeal, such judgements
have been overturned as it was in the case of Ndege Maragwa v. Republic (1965)
E.A.C.A. Criminal Appeal No. 156 of 1964, where court said:

24
“… We find it impossible to avoid the conclusion that the learned judge has,
in effect, provisionally accepted the prosecution case and then cast on
the defence an onus of rebutting or casting doubt on that case. We think
that is an essentially wrong approach: apart from certain limited
exceptions, the burden of proof in criminal proceedings is throughout on
the prosecution. Moreover, we think the learned judge fell into error in
looking separately at the case for the prosecution and the case for the
defence.
The burden of proof ever rests on the prosecution and it must prove to court
beyond reasonable doubt. If there should be even the slightest of doubt that the
accused might not have been liable, court will further require the prosecution to
fill up any gaps in the proof or else the accused shall be acquitted. However if the
prosecution has proved its case beyond reasonable doubt and the accused still
finds reasons for him not to face the law, any such exceptions and exemptions
must be proved by the accused not beyond reasonable doubt but on a balance
of probabilities.
PRINCIPLE OF REVERSE ONUS
There are situations when the Burden of Proof comes in Exceptions/ (Not
necessarily shifting the burden to the accused)
Section 105 of the Evidence Act provides that “Burden of proving that case of
accused comes within exceptions and fact especially within knowledge.
When a person is accused of any offence, the burden of proving the existence
of circumstances bringing the case within any exception or exemption from, or
qualification to, the operation of the law creating the offence with which he or
she is charged and the burden of proving any fact especially within the
knowledge of that person is upon him or her.”
There are situations where the accused is required to prove his or her argument
such that he comes to the exemption, exception or operation of the law. This is
largely understood as the “Reverse Onus” For example, if the prosecution proves
beyond reasonable doubt that X committed murder and X gives an excuse as to
why he thinks he is not guilty, he has to prove himself to the contrary buy bringing
the necessary evidence. This has also been described as an evidential burden by
Catherine Elion, “Criminal Law” on page 322.
In a criminal case, the burden of proof always lies with the prosecution: they must
prove beyond all reasonable doubt that the defendant committed the offence,
rather than defendants having to prove themselves innocent. On the other hand,

25
defendants who claim they have a substantive defence will be required to

provide some proof of it – they cannot simply claim to have acted in self-defence,
or under duress, and expect the court to leave it at that.
The precise nature of the burden of proof depends on the defence which is put
forward. Where it is self-defence, provocation, duress, necessity, automatism or
intoxication, defendants bear an evidential burden, which means that they must
produce some evidence to support the claim. Once this evidence is produced,
the burden of proof passes back to the prosecution, who have to disprove the
defence in order to prove their case.
Where the defence put forward is either insanity or diminished responsibility,

defendants bear not only an evidential but also a legal burden: as well as
producing evidence of this defence, they also have to prove to the jury that it was
more likely than not that factors amounting to such a defence existed (this is
called proving on a balance of probabilities, a standard of proof usually
associated with civil actions).
Conclusively, the position of Justice Alfonse Owiny-Dollo in Uganda V Hussein

Hassan Agade and 12 Ors sums up the discussion that;-
“I should however point out that while it is advisable and useful for the defence
to cause a reasonable doubt to hang over the prosecution case, by punching a
hole, or laying bare the deficit, in the case, this does not arise in every case. It only
does so where the prosecution has presented a fairly strong case that may need
an explanation from the Accused. This does not amount to shifting the burden of
proof to the Accused; as the burden lies perpetually on the Prosecution to prove
the guilt of an Accused person beyond reasonable doubt”
Modes of the Principle of Reverse Onus

1. Express Statutory Exceptions.
Statutory exceptions may be expressed or inferred by necessary implications and

such enactments specifically declare onus of proving a particular defence to be
on the accused e.g. the defence of insanity and diminished responsibility; S.10 of
the Penal Code Act. However, where the burden is cast on the accused to prove
any relevant fact, the standard of proof is not beyond reasonable doubt but on
the preponderance of evidence as balance of probabilities. In the case of
Sebakige John V. Uganda S.C.Cr.A No.6/2000, the Supreme Court observed that
diminished responsibility is a breach of statute which statute expressly places the
burden of proving it on the defence.

26
2. Implied Statutory Exception
Where an accused person relies for his or her defence on any exception,
exemption, provison, excuse or qualification, whether or not it accompanies the
description of the offence or a matter of complaint in the enactment creating
the offence, the burden of proving the exception, exemption, proviso, excuse or
qualification lies on him or her. In the case of R. V. Edwards (1975) 1 W.L.R 70, the
defendant was convicted of selling intoxicating liquor without the justice’s
licence. He appealed on ground that since the prosecution had access to a
register of licences in force, it should have presented evidence to show that no
licence was in force. It was held that the legal burden of proving that the accused
was a holder of a justice’s licence rested on the defence and not on the
prosecution.
3. Defense of Insanity
In the case of Chan Kau v. The Queen (1952) W.L.R. 192.... At p. 194 Lord
Tucker said this:
‘Since the decision of the House of Lords in Woolmington v. Director of

Public Prosecutions (1935) A.C. 462; and Mancini v. Director of Public
Prosecutions 28 C.A.R. 65; it is clear that the rule with regard to the onus of
proof in cases of murder and manslaughter is of general application and
permits of no exceptions save only in the case of insanity, which is not strictly
a defence.’”
In the aforementioned cases, insanity was pointed out and incase one gives a
defence of insanity, he has a duty to prove that he was insane by providing
medical evidence or expert evidence. The prosecution will in turn disapprove the
evidence produced by the accused who claims to have been insane. This further
shows us the burden of proof on the side of the prosecution since it has proven
until there is no room for doubt.
STANDARD OF PROOF
Having noted that in Law, the burden of proof lies on the prosecution, in the case
of Uganda V Hussein Hassan Agade, Justice Alfonse Chigamoyo Owiny-Dollo
equally emphasized that “the standard or threshold required to prove the case
against the Accused person is that the proof must be beyond reasonable doubt.
This does not necessarily mean proof with utmost certainty, or 100% proof.
Nonetheless, the standard is met only when, upon considering the evidence
adduced, there is a high degree of probability that the Accused in fact
committed the offence.”

27
In Miller vs Minister of Pensions [1947] 2 All E.R. 372 at page 373 to page 374, Lord
Denning stated quite succinctly that:–
"The degree of beyond reasonable doubt is well settled. It need not reach
certainty, but it must carry a high degree of probability. Proof beyond
reasonable doubt does not mean proof beyond the shadow of a doubt. The
law would fail to protect the community if it admitted fanciful possibilities to
deflect the course of justice. If evidence is so strong against a man as to leave
only a remote possibility in his favour, which can be dismissed with a sentence:
'of course it is possible but not in the least probable', the case is proved
beyond reasonable doubt; but nothing short of that will suffice."
In the case of Bater v. Bater [1950] 2 All E.R. 458 at 459, Lord Denning noted;-
“It is true that by our law there is a higher standard of proof in criminal cases
than in civil cases, but this is subject to the qualification that there is no
absolute standard in either case. In criminal cases, the charge must be
proved beyond reasonable doubt, but there may be degrees of proof
within that standard. Many great judges have said that, in proportion as the
crime is enormous, so ought the proof to be clear.”
That passage was approved in Hornal v. Neuberger Products Ltd. [1956] 3 All E.R.
970, and in Henry H. Ilanga v. M. Manyoka [1961] E.A. 705 (C.A.).
In Hornal v. Neuberger Products Ltd., Hodson, L.J.
“A larger minimum of proof is necessary to support an accusation of crime

than will suffice when the charge is only of a civil nature. ... in criminal cases
the burden rests upon the prosecution to prove that the accused is guilty
‘beyond reasonable doubt’. When therefore the case for the prosecution
is closed after sufficient evidence has been adduced to necessitate an
answer from the defence, the defence need do no more than show that
there is reasonable doubt as to the guilt of the accused.”
R. v. Stoddart (1909) 2 Cr. App. Rep. 217at p. 242.
... ... ...[I]n criminal cases the presumption of innocence is still stronger, and
accordingly a still higher minimum of evidence is required; and the more
heinous the crime the higher will be this minimum of necessary proof.
Where, on the evidence adduced before Court, there exists only a remote
possibility of the innocence of an Accused person, it would mean the Prosecution
has proved its case beyond reasonable doubt; hence, the Prosecution would
have conclusively discharged the burden that lay on it to prove the guilt of the
Accused.

28
INCHOATE OFFENSES NOT EXCEPTIONAL TO ACTUS REA-MENS REUS MAXIM
These are offences which are incomplete where they are partially completed or
imperfectly formed.8 It is usually a step toward the commission of another crime,
step in itself being serious enough to merit punishment. Inchoate offences are not
exceptional to the general rule of “Actus non Facit reum, nisi mens sit rea”. The
three inchoate offences are attempt, conspiracy and incitement.
3.1. Attempt
When a person begins to execute the means adapted to the fulfilment of a crime,
they are charged with the attempt to commit a crime. A person who executes
his/her intentions by an overt act is said to have attempted committing a crime.
At this point, the objective of the crime has not been achieved and the actus reus
of a completed offence is not yet committed.
Section 386 of the Penal Code Act notes that;-
(1) When a person, intending to commit an offence, begins to put his or her
intention into execution by means adapted to its fulfillment, and manifests his or
her intention by some overt act, but does not fulfill his or her intention to such an
extent as to commit the offence, he or she is deemed to attempt to commit the
offence.
(2) It is immaterial— (a) except so far as regards punishment, whether the offender
does all that is necessary on his or her part for completing the commission of the
offence, or whether the complete fulfillment of his or her intention is prevented by
circumstances independent of his or her will, or whether the offender desists of his
or her own motion from the further prosecution of his or her intention;
(b) that by reason of circumstances not known to the offender it is impossible in

fact to commit the offence.
Additionally, section 387 of the Penal Code Act points out that Attempts to
commit offences. Any person who attempts to commit a felony or a
misdemeanour commits an offence, which unless otherwise stated, is a
misdemeanour.
3.2. Conspiracy
When a person conspires with another to commit a criminal offense, he is charged

with a felony of conspiracy. This preparatory stage is treated as a crime and a
person is charged with conspiracy if the intended crime was not committed. This
8
William Musyoka, Criminal Law, (Law Africa Publishing (U) Ltd, 2013) p.225

29
is used to prevent group activity which can cause disharmony in society.

Consequently, different crimes in the penal code Act consist of conspiracy.
Section 390 of the Penal Code Act;- Conspiracy to commit felony. Any person
who conspires with another to commit any felony, or to do any act in any part of
the world which if done in Uganda would be a felony and which is an offence
under the laws in force in the place where it is proposed to be done, commits a
felony and is liable, if no other punishment is provided, to imprisonment for seven
years, or if the greatest punishment to which a person convicted of the felony in
question is liable is less than imprisonment for seven years, then to such lesser
punishment.
Section 391 of the Penal Code Act;- Conspiracy to commit misdemeanour. Any
person who conspires with another to commit a misdemeanour, or to do any act
in any part of the world which if done in Uganda would be a misdemeanour, and
which is an offence under the laws in force in the place where it is proposed to
be done, commits a misdemeanour and is liable to imprisonment for five years.
EXCEPTIONS TO THE RULE OF ACTUS REUS AND MENS REA

1. STRICT LIABILITY OFFENCES
The general rule of criminal law is that a man is not criminally responsible for an
act or conduct unless it is proved that he did the act voluntarily and with a
blameworthy state of mind. This principle is also frequently stated in the form of a
Latin maxim: actus non facit reum nisi mens sit rea. The definition of a particular
crime, either in statute or under common law, will contain the required actus reus
and mens rea for the offence.
The principle of strict liability is an exception to the general rule of criminal law.
The accused may be criminally liable although his conduct was not intentional,
reckless or negligent. This is known as strict liability or liability without fault. Thus strict
liability is simply criminal liability in the absence of intent, purpose, knowledge,
belief, recklessness, negligence or some other prescribed mental element.
Offences of strict liability are those crimes which do not require mens rea with
regard to at least one or more elements of the actus reus. The defendant need
not have intended or known about that circumstance or consequence. Liability
is said to be strict with regard to that element.
Under some circumstances, a person may be charged where there is no mental

element accompanying the criminal act. Hence, there may be no intention nor
recklessness or negligence. Although the defendant acted under a reasonable

30
mistaken belief that he had a defense applicable to the offence charged, he

can be punished in the absence of any fault on his part and he is said to be under
strict liability. This is common to crimes that violate public welfare, sale of goods,
drugs, operation of factories, traffic and road safety, among other cases.
According to Lord Edmund DAVIES in Whitehouse v Lemon [1979] 1 ALLER 898 at

920, an offense is regarded and properly regarded as one of strict liability if no
mensrea need be proved as to a single element in the actus reus. For example,
an offense of driving without a valid, driving license under s.35 of the traffic and
Road safety Act.
Another example is that of defilement, where the accused will be convicted of

defilement even though he reasonably but mistakenly believed that the victim
was old enough to consent to intercourse
No precise rules can be given as to when court will interpret a statutory offense
as one of strict liability. The courts will consider the wording of the statute, the
gravity of the offense and particularly the object and purpose of the legislation.
It is believed that where the statute applies to an issue of social concern such as
the sale of medicinal drugs without a prescription or public safety, then strict
liability would be effective to promote its objects. What factors are taken into
account by the courts when assessing whether or not an offence falls into the
category of strict liability offences?
These principles were also applied by the Court of Appeal in: R v Blake (1996). In
this case, investigation officers heard an unlicensed radio station broadcast and
traced it to a flat where the defendant was discovered alone standing in front of
the record decks, still playing music and wearing a set of headphones. Though
the defendant admitted that he knew he was using the equipment, he claimed
that he believed he was making demonstration tapes and did not know he was
transmitting. The defendant was convicted of using wireless telegraphy
equipment without a licence, contrary to s1(1) Wireless Telegraphy Act 1949 and
appealed on the basis that the offence required mens rea.
The Court of Appeal held that the offence was an absolute (actually a strict)
liability offence. The Court applied Lord Scarman's principles in Gammon and
found that, though the presumption in favour of mens rea was strong because
the offence carried a sentence of imprisonment and was, therefore, "truly
criminal", yet the offence dealt with issues of serious social concern in the interests
of public safety (namely, frequent unlicensed broadcasts on frequencies used by
emergency services) and the imposition of strict liability encouraged greater
vigilance in setting up careful checks to avoid committing the offence.

31
In criminal law, strict liability is liability for which mens rea does not have to be
proven in relation to one or more elements comprising the actus reus. The liability
is said to be strict because the accused will be convicted even though he was
genuinely ignorant of one or more factors that made his acts or omissions criminal.
The accused may therefore not be culpable in any real way, i.e. there is not even
criminal negligence, the least blameworthy level of mens rea.
An offence is regarded as that of strict liability if no mensrea need to be proved

as to the single element. Crimes of strict liability are almost a creation of the
statutes. In R V Woodrow, the accused was found guilty of having in his house
adulterated tobacco although he did not know. The prosecution emphasized the
purpose of statute. Court held that the crime was still committed even if there was
no fraud or intention.
In Gammon (Hong Kong) Ltd v Attorney-General for Hong Kong [1985] 2 All ER 503,
the accused were involved in building works in Hong Kong. Part of a building they
were constructing fell down, and it was found that the collapse had occurred
because the builders had failed to follow the original plans exactly. The Hong
Kong building regulations prohibited deviating in any substantial way from such
plans, and the defendants were charged with breaching the regulations an
offence punishable with a fine of up to US $ 250,000 or three years imprisonment.
On appeal they argued that they were not liable because they did not know that
the changes they made were substantial. However the Privy Council held that the
relevant regulations created offenses of strict liability, and the convictions were
upheld.
Explaining the principles on which they had based the decision, Lord Scarman
laid down the criteria upon which a court should decide whether or not it is
appropriate to impose strict liability: "In their Lordships' opinion,;-
The law … may be stated in the following propositions.
(1) there is a presumption of law that mens rea is required before a person can
be held guilty of a criminal offence;
(2) the presumption is particularly strong where the offence is "truly criminal" in
character;
(3) the presumption applies to statutory offences, and can be displaced only if
this is clearly or by necessary implication the effect of the statute;
(4) the only situation in which the presumption can be displaced is where the
statute is concerned with an issue of social concern, and public safety is such an
issue;

32
(5) even where a statute is concerned with such an issue, the presumption of
mens rea stands unless it can be shown that the creation of strict liability will be
effective to promote the objects of the statute by encouraging greater vigilance
to prevent the commission of the prohibited act."
In strict liability offences, the presumption of innocence does not require a mens
rea and the proof of mens rea can be challenged in four cases.
Classification of Strict Liability Offences
In Sherras v De Rutzen (1895), Wright J stated that apart from isolated and extreme
cases like bigamy and abduction of a girl under sixteen, the principal classes of
strict liability may perhaps be reduced to three:
in the public interest are prohibited under a penalty (eg, the sale of adulterated
food: Roberts v Egerton, 1874).
Stephens (1866) where the employer was held liable on indictment for a nuisance
caused by workmen without his knowledge and contrary to his orders.
it is really only a summary mode of enforcing a civil right (eg, see Hargreaves v
Diddams (1875) as to a bona fide belief in a legally impossible right to fish). But,
except in such cases as these, there must in general be guilty knowledge on the
part of the defendant, or of someone whom he has put in his place to act for him,
generally, or in the particular matter, in order to constitute an offence.
Grounds for challenging the need for Mens Rea
 Where the crime is regulatory

 Where the crime is one of a social concern
 Where the wording of the act indicate strict liability
 The Offence caries a small penalty.
1. Where the crime is regulatory
In the case of Sweet V Parsely (1970) AC 132, the defendant was found guilty of
allowing her property to be used for smoking cannabis. The judge questioned as
to which regulatory authority the defendant would be charged. The defendant
was a landlady of a house let to tenants. She retained one room in the house for
herself and visited occasionally to collect the rent and letters. While she was

33
absent the police searched the house and found cannabis. The defendant was
convicted under s5 of the Dangerous Drugs Act 1965 (now replaced), of "being
concerned in the management of premises used for the smoking of cannabis".
She appealed alleging that she had no knowledge of the circumstances and
indeed could not expect reasonably to have had such knowledge.
The House of Lords, quashing her conviction, held that it had to be proved that
the defendant had intended the house to be used for drug- taking, since the
statute in question created a serious, or "truly criminal" offence, conviction for
which would have grave consequences for the defendant. Lord Reid stated that
"a stigma still attaches to any person convicted of a truly criminal offence, and
the more serious or more disgraceful the offence the greater the stigma". And
equally important, "the press in this country are vigilant to expose injustice, and
every manifestly unjust conviction made known to the public tends to injure the
body politic [people of a nation] by undermining public confidence in the justice
of the law and of its administration." Lord Reid went on to point out that in any
event it was impractical to impose absolute liability for an offence of this nature,
as those who were responsible for letting properties could not possibly be
expected to know everything that their tenants were doing.
As a result, Sweet’s case was quashed since she was not bound too have
knowledge of what the tenants did in her premises. About the interpretation of
the statute, Lord Reed stated that the land lord cannot have full knowledge of
what the tenants do.
The House of Lords held that if the statutory regulatory authority is silent, it must be
presumed to be requiring mens rea unless it categorically indicates that it is an
offence of strict liability.
Out of this kind of challenge, the parliament amended this section.
It is also important to note that it is a universal principle that if the provision has a
double interpretation, then the interpretation that favours the defendant must be
used; hence, in Sweet’s case, the interpretation that favours the accused had to
be upheld.
In the case of Alphacell V Woodward, the company tried hard to ensure that the
rivers were not polluted but never the less, the rivers were polluted.

34
2. Where the crime is one of a social concern

In the case of Callow V Tillstone (1900) 64 JP 8
In this case, a butcher was convicted of selling spoilt meat despite it having been
stamped from the gate. He was not negligent but non the less, he was convicted
because the case was one of a social concern.
Uganda V Okum Crm 29 of 2008 P. 119
RV William [2011]1 WLR 588
3. Where the wording of the act indicate strict liability

R V Howells [1977]3 ALL ER 417
The appellant bought a revolver believing it to be an antique. The law did not
require a fire arm licence to buy an antique but however, the antique was fake
and it was found to be a gun that needed a licence. It was taken as an offence
of strict liability. Howell was charged of illegal possession of fire arms.
PSGB V Storkwain
The appellant was a pharmacist and was convicted of an offence under the
Medicines Act of 1998 of selling drugs.
In Cundy v Le Cocq (1884) 13 QBD 207, the appellant was convicted of unlawfully
selling alcohol to an intoxicated person under s.13 Licensing Act 1872. The
appellant appealed on the grounds that he unaware of the customer's
drunkenness. The appeal was dismissed and conviction was upheld. Court held
that S.13 was silent as to mens rea, whereas other offences under the same Act
expressly required proof of knowledge on the part of the defendant. It was
therefore taken that the omission to refer to mens rea was deliberate and the
offence was one of strict liability. Judge Stephen said that “The aim of this act is
to prevent a sale of intoxicating liquor to drunken persons” It was held that it was
not necessary to consider whether the defendant knew, or had means of
knowing, or could with ordinary care have detected that the person served was
drunk. If he served a drink to a person who was in fact drunk, he was guilty.
Stephen J stated: Here, as I have already pointed out, the object of this part of
the Act is to prevent the sale of intoxicating liquor to drunken persons, and it is
perfectly natural to carry that out by throwing on the publican the responsibility
of determining whether the person supplied comes within that category.

35
4. The Offence caries a small penalty

Where the offence caries a simple penalty, it means it is not very serious.
Case of William-Drunk driving
William was charged of drunk driving where he got an accident and caused
death. It was however proved that he did not drive carelessly and he was
imprisoned for 2 years instead of 14 years. If he had driven recklessly, he would
have been imprisoned for 14 years.
QN: DISCUSS THE ARGUMENTS FOR AND AGINST STRICT LIABILITY
Arguments for Defense of Strict Liability
5. It is meant to protect the public. Strict liability raises standards where health
and safety of the public is at stake and it enforces those in position of
responsibility to take great precaution.
6. It aims at promoting enforcement of the law. It ensures that more
convictions are secured and it does not allow people to escape liability
through a fabricated account of their state of mind.
7. It is a deterrence since the imposition of strict liability makes people to act
in a more careful and cautious manner.
8. It is easier to administer. This is because majority of the strict liability offences
are dealt with administratively without a need for court. Other agencies
such as NEMA, KCCA, URA, UNBS, URSB among others can intervene without
going to court.
9. It is fair and just that those who make the profit from business should also
pay for any breaks of standards in that business.
Arguments against Strict Liability
1. It may give an unjustified punishment

2. It may not require mens rea; hence, there are higher chances of punishing
innocent people.
3. It offends the natural sense of justice since the accused has limited
opportunities of proving his case. See the case of R V Butcher
4. Any criminal activity caries stigma; hence, the victim’s reputation may be
affected his will.
5. Strict liability makes criminal law harsh and controversial. This is because it
violates the fundamental principle of actus reus and mens rea as a primary
requirement while violating the presumption of innocence enshrined in
Article 28 (3) of the constitution of Uganda.

36
VICARIOUS LIABILITY
In vicarious liability, the defendant does not need to be personally involved in the
commission of the prohibited act. It is arguable that vicarious liability undermines
the first principle of actus reus. Laws can simultaneously impose both strict liability
and vicarious liability.
It makes employers to prevent breach of legislation by his agents, servants or

delegates.
Employers are more likely to train and control employees properly and make self-
control over the business.
Principles of Vicarious Liability
1. Where the master delegates a duty imposed upon him/ her onto a servant
2. Where a master/ employer is held liabe because acts which are done
physically by the servant may in law be the master’s acts
The Delegation Principle
Where a statute imposes a duty n a particular person such as the holder of a

justice license and that person delegates the performance of the statutory duty
to another. The Mens rea of the delegate (Employee) is sufficient to impose liability
on the delegator (Employer) for breach of the duty which is imposed on him and
him alone.
Allen v Whitehead [1929] ALL ER 13
Under the Metropolitan Police Act 1839, s.44, it is an offense to ‗knowingly permit
or suffer prostitutes or persons of notoriously bad character to meet together and
remain in a place where refreshments are sold and consumed‘
D the occupier of a café, while receiving the profits of the business, didn‘t himself
manage it, but employed a manager. Having had a warning from the police, D
instructed his manager that no prostitutes were to be allowed to congregate on
the premises and had a notice to that effect displayed on the walls. He visited
the premises once or twice a week and there was no evidence that any
misconduct took place in his presence. Subsequently on eight consecutive days
a number of women known by the manager to be prostitutes met and remained
on the premises between 8pm and 4 am, indulging in obscene language. It was

37
held by the divisional court that D‘s ignorance of the facts was no defense. The
act of the servant and his mensrea were both to be imputed to his master, not
simply because he was a servant, but because the management of the house
had been delegated to him. There was no delegation and therefore the master
could not be held liable for the breach of his servant.
It should be noted that if the licensee‘s delegate sub-delegates his responsibilities,

the licensee is liable for the sub-delegate‘s acts, but he is not liable for the acts of
an inferior servant to whom control of the premises has not been delegated.
In the case of Vane v Yiannapoulous [1964]3 W.L.R 12
The respondent was the holder of a restaurant license. A condition of the license
was that liquor should not be sold except to persons taking meals. The restaurant
was on two floors. While the respondent was on one floor, conducting the business
of the restaurant, a waitress on the other floor sold liquor to customers who had
not ordered a meal. The waitress had been instructed to serve liquor only to
customers ordering a meal. The respondent didn‘t know about the sales.
A charge of knowingly selling intoxicating liquor to persons to whom he was not

entitled to sell, contrary to section 22 of the Act was dismissed by the justices. The
prosecution appealed and its appeal was dismissed on the ground that the
respondent had not delegated to the waitress the management of the business.
In this case the court stated that there had been no delegation of authority in the
sense in which the word has been used in various cases, because in this case the
licensee was himself controlling the premises and had given direct instructions to
the persons in his employment (including the waitress who served the liquor) that
these terms had to be strictly observed.
In the case of R V Winson [1968] ALL ER 197, the appellant was a director of a
company which owned a club and the holder of the justice licence in respect of
the club. It was a term of the license that liquor should not be sold to anyone who
had been a member for less that 48 hours. Liquor was sold in breach of this term.
At the material time, the club was run by a manager appointed by the managing
director. The appellant visited the club only occasionally.
Where the servant/ employee’s acts is the master/ employer’s act in law. The
master will be held liable for those acts that may be committed by the servant
where those acts are in law deemed to be acts of the master. This arises where
the offence is one of a strict liability nature.

38
Coppen v Moore 1898 2 QB 306
D owned six shops, in which he sold American hams. He gave strict instructions
that these hams were to be described as breakfast hams and were not to be sold
under any specific name of place of origin. That is to say, they must not be
described as Bristol, Bath, Wiltshire or any such title bust simply as breakfast hams.
In the absence of D, and without the knowledge of the manager of the branch,
one of the assistants sold a ham as a scotch ham. D was convicted under the
Merchandise Marks Act of selling goods to which any false trade description is
applied.
It cannot be doubted that the appellant sold the ham in question, although the
transaction was carried out by his servants. In other words, he was the seller
although not the actual salesman. The appellant had committed an offense of
selling under a false trade description.
Principle of identification
A company can be held criminally liable because of the mind of the controlling
officer. The acts of the controlling officer. The acts of the controlling offier done in
the ourse of employmeny
For a good example see: R v Prince [1874-80] All ER Rep 881 R v Hibbert (1869) LR
1 CCR 184.
These laws are applied either in regulatory offences enforcing social behaviour
where minimal stigma attaches to a person upon conviction, or where society is
concerned with the prevention of harm, and wishes to maximise the deterrent
value of the offence. Examples of strict liability include statutes that regulate sale
of food, drinks and sellers of meat, offences under the Traffic Act, Public health
and industrial regulations and environmental offences.
Courts usually begin with the presumption in favour of mens rea, commonly the
well-known statement by Wright J in Sherras v De Rutzen [1895-9] All ER Rep 1167:
There is a presumption that mens rea, or evil intention, or knowledge of the
wrongfulness of the act, is an essential ingredient in every offence; but that
presumption is liable to be displaced either by the words of the statute creating
the offence or by the subject-matter with which it deals, and both must be
considered.
In Sherras v De Rutzen [1895-9] All ER Rep 1167: The defendant was convicted of
selling alcohol to a police officer whilst on duty, contrary to s16(2) of the Licensing
Act 1872. He had reasonably believed the constable to be off duty as he had

39
removed his arm-band, which was the acknowledged method of signifying off
duty. The Divisional Court held that the conviction should be quashed, despite
the absence from s16(2) of any words requiring proof of mens rea as an element
of the offence. Wright J expressed the view that the presumption in favour of mens
rea would only be displaced by the wording of the statute itself, or its subject
matter. In this case the latter factor was significant, in that no amount of
reasonable care by the defendant would have prevented the offence from
being committed. Wright J stated: "It is plain that if guilty knowledge is not
necessary, no care on the part of the publican could save him from a conviction
under section 16, subsection (2), since it would be as easy for the constable to
deny that he was on duty when asked, or to produce a forged permission from
his superior officer, as to remove his armlet before entering the public house. I am,
therefore, of opinion that this conviction ought to be quashed."
WHERE THE SERVANT’S ACT IS THE MASTER’S ACT IN LAW
The master will be held criminally responsible for those acts that may be
committed by the servant where those acts are in law deemed to be acts of the
master. This mostly arises where the offense is one of a strict liability nature. i.e
where selling is the central feature of the actus reus, under acts like the sale of
goods act cap 82. A sale under the sale of Goods Act consists in the transfer of
property in the goods from A to B and the seller in law is that person in whom the
property in the goods is vested at the commencement of the transaction.
Therefore when goods are sold by a shop assistant, the seller is the owner of the
goods, the employer. If the goods are sold with a false trade description, it is the
owner of the shop who has so sold them, even if he is on holiday at a Miami Beach
in florida at the time. Of course he has no mensrea, but if the offense is one of
strict liability, that will not help him. He will be held to have committed the offense.

Criminal Law Notes by Tenywa Joseph Micheal

Uploaded by

Copyright:

Available Formats

Criminal Law Notes by Tenywa Joseph Micheal

Uploaded by

Document Information

Original Title

Copyright

Available Formats

Share this document

Share or Embed Document

Sharing Options

Did you find this document useful?

Is this content inappropriate?

Copyright:

Available Formats

Criminal Law Notes by Tenywa Joseph Micheal

Uploaded by

Copyright:

Available Formats

1

CRIMINAL LAW NOTES

What is Criminal Law?

1. It developed as an institution of social control in society.

Compiled by TENYWA JOSEPH MICHEAL LLB (UCU) 2023

The purpose of criminal law

 To forbid and prevent conduct that unjustifiably inflicts or threatens

 Criminal law is categorized as public law. This is because it is intended to

Compiled by TENYWA JOSEPH MICHEAL LLB (UCU) 2023

Thus two points are involved in this maxim.

“The full definition of every crime contains expressly or by implication a

Compiled by TENYWA JOSEPH MICHEAL LLB (UCU) 2023

Compiled by TENYWA JOSEPH MICHEAL LLB (UCU) 2023

ii. Action crimes

These are also referred to as conduct and no consequence crimes. The

Compiled by TENYWA JOSEPH MICHEAL LLB (UCU) 2023

Similarly, in the case of R V Miller [1983]2AC 161 who created a dangerous

Compiled by TENYWA JOSEPH MICHEAL LLB (UCU) 2023

iii. Duty arising out of contractual liability

iv. Duty arising out of a Relationship

Compiled by TENYWA JOSEPH MICHEAL LLB (UCU) 2023

v. Duty arising from Assumption of Care for another

Compiled by TENYWA JOSEPH MICHEAL LLB (UCU) 2023

Compiled by TENYWA JOSEPH MICHEAL LLB (UCU) 2023

Exceptions to Breach of Duty

While as we found out that the act or omission is a principle requirement of an

Alternatively intention can be described as the accused purpose or aim. Section

Compiled by TENYWA JOSEPH MICHEAL LLB (UCU) 2023

or in part, by an act or omission, the result intended to be caused by an act or

In Muhammed V R the appellant a driver was convicted of stealing a load of

Direct intention; in which the consequences of an act are as intended. In the

Compiled by TENYWA JOSEPH MICHEAL LLB (UCU) 2023

In criminal law, when the action of a defendant falls below standards of a

Compiled by TENYWA JOSEPH MICHEAL LLB (UCU) 2023

2.2. Principles of Mens Rea

Compiled by TENYWA JOSEPH MICHEAL LLB (UCU) 2023

In R V Whatsson [1989] 2 All ER 865, the defendant had been convicted of

Compiled by TENYWA JOSEPH MICHEAL LLB (UCU) 2023

Circumstances where we establish the Causal Link

1. Circumstances of the third parties

Compiled by TENYWA JOSEPH MICHEAL LLB (UCU) 2023

Actions of the victim

Compiled by TENYWA JOSEPH MICHEAL LLB (UCU) 2023

something no reasonable man could do, it would be remote; hence, the

Where the doctor is administering palliative care to a patient with a naturally

In R v Smith [1959] 2 QB 35, a soldier was stabbed in a barrack-room brawl. He was

Compiled by TENYWA JOSEPH MICHEAL LLB (UCU) 2023

Life support Machine

Compiled by TENYWA JOSEPH MICHEAL LLB (UCU) 2023

THE PRINCIPLE OF LEGALITY

The principle of Legality is primarily enshrined in Article 28 of the Constitution of

Article 28(12) “Except for contempt of court, no person shall be convicted of a

Compiled by TENYWA JOSEPH MICHEAL LLB (UCU) 2023

“It therefore follows that an organization to qualify or be treated as belonging

Compiled by TENYWA JOSEPH MICHEAL LLB (UCU) 2023

Compiled by TENYWA JOSEPH MICHEAL LLB (UCU) 2023

In the case of Woolmington V DPP, Reginald Woolmington was a 21-year-old farm

On February14,1935 Woolmington was convicted and sentenced to death. On

Compiled by TENYWA JOSEPH MICHEAL LLB (UCU) 2023