CH 7
CH 7
Chapter 7: Valuation
2024
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Topics
• Du’s theorem
• Risk-sensitive preferences
• Epstein-Zin preferences
• Koopmans operators
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Nonlinear valuation
Now we go further
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In particular, we drop the linearity assumption
• existence results
• global stability results
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Knaster–Tarski Fixed Point Theorem
• X is a finite set
• I = [v1 , v2 ] is a nonempty order interval in (RX , ⩽)
• T is a self-map on I
• fix(T ) = the set of fixed points of T in I
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Ex. Sketch the one-dimensional case I = [0, 1] and convince
yourself that a fixed point must exist
The KT fixed point theorem has a huge range of applications
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Concavity, Convexity and Stability
T is called concave if
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Du’s Theorem
Theorem. Let
• X be a finite set
• I := [v1 , v2 ] be a nonempty order interval in (RX , ⩽)
• T be a self-map on I
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45
v2
Tv
v1
v
v1 v2
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45
v2
Tv
v1
v
v1 v2
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Power-transformed affine equations
v = [h + (Av)1/θ ]θ (v ∈ V )
where
• θ is a nonzero parameter
• A ∈ L(RX )
• V = (0, ∞)X and h ∈ V
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To analyze the equation we introduce the self-map
Gv = [h + (Av)1/θ ]θ (v ∈ V )
1. ρ(A)1/θ < 1
2. G is globally stable on V
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The one-dimensional case (so ρ(A) = A)
2
θ = −1.5 θ = −0.5
45◦ 45◦
0
0 2 0 2
2
θ = 0.5 θ = 1.5
45◦ 45◦
0
0 2 0 2
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Example. Kleinman et al. (ECMA 2023) study a model of
migration with capital accumulation
• X is finite
• (Xt ) is P -Markov
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−1/ψ
Setting vt = σt , we can write (1) as
h iψ 1/ψ
vt = 1 + β Et Rt+1
ψ (ψ−1)/ψ
vt+1 (2)
Define A ∈ L(RX ) by
X
(Av)(x) = β f (x′ )(ψ−1)/ψ v(x′ )P (x, x′ )
x′
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Proof: Consider a v ∈ V such that vt = v(Xt ) solves (2)
Equivalently,
v = [1 + (Av)ψ ]1/ψ
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Motivation: Limitations of time additive preferences
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Motivation: Limitations of time additive preferences
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Another issue: agent is indifferent to variations in the joint
distribution of rewards that leaves marginal distributions unchanged
Example. Suppose you accept a new job
(A) Your boss will flip a coin on day 1 only and set
(B) Your boss will flip a coin every day and set
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Strict preference between A and B implies choice cannot be
rationalized with time additive preferences
Either way,
X X
β u(1) + u(10000)
E t
β u(Ct ) = β Eu(Ct ) =
t
1−β 2
t⩾1 t⩾1
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A recursive view of time additive preferences
Vt = u(Ct ) + β Et Vt+1
where
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How to solve
Vt = u(Ct ) + β Et Vt+1 (3)
Since
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Conditioning on Xt = x and setting r := u ◦ c, this becomes
In vector form, v = r + βP v
From the NSL, the unique solution is
X
v ∗ = (I − βP )−1 r = βtP tr
t⩾0
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In summary:
Vt = u(Ct ) + β Et Vt+1
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In summary:
Vt = u(Ct ) + β Et Vt+1
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Pursuing this idea leads to lifetime valuations without any
sequential representations
Remark.
The term “recursive preferences” is confusing, since traditional
time additive preferences also admit a recursive specification
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Warm up 1: Nonlinear “expectations”
Suppose
Ex. Prove:
1. If φ is convex, then
EY ⩽ φ−1 (Eφ(Y ))
2. If φ is concave, then
φ−1 (Eφ(Y )) ⩽ EY
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Proof: We prove case 1, where φ is convex
φ(EY ) ⩽ Eφ(Y )
∴ EY ⩽ φ−1 (Eφ(Y ))
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Risk-Sensitive Preferences
with ( )
1 X
v(x) = r(x) + β ln exp(θv(x′ ))P (x, x′ )
θ ′ x
• θ is a nonzero constant in R
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We understand
( )
1 X
v(x) = r(x) + β ln exp(θv(x′ ))P (x, x′ )
θ ′ x
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As a preliminary step, let’s try to understand the nonlinear
expectation term
• θ is a nonzero parameter
Var[ξ]
Eθ [ξ] = E[ξ] + θ
2
Notice that θ ↓ lowers appetite for risk and θ ↑ does the opposite
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More generally,
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Existence and uniqueness
Equivalent:
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We continue to assume that
• P ∈ M(RX ) and r ∈ RX
• θ is nonzero and β ⩾ 0
Implications
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We continue to assume that
• P ∈ M(RX ) and r ∈ RX
• θ is nonzero and β ⩾ 0
Implications
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Example. Suppose r(x) = x and Xt+1 = ρXt + σWt+1 where
• (Wt ) iid
∼ N (0, 1)
• |ρ| < 1
1 β (aσ)2
a := and b := θ
1 − ρβ 1−β 2
function create_rs_utility_model(;
n=180, # size of state space
β=0.95, # time discount factor
ρ=0.96, # correlation coef in AR(1)
σ=0.1, # volatility
θ=-1.0) # risk aversion
mc = tauchen(n, ρ, σ, 0, 10) # n_std = 10
x_vals, P = mc.state_values, mc.p
r = x_vals # special case u(c(x)) = x
return (; β, θ, ρ, σ, r, x_vals, P)
end
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30
approximate fixed point
20 v(x) = ax + b
10
−10
−20
−30
−40
−50
−3 −2 −1 0 1 2 3
x
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Epstein–Zin preferences
• asset pricing
• business cycles
• monetary policy
• fiscal policy
• optimal taxation
• climate policy, etc., etc.
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With Epstein–Zin preferences, lifetime value obeys
n o1/α
Vt = (1 − β)Ctα + β[Et Vt+1
γ α/γ
]
where
Assume
• Ct = c(Xt ) where c ∈ RX
+
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We conjecture a solution of the form Vt = v(Xt )
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Let’s rewrite more generally as
" #α/γ 1/α
X
(Kv)(x) = h(x) + β v(x′ )γ P (x, x′ )
x′
Pointwise on X this is
n o1/α
Kv = h + β[P v γ ]α/γ
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Epstein–Zin stability
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Ex. Compute the fixed point of K in V starting with this code
include("s_approx.jl")
using LinearAlgebra, QuantEcon
function create_ez_utility_model(;
n=200, # size of state space
ρ=0.96, # correlation coef in AR(1)
σ=0.1, # volatility
β=0.99, # time discount factor
α=0.75, # EIS parameter
γ=-2.0) # risk aversion parameter
mc = tauchen(n, ρ, σ, 0, 5)
x_vals, P = mc.state_values, mc.p
c = exp.(x_vals)
return (; β, ρ, σ, α, γ, c, x_vals, P)
end
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The figure plots every 10th iterate, repeated 100 times.
1.6
v0
1.4 v∗
1.2
1.0
0.8
0.6
0.4
0.2
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Proof of global stability
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We define K̂ via
n oθ γ
K̂v = h + β(P v)1/θ where θ :=
α
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Let Φ be defined by Φv = v γ
In addition, for v ∈ V ,
n oθ n oγ/α
K̂Φv = h + β(P Φv)1/θ = h + β(P v γ )α/γ = ΦKv
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Now set A = β θ P , so that
K̂v = [h + (Av)1/θ ]θ
In our case
ρ(A)1/θ = ρ(β θ P )1/θ = β
Since (V, K) and (V, K̂) are topologically conjugate, K has the
same properties on V
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A general representations
• a Markov environment
• fixed point theory
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We will build our theory from two components
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Certainty equivalent operators
1. R is order-preserving on V and
2. R (λ1) = λ1 for all λ ∈ R with λ1 ∈ V
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Certainty equivalent operators
1. R is order-preserving on V and
2. R (λ1) = λ1 for all λ ∈ R with λ1 ∈ V
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Example. Let V = RX and fix
• P ∈ M(RX ) and
• nonzero θ
The operator
( )
1 X
′ ′
(Rθ v)(x) = ln exp(θv(x ))P (x, x )
θ ′ x
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Example. Let V = (0, ∞)X and fix
• P ∈ M(RX ) and
• nonzero γ
The operator
( )1/γ
X
′ γ ′
(Rγ v)(x) = v(x ) P (x, x )
x′
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Let V = RX and fix P ∈ M(RX ) and τ ∈ [0, 1]
Let Rτ be defined by (Rτ v)(x) = Qτ v(X) where
• X ∼ P (x, ·)
• Qτ is the quantile functional
More specifically,
( )
X
(Rτ v)(x) = min y ∈ R 1{v(x ) ⩽ y}P (x, x ) ⩾ τ
′ ′
x′
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A certainty equivalent operator R on V is called
• positive homogeneous on V if
• superadditive on V if
• subadditive on V if
• constant-subadditive on V if
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Example. Let V = (0, ∞)X and fix P ∈ M(RX )
is
1. subadditive on V when γ ⩾ 1
2. superadditive on V when γ ⩽ 1
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Ex. Show that the entropic certainty equivalent operator Rθ is
constant-subadditive
Proof: Fix v ∈ V , P ∈ M(RX ) and λ ∈ R+
Let X be a draw from P (x, ·)
We have
1
(Rθ (v + λ))(x) = ln {E exp[θ(v(X) + λ)]}
θ
1
= ln {E exp[θv(X)] · exp(θλ)}
θ
1
= ln {E exp[θv(X)]} + λ
θ
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Let V be convex and let R be a positive homogeneous certainty
equivalent operator on V
Lemma
1. R is subadditive on V =⇒ R is convex on V
2. R is superadditive on V =⇒ R is concave on V
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Lemma The Kreps–Porteus certainty equivalent operator Rγ is
1. convex on V when γ ⩾ 1 and
2. concave on V when γ ⩽ 1
Ex. Check it
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Monotonicity
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Aggregation
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Common types of aggregators include the
• Leontief aggregator
• Uzawa aggregator
• CES aggregator
• additive aggregator
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Given V ⊂ RX , we call K a Koopmans operator on V if
for
K =A◦R
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We have already met the following special cases
Kθ = Aadd ◦ Rθ
K = Aces ◦ Rγ
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Another special case is
K = Aadd ◦ P
In this case
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The lifetime value generated by Koopmans operator K on
V ⊂ RX is the unique fixed point v of K in V , whenever it exists
• Kv = r + βP v with β ∈ (0, 1)
• unique fixed point is v ∗ = (I − βP )−1 r
We know that
X
v ∗ (x) = E β t r(Xt ) when (Xt ) is P -Markov and X0 = x
t⩾0
= lifetime value
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Example. Let Kθ be the risk sensitive Koopmans operator
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Finite horizons
Given arbitrary Koopmans operator K, we identify K m w with total
m-period utility given terminal condition w
X
m−1
m
K w= (βP )t r + (βP )m w
t=0
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Let
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We call aggregator A on V a Blackwell aggregator if ∃ a
β ∈ (0, 1) such that
= min{r(x), βy} + βλ
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We call aggregator A on V a Blackwell aggregator if ∃ a
β ∈ (0, 1) such that
= min{r(x), βy} + βλ
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Proposition. If
1. A is a Blackwell aggregator and
2. R is constant-subadditive
then K = A ◦ R is a contraction on V with respect to k · k∞
Note that
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Uzawa aggregation and stability
Then
Kv = r + Lv where L(x, x′ ) = b(x)P (x, x′ )
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Example. In Krussell and Smith 1998, Toda 2019, Cao 2020, etc.,
∞ Y
" t #
X
v(x) = Ex βi u(Ct ) with β0 := 1 (7)
t=0 i=0
• b ⩾ 0 and
• (Xt ) is P -Markov for some P ∈ M(RX )
Kv = u ◦ c + bP v = Auzawa P v
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Stability via concavity
Suppose
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Proof: Under (a)–(b), K is a self-map on V
Indeed, we have
0 r = r + 0 = r + bR0 = K0
and
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EZ preferences with state-dependent discounting
In what follows we
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To discuss stability of K we introduce the operator A ∈ L(RX )
defined by
X γ
(Av)(x) := b(x)θ v(x′ )P (x, x′ ) where θ :=
′
α
x
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Proof: Let
n oθ
K̂v = h + (Av)1/θ
Let Φ be defined by Φv = v γ
Ex. Show that (V, K) and (V, K̂) are topologically conjugate
under Φ
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