Uav Certification

OPEN ACCESS | Review
UAV avionics safety, certification, accidents, redundancy,

integrity, and reliability: a comprehensive review and
future trends
Devon Wanner, Hashim A. Hashim , Siddhant Srivastava, and Alex Steinhauer
Department of Mechanical and Aerospace Engineering, Carleton University, Ottawa, ON K1S 5B6, Canada
Corresponding author: Hashim A. Hashim (email: [email protected])

Drone Syst. Appl. Downloaded from cdnsciencepub.com by 5.149.119.57 on 06/12/24
Abstract
This paper underscores the significance of safety and reliability in the realm of unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) technologies,
and how regulations play a pivotal role in ensuring their responsible use. We have analyzed safety incidents and trends both
in Canada and globally, noting a decline in incidents attributed to enhanced regulations. Our comparative analysis of different
UAV technologies identified batteries as the most reliable power supply, Global Navigation Satellite System as the most effective
navigation system, and light detection and ranging as the optimal optical sensor due to regulatory compliance and system
redundancies. We also examined the regulatory framework in Canada, comparing it with the risk-based approach of the
European Union Aviation Safety Agency and the efforts of Joint Authorities for Rule-making on Unmanned Systems towards
global harmonization. Furthermore, we highlighted emerging trends in automation and flight control technologies, with
a focus on European regulations shaping UAV automation trends. In conclusion, by adhering to best practices from other
regulatory bodies, embracing emerging trends, and adopting a risk-based approach, Canada can promote the growth of the
UAV industry while ensuring safety and reliability in UAV technologies.
Key words: unmanned aerial vehicles, avionics safety, drone certification, accidents, redundancy, integrity and reliability
1. Introduction
Canada, Transport Canada (TC) has set in place strict regula-
tions to govern the operation of UAVs, and these regulations
1.1. Motivation
require pilots to obtain a pilot certificate. This certificate en-
Unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), commonly referred to as
sures that pilots have the necessary skills and knowledge to
drones or uninhibited aerial systems, are aircraft that can be
be able to operate their UAVs in a safe manner while follow-
operated without a human pilot onboard (Adamo et al. 2017;
ing the rules that TC has set in place. All operations are con-
Jiang et al. 2020; Dai et al. 2021; Hashim et al. 2024). They
ducted under Part IX of the Canadian Aviation Regulation
can be remotely controlled or flown by a computer based
(CAR) (Transport Canada 2020a). Pilots must always carry a
in preprogrammed flight paths (Hashim et al. 2023a). UAVs
valid drone pilot certificate when operating their drone. This
have a rich history, dating back to their use in reconnais-
drone pilot certificate serves as documented evidence of the
sance missions during World War I. Today, UAVs are used in
pilot’s level of skill and expertise and helps mitigate the risk
a wide range of industries and applications, such as surveil-
of accidents and misuse of the UAV. In circumstances where
lance, photography, mapping, search and rescue, and more
a drone pilot wishes to operate a UAV in Canada outside of
which will be covered in subsequent sections (Hashim and
the rules set in place in Part IX of the CAR, they can apply for
Eltoukhy 2020; Jiang et al. 2020; Hashim et al. 2024). With
a Special Flight Operations Certificate (SFOC).
the introduction of drones, which refers to all unmanned ve-
Despite the numerous benefits of UAVs, there is also an in-
hicles that are controlled remotely, UAVs have become more
herent risk associated with their use. One of the most signif-
popular and accessible.
icant risks is the potential for mid-air collisions with other
The rise of UAVs has revolutionized the way we interact
UAVs or piloted aircrafts and helicopters. Other risks include
with the world around us. From aerial photography to mili-
loss of control and intentional misuse of the UAV. Certifica-
tary reconnaissance, UAVs have become an essential tool with
tion helps mitigate these risks by ensuring the pilot has the
a wide range of applications in many industries. However,
necessary training and knowledge to operate their UAV safely
this surge in popularity comes with an increased risk of acci-
and in a responsible manner. Additionally, certification can
dents. In order to ensure safe and responsible UAV use, cer-
help enforce the regulations set out by TC, which in turn
tification and regulation has become a crucial requirement
helps maintain the integrity of the Canadian aviation system.
for operators, government bodies, and the general public. In
Drone Syst. Appl. 12: 1–23 (2024) | dx.doi.org/10.1139/dsa-2023-0091 1

Canadian Science Publishing
In recent years, there have been several high-profile incidents (Canada 2021a). Over the last five years, TCCA has received
involving UAVs that have highlighted the importance of cer- on average 45 aviation safety occurrences every day (Canada
tification and safe operation. Using TC’s Civil Aviation Daily 2021a). The information that is gathered by TCCA in CADORS
Occurrence Reporting System (CADORS) between 5 Novem- is used to identify early potential hazards and loopholes in
ber 2005 and 31 December 2016, there were a total of 355 in- the current safety system. CADORS data is further used to fol-
cidents that were reported in Canadian airspace with 66.5% low up on specific events, develop safety communications,
of those involving UAVs. Of these 66.5%, the vast majority of and develop reports and studies on potential safety issues.
these incidents were reported by pilots operating piloted air- The most common event that results in a UAV safety occur-
crafts (Nesbit et al. 2017). These incidents have been steadily rence being recorded is due to UAVs entering areas of Cana-
increasing every year since 2013. By requiring and enforcing dian airspace in which they are not registered to fly. Analyz-
certification and regulation, TC can help ensure that UAVs are ing the safety occurrences that have happened in Canada,
operated safely and responsibly. certain trends start to emerge. Canadian UAV safety occur-
rences appear to be most frequent in Ontario and British
1.2. Scope Columbia where UAV safety occurrences were growing expo-
The goal of this paper is to review the significance of safety nentially, until 2017 at which point their number started to
decrease (Canada 2021a). This indicates that UAV regulations
and reliability considering the context of UAV technologies

as well as how regulations play a key role in ensuring their and safety technologies are resulting in reduced UAV safety
use. Safety incidents and their ongoing trends are investi- occurrences (Canada 2021a). Comparing trends in recorded
gated. Energy sources, the advancement of navigation sys- UAV safety occurrences in Canada to what is being recorded
tems, and sensing technologies are discussed in terms of reg- worldwide, it becomes clear that the same trend is being seen
ulatory compliance and system redundancies since they play worldwide. This further indicates that UAVs are becoming
a vital role in UAV safety and reliability. The paper also re- safer as certifications, regulations, and safety related tech-
views the regulatory framework in Canada, European Union nologies are developed.
Aviation Safety Agency (EASA), and the efforts of Joint Author- The information in the CADORS database comes from the
ities for Rule-making on Unmanned Systems (JARUS) towards sources around the country such as NAV CANADA, Trans-
global harmonization. The paper also presents the potential port Safety Board, Royal Canadian Mounted Police, aircraft
emerging trends in automation and flight control technolo- operators, and government agencies. Of those entities, NAV
gies. CANADA provides about 80% of all the aviation occurrence in-
formation. The information is provided in an Aviation Occur-
1.3. Structure rence Report and sent to Aviation Operations Centre through
The remainder of the article is organized as follows: secure emails. Once received, the Aviation Safety Research
Section 2 presents UAV safety occurrences, Canadian airspace and Analysis (ASRA) staff enter it into CADORS. Any miss-
classification, and UAV incidents in Canada and around the ing information on the CADORS application is received by
world. Section 3 lists UAV features, state of UAV technol- ASRA by consulting relevant sources. Finally, a quality as-
ogy, and advancements in safety and reliability. Section 4 surance review is performed before it is finally published
describes regulatory framework in Canada, Canadian pi- (Canada 2021a). Figure 1 illustrates the CADORS reporting
lot certification, and international regulatory frameworks. process graphically. Once the safety occurrence has been pub-
Section 5 presents a comparison of UAV technology based on lished, analysts assign it to an event based on its details. The
safety and reliability. Section 6 presents trade-off studies in event can describe something that occurred to the aircraft or
UAV systems of energy sources, navigation systems, and op- something that happened to the aviation system. By assign-
tical sensors. Section 7 illustrates potential future trends. Fi- ing events to the safety occurrences, it allows CADORS to be
nally, Section 8 concludes the work. easily categorized and improves the ability for the data to be
analyzed. For the purposes of analyzing UAV safety in Canada,
CADORS occurrences will be filtered for events which involve
2. Safety occurrences UAVs. Using the CADORS to analyze UAV data, the severity
and frequency of safety occurrences in Canada can be ana-
2.1. UAV safety occurrences lyzed.
To understand the current state of UAV incidents in
Canada, it is important to understand how the incidents are
recorded by Transport Canada Civil Aviation (TCCA). TCCA 2.2. Canadian airspace classification: A to G
records up to date not only UAV safety occurrences but in- Most UAV occurrences are reported because a UAV is found
stead all safety occurrences in aviation. This information is flying in classes of Canadian airspace without the required
organized into TCCA’s database called the CADORS, allow- permission to do so. Canada has seven classes of airspace with
ing all parties to have access to safety information to pro- each having its own rules about the types of aircrafts that can
mote the continuous improvement of safety in the space. All be used and the communication equipment that is required
stakeholders of the safety occurrence are notified in a timely for the pilots to use. In all classes of airspace, NAV CANADA
manner. CADORS was launched in 1985 and was used to cap- provides air traffic control and flight information to ensure
ture information on civil aviation occurrences and capture safety in the air. Pilots can fly the aircraft based on the air-
Air Traffic Services operations under the CAR, section 807.01 craft’s navigation instruments or visually by using their sight.
2 Drone Syst. Appl. 12: 1–23 (2024) | dx.doi.org/10.1139/dsa-2023-0091

Fig. 1. Graphical representation of Civil Aviation Daily Occurrence Reporting System (CADORS) reporting process (Canada
2021a). AVOPS, Aviation Operations Centre; AOR, Aviation Occurrence Report; ASRA, Aviation Safety Research and Analysis;
RCMP, Royal Canadian Mounted Police; TSB, Transport Safety Board.
Depending on the airspace, NAV CANADA may restrict which dio connection with ATC. In class E, only aircraft using IFR
of the two methods can be used by the pilot. Instrument need clearance and VFR do not. Class F is the final class and
Flight Rules (IFR) is defined as the pilot using only instrumen- refers to restricted and advisory airspace. In restricted or ad-
tation on the flight deck of an aircraft, where Visual Flight visory airspace, no aircraft can enter without the permission
Rules (VFR) is defined by the pilot using line of sight naviga- from the controlling agency. Airspace can be restricted due
tion which is based on what can be seen outside the cockpit to specific security, safety, or military concerns. UAVs flying
(Chen et al. 2019; NAV CANADA 2021). Beginning with Class in Canada must follow rules put in place by TC. Furthermore,
G, this classification refers to uncontrolled airspace. This is UAV activity must be done in Class G. If the UAV is flying in
where ATC services are provided; however, pilots are respon- Class A–E airspace, the UAV must be registered with TC, the
sible for keeping a safe distance from all other aircraft. Class operator must hold an advanced operations pilots’ certificate,
G airspace goes to an altitude of 18 000 ft, and both VFR and and have a written authorization from NAV CANADA (NAV
IFR apply (NAV CANADA 2021; Grote et al. 2022). CANADA 2021). Unfortunately, UAV operators do not always
Class B and A refer to controlled low-level airspace and con- follow these rules, which is the reason for most recorded UAV
trolled high-level airspace, respectively. In class B, ATC gives safety occurrences in the past decade.
pilots clearance to fly as well as instructions on how to main-
tain a safe distance from other aircraft. The altitude limits 2.3. UAV incidents in Canada
are between 12 000 ft and 18 000 ft and exist in areas close to Using the CADORS database from TCCA, all the aviation
an airport. Both IFR and VFR can be used in this Class. Class A safety occurrences that involved any type of UAV were fil-
is similar to class B in most respects; however, it accounts for tered through and recorded over the past 10 years from 1
all airspace above 18 000 ft. Aircrafts cannot use VFR when January 2013 to 24 March 2023. For the purposes of this anal-
flying in Class A airspace (NAV CANADA 2021). Next, classes ysis, severe safety occurrences would be any occurrence that
C, D, and E are defined as control zone and terminal area for involved injury or fatalities. The data we obtained show that
busy airport, control zone and terminal area for moderate there have been no safety occurrences in Canada related to
traffic airport, and control zone for airports without towers, UAVs that could be classified as severe. Although it has been
respectively. VFR and IFR apply to all aircraft flying in these concluded that there are no severe UAV safety occurrences,
zones. In class C, all aircraft need clearance to fly in this zone. there is one that does require more attention. In 2017, for
In class D, only aircraft using IFR require ATC clearance with the first time ever in Canada, a small drone collided with
aircrafts using VFR only needing to have an established ra- a passenger plane above Quebec City’s Jean Lesage airport

Fig. 2. Unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) safety occurrences in Canada: (a) percentage of safety occurrences per province and
(b) total number of UAV safety occurrences between 2013 and 2023 (Canada 2021a). CADORS, Civil Aviation Daily Occurrence
Reporting System.
(Sauve et al. 2020). Federal Transport Minister Marc Garneau imum age for drone operators and a mandatory written test
confirmed that the aircraft had only sustained minor dam- for UAV pilots who are now required to register their names
age and that nobody was hurt. This incident could have been and address on the drone itself. To analyze the spatial dis-
much worse if the drone had collided with the cockpit or the tribution of incidents in Canada over the past 10 years, the
engine on this aircraft. This incident resulted in a series of UAV safety occurrences were grouped by province. Figure 2a
interim regulations being put in place, which were further shows percentage of UAV safety occurrences per province in
approved in 2018. The updated regulations now state a min- Canada.

Looking at Fig. 2a, most of the UAV safety occurrences are UAVs. In 2022, the EASA issued its safety review for that year
recorded in British Columbia and Ontario which make up that showed a drop in recorded UAV safety occurrences in all
65% of all occurrences over the past 10 years. This finding categories (Ghasri and Maghrebi 2021; Kasprzyk and Konert
reasonably aligns with the fact that British Columbia and On- 2021; Crumley 2022). The number of severe incidents involv-
tario have large populations and very active airspace. Que- ing a UAV reached zero in 2021. EASA credits the reduction
bec and Alberta come next as they produced the third and in drone related incidents in Europe to advancements in ob-
fourth most safety occurrences, respectively, with a com- ject detection and avoidance technology as well as certifica-
bined 25%. Finally, the last 10% of recorded safety occur- tion for drone pilots (Crumley 2022). Another contributing
rences comes from all the other provinces. Prince Edward factor is likely the reduction in the amount of tourist traffic
Island produced the least number of UAV safety incidents in the European countries that occurred in 2020 and 2021.
with only four being recorded in the past 10 years. Looking at The reduction in the UAV safety occurrences seen in Europe
the amount of recorded UAV incident reports per year since since 2018 follows a trend similar to what has been seen in
2013 reveals general trends in UAV safety in the past decade. Canada since 2017. It may be too early to determine whether
Figure 2b shows the number of UAV safety occurrences yearly this trend continues in the coming years or if it will rebound
per province and Canada wide (Figs. 2a and 2b are using same to 2018 levels. To summarize, fewer UAV safety occurrences
province color and legend). are being recorded in Canada and worldwide compared to
From Fig. 2b, the first observation that can be made is that previous peaks in 2018 as safety technologies and regulations
between 2013 and 2017 there was an almost exponential rise begin to catch up to UAV popularity.
in reported UAV safety occurrences nationwide. This is a re-
sult of the explosion in popularity of recreational drones. Pi-
lots have spotted drones in their flight path more than 130 3. UAV features and safety technology
times in that 5-year range. The data shows that the amount
of UAV safety occurrences peaked in 2017, the same year that 3.1. State of UAV technology
the incident at Quebec City’s Jean Lesage airport occurred.
3.1.1. UAV power sources
After the new interim rules were put in place, and later be-
came part of TC’s regulations, the data show that the amount Batteries are a common power source for drones, with
of these recorded occurrences starts to decline. In 2020, the various types available, lead acid (Pb-acid), nickel cadmium
number of recorded incidents was the lowest it had been (NiCad), nickel metal hydride (NiMH), Alkaline, lithium poly-
since 2014, this is likely in part due to the pandemic reducing mer (Li-po), lithium ion (Li-ion), zinc oxide (Zn-O2), lithium-air
air transportation activity. Although air transportation activ- (Li-air), and lithium-thionyl-chloride (Li-SOCl2) (Dundar et al.
ities increased between 2021 and 2023, the levels of safety 2020; Qin et al. 2020; Townsend et al. 2020). Criterias that are
occurrences continued to decrease never rebounding back to important for considering a battery type include power den-
their previous highs. This proves that the regulations that TC sity, energy density, weight, volume, cycle life, cost, safety,
has put in place have been successful in promoting safety in and maintenance. Li-ion batteries are popular for electric
Canadian airspace. The correction of incidents to an accept- vehicle applications because they can deliver high energy
able level after an exponential increase is attributable to the and power per unit of battery mass, have a long cycle life,
current regulatory landscape in the country. Canada’s UAV and are more compact and efficient than other recharge-
regulations have resulted in a considerable improvement to able batteries. However, they are also more expensive than
aviation safety in Canada for all stakeholders, which is an other battery types. These factors are critical in determin-
achievement that did not appear to be possible only 5 years ing the UAVs effectiveness as they may influence the UAV’s
ago. cost, range, endurance, size, payload capacity, acceleration,
and lifespan before replacing the battery. Power density de-
termines the UAV’s acceleration, energy density determines
2.4. UAV safety occurrences around the world the UAV’s range and endurance, while life cycle determines
As previously demonstrated, in Canada, a great improve- the number of recharges before the battery must be replaced.
ment has been seen in the number of UAV safety occurrences UAVs can also be powered by combustion engines, which
in recent years achieving acceptable levels. In 2018 the Inter- include petrol and diesel engines. These engines comprise
national Air Transport Association (IATA) stated in its safety several parts, such as a combustion chamber, pistons, fuel
report 2018 that there has been an increasing safety risk injectors, intake, and exhaust valves. Despite the differences
posed by drones due to the unpredictable nature of drone between petrol and diesel engines, such as spark plugs in
operators (Werfelman 2019). IATA’s safety report stated that petrol engines and self-ignition in diesel engines under high
there was a significant increase in UAV related incidents from pressure, both types of engines are generally less efficient
2014 to 2018, with 50% of those reports coming from Eu- and more harmful to the environment due to emissions
rope (Werfelman 2019). Similar to reports in Canada, most (Sonawane and Mustafi 2020; Townsend et al. 2020; Ge et al.
of the reports occurred when a UAV was interfering with the 2021). Combustion fuels have a significantly higher energy
trajectory of an aircraft. It must be noted that most world- density compared to Li-ion battery with diesel fuel having an
wide safety occurrences are likely to go unreported as there energy density of 12 666.7 Wh/kg and petrol 12 888.9 Wh/kg,
is a lack of a standardized reporting system. As such, it is while Li-ion batteries only displaying an energy density of
difficult to understand the true scale of the safety threat of 250–340 Wh/kg (Townsend et al. 2020). While combustion en-

Table 1. Comparison of different 5 kg payload capacity UAV with different fuel sources (Townsend et al. 2020).
Product name Li-Po battery DJI M600 Hydrogen FC (1 kW) Gasoline Solar Airbus Zephyr 8
Specific energy (Wh/kg) 9.99 646 2600 435
Flight time (min) 20 250 120 20 160
Weight (kg) 10 6.5 4.9 60
Payload (kg) 5 5 5 5
Discharge/charge (min) 92 Refuel time Refuel time Constant charge
Cost (USD) 5699 13 410 1550 3 000 000
Note: UAV, unmanned aerial vehicle; FC, fuel cell.
gines have a more effective fuel source allowing for better (GNSS) receivers, inertial navigation systems (INS), light de-
UAV performance, they are only able to be used on larger ve- tection and ranging (LiDAR) scanners, ultrasonic sensors, vi-
hicles due to the more complex and resilient machinery re- sual cameras, and simultaneously localization and mapping
quired (Townsend et al. 2020). Solar power energy is another (SLAM) techniques for navigation. A localization navigation
energy source utilized in UAVs. Electrical current is harnessed system is used by autonomous UAVs to determine their po-
from the light radiated by the sun in two different fashions, sition and orientation in real-time. This system typically uti-
namely, there is the photovoltaic (PV) effect and concentrated lizes sensors and cameras such as LiDAR, radar, and GPS to
solar power (CSP) (Townsend et al. 2020). PV solar energy di- measure the vehicle’s movement and surroundings, and pro-
rectly transforms the energy from the sun’s light into current cesses these data to determine the UAV’s location. The infor-
with the use of solar panels while CSP solar energy concen- mation obtained from the localization navigation system is
trates the heat generated by solar rays to run a steam tur- then used by the UAV’s control system to plan and execute
bine. UAVs utilize PV solar energy to either power UAVs or to movements or tasks (Hashim 2021a; Odry 2021; Yang et al.
extend the range of battery powered UAVs. To generate suffi- 2021; Gyagenda et al. 2022; Li et al. 2022). Unmanned ground
cient power to operate UAVs, the solar panels need to be as vehicle (UGV) navigation refers to guiding UAVs from one lo-
large as possible. To achieve this, solar powered UAVs require cation to another and often involves the use of various sen-
large, fixed wings to function. sors and technologies such as GPS, LiDAR, and cameras to de-
As renewable fuel vehicles gain popularity, researchers are termine the UAV’s location on a known trajectory that has
investigating alternative power sources to batteries, one of been previously established. This type of navigation is com-
which is fuel cells (FCs). FCs are classified into different types, monly used in military reconnaissance and search and rescue
such as proton exchange membrane (PEM) FC, phosphoric operations (Gallo and Barrientos 2022; Gyagenda et al. 2022;
acid FC, solid acid FC, alkaline FC, high-temperature FC, and Hashim et al. 2023a). GPS/GNSS is widely used in UAVs for var-
electric storage FC (Townsend et al. 2020). PEMFCs are like ious applications such as reconnaissance, surveillance, sur-
batteries, with two electrodes separated by a membrane and veying, mapping, and geophysics exploration (Hashim 2021b;
connected through an electrolyte. FCs have an energy den- Hashim et al. 2024). GPS plays a critical role in UAV navi-
sity of up to 150 times that of a Li-po battery. Advancements gation systems by determining the position, speed, and al-
have led to the development of drones powered by FCs, which titude of the vehicle. GPS is often used in combination with
have advantages such as no direct pollution, no sound, high an INS to provide comprehensive navigation solutions. Au-
energy density, and almost instant recharge (Townsend et al. tonomous UAVs rely on GPS to provide highly precise infor-
2020; Ozbek et al. 2021). However, FCs require a high-power mation for control purposes, and GPS is also used in earth ob-
density, rapid response to loads, and a hydrogen supply in- servation measurements to accurately reference geographi-
frastructure. Each type of FC has its advantages and disad- cally collected data. The precise time stamps provided by UAV
vantages, and their implementation in drones must consider GPS are valuable in collecting information (Hashim 2021b).
the weight, size, and range limitations caused by hydrogen
storage tanks. FC technology would be very useful for drone
3.1.3. UAV optical sensor technology
operation; however, is not heavily utilized now due to the
challenge of existing infrastructure such as hydrogen storage Red green blue (RGB) cameras are commonly used in UAVs
to support its use. Table 1 presents comparison of different 5 for capturing high-quality images and videos of an area. RGB
kg payload capacity UAV considering different fuel sources. cameras capture visible light wavelengths that humans can
see and are used to create 2D or 3D maps of an area, mon-
itor crop growth, and capture aerial footage for film and
3.1.2. UAV navigation technology
video production. RGB cameras have the advantage of be-
Within UAV navigation, collision and obstacle avoidance ing lightweight, affordable, and easy to use. They also pro-
systems are crucial for ensuring safe and certified opera- vide high-resolution images, making them ideal for detailed
tions. Autonomous positioning is often necessary for station- analysis and documentation of an area. However, they may
keeping and loitering (Hashim 2021a, 2021b; Hashim et al. struggle to capture details in low light or in highly reflective
2023b, 2024). UAVs rely on a combination of Global Position- or dark environments. Infrared cameras are another type of
ing Systems (GPS) and Global Navigation Satellite Systems sensor used in UAVs for capturing thermal images of an area.

Infrared cameras detect infrared radiation, which is emit- the boundaries of UAV autonomous technology, it can self-
ted by all objects and provides a temperature profile of the navigate through environments unmapped by GPS (Hashim
area being imaged. Infrared cameras are used in various in- 2021b; Hashim et al. 2021). This technology is expected to
dustries including agriculture, construction, and search and continue to improve and mitigate associated human error.
rescue missions. They are particularly useful for identifying Autonomous UAVs are dependent on advancements in navi-
hotspots, detecting leaks in pipelines, and monitoring crops gation technology.
for irrigation and pest control. Infrared cameras can oper- Navigation systems are continuing to advance the safety
ate in low light and can penetrate through smoke and fog, and reliability of UAVs. All modern UAVs are equipped with
making them ideal for night-time and low-visibility missions advanced navigation systems such as GPS and ground-based
(Teledye FLIR 2021; Hashim 2021b; Hashim et al. 2024). sensors, which allow the drones to navigate remotely or au-
Hyperspectral sensors are also used in UAVs for capturing tonomously. UAVs are equipped with sensors that calculate
images of an area at hundreds of different wavelengths. Hy- the distance between the UAV and surrounding objects to
perspectral sensors can capture information on an area’s veg- avoid collisions (Wei et al. 2021; Kavitha and Nivetha 2022).
etation, water, and mineral content, and can identify specific It is common to see drones hover and maintain a certain al-
objects or materials that may not be visible to the human titude, this is a result of the altitude hold function. The al-
eye. Hyperspectral sensors are used in various industries, in- titude hold function is controlled by a barometric pressure
cluding agriculture, geology, and environmental monitoring. sensor, ultrasonic sensor, and a throttle stick which work co-
They can be used to monitor plant health, detect changes in hesively to allow the drone to maintain or shift its position
land use and vegetation, and identify areas with mineral de- during operation (Kavitha and Nivetha 2022; Xing and John-
posits. Hyperspectral sensors can be expensive and require son 2022). Modern navigation systems are connected seam-
complex processing, but they have the advantage of provid- lessly to cloud computing services such as Amazon Web Ser-
ing detailed information about an area that cannot be ob- vices, which analyzes and processes data from drone opera-
tained by other sensors (Adao et al. 2017; Alvarez-Montoya tion. This can be beneficial in avoiding recurring errors that
et al. 2020; Banerjee et al. 2020). LiDAR is a form of remote may have an effect on safety. Navigation systems help drones
sensing technology that uses rapid laser pulses to capture avoid obstacles and collisions and improve flight stability
data points and create precise and accurate maps of an area while ensuring more reliable operation. Sensors are the back-
(Murison 2020). LiDAR drones have a wide range of applica- bone of the UAVs navigation systems and autonomy (Kavitha
tions, including tracking the progress of construction, con- and Nivetha 2022). The improvement in navigation systems
ducting safety inspections, estimating resource stockpiles, and autonomy are directly linked to the advancements in sen-
mapping power lines, and reconstructing accident scenes. Li- sor position and accuracy. Sensors improve the UAVs environ-
DAR technology has the advantage of working in the dark mental awareness and help them detect challenges posed by
and penetrating through vegetation, making it suitable for its operation environment, such as temperature changes, air
various use cases where photogrammetry systems may strug- pressure, and humidity. UAVs can use cameras and ultrasonic
gle to capture detailed objects. However, photogrammetry sensors to detect obstacles and avoid collisions. Advancement
is still commonly used due to its accessibility and ability to in sensors can further lead to more effective autopilot and
create detailed models overall. With the decreasing cost and battery management. Advancing battery management sys-
weight of LiDAR, it is expected that LiDAR adoption may ex- tems with sensors can optimize and prevent overheating and
pand to new industries and use cases in the future (Murison other issues (Kavitha and Nivetha 2022). Sensor technology
2020). has made UAVs safer and more reliable.
The power supply for UAVs is what allows it to operate,
as a result advancement in the UAVs power supply is critical
3.2. Advancements in safety and reliability for safety and reliability. Most UAVs use lithium-ion batteries
The UAV industry is continuously evolving every year. As because they are highly energy dense, lightweight, and have
a result, safety and reliability must advance to ensure their excellent rechargeable properties. As power supply solutions
continued success. Advancements in safety and reliability are advance, UAVs will be capable of flying for longer periods of
focused in four main areas: autonomy, navigation systems, time. Many modern UAVs have a redundant power system to
sensors, and power supply. Advancements in all these four ensure that UAVs will not fall out of the sky if power in the
categories work cohesively to ensure safety and reliability. It main supply fails. In addition to having redundant power sys-
is imperative that progress in these categories is made to keep tems, many of them also have systems such as auto landing
up with the rapid advancements in UAV technology and per- or return home features, which would activate in the event
cent the safety of UAVs from being overshadowed. Drone au- of a critical failure or power loss. Power management sys-
tonomy has been increasing in the development of UAVs and tems in modern UAVs are a critical feature of the power sup-
has been directly responsible for the rise of hobbyist drone ply. This system monitors the power usage of individual UAV
pilots. Advancements in autonomy have led to the improve- components and can adjust power allocation accordingly to
ment of remote-control capabilities, and minimal human in- maximize the efficiency of the power supply (Kavitha and
tervention. Human error poses a risk to UAV operation, as Nivetha 2022). Power management systems will continue to
a result mitigating unexpected human error can greatly re- advance and become more efficient. Power supply technology
duce the probability of risk. As previously mentioned in 2.2 will continue to advance and improve the safety and reliabil-
State of UAV Technology, the LiDAR-based drone is pushing ity of UAV technology as a result.

4. Regulatory framework in Canada 25 kg (55 lbs.), (2) operation beyond VLOS, and (3) operation at
altitude greater than outlined above. For such an operation,
UAV operations are regulated in Canada through the CAR pilots must have a SFOC-RPAS in accordance with regulation
Part IX – Remotely Piloted Aircraft Systems (Transport Canada 903.02 if they are able to prove to the Minister the ability to
2020a). The regulation is subdivided into subparts for small perform the operation without adversely affecting aviation
remotely piloted aircraft which are defined as having a maxi- safety or the safety of any person.
mum take-off weight of between 250g (0.55 lbs.) and 25 kg (55
lbs.), defined in Subpart 1. Regulation for operation of larger
UAV, or unique operating condition is defined in Subpart 3. 4.1. Canadian pilot certification
Before 1996, when CAR Part IX was codified, old regulations In accordance with regulations 901.54 and 901.62, pilots
had a much more complex structure. Key elements of the pre- wishing to fly UAV between 250 g and 25 kg must possess
vious regulation remain, such as the SFOC. However, the new a pilot certificate. TC defines two certificates, Pilot Certifi-
regulation simplifies exemptions and UAV distinctions into 2 cate Basic Operations and Pilot Certificate Advanced Oper-
categories of operation, weight class and visual line of sight ations, which can both be attained through a TC adminis-
(VLOS) status, making for a more robust and expansive leg- tered online exam. As the names suggest, candidates for ad-
islation. Note that the maximum weight threshold was low- vanced certificates need to demonstrate a much higher apti-
ered from 35 kg to 25 kg in the new iteration of the Canadian tude for concepts through a separate exam and must already
regulations. This regulation only deals with the operation of have a basic operations certificate, mirroring licensing for
UAVs, defining when and where small UAVs can fly, as well as other forms of transportation such as automobiles (Transport
the certifications a pilot must possess for each operation type Canada 2019c; Sauve et al. 2020; Phadke et al. 2023). Exam-
(Transport Canada 2023; Henderson 2022). inations for both basic and advanced certificates cover al-
In accordance with Subpart 1 of CAR Part IX, every small most the entirety of CAR Part IX, and sections from other
remotely piloted aircraft operating in Canada must be regis- parts including Part I: General Provisions and Part VI: Gen-
tered with the Ministry of Transportation (901.03), with the eral Operating Flight Rules. Pertaining to RPAS airframes,
pilot also requiring a pilot certificate (901.54). Division III of powerplants, propulsion and systems, candidates must have
Subpart 1 outlines general operating and flight rules, which knowledge of proper RPAS handling, care and securing, elec-
mandate operation under a VLOS. This means that a pilot or trical systems, redundancies and critical items, ground con-
visual observer must always have unaided visual contact with trol stations, datalinks, batteries, autopilots, payloads, elec-
the UAV during flight, which greatly limits the operations of trical motors, launch and recovery systems, and other sys-
these aircraft (901.11). Also outlined in this section are pro- tems onboard UAVs (Transport Canada 2019c). For this exam,
hibited airspaces, flight safety regulations, and necessary doc- candidates must show understanding of many other concepts
umentation. Regulation 901.25 imposes a maximum flight al- including air law, air traffic rules, procedures, human fac-
titude of 122 m (400 ft), or 30 m (100 ft) above any building tors, meteorology, navigation, flight operations, flight theory,
or structure. Division V of Subpart 1 sets out regulations for and radiotelephony (Transport Canada 2019c). Both basic and
advanced operations, which are defined for small remotely advanced pilots need to register their UAVs with TC in ac-
piloted aircraft for operation in (1) controlled airspaces, (2) at cordance with regulation 901.06, which can easily be done
distances of less than 5 m (16.4 ft) from any person, (3) within through TC’s Drone Management Portal (Transport Canada
3 nautical miles from airports or 1 nautical mile from a he- 2019a, 2019b, 2021b; Lamb et al. 2021; Jagielski et al. 2022;
lipad. This requires pilots to have an additional supplemen- Villeneuve et al. 2022).
tary pilot certificate for advanced operations (901.62). Subse- Basic pilots can begin conducting operations once they re-
quently, Division VI imposes requirements for manufactur- ceive their certificate, unlike advanced pilots who must pass
ers that make UAVs intended for advanced operations. Reg- a flight review. This is a process where a flight reviewer,
ulation 901.78 states that manufacturers must make avail- who are TC approved UAV pilots, assess the pilot’s ability to
able to UAV owners (1) a maintenance program that provides safely operate the drone (Canada 2019b). During this exami-
instructions and inspection program, (2) any mandatory ac- nation, pilots must demonstrate skill and knowledge includ-
tions the manufacturer issues with respect to the system, (3) ing providing a satisfactory site survey, properly identifying
operating manual that includes safe ranges of weights and airspace, obstructions, and terrain features, retrieve and in-
centers of gravity, minimum and maximum altitudes and ve- terpret weather information, select a safe and efficient take-
locities for each flight phase, effects of foreseeable weather off location and flight route, and organize and arrange mate-
conditions, unsafe characteristics of the system that could rial and equipment in a manner that makes the items readily
result in injury, procedures for operating system in normal available. In addition, the pilot must be able to describe emer-
and emergency conditions, and assembly/adjustment instruc- gency procedures, complete all pre-flight inspection/checks,
tions. Under regulation 901.79, the manufacturer must also maintain a stable airspeed, cruising altitude, and heading,
keep records of results, and reports relating to product verifi- navigate by applying systematic navigation techniques, and
cation for a period of 2 years after the date of manufacturing orient the UAV to the direction of flight. The pilot must also
of the system (Transport Canada 2020a, 2023). be able to correctly program the UAV for a “return to home"
Subpart 3 of CAR Part IX addresses special flight operations if it is equipped with that function, select a power setting and
for remotely piloted aircraft systems which include the oper- altitude appropriate for the lost link situation, and promptly
ation of (1) UAV having maximum takeoff weight more than recognize when a lost link has occurred. Other skills and

knowledge required include the ability to perform the tasks to any persons near the UAV during operation by stating that
of identifying and recording their present position, estimat- the occurrence of any single failure of the UAV that may re-
ing the approximate available flight time that will remain sult in severe injury to a person within 30 m (98.4ft) or 5 m
with the fuel/power on board upon arrival at the destina- (16.4ft) horizontally must be shown to be remote. Further-
tion, and without delay contacting the appropriate facility to more, the systems, controls and associated monitoring and
provide information on the “fly away" if needed. Addition- warning must be designed in a way as to minimize UAV pilot
ally, the pilot must use an organized and efficient procedure errors that could create additional hazards.
to land, comply with all arrival clearances and instructions, Under Division II of Standard 922: Technical Require-
complete appropriate checklists, note landing time, and se- ments – Operations within VLOS, only the regulations have
cure the UAV (Transport Canada 2019c). Lastly, advanced oper- been published and codified by TC and the Government of
ations can only be done by TC approved UAV (Canada 2019a). Canada. Sections dealing with certification for basic opera-
This program is called RPAS Safety Assurance and requires tions (922.02), operations over critical infrastructure (922.03),
manufacturers to make a declaration which states that their and all of Division III: Technical Requirements – Operations
UAV is in accordance with advanced operations technical re- Beyond Visual Line of Sight (BVLOS) are labeled as reserved,
quirements. TC provides a complete list of all RPAS Safety which means that they are still under development by TC
Assurance compliant UAV for pilots looking to conduct ad- (GovInfo 2022). With this ongoing development worldwide,
vanced operations. National Aviation Authorities (NAAs) have come together to

create an advisory committee to consider and draft certifica-
tion and regulation bases which can be used as a framework
4.1.1. Special Flight Operations Certificate (SFOC) for national policy. The JARUS is an ICAO-recognized group
that aims at drafting regulations to cover all aspects of un-
In accordance with CAR 903.02, any pilot seeking to con-
manned aircraft systems operations (van de Leijgraaf 2012).
duct UAV operations that fall outside of the definitions for
Its members include several NAAs including TC, Federal Avi-
basic and advanced operations must have an SFOC. This cer-
ation Authority (FAA) and the EASA. JARUS 2019 report “Rec-
tificate is mandatory for foreign operators, special events, fly-
ommendations for Certification Specification for Unmanned
ing near military airports, flying beyond visual line-of-sight,
Aircraft Systems” is the backbone for the development of
drones over 25kg (55lbs.), higher altitudes, hazardous pay-
many UAV certification regulations worldwide (Farner 2019).
loads, and flying more than five drones at once (Canada
Subsequent sections discuss JARUS recommended regula-
2020b; Nikodem and Kaltenhäuser 2020). Applications for an
tions for certification of UAV.
SFOC consist of the purpose, dates, alternate dates, and times
of the operation, along with the manufacturer and model
of the system, complete with three-view drawings or pho- 4.2.1. General regulations
tographs of the aircraft, performance, operating limitations,
JARUS defines the applicability to these regulation recom-
and equipment. A safety plan for the proposed area of opera-
mendations as any UAV which does not exceed 3175 kg (7000
tion and an emergency contingency plan must be described,
lbs.) maximum takeoff weight (MTOW) for VTOL aircraft, and
as well as a detailed plan for how the operation is to be car-
8618 kg (19 000 lbs.) for aircraft without VTOL capabilities
ried out. The names, certificates, licenses, permits, and quali-
(Terkildsen and Jensen 2019; Konert and Kasprzyk 2020). The
fications of crew members, including pilots, visual observers,
manufacturer must define the limitations of operation un-
and UAV maintenance personnel must also be given. Instruc-
der normal and emergency conditions. Operation conditions
tions for system maintenance and how that maintenance will
must consider environmental factors such as temperature,
be performed must also be included. Descriptions of weather
humidity, wind, and rain when determining limits. Not
minima for the operation, separation and collision avoid-
exceeding limitations must be a part of the integrated flight
ance capability and procedures, normal and emergency pro-
system on the UAV. In the case that the UAV is designed
cedures for the operation, and ATC services coordination, if
in a modular fashion, or intended to be disassembled and
applicable, must also be provided. Lastly, any other informa-
transported, the manufacturer must provide complete dis-
tion requested by the Minister relevant to the safe conduct of
assembly/assembly, storage, and handling documentation.
the operation must be submitted (Transport Canada 2023).
Furthermore, incorrect assembly must be avoided by proper
design and the transportation must not adversely affect the
4.2. Certification airworthiness of the UAV. The manufacturer is required to
As mentioned above, all advanced operations require RPAS provide comprehensive documentation of testing data or
Safety Assurance, which is governed by CAR Standard 922. system compliance within established operating limits, in or-
This standard seeks to set out the minimum technical re- der to verify adherence to both earlier and later compliance
quirements that each UAV manufacturer must meet to be specifications.
safety certified in Canada. Current codified sections refer
only to operations in controlled spaces, and operations near
people. Under regulation 922.04: Operations in Controlled 4.2.2. UAV operations
Airspace, the UAV must have a lateral positional accuracy of The manufacturer must determine the boundaries of the
±10 m (32.8ft) and an altitude accuracy of ±16 m (52.5ft). approved flight envelope, clearly demonstrating areas of safe
Regulations 922.05 and 922.06 relate to minimizing injury flight, flight under abnormal conditions, and flight under

Fig. 3. Unmanned aerial vehicle flight envelopes. quality assurance requirements. Moreover, the manufacturer
must establish a unique safety factor for critical design values
that are uncertain, as well as for parts or assemblies that are
likely to deteriorate before normal replacement or are prone
to significant variability due to uncertainties in manufactur-
ing processes or inspection methods. To determine the safety
factor, the applicant must consider quality controls and spec-
ifications that account for the type of application, inspection
method, structural test requirement, sampling percentage,
and process and material control. Finally, the applicant must
multiply the highest applicable safety factor for each part of
the structure by using the limit load and ultimate load. If
there is no limit load, the applicant is expected to use the
ultimate load alone.
4.2.4. UAV design and construction

The manufacturer must ensure that the flight control sys-
tems operate smoothly and effectively, with trim systems de-
emergency conditions. Different UAV flight envelopes are as
signed to prevent inadvertent operation. Take-off and landing
depicted in Fig. 3. The regulation outlines various require-
devices must provide stable support, account for system fail-
ments wherein the manufacturer seeking certification for
ures and environmental factors, and absorb kinetic energy.
the operation of UAV must demonstrate compliance. Among
If necessary, the UAV must demonstrate aborted take-off ca-
these requirements are the determination of minimum
pability, and must be able to keep landing devices in place.
speeds for each flight configuration and phase, minimum
For operations on water, the design must ensure adequate
performance requirements for take-off and other critical
buoyancy to support take-off and landing. The UAV must be
flight phases, minimum climb and rate of descent perfor-
designed to minimize the risk of fire initiation due to antici-
mance, landing area requirements, approach and landing
pated energy dissipation or ignition of flammable fluids. This
speeds, and procedures, as well as controllability and stabil-
is to be minimized through adequate fire or smoke detec-
ity requirements for the UAV. All performance parameters
tion and notification to the operator and if possible or the
must be determined for normal, abnormal, and emergency
application of self-extinguishing or utilizing fireproof mate-
conditions to demonstrate safety considerations by the
rials. In areas where the likelihood of lightning exposure is
manufacturer.
high, a UAV that is being certified for operation must have
measures in place to protect it from the destructive effects
4.2.3. UAV structures of lightning. For UAVs that are not certified for such condi-
tions, restrictions on flight, including take-off and landing,
Regarding UAV structure, the manufacturer must establish
must be put in place to prevent them from being exposed to
a structural design envelope which describes the range and
lightning. Electrical and electronic systems on a UAV must be
limits of the design. The manufacturer must consider flight
designed to protect against lightning. Systems that are essen-
and ground loading conditions, mass variations and distri-
tial for safe flight and landing or emergency recovery must
butions over the applicable center of gravity envelope and
be designed to function properly during and after lightning
loads in response to control inputs. Flight load conditions
exposure, with normal operation recovery in a timely man-
must be established and must ensure that all critical loads
ner. Systems that significantly reduce the UAVs capability or
are established, vibrations and buffeting does not result
the crew’s ability to respond to adverse conditions must also
in structural damage within the boundaries of the flight
recover normal operation after lightning exposure. In case
envelope, and flight loads resulting from likely failures are
an emergency procedure requires a forced landing or con-
determined. Furthermore, structural design loads from taxi,
trolled crash into a specific area, the following rules must be
takeoff, launch and handling must be determined. Under
followed: (a) The UAV design should include enough features
this regulation proposal, the manufacturer must develop
to minimize the risks arising from potential debris, fire, or
and implement inspections or procedures to prevent struc-
explosions that could spread beyond the designated landing
tural failures which could be catastrophic. For UAV with
or crash zone. (b) The Flight Manual for the crew must pro-
pressurized compartments, the aircraft must be designed
vide information about the forced landing or controlled crash
to be capable of continued safe flight in the event of rapid
area’s characteristics.
depressurization.
Critical parts are described as any part of a UAV, the fail-
ure of which would endanger continued safe flight, landing
4.2.5. UAV systems and equipment
or emergency recovery. For any such parts, the manufacturer
must establish a critical parts list. Procedures must be estab- UAV equipment, systems and networks must be protected
lished for these critical parts to determine compliance with from intentional unauthorized electronic interactions (cyber-

security). All on-board power generation, storage, and dis- this category, drones must be flown within VLOS, below 150
tribution must be designed to supply the power required m altitude, and outside specified reserved areas. Flying over
for all approved operating conditions and ensure that no crowds is not allowed, but flying over unrelated individuals
single failure will prevent the system from supplying the in populated areas is permitted. Although airworthiness ap-
essential loads for continued safe flight. The manufacturer proval is not required, industry standards can be used, and
must ensure that equipment with high-energy rotating parts UAV with safety features like parachutes and software re-
must be designed or installed in a way that prevents dam- dundancy that are already available (Konert and Dunin 2020;
age to other systems or structures in the event of failure. If European Union Aviation Safety Agency 2023). The open cat-
recording is required, the system must accurately record and egory is further subdivided into 3 subcategories: A1, A2, and
safeguard the necessary data including emergency events. A3. A1 is defined as flight over people but not assemblies,
The UAV must also have emergency recovery capabilities A2 as flight close to people, and A3 flight far from people.
and procedures in place to prevent fatal injuries to people UAV weight below 250 gm has a subcategory of A1. No flight
on the ground or in the air, as well as damage to critical over uninvolved people (minimize duration if it occurs) and
infrastructure. no training is required. UAV weight between 250 and 500 gm
has a subcategory of A3. No flight over assemblies of people
and the operator should read carefully the user manual as
4.2.6. UAV crew interface and other information well as complete training and pass nationally defined exam.
This regulation outlines requirements for the remote pilot UAV weight between 500 gm and 2 kg has a subcategory of
station and associated equipment in operating a UAV. The A3. No flight over uninvolved people and no flight over as-
remote pilot station must be designed to support command semblies of people. The operator should read carefully the
and control of the UAV for the intended operations and user manual and complete training and pass a nationally de-
qualify against expected environmental conditions. The fined exam. UAV weight between 2 and 25 kg has a subcate-
equipment must also be designed to minimize errors that gory of A3. No flight near or over people at least 150 m away
could result in additional hazards, and physical security must from residential, commercial, industrial areas and training is
be considered. Additionally, the manufacturer must provide required.
a UAV flight manual containing information such as operat- The specific category is for operations that require ad-
ing limitations and procedures, performance information, ditional limitations or higher capability of the equipment
loading information, and instrument marking and placard and personnel, beyond the open category. Operators are
information necessary for the safe operation of the UAV. The required to perform a safety risk assessment and identify
manual must also include limitations for transportation, mitigation measures, which will be reviewed and approved
reconfiguration, and storage. Installed systems must provide by the applicable national aviation authority, unless the op-
the remote crew with necessary information to operate the erator is approved to approve its own safety risk assessment.
UAV during each phase of flight, and not inhibit primary The safety risk assessment covers airworthiness, operating
displays of flight or powerplant parameters. These systems procedures and environment, personnel competence, and
must also be designed to ensure continued safe flight and airspace issues. The level of safety for airworthiness is based
landing or emergency recovery in the event of a single failure on acceptable industry standards, and the competence of
or probable combination of failures. the involved staff, established through specific training or
licensing. An operations manual is required to define the
operating procedures, airworthiness level, personnel com-
4.3. International regulatory frameworks petence, and the type of airspace. The specific category is
required when an operation poses significant aviation risks
4.3.1. European Union Aviation Safety Agency
to persons overflown or involves sharing airspace. Examples
(EASA)
of conditions resulting in specific categories include BVLOS
The regulation of UAV operation in European countries is flight, UAV with MTOW > 25 kg, and flight at altitude > 120
mandated through EASA and is done proportionally to the as- m (Huttunen 2019; European Union Aviation Safety Agency
sociated risk of the specific operation (European Union Avia- 2021b).
tion Safety Agency 2015; Bassi 2019). Their current regulation The certified category is intended for operations that
separates operations into “open”, “specific”, and “certified” pose the highest risk, such as future drone flights carrying
risk levels which come with differing levels of authorization passengers like air taxis. The third component of the regu-
and bureaucracy. Like Canadian regulations, registration is latory framework is similar to the regulations for manned
not required for UAV < 250 g (0.55lbs.) and required for all aircraft because when drone risks are similar to manned
else. EASA believes that this regulation framework both pri- aviation risks, they need to be classified as certified oper-
oritizes the safe integration of UAV into the aviation system ations and treated accordingly with multiple certificates
as well as fosters innovation and a competitive UAV industry issued. For drones weighing over 150 kg, a Type Certificate,
in Europe. The open category allows low-risk drone opera- individual certificate of airworthiness, and individual noise
tions that do not involve aviation authorities, even for com- certificate needs to be issued. Design and production organi-
mercial purposes. Operators and pilots do not need licenses zations need to be approved and certification specifications
or approvals, and the focus is on simple operations for small are adopted for different configurations (European Union
and medium-sized enterprises to gain experience. To fly in Aviation Safety Agency 2021a).

4.3.2. Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) and reliability, several factors must be considered. These in-
clude flight stability, redundancy, collision avoidance, battery
The United States’ FAA regulates UAV in a very similar man-
life, and remote control. Generally, UAVs that prioritize safety
ner to Canada, with its regulations codified under the Code of
and reliability are more expensive than those that do not.
Federal Regulations (CFR) Title 14 Part 107: Small Unmanned
However, the extra cost may be justified in industries where
Aircraft Systems. The regulations contained in this part are
safety and reliability are paramount, such as military or com-
for operating UAV that weigh less than 55 pounds, in Class G
mercial settings. Subsequent sections explore UAV technolo-
airspace, within VLOS, at or below 400 ft, and during the day-
gies that improve the aforementioned factors, which are cru-
time. Regulations prohibit UAV from flying at speeds above
cial for the future of UAVs. By enhancing UAV safety and reli-
100 mph and over people, although this may be permitted
ability through these technologies, we can ensure safer and
depending on the level of risk presented by the operation to
more dependable use of UAVs in various applications.
individuals on the ground (Code of Federal Regulation 2020).
Operations over persons on the ground are separated into 4
categories of operation (numbered 1 through 4). Small, un- 5.1. Flight stability
manned aircraft falling under Category 1 may fly over peo- The evolution of flight stability in UAVs has been an ongo-
ple as long as they weigh 0.25kg (0.55lbs) or less and have ing process of improving the design and functionality of the
no exposed rotating parts. Category 2 and 3 operations have aircraft (Hashim 2023; Hashim et al. 2023a). Initially, UAVs
specific eligibility and operating requirements for unmanned were manually controlled by human operators using remote
aircraft that weigh more than 0.25kg (0.55lbs) but do not have controls or onboard controls. However, this required a lot of
an airworthiness certificate under Part 21. Category 3 has fur- skill and attention to maintain a stable flight path (Hashim
ther restrictions, including not allowing small, unmanned 2023). As technology advanced, autopilot systems were devel-
aircraft to fly over open-air assemblies of human beings, ex- oped to assist in maintaining stability during flight. With the
cept in specific cases like being inside a stationary vehicle emergence of UAV autonomy, flight stability has been further
or a covered structure that can provide protection (Stankovic improved. Autonomous UAVs use a combination of human-
et al. 2021; Federal Aviation Administration 2022b). directed and autonomous drone operations to achieve a
Category 4 allows small, unmanned aircraft with an air- higher level of independence (Hashim 2023; Hashim et al.
worthiness certificate under Part 21 to operate over people, 2023a). This has led to the development of Intelligent Outer-
provided that they meet additional requirements to en- Loop Control (IOLC) systems that can operate autonomously
sure continued airworthiness and reliability. Note that a or semi-autonomously without predefined guidance from hu-
brief, one-time transiting over a portion of an assembled man interaction. The IOLC is capable of monitoring and con-
gathering, which is incidental to a point-to-point operation trolling not only the UAV’s critical functions but also its com-
unrelated to the assembly, does not count as sustained flight munications, sensor payload, and other subsystems, which
over an open-air assembly (Federal Aviation Administration enables it to meet complex mission goals (Hussein et al.
2022b). CFR 14 Part 21 relates to certifications procedures for 2021). Additionally, advancements in sensors and Artificial
products and articles and is the governing regulation which Intelligence (AI) have enabled UAVs to adapt to changing en-
certifies manned and unmanned aircraft. UAV wishing to un- vironmental conditions in real-time, which has further im-
dergo Category 4 operations must receive type certification, proved flight stability. For example, UAVs can now detect and
product certification, and airworthiness certification to com- avoid obstacles during flight, which helps prevent crashes
ply with regulations, similar to manned aircraft (Fennelly and maintain stability. Overall, the evolution of flight stabil-
and Perry 2020; Federal Aviation Administration 2022a). ity in UAVs has been driven by advances in technology and
Whilst 14 CFR Part 107 is only applicable to UAV weighing the need for greater autonomy in unmanned aircraft. As tech-
less than 25kg (55lbs), to fly a UAV that exceeds this limit, the nology continues to advance, we can expect to see even more
pilot may apply for an exemption under 49 US Code (USC) improvements in flight stability and overall UAV safety and
Section 44807: Special Authority for Certain Unmanned Sys- reliability.
tems. The application for this exemption consists of concepts
of operations, operations manual, emergency procedures,
5.2. Redundancy
checklists, maintenance manual, training program, flight
Redundancy is an important aspect of UAV technology that
history, and safety risk analysis. If the proposal includes com-
ensures the reliability and safety of the aircraft. Redundant
plex operations such as flying over or near people, BVLS, or
systems, such as having multiple motors or power sources,
multiple UAV operations, a safety risk analysis is required. To
make the UAV more reliable because they can help maintain
apply for operational approval for specific airspace, the oper-
the UAV’s operation in case of a system failure. For example,
ator must apply for a Certificate of Waiver or Authorization
when implementing LiDAR technology onto a UAV, it requires
(COA) (Federal Aviation Administration 2022c).
more power resources to compensate for the power need and
added weight of the LiDAR sensors. To ensure safety and re-
5. Comparison of UAV technology based liability in operations, modern UAVs that implement LiDAR
technology are designed with redundancies. The Sky front
on safety and reliability Perimeter 8 gasoline-electric hybrid multi-copter is an exam-
UAVs have gained popularity due to their versatility and af- ple of a UAV with a redundant system. It has both hybrid and
fordability. When assessing UAV technology based on safety electric engines for both motors, which provide complete en-

Fig. 4. Stages of perception, localization and filtering, motion planning, and obstacle avoidance. GPS, Global Positioning Sys-
tems; LiDAR, light detection and ranging.
gine redundancy for safety. Flight navigation systems on au- Geometric action involves using the UAV’s location informa-
tonomous UAVs must comply with JARUS worldwide regulation to avoid obstacles, while force-field action uses attrac-
tions to adapt to software or hardware failures and maintain tive and repulsive forces to maneuver around obstacles. Op-
an acceptable level of safety. Fail-safe technology is crucial for timized actions are based on known parameters that can be
any drone to be reliable. One common redundancy is identi- used to avoid obstacles, while sense-and-avoid actions rely on
fying the drone’s position. In case of GPS failure, autonomous real-time decision making for obstacle avoidance based on
drones must be equipped with an Indoor Positioning System data from the sensors. Figure 4 shows the stages of percep-
(IPS), such as Bluetooth antennas, Wi-Fi, digital cameras, or tion, localization and filtering, motion planning, and obsta-
LiDAR, which can identify the UAV’s location independent of cle avoidance.
GPS. In some cases, purpose-built infrastructure can be built LiDAR technology is one of the most advanced and reli-
around the area of operation to further enhance the redun- able systems used for collision avoidance in UAVs. It emits
dancy of the UAV’s navigation system (Angrisano et al. 2018; laser beams that bounce off objects and surfaces, creating
Kotikalpudi et al. 2020). high-resolution 3D maps of the surrounding environment.
LiDAR technology provides accuracy and precision in cap-
5.3. Collision avoidance turing data, which is crucial for safety operations when
As UAVs become more prevalent, the risk of collisions with detecting potential hazards and preventing accidents. This
obstacles such as buildings, trees, and other aircraft also in- feature greatly improves the ability to navigate complex
creases. Collision avoidance is therefore a crucial aspect of environments, especially when operating in hazardous or
UAV technology that directly impacts their safety and relia- populated areas. In summary, collision avoidance is crucial
bility. In this context, exploring the different categories of for safety and reliability in UAV technology. It involves the
collision avoidance and their importance in UAV operations, detection of obstacles through sensors and real-time decision
with a particular focus on the role of LiDAR technology is nec- making for obstacle avoidance. LiDAR technology is one of
essary. Collision avoidance is a critical aspect of safety and re- the most advanced systems used for collision avoidance, as
liability in UAV technologies. It involves two main categories: it provides high-resolution 3D maps that improve accuracy
perception and action. Perception, which is the detection of and precision in navigating complex environments.
obstacles, can be achieved using sensors, classified into two
categories: active and passive sensors. Active sensors emit 5.4. Operation time
their own source of light waves and read back the reflections, One way to enhance the safety and reliability of UAVs is
while passive sensors read only what is reflected from other by increasing their operational time. Longer flight times re-
objects, such as a camera or infrared camera. The next step duce the number of take-offs and landings, which are the
is action, which is based on the information gathered during most common causes of accidents. This section focuses on
the perception stage. The action can be categorized into ge- the relationship between the operational time and safety and
ometric, force-field, optimized, and sense-and-avoid actions. reliability of UAVs (Townsend et al. 2020). The operational

time of UAVs depends on their power sources. There are sev- dancy, robustness, compliance with regulations, and human
eral power sources available in the market, including solar oversight. The system should be reliable and have a low
power, hydrogen FCs, batteries, and traditional combustion failure rate to minimize risk of accidents. The results of the
engines (Townsend et al. 2020). Each power source has its ad- trade-off study will provide valuable insight into the design
vantages and disadvantages, and choosing the appropriate and selection of safe and reliable systems for UAVs, helping
power source for a UAV depends on various factors, includ- to mitigate risks associated with UAV operation and ensure
ing flight time, payload capacity, and environmental impact. their successful deployment during their specific operation.
Batteries are commonly used in recreational UAVs due to The system should have redundant components to ensure
their portability and rechargeability. However, their low en- that in that case that one fails. The system should be robust
ergy density limits the flight time of the UAV. Hydrogen FCs and can withstand environmental disturbances such as wind
have a higher energy density, resulting in longer flight times, gusts, turbulence, or electromagnetic interference. It should
but the technology is currently limited to larger UAVs due to be able to adapt to changing conditions. The system should
its size and weight (Townsend et al. 2020). Traditional com- comply with relevant regulations such as airspace regula-
bustion engines provide high operational time, but they are tions, altitude limits, and collision avoidance rules. Finally,
noisy and require regular maintenance, making them unsuit- the system should incorporate a level of human oversight to
able for recreational UAVs. Solar power is a new technology ensure that the human operator can intervene if necessary.
in the UAV industry that requires more research. Solar pan- Safe UAVs should incorporate all these safety parameters
els require a lot of sunlight, and the technology is more ex- during operation.
pensive than other power sources. LiDAR is a technology that
provides several benefits but when used in UAVs it can reduce
the operational life of the UAV due to its added weight and 6.1. Power supply trade off study
power requirements. The choice of power source for a UAV Fundamentally in the comparison of power systems uti-
depends on various factors, including the desired flight time, lized in UAVs, the main goal is to identify which power sys-
payload capacity, and environmental impact. Increasing the tem used in UAV application has the most positive impact on
operational time of UAVs can enhance their safety and re- safety and reliability in regular operation. A trade off study
liability by reducing the number of take-offs and landings, will be performed on four different power systems that are
which are the most common causes of accidents. commonly used on UAVs. Battery power (Li-ion and Li-po),
Combustion power (Petrol and Diesel), Hydrogen FCs.
5.5. Remote control Table 2 compares reliability, redundancy, robustness, com-
Safety and reliability are crucial factors that must be con- pliance with regulations, and human oversight of different
sidered when operating UAVs, especially near populated or energy sources for UAVs. This trade-off study evaluates the
hazardous environments. Remote control technology plays a performance of electric batteries for powering UAVs. While
critical role in the safe operation of UAVs. In the past, UAVs they are compliant with regulations and have moderate relia-
were operated manually, like conventional aircraft. However, bility and redundancy, they are not very robust and have lim-
advancements in automation have made it easier for opera- ited endurance, reducing their ability to run autonomously.
tors to control UAVs remotely. The use of immersive VR dis- Due to these characteristics it is apparent why batteries are
plays has further improved the remote-control characteris- the most utilized power source in non-military applications
tics of UAVs. Studies have shown that using VR displays dur- with a score of 34 out of 50. Combustion power is a mod-
ing UAV operations has a positive impact on in-depth tasks, erately safe and effective source of power for UAVs with a
which require greater accuracy and precision. Moreover, the score of 27 out of 50 however, they may be dangerous with
combination of automation and VR displays has resulted in untrained pilots and urban areas. They have high reliability
better understanding of the operating environment and me- and robustness, but limited autonomy due to their complex
chanics of the UAV from a remote setting. NASA has success- mechanical nature. They are strictly regulated and require
fully used this technology to improve the usability of UAVs special authorization to be flown. Solar power is a very safe
for complex 3D tasks. In disaster emergency response, the and environmentally friendly power source for UAVs with a
use of VR technology in UAVs has been crucial in providing rating of 29/50. While solar-powered UAVs comply with reg-
users with a view of the 3D surroundings, which improves ulations, operate at high altitudes, and require low human
the efficiency of rescue operations. The use of automation oversight, they have low redundancies, and may be affected
and immersive VR displays has greatly improved the usabil- by changes in sunlight conditions. FC power achieved a score
ity and accuracy of UAVs during complex tasks. The develop- of 29 out of 50 demonstrating its viability as a UAV power
ment of more advanced remote-control technology will un- source. FC power offers high redundancy, may require care-
doubtedly improve the safety and reliability of UAVs in the ful handling to prevent accidents and require proper human
future. oversight to ensure their proper functioning. They also face
regulatory compliance challenges. FC technology and infras-
tructure is still in its early stage of development and as tech-
6. Trade off studies in UAV systems nology improves it will prove to be a very safe and effective
When comparing UAV technologies, it is important to source of power for UAVs. Through the conducted trade stud-
understand the following factors that will be compared ies above battery powered UAVs received the highest score of
that relate to safety. These factors include reliability, redun- 34 out of 50.

Table 2. Comparison of different 5 kg payload capacity unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) with different fuel sources (Townsend
et al. 2020).
UAV-based battery power (Li-ion and Li-po)
Description Score
Reliability Moderate reliability, low power and energy density, prone to power fluctuations and require frequent 6
recharging.
Redundancy Moderate redundancy, multiple batteries instead of one unit, and combined with FCs. 6
Robustness Less robust (extreme hot or cold conditions may either drain the battery or pose risks). 4
Compliance Compliant with strict regulations and widely used in nonmilitary applications. 9
Oversight Limited endurance and range, but monitoring battery levels can enhance efficiency. 7
Total (out of 50) 34
UAV-based combustion power (Petrol and Diesel)
Description Score
Reliability Engines have a high reliability and require less regular maintenance. 8
Redundancy Hybrid combustion is comparatively much more complex and environmentally taxing. 2
Robustness Bulk combustion power is very robust and able to withstand harsh environments. 9
Compliance Regulated more strictly than other power types due to the dangerous nature. Special authorization is required 5
to be flown.
Oversight High power to weight ratio and long operating time. Complex mechanical nature reduces their ability to be 3
ran autonomously.
UAV-based solar power
Description Score
Reliability If sunlight conditions rapidly change, the UAV may be at risk of power loss. 3
Redundancy Offers low redundancies but can be combined with FCs to improve redundancy. 3
Robustness Typically operate at high altitudes good fit for extreme weather conditions. 7
Compliance Comply with strict regulation and can be used in urban areas. 7
Oversight Require low human oversight due to their simple design. 9
UAV-based hydrogen FCs power
Description Score
Reliability Flow decay, thermodynamic characteristics, and capacitance effect may result in FC systems experiencing fuel 6
starvation.
Redundancy FCs comparatively redundant (multiple cells) and combined with batteries or solar power. 8
Robustness Require careful handling to prevent accidents. Onboard hydrogen tank is susceptible to leaks and may 3
explode if not handled properly.
Compliance CSA/ANSI Hydrogen Gas Vehicle 2 (HGV 2) standard and the European Union have specifications for the 6
pressure of hydrogen stored however not well defined.
Oversight Long range and endurance compared to batteries. Require high human oversight to ensure proper handling 6
to avoid malfunctions.
Note: FC, fuel cell.
While battery powered UAVs lack a long endurance and are require additional safety measures, and with future develop-
particularly vulnerable in unfavorable weather conditions ment their limitation may be reduced. Ultimately, the deci-
they were demonstrated to excel in every category except for sion on which power source to use must consider the specific
robustness. Due to electric batteries’ characteristics, they are needs and requirements of the UAV.
the most widely used source of power in nonmilitary UAV ap-
plication. Gasoline-powered engines offer high reliability and 6.2. Navigation system
robustness but may not comply with strict regulations, this Table 3 compares reliability, redundancy, robustness, com-
is demonstrated with their high use in military applications pliance with regulations, and human oversight of UAV navi-
due to operators requiring a higher level of training. Solar gation techniques. When comparing navigation systems, the
cells can be highly robust, compliant with regulations and main goal is to identify which navigation system used in UAV
autonomous, but their safety is compromised with low relia- application has the most positive impact on safety and re-
bility and redundancies. Hydrogen FCs offer moderate relia- liability in regular operation. A trade off study will be per-
bility and redundancy, but due to their novelty their use may formed on three different navigation systems that are com-

Table 3. Localization navigation system trade off study (Angrisano et al. 2018; Gyagenda et al. 2022).
Inertial units-based UAV localization
Description Score
Reliability Inertial-based localization suffers from time drift and magnetic-based localization is prone to interference 4
(errors in position estimates).
Redundancy Different localization techniques can be combined via sensor-fusion to improve navigation performance and 7
create redundancy.
Robustness Robust against weather effects (good for outdoor navigation) but is susceptible to magnetic interference. 7
Compliance Developed in compliance with local aviation regulatory bodies. 10
Oversight Operational independent of human interaction which are easy to set up and deploy. 6
GNSS-based UAV navigation
Description Score
Reliability GNSS/GPS can estimate receiver clock, atmospheric and tropospheric effects, and geographic coordinates, 9
resulting in less error. Not applicable for indoor missions.
Redundancy Multiple satellites used in GPS positioning improve redundancy and time-delay accuracy. 9
Robustness Widely used and able to provide continuous positioning even during GNSS outages. Spoofing, multipath, and 8
signal-denial are persistent critical challenges in outdoor missions.
Compliance Regulated by ICAO and Transport Canada (see ICAO document 9849 “GNSS Manual”). 9
Oversight Human oversight is involved in interpretation of GNSS data. 8
Note: GNSS, Global Navigation Satellite Systems; GPS, Global Positioning Systems; ICAO, International Civil Aviation Organization; UAV, unmanned aerial vehicle.
monly used on UAVs. A localization navigation system is a 6.3. Optical sensors trade off study
system that helps autonomous UAVs to determine their po- In the comparison of optical sensors, the main goal is to
sition and orientation in each environment. It typically uses identify which optical sensor used in UAV application has the
sensors and cameras like LiDAR, radar, and GPS to measure most positive impact on safety and reliability in regular oper-
the vehicles movement and surroundings and processes this ation (see Table 4). A trade off study will be performed on four
data to determine the UAVs location in real-time. This infor- different optical sensors that are commonly used on UAVs.
mation is then used by the vehicle’s control system to plan The RBG camera, LiDAR sensor, thermal sensors, and hyper-
and execute movements or tasks. Localization navigation is spectral sensors. Cameras are the most used optical sensors
a moderate source of navigation with a score of 34 out of 50. in UAVs. They capture images of the terrain and are used to
Localization navigation provides accurate position estimates create maps and 3D models of the environment. Cameras can
but suffers from time drift and interference. Different tech- also be used to detect obstacles, such as trees or buildings,
niques can be combined to create redundancy. Radar-based and to track the UAV’s position relative to the ground.
localization is robust against weather effects, but magnetic- According to the study, RGB cameras are a safe and effective
based localization is susceptible to interference. Localization sensor to navigate terrain with an overall score of 29 out of
systems are developed in compliance with local aviation reg- 40. RGB cameras are generally dependable but may struggle
ulatory bodies. Magnetic-based localization is easy to set up with low-light or inclement weather conditions. They are not
and deploy and is operational independent of human inter- very robust and may be sensitive to environmental factors
action. that can affect image quality. However, they are compliant
Based on the provided trade off study tables, GNSS navi- with UAV laws and can be easily integrated into autonomous
gation has the highest score of 43 out of 50, indicating that systems. With their inexpensive cost it is easily proven how
it is the most favorable navigation system in terms of the RGB cameras are the most used optical sensors in UAVs, be-
categories of reliability, redundancy, robustness, compliance ing particularly effective at capturing images of the terrain,
with regulations, and human oversight. GNSS navigation is creating maps and 3D models of the environment such as ob-
particularly reliable compared to the UGV navigation and lo- stacles as well as tracking the UAV’s position.
calization navigation due to its precise positioning capabili- Based on our study findings, LiDAR sensors are a safe and
ties and use of multiple satellites for redundancy. UGV navi- effective sensor for UAV use with an overall score of 33 out
gation has limitations in the categories of robustness and reli- of 40. Unlike RGB cameras, they can deliver precise 3D map-
ability, which comes from its over-dependence on automated ping data even in low light or bad weather. They are generally
technologies. UGV navigation would be a suitable choice for more robust than RGB cameras but may still require protec-
operation in areas which can be seen as harmful for hu- tion from environmental factors. LiDAR sensors are compli-
mans, or property. Ultimately the choice on which naviga- ant with most regulations but may require additional permits
tion system is better is based on specific requirements and or clearances due to the potential for laser interference with
constraints for a given application. other systems. Although LiDAR sensors require more sophis-

Table 4. Comparison of different 5 kg payload capacity unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) with different fuel sources (Adao et al.
2017; Murison 2020; Teledye FLIR 2021; Kavitha and Nivetha 2022).
RGB cameras
Description Score
Reliability Typically dependable and can be impacted by lighting conditions and find difficulties in inclement weather. 7
Robustness Can be easily damaged by physical impacts or harsh weather conditions, and sensitive to dust which affects 6
image quality.
Compliance Obey majority of UAV laws but subject to privacy and data protection limitations. 9
Oversight Simple to integrate into autonomous systems, but images require processing and analysis. 7
LiDAR sensors
Description Score
Reliability Extremely dependable and can deliver precise 3D mapping data even in bad weather but expensive. 9
Robustness Withstand physical impacts and harsh weather but prone to vibration and need protection from dust and 8
environmental factors.
Compliance Compliant with most regulations but require additional permits / clearances due to laser interference with 7
other systems.
Oversight Fit for autonomous systems, but processing and analyzing require sophisticated software and hardware. 9
Thermal (infrared) sensors
Description Score
Reliability Reliable and can sense heat even in complete darkness. More expensive than conventional sensors, but 8
require calibration.
Robustness Withstand physical impacts and harsh weather but sensitive to vibration and require protection from 8
environmental factors.
Compliance Compliant with most regulations but may require additional clearances due to radiation emissions and safety. 8
Oversight Simple to integrate into autonomous systems, but processing and data analysis require additional software 8
and hardware.
Hyperspectral sensors
Description Score
Reliability More susceptible to variations in lighting, which might impair their accuracy. 5
Robustness Sensitive to physical impacts or weather conditions and require careful handling and protection to maintain 7
accuracy.
Compliance Require additional permits or clearances (due to data they capture) and privacy and data protection pose 6
concerns.
Oversight The data is more difficult to integrate into autonomous systems. 6
Note: LiDAR, light detection and ranging; red green blue, RGB.
ticated hardware and software for processing and analyzing narios with temperature differences, which can be used to
data, they excel at jobs that require real-time 3D mapping and identify potential obstacles or hazards, such as fires or hot
obstacle recognition. In addition, despite being costly, LiDAR power lines.
sensors are excellent at navigating terrain and are proven to While hyperspectral sensors received a lower score than
be highly effective. the other sensors with 24 out of 40, they are still considered
Thermal sensors are safe and useful with an overall score of safe and practical for drone use. They require regular mainte-
32 out of 40. Thermal sensors are reliable and can sense heat nance, may be sensitive to lighting, are not very robust, and
even in complete darkness but may require further calibra- require careful handling. They may require additional per-
tion for precise results. They are generally more robust than mits due to the specialized data they collect. They are difficult
hyperspectral sensors but may still be sensitive to environ- to integrate into autonomous systems but are appropriate
mental factors. Thermal sensors are compliant with most reg- for long-term monitoring initiatives. Although hyperspectral
ulations but may require additional clearances due to safety sensors received a low score, they have a niche application in
concerns. Although thermal sensors are simple to integrate monitoring changes in terrain over time. Overall, the trade-
into autonomous systems, processing and data analysis may off study shows that LiDAR is the most reliable, robust, and
require additional hardware and software. While thermal autonomous sensor, but may have more regulatory restric-
sensors may be costly, they are particularly effective in sce- tions. RGB cameras and thermal sensors are both reliable and

compliant but may require more external light sources. RGB tionize the UAV industry. One of the most notable regulatory
cameras also tend to be more vulnerable to physical damage bodies monitoring the rise of UAVs is the Single European Sky
compared to the other types of sensors. Hyperspectral sensors ATM (Air Traffic Monitoring) Research (SESAR). SESAR views
are less reliable and may require more human intervention itself as the pillar of technology of the EU’s single European
but can provide unique data on the environment. The choice sky policy. This policy in Europe is a reform in the European
of sensor ultimately depends on the specific use case and the air traffic management system which is carried out on four
trade-offs between the above-discussed factors. different levels with the goal of improving Europe’s airspace
in terms of safety, efficiency, capacity, and environmental im-
pact. SESAR defines and develops technology with the aim
7. Future trends of transforming the European air traffic sector. Like JARUS,
The future trends provide an analysis of the evolving land- SESAR is a joint undertaking for European entities through
scape of UAV technology. This section delves into emerging a public and private partnership to accelerate research in
trends in safety and reliability, specifically focusing on flight technologies that can transform air traffic in the continent
control technology and automation technology. The analysis and make it more environmentally friendly. With this over-
focuses on the future of UAV automation technology, with all goal, SESAR is making itself a notable entity in the de-
velopment of autonomous drones in Europe and setting the
an examination of the regulatory landscape in Europe and

its impact on the development of drone automation technol- framework.
ogy. Furthermore, the potential of regulatory frameworks in
Canada to facilitate improvements and enhance accessibility 7.1.3. Enabling the framework of drone
within the rapidly growing UAV industry will be explored. automation
This section uncovers the latest advancements and regulatory
shifts moving the future of UAV technology forward and shap- SESAR noted the positive effect that artificial intelligence
ing the trajectory of the industry in the years to come both and automation could have on the future of ATC systems
in Canada and worldwide. and have begun implementing steps in research and de-
velopment particularly in automation. And within these
7.1. Emerging trends in UAV technology advancements in automation, one of the main focuses is
on the development of this technology in UAVs. The result
7.1.1. Emerging trends in UAV flight control was the U-Space initiative. Drones are a growing industry in
technology Europe and around the world, they deliver new services both
in rural and urban areas and have many applications. Their
The future of flight control systems for UAVs is changing presence in European airspace means that advancements
and current regulations need to be changed to meet de- in safety and reliability are necessary to ensure growth in
mand. Safety and reliability are an increasing requirement this sector. Having a clear framework for autonomous drone
for the future of FCS due to the growth of UAVs. As a result, services is key. U-Space is a set of high-level services that
stringent space, weight, and power requirements need to be are based on digitalization and automation of functions that
met. The proposal involves the distribution of computing are specific to support safe and reliable drone development.
architectures with multiple different entities as it relates to U-space has been developed as a framework to support
microcontroller units (MCU). An MCU is a small computer routine missions of drones. The initiative for the U-space
that contains a single integrated circuit with a processor blueprint was developed in 2017 with this vision of mak-
core, memory and input and outputs, and are commonly ing autonomous drones more accessible and operationally
used in-flight control systems. MCUs have been developed possible through this framework (SESAR 2017). The 2017
in similar cases in the automotive sector. Opening the regu- blueprint covered four sets of services to support the regula-
lations and promoting collaboration in this technology can tory framework of drone development in the EU. With this
help continuing improvement in UAV flight control systems. U-Space blueprint framework, as the level of UAV automation
increases the level of UAV connectivity between UAV and
infrastructure also increases. This is necessary to ensure safe
7.1.2. Emerging trends in UAV automation
implementation of UAV automation in the future. U1 refers
technologies
to U-space foundation services covering e-registration, e-
Current UAVs already have a great variety of hardware and identification, and geofencing. U2 describes a U-space initial
software. However, the success of UAV technology is largely services for drone operations management, including flight
due to the local regulations. As previously mentioned, JARUS planning, flight approval, tracking, and interfacing with
initiative has brought together international regulatory bod- conventional ATC. U3 refers to U-space advanced services
ies around the world to work together to improve oversee supporting more complex operations in dense areas such as
UAV development. One of the largest innovation categories assistance for conflict detection and automated detect and
in drone development is the rise of autonomy. Autonomous avoid functionalities. Finally, U4 describes U-space full ser-
UAVs have many benefits which include not needing a pilot vices, offering very high levels of automation, connectivity,
or drone operator, having greater operational efficiency, and and digitalization for both the drone and the U-space system.
reduced costs. UAV traffic and BLOS piloting technology are The drone system functions are the essential functions that
quickly becoming more popular with the potential to revolu- enable the drone to fly safely and reliably (Hussein et al.

2021). The U-Space framework is a set of guidelines that out- temperature, and humidity. Finally, external sensors are
lines the development and function of key components nec- used to detect environmental factors outside of the drone’s
essary for autonomous UAVs. The System Functions compo- immediate surroundings. This includes geophysical sensors,
nent is a critical part of the framework that ensures safe and weather stations, and perimeter sensors that are used to de-
reliable drone operation. System Functions are composed of tect objects and obstacles in the drone’s flight path. Overall,
several sub-components that work together to enable the the Payload Technology aspect of the U-Space framework
drone to perform its core functions. Flight Control is one such provides the necessary sensors and tools for autonomous
sub-component, which includes intelligent mission manage- UAVs to effectively sense and navigate their environment.
ment and intelligent outer loop control (Hussein et al. 2021). The U-Space framework includes a set of tools that are in-
These capabilities ensure that the drone can fly safely and ef- tended to support the development of autonomous UAVs. The
fectively, even in complex or challenging conditions. Flight first tool in this category is the Service Specification, which
Navigation is another important sub-component of System includes several subcategories. The User Requirements sub-
Functions. It includes planning and scheduling, contingency category outlines the needs of the drone’s user, such as pay-
management, deconfliction fail-safe mission, and obstacle de- load requirements, flight duration, and data collection. The
tection and avoidance. These features allow the drone to nav- Acceptance Testing subcategory involves testing the drone to
igate through different environments while avoiding colli- ensure that it meets the user requirements and that it can
sions or other hazards (Hussein et al. 2021). Positioning is also operate safely and effectively. The Data Analytics subcategory
a key part of System Functions, and it includes indoor posi- involves analyzing the data collected during drone flights to
tioning, georeferencing, geofencing, and simultaneous local- provide insights that can improve future drone development.
ization and mapping. These capabilities allow the drone to lo- Finally, the Mission Planning subcategory involves planning
cate itself accurately and precisely in different environments the drone’s flight path and setting waypoints to ensure that
and navigate through them safely. the drone can navigate to its destination safely and efficiently
System and Environmental Status is yet another important (Hussein et al. 2021). The second tool in the “Tools" category
sub-component of System Functions, which includes intelli- is System Development, which also includes several subcat-
gent vehicle monitoring and intelligent data handling. These egories. The System Requirements subcategory involves out-
features enable the drone to monitor its own performance lining the technical requirements for the drone’s hardware
and environmental conditions and adjust as needed to en- and software, such as processing speed and storage capacity.
sure safe and reliable operation (Hussein et al. 2021). Coor- The Design subcategory involves creating a detailed design
dination is also a critical aspect of System Functions, which plan for the drone, including its physical structure and its
includes swarm formation and cooperation, and UAV and software architecture. The Implementation subcategory in-
UGVs coordination (Hussein et al. 2021). These features al- volves building the drone’s hardware and software compo-
low multiple drones to work together in a coordinated man- nents, while the Integration subcategory involves bringing
ner to achieve common objectives. Finally, Communication these components together to create a working drone system.
is a key sub-component of System Functions, which includes Finally, the Validation and Verification subcategory involves
network-centric communications and over-the-horizon com- testing the drone system to ensure that it meets the require-
munications (Hussein et al. 2021). These capabilities enable ments outlined in the Service Specification and that it can
the drone to communicate with ground-based operators and operate safely and reliably (Hussein et al. 2021).
other drones, and to receive and transmit data in real-time.
Figure below shows the system functions in a tree format for
better understanding. 7.2. Future of regulatory framework in Canada
The Payload Technology aspect of the U-Space framework The use of UAVs, commonly known as drones, has grown
refers to the various types of sensors that are used in au- exponentially in recent years. As UAV technology continues
tonomous UAVs. These sensors are categorized into four to advance, regulations governing their operation and use are
groups: optical sensors, microwave sensors, initial sensors, evolving as well. In Canada, UAVs are subject to strict reg-
and external sensors. Optical sensors can be further divided ulatory frameworks aimed at ensuring safety and promot-
into two subcategories: active optical LiDAR and passive ing responsible use. However, there is an increasing need for
optical sensors. Active optical LiDAR sensors use lasers to a more flexible and risk-based approach to UAV regulations
create detailed 3D maps of the drone’s surroundings, while that considers different parameters such as area, purpose,
passive optical sensors use visible light to detect objects. and visibility. In this section, we will explore the future reg-
Microwave sensors are also divided into two subcategories: ulatory framework for UAVs in Canada. We will discuss the
active microwave and passive microwave. Active microwave current regulatory landscape, the challenges faced by vari-
sensors emit microwave radiation and measure the time ous stakeholders, and the proposed changes and priorities
it takes for the signal to bounce back from surrounding outlined by TC for the future. The goal is to provide insights
objects, while passive microwave sensors detect naturally into the direction of UAV regulations in Canada and how they
occurring microwave radiation. Initial sensors include var- may impact the UAV industry, innovation, and consumers.
ious types of sensors, such as microsystems-based chemical Canada is known to have one of the most stringent reg-
sensor arrays, chemical detection sensors, meteorological ulatory frameworks for UAVs in the world. Current regula-
data sensors, and CO2 detection sensors. These sensors are tions require all UAVs weighing between 250g and 25 kg to
used to measure environmental factors such as air quality, be registered with TC, and pilots of these vehicles must be

certified. Additionally, operations involving UAVs over 25 kg corporate heavier UAVs into the framework, likely requiring
require a SFOC, and only operations under the SFOC are al- changes to the current operational levels (basic, advanced,
lowed. These regulations pose significant administrative bur- special), but would still require pilots to demonstrate under-
dens and paperwork for both public consumers and commer- standing and aptitude for the regulations and technical as-
cial users of UAVs, which may deter their use for hobby or pects of UAV operations.
commercial purposes. In contrast, the EASA follows a risk- The future regulatory framework for UAVs in Canada is ex-
based approach, where operations assessed to have low risk pected to be more flexible and risk-based, considering dif-
to the public and/or infrastructure are subject to less regula- ferent parameters such as area, purpose, and visibility. The
tion, and some operations may not be regulated at all. Stocker “safe innovation" approach outlined by TC aims to promote
et al. (2017) (Stocker et al. 2017) identified various stakehold- progress and integration while ensuring safety. Lower-risk
ers who play roles and are affected by changes in the reg- BVLOS rules, reduced SFOC thresholds, and harmonized cer-
ulatory framework for UAVs. Government institutions and tification requirements are among the proposed changes and
regulatory bodies have political mandates to ensure safety in priorities for the future. These changes are expected to have a
the UAV space while promoting innovation. UAV researchers significant impact on the UAV industry, innovation, and con-
and manufacturers aim for technical advancements and seek sumers in Canada. Stakeholders will need to stay informed
to lower barriers to access the technology. End users have and adapt to the evolving regulatory landscape to ensure re-
their own needs and market interests. The key challenge is to sponsible and compliant use of UAVs.
strike an optimal balance between the demands of these var-
ious stakeholders. The authors concluded that a risk-based
approach to regulating UAVs seems to be the preferred ap-
8. Conclusion
proach for many NAAs. It is evident from research and discus- Safety and reliability are crucial aspects of UAV technolo-
sions among various international regulating bodies that as- gies, and regulations play a vital role in ensuring their safe
sessments and requirements are largely based on UAV weight. and responsible use. The importance of regulations and cer-
However, considering the diverse applications of UAVs, fu- tifications in the UAV industry and the associated risks of
ture UAV regulations will need to take into account other UAV technologies, such as collision incidents, have been high-
parameters such as area, purpose, and visibility (VLOS or lighted. Safety occurrences and incidents in Canada and in-
BVLS). ternationally have been analyzed, and a decline in incidents
Canada is currently a global leader in UAV regulations, in Canada have been observed, which can be attributed to
having introduced comprehensive regulations for VLOS UAV increased safety regulations. Global data provided by IATA
operations in 2019 through CAR Part IX. This includes the also supports this trend of decreasing UAV incidents world-
launch of the Drone Management Portal to centralize pilot wide, indicating the positive impact of regulations on safety.
examinations and drone certification, as well as the estab- A comparative analysis of different UAV technologies, in-
lishment of the Safety Assurance Program to evaluate man- cluding power supply, navigation, and optical sensors have
ufacturer compliance with technical standards for advanced been conducted. Batteries were found to be the most reli-
operations. In a 2021 report by TC, the government outlined able power supply technology, while GNSS was identified as
its vision for the future of the UAV space in Canada over the the most effective navigation technology. LiDAR was deter-
next 4 years. In this report, TC states that they are adopting mined to be the best optical sensor due to its compliance
a “safe innovation" approach to UAV regulation, which pro- with regulations and redundancies with other systems. The
motes progress and integration by providing a clear and pre- regulatory framework in Canada have been examined, com-
dictable regulatory framework (SESAR 2017). Their priorities paring it with the risk-based approach followed by EASA.
include developing lower-risk BVLOS rules for operations in We found that current regulations in Canada are relatively
rural and remote areas, issuing medium-risk BVLOS SFOCs strict, but the future trends indicate a shift towards adopt-
to test new technologies, and supporting projects and tri- ing regulations similar to EASA’s approach in conjunction
als that inform the development of BVLOS rules. This safe with JARUS, an international organization working towards
innovation approach closely aligns with the risk-based ap- streamlining UAV regulations worldwide. Additionally, we
proach, as TC demonstrates a commitment to reevaluating highlighted emerging trends in technology, particularly au-
the “one-size-fits-all" approach of current regulations by tak- tomation and flight control technologies, with a focus on Eu-
ing into account the area, purpose, and visibility aspects of ropean regulations that are shaping the future of UAV trends
UAV flights as investigated by (Stocker et al. 2017). TC also in automation. By following the best practices of other regula-
aims to promote innovation by lowering the SFOC thresh- tory bodies, embracing emerging trends, and adopting a risk-
old to allow for experimentation by Canadian UAV innova- based approach, Canada can further promote the growth of
tors, taking into consideration the different actors in the UAV the UAV industry while ensuring safety and reliability in UAV
space. Furthermore, TC is dedicated to crafting harmonized technologies.
UAV certification requirements by collaborating with the In-
ternational Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) and the JARUS,
which would enable Canada to easily integrate into the in-
Acknowledgements
ternational UAV market, both as innovators and consumers. This work was supported in part by National Sciences and
Additionally, Canada has proposed amendments to CAR Part Engineering Research Council of Canada (NSERC), under the
IX that would expand the existing VLOS regulations to in- grant RGPIN-2022-04937.

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Author ORCIDs European Union Aviation Safety Agency. 2015. Concept of operations for
Hashim A. Hashim https://orcid.org/0000-0003-2376-0603 drones: a risk based approach to regulation of unmanned aircraft. Eu-
ropean Union, 2. Available from https://www.easa.europa.eu/sites/d
ef ault/f iles/dfu/204696_EASA_concept_drone_brochure_web.pdf [ac-
Author notes cessed July 2023].
Hashim A. Hashim served as an Associate Editor at the time of European Union Aviation Safety Agency. 2021a. Certified category - civil
manuscript review and acceptance; peer review and editorial drones. European Union, 3.
decisions regarding this manuscript were handled by another European Union Aviation Safety Agency. 2021b. Specific category - civil
drones. European Union, 1.
Editorial Board Member. European Union Aviation Safety Agency. 2023. Open category - civil
drones. European Union, 3.
Author contributions Farner, M. 2019. JARUS CS-UAS recommendations for certification spec-
Conceptualization: DW ification for unmanned aircraft systems. Joint Authorities for Rule-
Data curation: DW, SS, AS making of Unmanned Systems, 2: 1–67.
Federal Administration Aviation 2022a. Certification. United States De-
Formal analysis: DW, HH
partment of Transportation, 3 [accessed August 2023].
Funding acquisition: DW Federal Administration, Aviation 2022b. Operations over people general
Investigation: DW, HH, SS, AS overview. United States Department of Transportation, 4.
Methodology: DW, SS Federal Aviation Administration. 2022c. Section 44807: Special Authority
for Certain Unmanned Aircraft Systems. United States Department
Resources: DW
of Transportation, 3.
Supervision: HH Fennelly, L.J., and Perry, M.A. 2020. Unmanned aerial vehicle (drone) us-
Validation: SS, AS age in the 21st century. In The professional protection officer. Else-
Visualization: HH vier, pp. 183–189. doi:10.1016/B978-0-12-817748-8.00050-X.
Gallo, E., and Barrientos, A. 2022. Reduction of gnss-denied iner-
Writing – original draft: DW, HH, SS, AS
tial navigation errors for fixed wing autonomous unmanned air
Writing – review & editing: HH vehicles. Aerosp. Sci. Technol. 120: 107237. doi:10.1016/j.ast.2021.
107237.
Competing interests Ge, J., Liu, L., Dong, X., and He, Y. 2021. A trajectory optimization method
The authors declare that they have no known competing fi- for reducing magnetic disturbance of an internal combustion engine
powered unmanned aerial vehicle. Aerosp. Sci. Technol. 116: 106885.
nancial interests or personal relationships that could have
doi:10.1016/j.ast.2021.106885.
appeared to influence the work reported in this paper. Ghasri, M., and Maghrebi, M. 2021. Factors affecting unmanned aerial ve-
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UAV avionics safety, certiﬁcation, accidents, redundancy,

Corresponding author: Hashim A. Hashim (email: [email protected])

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and reliability considering the context of UAV technologies

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vanced operations. National Aviation Authorities (NAAs) have come together to

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4.2.4. UAV design and construction

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an examination of the regulatory landscape in Europe and

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Data availability report. Drone DJ, 1.

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