Maintenance Practices

Preliminary Module 7 Maintenance Procedures

Notes 7.20 7.20.1 - HO - 1

Maintenance Procedures

Aircraft Maintenance

Preface

Refer to Figure 1.

A major concern of airlines in today’s competitive business environment is lowering

their aircraft related operating costs (AROC). These costs directly affect an airline’s
cash flow and ultimately its financial health. An airline’s total AROC falls into six
categories:
V flight and cabin crews
V fuel
V maintenance
V navigation and landing fees
V ownership and spares
V depreciation.

A sizable part of AROC is related to aircraft maintenance. Although maintenance

costs, as a percentage of AROC, vary depending on such factors as aircraft type,
average flight segment length and aircraft age, typical maintenance costs range from
approx. 10 % to 20 % of AROC. These percentages may seem somewhat small at
the first glance, but they represent significant sums of money.

There are different ways to reduce maintenance costs. These are:

V aircraft design improvements
V scheduled maintenance program improvements
V improved maintenance documents and training.

Note: In the following, we only discuss about the maintenance program and its
background.
To reduce scheduled maintenance activities and simplify the development of
maintenance programs, an analysis logic called MSG--1 was developed in the early
1960s.

Review

Aircraft maintenance philosophies have progressed consistently since the introduc-

tion of jet--powered aircraft. Maintenance programs for early airliners were based on
the theory of preventative replacement or restoration, commonly known as ’hardtime’
within the airline industry, where aircraft structures and components were overhauled
at given frequencies. The ultimate airframe--related overhaul was a D--check, which
was intended to ’zero--life’ the airframe until the next D--check.

To a large extent, manufacturers’ recommended programs dictated when the

hardtimes were scheduled. But there was no common philosophy applied by the
airframe manufacturers in this regard.
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Whilst airlines could extend hardtime by submitting selected high life samples of
components for strip and examination by the relevant airworthiness authority, the
system was extremely conservative, and it could take many years for escalations to
arrive at a realistic life for any particular component. Meanwhile, the provisioning of
spare parts was based upon early experience rather than that which reflected a
mature maintenance requirement, so that inventory costs became prohibitive.

Worse still, it was eventually demonstrated that there was no correlation between the
reliability of certain aircraft components and systems, and the frequency of prevent-
ative maintenance. Indeed, in some cases, the accomplishment of such maintenance
on aircraft systems during a major check was more likely to lead to in--service defects
immediately afterwards. Also, the planning burden for airlines was significant with
some components having to be removed at certain checks, and others at different
frequencies. If these components failed between checks, further wastage was
involved in the replacement of part--life components at the next scheduled mainten-
ance interval.

In the meantime, manufacturing techniques became better and new technologies

were being introduced, resulting in significant improvements in component reliability.
Self--test features (e.g. built--in test equipment (BITE)) were being used more
extensively. Other developments in avionics, such as solid--state electronics, resulted
in a randomness of failures which defied the logic of preventative maintenance.

Emergence of MSG

In the early 1960s, the FAA formed an industry body to establish whether there were
alternative methods of ensuring aircraft reliability. Airlines were seeking a more
consistent set of rules through which maintenance programmes could be determined.
This led to the maintenance steering group (MSG) for civil operators. The military
was equally interested in the subject and they, too, requested manufacturers to come
up with more rational criteria to develop maintenance programs.

Many airline operators applied pressure to the aircraft manufacturers through the
ATA for changes of the old ’hardtime’ policies. Indeed, all MSG concepts originated
from industry inputs to the ATA and the final MSG documents, accepted by the FAA
and other airworthiness authorities, are ATA documents. MSG--3, for example, the
latest and most current version of the decision logic, involved the active participation
of the FAA, the UK’s CAA, the Association of European Airlines, US and European
aircraft and engine manufacturers, US and non--US airlines and the US Navy.

In 1968, the first path leader to MSG logic was the B747--100. The maintenance
philosophy developed at that time was called MSG--1. Apart from any economic or
safety drivers, the fact that the B747 was such a large and complex aircraft was
considered to be reason enough to apply some engineering discipline to mainten-
ance program developments.

MSG--1 was therefore developed with the B747--100 specially in mind, but the merits
of the systematic approach applied to the aircraft were considered to justify a generic
solution which could be applied to other new aircraft types. This resulted in the
publication of MSG--2 in 1970 which was applied to the L--1011 and the DC--10. The
philosophies behind MSG--1 and MSG--2 are therefore very similar.
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Indeed, a European version of the same concepts, called European maintenance

system guide 2 (EMSG--2), was developed along the same lines in 1972. It was used
for the Concorde and the Airbus A300.

What made these philosophies radically different were the ’on--condition’ and
’condition monitoring’ concepts which were introduced. They permitted a drastic
reduction in the number of scheduled component overhauls: where as many as 400
components had required scheduled overhaul prior to MSG1/MSG2/EMSG--2, this
number could now be reduced to something in the order of 10. All other components
could remain ’on condition’, if suitable inspections could be accomplished on the
aircraft to determine the continued serviceability of the component until the next
scheduled inspection.

Condition monitoring, on the other hand, required the setting up of a system to track
a large family of components within an airline which tracks pilot reports as well as the
mean time between failure (MTBF) and the mean time between removal (MTBR) of
individual components. When MTBF and MTBR exceeded specified ’alert’ levels,
engineering action was initiated to investigate and rectify the associated technical
problems.

But, MSG--1, MSG2 and EMSG--2, still involved a ’looking--up’ approach to aircraft
maintenance whereby the integrity of components was considered first, before those
of complete systems. Furthermore, there was room for interpretation of the conven-
tions when using these MSG philosophies, and many in the industry believed that a
tightening of the rules was required. This, together with the escalating costs of fuel
and the advent of deregulation in the US in 1978, placed new emphasis on commer-
cial competition and, in turn, placed new emphasis on the efficiency of aircraft
maintenance.

So, another major rethink of maintenance philosophies was initiated which built on
the framework of MSG--2, which had been validated by ten years of reliable aircraft
operation. This resulted in the issuance of MSG--3 in 1980.

When the MSG--3 task force was formed to review MSG--2 experience, it became
obvious that subtle changes to aircraft technology and the rules appertaining to the
design of aircraft had also impacted upon maintenance methodologies.

For example, new types of aircraft were using more electronics in control and display
systems, and new fatigue design rules requiring damage tolerance certification for
structures had been introduced.

This together with the introduction of reliability centered maintenance (RCM)

concepts led to a revolution in thinking whereby a ’top--down’ approach was used in
developing the new logic. Basically, if it could be demonstrated that the functional
failure of a particular system had no effect on operational safety, or that the economic
repercussions were not significant, there was no need for a routing maintenance
activity. Instead, for failures evident to flight crews, the pilot reports could be used as
the point of initiation of system rectification.

Where a failure was not obvious to flight crews, other maintenance activities would
have to be defined (servicing/lubrication, operational/functional check, general visual
inspection, detailed inspection, special detailed inspection, restoration or replace-
ment).
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However, in certain areas, what may be economic for one airline may not be for
another. So these areas need to be considered on an airline--by--airline basis.

For example, an airline which flies mainly segments of less than one hour would not
consider the failure of an inflight entertainment system to be of significant economic
importance. But a longhaul airline flying transpacific routes would arrive at a very
different answer, if it wished to retain customer loyalty.

Therefore, in certain areas maintenance programs are customised by the individual

airline concerned. But, this is well known to airlines, since they have always
incorporated maintenance review board (MRB) requirements, as well as their own
specific requirements into aircraft maintenance programs.

After 1980, for new aircraft such as the A320, A330, A340, B747--400, B757, B767,
MD--11 and MD--90, MSG--3 logic was applied and significantly more efficient
maintenance programs were introduced by the airlines.

However, the success of the new maintenance programs prompted the airlines to ask
aircraft manufacturers to retrospectively apply MSG--3 logic to aircraft which had
originally been subject to MSG--2, MSG--1 or the old overhaul concepts. This was not
a simple matter.

MD--80 MSG--3 Program Economic Savings

The first manufacturer to react on these airline requests was McDonnell Douglas with
the MD-- 80. The program was started in 1994, and it took approx. 15 to 16 months
for one aircraft type. Reanalysis of the DC--8, DC--9 and DC--10 were completed
subsequently.

The result for the MD--80 was that over a 90--month time frame the savings in labour
hours were approx. 12,000 hours per aircraft:
V MSG-- 242,598 hours required for maintenance
V MSG-- 330,242 hours required.

This means, that the labour hours savings per year per aircraft were 12,000 : 7.5 =
1,600 hours.

When asked whether the process or re--analysis takes longer on certain aircraft than
on others, a company representative said, ’No, it really doesn’t make much differ-
ence. I have been involved in corporate aircraft all the way up to B747s and they all
take about the same time’.

Approx. 80 % of smaller corporate jets have switched to MSG--3 maintenance

philosophies, starting with new aircraft types in the early 1990s and moving on to
re--analysis of existing aircraft types from approx. 1997 onwards.

All in all, the potential efficiency gains to the airlines can be very significant, and
savings of between 10 % and 30 % of the total scheduled airframe maintenance
man--hours are achievable, with the least efficient operators having the most to gain.
Pro--rata savings are anticipated in aircraft downtime, and even unscheduled
maintenance man--hours should decrease.
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Development of Scheduled Maintenance Program

As stated before, an aircraft shall not be operated unless it is maintained and

released to service by an organization appropriately approved/accepted in accord-
ance with EASA Part--145.

An operator must ensure that the aircraft is maintained in accordance with the
operator’s aircraft maintenance program. The program contains details, including
frequency, of all maintenance required to be carried out.

The program will be required to implement a reliability program when the authority
determines that such a reliability program is necessary. An operator’s aircraft
maintenance program and any subsequent amendments must always be approved
by the authority.

The initial maintenance program is given by the maintenance review board (MRB)
document. In addition, based on the above approved MRP document, manufacturers
produce a maintenance planning document. This constitutes a fully workable
maintenance program, which will be revised periodically according to service
experience.

Before development of a scheduled maintenance program, it is necessary to develop

the initial minimum maintenance requirements for each new type of aircraft prior to its
introduction into airline service.

Maintenance Review Board Procedure

The initial minimum maintenance/inspection requirements which are used for the
basis for the operator’s initial maintenance program are developed through the
maintenance review board (MRB) procedures. The guidelines are incorporated into a
policy and procedure handbook (PPH). Each PPH is adapted to each individual
aircraft program and reflects the latest in--service experience and airworthiness
authority requirements.

Refer to Figure 2.

The maintenance review board procedure requires:

V a joint industry steering committee (ISC) to direct the policy, procedures and
work. Members: operators, manufacturers, aviation authorities.
V a joint manufacturer/airline maintenance working groups (MWGs) to develop
the requirements. Members: operators, manufacturers, aviation authorities.
V a maintenance review board (MRB) to approve the work. Members: aviation
authorities.

The maintenance program proposal (MPP) is reviewed by the MRB and the resulting
requirements are published in the MRB report (MRBR).

MSG-- 3 Document

The airline/manufacturer maintenance program development document ’MSG--3’ was

written by the MSG--3 task force organized under the leadership of the Air Transport
Association of America (ATA).
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The primary purpose of the MSG--3 document is to develop a proposal to assist the
regulatory authority in establishing initial scheduled maintenance tasks and intervals
for new types of aircraft and/or powerplant. The intention is to maintain the inherent
safety and reliability levels of the aircraft. These tasks and intervals become the basis
for the first issue of each airline’s maintenance requirements to govern its initial
maintenance policy. Initial adjustments may be necessary to address operational
and/or environmental conditions unique to the operator. As operating experience is
accumulated, additional adjustments may be made by the operator to maintain
efficient scheduled maintenance.

The objectives of efficient aircraft scheduled maintenance are:

1. to ensure realisation of the inherent safety and reliability levels of the aircraft
2. to restore safety and reliability to their inherent levels when deterioration has
occurred
3. to obtain the information necessary for design improvement of those items
whose inherent reliability proves inadequate
4. to accomplish these goals at a minimum of total costs, including maintenance
costs and the costs of resulting failures.

Scheduled maintenance will be developed by use of a guided logic approach and will
result in a task--oriented program. The logic’s flow of analyses is failure--effect
oriented: it does not start with an evaluation of a proposed task (as MSG--2 and
EMSG--2 did), but with the most important factor determining the task, namely the
consequences of a functional failure.

! Items that, after analysis, have no scheduled task specified, may be monitored by
an operator’s reliability program.

Divisions of MSG--3

The working portions of MSG--3 Revision 2002 are contained in four sections:
1. systems/powerplant, including components and APU’s
2. aircraft structures
3. zonal inspections
4. lightning/high intensity radiated fields (HIRF).

Maintenance Task Development

The method for determining the scheduled maintenance tasks and intervals for
systems/powerplant, including components and APU, uses a progressive logic
diagram. This logic is the basis of an evaluation technique applied to each mainten-
ance significant item (system, sub-- system, module, component, accessory, unit,
part, etc.) using the technical data available. Principally, the evaluations are based on
the items’ functional failures and failure causes.
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Maintenance Significant Item

Refer to Figure 3.

Maintenance significant items (MSI) are items identified by the manufacturer the
failure of which
V could affect safety (on ground or in flight)
V is undetectable during operations
V could have significant operational impact
V could have significant economic impact.

Before the actual MSG--3 logic can be applied to an item, the aircraft’s significant
systems and components must be identified. This process of identifying MSI is a
conservative process (using engineering judgment) based on the anticipated
consequences of failure. The top--down approach is a process of identifying the
significant items on the aircraft at the highest manageable level.

According to MSG--3, the following maintenance tasks can be selected:

V lubrication/servicing LUB, SVC
V operational/visual check OPC, GVI, VCK
V inspection/functional check TVI, NDT, FUC
V restoration RST
V discard DIS.

Structural Significant Item

Refer to Figure 3 again.

Aircraft structure consists of all load carrying members including wings, fuselage,
empennage, engine mountings, landing gear, flight control surfaces and related
points of attachment. The actuating portions of items such as landing gear, flight
controls, doors, etc. will be treated as systems components. Attachments of the
actuators to the airframe will be treated as structure.

A structural significant item (SSI) is any detail, element or assembly, which contrib-
utes significantly to carrying flight, ground, pressure or control loads, and whose
failure could affect the structural integrity necessary for the safety of the aircraft.

As part of the scheduled structural maintenance development, it is necessary to rate

each structural significant item in terms of susceptibility (likelihood of damage) and
detectability (timely detection of damage). The scheduled structural maintenance
tasks and intervals are developed on the basis of requirements to assure timely
detection of accidental damage, environmental deterioration, and fatigue damage.

The scheduled structural maintenance tasks and intervals are based on an asses-
sment of structural design information, fatigue and damage tolerance evaluations,
service experience with similar structure and pertinent test results.

The resulting maintenance requirements for all structure are submitted to the ISC for
approval and inclusion in the MRB report proposal.
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Zone Inspection Program

Refer to Figure 3 again.
Zonal inspections may be developed from application of the zonal analysis pro-
cedure. This requires a summary review of each zone on the aircraft, which normally
occurs when the MSG--3 analyses of structures, systems and powerplants are being
concluded. These inspections may subsequently be included in the zonal inspection
program (ZIP).
In top--down analyses conducted under MSG--3, many support items such as
plumbing, ducting, wiring etc. may be evaluated for possible contribution to functional
failure. In cases where a general visual inspection is required to assess degradation,
the zonal inspection is an appropriate method.

Reliability Program
Refer to Figure 4.
The aim of a reliability program is to monitor the effectiveness of an established
maintenance program and to ensure an acceptable level of airworthiness and
operation capability of the aircraft’s structure, components and its systems.
During performance of a maintenance task, it is imperative to collect and record all
data found (maintenance complains), in relation to the corresponding task reference.
The collected reliability data are analysed on a continuous basis and if justified
immediate adjustments to the maintenance program are implemented or design
changes initiated with SBs and EOs.

Check Intervals
Refer to Figure 5.
Check intervals are laid down ’as expected’ at entry into service. They will be revised
according to service experience.

Note: The table in Figure 5 shows the check intervals of an A320.

Stores Procedures

Basic Rules
The basic rules of material storage can be stated as follows:
V All parts and materials used in the construction, servicing, maintenance, repair
and modification of civil aircraft must originate from an approved source.
V When parts are released, they should be accompanied by one of the following:
Refer to Figure 6.
-- an airworthiness release certificate (JAA Form One, FAA 8130--3)
Refer to Figure 7.
-- a stockist’s certificate (’certificate of conformance’) depending on the cir-
cumstances.
In all cases the verifying document must bear the signature of an appropriately
authorised person.
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V All organizations concerned with the manufacture, maintenance, repair and over-
hauls of civil aircraft must maintain a bounded store. This store will contain only
such parts intended for aeronautical use, which have been found to conform to all
requirements.
V Besides a bonded store, organizations must maintain a quarantine store. On re-
ceipt, all parts must be placed in this store until it can be confirmed that they
meet all the standards required for transfer to the bonded store. The confirmation
process will involve a check of the verifying document(s) and a physical inspec-
tion of the item to ensure its serviceability.
V When parts are issued from the bonded store, the relevant incoming authorised
release certificate or the airworthiness approval tag serial number must be
quoted on all relevant documentation. This includes, particular, the entry made in
the aircraft or engine log book, when the parts are eventually fitted to an aircraft.
V The supplier shall ensure that no part number ambiguity exists. Parts shall not be
labelled with multiple part numbers, if such labelling may cause confusion as to
the part’s manufacture (or applicable) specification. A supplier’s alteration to, or
replacement of, the data plate or manufacture’s part number is unacceptable.
V Flammable, toxic or volatile materials shall be stored in a safe manner according
to the manufacture’s recommendations or as specified by local fire regulations.
V Material subject to damage from electrostatic discharge shall be packaged,
handled and protected with necessary precaution and in accordance with require-
ments for handling electrostatic sensitive devices.

Housing and Facilities

Appropriate facilities shall be maintained so as to insure that storage does not

damage inventory.

If the supplier of surplus parts engages in aircraft/component maintenance as well as

in parts sales, the storage area must be secured to prevent cannibalising by
maintenance personnel.

The supplier of surplus parts shall have a system to segregate and identify service-
able units from unserviceable ones in a manner that will preclude issuing an
unserviceable part.

Stores Documentation

Incoming Documentation

All incoming material shall be accompanied by approved incoming documentation.

Certificate of Conformance

Refer to Figures 6 and 7 again.

Once a part has been received and checked to ensure that it conforms to all
requirements, it is placed in the bonded store. Subsequently, that part may be sold to
another organization which is not part of the recipient company’s group.
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In order to effect the transfer of that part, a certificate of conformance should be

raised by the supplier. If more than one identical item is listed on one JAA Form One,
a true copy of the original JAA Form One is to accompany the requested parts. If
only one item is applicable to the original JAA Form One, then the original tag is
dispatched with the requested part and an identical copy retained by the bonded
store.

Stockist’s Certificate

A stockist’s certificate is a release document issued by a distributor company which

is not an approved source.

Note: It must be emphasised at this point that it is the responsibility of the user to
ensure that all aeronautical parts used on aircraft are genuine, in a serviceable
condition and conform to the correct modification and inspection standards,
regardless of their source.
Whenever aeronautical parts are obtained from an unapproved source, the user
must obtain evidence as to the origin of such parts. One acceptable form of evidence
is the stockist’s certificate. This is a release certificate which certifies that the parts
were obtained initially from an approved source. It must bear the serial number and
date of the incoming verifying document(s) received by the distributor. The stockist’s
certificate must bear the signature of a person authorised by the distributor company.
Where a degree of confidence exists between the user and the distributor the
stockist’s certificate is all that is required in the way of documentary evidence. Where
no such confidence exists, the user should also obtain a certified photocopy of the
incoming approved certificate and any other technical documents which were
received by the distributor when the parts were originally obtained.

Airworthiness Approval Tags

JAA Form One

Refer to Figure 6 again.

A JAA Form One is required to be issued for aircraft parts other than standard parts
which are intended for use in civil aircraft. It constitutes a certificate of conformance
in that it states that items detailed on the certificate conform in all respects to the
approved drawings and specifications.
As stated previously, a JAA Form One is required to be issued for newly manufac-
tured or assembled parts. They are also required to be issued for parts which have
been overhauled, repaired, modified or inspected.
Therefore, the certificate must include a statement of the flying hours expended
(where the part is subject to a flying hour TBO life) or a statement of calendar time
expended (where the TBO life is calculated on a time basis). The certificate must
also state whether the parts are manufactured, overhauled, inspected, modified or
repaired.

Note: TBO = time between overhaul.

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The form and wording of JAA Form One may not be altered. It has to bear the
issuing organization’s name and address and the number of the certificate. Once it
has been issued, no alterations or additions are permitted. If an organization
transfers parts to another organization, any additional information must be stated on
the back of the accompanying JAA Form One or on a separate document.
Every JAA Form One must be signed by an authorised person. The form must
always be raised in duplicate, at least. The top copy (or: certified true copy) is to be
sent out with the parts. The raising organization will keep a copy in their file.
When a JAA Form One is received in an organization, it must be filed, together with
any other relevant documents, and retained for a minimum period of 5 years. The
certificate should not be destroyed as long as the items are held in stock. On
completion of the 5--year period, if the items have been issued from stores and used
on aircraft, the filing information may be destroyed, except in cases of major
assemblies or components where documentation should not be destroyed without
prior consultation with the NAA.
When an item is released from the bonded store and fitted to an aircraft, a certificate
of release to service must be raised in respect of the work done.

FAA Form 8130--3

There are various means and ways how the user can be satisfied that the parts are
acceptable for use on aircraft when they are obtained from a foreign source. One
such way of acceptable documentary evidence is the FAA tag. This is a label which
can be attached to the parts. It is identified as FAA Form 8130--3 airworthiness
approval tag and will be signed by a representative of the Federal Aviation Adminis-
tration.

Re-- Certification of Parts

From time to time, it is necessary to carry out inspections and tests on items held in
the bonded store to ensure that they remain serviceable. Occasionally, these tests
may be carried out on items which have a finite shelf life, such as flexible pipelines.
It should be understood that re--certification of such parts, during a long period when
they are held in the bonded store, does not mean that the shelf life reverts to zero
after re--certification. All such periods of shelf life are cumulative and the part must be
scrapped when its finite life is reached, irrespective of how serviceable that part may
seem.

Bogus Parts

This term is used to describe parts which seem to be approved and/or genuine items
from acceptable sources, but they are actually not. The flight safety foundation of
America has defined bogus parts as follows:
V parts which are not airworthy
V parts the source and identity of which have long been lost
V parts of unknown material, fabricated by processes at variance with industry
and government specifications.
Any positive evidence of bogus parts must immediately be reported to the national
aviation authorities.
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Parts Classification

Parts are classified according to their degree of importance.

Class 1

Complete type--certified aircraft, aircraft engines and propellers.

Class 2

A major component of a class--1 product, e.g. a wing or control surface, the failure of
which would jeopardise the safety of a class--1 product or any part, material or
appliance, approved and manufactured under the technical standard order (TSO)
system.

Class 3

Any aircraft part or component which is not a class--1 or a class--2 product. This
includes standard parts, e.g. those designated AN, MS, NAS, etc.

Certification of Airline and Aircraft

For more than 20 years after the Wright brothers’ first flight, aviation was virtually an
unregulated industry. Anyone who wanted could design, build and fly an aircraft
without obtaining approval from the government. Predictably, the safety record of the
early air transport was not very good and the government responded by passing the
air commerce act of 1926. The 1926 act required registration of aircraft and
mechanics. In 1938, the air commerce act was repeated and replaced by the civil
aeronautics board which established and enforced all regulations pertaining to civil
aviation.

Airworthiness Certificate

The certification process begins with the design of an aircraft. EASA/JAA/FAA

aeronautical engineers participate in the design process. They also supervise the
construction and flight testing of the prototype. If all tests are successfully completed,
EASA/JAA/FAA issue a type certificate for the new aircraft. This is followed by a
production certificate, once EASA/JAA/FAA are satisfied that the manufacturer has
everything in place to properly duplicate the prototype.

The final step in aircraft certification is the issue of an airworthiness certificate, which
essentially bears the EASA/JAA/FAA stamp of approval for each aircraft coming off
the assembly line. It gives proof of the fact that the aircraft has been properly built,
according to an approved design, and that it is safe for commercial service.

The EASA/JAA/FAA require that all commercial transport aircraft be designed with
built--in redundancies, so they can fly even when a structural element fails. For
example, there is more than one way to lower the landing gear, more than one way
to communicate with the ground and more than one way to control the aircraft.
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Operating Certificates

Aviation regulations (EASA Parts/JAR/FAR) require certification of all airline

operators as well as the equipment they use. Each airline is therefore issued an
operating (or: airline) certificate by the authorities.
Among other things, a commercial operator must have EASA/JAA/FAA approved
training and maintenance programs which as well must comply with the airworthiness
certificates of individual aircraft. The maintenance programs must specify the
intervals at which certain aircraft and engine parts are to be inspected and, in some
cases, replaced. In addition, the maintenance shops which the airline intends to use
(both own and such of subcontractors) must be certified by EASA/JAA/FAA and open
to inspection (on demand). Records of all maintenance work must be kept and also
be open for inspection.
Other requirements refer to the following areas:
V the equipment a carrier must have on board of each aircraft
V flammability standards for cabin materials
V floor lighting for emergency evacuation
V onboard smoking rules
V the number of flight attendants on board
V the content of pre-- flight announcements
V rules for carry-- on (hand) luggage
V security procedures
V aircraft de-- icing procedures.

Post Type Certification Activities/Modifications

Changes in type design are classified as minor and major. a ’minor change’ is one
that has no appreciable effect on the weight, balance, structural strength, reliability,
operational characteristics or other characteristics affecting the airworthiness of the
product. All other changes are ’major changes’.
All changes (major and minor) must be approved in accordance with JAR/FAR as
appropriate, and must be adequately identified.

Airworthiness Directives

Design problems, discovered after an aircraft is in service, which may result in

possibly unsafe conditions, are addressed through airworthiness directives (AD).
Through these directives the EASA/JAA/FAA informs all operators of a certain aircraft
or engine type of the repairs or modifications necessary to correct a problem.
Usually, ADs are written in cooperation with the manufacturer, but unlike manufac-
turer--issued service bulletins, ADs carry the force of law and airlines must comply
with them. If the problem poses an immediate safety hazard, the EASA/JAA/FAA will
direct the airlines to complete the work quickly, sometimes even before further flight.
In most situations, however, there is no immediate safety hazard and the airlines are
given a specified amount of time to complete the ADs.

! It is the operators responsibility to ensure that ADs are carried out.

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Notes 7.20 7.20.1 - HO - 14

Service Bulletins

Normally, the decision to follow service bulletins (SBs) or modifications falls in the
operator’s responsibility. However, the operator may delegate that decision provided
that the conditions of delegation are clearly established (e.g. the modification does
not affect the interchangeability and the reliability [which should be demonstrated];
the modification does not affect the maintenance or operational procedures, etc.).

Such a delegation may be useful in case of an EASA Part--145 approved/accepted

organization that maintains, to a common standard, a fleet of aircraft that belong to
different operators.

Additional Maintenance Procedures

Additional maintenance procedures must be carried out if aircraft operation deviates

from standard rules, or to gain the benefits from certain improvements. Two
examples are discussed below. These are:
V extended twin engine operations (ETOPS)
V reduced vertical separation minimum (RVSM).

ETOPS Maintenance

In 1953, the USA developed regulations that prohibited two--engine aircraft from
routes more than 60 min (single--engine flying time) from an adequate airport. These
regulations were later formalised in FAR 121.161. The ETOPS program allows
operators to deviate from this rule under certain conditions. By incorporating specific
hardware improvements and establishing specific maintenance and operational
procedures, operators can fly distances up to 180 min from the alternate airport.

The ETOPS maintenance approach that can be applied to all commercial aircraft
includes:
V engine health monitoring
V pre-- departure service check
V basic and multiple-- system maintenance practices
V event-- oriented reliability program.

Engine Health Monitoring

ETOPS maintenance procedures were created to ensure the safety and reliability of
flights operating at extended distances from alternate airports and to prevent or
reduce the probability of a diversion or turnback with one engine off.

Most traditional maintenance programs are based on regularly scheduled preventive

maintenance and on the ability to predict or anticipate maintenance problems by
studying failure rates, removal rates and other reliability data. However, the ETOPS
philosophy is a real--time approach to maintenance and includes continual monitoring
of conditions to identify problems before they threaten aircraft option or safety.
 Maintenance Practices
Preliminary Module 7 Maintenance Procedures
Notes 7.20 7.20.1 - HO - 15

Two items in the ETOPS maintenance program that best illustrate this real--time
approach are oil consumption monitoring and engine condition monitoring.

Oil Consumption Monitoring

A typical maintenance program requires checking of engine oil before each flight (or
only once every day), with check of the APU oil even less frequently (such as every
100 hours). The quantity of oil added and the flight hours for each leg are to be noted
in the maintenance logbook.
Refer to Figure 8.
The oil consumption rate, i.e. the amount of oil used per hour of operation on the
previous flight leg, should be calculated for both engines and the APU during ETOPS
before dispatch onto the next leg. The resulting value provides a better indication of
oil usage or loss than the quantity of oil added. If the rate is acceptable, the flight can
be released, if not, the cause of the increased usage must be addressed before
dispatching the aircraft onto an ETOPS flight. This increase can frequently be caused
by an oil leak, which is easy to detect and repair.
The consumption rate data is also logged in order to track long--term variations in
consumption rates. This allows the operator to determine if problems are developing.
So they can be identified and solutions implemented before serious engine or APU
degradation occurs.

Engine Condition Monitoring

For many years, engine condition monitoring (ECM) computer programs have been
available for all engines. The engine manufacturer supplies ECM software to help
operators to record and analyse parameters like N1, N2, exhaust gas temperature,
fuel and oil pressures, and vibration. In some cases, oil consumption data and ECM
data can be correlated to define certain problems.
ETOPS operators are required to use ECM programs to monitor adverse trends in
engine performance and execute maintenance to avoid serious failures. These
failures could cause in--flight shutdowns and may require diversions or turnbacks. But
most operators use an ECM program regardless of whether they fly ETOPS routes or
not.

Pre--Departure Service Check

Regulations require certain ETOPS systems to be checked before each flight. This is
because certain systems relating to ETOPS were redesigned for greater reliability,
and dispatch requirements were altered for ETOPS (e.g. standby generators,
minimum equipment list requirements).

Basic and Multiple--System Practices

Resolution of Discrepancies

This program requires items that are repaired or replaced to be checked for proper
installation and operation before the work is signed off in the maintenance log. This
ensures that the item is actually fixed and that no new problems were introduced
during maintenance. This maintenance practice is applicable to all aircraft.
 Maintenance Practices
Preliminary Module 7 Maintenance Procedures
Notes 7.20 7.20.1 - HO - 16

Avoidance of Multiple Similar Systems Maintenance

Maintenance practices for the multiple similar systems requirement were designed to
eliminate the possibility of introducing problems into both systems of a dual installa-
tion (e.g. engines and fuel systems) that could ultimately result in failure of both
systems. The basic philosophy is that two similar systems should not be maintained
or repaired during the same maintenance visit. Some operators may find this difficult
to implement because all maintenance must be done at their home base.
However, methods exist for avoiding the problems that may be introduced by working
on two similar systems simultaneously.
For example, different personnel can perform the required work on the similar
systems, or they can ask each other to review the work done on each system. If the
systems are checked after performing maintenance according to the resolution of
discrepancies program, any problems introduced during maintenance should be
identified and corrected before releasing the aircraft to service.

Event--Oriented Reliability Program

An event--oriented reliability program associated with ETOPS differs from conven-

tional reliability programs, which relay on historical data or alert levels to determine
when an item should be investigated for possible corrective action.
In an event--oriented reliability program, each event on an ETOPS--significant system
is investigated to determine if a problem could be reduced or eliminated by changing
the maintenance program. Such events may be a failure, a removal or a pilot’s report.
Events can also be monitored to detect long--term trends or items with failure
repetitions. Not all events warrant such detailed investigations; continual monitoring
and awareness of problem areas reflect the ETOPS real--time maintenance
philosophy.

Three and Four--Engine Aircraft

Although three--and four--engine aircraft are not specifically designed or improved for
ETOPS, the ETOPS maintenance approach can be applied to those aircraft and offer
operators significant improvements in reliability, performance, and dispatch rates.
The approach can be applied at minimal cost, which can later be offset by reduced
maintenance costs and other costs associated with diversions or turnbacks.

Reduced Vertical Separation Minimum

In the late 1950s, vertical separation for aircraft flying in the upper airspace was
1,000 feet.
However, it was realised that as altitude increased the accuracy of pressure sensing
barometric altimeters decreased. Therefore, in 1960, the decision was taken to
increase separation at and above flight level (FL) 290 from 1,000 feet to 2,000 feet.
As a global standard, the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) adopted FL
290 as the changeover level in 1966.
Despite this increase in vertical separation minimum (VSM), some years later it was
recognised that, as technology advanced, more accurate height measuring equip-
ment would become available in the future which would allow a reduction in the given
standards.
 Maintenance Practices
Preliminary Module 7 Maintenance Procedures
Notes 7.20 7.20.1 - HO - 17

It was also recognised that because of differing airspace capacity requirements

throughout the world, reduction in VSM would occur initially on a regional basis with
global introduction following in due course. Areas with high numbers of aircraft flying
at or above FL 290 would be the first to benefit from reduced VSM (RVSM).

More Airspace Needed -- Fuel Becoming an Issue

In the late 1970s, faced with rising fuel costs and growing demands for a more
efficient use of the available airspace, ICAO initiated a comprehensive program of
studies to examine the feasibility of reducing the 2,000--feet VSM at FL 290 and
above to a 1,000--feet VSM. The underlying approach of the programs was to
V determine the height--keeping accuracy of the altimeter and autoflight sys-
tems of the then current aircraft generation
V establish the causes of observed height keeping errors
V determine the required safety levels for the implementation and use of an
RVSM of 1,000 feet at/above FL 290
V define a minimum aircraft systems performance specification (MASPS) for
aircraft altimeter and associated height--keeping equipment
V determine whether or not the global implementation and use of RVSM was
-- technically feasible, subject to the overriding need to satisfy the agreed
safety standards
-- cost--beneficial.

Minimum Aircraft Systems Performance Specification

The main provision for any reduction in vertical separation was that the aircraft in the
area(s) had to be equipped with height keeping equipment complying with minimum
aircraft systems performance specification (MASPS).
MASPS would ensure height--keeping accuracy to a standard compatible with the
agreed safety requirements for RVSM. This would include at least 2 independent
altimeters on board an aircraft that would always have to be within a certain
tolerance of each other.

Continued Airworthiness (Maintenance Procedures)

The integrity of the design features necessary to ensure that altimetric systems
continue to meet RVSM approval criteria should be verified by scheduled tests and
inspections in conjunction with an approved maintenance program. The operator
should review its maintenance procedures and address all aspects of continued
airworthiness that may be relevant.
Adequate maintenance facilities should be available to enable compliance with the
RVSM maintenance procedures.

Maintenance Programs

Each operator requesting RVSM operational approval should establish RVSM

maintenance and inspection practices acceptable to, and as required by, the
responsible authority. That includes any required maintenance specified in the data
package. Operators of aircraft subject to maintenance program approval will need to
incorporate these practices in their maintenance program.
 Maintenance Practices
Preliminary Module 7 Maintenance Procedures
Notes 7.20 7.20.1 - HO - 18

Maintenance Practices

If the operator is subject to an approved maintenance program, that program should

include, for each aircraft type, the maintenance practices stated in the applicable
aircraft and component manufacturers’ maintenance manuals. In addition, for all
aircraft, including those not subject to an approved maintenance program, attention
should be given to the following items:
V All RVSM equipment should be maintained in accordance with the compo-
nent manufacturers’ maintenance instructions and the performance criteria of
the RVSM approval data package.
V Any modification or design change which in any way affects the initial RVSM
approval, should be subject to a design review acceptable to the responsible
authority.
V Any repairs not covered by approved maintenance documents, that may af-
fect the integrity of the continuing RVSM approval, e.g. those affecting the
alignments of pitot/static probes, repairs to dents or deformation around static
plates, should be subject to a design review acceptable to the responsible
authority.
V Built-- in test equipment (BITE) testing should not be used for system calibra-
tion unless it is shown to be acceptable by the aircraft constructor or an ap-
proved design organization, and with the agreement of the responsible auth-
ority.
V An appropriate system leak check (or visual inspection where permitted)
should be accomplished following reconnection of a quick--disconnect static
line.
V Airframe and static systems should be maintained in accordance with the air-
craft constructor’s inspection standards and procedures.
V To ensure correct maintenance of airframe geometry and proper surface con-
tours and the mitigation of altimetric system error, surface measurements or
skin waviness checks will need to be made, as specified by the aircraft con-
structor, to ensure adherence to RVSM tolerances. These checks should be
performed following repairs, or alterations having an effect on airframe sur-
face and airflow.
V The maintenance and inspection program for the autopilot will need to ensure
continued accuracy and integrity of the automatic altitude control system to
meet the height keeping standards for RVSM operations. This requirement
will typically be satisfied with equipment inspections and serviceability.

Certification of Airline Personnel

As with aircraft and airlines, also the persons who work on, fly or manage aircraft
must be personally licensed by EASA/JAA/FAA and must have minimum levels of
training and experience. These certification requirements apply to aircraft mechanics,
pilots, flight engineers, aircraft dispatchers and air traffic controllers. The schools
where these aviation professionals get their training, as well as the teachers in those
schools, also require a license.

! Only the maintenance technician’s certification will be discussed in this section.

 Maintenance Practices
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Notes 7.20 7.20.1 - HO - 19

Maintenance Technicians

EASA Part--145 require appropriately authorised certifying staff to issue a certificate

of release to service on behalf of the EASA Part--145 approved maintenance
organization when satisfied that all required maintenance has been completed.

Aircraft Maintenance Licence

’Aircraft Maintenance Licence (AML)’ means a document issued as evidence of

qualification confirming that the person to whom it refers has met the EASA Part--66
knowledge and experience requirements for any basic aircraft category and the
aircraft type rating specified in the document.

The certifying staff responsible for issuing the certificate of release to service must be
qualified in accordance with the appropriate requirements of EASA Part--66.

! The aircraft maintenance licence alone does not permit the holder to issue
certificates of release to service for aircraft used for commercial air transport. To
issue a certificate of release to service for such aircraft, the aircraft maintenance
licence holder must in addition hold an EASA Part--145 certification authorisation
issued by an EASA Part--145 approved maintenance organization.

Categories and Certification Privileges

Certifying staff qualified in accordance with EASA Part--66 and holding a valid aircraft
maintenance licence with an appropriate type ratings (if applicable), will be eligible to
hold an EASA Part--145 certification authorisation in one or more of the following
categories:
V A category A certifying staff authorisation permits the holder to issue certifi-
cates of release to service following minor scheduled line maintenance and
simple defect rectification, as specified in EASA Part--145, within the limits of
tasks specifically endorsed on the authorisation. The certification privileges
are restricted to work that the authorisation holder has personally performed.
V A category B1 certifying staff authorisation permits the holder to issue certifi-
cates of release to service following line maintenance, including aircraft struc-
ture, powerplants and mechanical and electrical systems. Replacement of
avionic line--replaceable units, requiring simple tests to prove their service-
ability, is also included in these privileges.
V A category B2 certifying staff authorisation permits the holder to issue certifi-
cates of release to service following line maintenance on avionic and electri-
cal systems.
V A category C certifying staff authorisation permits the holder to issue certifi-
cates of release to service following base maintenance. The authorisation is
valid for the aircraft in its entirety, including all systems.
 Maintenance Practices
Preliminary Module 7 Maintenance Procedures
Notes 7.20 7.20.1 - HO - 20

Certification of Maintenance

Release to Service
Refer to Figure 9.
A certificate of release to service is necessary before flight at the completion of any
maintenance task scheduled by the approved aircraft maintenance program on the
aircraft, whether such maintenance took place as base or line maintenance.
Prior to the issue of the certificate of release to service, the approved person with
final release responsibility shall establish from the bill of work that no job cards
remain open which could jeopardise the continuing airworthiness of the aircraft.
The issue of a certificate of fitness for flight shall only be made by an approved
person with final release responsibility.
The certificate of release to service should certify that the work was carried out in
accordance with EASA Part--145 (unless otherwise specified). In respect to that work
the aircraft/aircraft--component is considered ready for release to service.
The certificate of release to service should relate to the task specified in the aircraft
maintenance program which itself may cross--refer to a manufacturer’s/operator’s
instruction in a maintenance manual, service bulletin etc.
The date such maintenance was carried out should include when the maintenance
took place relative to any life or overhaul limitation in terms of date/flying hours/
cycles/landings etc., as appropriate.
When extensive maintenance has been carried out, it is acceptable for the certificate
of release to service to summarise the maintenance so long as there is a unique
cross--reference to the work--pack containing full details of maintenance carried out.
Dimensional information should be retained in the work--pack record.
The person who carried out the maintenance task specified in the approved
maintenance instructions should only sign that the task has been accomplished when
satisfied by self inspection that the task has been properly carried out in accordance
with the approved maintenance instructions.
The person issuing the certificate of release to service should use his normal
signature except in the case where a computer release to service system is used. In
the latter case a magnetic or optical personal card may be used in conjunction with a
personal identity number (PIN) known only to the individual. A certification stamp is
optional and used by some companies.
Refer to Figure 9 again.
Figure 9 shows a release to service entry in the log book after line maintenance.
Refer to Figure 10.
Figure 10 shows a certificate of release to service after base maintenance.

Certification of Components

The workshop component certifying staff should issue release to service for the
aircraft component when satisfied that the complete maintenance process has been
carried out in accordance with the approved procedures including additional
inspections, when required.
 Maintenance Practices
Preliminary Module 7 Maintenance Procedures
Notes 7.20 7.20.1 - HO - 21

Refer to Figure 6 again.

The authorised release certificate/airworthiness approval tag identified as JAA Form
One constitutes the aircraft component certificate of release to service when an
aircraft component is maintained by an EASA Part--145 organization.

Maintenance Management

Refer to Figure 11.

An operator must be appropriately approved according to EASA Part--145 to carry
out the requirements specified in EASA Part--OPS, except when the authority is
satisfied that the maintenance can be contracted to an appropriate EASA Part--145
approved/accepted organization.
V An operator must employ a person or group of persons acceptable to the
authority to ensure that all maintenance is carried out on time to an approved
standard such that the maintenance responsibility requirements prescribed in
EASA Part--OPS are satisfied and to ensure the functioning of the quality sys-
tem required by EASA Part--OPS.
V When an operator is not appropriately approved in accordance with EASA
Part--145, arrangements must be made with such an organization to carry out
the requirements specified in EASA Part--OPS. A written maintenance con-
tract must be agreed between the operator and the EASA Part--145 ap-
proved/accepted maintenance organization, detailing the functions specified
in EASA Part--OPS and defining the support of the quality functions of EASA
Part--OPS. This contract together with all amendments must be acceptable to
the authority. The authority does not require the commercial elements of a
maintenance contract.

Quality System

For maintenance purposes, the operator’s quality system as required by EASA

Part--OPS must additionally include at least the following functions:
1. monitoring that the activities of EASA Part--OPS are being performed in ac-
cordance with the accepted procedures
2. monitoring that all contracted maintenance is carried out in accordance with
the contract
3. monitoring the continued compliance with the requirements of this subpart:
a) an operator must provide an operator’s maintenance management ex-
position containing details of the organization structure including:
-- the nominated postholder responsible for the maintenance system
-- the procedures that must be followed to satisfy the maintenance re-
sponsibility and the quality functions of EASA Part--OPS
b) an operator’s maintenance management exposition and any subsequent
amendment must be approved by the authority.

Note: Where the operator is appropriately approved as a maintenance organization in

accordance with EASA Part--145, such details as listed above may be included in
the EASA Part--145 exposition.
 Maintenance Practices
Preliminary Module 7 Maintenance Procedures
Notes 7.20 7.20.1 - HO - 22

An EASA Part--145 approved maintenance organization must establish procedures

acceptable to the authority to ensure good maintenance practices and compliance
with all relevant requirements laid down in EASA Part--145. This must include a clear
work order or contract so that aircraft and aircraft components may be released to
service in accordance with EASA Part--145.
In addition, the EASA Part--145 approved maintenance organization must establish a
quality system including independent audits to monitor product standards and
compliance with and adequacy of the procedures to ensure good maintenance
practices and airworthy aircraft/aircraft components. Compliance monitoring must
include a feedback system to the person or group of persons specified in EASA
Part--145 and ultimately to the accountable manager to ensure, as necessary,
corrective action. Such systems must be acceptable to the authority.

Quality Assurance
The concept of quality assurance is not new to the aviation industry.
The increasing complexity of both aircraft and the companies engaged in aviation has
been accompanied by corresponding changes in the number of the requirements
and the demands put upon the authorities.
The authority continues to be responsible for drawing up the regulations, which form
the base on which a safe operation is build and also for overall surveillance.
The operator remains responsible for the safety of the operation and for compliance
with the requirements.
The change, is that the maintenance organization is called upon to set in place
structured internal quality assurance procedures acceptable to the authority.
It is the assurance of regulatory compliance, which are then primary goal of the
quality program and a primary function of the operator’s quality system.
The authority’s role will, with time, shift to the verification of operators’ compliance
with their quality system and with the requirements. The development of internal audit
and evaluation programs relies heavily upon AOC (Aircraft Operator Certificate)
holders to continuously monitor and audit their operations to ensure that they are
safe and conform to the requirements and the operator’s standards.

Quality System Concept

It should always be born in mind that the concept of a quality system in any
organization embraces all aspects of that organization to which the quality system
applies.
This includes the organizational structure, responsibilities, procedures and resources
for implementing quality management. The essential elements of a quality system
are covered below.

Quality Assurance Programs

Quality assurance includes all those systematic measures needed to ensure that a
company is well--planned, organized, operated maintained, developed and supported
in accordance with authority regulations and the operator’s own additional standards.
 Maintenance Practices
Preliminary Module 7 Maintenance Procedures
Notes 7.20 7.20.1 - HO - 23

It is fundamental to flight safety and a primary concern of the quality assurance

program, that each company employee is motivated to do his work in a professional
manner and in accordance with the given standards.

Independent Monitoring

To be effective in providing the management with confidence in the reliability of an

operation, the monitoring organization should be free to act independently of routine
management. The essential aspects of this independence are:
V direct line reporting, meaning the freedom of direct access and direct report-
ing to the accountable manager
V independent authority, meaning the freedom of inspectors or auditors to
choose their own areas and lines of inquiry
V independent access, meaning the freedom of inspectors or auditors to visit or
inquire into any part of the organization.

Quality Inspection

The primary purpose of an inspection is to verify that established procedures are

followed during an observed event and that the required standard is achieved.
Typical subject areas for quality inspections are:
V the actual flight operation
V flight support services
V load control
V maintenance
V technical standards
V training standards.

Quality Audit

Internal quality audits are held on a planned basis and are performed annually.
Nevertheless an audit may become necessary when circumstances change or
company employees can not be expected to comply with arrangements which have
become outdated. New aircraft, for example, or new routes may be introduced or the
company may grow. If standards are to be maintained, it is necessary to include
quality audit as an accepted part of the functioning and the organization of all
departments.

A quality audit is used to confirm that policies, structures, facilities, resources and
procedures remain relevant to the company’s operation and effective in maintaining
standards. The primary purpose of a quality audit is to identify, in an objective
fashion, potentially unsatisfactory practices or procedures before they cause an
accident or an incident.

An audit is a comparison of the way in which an operation is being conducted against

the way in which the published procedures say it should be (or: should have been)
conducted.
 Maintenance Practices
Preliminary Module 7 Maintenance Procedures
Notes 7.20 7.20.1 - HO - 24

The various techniques that make up an audit are:

V interviews or discussions with personnel
V a review of published documents
V the examination of an adequate sample of records
V the witnessing of the activities which make up the operation
V the recording of observations
V the preservation of documents.

Therefore, an audit can be seen as building on the inspection process. Auditors, who
have relevant operational and/or maintenance qualifications, should use the records
of inspections to guide them towards problem areas or to problems which are caused
by a weakness in the system itself. An audit can vary greatly in scope and range of
its enquiry. These things should be defined so that the composition of the team and
the time needed for the audit are appropriately set.

Any non--compliances will be recorded and rectified in accordance with the cause.

Control of Life Limited Parts

Life Limited Parts

Life limited parts (LLP) are components, which have to be removed and discarded
after a certain time or a certain number of cycles or flight hours.

Example: Parts of a landing gear which can not be reworked.

The control of life limited parts is within the operator’s responsibility.

To enable the control of life limited parts by the operator, the EASA Part--145
approved/accepted organization has to provide the operator with all the necessary
information about the LLP removal/installation requirements so that the operator may
update its records.

Both the operator and the EASA Part--145 approved/accepted organization may also
agree in the control of LLP carried out by the EASA Part--145 organization. This will
have to be specified in the contract. This will have to be specified in the contract.

The EASA Part--145 approved/accepted organization will need to be in receipt of

current hours/cycles of the aircraft, as well as any other information necessary to
perform the control. The operator should be in receipt of the life limited parts’ status
in order to exercise his airworthiness responsibility.

Hours and Cycles Control

Hours and cycles control is the responsibility of the operator, but there may be cases
where the EASA Part--145 approved/accepted organization performs that control,
especially when it carries out planning functions. In the latter case, the EASA
Part--145 approved/accepted organization must be in receipt of the current flight
hours and cycles on a regular basis so that it may update the records.
 Maintenance Practices
Preliminary Module 7 Maintenance Procedures
Notes 7.20 7.20.1 - HO - 25

Aircraft-- Related Operating Costs (Typical)

Figure 1
 Maintenance Practices
Preliminary Module 7 Maintenance Procedures
Notes 7.20 7.20.1 - HO - 26

Maintenance Review Board Structure

Figure 2
 Maintenance Practices
Preliminary Module 7 Maintenance Procedures
Notes 7.20 7.20.1 - HO - 27

Simplified MSG-- 3 Procedure

Figure 3
 Maintenance Practices
Preliminary Module 7 Maintenance Procedures
Notes 7.20 7.20.1 - HO - 28

Maintenance Program Development (Example)

Figure 4
 Notes
Preliminary
Scheduled Intervals
Remarks
Inspection (may change)
Daily 48 calendar hours Cockpit and walkaround
elapsed check; must be accom-
plished by flight crew without
technical assistance or
special tools
Weekly 8 calendar days Servicing and general condi-

Module 7
tion from ground

7.20
A 500 flight hours Walkaround, some system
checks and servicing
C 18 months System checks; checks of
general conditions; security
of installations and structure
D 6, 10, 15 years Fatigue and corrosion critical
(typically) items; system and structure

Maintenance Procedures
C 1713
checks and overhaul

Maintenance Practices
7.20.1 - HO - 29
Figure 5 Typical Check Intervals
 Maintenance Practices
Preliminary Module 7 Maintenance Procedures
Notes 7.20 7.20.1 - HO - 30

Authorised Release Certificate (Example)

Figure 6
 Maintenance Practices
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Notes 7.20 7.20.1 - HO - 31

Certificate of Conformance (Example)

Figure 7
 Maintenance Practices
Preliminary Module 7 Maintenance Procedures
Notes 7.20 7.20.1 - HO - 32

Oil Consumption Rate (Example)

Figure 8
 Maintenance Practices
Preliminary Module 7 Maintenance Procedures
Notes 7.20 7.20.1 - HO - 33

Log Entry: Release to Service (Example)

Figure 9
 Maintenance Practices
Preliminary Module 7 Maintenance Procedures
Notes 7.20 7.20.1 - HO - 34

Figure 10 Certificate of Release to Service (Example)

 Maintenance Practices
Preliminary Module 7 Maintenance Procedures
Notes 7.20 7.20.1 - HO - 35

Figure 11 Maintenance Management