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German Bundestag printed matter17/12051
17th parliamentary term 01/03/2013
briefing
by the federal government
Report on risk analysis in civil protection 2012
Table of contents
Page
preamble. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
1 Introduction. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
2 Status of implementation at federal level. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3

2.1 Basics and preparation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
2.2 Risk analysis "Extreme melting floods from the low mountain
ranges" . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
2.3 Risk analysis "pandemic caused by Virus Modi-SARS" . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
3 Digression: Cross-level risk management-

using the example of flooding. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
4 Status of implementation at country level. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8th
5 Parallel development at international level. . . . . . . . . . . . . 9

5.1 EU. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
5.2 OECD . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
6 outlook. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
Credit. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
Attachment. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
Appendix 1 Classification Probability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Appendix 2 14
Classification of extent of damage . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
Appendix 3 Result of risk analysis "Extreme melt flood -
from the low mountain ranges". . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
Appendix 4 Result of risk analysis "Pandemic caused by Virus Modi-SARS" . . 55
Supplied with a letter from the Federal Ministry of the Interior dated December 21, 2012 in accordance with Section 18
(1) and (2) of the Federal Civil Protection and Disaster Relief Act.
printed matter17/12051 -2- German Bundestag – 17th electoral term
preamble thus enabling improved, risk- and needs-oriented

precautionary and defense planning in civil and
The task of civil protection is to protect the
disaster protection.
population, their homes and workplaces, vital or
defense-critical civil offices, businesses, facilities In contrast to technical risk analysis, risk
and facilities, as well as the environment and assessment is a political process that also includes
cultural assets from damage events and to social values and the respective risk acceptance.
eliminate or mitigate their consequences. Germany After a risk analysis has been carried out, a risk
has an efficient, integrated assistance system that assessment must be carried out by the
has proven itself in action and is also capable of administrative and political levels responsible. Risk
dealing with events that go beyond the area of assessment is a process that a) determines to what
everyday averting danger. Nevertheless, society is extent the previously defined protection goal will be
faced with a number of possible dangerous events, achieved in the event of an event, b) decides which
the intensity of which would also pose major remaining risk is acceptable and c) decides whether
challenges for German civil protection. It must be Measures to minimize it can or must be taken.3
recognized that risks remain against which it may
not be possible to adequately protect. Protection goals refer to the extent and to which quality the different objects to be
protected are to be protected and to what extent capabilities to deal with possible
In order to be able to adequately answer the damage are to be provided. On the basis of a risk portfolio that is as
question "How can the state guarantee needs- and comprehensive as possible, risks and protection goals can be compared in order
risk-oriented precautionary and defense planning in to identify possible deficits. As part of risk management, the responsible
civil and disaster control?", a well-founded risk authorities at the federal and state levels can check whether the existing
analysis is required as a basis.1This serves the capabilities to protect the population and their livelihoods are appropriate, the
forward-looking and structured dealing with need for action can be identified and appropriate measures can be taken. This
possible nationally relevant dangers and the effects illustrates the close connection between risk analysis and capability-based
on the population, their livelihoods and public planning and thus between risk and crisis management. The findings of the risk
security and order in Germany that are to be analysis thus contribute directly to pursuing a networked approach to action that
expected if they occur. promotes flexible, efficient and effective action in the event of an incident,
regardless of the cause of the event in question. The risk analysis is therefore to
The aim of risk analysis in civil protection is to be understood as a partial aspect of a comprehensive risk management, which
create a comparative overview that is as consists of the continuous identification, analysis, evaluation and treatment of
comprehensive as possible (risk portfolio2) about risks. It represents the starting point for the necessary risk assessment discourse
different dangers and events in relation to their in politics and society and for decisions on civil protection measures. Efficient and
probability of occurrence and the extent of damage effective action is promoted in the event of an incident. The risk analysis is
to be expected if they occur. In order to be able to therefore to be understood as a partial aspect of a comprehensive risk
map these two variables and to be able to represent management, which consists of the continuous identification, analysis, evaluation
them in relation to each other in a risk matrix, a and treatment of risks. It represents the starting point for the necessary risk
suitable classification must be determined assessment discourse in politics and society and for decisions on civil protection
beforehand. This is a tool to be able to assign a measures. Efficient and effective action is promoted in the event of an incident.
relative magnitude to the risk under consideration. The risk analysis is therefore to be understood as a partial aspect of a
For this purpose, it is also necessary to record comprehensive risk management, which consists of the continuous identification,
information about the number of possible victims. analysis, evaluation and treatment of risks. It represents the starting point for the
The classifications attached to this report in necessary risk assessment discourse in politics and society and for decisions on
Annexes 1 and 2 apply exclusively to the risk civil protection measures.
analysis at federal level. They do not yet contain any
evaluation of certain dangers or events, but are In accordance with Section 18 Paragraph 1 Clause 1 of the
rather a prerequisite for a differentiated risk Civil Protection and Disaster Assistance Act, the federal
assessment, government, in cooperation with the federal states that are
responsible for disaster control, prepares a nationwide risk
The risk analysis is carried out on a professional basis. It is
analysis for civil protection. The federal government is
to be understood as a matter-of-fact, sober inventory of
responsible for protecting the population from dangers and
what is to be expected in the event of the occurrence of
risks arising from military conflicts and wars (Article 73
various dangers in Germany. It anticipates neither a
paragraph 1 number 1 of the Basic Law). In all other cases,
prioritization of individual scenarios nor a political
responsibility lies with the federal states. In line with the
assessment of risks or precautionary measures to be
"New Strategy for the Protection of the Population in
taken. Rather, their results should serve as a basis for
Germany" (resolution of the 171st session of the Standing
information and decision-making
Conference of Interior Ministers and Senators of the Federal
States (IMK) on December 6, 2002), the federal and state
1See German Bundestag: Shorthand report on the 162nd session
from March 1, 2012, agenda item 11.
2See Center for Security Studies (CSS) at ETH Zurich, Crisis and 3 See Federal Office for Civil Protection and Disaster Assistance
Risk Network (CRN) 2009. 2011
German Bundestag – 17th electoral term -3- printed matter17/12051
who agreed, however, that a strict division of development of the now completed risk analyzes
responsibilities would not go far enough in view of "Extreme melting floods from the low mountain
dangerous situations of national importance. The ranges" and "Pandemic caused by Virus Modi-
philosophy and, at the same time, the common SARS". It also provides an overview of the two
thread of the "New Strategy" is the idea of a joint scenarios.
responsibility of the federal and state governments
for dealing with major disasters. Joint responsibility A comprehensive concept for cross-level risk
is not understood here in the sense of new management is then presented in Chapter 3 using
the example of flood risk management.
responsibilities and legal changes or even as a joint
task in the constitutional sense, but rather in a The status of the implementation of the risk analysis at
pragmatic, political sense: as partnership country level is summarized in Chapter 4, while Chapter 5
cooperation across federal borders. A core element is devoted to parallel developments at international level,
of the "New Strategy" is the better integration, here using the EU and OECD as examples.
coordination and cooperation of the federal levels
of responsibility on the basis of hazard and risk The report concludes with an outlook on the further
analyses. planned or necessary steps for the optimization and
ongoing implementation of the risk analysis in
Against this background, the federal government chapter 6. The classifications used for the risk
carries out cross-departmental risk analyzes in civil analysis at the federal level to determine the
protection. These take into account such dangers probability of occurrence and the extent of damage
and events that have potential federal relevance, i.e. as well as the results of the first two risk analyzes
the federal government may be required to deal are in the report in attached.
with them in a special way within the framework of
its (fundamental) legal responsibility.4The federal 2 Status of implementation at level- of the federal
government's risk analyzes are carried out in an government
abstract, generic manner. The scenarios used for
this cannot claim to be absolutely representative. 2.1 Basics and Preparation
Due to the number, type and scope of conceivable In order to create reliable and coordinated risk
dangers and events, however, they lay the analyzes at the federal level with the aim of creating
foundation for adequate risk management at the a comparative overview of risks from different
various administrative levels of the federal and dangers, the cooperation of all departments and
state governments. In terms of a holistic approach, specialist authorities concerned is required. Existing
they must be supplemented by correspondingly expertise and findings are brought together
more specific risk analyzes at state and municipal through interdisciplinary and cross-authority
level in their respective areas of responsibility. cooperation, responsibilities are preserved and the
Dealing with risks across responsibilities and cross-departmental acceptance of the results of the
authorities can help to strengthen the protection of risk analysis is guaranteed. Two committees were
the population in Germany at all levels. therefore set up at federal level to implement the
risk analysis:6
On the one hand, the steering committee "Risk
analysis of civil protection at the federal level" was
1 Introduction
formed, in which all relevant departments are
represented and which is coordinated by the Federal
After the first two reports to the German Bundestag Ministry of the Interior (BMI). The steering committee
5First of all, the objective and the method of the risk provides the guidelines for risk analysis at federal
analysis were presented and the structures and level. They include the selection of the damage
procedures for the preparation and implementation parameters to be used, the specification of the
of the risk analysis at federal level were explained. classifications to determine the probability of
This report reflects the status of the subsequent occurrence and the extent of damage, and the
and ongoing work. selection of the hazards that are examined as part of
the risk analysis. In addition, the steering committee
evaluates the results and findings developed by the
In Chapter 2, the organizational framework, the working working group with a view to the need for action to be
methods of the departments involved and the specific derived from them, coordinates the annual report to
the German Bundestag and determines the further
procedure within the framework of the federal risk
4 See information from the Federal Government: Report on risk
analysis in civil protection 2011, Chapter 3.1.2. analysis.
5 See briefing by the Federal Government: Report on the method
for risk analysis in civil protection 2010 and briefing by the
Federal Government: Report on risk analysis in civil protection 6 See information from the Federal Government: Report on risk
2011. analysis in civil protection 2011, Chapter 3.1.1.
On the other hand, a working group was formed, Scenario Statements on the likely effects on critical
which is made up of mandated departmental infrastructure and the supply of the population with
authorities from the relevant departments and is important goods and services as well as statements
coordinated by the Federal Office for Civil on the expected effects on the protected goods,
Protection and Disaster Assistance (BBK) in which are taken into account in the risk analysis. In
coordination with the BMI. The working group addition, it includes a list of reference events,
develops scenarios for the hazards selected by the relevant literature and further information. Since
steering committee and carries out the the respective scenario implicitly determines the
corresponding risk analyzes based on the result of the risk analysis through the form of the
specifications of the steering committee. Existing event selected there, its careful and consistent
findings and information from the business area design is of particular importance for the creation
authorities are brought together. The analyzes are of reliable risk analyses. When developing the
carried out in hazard-specific working groups, scenarios, it was also important to ensure that they
which are made up of representatives of the were sufficiently concrete to achieve reliable risk
competent or competent authorities and, if analysis results, at the same time, they are
necessary, are supplemented by expertise from practicable and not too detailed for the analyzes
other areas. from the federal point of view. The scenario
development was based on the understandable/
plausible assumption of the most unfavorable
In preparation for the risk analysis at federal level, the
course of an event (known internationally as the
steering committee first laid down the necessary
“reasonable worst case”). The draft scenarios thus
foundations. Dangers and events with potential
prepared were approved by the Steering
federal relevance, which would place great demands
Committee.
on the structures of the German civil protection
system, were identified7and prioritized with regard to The risk analyzes were then carried out with
their processing sequence within the framework of the determination of the probability of occurrence and
risk analysis. In addition, the steering committee extent of damage using the classifications defined
selected the damage parameters that are used in the by the steering committee. The results of the two
risk analysis to map the protected areas PEOPLE, risk analyzes were presented and discussed both in
ENVIRONMENT, ECONOMY and INTANGIBLE and made the working group and in the steering committee.
the classifications to determine the probability of Suggestions from both bodies were taken up and
occurrence8thand extent of damage9firmly. It should be incorporated into the completion of the analyzes
pointed out once again that the classification of the and documents. The results of the risk analyzes
extent of damage does not contain any judgmental were then prepared for this report.
considerations, but rather represents an aid for the
relative representation of the magnitude of the event
with a view to the extent of damage to be expected for 2.2 Risk analysis "Extreme melting floods
the respective damage parameters. from the low mountain ranges"
In 2012, risk analyzes for the dangers/events "flood"
The risk analysis "Extreme melting floods from the low mountain
and "extraordinary epidemic occurrence" were
ranges" was carried out under the technical leadership of the
carried out at federal level. The processing took
Federal Institute for Hydrology and with the participation of other
place in two hazard-specific working groups, which
federal authorities10carried out.
were made up of the relevant specialist authorities
of the working group and were coordinated by the First, a scenario was developed by the inter-agency
BBK. In the first step, the working groups each drew working group. From the large number of possible
up a proposal for specifying the initially abstract flood events that can occur in Germany, an event of
dangers/events “flood” and “extraordinary epidemic the "snowmelt flood" type was selected for this
occurrence”. After the proposals had been purpose, since this has occurred many times in
approved by the steering committee, the respective history, affects most of the river areas in Germany
scenario was then developed in the working groups, and harbors a correspondingly large potential for
which forms the starting point of the risk analysis damage.11By combining different
and the basis for determining the probability of
occurrence and the expected extent of damage for
the underlying event. In addition to a 10 Office for Geoinformation of the Federal Armed Forces, Federal Office for
Building and Regional Planning, Federal Office for Civil Protection and Disaster
comprehensive description of the assumed course
Assistance, Federal Office for Nature Conservation, Federal Office for Maritime
of events, such a Shipping and Hydrography, Federal Office for Information Security, Federal
Institute for Geosciences and Natural Resources, Federal Institute for
Agriculture and Food, Federal Institute for Material research and testing,
7 See information from the Federal Government: Report on risk Federal Agency for Technical Relief, Federal Network Agency, German Weather
analysis in civil protection 2011, Chapter 3.1.2. Service, Armed Forces Support Command of the German Armed Forces,
8th See Appendix 1. Federal Environment Agency.
9 See Appendix 2. 11 See Deutsch, Glaser and Pörtge 2010.
Several periods of weather, which have already Here, too, a corresponding scenario was initially
occurred individually in this form in the past - albeit developed by the inter-agency working group. The
not in immediate succession - an extreme melt probability of occurrence of such a pandemic and
flood was generated, which is equally nationally the extent of the damage to be expected if it did
relevant and plausible.12 occur were then determined.
The scenario describes a situation in which, due to
long-lasting, unfavorable weather conditions in late The scenario describes an extraordinary epidemic
winter/spring, there is a snowmelt flood in two that is based on the spread of a new type of
waves on the Ems, Weser, Elbe, Rhine, Oder and pathogen. For this purpose, the pathogen "Modi-
Danube and their tributaries. The trigger for this is SARS", which is hypothetical but has realistic
strong thaw in the catchment areas with a high properties, was used as a basis. The choice of a
proportion of low mountain ranges in combination SARS-like virus was based, among other things, on
with high precipitation. The water levels have the fact that the natural variant in 2003 quickly
increased significantly over a period of two months pushed very different healthcare systems to their
and in many places go beyond a 200-year return limits. The past has already shown that pathogens
interval (HQ200). Structural flood protection with novel properties that trigger a serious
facilities are flooded or cannot withstand the epidemic event can suddenly appear (e.g. SARS
enormous loads, resulting in massive flooding coronavirus (CoV), H5N1 influenza virus,
along the river courses. A number of large cities are chikungunya virus, HIV).14Using simplified
also affected. The sufficiently long warning time assumptions, the hypothetical course of a pandemic
enables the authorities and the population to in Germany was modeled for this Modi-SARS virus,
prepare for the event. Evacuations are ordered on a which is both nationally relevant and plausible.15
large scale, police, fire brigade, aid organizations,
technical relief organizations and the German
armed forces are in constant use. In the flooded The scenario describes a worldwide spread of a hypothetical new virus originating from Asia,
area and partly in the adjacent hinterland, the which is named Modi SARS virus. Several people travel to Germany before the authorities receive
electricity, gas and water supply often fails, but the first official warning from the WHO. These include two infected people who, through a
there are no widespread failures. The cessation of combination of a large number of contact persons and high infectivity, make a strong contribution
inland shipping and the impairment of road and rail to the initial spread of the infection in Germany. Although the measures provided for in the
transport have noticeable effects on the logistics Infection Protection Act and pandemic plans are being implemented quickly and effectively by the
sector throughout Germany. Such a river flood is authorities and the health system, the rapid spread of the virus cannot be effectively stopped due
part of the natural water cycle and, particularly in to the short interval between two infections. At the peak of the first wave of illness after approx.
extreme cases, has a significant impact on all 300 days, approx. 6 million people in Germany contracted Modi-SARS. The healthcare system is
protected areas considered in the risk analysis. faced with immense challenges that cannot be mastered. Assuming that the maintenance of the
function of vital infrastructures is given the highest priority and key positions remain occupied,
large-scale supply failures can be avoided in the other infrastructure sectors. After the first wave
For this scenario, both the probability of occurrence subsides, two more, weaker waves will follow until a vaccine is available three years after the onset
for such a flood event and the extent of damage to of the first diseases. What is special about this event is that firstly the entire area of Germany and
be expected if it occurs were then determined all the population that the maintenance of the function of vital infrastructures is given the highest
according to the method of risk analysis for civil priority and key positions remain occupied, large-scale supply failures can be avoided in the other
protection at federal level. The results of the risk infrastructure sectors. After the first wave subsides, two more, weaker waves will follow until a
analysis (probability of occurrence, extent of vaccine is available three years after the onset of the first diseases. What is special about this event
damage, scenario) are attached to the report in is that firstly the entire area of Germany and all the population that the maintenance of the
Appendix 3. function of vital infrastructures is given the highest priority and key positions remain occupied,
large-scale supply failures can be avoided in the other infrastructure sectors. After the first wave
subsides, two more, weaker waves will follow until a vaccine is available three years after the onset
2.3 Risk analysis "pandemic caused by Virus
of the first diseases. What is special about this event is that firstly the entire area of Germany and
Modi-SARS"
all the population a vaccine is available up to three years after the onset of the first illnesses. What
The risk analysis "pandemic caused by virus Modi-SARS" was is special about this event is that firstly the entire area of Germany and all the population a
carried out under the technical leadership of the Robert Koch vaccine is available up to three years after the onset of the first illnesses. What is special about this
Institute and with the participation of other federal authorities13 event is that firstly the entire area of Germany and all the population
carried out.
12For this purpose, the water balance model LARSIM-ME (Large Area 14A current example of an emerging pathogen is a coro-
Runoff Simulation Model Central Europe) is used. navirus, which is not closely related to SARS-CoV. This virus has
13 including Federal Office for Building and Regional Planning, Federal Office for been detected in six patients since the summer of 2012, two of
Civil protection and disaster relief, Federal Office for whom have died (as of November 26, 2012).
Information Security, Federal Agency for Agriculture and Food, 15A Susceptible-Infected-Recovered
Federal Agency for Technical Relief, Federal Network Agency, (SIR) model created with Stata 12 software. The course of the
Paul Ehrlich Institute, Armed Forces Support Command of the pandemic was modeled using population density.
Bundeswehr.
groups to the same extent, and secondly, occurs Numerous flood events in recent decades have
over a very long period of time. If such a pandemic repeatedly led to the catalog of measures for flood
were to occur, three separate waves would have to protection and flood prevention being continuously
be expected over a period of three years with an expanded. The basis of earlier flood protection
immensely high number of victims and serious concepts was mostly a static flood protection
effects on different protected areas. approach, i.e. the focus was on "technical flood
protection". In the last 20 years, this approach has
been expanded to include comprehensive modern
For this scenario, both the probability of occurrence flood protection. This is based on the three pillars:
to be assumed for such an epidemic and the extent technical flood protection, flood prevention and
of damage to be expected in the event of its "natural support". All known flood protection and
occurrence were then determined using the flood prevention measures can be integrated into
method of risk analysis for civil protection at federal this 3-pillar concept, see Figure 1. This ensures very
level. The results of the risk analysis (probability of comprehensive precautionary flood protection.
occurrence, extent of damage, scenario) are
attached to the report in Appendix 4.
3 Digression: Cross-level risk management Until then, the term “risk” was only anchored in
using the example of flooding connection with risk prevention, i.e. the
predominantly financial personal provision of those
Flood protection has a very long tradition in Germany. affected, e.g. B. by taking out insurance. In the last
Technical protective measures, such as dike few decades, it has only gradually become clear that
construction, have been known for several hundred a dyke cannot “make an area flood-free” and that
years. The first regulations on keeping flood plains there is always a risk of the dyke failing.
clear can be found e.g. B. in the Prussian Laws of 1905.
Illustration 1
3-pillar concept of modern flood protection16
16See Ministry of Agriculture and the Environment of the State of Saxony-Anhalt 2010 (graphic also available online at http://www.sachsen-
Anhalt.de/index.php?id=13429, last accessed on October 26, 2012)
The flood of 2002 in the catchment areas of the Elbe the responsible authorities and aid organizations
and Danube intensified existing discussion approaches (see Figure 2). After a flood event, the precautionary
in flood protection, which made it clear: measures must be readjusted. This holistic
approach creates a stronger connection between
a) There is no 100% protection behind dikes and the actual measures of flood prevention and flood
other technical protective devices. protection as well as the management of the event.
The FRMD continues to underline this cyclical and
b) The goal should be flood protection that makes dynamic understanding through the mandatory
life with the river and the risk of flooding review of the three work steps mentioned every six
possible. years.
c) The flood awareness of the population plays a

major role in flood prevention. In this way, current developments and new
findings, e.g. B. also from the discussion about
d) Flood protection takes place at the level of the river climate change, reacted and adjusted. In addition,
catchment area, within which the risk of flooding the mandatory processing in the river catchment
should not be shifted as far as possible. area and cross-border cooperation are decisive in
the application of the Floods Directive.
At the European level, this discussion led to the
2007 EC directive for the assessment and
management of flood risks (2007/60/EC). This flood With the amendment to the Water Resources Act
risk management guideline (FRM-RL) comprises (WHG), which came into force on March 1, 2010, the
three work steps: regulations of the FD were implemented in German
law. After implementation at state level, they
1. Preliminary flood risk assessment (completed
started with a variety of measures. The preliminary
March 2012)
assessment of the flood risk has been completed
2. Development of flood hazard and flood risk maps and was reported to the EU Commission at the end
(until December 2013) of 2011. Work is currently concentrating on creating
the flood hazard and flood risk maps. At the same
3. Development of flood risk management plans (by time, the development of the first model flood risk
December 2015) management plans was completed. International
coordination and cooperation in the transnational
The basic idea of risk management runs through
river basins will continue to be carried out by the
all three processing steps. In the preliminary
international commissions (e.g. IKSE, IKSR, etc.).
assessment of the flood risk, not only the risk of
flooding is assessed, but also the probability of
damage to the protected assets of human health, The implementation of the FRMD in German law is a
economic activity, the environment and culture. In decisive step towards anchoring the holistic approach
addition to the risk of flooding, the flood hazards to risk management. The following points are still
and flood risk maps also show the risk of flood outstanding when it comes to improving individual
damage, the number of people affected and components of flood risk management:
relevant industries that could pose a threat to the
environment in the event of flooding. The – Improvement of risk communication and
development of the flood risk management plans is strengthening of private provision,
based on the flood risk management cycle.
- Improvement of damage monitoring and damage analysis
in order to be able to derive more differentiated
What is new compared to the 3-pillar concept is that protection levels if necessary,
flood risk management also takes into account the
management of a flood event, i.e. preparing for an Support for decision-making at the municipal level
event with hazard prevention and disaster control in order to use long-term development potential
measures is given greater importance and calls for and short-term developments, e.g. B. to avoid in
a stronger connection flood areas.
printed matter17/12051 - 8th - German Bundestag – 17th electoral term
Figure 2
Flood Risk Management Cycle17
4 Status of implementation at level- The risk analysis, including the implementation of the
the countries risk analysis at all administrative levels, provides
insights that can flow into the implementation process,
Cooperation between the federal and state governments
taking into account the interests of the federal and
takes place within the framework of the constitutional
state governments.
distribution of responsibilities. Since 2009, there has been
a regular technical exchange (federal-state expert The scenarios underlying the two risk analyzes
conference) with the representatives of the state interior carried out at federal level in 2012 were made
ministries and senates to carry out risk analyzes at the known to the state authorities responsible for civil
various administrative levels. protection while the risk analyzes were being
Several federal states are currently carrying out risk carried out.
analyzes for civil protection using the method developed
In addition, the federal states were also informed via the
by the BBK in the form of pilot projects. The lead
respective specialist committees - for the risk analysis
management of the risk analysis within the pilot projects
"Extreme melting floods from the low mountain ranges"
lies with the respective state or with the respective
via the standing committee "Flood Protection and
independent city/rural district. As part of the
Hydrology" of the federal/state working group on water
implementation of the method developed by the BBK
(LAWA), and for the risk analysis "Pandemic through Virus
Modi-SARS” via the Infection Protection Working Group
17See federal/state working group on water, standing committee (AG I) of the Working Group of the Supreme State Health
"Flood Control and Hydrology" 2010. Authorities (AOLG).
5 Parallel development at international The identification of a broad portfolio of dangers that

level can develop a certain relevance for a state's disaster
prevention (including those whose occurrence is very
5.1 EU rarely expected), as well as the systematic,
interdisciplinary investigation of these dangers with
The European Commission is preparing to produce regard to their probability of occurrence and their
a cross-sectoral overview of the main risks the EU extent of damage (risk analysis) are also according to
can face in the future. In this context, the joint the OECD at the beginning of effective risk
exchange of experience between the Member management. Furthermore, the OECD also considers
States should be supported and cooperation the participation of ministries and authorities from the
between relevant scientific institutions and political various relevant specialist areas, possibly
decision-makers should be promoted. Germany is supplemented by representatives of other institutions,
actively supporting this process, e.g. B. by industry and science, to be useful in order to be able to
participating in expert meetings organized by the draw on the broadest possible knowledge base. At the
EU Commission and the preparation of same time, an authority is to be named as the central
corresponding documents. These include, for coordination office.
example, the guidelines for risk analysis and risk
mapping for disaster management, which the In addition to the presentation of the proposed
European Commission has developed in procedure, the challenges faced by the risk analysis
cooperation with the Member States.18At the same are also explained. This includes e.g. B. the
time, the EU Commission is currently preparing uncertainties associated with the assessment of the
probability of occurrence and the extent of damage,
legislative proposals to improve the coordinated
the limitations of the performance of programs for
approach in this area.
modeling and the lack of reliable data bases in
Germany attaches great importance to dealing with many areas. Against this background, risk analysis
the development and application of risk analyzes at is presented as a legitimate and valuable
European level. The bilateral and multilateral precautionary instrument, but at the same time it is
activities of the EU Commission to protect the distinguished from exact science "in the classical
population represent the right approach to sense".
anchoring the goals of protecting the population In order to create a risk analysis that is as
throughout the European Union while maintaining comprehensive as possible, the linking of the results
the principle of subsidiarity and strengthening the obtained at national and regional or local level is
idea of prevention throughout Europe. This recommended, as well as a constant mutual exchange
includes the exchange of information and methods between the bodies involved. In addition, the
as well as best practices. In this context, the Federal importance of appropriate risk communication is
Government works closely with the Member States made clear. Transparency, comprehensibility and
and the European Commission. comprehensible communication of the results of the
risk analysis (and all other aspects of risk
management) can make a significant contribution to
awakening trust in state provision - but also in
concrete measures in the event of damage - and to
developing an enlightened "risk culture".
5.2 OECD 6 outlook

The structures and procedures established at federal level
The Organization for Economic Co-operation and have proven their worth in practice when carrying out the
Development (OECD) has drafted a non-binding first two risk analyzes "Extreme melting floods from the
framework for disaster-related risk assessment and low mountain ranges" and "Pandemic caused by Virus
risk financing at the national level, which focuses on Modi-SARS". This applies in particular to the
risk analysis as the basis for comprehensive risk interdisciplinary approach and the bundling of diverse
management.19The approach and method specialist expertise through the involvement of numerous
proposed there is compatible with the German federal authorities.
"Method for risk analysis in civil protection" and is
based on a comparable concept of risk. The In this context, it is pointed out that the federal
explanations on risk analysis are supplemented by a government's risk analyzes are deliberately carried
chapter on the basics of risk financing. out in a pragmatic manner in order to achieve
results within a reasonable period of time based on
the knowledge available to the authorities involved.
A central challenge here is to find an appropriate
18 See European Commission 2010. balance between the practicability of the analyzes
19 See OECD 2012. and the reliability of their results. So
printed matter17/12051 - 10 - German Bundestag – 17th electoral term
From the federal government's overarching Law on access to digital geodata

perspective, it is not possible - but also not necessary - (Geodatenzugangsgesetz - GeoZG), which implements the
to assess the effects of an event on a small or even European INSPIRE directive20and is closely linked to the
microscopic level in detail and thus to make activities undertaken since 2004 by the federal, state and
statements about what damage, failures or disruptions local governments to set up the Geodata Infrastructure
could be expected on site . This can only be Germany (GDI-DE). According to the GeoZG, the geodata
determined at the respective administrative level in and geodata services of the federal government,
their own area of responsibility. Nevertheless, the including the associated metadata, should be available
analysis from a federal perspective requires a basic free of charge for commercial and non-commercial use
understanding of some local processes in order to be and further use in the future, unless otherwise
able to estimate at a general level whether and how an determined by special legal provisions and contractual or
event could have a nationwide impact. This applies, for legal rights of third parties do not conflict with this.21This
example, with regard to the supply of the population takes into account the ideas of “open government” and
with services and goods through critical “open data” also supported by the federal government. In
infrastructures in the event of an incident. this context, the central German search service
"Geodatenkatalog-DE" is of great value. It brings together
Aspects for which no reliable and sufficiently decentralized metadata stocks from the federal and state
detailed information is available to date must first
governments and makes them available in a consolidated
be approached with the help of assumptions and
manner and in accordance with the requirements of
expert assessments. The first two risk analyzes have
INSPIRE via a central catalog interface for both GDI-DE
made it clear that there are sometimes no reliable
and INSPIRE. Descriptive meta information on geodata
findings on certain points at the level of the federal
can be searched for centrally and efficiently here. In
authorities involved or that relevant data are
addition to contact, room and origin information, the
currently not accessible. For example, assessments
"Geodatenkatalog-DE" also contains information on the
by infrastructure operators and companies would
intended use and conditions of use of the respective
be helpful, especially for estimating the effects on
geodata. Especially the latter are an important aspect in
the areas "KRITIS/supply" and "economy", in order
relation to the risk analysis, because not all relevant
to be able to make more reliable statements about
geodata are actually accessible and usable.
the consequences for the event on which the
scenario is based in the area. In the future, the
involvement of research and science institutions For the purpose of a reliable assessment of the
should also be striven for in order to supplement expected effects of the events examined within the
expertise and validate results. In this way, the framework of the risk analysis, it should also be
common knowledge could be continuously possible to tap into those data sources for the risk
improved and used for a variety of purposes in the analysis in civil protection whose targeted use is
respective areas of responsibility. currently not possible for various reasons. For
example, nationally comparable data from official
In addition, the implementation of the risk analysis statistics (e.g. data on population distribution, on
can be supported by using suitable tools apartments and workplaces) is currently only
(particularly models). However, transparency and available in a spatial resolution that refers to
traceability are important here. In this context, the districts or municipalities due to the current legal
use of geoinformation technology holds great situation. This considerably limits their use for civil
potential, because in combination with the protection, partly because they are inhomogeneous
appropriate analytical skills, geoinformation and the in terms of their spatial extent and shape and are
associated technical infrastructures are valuable not constant over time.22The provision of statistical
planning aids for civil protection. In the future, the data on a grid basis ("geographical grid cell"), which
federal government's risk analysis is to be is planned as part of the planned law to promote
increasingly supported by geodata and the needs- electronic administration and to change other
based information created with it. These include, for regulations, would mean important progress here
example, maps that show how the different objects and
of protection are distributed over the territory of
the Federal Republic,
20 INSPIRE (Infrastructure for Spatial Information in Europe) is a
Directive of the European Commission for the creation of a spatial
data infrastructure in the European Community. The aim of the
INSPIRE directive is to make high-quality spatial data from the
In this context, the availability and intelligent linking authorities of the member states accessible under uniform
of relevant geodata is of central importance. For conditions to support the formulation, implementation and
this purpose, it is necessary to bring together the evaluation of European and national policy areas.
21§ 11 paragraph 2 sentence 1 GeoZG, the recently decided change
geo-information relevant to civil protection that is of the GeoZG, which is to come into force at the end of 2012, has already been taken into
available at different points and to make it usable account here.
for risk analysis. That helps with that 22 See Heidrich-Riske 2010.
German Bundestag – 17th electoral term - 11 - printed matter17/12051
bring considerable added value for risk analysis and Population.23For these initiatives, too, a risk analysis
civil protection as a whole. This applies in particular tailored to the relevant focal points can provide
if this were already applied to the current 2011 further important insights and support decision-
census. Another example of geodata that cannot making in measures to protect the population from
currently be used for risk analysis for legal reasons the extreme consequences of climate change, from
is the employment statistics of the Federal the consequences of the failure of critical
Employment Agency, which would be a valuable infrastructure and in the development of solution-
basis for determining the economic effects of oriented protection concepts as part of prevention
different events. policy serve at European level.
The scenarios and results of the federal risk

Where comprehensive generalized statements are currently not possible or only possible to a limited extent, so that analyzes should also be made available to other
simplified assumptions sometimes have to be made, the most favorable course was assumed in the context of this year's users. These include, for example, the authorities
two risk analyzes in order to avoid unprovable dramatizations. Otherwise, the scenarios on which the risk analyzes are responsible for civil protection at state, district and
based could have been designed differently, which could certainly have led to even more drastic effects on the protected municipal level. Even beyond the actual area of
assets under consideration. This would be the case, for example, if it had been assumed that the flood event would also
civil protection, additional possible uses are already
cause an accident in a nuclear power plant or a chemical plant, or if it had been assumed that due to the pandemic event
emerging at this point in time. For example, the
and the associated loss of personnel, several vital infrastructures could no longer be maintained. A single scenario thus
federal and state project group “Restructuring the
represents, so to speak, a point recording for an event that is assessed as plausible and could occur in the assumed way.
legal basis for emergency nutrition” set up by the
However, it cannot and must not be understood in the sense of a prognosis, because it is not possible to predict whether
federal and state consultants responsible for
such an event will actually occur in one form or another. Rather, the purpose of the risk analysis is to use selected scenarios
emergency nutrition has been informed about the
to examine whether the existing capabilities and state preparations for dealing with the possible damage and effects
methodological approach in the context of the risk
identified in the risk analysis are appropriate and sufficient. A single scenario thus represents, so to speak, a point
analysis for civil protection and is interested in
recording for an event that is assessed as plausible and could occur in the assumed way. However, it cannot and must not
using the here scenarios created for their own
be understood in the sense of a prognosis, because it is not possible to predict whether such an event will actually occur in
purposes.
one form or another. Rather, the purpose of the risk analysis is to use selected scenarios to examine whether the existing
capabilities and state preparations for dealing with the possible damage and effects identified in the risk analysis are
appropriate and sufficient. A single scenario thus represents, so to speak, a point recording for an event that is assessed as
plausible and could occur in the assumed way. However, it cannot and must not be understood in the sense of a prognosis,
because it is not possible to predict whether such an event will actually occur in one form or another. Rather, the purpose
of the risk analysis is to use selected scenarios to examine whether the existing capabilities and state preparations for After the method for risk analysis in civil protection has proven to be profitable and practicable in the first scenarios, work
dealing with the possible damage and effects identified in the risk analysis are appropriate and sufficient. However, it on risk analysis at federal level is being continued with close involvement of the federal states. The annual report to the
cannot and must not be understood in the sense of a prognosis, because it is not possible to predict whether such an event German Bundestag will present the respective status of the risk analysis. Gradually, the desired overview of the risk
will actually occur in one form or another. Rather, the purpose of the risk analysis is to use selected scenarios to examine landscape will emerge. Concrete starting points for the area of responsibility for civil protection at federal level are to be
whether the existing capabilities and state preparations for dealing with the possible damage and effects identified in the derived from this. In addition, the results of the risk analyzes are to be used for appropriate risk communication between
risk analysis are appropriate and sufficient. However, it cannot and must not be understood in the sense of a prognosis, the actors in civil protection and with the population. In perspective, it would be advisable to carry out several risk analyzes
because it is not possible to predict whether such an event will actually occur in one form or another. Rather, the purpose for each type of hazard in order to present the possible range of different characteristics with regard to the probability of
of the risk analysis is to use selected scenarios to examine whether the existing capabilities and state preparations for occurrence and the extent of damage. The risk analysis for a summer flood would possibly lead to different results than the
dealing with the possible damage and effects identified in the risk analysis are appropriate and sufficient. present analysis for the spring melt flood. At the same time, a variety of pathogens, transmission routes and courses are
conceivable for the risk of "extraordinary epidemic occurrence", which would also lead to different results. In the future,
combinations/chains of events due to different hazards should also be taken into account in the risk analysis to show the
At this point it should be emphasized once again possible range of different characteristics with regard to the probability of occurrence and the extent of damage. The risk
that these are risk analyzes from the perspective of analysis for a summer flood would possibly lead to different results than the present analysis for the spring melt flood. At
civil protection. If necessary, these are to be the same time, a variety of pathogens, transmission routes and courses are conceivable for the risk of "extraordinary
supplemented by additional special analyses, epidemic occurrence", which would also lead to different results. In the future, combinations/chains of events due to
particularly at district and state level; This applies to different hazards should also be taken into account in the risk analysis to show the possible range of different
both technical specification (e.g. detailed analyzes characteristics with regard to the probability of occurrence and the extent of damage. The risk analysis for a summer flood
for a more differentiated assessment of possible would possibly lead to different results than the present analysis for the spring melt flood. At the same time, a variety of
effects on different KRITIS sectors) and spatial pathogens, transmission routes and courses are conceivable for the risk of "extraordinary epidemic occurrence", which
specification (e.g. detailed analyzes for more would also lead to different results. In the future, combinations/chains of events due to different hazards should also be
differentiated assessment of the effects on a taken into account in the risk analysis At the same time, a variety of pathogens, transmission routes and courses are
regional to local level). Insights gained during the conceivable for the risk of "extraordinary epidemic occurrence", which would also lead to different results. In the future,
implementation of the risk analysis can provide combinations/chains of events due to different hazards should also be taken into account in the risk analysis At the same
valuable information on interfaces and the need for time, a variety of pathogens, transmission routes and courses are conceivable for the risk of "extraordinary epidemic
research. The risk analysis in civil protection is also occurrence", which would also lead to different results. In the future, combinations/chains of events due to different
closely related to other (security) political initiatives. hazards should also be taken into account in the risk analysis
These include, among others
23See briefing by the Federal Government: report on the

method for risk analysis in civil protection 2010, Chapter 5.1.
because far more severe effects are to be expected with the topic and a corresponding sensitization of
here. Although the corresponding probabilities of the population.
occurrence for such events are significantly lower,
their occurrence is nevertheless possible at any time, With regard to practical hazard prevention in particular, it
as the catastrophic event at Fukushima impressively is important that protection goals are formulated in
demonstrated. concrete terms, since preventive measures and coping
strategies can only be implemented, checked, discussed
The insights gained in the course of the risk analysis and adapted through measurable specifications.27There is
form the starting point for holistic risk and crisis still a clear need for preparation and coordination here,
management, which must also include a because in the event of a nationally relevant damage
corresponding discussion with society as a whole. event, protection goals that apply to normal everyday life
Because while the analysis of the risks is a technical may no longer be guaranteed by the state. Other
process, the risk assessment and the resulting administrative levels/responsibilities must also be taken
consideration and selection of e.g. B. risk-reducing into account, e.g. B. to derive which capabilities the
measures are determined to a considerable extent federal government must be able to provide in the event
by political and social aspects. Consequently, a of an operation. A corresponding horizontal and vertical
corresponding dialogue must take place between networking of the respective levels is therefore of great
specialist authorities, science, politics and the importance. To this end, there is a continuous exchange
population. In this context, it is imperative to define between the federal and state governments.
protection goals so that the results of the risk
analyzes can be compared with them and possible Finally, it should be emphasized once again that risk
deficits can be identified. In this way it can also be analysis in civil protection is an ongoing task and
determined should be understood as a process. If risk analyzes are
carried out at all administrative levels in the respective
area of responsibility and the experiences and
knowledge gained are exchanged mutually, the
comprehensive consideration and adequate treatment
of the identified risks is placed on a broad basis and
In the Committee for Education, Research and
the possibility opens up of protecting the population in
Technology Assessment of the German Bundestag, the
Germany where necessary strengthen. In addition,
topic of protection goals has already been dealt with in
individual risk analyzes can be carried out in close
connection with the TA project: endangerment and
cooperation between the federal and state
vulnerability of modern societies - using the example
governments if the scenario being examined requires
of a large-scale and long-lasting failure of the power
this from a technical point of view.
supply.24In its 162nd session, the German Bundestag
also dealt with the report on the TA project25as well as Findings, data used and methodological procedures
with the first two reports on risk analysis in civil must be regularly checked, updated and, if
protection.26Both topics were given high priority necessary, adapted to new framework conditions. If
across the parliamentary groups and the work necessary, additional scenarios are to be developed
submitted was rated as correct and groundbreaking. for newly identified hazards. Gaps in knowledge can
Against the background of the threat and vulnerability be closed by targeted research projects. In this way,
of society to power failures and other dangers, the a realistic assessment of the current risks can be
importance of early and serious employment was also made, which, depending on the measures already
emphasized here. taken as part of risk and crisis management, leads
to an improvement in the risk landscape. The
24See the website of the German Bundestag (http://www.bundes
cooperation of citizens, science, business, politics
tag.de/dokumente/textarchiv/2011/34457220_kw21_pa_bildung_for and authorities at federal and state level, which is
schung/index.html, last accessed on October 26, 2012). shown here in perspective, will contribute to
25See report of the Committee for Education, Research and Technology- reducing Germany's vulnerability to dangers and
impact assessment (18th committee) in accordance with Section
possible disasters to a jointly supported level.
56a of the Rules of Procedure: technology assessment (TA). TA
project: Endangerment and vulnerability of modern societies -
using the example of a large-scale and long-lasting power failure in
26 2011. Cf. German Bundestag: Stenographic report on the 162nd
session of March 1, 2012, agenda item 11. 27 See Gullotta 2007.
Credit Gullotta, G.: Risk assessment - half full or half empty?

In: Civil protection, issue 01/2007, pp. 9-10.
Report of the Committee for Education, Research and
Technology Assessment (18th Committee) according to
§ 56a of the Rules of Procedure: Technology Heidrich-Riske, H.: Official statistical data for
Assessment (TA). TA project: Endangerment and disaster prevention. In: German Committee for
vulnerability of modern societies - using the example Disaster Prevention eV (DKKV) (ed.): Disasters - data
of a large-scale and long-lasting power failure. In: background and information.
Negotiations of the German Bundestag: Printed
matter – (2011), 17/5672 from April 27th, 2011. Documentation 10th Forum Disaster Prevention. Bonn
2010.
Federal/state working group Water (LAWA),
Standing Committee "Flood Protection and Hydrology"
Internet pages of the German Bundestag (http://
of the LAWA (AH): Recommendations for the
www.bundestag.de/dokumente/textarchiv/
preparation of flood risk management plans. Decided
at the 139th LAWA-VV on 25./26. March 2010 in 2011/34457220_kw21_pa_bildung_forschung/index.html, last
Dresden. accessed on October 26, 2012).
Federal Office for Civil Protection and Disaster Ministry of Agriculture and the Environment of the State
Assistance (ed.): BBK Glossary: Selected central of Saxony-Anhalt (ed.): Flood protection concept of the
terms of civil protection. Bonn 2011.
State of Saxony-Anhalt up to 2010 from March 25, 2010
Center for Security Studies (CSS) of ETH Zurich, Crisis (graphic also available online at http://
and Risk Network (CRN): CRN Report - Focal Report 2: www.sachsenanhalt.de/index.php?id= 13429, last
Risk Analysis - Integrated Risk Management and retrieved on 10/26/2012).
Societal Security. Zurich 2009, p. 6.
Deutsch, M., Glaser, R. and Pörtge, K.-H.: Historical Organization for Economic Cooperation and
flood events in Central Europe. In: Geographical Development (OECD): Disaster Risk Assessment and
Review, Issue 3/2010, pp. 18-24. Risk Financing. A G20/OECD Methodological
Framework. 2012
German Bundestag: Shorthand report on the 162nd
session on March 1, 2012.
Informed by the Federal Government: Report on
European Commission (ed.): Risk Assessment and the method for risk analysis in civil protection 2010.
Mapping Guidelines for Disaster Management. In: Negotiations of the German Bundestag: Printed
Commission Staff Working Paper. SEC(2010) 1626 final matter - (2010), 17/4178 from 9.12.2010.
of 21.12.2010.
Federal government bill. Draft law to promote e- Information from the Federal Government: Report on
government and amend other regulations. Federal risk analysis in civil protection 2011. In: Negotiations of
Council printed matter 557/1/12 of 09/21/2012. the German Bundestag: Printed matter - (2011),
17/8250 from 21.12.2011.
Attachment
Annex 1
Risk analysis for civil protection at the federal level
– classification of the probability of occurrence
Probability classes:
A: very unlikely
an event that statistically usually occurs once in a period of more
than 10,000 years
B: unlikely
an event that statistically usually occurs once every 1,000 to
10,000 years
C: conditionally probable
an event that statistically usually occurs once every 100 to 1,000
years
D: probably
an event that statistically usually occurs once in a period of 10 to
100 years
E: most likely
an event that statistically usually occurs once every 10 years or
more frequently
A notice:
These are statistical annual values, which should be understood in such a way that
the intensity of the event to be expected increases with increasing rarity. For
example, less damage can be expected from a 10-year storm event than from a
100-year one. However, the statistical annuality says nothing about the time
intervals at which a corresponding event actually takes place. It can happen, for
example, that within a decade several events of the magnitude "100 years" occur
(example: "century flood" of the Rhine in Cologne in 1993 and 1995).
Annex 2
Risk analysis for civil protection at the federal level –
classification of the extent of damage
Hints:
The classification of the extent of damage is used for the risk analysis of civil protection at federal level. The
focus is therefore on civil protection (ie for other purposes, e.g. environmental protection, other threshold
values might have to be selected depending on the focus and protection objective). On the other hand, the
focus is on the federal perspective (ie at the level of the federal states/counties/municipalities, appropriately
adjusted threshold values would have to be selected if necessary).
Every event that leads to injuries or even fatalities, causes damage to the environment,
infrastructure and/or residential property and can have other effects on the population, their
livelihoods and public safety and order is tragic, especially for those directly affected. This should
by no means be negated by the classification used. In the context of the risk analysis, it rather
serves as an aid in order to be able to assign the hypothetical event described in the scenario a
relative magnitude in relation to the extent of damage to be expected if it occurs.
It is possible to add additional correction factors to the classification for certain damage
parameters in order to enable a more differentiated derivation of the respective extent of
damage. In doing so, a balance must be struck between the practicability of implementation and
the reliability of the results.
As part of the risk analysis, it must be documented to what extent damage is taken into account
when determining the extent of damage that does not result directly from the event itself, but
indirectly as a result of the event (e.g. injuries or deaths caused by an evacuation measure in
connection with the considered event occur).
Protected good PEOPLE
Damage Parameters: Dead (M1)
Damage extent classes:
A:
B:>10 - 100
C:>100 - 1,000
D:>1,000 - 10,000
E:>10,000
Annotation:
Considered here are people whose death – regardless of when it occurred – is causally
attributable to the damaging event.
Damage parameters: injured, sick (M2)
A:
B:>10 - 100
C:>100 - 1,000
D:>1,000 - 10,000
E:>10,000
Annotation:
Considered here are people who are injured by the event in the reference area or who
become so ill in the course of the event or as a result of it that they require medical or
healthcare care (late effects/long-term damage must also be taken into account here).
Damage parameters: those in need of help (M3)
A:10,000 feet
B:
- 4 weeks
C:
- 4 weeks
D:
- 4 weeks
E:>1,000,000 for > 1 week

or > 100,000 for > 1 month
Annotation:
Considered here are people who are homeless as a result of the event or who require
some other form of government assistance for physical survival.
In the event that two classes apply, the higher class is to be chosen.
Damage Parameters: Missing (M4)
A:
B:>10 - 100
C:>100 - 1,000
D:>1,000 - 10,000
E:>10,000
Annotation:
Here people are considered who are considered to be permanently missing as a result of the event.
ENVIRONMENT
Damage parameters: Damage to protected areas (U1)

2)
A:
B:>0.005 - 0.05% of the total area of protected areas (corresponds to > 10 - 100 km2)
C:>0.05 - 0.5% of the total area of protected areas (corresponds to > 100 - 1,000 km2)
D:>0.5 - 5% of the total area of protected areas (equivalent to > 1,000 - 10,000 km2)
E:>5% of the total area of protected areas (equivalent to >10,000 km2)
Annotation:
Protected areas damaged by the event (nature protection areas, national parks, biosphere
reserves, landscape protection areas, nature parks) and fauna (wild animals) are considered
here.
Damage parameters: Damage to surface water/groundwater (U2)
A:
B:>0.01 - 0.1%
C:>0.1 - 1%
D:>1 - 10%
E:>10%
Annotation:
Surface water damaged by the event (rivers, canals, streams, lakes, sea) and groundwater
are considered here.
Damage parameters: Damage to forest areas (U3)
A:
B:>0.01 - 0.1%
C:>0.1 - 1%
D:>1 - 10%
E:>10%
Damage parameters: Damage to agricultural land (U4)
A:
B:>0.01 - 0.1%
C:>0.1 - 1%
D:>1 - 10%
E:>10%
Damage parameters: damage to livestock (U5)
A: livestock units
B:>1,500 - 15,000 livestock units
C:>15,000 - 150,000 livestock units
D:>150,000 - 1.5 million livestock units
E:>1.5 million livestock units

Protected asset ECONOMY
Damage Parameters: Impact on Public Sector (V1)
A:Public sector costs caused by the event can be fully covered by

are borne by the affected country/countries, no direct impact on the federal
government. In some cases, planned federal measures to support the affected
region are being processed more quickly.
B:Public sector costs caused by the event can for the most part
borne by the affected country/countries. Shifts in the budget can cover the need for
funds. Some federal measures are being accelerated or brought forward.
C:Public sector costs caused by the event have a

supraregional scope. For the most part, they can no longer be borne by the affected
country/countries from their own resources. Shifts in the budget cannot cover the funds
required, and a supplementary budget must be passed at state level. Due to the state
responsibility, federal aid is necessary.
D:Public sector costs caused by the event are of such a large

supra-regional to nationwide, that the federal government has to provide limited
financial resources in the short to medium term due to its national responsibility.
Reallocations in the budget cannot cover the funds required, and a supplementary
budget must be passed at the federal level. The EU aid program can be used.
E:Very big impact. Public sector costs caused by the event

have such a significant, supra-regional to nationwide scope that the federal government
has to provide extensive medium to long-term funds due to its national responsibility. A
supplementary budget has to be passed as a result of the event and the medium-term
financial planning also has to be significantly improved. This has an impact on other
areas of the federal budget. EU aid is required (EU Solidarity Fund).
Damage Parameters: Impact on the Private Economy (V2)
A:Costs to the private sector caused by the event can be approximated

be borne entirely by the companies concerned. There are no supra-regional effects.
B:Costs caused by the event for the private sector can for the most part
borne by the companies concerned. There is little supra-regional impact.
C:The costs for the private sector caused by the event have a national impact
The extent and some of the companies affected cannot bear this on their own. Short- to
medium-term sales losses are to be expected for the affected sectors and companies.
Some companies are going bankrupt, other companies are threatened with bankruptcy;
in some sectors, short-term supra-regional effects (supplier companies) can be
observed.
D:Costs for the private sector caused by the event have a large,
supra-regional scope, and many of the affected companies cannot bear this on their own.
Medium to long-term sales losses are to be expected for the affected sectors and
companies. Numerous companies are going bankrupt, other companies are threatened
with bankruptcy; medium-term supra-regional effects (supplier companies) can be
observed in some sectors. The federal government is required to support reconstruction
programs. recession is imminent.
E:Costs caused by the event for the private sector have a significant,
supra-regional scope, and the majority of the affected companies cannot bear it on their
own. Long-term sales losses are to be expected for the affected sectors and companies.
A large number of companies are going bankrupt, many other companies are
threatened with bankruptcy; in some sectors there are nationwide effects (supplier
companies). The entire economy falls into recession as a result of the event, and
economic stimulus programs are necessary.
Damage parameters: impact on private households (V3)
A:
B:>4,000 - 40,000 households affected
C:>40,000 - 200,000 households affected
D:>200,000 - 400,000 households affected
E:>400,000 households affected
Annotation:
Definition "affected": Households that cannot cope with the recovery on their own.
INTANGIBLE property to be protected
Damage parameters: impact on public safety and order (I1)
A:Maintaining public safety and order is possible without any problems.
B:Maintaining public safety and order is at the regional level

slightly increased effort possible.
C:Maintaining public safety and order is up to the regional level

supra-regional level only possible with increased effort.
D:Maintaining public safety and order is of great importance nationally

Effort associated or regionally endangered.
E:Maintaining public safety and order is national to nationwide

endangered.
Damage Parameters: Political Impact (I2)
A:Political implications at regional level.
B:Political implications at supra-regional to state level.
C:Political implications at state to federal level.
D:Major political implications up to the federal level.
E:Very large political impact up to the federal level.

Damage parameters: Psychological effects (I3)
A:
B:>100,000 - 1,000,000
C:>1,000,000 - 10,000,000
D:>10,000,000 - 40,000,000
E:>40,000,000
Annotation:
The extent of the impact of the event on the perception/behaviour of the population
is considered here, which includes changed work, social and consumer behavior.
Damage parameters: Damage to cultural property (I4)
A:
B:>0.05% - 0.1%
C:>0.1% - 0.5%
D:>0.5% - 1.0%
E:>1.00%
printed matter17/12051 – 24 – German Bundestag – 17th electoral term
Appendix 3
extremes
melt flood
from the low mountain ranges
Status: 10.12.2012
Probability of occurrence:
Class B: unlikely
an event that statistically usually occurs once every 1,000 to
10,000 years
extent of damage:
extent of damage
protected goods damage parameter
A B C D E
M1 dead
M2 injured, sick
PERSON
M3 needy
M4 missing
u1 damage to protected areas
u2 Damage to surface water/groundwater

ENVIRONMENT u3 damage to forest areas
u4 Damage to agricultural land
u5 damage to livestock
V1 Effects on the public sector

FOLK
V2 Effects on the private economy
BUSINESS
V3 Impact on private households
I1 Effects on public safety and order
I2 Political Implications
IMMATERIAL
I3 Psychological Effects
I4 damage to cultural property

SCENARIO
1. Definition of the hazard/event type
According to Section 72 of the Water Resources Act, flooding is defined as “the temporary
inundation of land not normally covered with water by surface water or by seawater
penetrating coastal areas”. DIN 4049 describes flooding as the "condition in a body of water
above ground where the water level or the flow rate has reached or exceeded a certain value
(threshold value)." As a rule, these threshold values are significant with regard to the damage
potential associated with a flood. This is determined by
- peak height, duration and discharge volume of the flood event,

- Topography and use (accumulation of values) of the areas affected by flooding, as well as
- the season in which the event occurs.1
For the present scenario, the assumed flood threshold values are to be defined for each
river section in order to provide the basis for an assessment of the expected extent of
damage in the context of the risk analysis, in conjunction with other parameters (e.g.
flow velocity).
According to the different hydro-meteorological conditions prevailing in the federal territory and
the adjacent foreign parts of the river basin on the one hand and the hydrologically effective
area characteristics on the other hand, a large number of different flood genesis and occurrence
forms are possible. River floods are part of the natural water cycle and are caused in winter by
heavy, continuous precipitation lasting several weeks, often in connection with snowmelt and/or
frozen ground, and in summer by long-lasting, wet weather, in which heavy shower-like
(convective) precipitation events in connection with advective, large-scale precipitation occur in a
row.
Like all natural hazards, floods are initially natural occurrences that become an imminent
danger or actual catastrophe through human settlement and a variety of uses in the potential
flood plains.2For medium and large river basins
1See Engel 1997.

2While normal floods are valuable and necessary for the ecology, extreme ones must
flood events it is also expected that relevant ecosystems can be permanently changed.
meteorological causes have a significantly higher significance in the development of

floods than changes in hydraulic discharge.3
2. Description of the event
2.1. Place of occurrence/Spatial extent
Where is the event happening?/What area is affected by the event?

In the present scenario, floods occur simultaneously in the rivers Danube, Rhine, Ems, Weser,
Elbe and Oder and in their most important tributaries.4Due to greatly increased water levels on
large sections of these rivers, exposed areas along the river courses are flooded.
A map is attached to the scenario, which shows which HQ peak values occur at the respective
river sections for the event on which it is based. This was based on the largest HQ occurring in
the course of the event per river section.
2.2. time
When does the event happen? (season/possibly time of day)
The event takes place in late winter/spring (period: January 1st to March 31st).
2.3. Triggering events
What events lead to this event/What triggers the event? The trigger for the flood is the
onset of strong thaw in the catchment areas with a high proportion of low mountain ranges. In
the ridges of the low mountain ranges, exceptionally high snow depths accumulated in a
previous long and rainy cold period, and the thaw period also occurs in the medium-high areas
at the beginning of the year
3See Pohl and Dikau 2007.

4In the hydrological modeling of the underlying hydro-meteorological extreme event
smaller rivers (catchment area < ~2500 km²) were also simulated. To determine the extent of damage to
be expected, however, only the large rivers and their most important tributaries are considered, since on
the one hand due to the type of extreme scenario selected, ie the "snowmelt flood" genesis, the greatest
flooding is expected in these areas and on the other hand in the floodplains of these rivers, the damage
potential only reaches orders of magnitude that are relevant from the point of view of the federal
government's overarching perspective.
still a closed blanket of snow. Due to previous, short periods of thawing and the long lying
time, the snow cover is very water-rich (old snow holds up to 4 l of water/cm/m²). In addition, a
strong advance of warm air and heavy precipitation led to an unusually rapid melting of the
snow masses. Due to the spring weather with high precipitation (northwest weather
conditions), the soils of the lower-lying parts of the river basin are also saturated, so that there
is large-area, exceptionally high runoff near the surface, which is fed to the receiving waters
without delay.
2.4. intensity, duration and course
How strong is the event?

Floods occur at most gauges along the affected rivers, the frequency of which corresponds
to HQ200are equivalent to. The levels often reach or exceed the HQ markExtreme. Due to the
severity of the individual events, but also the overall situation, a situation of nationwide
relevance is developing.
How long does the event and/or its direct effects last? Elevated levels occur
over a period of a good two months.
How long after the start/occurrence of the event should be taken into account when
determining the extent of the damage?
Immediate damage occurs during the event, so here a little over two months is to be
considered. Clean-up work, repairs and the economic recovery of affected companies will take
longer, but this is not taken into account in the risk analysis.
How is the event going?

The levels rise rapidly at the end of January and reach a peak for the first time after just under a
week. After that, the levels drop again. However, they do not reach their normal values before
they start to rise again. After reaching the second peak, the levels decrease continuously until
they are back to their average level after a total of two months. The course described here in two
tidal waves takes place on all affected rivers. There are differences in terms of characteristics: in
some places the first wave is the larger, in some places the second. In other cases, both waves
have the same intensity.
The design flood, on which the flood protection facilities were based, is exceeded in many
places. Dykes and sheet piling are flooded beyond that
some dykes are damaged by the water masses overflowing them. Even where the water level
does not exceed the height of the flood protection facilities, the exceptionally long duration of
the event means that dykes are washed away, dyke softening and other damage to structural
flood protection measures, which leads to the failure of these facilities in some places. It also
floods those areas of the hinterland that would be protected during normal flood events.
Against this background, the maximum floodable space is estimatedwithoutconsideration of
these institutions.5
Figure 1 shows the course of the discharge for exemplary gauges:
Illustration 1: Daily values of the normalized runoff for the synthetic flood scenario at a representative
level for each river basin.6
5As a study carried out by the BfG shows, the Czech dams had an impact during the
Elbe floods in 2002 had a significantly relieving effect on the flood situation in Germany as well. Without
the retention of these dams, the record water level of 9.40 m measured in Dresden would have been 72
cm higher (cf. BfG (2012). The present scenario does not take into account the protective effect of dams, as
this would not take certain uncertainties into account: see above the actual retention capacity depends on
the existing water level at the dams, which cannot be predicted within the framework of the risk analysis.
dw the scenario considers several other large rivers for which no studies are available regarding the
retention effects of existing dams in extreme events that have actually occurred.
6The ratio of the calculated discharge to that for the respective gauge was used for standardization
estimated extreme flood peak value (HQ200). The HQ200 corresponds to a peak value which, based on a
statistical analysis of extreme values, is expected to occur on average once every 200 years
In summary, it can be said that with regard to the following characteristics, this is an equally
extraordinary and plausible flood event:
- Peak values (HQ200and HQExtreme)
- Duration (2 waves, ~ 2 months)
- Spatial coverage (almost all river basins are affected).
2.5. Predictability/Forewarning/Communication
Is the event expected?

The event is predictable by weather forecasts in conjunction with the hydrological forecasting
systems. The first signs that lead to the issuance of an early warning are available ten days
before the start of the first wave. However, the early warning is associated with relatively large
uncertainties, so that this alone does not justify any measures. Three days before the rapid rise
in water levels, the forecasts are sufficiently accurate to take concrete action. However, an exact
prediction of the expected level heights is not possible for all areas.
In the upper reaches of the river, especially on the smaller rivers and streams that flow into the
main streams, the flood can start much earlier than at the gauges further along the river, which
shortens the warning time. Due to the low temperatures, there is occasional ice formation. Ice
floes that have been swept away, ships and boats that have been swept away and other flotsam
(tree trunks, rubbish, etc.) not only pose a danger to buildings, bridges and flood protection
facilities, but also form artificial dams at some water bottlenecks where water accumulates. The
breaching of these barriers releases large amounts of additional water within a very short time.
The advance warning time for the areas immediately downstream is very short in these cases.
This makes it difficult to accurately forecast the areas in question.
The onset of the second flood wave, like that of the first wave, is predicted with a
three-day warning period.
becomes. The normalization directly allows the classification of the synthetic flood scenario with regard
to the extreme behavior and a comparability of the results between the river basins.
German Bundestag – 17th electoral term – 31 – printed matter17/12051
The flood intelligence services of the countries7evaluate the available hydrological and
meteorological data, issue flood warnings and create needs-based information (status
reports, maps, etc.). Figure 2 illustrates the process:
Figure 2: Schematic representation of the flood notification and warning service (source: HAD, 2003).
To what extent can the authorities prepare for the event?

In principle, the authorities can prepare for the event on the basis of the existing warning and
alarm plans. However, uncertainties in the forecasting process occasionally lead to
misinterpretations and incorrect actions by the forecasting services and decision-makers. In
general, official action also depends on corresponding experience with flood events.
7See: Transnational flood portal, a joint initiative of the German

Federal stateshttp://www.hochwasserzentralen.de/
Can the population prepare for the event?

The scenario is based on the assumption that the population is informed promptly, adequately
and consistently. Special information and instructions are communicated via various media
(television, radio, internet, press), if necessary in acute cases also via announcements by the
emergency services. Orders for evacuations are also communicated in good time where
necessary, with the majority of the population being reached.
Due to the early warning and continuous communication of the forecasts, most of the
population can prepare for the event. Especially in the areas close to the river, many residents
are sensitized through personal experiences with flood events, in connection with the long-
lasting, high-precipitation overall weather situation, the reports about snowmelt and the
general weather forecasts and flood warnings. Where risk communication has already taken
place successfully in the course of prevention (information about general flood hazards,
recommendations for action, e.g. through residents' meetings or official brochures), the
information is quickly recorded and processed correctly. Where this has not been done in
recent years,
Overall, however, the official warnings do not reach the entire population, so that not all
affected persons are equally informed and sensitized in advance. Socio-cultural and
demographic aspects also play an important role here (e.g. language skills, cultural
background). It is true that the sensitization, the perception of personal danger and the
personal preparation for dealing with a possible flood event decrease with increasing living
distance from the river courses.
2.6. Regulatory Actions
The municipal authorities in the affected areas take timely measures to prevent or reduce
damage to people, animals, the environment and property caused by floods, based on existing
plans for flood risk management, alarm and action plans and past experience. This also
includes informing the population about precautionary flood protection and warnings in the
event of a hazard. The first measures include closing dike gates, erecting mobile sheet piling
and other flood protection measures (e.g. building footbridges, blocking roads, preparing
sandbags).
With rising levels and the expected long-lasting, high water levels, securing the dykes is of
particular importance, which necessitates the increased use of the local fire brigade, the
Technical Relief Agency (THW) and other forces (e.g. volunteers). Crisis and management staffs
are convened at an early stage and take over the management and coordination of all
measures. In areas at risk (e.g. where there is no structural flood protection), evacuation
measures are ordered, which the police, fire brigade and aid organizations are responsible for
carrying out. As soon as it can be foreseen that the safety of dikes and dams will be
compromised due to undermining, Soaking and the physical loads can no longer be
guaranteed across the board or as soon as other circumstances justify the decision, a disaster
alarm is triggered in the affected areas. Increasingly, emergency services and material
(especially sandbags) are being requested from neighboring communities and districts that are
not affected.
Due to the rapidly deteriorating situation, evacuations will be extended as the event unfolds. People who want to evade the evacuation, who are helpless or who have not been reached by official orders
are brought to safety by the police. Where self-sufficiency is no longer possible in slightly or partially flooded residential areas, the care of those affected is ensured by auxiliary workers. By way of
administrative assistance, the Federal Police, other THW forces and the Federal Armed Forces are requested to provide support in particularly hard-hit areas. Air transport is also used to bring personnel,
equipment and relief supplies to operational areas or to support rescue measures. Crisis teams at country level help coordinate operations. The joint reporting and situation center (GMLZ) of the federal
and state governments provides situation reports and provides bottleneck resources at the request of the states. After just a few days, emergency services from all over Germany are constantly on the
job. With the increasing flooding of existing dikes and dams, protection and safety measures in the hinterland that have not been affected until now are becoming necessary. Furthermore, a focus is
placed on the protection and security measures of critical infrastructure systems in the affected areas. In order to relieve the German units and to ensure a sufficient supply of material (especially
sandbags), bilateral assistance agreements and the Monitoring and Information Center (MIC), within the framework of the EU After just a few days, emergency services from all over Germany are
constantly on the job. With the increasing flooding of existing dikes and dams, protection and safety measures in the hinterland that have not been affected until now are becoming necessary.
Furthermore, a focus is placed on the protection and security measures of critical infrastructure systems in the affected areas. In order to relieve the German units and to ensure a sufficient supply of
material (especially sandbags), bilateral assistance agreements and the Monitoring and Information Center (MIC), within the framework of the EU After just a few days, emergency services from all over
Germany are constantly on the job. With the increasing flooding of existing dikes and dams, protection and safety measures in the hinterland that have not been affected until now are becoming
necessary. Furthermore, a focus is placed on the protection and security measures of critical infrastructure systems in the affected areas. In order to relieve the German units and to ensure a sufficient
supply of material (especially sandbags), bilateral assistance agreements and the Monitoring and Information Center (MIC), within the framework of the EU Furthermore, a focus is placed on the
protection and security measures of critical infrastructure systems in the affected areas. In order to relieve the German units and to ensure a sufficient supply of material (especially sandbags), bilateral
assistance agreements and the Monitoring and Information Center (MIC), within the framework of the EU Furthermore, a focus is placed on the protection and security measures of critical infrastructure
systems in the affected areas. In order to relieve the German units and to ensure a sufficient supply of material (especially sandbags), bilateral assistance agreements and the Monitoring and
Information Center (MIC), within the framework of the EU
Community procedure for civil protection, forces from other (EU) states requested. The integration
of foreign forces at the local level takes place at an early stage within the framework of the bilateral
agreements.
3. Impact on KRITIS/Supply
preliminary remark:
The critical infrastructures listed below are complex systems upon which a variety of utility
functions depend. In principle, it can be assumed that the impairment of individual
infrastructure sectors and branches will also have an impact on other infrastructures and their
supply services.8thThis circumstance cannot be shown here in its complexity. Since the risk
analysis is carried out from the overriding perspective of the federal government, the expected
effects on the area of KRITIS/care are presented below in a generalised, qualitative way.
Significant interdependencies are discussed in the explanations for the individual sectors.9
The basic assumption for the flood event described in this scenario is that the population of
the areas particularly hard hit by the flooding, in which a failure of the supply can also be
assumed, will be evacuated. As a result, the supply does not necessarily have to be
maintained within these areas.
ENERGY sector
industry Explanations
In the immediate flood area, the electricity is shut off for safety reasons or
fails due to disruptions in the local distribution network.
In the vicinity of the flooded areas, the power supply fails at the distribution
grid level; continued operation of the transmission grids is still possible.
Temporary power cuts will affect people who are not evacuated.
X electricity
River hydroelectric power plants are shut down and therefore no longer
supply electricity. Nuclear, coal, gas, petroleum and biomass power plants
are often located near large rivers to facilitate the supply of cooling water. In
some cases, penetrating water has a negative impact on power generation.
Power plants that are in regular operation
8thWith a view to the danger of "flooding", for example, the failure of IT/TK systems can remedy the situation
impede/delay disruptions in other areas and also affect the crisis management of the authorities.
Disruptions to transportation and traffic infrastructure can impede the accessibility of other utilities for
personnel and suppliers and require alternative solutions.
9Thisis based on justified assumptions and expert assessments. For quantitative statements
additional, more in-depth analyzes would be necessary, which would also have to take into account the
complexity of the variously intertwined infrastructures. Correspondingly detailed background information
is not available at federal level for many areas due to responsibilities.
Fuels supplied by rivers can often not be supplied to a sufficient extent via
land routes. Since inland shipping has to be stopped during high water, the
supply to coal-fired power plants, for example, is interrupted. Shore-side
supply and recourse to the power plant's own bunker reserves cannot
compensate for this interruption over the full period of the event.
If power bottlenecks become apparent in the interconnected grid, these can

be partially offset by increasing the feed-in from other, unaffected power
plants and via the Europe-wide interconnected grid. In addition, the grid
operator can take control measures that have a stabilizing effect on the entire
grid (e.g. the electricity could be switched off for a few hours alternately in the
individual regions).Against this background, long-lasting, large-scale power
outages are not expected.10
Thermal power stations are also affected, so that failure of district heating networks is to
be expected.
Gas pipelines continue to function, only in the immediately flooded area are
the local distribution networks shut down for safety reasons. Locally, there
is damage to the gas supply (damage/destruction of the network,
distribution stations and connections due to flushing of underground pipes,
X gas water ingress via unsecured house connections, direct water impact on
pipes attached to bridges, etc.), some of which have to be repaired at great
expense after the flooding has subsided Need to become. Temporary gas
supply restrictions will affect people who are not evacuated.
Petroleum (derivative) pipelines continue to function. The supply of crude oil

(derivatives) via inland shipping is disrupted. The same applies to road and
X mineral oil rail-bound supply, as traffic routes near the banks are flooded. Since the
supply of emergency services and power plants is given priority, it comes to
gas stations
10In addition to the risk of a power failure due to the failure of infrastructure components, a flood could also
pose a risk to the population from individual power supply infrastructures. In particular, the risk from
nuclear power plants in the flood area should be examined in this context. This was done as part of the EU
stress test and the Reactor Safety Commission safety review conducted after the Fukushima incident. It was
determined that all nuclear power plants in Germany would withstand floods with a return interval of at
least 10,000 years. Thus, accidents are not to be feared in the event of a 200-year flood event in nuclear
power plants in Germany (cf.: EU Stress Test - National Report of Germany, BMU 2011),
Reactor Safety Commission of May 17, 2011, Office for Nuclear Safety 2011, Assessment of the
plant-specific safety review (RSK-SÜ) of German nuclear power plants by the Reactor Safety
Commission (RSK) of May 16, 2011, Greenpeace 2011).
bottlenecks, but not across the board.
Should major bottlenecks occur due to the failure of important refineries,

there is the possibility, due to the special
fall back on the strategic reserves in an exceptional situation, which would
ensure the supply again.
INFORMATION AND TELECOMMUNICATIONS Sector
In the immediately flooded areas, there can be problems with the wired
telephone network due to a local power failure or the direct ingress of water
into infrastructure components. Telephone communication is also disrupted in
areas where the wired telephone network is still working but no longer has a
power supply (in many cases ISDN connections, charging stations for cordless
telephones, VoIP, etc.). In addition, as a result of local power outages caused
by the flooding, some base stations in the mobile network fail. Due to the
failures, there is no mobile phone coverage in some areas of the flooded areas
X telecommunications
or the power failure. At the same time, heavy use of mobile phone networks in
the affected areas is to be expected.
It can be assumed that the telecommunications service providers have not

installed any vital, non-redundant facilities in the flooded area, the failure
of which could affect the entire system. As a result, there are only isolated
failures.
X information technology See telecommunications
Sector TRANSPORT AND TRANSPORT11
Of the international and regional airports in Germany, parts of Frankfurt am

Main and Düsseldorf are in the flood zone. Bremen Airport is completely in the
flood zone. Of the regional airports, Karlsruhe/Baden-Baden is affected.
X aviation
Against this background, restrictions are to be expected, but from the federal
point of view no serious effects on air traffic are to be expected.
11Itcan be assumed that the flood event described in the scenario will be serious
Has an impact on the entire "transport and traffic" sector, especially where inland waterway,
rail and road traffic are canceled at the same time.
Airports are largely supplied with fuel via pipelines, and serious restrictions
on air traffic due to fuel shortages are not to be expected. However, there
may be repercussions if people and/or cargo can no longer reach or leave the
airports via land-based transport routes, or can only do so under difficult
conditions.
Maritime shipping is affected to the extent that goods cannot be

X maritime shipping
delivered to or removed from seaports
Commercial inland waterway traffic will be suspended on all affected

rivers. Ships are moored at the berths and ports. It is to be expected that
damage to port facilities,
traffic water management structures and ships. As a result, some ships
and parts of port facilities are still out of service after the flood.
X inland shipping Impairments to the transport infrastructure in the hinterland also have an
indirect effect on inland navigation. For example, goods can no longer be
transported away regularly in some large inland ports.
In addition to its importance for the energy and food industries, inland
waterway transport is also of great importance for logistics and other areas,
so that considerable effects can be expected here.
Railway lines in the flood area are impassable because they are flooded or
threatened by undermining. This leads to the cancellation of a large number of
rail connections and poses immense challenges to overall scheduling,
especially since some of the losses in inland waterway transport have to be
compensated for by rail. In general, the dispatching of goods flows via rail is
more complicated than via road.
X rail transport The Rhine axis is of particular importance. Since rail traffic along the Rhine is at
a standstill and a shift to alternative routes is not possible or only possible to a
limited extent, the north-south transport of goods and people is only possible
by road.
In particular, the failure of transshipment stations for combined

(sometimes trimodal) transport will have a significant impact on the areas
of logistics and freight transport.
Roads in the flood area are impassable, as are some tunnels under the rivers.
Numerous federal motorways, country and district roads are also partially
X road traffic affected. A considerable amount of additional traffic is to be expected on
alternative routes, especially since these also account for part of the failures in
rail traffic (cf. the problem of the Rhine axis) and
have to compensate in inland shipping. In addition to the increase in

general car and truck traffic, there is also an increase in dangerous goods
and heavy goods traffic.
Logistics centers (which serve both as a depot for trucks and, more
specifically, as transhipment points for goods) in the flood area (e.g. at
inland ports) are no longer available. Trucks and goods can be evacuated to
alternative areas. The problems in ship, road and rail transport have a direct
impact on logistics companies and the transport of goods. Scheduling road
freight traffic is becoming increasingly difficult as demand for trucks is likely
X logistics
to be high and delays due to congestion are likely to be significant. At the
same time, however, it can be assumed that the volume of goods will not
reach the usual level due to the loss of production facilities and businesses
in the flooded area. The effects of the delays and failures can still be felt in a
wide variety of areas.
HEALTH Sector
In the flooded areas, which also include some metropolitan areas, hospitals,
medical practices, retirement homes, etc. have to be evacuated or shut down.
At the same time, people who have previously been cared for or cared for at
home must be evacuated. Hospitals and retirement homes in unaffected
areas can accommodate the patients and residents to be evacuated. Where
necessary, patients whose hospital stay can be shortened can be discharged,
and non-essential operations can be postponed. If specialized hospitals or
departments of supra-regional importance (e.g. those for the treatment of
severe burn injuries) fail, an attempt is made to relocate material and
Medical
X specialists to find alternative options that are approximately the same in the
care
nearest,
An additional burden on the healthcare system from outbreaks of epidemics is

not to be expected. In particular, the occurrence of epidemics due to
decomposing animal carcasses is almost impossible, since it is not assumed
that the number of carcasses is particularly high, only a few pathogens can be
considered, the temperatures are low and people keep their distance from the
carcasses.
Pharmaceutical production facilities located in the flooded area have to shut

medicines and
X down their operations. Does this also affect companies that play a key role in
vaccines
the production of certain medicines and/or
If you take the basic steps for this, it may not be possible to procure them
from other manufacturers in Germany or abroad. Pharmacies only have
limited stocks, so that temporary supply bottlenecks are also to be expected
in the affected regions.
See “Medicines”. Some laboratories in the flooded areas have had to stop
working.
X laboratories
Depending on the field of activity of the laboratory, this can result in additional
dangers for the population and the environment.
WATER sector
For the following reasons, the mains-connected drinking water supply is

locally impaired in the flooded areas and partly also beyond and sometimes
even has to be stopped12:
- The entry of remobilized pollutants or those released as a result of the

flooding of factories, businesses, workshops, but also pathogens (e.g.
from sewage disposal plants) into water protection areas leads to
impairments of the raw water quality. This causes problems in the
treatment process. This is to be expected in particular for water supply
systems that are fed from surface water. Supply areas that are fed from
public Water-
X groundwater are less affected here.
care
- In addition to failures due to water hygiene problems, infrastructure

components of the drinking water supply fail (either due to water ingress,
secondary effects such as power failure or inaccessibility or physical
damage to parts of the pipe network).
Where the mains-connected water supply fails, part of the water requirement
(drinking, industrial, rinsing water) can be covered by non-mains-connected
supply (e.g. by THW).
Flooding of the sewer system, causing pipes to overflow, as well as the

failure or flooding of sewage treatment plants allow large quantities of
public Sewage-
X untreated wastewater to escape into the environment. People who come
elimination
into contact with this water can become ill.
12When the Elbe/Danube flooded, the line-free backup supply was at its limits
Performance, cf. Wricke 2003.
Due to damage or clogging of sewage pipes, sewage disposal cannot be

maintained everywhere. Where the drinking water supply has to be cut off,
the transport of waste water is also affected. In particular, the transport of
faeces from domestic wastewater is an interruption of the
Drinking water supply is a serious problem. In the sewage network itself, due to
the large proportion of external water (which can account for half of the planned
proportion of wastewater), wastewater transport can still be guaranteed
The failure of some pumping and lifting stations (due to

overloading/damage or power failure) means that the removal
of the waste water fails in some sections.
NUTRITION sector
In the food production sector, there is a particularly strong dependency on the

availability of transport and communication services. Production facilities in
the flooded area have to stop working. This also affects some large mills. This
means that logistics are of particular importance. Since just-in-time production
is also often used in the food and animal feed industry, it is particularly
dependent on a functioning transport network. The transport of perishable
foodstuffs for sale or further processing in particular, but also the transport of
foodstuffs that have a longer shelf life, is timed with pinpoint accuracy, and
long distances often have to be covered. If it becomes apparent that the
interruptions in the operational process are becoming too great, Transport
nutritional prioritizations are made. The event has a noticeable impact on the supply of
X
business the population with individual products.
30% of the grain milling capacity is affected by the flood.13

From the third week onwards, nationwide supply bottlenecks for flour and
thus also for baked goods and pasta are to be expected. Especially to the east
of the Elbe, the problems quickly increase and from the 5th week less than
50% of the usual amount of flour products are available.
The nationwide supply of food is nevertheless largely secured.
13Seed processing companies such as mills and compound feed companies usually have stocks of
Raw materials originating in Europe take two to four weeks and those originating from overseas four to eight
weeks.
After 3 weeks there are significant restrictions on the provision of feed. The
most important oil mills are located in the flood area and with the cessation
of the processing of oilseeds, the supply of the compound feed plants with
protein sources collapses. Since many of the large compound feed plants are
located on waterways and import goods via inland waterway vessels, they will
no longer be able to supply complete feed. Livestock farmers in north-west
Germany will be hardest hit, as this is where the largest animal populations
are and the supplying feed plants. This has an impact on milk, meat and egg
production and, in addition to the significant reduction in supply for
consumers, will have lasting negative economic effects for the entire
economic sector.
In the food retail sector, there is a particularly strong dependency on the

availability of transport and communication services. The food trade in the
evacuation area is closed. With such a long event period, it is to be expected
that the retail chains themselves will set up some alternative bases. In some
places, central offices for emergency care have to be set up, and in some cases
emergency services have to care for people directly in their homes. The effects
of the flood are also noticeable in the rest of the flooded area, since the
X grocery store
distribution of the finished products to wholesalers and food retailers faces the
same challenges as the transport of the primary products.
Since there are no concrete statements about the obstructions in the

transport system, the effects on the food trade cannot be estimated.
FINANCIAL AND INSURANCE Sector
The banks in the flooded area close or are difficult to reach. Contingency
measures by the banks should only include the orderly shutdown of the site
and the backup of the data, since no alternative sites can be set up for banks.
X banks
Banks in the adjacent area that are not affected can, however, be increased in
terms of staff. There will be no impact on the nationwide banking system.
X exchanges The exchanges continue to operate without restrictions.
X insurances Insurance companies only face challenges after the event

(of a financial nature), branches only have to be closed in the

flooded areas.
financial service providers Financial service providers continue to operate, branches only have to
X
be closed in the flooded areas.
GOVERNMENT AND ADMINISTRATION Sector
Government institutions and administrative authorities in the flood area have

to move into emergency quarters because the power supply, and in many
government and
X cases immediate accessibility, cannot be guaranteed. Since the majority of the
Administration
files cannot be moved but only backed up, more complex, non-urgent
processes are put on hold.
The Bundestag and state parliaments continue to work without restrictions, if necessary
X houses of Parliament
in alternative quarters.
Judicial institutions continue to function like government and administration.

Correctional facilities located in the flood area will be evacuated. Where
X judicial institutions distribution to other prisons is not possible, but the facility can be effectively
protected against flooding, the facility will continue to operate.
Police, fire brigade, THW, civil protection and rescue services are constantly on
duty. Since local forces are not sufficient to carry out flood protection
measures, evacuations, transfer trips, supply tasks, etc., units from all over
Germany are transferred to the affected areas. In particular, the evacuation of
affected hospitals, retirement homes and other facilities ties up patient
transport capacities in the first few days (warning time: 2 - 3 days), since
destinations that are further away also have to be headed for. The need is so
great that only a minimum of staff, vehicles and equipment remains in the
unaffected areas. The basic supply remains guaranteed everywhere. In
emergency/rescue
individual cases, the assistance deadlines are exceeded. There would only be
X essence incl.
major restrictions when dealing with major disasters. Bundeswehr units are
civil protection
used in support, but on a large scale.
Flooded buildings, equipment in these buildings and technical facilities in the

flooded area, such as converters for the BOS radio, are not available. Rescuers
deployed in the flooded area are at risk from contaminated water. The
corresponding protective measures are taken against this. Nevertheless, some
helpers get sick.
Sector MEDIA AND CULTURE
There are no significant restrictions in the media sector. Branches in the

flooded area have had to stop their work, but the supply of media services to
broadcast
the majority of the population is maintained. In the flooded areas that did
(TV and
not have to be evacuated, television, internet and radio are probably not
X radio), printed
available across the board, mainly due to the failure of electricity-dependent
and electronic
devices. It will also not be possible to deliver newspapers everywhere.
Press
symbolic Symbolic buildings in the flood area can be massively and permanently
X
buildings damaged or destroyed.
4. Protected goods affected
Which protected goods are directly/indirectly affected by the event? Note: At this point, it
is generally recorded for which protected goods effects/damage are to be expected from the
event and from the failure of critical infrastructures. The actual extent of damage is
determined in a separate step of the risk analysis.
Effects on the protected asset PEOPLE:
dead (M1):
Deaths are to be expected. If appropriate evacuations take place, a significantly lower number
of deaths can be expected than in the case of inadequate evacuations or sudden dyke breaches
or similar. People die e.g. B. during attempted rescue operations or when trying to recover
objects from basements.
Injured/sick (M2)14:
Injuries are to be expected. If adequate evacuations take place, a significantly lower number of
injuries is to be expected than in the case of inadequate evacuations or sudden dyke breaches or
similar. Diseases may occur in connection with water hygiene aspects and possible
consequences.
needy (M3):
A large number of people in need of help are to be expected who need to be cared for (e.g. due
to the evacuation of communities along a river), often over a longer period of time. It can be
assumed that emergency shelters will have to be set up and maintained. Evacuations from
hospitals, retirement homes, etc. are also allowed here. take into account.
Impairments in water hygiene can also lead to a need for help.
Missing (M4):
Missing persons are to be expected in the short term.
14Sewage treatment plants and municipal sewage systems, but also farms, fattening farms and liquid
manure tanks are flooded and partially damaged by the flooding. Human and animal excretions enter the
environment untreated, untreated and in large quantities. This contains microorganisms and viruses that
can be dangerous to people in different ways, also depending on their physical condition (previous illnesses,
injuries). Examples of pathogens that can cause potentially serious diseases are Escherichia coli and
salmonella. Staying in the vicinity of the facilities that can release microorganisms should therefore be
avoided, emergency personnel must work with the appropriate caution. Due to the high dilution effect of the
water masses and the low water temperature, the concentration of the pathogens and thus the risk of
disease decreases with increasing distance from the source of the release. It is also possible to reduce the
number of pathogens before the flooding by means of improvised disinfection (e.g. by adding chlorine or
lime). The carcasses of dead animals can also be dangerous to human health, even if the risk in Germany is
significantly lower than in other countries or climate zones - many pathogens do not usually occur in
Germany. Here, too, the dilution effect and the low temperatures have a positive effect, so that there is only
an immediate risk of infection in the vicinity of the carcasses - but the population instinctively avoids this
proximity. Nonetheless, the disposal of the carcasses must start as soon as possible.
If water areas from which the drinking water supply is fed are located at a short distance from the pathogen
sources and downstream of them, it must be checked whether the drinking water obtained is harmless to
health. In many places, the drinking water supply has to be restricted. Where drinking water is extracted
from the groundwater, the filtration effect of the soil layers is usually sufficient to ensure the safety of the
water, but investigations are also necessary here. When the Elbe/Danube flooded in 2002, no increased
disease rates were registered among the people affected, but a clear contamination of some cellars with
multi-resistant bacteria was noticeable. This shows how effective and at the same time necessary the
observance of hygiene and precautionary measures is.
Effects on the protected asset ENVIRONMENT15:
Damage to protected area (U1):

Soil erosion, uprooting of vegetation, flooding, siltation and the introduction of pollutants
are to be expected. Near-natural floodplain landscapes are best able to compensate for the
damaging effects of flooding.
Damage to surface water/groundwater (U2):

Pollutant entry into surface water and groundwater is possible (e.g. from heating oil tanks, storage
facilities, remobilized contaminated sediments).
Damage to forest areas (U3):

Soil erosion, uprooting of vegetation, flooding, silting and the entry of pollutants can
occur.
Damage to agricultural land (U4):

Damage to agricultural land due to soil erosion, uprooting of vegetation, flooding,
siltation and the introduction of pollutants must be expected.
15It is to be expected that the flood event assumed here will release pollutants in not inconsiderable quantities and get into the environment (water, soil, flora and fauna) (cf. UFZ -
Umweltforschungszentrum Leipzig-Halle GmbH, Pollutant load after the Elbe flood 2002, Magdeburg 2005). This can have different causes, e.g. B. by insufficiently secured chemical plants in the flood
area, but also (and this with a very high probability) by the flooding of private properties and other companies that are not primarily assigned to the chemical industry, since dangerous substances are
also stored here (paints, varnishes, thinners, Solvents, adhesives, synthetic resins, fertilizers, pesticides, motor vehicle operating materials, fuel, batteries, etc.). During the Elbe/Danube flood in 2002,
heating oil tanks that were floating and leaking in particular posed a burden on the environment. In addition, the re-mobilization of pollutants from already settled sediments and contaminated soil is to
be expected. The substances not only pose a danger to the environment, but also to the people who stay in the area or who return to the area after the flood. After the Elbe/Danube floods, several
buildings had to be demolished whose masonry was contaminated with pollutants. Even radioactive substances could, albeit to a small extent, pose a certain risk potential. They are used not only in
nuclear power plants, but also in In addition, the re-mobilization of pollutants from already settled sediments and polluted soils is to be expected. The substances not only pose a danger to the
environment, but also to the people who stay in the area or who return to the area after the flood. After the Elbe/Danube floods, several buildings had to be demolished whose masonry was
contaminated with pollutants. Even radioactive substances could, albeit to a small extent, pose a certain risk potential. They are used not only in nuclear power plants, but also in In addition, the re-
mobilization of pollutants from already settled sediments and polluted soils is to be expected. The substances not only pose a danger to the environment, but also to the people who stay in the area or
who return to the area after the flood. After the Elbe/Danube floods, several buildings had to be demolished whose masonry was contaminated with pollutants. Even radioactive substances could, albeit
to a small extent, pose a certain risk potential. They are used not only in nuclear power plants, but also in return to the area after the flood. After the Elbe/Danube floods, several buildings had to be
demolished whose masonry was contaminated with pollutants. Even radioactive substances could, albeit to a small extent, pose a certain risk potential. They are used not only in nuclear power plants,
but also in return to the area after the flood. After the Elbe/Danube floods, several buildings had to be demolished whose masonry was contaminated with pollutants. Even radioactive substances could,
albeit to a small extent, pose a certain risk potential. They are used not only in nuclear power plants, but also in
radiation medical facilities, disinfection systems for food, medical equipment and blood, research facilities,
etc., so that the safety of the substances must be guaranteed during the entire event - also and especially
when the surrounding infrastructure is destroyed. If, in the event of a flood, large quantities of particularly
dangerous pollutants were to escape from industrial plants, this would have potentially catastrophic
consequential damage, and there would also be considerable additional problems in dealing with the
general flood situation (need for additional evacuations, high risk for those remaining in the area or
deployed downstream). emergency services).
Harm to livestock (U5):

In some cases livestock may be harmed.
Effects on the protected asset ECONOMY:
public hand (v1):

Damage to buildings in the flooded area (particularly in basements and lower floors) and to
infrastructure (e.g. bridges) is to be expected. In particular, the reconstruction of state-owned
facilities (rail network, roads, bridges, buildings) and reconstruction aid for private individuals (cf.
total damage from the Elbe/Danube floods in 2002: approx. €11.4 billion) are expected to cost
the public sector significant amounts. Tax losses due to significant production losses are to be
expected. In addition, costs for the repair of protective structures (e.g. dykes) and systems for
inland shipping (e.g. locks, pumping stations) must be expected. In addition, there are also costs
for the deployment, the funds used and the loss of work of the volunteer helpers.
private economy (v2):

Damage to operating sites in the flooded area is to be expected (storage sites, inland ports, etc.).
Corresponding losses in economic performance due to the flooding of companies, production
facilities and commercial areas are also to be expected. In addition, fewer tourists are expected
in the affected areas for some time. Bankruptcies and layoffs are possible.
private households (v3):
Damage to residential buildings in the flooded area is to be expected (especially in basements and lower
floors). It can be assumed that a large number of private households will be affected, some of whom will
not be able to bear the costs of reconstruction themselves.
Effects on the protected asset INTANGIBLE:
Public safety and order (I1):

Effects on public safety and order are to be expected. Example: Police forces must set up/guard
barriers and also show a minimum presence in evacuated areas in order to reduce the number
of possible break-ins or to be able to intervene quickly if disoriented people endanger
themselves.
Political implications (I2):

During the entire situation, a high level of national and international public interest is to be
expected, both in the event/damage and in crisis management. The responsible politicians
and officials are expected to act quickly and effectively and communicate openly and
transparently. It is also conceivable that the question will arise as to whether better
preparation would have been possible, also with regard to better area management in the
river regions (retention areas, etc.). Whether there are calls for his resignation will depend in
particular on the crisis management and crisis communication of those responsible in politics
and administration.
Psychological effects (I3):

It can be assumed that actual and potential concern has different consequences for the behavior
of the population. Furthermore, it can be assumed that a - not yet there
– Extreme events have different psychological effects than regularly occurring/known flood
events. If necessary, significant psychological effects are to be expected (long-term effects). The
basic problem of an often lacking awareness of dangers/risks in the population may also play a
role here (“comprehensive insurance mentality”). The psychological impact is likely to peak in the
final stages of the event rather than during its genesis.
Damage to cultural property (I4):
Damage to cultural property that cannot be evacuated is to be expected.
5. Reference Events
The level system in Germany has existed for around 200 years. For this period of time, the flood
events that occurred can be quantified, at least for the larger rivers in Germany, and can also be
interpreted together with meteorological observation series with regard to the different flood
genera. Since floods have always been associated with enormous damage, there are also
numerous written records and water level marks from the pre-instrumental period that allow
flood events, e.g. T. to the year 1000 AD to reconstruct. All of this information indicates that of
the various flood genera- tions such as convective rain, prolonged rain, ice jams and snowmelt,
the latter has the greatest potential to affect several river basins simultaneously.
From pre-industrial times, the floods of February/March 1595 and 1655, February-April 1709,
February/March 1784 and 1799 should be mentioned here. Almost all of these events were
The Danube, Rhine, Elbe and Oder river basins were affected, although the Weser was not represented in
this analysis.
From the time period of the instrument measurements, the flood events of March 1845, 1876, 1947, 1956, 1970,
1988, 2001, 2006 as well as January/February 1995 and December/January 2011 could be assigned to the flood
genesis of snowmelt in connection with long-lasting precipitation. Of these events, the flood of 1845 is of great
importance, since floods with an annual frequency of 200 years (HQ200) were reached or exceeded in the Main,
Weser and Elbe areas. A HQ50 and higher can be assigned to this HW event in the Rhine area, and thus reaches the
magnitude of the floods of 1993 and 1995. In this context, the winters of 1978/79 and 2010/11 should also be
mentioned, which were not characterized by extreme mark floods, which, however, stand out from the other
winters due to a particularly high snow cover build-up in Germany. Another extreme snowy winter of 1998/99 in the
Alpine region led to extreme flooding in the Danube, High and Upper Rhine areas in May 1999. The snowy winter of
2005/2006 led to a major event and corresponding damage, primarily in the Elbe area. In the lower reaches of the
Elbe, the HQ50 was almost reached. This event is one of the largest floods of the last century in this section of the
Elbe. In the lower reaches of the Elbe, the HQ50 was almost reached. This event is one of the largest floods of the
last century in this section of the Elbe. In the lower reaches of the Elbe, the HQ50 was almost reached. This event is
one of the largest floods of the last century in this section of the Elbe.
The so-called ice floods also represent a particular risk potential. It is known from the pre-
instrumental period that this type of flood can also occur in river basins in the western parts of
Germany. After a long phase without such floods, the severe winter of 1996/97 caused such an
event in the Moselle region. In January 2011 there was also a risk of ice flooding in the Oder
region. The power that the Eis-Oder can develop was observed at the Lower Oder Valley
National Park, where the dyke tops were literally “shaved off” in two sections over a total of 200
meters. There are also reports of dykes being peeled off by ice on the Elbe during the January
2003 flood.
Extreme flood events can also occur in summer. The potential to affect several river basins can
be attributed to the meteorological event "Low-pressure area on the railway track Vb". The so-
called Magdalenen flood of July 1342, which affected large parts of the Danube, Elbe and Weser
areas, must be regarded as an extraordinary extreme from the pre-instrumental period. water
level marks and
Discharge reconstructions show that an HQ200 and, in many places, an HQExtreme occurred in
many sections of the river. The floods of July 1997 (Oder), August 2002 (Danube and Elbe),
August 2005 (Danube and High Rhine), August 2010 (Spree and Neisse) can also be attributed to
this flood genesis. In addition, inland floods and storm surges from the sea can overlap in the
coastal area (there was such a case in the Elbe on February 4th/5th, 2011), so that the water
levels
above the Geesthacht barrage are also increased due to storm surges.
The listed historical and recent flood events that have occurred in Germany form the
background and the starting point for creating the present flood scenario.
There are numerous reports from pre-industrial times to estimate the damage caused by flood
events. In particular, starting with the Rhine flood in 1993, there are increasing estimates of the
extent of the damage caused by the floods under the boundary conditions that apply today.
6. Literature/additional information
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2006.
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journal, issue 10/2002, pp. 577-603.
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for action. Berlin 1998.
Federal/state working group on water (LAWA), standing committee “Flood Protection and
Hydrology” of LAWA (AH): Recommendations for the preparation of
Flood hazard maps and flood risk maps. Decided at the 139th LAWA-VV on 25./26. March
2010 in Dresden.
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extreme hydrological events". BfG events. (in preparation)
Federal Institute for Hydrology (ed.): Hydrological principles to support risk analysis in civil
protection. BfG report BfG-1774. (in preparation)
Federal Ministry for the Environment, Nature Conservation and Nuclear Safety (ed.):
Hydrological Atlas of Germany. Berlin 2003.
Deutsch, M., Pörtge, K.-H. and Teltscher, H. (eds.): Contributions to flood/flood protection in
the past and present. In: Erfurt Geographical Studies, Issue 9/2000.
Deutsch, M. and Pörtge, K.-H.: Flood events in Thuringia. Jena 2002.
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Geographical Review, Issue 3/2010.
German-Dutch flood working group: Transboundary effects of extreme flooding on the

Lower Rhine. final report. Nijmegen 2004, p. 160.
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Lower Rhine. Sub-report extreme discharges from the Rhine catchment area. Nijmegen
2004, p. 141.
German Committee for Disaster Preparedness e. V. (DKKV) (ed.): Flood prevention in Germany.
Learning from the 2002 catastrophe in the Elbe region. Bonn 2003.
Dikau, R. and Pohl, J.: "Hazards". Natural hazards and natural hazards. In: Gebhardt, H. et al. (ed.):
Geography. Physical Geography and Human Geography. Munich 2007, pp. 1028-1076.
DWA: Determination of flood probabilities - Leaflet DWA-M552, 2012 (in print).
Engel, H.: The causes of the floods on the Rhine - natural or self-made? In: Immendorf,
R. (ed.): Flood. Nature in abundance? Heidelberg 1997.
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Symposium on Flood Risk Management Research (EFRM 2007), 6th
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Munich 2002.
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Heintz, MD and Pohl, J.: Acceptance and Implementation of the EC Flood Risk
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water management. Hydrology - hydraulic engineering - hydromechanics - bodies of water - ecology -
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2012.
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Dissertation, publication series Hydrology & Water Management of the Ruhr University
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Annex 4
Pandemic caused by virus
"Modi-SARS"
Status: 10.12.2012
Probability of occurrence:
Class C: conditionally probable

an event that statistically usually occurs once every 100 to 1,000
years
extent of damage:
extent of damage
protected goods damage parameter
A B C D E
M1 dead
M2 injured, sick
PERSON
M3 needy
M4 missing
u1 damage to protected areas
u2 Damage to surface water/groundwater
ENVIRONMENT u3 damage to forest areas
u4 Damage to agricultural land
u5 damage to livestock
V1 Effects on the public sector
FOLK
V2 Effects on the private economy
BUSINESS
V3 Impact on private households
I1 Effects on public safety and order
I2 Political Implications
IMMATERIAL
I3 Psychological Effects
I4 damage to cultural property

SCENARIO
1. Definition of the hazard/event type
A pandemic is the worldwide spread of a disease.
Unusual outbreaks of epidemics can have natural causes, e.g. e.g.:

Recurrence of known pathogens (measles, typhoid)
imported cases of diseases with rare highly contagious and/or highly pathogenic agents
(Ebola, Lassa fever)
Pandemics with variations of known pathogens (fluenza pandemic)
Occurrence of novel pathogens (Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome, SARS)
In exceptional cases, epidemics can also be traced back to accidental or intentional

release, e.g. e.g.:
Accidental release, for example due to a laboratory accident (as in isolated cases after the
SARS pandemic or the 1977 H1N1 influenza, the so-called "Russian flu", which was probably
the result of a laboratory release (Scholtissek et al., 1978; Zimmer and Burke, 2009) )
intentional release in the area of food blackmail or also with a bioterrorist background
(the best-known example here are the "anthrax letters" in the USA in 2001).
This scenario describes an exceptional epidemic that is based on the spread of a new type of
pathogen. The scenario is the although hypothetical pathogen "Modi-SARS"taken as a basis, the
properties of which are described in the information sheet (see appendix) and which is very
closely based on the SARS virus. The past has shown that pathogens with novel properties that
trigger a serious disease event can appear suddenly. (e.g. SARS coronavirus [CoV], H5N1
influenza virus, Chikungunya virus, HIV). A current example of an emerging pathogen is a
coronavirus (“novel coronavirus”), which is not closely related to SARS-CoV. This virus has been
detected in six patients since the summer of 2012, two of whom have died. One patient was
treated in Germany and was discharged as cured. In contrast to SARS-CoV, however, this virus
does not appear to be transmissible from person to person, or only very poorly. so that the
current risk assessment assumes that the risk of contracting the disease as a result of human-to-
human transmission is low (as of November 26, 2012). SARS-CoV and HIV were “new” to the
human population until then
unknown viruses with a high lethality, which for HIV could only be reduced after years and
extremely expensive research. In contrast, Chikungunya viruses and H5N1 viruses were already
known; However, properties changed by mutations led to better transmissibility of these viruses
to humans. SARS-CoV and H5N1 are transmitted via the respiratory tract, Chikungunya is
transmitted by a vector (mosquitoes). This makes these diseases more difficult to control than
HIV, which is transmitted through sexual intercourse or through contact with HIV-positive blood.
While HIV control has been relatively successful in Germany and other countries in Western
Europe or North America, this is not the case in many other countries with less good health
infrastructure - an indication that
2. Description of the event
The hypotheticalModi-SARSvirus is identical to the natural SARS-CoV in almost all properties. The
incubation period, i.e. the time from transmission of the virus to a person until the first
symptoms of the disease, is usually three to five days, but can range from two to 14 days.
Almost everyone who is infected also becomes ill. The symptoms are fever and a dry cough, the
majority of patients have shortness of breath, changes in the lungs visible on X-rays, chills,
nausea and muscle pain. Diarrhea, headache, exanthema (rash), dizziness, cramps and loss of
appetite may also occur. The lethality1is high at 10% of those affected, but to different degrees
in different age groups. Children and adolescents usually have a milder course of the disease
with a mortality rate of around 1%, while the mortality rate for those over 65 is 50%. The
duration of the disease also differs depending on the age of the patients; Younger patients have
often overcome the infection after just one week, while older patients who are more severely ill
have to be treated in hospital for around three weeks, and a need for treatment of up to 60 days
has also been described for SARS-CoV. This age-dependent course of infection with SARS-CoV
wasModi-SARSnot accepted. For modeling the numbers of sick and affected people in the
scenario, we assume that all age groups are equally affected. Other parameters that can modify
the course, such as human contacts and mobility in metropolitan areas or social networks, were
also not taken into account. Transmission is mainly via droplet infection, but since the virus can
remain infectious for a few days on inanimate surfaces, smear infection is also possible. When
the first symptoms appear, the infected people are contagious. this is theonly differencein the
transferability between the hypotheticalModi-SARSand the SARS
1Mortality describes the proportion of sick people who die as a result of the infection.
CoV - the naturally occurring pathogen can only be transmitted from person to person when a
person already shows clear symptoms of the disease. There are no medications available for
treatment, so only symptomatic treatment can be given. A vaccine is also not available for the
first three years. In addition to compliance with hygiene measures, protective measures in this
sense can only be taken by isolating those who are sick or suspected of being infected, and by
using protective equipment such as protective masks, goggles and gloves. Separation, isolation
and quarantine are only of limited effectiveness, since there is already a very pronounced
infectivity at the onset of the symptoms (Fraser et al., 2004)
The infectious disease spreads sporadically and in clusters. Transmission takes place in
particular via household contacts and in the hospital environment, but also in public
transport, at work and in leisure time.
For theModi-SARS-Scenario assumes only a mutational change in the transmissibility of the

virus; other possible variants, also with multifactorial characteristics, would be conceivable
(Reichenbach, 2008)2, but are not considered in this scenario.
2.1 Place of Occurrence/Spatial Extent
Where is the event happening?/What area is affected by the event? The

event occurs globally (mainly Asia, North America, Europe).
The spread in Germany takes place via a trade fair town in northern Germany and a university
town in southern Germany (see 2.4 Duration and course). In the initial phase of events, a total
of ten cases are registered in Germany. Two cases are of particular importance here, as they
occupy key positions for dissemination (see 2.3 Triggering events). The other cases concern
travelers who contribute to the spread. The spread is nationwide across Germany, analogous to
the population density. This assumption reflects a theoretical, simplified model, in the case of a
natural "real" eruption, geographical differences would have to be expected, the complexity of
which cannot be illustrated here.
2Thechoice of a SARS-like virus is also justified by the fact that the natural variant in 2003 was very
has quickly pushed different healthcare systems to their limits. The Green Paper cited here also ran a
similar thought experiment with a mutated SARS virus. The presentModi-SARS-Scenario differs in its
properties and the assumptions for the extent of damage derived from it.
A map of the spatial distribution of the number of sick people at the peak of the first wave
of infection is attached to the scenario.
2.2 Timing
When does the event happen? (season/possibly time of day)
The event begins in February in Asia, but its dimension/importance is not recognized there until
a few weeks later. In April occurs the first identifiedModi-SARS- case in Germany. This point in
time forms the starting point of the present scenario.
2.3 Triggering Events
What events lead to this event?/What triggers the event? The pathogen originates from
Southeast Asia, where the pathogen found in wild animals was transmitted to humans via
markets. Since the animals themselves do not become ill, it was not apparent that there was a
risk of infection. Chains of infection set in motion by this zoonotic transmission could only be
traced retrospectively; this did not succeed in all cases. Domestic pets and farm animals are
throughModi-SARSnot infectious and therefore do not contribute to the spread or
maintenance of the chain of infection.
Two of the first cases to be brought into Germany concern people who were infected in the
same Southeast Asian country. One of the people flies to Germany that same evening to look
after a stand at a trade fair in a northern German city, the other person flies back to Germany a
day later to resume their studies in a southern German university town after a semester abroad
in China. These two people are two of the index patients in Germany through whom the
infection is further spread.3They are of particular interest because both people come into
contact with an extraordinary number of people and thus contribute significantly to the initial
dissemination. There are other cases that are imported to Germany, so it is assumed that a total
of ten infected people are responsible for the first wave of infection.
3The course of the SARS epidemic in 2003 showed that extremely few cases can be enough to
to trigger global infections. For example, a doctor who stayed in a hotel in Hong Kong was identified as the
primary index patient for four clusters of SARS cases and two cases that did not spread further (WHO,
2003). This index patient is known to have infected at least 13 other people (hotel guests and visitors).
These infected people spread SARS to 27 countries within a very short time - for example, 225 people were
infected in Toronto between February and June 2003, whose infections could be traced back to a single
hotel guest. The Toronto Health Department counted over 2000 suspected cases and over 23,000 people
were quarantined (see reference events).
2.4 Duration and History
How long does the event and/or its direct effects last?
New cases can be expected until a vaccine is available. A total period of three years is assumed
for the present scenario, with the assumption that after this time a vaccine will be developed,
approved and available in sufficient quantity. The pathogen changes over the course of three
years through mutations in such a way that even people who have already experienced an
infection become susceptible to an infection again. This results in a total of three waves of
disease of different intensity.
How long after the start/occurrence of the event should be taken into account when
determining the extent of the damage?
The extent of damage is determined as a total for the entire three-year period.
How is the event going?

Starting with the cases that first appeared in northern and southern Germany, the pandemic is
spreading in waves with increasing numbers. In principle, correspondingly higher numbers of
illnesses can be expected, especially in conurbations, due to the high population density and
movement patterns (high mobility, use of mass transport, etc.).
It is believed that each infected person infects three people on average, and it takes three days
for the next transmission to occur. So-called “super spreaders” are not taken into account here.4
It is also assumed that the population is fully susceptible, i.e. susceptible to the virus. A
reduction in the number of susceptible individuals is achieved by cycling through the infection.
The number of people who can be infected is decreasing because the sick die or develop
temporary immunity. The spread is also slowed and limited by the use of anti-epidemic
measures. Such measures include quarantine for contact persons of infected people or other
isolation measures such as the treatment of highly infectious patients in isolation wards, taking
into account special requirements
4So-called "super spreaders", as described in the spread of SARS, are people who
that infect more than ten other people. These cases are exceptional, but they can have a significant effect
on the spread. It is impossible to predict whether there will be super spreaders and, if so, what part they
will play in the spread of infection. In terms of the necessary reduction in complexity, super spreaders
were therefore excluded for the present scenario in order to enable an estimation of the course at all.
infection control measures. Means of containment are, for example, school closures and
cancellations of major events. In addition to these measures, which can be ordered according to
the Infection Protection Act, there are other recommendations for personal protection, e.g. B. in
the case of occupationally exposed persons, such as compliance with hygiene
recommendations. The anti-epidemic measures begin after ten patients in Germany died of the
infection. Measures are ordered first in the regions where cases occur; the population
implements the measures differently depending on their subjective perception. In general,
measures between day 48 and day 408 are described as effective. This results in having
effective anti-epidemic measures in a population5
10
8th
6
sick in percent
0
0 180 360 540 720 900 1080
symptomatic patients hospitalized

requiring intensive care deceased
start/end of intervention
illustration 1
5The modeling of the course is based on the following assumptions: The total population will be at 80
million accepted. On average, the latency period is 3 days, the time from the onset of infectivity to the
expression of symptoms is 0.1 days, the length of the infectious phase is 13.1 days, the duration of the
disease is 13.5 days; for people who have to be hospitalized, the duration is 19 days, the average intensive
medical care lasts 13.5 days. It is believed that a person after experiencing the infection withModi-SARSis
immune for 360 days, after which that person can be re-infected by a mutated version of the virus. The
modeling is based on the population density, it does not include factors such as different disease courses in
different age groups or different mobility (of age groups or in certain regions). It is a Susceptible-Infected-
Recovered (SIR) model, created with Stata 12 software.
80
Number of people (in millions)
60
40
20
0
0 180 360 540 720 900 1080
Number of days
susceptible infected
infectious recovered
Figure 2
Figures: Course of the pandemic over time.

The figures show the course of the eruption in a highly simplified form. Percentages
are shown in Fig. 1; the number of sick people is given in relation to the total
population at a certain point in time, from this the number of hospitalized and from this
in turn the number of
Specify the person requiring intensive care. The numbers for deceased accumulate over
time. Fig. 2 shows the absolute number of those affected. For example, before the onset of
the pandemic, it is assumed that there were around 80 million susceptible people (total
population, since there is no basic immunity). The curve of susceptible persons moves in
waves, because despite having undergone the first infection, they become susceptible again
through virus mutation, ie can be re-infected.
The development of the spread in terms of the number of infected people is as follows:
Maximum number of symptomatic patients at the crest of the waves (to

concurrently ill at a certain point in time)
time
of which hospitalized6
in total
(intensive care)
on day 1 10 0
during the day
millions
300 million
( Millions)
(1st wave)
during the day
millions
520 millions
( Millions)
(2nd wave)
during the day millions

880 millions ( Millions)
(3rd wave)
Table 1: Number of sick people at the peaks in the course of events.
During the first wave (days 1 to 411) a total of 29 million people fell ill in Germany, during the
second wave (days 412 to 692) a total of 23 million and during the third wave (days 693 to 1052)
a total of 26 million people in Germany. At least 7.5 million deaths can be expected as a direct
result of the infection over the entire three-year period taken as a basis. In addition, mortality
increases from bothModi-SARS Sick and otherwise ill people as well as those in need of care,
since they can no longer receive adequate medical care or care due to the overload of the
medical and nursing area (cf. Section 3. - here: health care).
Around 10% of those infected die. The pool of people who can be infected and thus potential
carriers of the infection is getting smaller over time, since people who were infected and have
since recovered are initially immune to the pathogen, while other people have died of their
disease. After a peak, the rate of new cases also falls because the population generally reacts to
the massive occurrence of the disease with increased (own) protective measures. As a result of
these measures, the number of new cases decreases, which leads to a reduction in individual
protective measures (due to a lower subjective risk perception), which in turn increases the
number of new cases. These interactions contribute in addition to the appearance of new ones
6“Hospitalised” is to be understood in the medical sense.

Virus variants contribute to a course with several peaks. New cases can be expected
until a vaccine is available (36 months).
The enormous number of infected people whose illness is so severe that they should be
hospitalized or require intensive medical care in the hospital exceeds the available capacities
many times over (see section KRITIS, sector health, medical care). This requires comprehensive
triage and decisions about who can still be admitted to a clinic and treated there and who can
no longer be treated. As a consequence, many of those who cannot be treated will die.7
Digression: course without anti-epidemic measures
The scenario presented here assumes that anti-epidemic measures are

introduced early in the course of the disease, which means that each
infected person infects not three but 1.6 people on average. The
countermeasures are only accepted for the period from day 48 to day 408.
If one assumed that no countermeasures were used and that every infected
person would infect three other people (until the vaccine is available), one would
have to expect an even more drastic course. On the one hand, the absolute
number of those affected would be higher, on the other hand, the course would
also be much faster. While the peak of the first wave is reached after around 300
days in the model presented, this would be the case after around 170 days
without anti-epidemic measures. This time gain through anti-epidemic measures
can be used very efficiently, e.g. B. to produce and distribute personal protective
equipment and to provide information on its correct use.
The number of people affected differs significantly in both scenarios. If

protective measures are introduced and take effect, around 6 million (1st wave),
3 million (2nd wave) and 2.3 million (3rd wave) will be affected at the peak of the
waves. Without countermeasures, there are around 19 million (1st wave), around
6.5 million (2nd wave) and around 3.3 million (3rd wave). The numbers for
hospitalized patients or patients who need intensive care treatment are similar.
7Sofar there are no guidelines, like with a mass outbreak of infected people in a pandemic
can be handled. This problem requires complex medical, but also ethical considerations and should
not only be considered in a special crisis situation.
2.5 Predictability/Pre-Warning/Communication
Is the event expected?

The emergence of new diseases is a natural occurrence that will happen again and again.
In practice, however, it is not possible to predict which new infectious diseases will occur,
where they will occur and when this will happen. Therefore, a specific prognosis is not
possible.
The germModi-SARSwas only discovered a few weeks before it first appeared in Germany.
The official warning via the regular WHO reporting channels only occurs when the first two
diseases have already been detected in Germany.
To what extent can the authorities prepare for the event?

The discovery of the pathogen only becomes known to the German authorities a few days
before the first case of illness in Germany. Accordingly, initially only existing plans/measures
can be activated. The Infection Protection Act (IfSG) applies8th, according to which two or more
similar diseases for which an epidemiological connection is probable or suspected are
notifiable (Section 6 paragraph 1 sentence 1 no. 5 IfSG). In addition, depending on the
epidemiological situation, the Federal Ministry of Health can restrict or expand the obligation to
report (Section 15 IfSG) (Uhlenhaut, 2011). At the international level, the International Health
Regulations (WHO, 2005) are legally binding guidelines for the control of infectious diseases.
At the national level, efforts have been made to develop influenza pandemic plans, particularly
since the increased occurrence of human cases of avian influenza ("bird flu") of the H5N1 type.
There is a national influenza pandemic plan (RKI, 2007) that consists of three parts:
1. Overview of the measures

2. Phase-oriented tasks and recommendations for action
3. Scientific connections
On this basis, separate pandemic plans were drawn up at state and municipal level (e.g. City of
Frankfurt am Main, 2008, Lower Saxony Ministry for Social Affairs, 2006). In addition, many
large companies and institutes have developed their own plans to reduce sick leave and
increase the ability to work, e.g. g. through teleworking.9
8thThe control and prevention of human infectious diseases is managed by the public
Health service on the legal basis of the Epidemic Law Reorganization Act (SeuRNeuG) and here in
particular in the Infection Protection Act (IfSG) integrated in Article 1.
9See Federal Office for Civil Protection and Disaster Assistance 2010, Federal Ministry of the Interior 2005.
Loss of working hours can have various causes; On the one hand, the employee himself can
be ill, on the other hand, he can also stay away from work to reduce his risk of infection
(e.g. in public transport, but also in contact with colleagues), or the care of sick relatives can
be the reason be.
Can the population prepare for the event?

After it is recognized that the pathogen is transmissible via the respiratory tract, the
population is informed very quickly about general protective measures (e.g. follow hygiene
rules, avoid mass gatherings, avoid public transport, follow the measures ordered by the IfSG).
It is questionable to what extent the communicated
Recommendations/instructions are implemented, e.g. to what extent people have
protective equipment and can use it correctly. The actions of people in dangerous or
catastrophic situations are determined by a number of different factors that also
influence each other, including e.g. e.g.:
- own risk perception
- social context (family, job, ...)
- Socio-economic status (income, social class and milieu, ...)
- level of education
Communication:
There are about 24 hours between the German authorities becoming aware of the pathogen and
the dissemination of the first information by the media. It can be assumed that the event will be
assessed by many voices, which is not without contradictions. Accordingly, uncertainty among the
population is to be expected. In addition, a (more or less qualified) exchange via new media (e.g.
Facebook, Twitter) can be expected.
The event requires the creation of information material that has to be continuously adapted to
the situation and that is given to the population via different media (e.g. print media, television,
social media). In the initial phase, the occurrence of the disease and the associated
uncertainties are communicated (e.g. unknown pathogen, extent, origin, danger not to be
described precisely, countermeasures only to be formulated in general). New findings are
passed on promptly. Care is taken to ensure that the questions and fears of the population are
adequately addressed.
It can be assumed that crisis communication is not consistently successful. For example,
contradictory statements from different authorities/authorities can make it difficult to build
trust and implement the necessary measures. Only if the
If the population is convinced that measures (e.g. quarantine) make sense, they will be
implemented.10
2.6 Regulatory Actions
In addition to informing the population, the authorities are taking measures to contain and
manage the event, based on existing plans and past experience. Crisis teams are convened
promptly and take over the management and coordination of the measures. The forward-
looking assessment of the situation and the corresponding planning of countermeasures are
coordinated at all levels involved.
Public health measures include lockdown, isolation and quarantine. Isolation describes the
spatial and temporal isolation measures of sick people, suspected illnesses and infections
from each other and also from susceptible, non-infected people, but also in groups (cohort
isolation,
- quarantine, household quarantine). Quarantine defines the isolation of people who do not
require treatment, without including the sick or those suspected of being sick. The term
isolation should exclusively describe the inpatient treatment of sick people and suspected
diseases in an isolation or special isolation ward (Fock et al., 2007). A precise definition and
precise use of these terms is important for communication at all levels - especially since these
terms are not or only insufficiently described in the IfSG.
It is important to identify and find contact persons who are suspected of being infected, to
have (sometimes difficult) discussions with them and to implement measures provided for by
the IfSG. If the health authorities can no longer look for contact due to the large number of
cases, an individual case report no longer makes sense and can be revoked.
The competent authorities, first of all the health authorities and there primarily the medical
officers, have to take measures to prevent communicable diseases. The IfSG allows this
10Itis generally critical to maintain a positive flow of information. Without this it can e.g. B.
Greater uncertainties, early lifting of protective measures in the personal environment and thus new
outbreaks. For the acceptance of the communicated messages, it is essential that the authorities
communicate with the population "at eye level". The citizen should be understood as a partner, not as a
"receiver of orders". One is also necessary
target group differentiated communication; different demographic groups need to be addressed
differently (also: multilingual information material).
among other things, restrictions on fundamental rights (§ 16 IfSG), e.g. B. the right to the
inviolability of the home (Article 13(1) of the Basic Law). Within the scope of necessary
protective measures, the basic right to freedom of the person (Article 2 paragraph 2 sentence
2 GG) and freedom of assembly (Article 8 GG) can also be restricted (Section 16 paragraph 5 to
8 and Section 28 IfSG). In addition to these measures to be ordered directly by the public
health officer, the Federal Ministry of Health can issue an ordinance that endangered parts of
the population must take part in vaccinations or other specific prophylactic measures (Section
20 paragraph 6 IfSG), whereby the right to physical integrity (Article 2 paragraph 2 sentence 1
GG) can be restricted.
In the course of the event on which this is based, these tasks present the competent
authorities with major challenges that can sometimes no longer be mastered. This applies
both with regard to human and material resources and with regard to the enforceability of
official measures.
3. Impact on KRITIS/Supply
preliminary remark:
The critical infrastructures listed below are complex systems upon which a variety of utility
functions depend. In principle, it can be assumed that the impairment of individual
infrastructure sectors and branches will also have an impact on other infrastructures and their
supply services. This circumstance cannot be shown here in its complexity. Since the risk
analysis is carried out from the overriding perspective of the federal government, the expected
effects on the area of KRITIS/care are presented below in a generalised, qualitative way.
Significant interdependencies are discussed in the explanations for the individual sectors.11
The event takes place in three disease waves as described under 2.4. During the first wave,
particularly acute effects are generally to be expected in all of the areas listed below, since up
to 8% of the total population become ill here at the same time. The infection and transmission
risks differ according to occupational fields. The following explanations were based on the
assumption that this is also the case in
11Thebasis for this are justified assumptions and expert assessments by those involved
federal agencies. In the future, it would be desirable to include direct expertise from KRITIS operators in
the scenario development process in order to be able to make more specific and validated statements.
Additional, more in-depth analyzes would be necessary for quantitative statements, which would also
have to take into account the complexity of the variously intertwined infrastructures. Correspondingly
detailed background information is not available at federal level for many areas due to responsibilities.
working population reflects. In addition, there are staff shortages due to the care of sick
relatives, the care of children, etc., or the fear of infection.
With increasing sick leave, approved holidays and training courses have to be postponed, the
operating procedure is adjusted accordingly, non-urgent maintenance work etc. is reduced,
the possibilities of paragraphs 14 and 15 of the Working Hours Act are used. The increasing
number of sick people and the absences due to the care of sick relatives or the fear of infection
are affecting the availability of personnel in all industries and sectors. This applies in particular
to areas with many personal contacts.
In the long term, it can also be assumed that there will be fundamental difficulties in
operating the infrastructure due to the permanent loss of staff (deceased). Conversely,
experiences from the first wave will lead to corresponding adjustments and measures in the
operation of critical infrastructures.
In principle, it can be assumed that maintaining the supply is given the highest priority, that the
suppliers are making the appropriate efforts and that large-scale supply failures are therefore
not to be expected. Occasionally, however, longer-lasting disruptions are to be expected, since
services are not available everywhere to the usual extent due to staff shortages. This applies in
particular to personnel-intensive areas and areas with little personnel redundancy in key
positions.
The operation of critical infrastructures is dependent in many places on highly qualified and
specialized personnel, the failure of which can have far-reaching consequences (e.g. in the area
of control of transmission networks, in air traffic control, etc.) and supply failures or
bottlenecks of national relevance could bring. The following estimates are based on the
assumption that these key positions can still be filled, i.e. that not too many of these employees
will fall ill at the same time within the period under review. This restriction is necessary because
this scenario would have to be assessed significantly differently under a different assumption.
In addition, in view of the wide range of international relationships, healthcare services from
other countries are also of great importance to Germany. Numerous goods and services are
provided worldwide by only a few key producers.
Thus, failures in the area of imported goods and raw materials could also lead to
noticeable bottlenecks and cascade effects in Germany.
The following observations relate to the first wave of infection, since this is when the largest number of
people who become ill occur at the same time.
ENERGY sector
In principle, the supply can be maintained.

X electricity
Cross reference logistics
X gas In principle, the supply can be maintained.
X mineral oil In principle, the supply can be maintained.
INFORMATION AND TELECOMMUNICATIONS Sector
The supply (landline network, mobile communications, Internet) can

X telecommunications
generally be maintained.
X information technology In principle, the supply can be maintained.
Sector TRANSPORT AND TRANSPORT
There are restrictions in air traffic.
Flights are being canceled in freight and, in particular, in passenger transport,

since personnel planning only allows a certain degree of flexibility due to the
special requirements (rest periods, crews' different whereabouts, etc.).
X aviation Due to the generally high number of personal contacts in the areas of service
and security personnel, there are increased staff shortages at airlines and
airports.
At the same time, demand for both personal and business travel
is falling (illness, fear of infection, travel warnings).

X maritime shipping
Cargo transport on the high seas will only be slightly affected.
Although there are also staff shortages here, they are less than in other
sectors (little external contacts, additional infection protection measures).
Cross reference logistics (seaports)
Cargo transport on inland waterways will only be slightly affected. Although

X inland shipping there are also staff shortages here, they are less than in other sectors.
Cross reference logistics (inland ports)
Rail traffic is affected by staff shortages. Connections fail, there are delays
in operations. This also affects commuters/travellers who cannot get to
their place of work/destination by train.
X rail transport
At the same time, numerous people will avoid traveling by train or will not be
able to travel by train due to illness, so that there will be a certain balance
here.
Individual transport increases due to the failure or avoidance of

mass transport. Overall, there are more traffic disruptions and
X road traffic
capacity bottlenecks in road traffic.
Failures at individual points within the supply chain are multiplied due to the
complex interdependencies. Therefore, staff shortages sometimes lead to
significant restrictions or to interruptions in supply chains. This has a
corresponding impact on
X logistics
Production processes and other infrastructure sectors.
Certain transport capacities are used to transport goods with special

priority (e.g. food, energy sources).12
12Thelaw to secure transport services (Transport Services Act - VerkLG) serves the
Ensuring adequate transport services in special (crisis) situations. Due to this law, providers of
transport services (entrepreneurs) can be obliged to provide corresponding services and ancillary
services. This also includes the provision of means of transport and facilities, but not the provision
of personnel.
HEALTH Sector
The high number of consultations and treatments poses immense

problems for both hospitals and doctors in private practice. Medical care
is collapsing nationwide.
The human and material capacities are not sufficient to maintain the usual
supply. The current capacity of 500,000 hospital beds (the number of beds,
some of which are already occupied by people with other illnesses, the
number of beds could be slightly increased through provisional measures) is
compared to more than 4 million patients in the period under review (1st
wave) who are below normal Circumstances requiring hospital treatment. The
majority of those affected cannot be adequately cared for, so that most of
those affected have to be cared for at home. Emergency hospitals are set up.
Medical
X
care
In the health sector, too, there are above-average staff absences (e.g.
due to an increased risk of infection, psychosocial stress) and at the
same time there is a significantly increased need for staff.
Drugs, medical products, personal protective equipment and disinfectants are

in increasing demand. Bottlenecks arise because hospitals, medical practices
and authorities are generally dependent on rapid subsequent deliveries, but
the industry can no longer fully meet the demand.
Due to the high mortality rate, the burial of the deceased also poses a
major challenge (mass death toll, concern about contagion).
A vaccine does not initially exist and will only be available after about
three years.
medicines and
X The stocks of medicines to treat the symptoms are initially sufficient,
vaccines
replacement purchases are ordered promptly, but the international
pharmaceutical industry is reaching the limits of production capacity.
X laboratories ability to work is given.

WATER sector
public Water-
X In principle, the supply can be maintained.
care
public Sewage-
X In principle, the supply can be maintained.
elimination
NUTRITION sector
The production of food is not possible in the usual quantity and variety.
Illness-related absences in agriculture (especially in small and medium-sized

businesses) sometimes lead to significant losses in agricultural production.
nutritional
X
business
The sickness-related loss of staff, which cannot be compensated for everywhere,
sometimes has a significant impact in the processing industry, especially at peak
times (e.g. harvest time).
The supply of food is not possible in the usual quantity and variety.
Shop closures are to be expected, but not across the board.
Due to the generally large number of personal contacts, there are increased
X grocery store staff shortages. Bottlenecks can only be partially compensated for.
The supply institutions (e.g. hospitals, retirement homes) can basically be

maintained. However, individual care is sometimes severely restricted
regionally.
Cross-reference logistics (due to limited storage capacity, the shops

depend on an uninterrupted supply)
FINANCIAL AND INSURANCE Sector
X banks ability to work is given.
X exchanges ability to work is given.
X insurances ability to work is given.
X financial service providers ability to work is given.
GOVERNMENT AND ADMINISTRATION Sector
Personnel bottlenecks in government and administration can be intercepted

by adjustments. Non-urgent and non-existential tasks are only given
government and
X secondary priority, so that the areas of "public safety and order" and "social
Administration
affairs" in particular can fall back on sufficient personnel capacities.
X houses of Parliament The Bundestag and state parliaments can continue their work.
Judicial institutions can continue to be managed safely despite staff

X judicial institutions
shortages due to vacation bans and rescheduling.
Due to the extensive and long-lasting situation, all forces of the German
emergency and rescue services, including civil protection, are heavily used.
The assistance potential of the federal government (e.g. THW, Federal Police,
Bundeswehr) are used to support in all areas. Despite maximum commitment,
emergency/rescue the tasks cannot be mastered, especially during the peak of the disease waves.
X essence incl.
civil protection
The mobilization of voluntary potential is only insufficiently successful,

especially since conflicts of interest arise in Germany's mainly voluntary
assistance system.
Sector MEDIA AND CULTURE
The media can keep up their coverage. Personnel bottlenecks are

cushioned by direct reporting of news events moving into the focus of the
broadcast
editors. Capacity will be reduced in the areas of culture, sport and
(TV and
entertainment.
X radio), printed
and electronic
Press
Official announcements, recommendations and instructions on how to
behave are transmitted through the public service media.
symbolic
X Symbolic buildings are not affected by the pandemic.
buildings
Additional information:
Disposal:
There are considerable problems in the field of disposal (e.g. garbage disposal).
Wholesale and retail:

The supply of everyday goods is not possible in the usual quantity and variety.
4. Protected goods affected
Which protected goods are directly/indirectly affected by the event? Note: At this point, it
is generally recorded for which protected goods effects/damages are to be expected from the
event and from the failure of critical infrastructures. The actual extent of damage is
determined in a separate step of the risk analysis.
Effects on the protected asset PEOPLE:
dead (M1):
At least 7.5 million deaths are to be expected over the entire period (cf. Chapter 2.4).
Injured/sick (M2):
During the first wave of the disease alone, 6 million patients are to be expected at the same
time. Over the entire period, the number of sick people is significantly higher.
needy (M3):
Where isolation, segregation, quarantine are required, the affected persons are dependent on
appropriate care from outside. Likewise, the provision of food and medicines, especially for
elderly and sick people, could be more difficult and may require government intervention, e.g.
B. because nursing staff are not protected by vaccination (ie more difficult working conditions,
additional work, etc.). Exemplary, conceivable cases:
- People in quarantine at home must be cared for and (their health parameters) checked -
without these measures, the quarantine will not be maintained
- Older people or people with previous illnesses are particularly unsettled by the
development and avoid going to shops
- People who previously looked after elderly or sick neighbors (shopping, going to the
pharmacy) reduce this commitment for a variety of reasons (e.g. frightened themselves;
too busy with their own situation; leaving the place of residence to take care of their own
relatives to take care of)
- Pharmacy delivery service collapses
Missing (M4):
Missing persons as a result of the event are to be expected to a lesser extent, e.g. B. People
who die unnoticed due to the disease and whose fate cannot be clarified.
Effects on the protected asset ENVIRONMENT:
Damage to protected area (U1):

Immediate effects on protected areas are not to be expected.
Damage to surface water/groundwater (U2):

Immediate impacts on surface water/groundwater are not to be expected.
Damage to forest areas (U3):

Immediate effects on forest areas are not to be expected.
Damage to agricultural land (U4):

Direct effects on agricultural land are not to be expected.
Harm to livestock (U5):

In individual cases livestock can be harmed.
Effects on the protected asset ECONOMY:
The economic effects cannot be specifically estimated here, but could be immense.13Since at
least 7.5 million people die over the entire course of the event, the deaths of a large number of
employed persons can be expected, despite the age distribution of the mortality rate. Should
e.g. B. four million workers die, this would be about ten percent of all workers, this loss would
be clearly felt economically and would be associated with a sharp slump in gross domestic
product.
public hand (v1):

Massive costs for the public sector are to be expected, including the consumption of medical
materials and drugs and the development and procurement of a vaccine. Due to the loss of
economic output, lower tax revenues are to be expected. This, combined with the increase in
health care costs, is likely to place a significant burden on social security systems, especially
statutory health insurance.
private economy (v2):

With losses in economic performance due to sick leave among staff or deaths in the workforce
of companies, additional costs due to adjustment measures to maintain operations, higher
costs for transport and logistics or restrictions on the transport of goods and a changed
(reluctant) consumption and investment behavior of the population and other companies can
be expected, as well
13Even the evaluation of known eruptions, which do not correspond to the extent considered here
Modi-SARS-scenario are comparable, can only be understood as an estimate in this respect. Examples are
E. coli outbreaks in the USA, which cost around 1.6 billion US dollars between 1991 and 1999, a cholera
outbreak in Peru (around 770 million US dollars) or the pneumonic plague in Surat, India. In this outbreak,
over 50 people died and there were over 5,000 infected (fatality ~ 1%). The main problem, however, was
the reaction of the population, with reports of around 300,000 people fleeing the region; the economic
damage is estimated at around 1.7 billion US dollars. The occurrence of SARS in 2003 not only impressively
showed how a new type of pathogen can very quickly push even the most modern infrastructure to its
limits. The economic damage was also considerable.
officially ordered restrictions on international trade and air traffic/travel

and a decline in tourism.
In general, it should be noted that companies may no longer be able to compensate for the
effects of the pandemic, even with good planning and preparation (general rationalization
tendencies: thin staffing levels, dependency on suppliers, just-in-time production, etc.). This
can even lead to global production chains coming to a standstill.
In view of the wide range of international relationships, healthcare services from other
countries are also of great importance to Germany. Numerous goods and services are provided
worldwide by only a few key producers. Thus, failures in the area of imported goods and raw
materials could also lead to noticeable bottlenecks and cascade effects in Germany.
private households (v3):
Since no direct damage to private property is to be expected as a result of the event, it

cannot be assumed that restoration measures will be necessary.
For private households in which employed persons die or become unable to work as a result of
the event, correspondingly severe economic effects are to be expected.
Effects on the protected asset INTANGIBLE:
Public safety and order (I1):

It can be assumed that the uncertainty of the population, which is to be expected in the
event of a severe pandemic, will also affect public safety and order.
However, the impact of such a pandemic on society is difficult to assess and depends on
various factors, e.g. B. from the way of official action and official communication, reporting in
the media, etc. In the present scenario, it is assumed that the majority of the population acts
in solidarity and tries to mitigate the effects of the event through mutual support and
consideration reduce. Similar forms of solidarity have often been observed in other extreme
situations. At the same time, it cannot be ruled out that increasing insecurity and the feeling
of being let down by the authorities and the health care system will promote aggressive and
antisocial behavior.
This includes e.g. B.14

Burglaries/thefts, e.g. B. to obtain medicines (e.g. antibiotics) etc. Looting and
vandalism
Trade in counterfeit medicines
Actions against authorities or healthcare facilities (out of anger, e.g. because of alleged
unfair treatment in medical care)
Whether people resort to such means depends on various factors. If a person gets into a
conflict of goals, the probability of such a reaction increases (e.g. looting a supermarket if this
appears to be the only way to provide for one's family, also looting a pharmacy, etc.).
Furthermore, it is possible that instructions from the police and other authorities are not
followed (e.g. residence, hygiene regulations) or that representatives of these authorities are
met aggressively. Larger-scale demonstrations or riots are not to be expected, as it is assumed
that larger gatherings of people are more likely to be avoided. However, this depends on the
individual risk perception.
Political implications (I2):

A high level of public interest can be assumed throughout the situation. The call for quick and
effective action by the authorities will be heard early on. The search for “culprits” and the
question of whether the preparations for the event were sufficient are likely to arise during the
first wave of infections. Whether there are calls for his resignation or other serious political
consequences also depends on the crisis management and crisis communication of those
responsible.
Psychological effects (I3):

An insecurity of the population is to be expected. Behavior changes can occur when people
feel threatened. Here, too, different factors come into play, such as the course of the
disease, knowledge of the causes and specific dangers, the local proximity to the cases that
have occurred, etc.
Behavioral changes can show up in:
avoiding crowds
the avoidance of public life altogether
change of residence (leaving the place of residence)
14See e.g. B. Quarantelli 2003, Geenen 2010.

There are no reliable findings on the long-term social effects of such an event, there is still a need for
research.
the increase in calls to information

hotlines the increase in doctor visits
changing buying behavior
In addition, insufficient information from the authorities to the population can lead to
increased distrust of state action (especially as soon as treatment priorities become known
or are raised as a topic in the media without a plausible justification for this being
communicated appropriately at the same time).
Damage to cultural property (I4):
Immediate effects on cultural property are not to be expected.
5. Reference Events
SARS pandemic 2002/2003, mostly in Canada and some Asian countries. EHEC: 855 HUS
diseases and 2,987 cases of EHEC gastroenteritis (without development of HUS) were
recorded, i.e. a total of 3,842 diseases.
In Germany, there have hardly been any exceptional epidemics in recent decades that would
have led to enormous material damage or loss of life. However, the example of SARS shows
that such an epidemic can easily affect countries with high development and health care
standards.
Examples of SARS outbreak patterns described:

The index patient infected 13 other hotel guests and visitors to Hotel M - these
people had no direct contact with the index patient.
A Hotel M guest infected 47 nurses and doctors, causing approximately 112 secondary
infections and 26 tertiary cases.
Another guest at the hotel infected 225 people in Toronto between February and June;
subsequently, the Toronto Health Department counted 2,132 suspected cases; 23,105
contacts were quarantined (Breugelmanns et al. 2004).
Study among medical students in Hong Kong: those who had visited a SARS patient in
their area (before the diagnosis of SARS) had a 7-fold increased probability of
contracting the disease. All students who came at least one meter from the patient
became infected.
Flight: 16 of 119 passengers (13%) became infected (laboratory-confirmed cases), 2
other suspected cases after a flight with a symptomatic person. The risk of becoming
infected was 3-fold higher within a 3-row distance from the sick traveler.
One patient infected 45% of their contacts, these secondary cases infected 32% of their
contacts.
"Super spreaders" (people who infect more than 10 other people) were responsible for
around ¾ of the cases in Hong Kong and Singapore.
6. Literature/additional information
Allianz Deutschland AG and Rheinisch-Westfälisches Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung (ed.):

Pandemic - risk with a major impact. Munich 2006.
Federal Office for Civil Protection and Disaster Assistance (ed.): Manual for corporate
pandemic planning. Bonn 2010.
Breugelmans JG, Zucs P, Porten K, Broll S, Nieder M, Ammon A and Krause G SARS
transmission and commercial aircraft. In: Emerging Infectious Diseases, Vol. 10, 2004, pp.
1502-1503.
Federal Ministry of the Interior (ed.): Protection of Critical Infrastructures - Basic
Protection Concept. Berlin 2005.
R Fock, EJ Finke, K Fleischer, R Gottschalk, P Graf, T Gruenewald, U Koch, H Michels, M

Peters, A Wirtz, Andres , M., Bergmann, H., Biederbick, W., Fell, G., Low, M. and Scholz, D.:
Definitions of measures and designations relevant to epidemic hygiene. In: Federal Office
for Civil Protection and Disaster Assistance (ed.): Biological hazards. Bonn 2007, pp. 391-409.
Fraser C, Riley S, Anderson RM and Ferguson NM Factors that make an infectious disease
outbreak controllable. In: Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United
States of America, Vol. 101, No. 16, 2004, pp. 6146-6151.
Geenen, EM: Population Behavior and Possibilities of Crisis Management and Disaster
Management in Multicultural Societies. In: Federal Office for Civil Protection and Disaster
Assistance (ed.): Research in Civil Protection, Volume 11. Bonn 2010.
Law on the Prevention and Control of Infectious Diseases in Humans (Infection

Protection Act – IfSG).
Lower Saxony Ministry for Social Affairs, Family and Health: Lower Saxony Influenza
Pandemic Plan.
Quarantelli, EL: Social behavior related to disaster. In: Clausen, L., Geenen, EM and Macamo,
E. (eds.): Terrible social processes. The theory and empiricism of catastrophe. Munster 2003,
pp. 25-33.
Reichenbach, G. et al. (ed.): Risks and challenges for public safety in Germany: Scenarios
and key issues. Green Paper of the Public Safety Future Forum. Berlin 2008.
Robert Koch Institute: National Influenza Pandemic Plan.
Robert Koch Institute: Information on SARS (http://www.rki.de/DE/Content/InfAZ/S/SARS/

SARS.html;jsessionid=229C2FDD788B1C95D1 07C97DFF8111D5.2_cid234?
cms_lv2=2394402&cms_box=1&cms_current=Heavy+Acute s +Respiratory+syndrome+
%28SARS%29, last retrieved on 31.8.2012).
Scholtissek, C., von Hoyningen, V. and Rott, R.: Genetic relatedness between the new 1977
epidemic strains (H1N1) of influenza and human influenza strains isolated between 1947 and
1957 (H1N1). In: Virology, Vol. 89, 1978, pp. 613-617.
City of Frankfurt am Main: Municipal influenza pandemic plan.
Uhlenhaut, C.: Pandemic, endemic and local outbreak. Prevention and crisis response to
biological threats using the example of viral infectious diseases. Publication series “Public
Security Research Forum”. Berlin 2011.
Uhlenhaut, C. and Biederbick, W.: Prevention and crisis response in biological threat
situations - the mechanisms for dealing with pandemics, endemics and local outbreaks.
In: Gerhold, L. and Schiller, J. (eds.): Perspectives on security research. Frankfurt am Main
2012.
WHO (ed.): Consensus document on the epidemiology of severe acute respiratory

syndrome (SARS). Geneva 2003.
WHO: International Health Regulations.
WHO (ed.): The world health report 2004 – changing history. Geneva 2004.
WHO (ed.): The world health report 2007 – a safer future – global public health security in the
21st century. Geneva 2007.
Zimmer, SM and Burke, DS: Historical perspective - Emergence of influenza A (H1N1)

viruses. In: New England Journal of Medicine, No. 361, 2009, pp. 279-285.
SARS information
SARS coronavirus (coronaviruses), intracellular and on the surface of Vero cells. Transmission
electron microscopy, ultrathin section. Scale = 100 nm. Source: RKI Source:Hans R. Gelderblom, Freya
Kaulbars (2003)/RKI
pathogen: SARS corona virus (enveloped virus, 80-200 nm, positive-strand RNA, approx. 30 kbases in length).
incubation period: 2-14 (usually 3-5) days
infectivity: Patients become infectious when the symptoms are already clearly pronounced,
i.e. some time after the onset of symptoms, R015is estimated at 2.7 or between 2.2 and 3.7.
So-called "super spreaders" are not taken into account in the calculation. Virus was grown
from respiratory secretions, stool and urine and detected in tears.
symptoms: Fever >38°C (100%), dry cough (100%), shortness of breath (80%),
radiological changes, chills (73%), nausea (70%), myalgia (60%), diarrhea, headache,
rash , dizziness, cramps, loss of appetite
lethality: around 10% (1-50%, depending on age and secondary diseases)
tenacity: In the stool 1-2 days, with diarrhea 4 days, on surfaces (Fomite) days
prophylaxis: Exposure prophylaxis (protective clothing, isolation, quarantine), no vaccine

available
therapy: only symptomatic, between 20 and 30% require intensive medical care,
around 14% require ventilation, no antiviral drugs available. Rapid initiation of therapy
to prevent/fight secondary (bacterial) infections improves the prognosis.
Length of time: In 2002/3, the majority of patients could be discharged from the hospital
after 3 weeks, but in some cases it took 40-50 days. Patients over 60 years often had to be
treated for 60 days, and fatalities accounted for about 50% in this group.
Properties that made SARS controllable
Late onset of virus shedding

Virus was isolated only in exceptional cases 3 weeks after onset of disease, no
transmission later than 10 days after defervescence is reported.
SARS has only rarely been observed in young children. Chronic
excretors or asymptomatic courses are rare
15R0: indicates the number of cases that are infected by an infected person on average.
Modi-SARSinformation
Characteristics: like SARS with the following exceptions:
Hypothetical pathogen:Virus from the corona virus family
Incubation period:3 days
infectivity:Patients can shed viruses immediately with the onset of symptoms, virus
shedding begins after 3 days. The infectivity ends when the clinical symptoms subside, on
average after 16 days.
symptoms: Fever >38°C (100%), dry cough (100%), shortness of breath (80%),
radiological changes, chills (73%), nausea (70%), myalgia (60%), diarrhea, headache,
rash , dizziness, cramps, loss of appetite
lethality: around 10% (1-50%, depending on age and secondary diseases)
tenacity: In the stool 1-2 days, with diarrhea 4 days, on surfaces (Fomite) days
prophylaxis: Exposure prophylaxis (protective clothing, isolation, quarantine), no vaccine

available
therapy: only symptomatic, between 20 and 30% require intensive medical care,
around 14% require ventilation, no antiviral drugs available. Rapid initiation of therapy
to prevent/fight secondary (bacterial) infections improves the prognosis.
Duration :expected length of infectious phase about 13 days, expected sick days about 13.5
days, days in hospital about 19, days in intensive care about 19. Time from hospitalization to
death: 28 days on average.
anti-epidemic measures(Separation, masks, hygiene etc.): were modeled from day 48

to 408, the measures reduce R0 from 3 to 1.6.
Mild course:is observed in around 5% of cases, asymptomatic course in around 2%.

Map of the spatial distribution of the number of sick people

Peak of the first wave of illness
Modi-SARS
Day 300, sick people [thousands]
Overall production: H. Heenemann GmbH & Co., Buch- und Offsetdruckerei, Bessemerstraße 83-91, 12103 Berlin, www.heenemann-druck.de Sales:
Bundesanzeiger Verlagsgesellschaft mbH, PO Box 10 05 34, 50445 Cologne, telephone (02 21) 97 66 83 40, fax (02 21) 97 66 83 44, www.betreff-gesetze.de
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Translated from German to English - www.onlinedoctranslator.

German Bundestag printed matter17/12051

17th parliamentary term 01/03/2013

Report on risk analysis in civil protection 2012

2 Status of implementation at federal level. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3

3 Digression: Cross-level risk management-

4 Status of implementation at country level. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8th

5 Parallel development at international level. . . . . . . . . . . . . 9

preamble thus enabling improved, risk- and needs-oriented

3-pillar concept of modern flood protection16

c) The flood awareness of the population plays a

Flood Risk Management Cycle17

5 Parallel development at international The identification of a broad portfolio of dangers that

5.2 OECD 6 outlook

From the federal government's overarching Law on access to digital geodata

The scenarios and results of the federal risk

23See briefing by the Federal Government: report on the

Credit Gullotta, G.: Risk assessment - half full or half empty?

Risk analysis for civil protection at the federal level

– classification of the probability of occurrence

Risk analysis for civil protection at the federal level –

classification of the extent of damage

Protected good PEOPLE

Damage Parameters: Dead (M1)

Damage extent classes:

Damage parameters: injured, sick (M2)

Damage extent classes:

Damage parameters: those in need of help (M3)

Damage extent classes:

E:>1,000,000 for > 1 week

Damage Parameters: Missing (M4)

Damage extent classes:

Damage parameters: Damage to protected areas (U1)

Damage extent classes:

E:>5% of the total area of protected areas (equivalent to >10,000 km2)

Damage parameters: Damage to surface water/groundwater (U2)

Damage extent classes:

Damage parameters: Damage to forest areas (U3)

Damage extent classes:

Damage parameters: Damage to agricultural land (U4)

Damage extent classes:

Damage parameters: damage to livestock (U5)

Damage extent classes:

B:>1,500 - 15,000 livestock units

C:>15,000 - 150,000 livestock units

D:>150,000 - 1.5 million livestock units

E:>1.5 million livestock units

Protected asset ECONOMY

Damage Parameters: Impact on Public Sector (V1)

Damage extent classes:

A:Public sector costs caused by the event can be fully covered by

C:Public sector costs caused by the event have a

D:Public sector costs caused by the event are of such a large

E:Very big impact. Public sector costs caused by the event

Damage Parameters: Impact on the Private Economy (V2)

Damage extent classes:

A:Costs to the private sector caused by the event can be approximated

Damage parameters: impact on private households (V3)

Damage extent classes: