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Qudus International Journal of Islamic Studies (QIJIS)

Volume 11, Number 2, 2023 (PP : 247-278)


https://journal.iainkudus.ac.id/index.php/QIJIS/index
http://dx.doi.org/10.21043/qijis.v11i2.7953

SALAFISM IN RURAL JAVA: THE STRUGGLES OF


INDONESIAN ISLAM SINCE THE FALL OF THE NEW ORDER

Zuly Qodir
Universitas Muhammadiyah Yogyakarta
zuliqodir@umy.ac.id

Krismono
Universitas Islam Indonesia
krismono@uii.ac.id

Irwan Abdullah
Univeritas Gadjah Mada
irwan.fib@ugm.ac.id

Abstract
This study elucidates the factors that have driven the
emergence of Salafism in rural Java, including the individual
actors, the global Salafi movement, and the connections
established amongst Islamic organizations since the fall of the
New Order. This study emphasizes that the Salafi movement
has not been purely religious in rural Java, but rather served
to provide members with economic and political salvation.
Diverse economic and political contestations have occurred
within the Salafi movement as actors within the movement
have established connections with individuals who share their
vision and political ideology. This article concludes that the
Salafi movement may be considered a form of political Islam,
wherein individuals contest public spaces through public piety,

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Zuly Qodir, Krismono, and Irwan Abdullah

economic activities, and political approaches. Data for this


study were collected through field research, interviews with
informants, and a review of the literature. A political sociology
approach was used to analyze the connections between village
actors, the spread of Salafism, and the political and economic
issues faced by religious organizations.

Keywords: Salafism, Java, Political Economy, Post-New Order


Indonesia

A. Introduction

After the resignation of President Soeharto in May 1998,


Indonesia began transitioning to a liberal democratic system
(Törnquist et al. 2017) wherein the Indonesian public’s
political euphoria was realized. Although Indonesians did not
enjoy absolute freedom (Hadiz 2017), they were nonetheless
relieved to be free of the authoritarian politics that had
marked Soeharto’s New Order regime (Mietzner 2012). The
availability of such democratic freedoms, though limited,
made it possible for individuals and organizations to work
towards goals that had long been stifled by those in power
(Gaffar 2006). This included the public expression of Islam, as
seen in the political, economic, and cultural fields (Fealy and
White 2008; Weck and et al., 2011).
The resignation of President Soeharto in May 1998,
which coincided with a series of monetary, economic, and
political crises, was perceived as providing the momentum
for Islam to begin playing an increasingly important role
in Indonesian politics and civil society (Lewis 2013). This
is evidenced by two factors: first, the rise of openly Islamic
movements and political parties; second, the expression

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SALAFISM IN RURAL JAVA: THE STRUGGLES OF INDONESIAN ISLAM …...

of Islamic symbols and identities in public spaces (Fossati


2019). These movements—which included paramilitary
organizations such as the Jihad Warriors (Laskar Jihad, LJ),
the Islamic Defenders’ Front (Front Pembela Islam, FPI),
and the Indonesian Mujahedeen Council (Majelis Mujahidin
Indonesia, MMI) (Hasan 2006; Hasani and Naipospos
2010; Meuleman 2005) shaped society in new ways,
causing significant concern for Indonesia’s largest Islamic
organizations: Muhammadiyah and Nahdlatul Ulama, both of
which practiced a more moderate Islam (Hilmy 2013).
The recent mushrooming of puritanical Muslim
lifestyles likewise highlights how technological advances and
globalization have contributed to the spread of Salafism and
Islamism in Indonesia (Bubalo and Fealy 2005; Roy 2004).
Salafism has often been deemed the most appropriate means
of exploiting the opportunities offered by globalization
(Bubalo and Fealy 2005; Roy 2004). Salafism has spread
throughout Indonesia, finding strong support in prayer
groups and on university campuses. Through organizations
such as the Indonesian Students Action Union (Kesatuan
Aksi Mahasiswa Indonesia, KAMI), Hizbut Tahrir, and the
aforementioned MMI, Salafism has found fertile ground in
Indonesia’s universities (Arifianto 2019).
The spread of Salafism around the world, including in
rural Indonesia, has produced a new global Islamic identity
that is divorced from national references, local histories, and
cultural institutions that are deemed non-Islamic (Bubalo
and Fealy 2005). Such Salafism is perceived as better suited
to the current global situation, wherein identities have been
deterritorialized (Roy 2004; Tomlinson 2007). It has been

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Zuly Qodir, Krismono, and Irwan Abdullah

used to challenge Islamic beliefs that are considered deviant,


to promote the reform of public morality (akhlak), and to
purify cultural, national, traditional, and historical identities.
It has predominantly targeted the cultural practices of
Muslim-majority countries that are believed to deviate from
the true teachings of Islam. This desire to manifest a pure
form of Islam, having contributed significantly to the creation
of new Islamic identities and religious performativities, has
found particular traction amongst marginalized communities
in both the West and in Muslim-majority countries (Bubalo
and Fealy 2005).
This situation has significantly transformed the
configuration of Indonesian Islam, including in Java, a
situation that has been complicated by the diverse variables
involved (i.e. modernization, globalization, and democracy).
These effects have become increasingly evident in recent
years (Ali 2011), as Indonesian Islam (created through a
synthesis of Islam and local traditions) has come face-to-
face with the puritanical Salafi movement. The influences of
Middle Eastern Islam began to be felt tangibly in the 1980s
and 1990s, and over time these views began to be embraced
by Muslims in Indonesia. Traditional Islamic practices,
including their specific characteristics, have slowly been
eroded (Wildan 2013).
In Indonesia, studies of Salafism have been fascinating
in the previous ten years. For example, Bruinessen (2018)
highlights the emergence of religious conservatism, including
Salafism. Elsewhere, Bruinessen (2011) examines the
presence of a conservative religious and political parties
in the United States from 1998 to 2000 from a historical

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standpoint, giving the impression of a time series describing


the emergence of conservativism in Indonesia and its impact
on practical politics.
Meanwhile, Noorhaidi Hasan (Hasan 2009b) discusses
the Salafism movement by focusing on the phenomenon
of piety politics, which structures Islamic activities in
both Muslim and non-Muslim universities. Hasan offers a
critique of the Salafism movement and its effect on Islamic
and non-Islamic colleges in terms of student activities and
their efforts to control Indonesia’s Islamic public spaces
(Hasan 2012b)Partai Keadilan Sejahtera. According to Hasan,
Salafism impacts pupils (as young Muslims) and their active
development. Salafism’s rise in Islamic and non-Islamic
colleges may thus be attributed to the Prosperous Justice
Party’s (PKS) cadres.
Hasan also looks into the political disasters
perpetrated by the Salafism movement in Indonesia (Hasan
2010)Salafists have dismantled political traditions that
were seen as incompatible with Islam and replaced them
with political beliefs that they deem more attuned to Islam.
However, their goals have not been met, as their approaches
have not been suited to the Indonesian environment and not
received political support from Indonesian Muslims. During
the civil war in Ambon, Hasan also studied Laskar Jihad,
which became one of the elements promoting Salafism in
Indonesia (Hasan 2006).
Din Wahid also performed research in Indonesia on
Salafist groups (Wahid 2015), focusing much of his research
on pesantren, which he classified as Salafi. According to
Wahid’s research, Salafist boarding schools prioritize worship

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Zuly Qodir, Krismono, and Irwan Abdullah

activities that they consider more in harmony with the Qur’an


and Sunnah, and thus with Islamic law. Such schools’ view
Indonesian Muslims’ worship as still intertwined with non-
Islamic practices. It is also said to be a heretical (deviant from
the pure teachings of Islam) because it is has influences from
Hindu culture.
Buehler (2013) examines the Salafist political
movement, which engages in a variety of political actions
by advocating the implementation of Islamic law rules in
a number of Indonesian provinces. Buechler’s research of
sharia legislation reveals an interesting political compromise
between local elites and elite politicians. Politicians from
both Islamic and religious parties are involved. Parties with
the support of local elites and business people advocated for
the introduction of sharia norms since they gained financial
and popularity, allowing them to gain voter support during
elections. This is regarded as part of the democratic process
(Buehler et al. 1998; Buehler and Muhtada 2016).
Arifianto (2020) investigated the presence of Salafi
groups and other organizations deemed to be extremist as an
essential component of the rise of Indonesian Islam. According
to Arifianto, the rise of Indonesian Islam resulted in fanaticism
during the 2014 and 2019 presidential elections. Salafist,
extremist, and extreme Islamic organizations influenced
Indonesian Islam in the public domain, carrying out diverse
activities on campuses, in communities, and in mosques.
Because of the democratic atmosphere of Indonesian Islamic
society, Salafist Islamists have a profound and extensive
influence in the country’s Islamic community, as democratic
politics supports even anti-electoral democracy movements.

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Articles and studies of Salafism focus on several points.


First, Salafism is viewed as a response to the state, which is
thought to have marginalized Muslims throughout the New
Order. Second, Salafism is understood as a movement for
purifying worship among movements such as Muhammadiyah
and NU in Java, which is considered to not reflect the primary
references of Islam—namely the Qur’an and Sunnah. Third,
Salafism is understood as a movement for purification of
worship and fiqh Islamic movements such as Muhammadiyah
and NU in Java, which is considered no longer in accordance
with the primary references, namely the Qur’an and
Sunnah. Therefore, Salafism is here to purify the worship
and jurisprudence of Muslims. This article emphasizes that
the Salafism movement in Kepakisan can be described as a
reactionary da’wah and political movement that has seized
economic resources to strengthen itself in broader da’wah,
politics, and society at large. As such, the Salafism movement
in rural areas has received broad support, particularly among
those facing difficulties or financial trouble.
This study has several goals. First, it seeks to investigate
the rise of Salafism in a Wonosobo community following
the fall of the New Order. Second, it seeks to conduct an in-
depth analysis of the Salafi movement’s activities and public
reactions to them. The author uses explanatory qualitative
research methods, relying on interpretation of field data
and the expressions of informants to understand what is
available and link various indicators. Data was also collected
through a review of the literature, which was used to map
the research on Salafism in Indonesia (specifically in Java).
In addition, between May–June 2020, the authors conducted

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Zuly Qodir, Krismono, and Irwan Abdullah

field observations over the course of one month in the village


of Kepalkisan, Dieng, Wonosobo, to directly observe the Salafi
movement’s activities. The author also conducted in-depth
interviews with informants from the Salafi movement (as well
as Muhammadiyah and Nahdlatul Ulama). These interviews
dealt with a variety of topics relating to Salafism, including
their political, economic, and religious behavior. The author
then categorized the data and conducted an analysis using the
theoretical framework.

B. The Characteristics of Salafi Movements

Discussion of Salafism in Indonesia cannot be separated


from the acceleration of modernization and development
through the Five-Year Development Planning Program (better
known as PELITA), one of the early New Order’s most touted
policies. Through PELITA, the Indonesian government was
able to improve literacy rates by building schools throughout
the Indonesian Archipelago. This was supported by massive
efforts to develop the nation’s infrastructure, both in the cities
and in rural areas. Bridges, roads, health facilities, education
facilities, and other infrastructure all contributed importantly
to transforming Indonesia’s urbanites into rational and
modern beings (Hasan 2006).
A detailed understanding of Salafism and its
characteristics facilitates the analysis and understanding of
the movement. As stated by Wictorowicz, when discussing
global Salafism, the categories “moderate”, “radical”, and
“extreme” are commonly used (Hadiz and Robison 2012).
Likewise, Schmid notes that many Salafi movements have
been categorized as radical/extremist and associated with

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terror and violence (Schmid 2013). However, such categories


cannot be readily applied when analyzing Salafism in
Indonesia. Some Salafis act as individuals, spreading their
teachings and morality through sermons. At the same
time, Salafi organizations such as Jamaah Tabligh teach
their specific understandings of piety to their members
and communities through structured means. As a result of
globalization and transnational Islam, Indonesian Salafism
is highly diverse—including in its response to social change,
(Teik and Hadiz 2010).
This can be seen, for instance, in the rise of Salafism in
Kepakisan, Wonosobo, in the late 1990s. Under the influence
of globalization, the village became an open class society
where traditional cultural boundaries were broken down
(Von Holy and Lindsay 2006). Taking advantage of local and
international political opportunity structures, Salafis were
able to freely and collectively express their symbolic identity
(Mahmood 2006). They presented their religious identities
in new ways, including in their clothing. Men, for example,
began to wear robes (jalabiyyah), keep beards (lihyah), and
avoid pants that reached above their ankles (isbal). Women,
meanwhile, began to wear loose, dark clothing, as well as full
veils (niqab) (AM 2015)
Although Salafism has become widespread in Indonesia,
especially in Java, there have remained tensions between
Salafis and local communities that continue to adhere to
traditional beliefs and uphold the status quo. Nevertheless, at
the grassroots level, Salafism has found significant acceptance
within the rural communities that have long been identified
as strictly adhering to traditional culture, even as they are

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Zuly Qodir, Krismono, and Irwan Abdullah

underdeveloped and impoverished. Azra, writes that the success


of Salafism and similar transnational Islamic movements
lies in its ability to transform adherents’ understandings of
Islamic doctrine. These movements’ transnational ideals have
become contextualized, vernacularized, and even indigenized
(Azra 2009).
Unlike the transnational movement Ikhwanul Muslimin,
which used political instruments and organizations—in
Indonesia, the Prosperous Justice Party (Partai Keadilan
Sejahtera, PKS) (Wahid 2015) the Salafi movement in
Kepakisan has not been associated with any particular
political party. Rather, it has been influenced primarily by
local contestations through which merchants, entrepreneurs,
and brokers have attempted to control the village economy.
Interestingly, Salafism first emerged in Kepakisan as a result
of sermons in the local prayer rooms, which became used as
an arena for ideological, political, and economic contestation.
As such, this local approach to Salafism is distinct from that
recognized by the literature.
This study differs from existing research, thus, in that
the Salafi movement in Kepakisan, Wonosobo, has been driven
by economic and political factors from the beginning (Hasan
2009a). It has been economic, because it has been driven by
merchants and by brokers. At the same time, it has been political,
being promoted by village officials—including the village chief
(lurah) Supoyo Raharjo, who had previously gained recognition
as a religious leader. After one of Jafar Umar Thalib’s students
was granted permission to preach at the local mosque, Salafi
activities advanced rapidly. However, after the village chief left
office, the Salafi movement lost its main political supporter,

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and activities became less common (Al Qurtuby 2015).


Nevertheless, this article will show that Salafism has continued
to exist, even without broad political support.
The dual issues of Salafism and radicalism have received
much attention in Indonesia. Discourses have been informed
heavily by the attacks on the World Trade Center and the
Pentagon on September 11, 2001 (Meijer 2009); the Bali
Bombings of 2002; the bombing of the JW Marriott and Ritz
Carlton Hotels in 2003; the attack on the Australian Embassy in
2004; the Bali Bombings of 2005; and the attack on Thamrin,
Sudirman, in 2016 (Colombijn 2018). In these cases, the
perpetrators were rapidly identified as jihadis whose beliefs
and appearances reflected those of Salafism (Sidel 2006, 4).
In Kepakisan, Wonosobo, understandings of Salafism
have generally been moderate, rather than extreme or
violent. Nevertheless, the economic and political activities
undertaken by Salafi activists in the village have been oriented
towards realizing cultural, political, and economic change
while simultaneously wielding and maintaining power.
Initially, Salafism in the village was focused more on da’wah,
drawing inspiration from Ja’far Umar Thalib (Hasan and
et.all 2019). Over time, however, it has become increasingly
political as community members have competed to control
economic spaces and wield political power (Umam 2006). In
this, it differs little from the Salafism that is found throughout
Indonesia (Al Qurtuby 2020).

C. Kepakisan: A Contested Arena


Kepakisan is a village in the Dieng Highlands,
Wonosobo Regency. It lies approximately 30 kilometers

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from Wonosobo City, the capital of the regency, a distance


that requires ninety minutes to travel by car. The journey
takes drivers along steep and winding roads, overlooking
rice paddies as well as fields of potatoes, carrots, cabbage,
and celery. Many large houses line the road to Kepakisan, as
well as elementary schools and mosques.
Kepakisan is located along the border between
Wonosobo and Banjarnegara, where many tourists travel in
search of green fields and high mountains. Fog forms readily
in the fresh mountain air. Nearby is the Sileri Crater, a major
tourist destination that has many myths associated with
it. It is said, for example, that people have drowned in the
crater after insulting the Islamic beliefs of the local people.
Traditionally, Kepakisan has been closely associated with
Muhammadiyah, as evidenced by the presence of schools,
mosques, and microfinance institutions associated with the
organization. Being located in the Dieng Highlands, Kepakisan
has a natural beauty that readily draws the eye. One would not
expect Salafism to have found fertile ground in this village.
The residents of Kepakisan are very pious, remembering
to do their worship even in the fields. Before leaving home
in the morning, they prepare their meals as well as the items
needed for their dhuhur and ashar prayers. After returning
home from the fields, they do their domestic chores and then
rest. When communal religious activities are held, they are
welcomed enthusiastically; few are willing to miss worship.
According to data from the Kepakisan District, Kepakisan
had a population of 2,975 in 2019, distributed amongst 790
families in four neighborhood associations (rukun warga) and
fifteen neighborhoods (rukun tetangga). The village covers an

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area of 562,882 hectares, divided into four hamlets; a third of


the village is used for agricultural purposes. Homes are built
close together, with little space between them. According to
demographic data, and following the categories of Indonesian
Islam offered by Geertz (while admitting the valid criticism
of his theories (Burhani 2017), the people of Kepakisan are
mostly adherents of santri Islam.
Historically, the residents of Kepakisan were mostly
adherents of abangan Islam. Before the arrival of Islam,
they had mostly followed the Hindu–Buddhist traditions
that permeated the Dieng Highlands. As in other areas
of Java, nature, myth, and the supernatural—including
guardian spirits—have played important roles in traditional
spirituality (Bruinessen 2015; Robert 1987). Significant
changes occurred, however, after Supoyo Raharjo became
the Village Chief of Kepakisan in 2010. In this official
capacity, Supoyo promoted what he deemed a “pure” Islam,
one with a heavy emphasis on Sharia law and symbols,
and consequently challenged the Hindu and Buddhist
influences that remained in society. This is interesting to
note, as the people of Kepakisan ultimately transformed
their beliefs, abandoning syncretic traditions in favor of a
“pure” and “modern” Islam (Nashir et al. 2019). Although
Muhammadiyah has long been active in the region, it has
focused mostly on philanthropic activities (Latief and Nashir
2020) and avoided practical politics (Nashir et al. 2019).
The Muslims of Kepakisan have traditionally been
involved in such practices as Manakiban, textual recitations
(borrowing from the Mawlid Barzanji, the Tahlil, and Surah
Ya-Sin), and death anniversaries (on the seventh, fortieth,

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Zuly Qodir, Krismono, and Irwan Abdullah

and hundredth day). Similarly, village cleansing activities


have long been practiced, showing how villagers combined
Islamic thought with local culture (Hefner 2018b). Over
time, however, sermons by Supoyo Raharjo led residents to
increasingly abandon such traditions. He taught that Islam
should not be blended with local tradition, promoting what
has been deemed “pure” Islam (Hefner 2018c). The village’s
main mosque, Nurul Haq Mosque, provided him with his
main pulpit.
Supoyo found success preaching “pure” Islam in part
due to the support of Muhammadiyah, the Islamic Union
(Persatuan Islam, PERSIS), and the Islamic Association
(Sarekat Islam, SI), long-standing organizations with a
similar interest in promoting a “pure” Islam (Hefner 2016).
Supoyo’s close ties with these organizations facilitated
his preaching activities. At the same time, he supported
the invitation of Muhammad Adib, a student of Jafar Umar
Thalib, to preach at the Nurul Haq Mosque. This marked the
rise of Salafism in Kepakisan.
Muhammad Adib’s sermons were attended by many
members of the local community, and he was able to convince
audiences by using references to the Qur’an and the Hadiths.
The phrase “Return to the Qur’an and the Sunnah” was
commonly used in his sermons (Hefner 2016). Over time, as
it became evident that Muhammad Adib’s religious beliefs
differed from those of Muhammadiyah, the organization
distanced itself from the preacher. During their sermons,
Adib and Supoyo urged audiences to avoid becoming divided
by their religious organizations (ashobiyah); they argued that
one is Muslim, not a Muhammadiyah Muslim, NU Muslim,

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PERSIS Muslim, etc. Such understandings became common


among the people of Kepakisan. However, after Supoyo left
office, contestation has become increasingly intense; Adib, the
main proponent of Salafism in the village, has lost the political
and economic resources needed to dominate the community’s
religious discourses.

D. The Rise of Salafism in Kepakisan

The emergence and development of Salafi thought


in Kepakisan cannot be separated from Muhammad Adib,
a student of Jafar Umar Thalib who first taught Salafism
in the village. Raised in a family of NU members, Adib had
previously studied at the NU-affiliated Berjan al-Nawawi
Pesantren in Purworejo—one of Central Java’s most famed
Islamic boarding schools. After completing his secondary
studies in Purworejo, he moved to Yogyakarta, where he
studied mathematics education at the Faculty of Tarbiyah,
Sunan Kalijaga State Islamic Institute (now the Sunan
Kalijaga State Islamic University). With these qualifications,
he began teaching math at a madrasa in Wonosobo City.
While living in the regency capital, he also became active as
a preacher, in which capacity he became recognized for his
skill and his influence.
Adib played an important role in spreading Salafism in
Wonosobo, spreading its teachings from mosque to mosque.
These understandings were also spread through a monthly
magazine, titled Salafy, which was distributed to the general
public. This magazine, which significantly supported the
mission of the Degolan Salafi Institute, was designed in part
to challenge the dominance of the magazine as-Sunnah, which

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Zuly Qodir, Krismono, and Irwan Abdullah

was deemed to no longer represent Salafi beliefs. Being heavily


involved in this magazine, and with significant support from
the people of Wonosobo, Adib and his associates became
an important catalyst in the rapid spread of Salafi teachings
throughout the regency.
As such, Adib’s Salafi teachings spread rapidly throughout
urban and rural Wonosobo. His interactions with Mat Thayib,
a village leader in Kepakisan and close colleague of Supoyo
Raharjo, laid the groundwork for Salafism’s introduction to
the village. It is through these networks that Muhammad Adib
and Supoyo Raharjo were introduced. Learning of their shared
vision and mission to eradicate shirk, takhayyul (superstition),
and bid’ah (heresy). Supoyo later recommended that Adib
take his position as a preacher. Supoyo became increasingly
certain in his beliefs after reading Salafy, and began praising
Salafism as providing the most comprehensive understanding
of Islamic doctrine (Thayib 2019).
Wildan identifies several factors that have contributed
to rural Indonesians’ ready acceptance of Salafism, a Middle
Eastern model of Islam. First, the people of rural Indonesia—
especially in Java—are known for their friendliness and
openness; second, rural peoples tend to emphasize harmony
and tolerance in their culture; third, rural peoples tend to be
more willing to accept new Islamic movements so long as said
movements do not contradict their own Islamic traditions;
fourth, modernization and globalization have made it possible
to learn about diverse alternatives, and thus to choose the
form best suited to one’s interests; and fifth, rural peoples
often face financial difficulties, which results in them being
more likely to join social movements (Wildan 2013).

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In Kepakisan, Salafism has been accepted as it has spread


Islamic teachings while simultaneously offering a seemingly
logical means of addressing issues: referring to the explicit
teachings of the Qur’an and the Sunnah, as understood through
al-Salaf as-Salih (al-Qur’an wa al-Sunnah ‘ala fahm al-salaf al-
ummah). Without this final element, it argues, the teachings
and practices of Islam could never be correctly realized. At the
same time, Salafism staunchly rejects taqlīd (blind adherence
to the authority of later ulamas), emphasizing instead the
primacy of the Qur’an and the Sunnah in Islamic belief and
law (Hasan 2012a). In place of taqlīd, Salafism promotes an
independent approach to exegesis, considering ijtihad the
best means of addressing contemporary issues and problems
(Meijer 2009).
Salafism’s introduction to Kepakisan shows that the
Islamic thought of the Middle East, as introduced through
modernization and globalization, can cause significant socio-
religious transformations even in areas where local traditions
and beliefs have been strong (Rohmana 2019). Historically,
the religious beliefs, morals, and practices of Kepakisan, a
village located in an isolated part of the Dieng Highlands, have
differed significantly from those of Salafism. For decades,
the Islamic Reform promoted by Supoyo Raharjo had little
effect on villagers’ Islamic identities. However, once Salafism
took root, it established a theological perspective and socio-
political reality that challenged the longstanding traditions of
the village; a similar phenomenon has been noted in Lombok
(Sila 2020). As such, the rise of Salafism in Kepakisan can be
understood as a continuation of the Islamic reform led and
promoted by Supoyo Raharjo in his capacity as a religious

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leader. It differed predominantly in its offering of new forms


of religiosity and alternative symbols of identity.
The growth of Salafism in Kepakisan over the past
decade is also inexorably tied to the community’s success
in teaching d’ai to spread its views (Chaplin 2020). After
Muhammad Adib left the village to focus on managing the
Ta’dhimus Sunnah Pesantren in Wonosobo City, several new
preachers have taken his place. Many of these young Salafis,
having received scholarships to study at the largest Salafi
pesantren in Java, have obtained the understanding of Salafi
doctrine and aptitude for preaching necessary to ensure the
community’s continued regeneration (Chaplin 2018). They
are locally born, having been raised in Kepakisan’s Salafi
community, and thus know the village’s particular needs and
feel responsible for its continued wellbeing. Among the most
prominent of these young d’ai are Arif, Musa, Ra’uf, and Kurnia.
Arif studied under Ustadz Muslim Abu Ishaq at the al-Furqan
Pesantren in Kroya, Cilacap; Musa was a student of Ustadz
Muhammad Umar as-Sewed at Dhiya as-Sunnah Pesantren,
Cirebon; Ra’uf learned from Ustadz Luqman Ba’abduh at the
as-Salafy Pesantren in Jember; and Kurnia studied under
Ustadz Affifuddin at al-Bayyinah Pesantren in Gresik before
traveling to Yemen to continue his studies (Woodward 2017).

E. Conclusion
The development of Salafism in rural Java, as shown by
the case of Kepakisan, cannot be separated from the political
and economic transformations that have accompanied
Indonesia’s political reform and the ongoing process of
globalization. The spread of Salafism is strongly driven by the

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desire to consolidate political and economic power; however,


as the movement presents itself primarily as a religious one,
this motivation is not readily recognized. Likewise, the rise
of Salafism in Indonesia has been inexorably intertwined
with the political reforms implemented in the country since
the collapse of the New Order in 1998. As Indonesia became
increasingly democratic, new political and Islamic movements
began vying to dominate public spaces, finding particularly
fertile soil in the rural parts of the archipelago.
Many elites have integrated themselves into Indonesia’s
Salafi movements, including in rural Java. Such elites’ efforts
to control public religious discourses while simultaneously
establishing new enclaves must be considered when exploring
global Salafism. At the same time, the ideological motivations
that underpin the Salafi movement must also be considered.
Local and global motives intertwine, with the ultimate goal of
replacing Indonesia’s economic and political system with an
Islamist one that is capable of protecting the nation from the
destruction wrought by global capitalism.
The contestation between religious organizations and
actors in rural Java has occurred, in part, as globalization
has made it possible for transnational Islamism to spread
around the world. Several of Indonesia’s nascent Islamic
movements trace their roots to the Middle East, be it to Saudi
Arabia, Yemen, or Iran, and their messages have resonated
significantly in rural Java—including in Wonosobo, Central
Java. It is because of this resonance that global Salafism has
grown rapidly in Indonesia.

QIJIS, Volume 11, Number 2, 2023 265


Zuly Qodir, Krismono, and Irwan Abdullah

Acknowledgments: The authors would like to thank Prof.


Dr. Achmad Nurmandi, M.Sc, and Prof. Dr. Sunyoto Usman for
their discussions, through which this article’s analysis has
been greatly honed. To the Program of Islamic Politics, the
authors would like to express their gratitude.

Funding: Research for this article was funded by the Jusuf


Kalla School of Government, Universitas Muhammadiyah
Yogyakarta, as part of the Islamic Project-122 Program
(2019).

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