IDENTIFICATION FRIEND-OR-FOE (IFF) SENSOR

UNCERTAINTIES, AMBIGUITIES, DECEPTION AND THEIR

APPLICATION TO THE MULTI-SOURCE FUSION PROCESS

TOD M. SCHUCK', BILL SHOEMAKER", and JEFF WILLEYml

Lockheed Martin Naval Electronics & Surveillance Systems, 199 Borton Landing Road, 137-207,
Moorestown, New Jersey, 08057, USA, [email protected]

'ZAI-AMELEX, 304 Airport Drive, California, Maryland, 206 19, USA, [email protected]
VII
Naval Research Laboratory, 4555 Overlook Avenue, Code 5344, Washington D.C., 20375, USA,
jeff.willey @nrl.navv.mil

Abstract. The importance of quantifying and modeling sensor uncertainties associated with kinematic,
attribute, and hybrid sensors and their effect on the data fusion process (Bayesian, Dempster-Shafer, etc.)
has not been well described. This paper explores some of the characteristics and uncertainties associated
with MK XI1 Identification Friend-or-Foe (IFF) including its limitations, inherent error sources, and
robustness to jamming and interference. A general multi-source sensor fusion process is described using
Non-Cooperative Target Recognition (NCTR), Electronic Support Measures (ESM) and IFF dissimilar
source inputs with specific attention placed on realizable IFF sensor systems and how they need to be
characterized in order to understand and design an optimized and effective multi-source fusion process.

Key Words: sensor uncertainties, IFF, multi-sensor fusion, Bayesian, Dempster-Shafer

1. INTRODUCTION background of friendly forces and neutral objects

PI.
The multi-source sensor fusion process has been
described in numerous studies [ l ] [2] [3] [4] as a The output of a meaningful multi-source fusion
way to improve the process for combat identification principally
space/air/surface/land/subsurface track picture to includes the following parameters [3]:
facilitate higher quality identification of tracked
objects. In a modem Naval Battle Group, Identity - in this case as dictated by
surface and air units may have thousands of Operational Specification 516.2 (OS 5 16.2)
objects within their sphere of influence to detect, which specifies pending, unknown, assumed
track, identify, and possibly deceive and/or friend, friend, neutral, suspect, and hostile
engage. Even without active deception by an designations.
opposing force, limitations of sensor gridlock Classification - which includes:
and alignment, registration, radio-frequency (RF) Category (air, surface, subsurface,
propagation, and inherent measurement land. space)
inaccuracies lead to difficulties in establishing Platform (fighter, destroyer, aircraft
the quality of the reported information. There carrier, tank, etc.)
exist many difficulties in the correlation of Type (F-14, Combatant,
kinematic and attribute information with other Amphibious ship, submarine, etc.)
sensor information and in correlating other Class (F-l4D, Arleigh Burke
diverse sensors to identify potentially hostile (DDG), Wasp (LHD), etc.)
aircraft, missiles, and ships in a cluttered Unit (VF-101, Ramage (DDG 61),
Boxer (LHD-4), etc.)

'
Work done by Bill Shoemaker (ZAI-AMELEX) was in support of NAWCAD St. Inigoes under contract
number N00421-97-C- 1434.

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 Nationality (U.S., Russia, France,
Iraq, etc.) Regardless, before exploring specific uncertainty
Activity (ASW, USW, RECON, types, it is necessary to identify how uncertainty
etc.) figures into the multi-source fusion process.
0 Confidence (numerical measure of
certainty/quality of identification (ID)) 2. UNCERTAINTY AND A GENERIC
0 Rationale (reason(s) for ID selection) MULTI-SOURCE FUSION PROCESS
Source (organic and off-board source(s) of
ID) The methodology for the multi-source fusion
process that will serve strictly as an example for
The input requirements for this same process are our uncertainty discussions is a combination of
varied according to the type or "flavor" of sensor the Bayesian quantitative identity inference and
information available. However, the assumption the Dempster-Shafer (D-S) generalization of the
is that there are three types of organic sensor Bayesian process for qualitative data. It has been
information available (at a minimum) - MK XI1 shown that the best solution for qualitative
Identification Friend-or-Foe (IFF), Electronic attribute fusion is the direct implementation of
Support Measures (ESM), and Non-Cooperative . the D-S process while pure quantitative attributes
Target Recognition (NCTR), based on the are best applied to a Bayesian algorithm prior to
complementary nature of the information from application to the D-S fusion process [4]. The D-
these categories of sensors. IFF operates as a S process allows for a general level of
reasonably narrow-band, directional uncertainty, which unlike the Bayesian approach
communications system deteriorating in provides for a specific account for unknown
performance with the square of the range (R') to possible causes of observational data, such as the
the cooperating track of interest using two case in a hostile military environment in which
distinct uplink/downlink frequencies (1030/1090 sensor measurements are corrupted by enemy
MHz) and can provide both medium to high countermeasures [5].The D-S process however,
quality kinematic and ID information. requires more computational resources compared
Uncertainties are similar to radar in some to a Bayesian inference process given a few
respects while the ID codes generated have sensors in a nonparallel implementation due to
unique error functions. ESM and NCTR must be slower convergence, which supports a dual
considered for the completeness of the BayesianID-S approach.
multisource sensor fusion process and will be
discussed in separate correspondence.
Taxonomy
(classificationhypothesis)
and Belief

Kinematics information
and Uncertainty
Updated
Track
Taxonomy
and Belief
(AHSO ,N

Attribute Information
and Uncertainty/Belief
- -
Data Base

Figure 1. Multi-Source Fusion Process

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 Referencing Figure l., a modified realization of Mapping to Taxonomy include the sensor
the proposed Multi-Source Integration Systems kinematic measurements and their respective
Engineering Team (MSI SET) Attribute Fusion uncertainties, which include inherent
F'rocess, we will use organic sensor data derived uncertainties and ambiguities associated with
from multiple, organic sources that is both sensor quality and performance, as well as
kinematic and attribute based. This is an uncertainties potentially caused by enemy
autonomous fusion model where each sensor deception. The outputs into the D-S fusion
type processes data locally and produces an process include the probability that a taxometric
output or ID decision for inclusion into the hypothesis is true given a certain kinematic input
fusion process. Each of these sensors also has with uncertainty, and the likelihood associated
measurement and instrument uncertainty. Some with a taxometric hypothesis and associated
of this uncertainty is derived from the attribute(s).
environment and tracked object phenomenology,
while the sensor itself generates other The mechanics of a MSI process are further
uncertainties. The total uncertainty can be illustrated in Figure 2 [4]. AHS(t,) is the updated
modeled with a priori probabilities and Active Hypothesis Support at a time of validity
probability mass functions suitable for Bayesian (t,) that consists of a group of ID
and D-S fusion. Uncertainty information can recommendations (H) and their confidence
also be provided from the fusion database. The values B( (H)).
inputs to the Bayesian Fusion and Attribute

MSI Input: SSI, DSI, Other- MSI Output

Report time of validity
Source identification code
*
Sensor kinematic state at the time of validity Time of validity
Object kinematic state at the time of validity
Uncertainty associated with object kinematic state
Attributes associated with object
AHS (tv ) =
[
p} Set of active hypotheses at t
:(p})l Z 4 k e l i h o o d associated
Uncertainty associated with attributes
Taxonomic hypotheses assigned to object *
Beliefilikelihoodassociated with taxonomic
hwtheses

['v 1 Time of validity of hypothesis

Set of MSI reports associated with hypothesis
Belief associated with MSI reports

Report time of validity

Fused kmemabc state at the time of validity
Uncertainty associated with fused lonematic state
Associated source reports
Taxonomic hypotheses supported by associated reports
BeliefAikelihocd associated with taxonomic hypotheses j
and kmematic state 2

Figure 2. MSI Input/Output Associations with Uncertainty

Specifically, the MSI input values of: where,

CK = Sum of Kinematic Uncertainty (1) CK,n=

o;,E= o;,,,,
+ 4 z . a 2 + ...+ o;n.ml(3)
and,
is the sum-square error that we are concerned
with characterizing for IFF for this paper.
C, = Sum of Attribute Uncertainty (2)

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 3. IFF UNCERTAINTIES, AMBIGUITIES, of uncertainty, we find that a good place to start
AND ROBUSTNESS TO INTERFERENCE is the generalized pulse position modulation
(PPM) equation valid for both the interrogation
A general description of IFF principles is beyond and reply IFF pulse trains 171:
the scope of this paper, however the interested
reader is referred to the standard text by Stevens
[6] for additional information. However, (4)
common IFF error and uncertainty sources n=-
include the following:
a) Mechanical (interrogator antenna where g ( t ) represents the shape of individual
rotating equipment including wind
pulses at occurrence times t , l . For IFF
loading and pitch and roll)
b) Antenna pattern degradation interrogation and reply pulses this becomes a
(mechanical and phased array) sum of cosines where:
C) Timingktabilityhdar pre-trigger jitter
N
d) m of n reply failures and split targets
e ) Round reliabilityhtemal-external
xIFF( t )= C I A C O S ( ~+Unt,,Lc))I (5)
n=O
suppression of transponder (including
intentional and unintentional Where: N = the number of cosines used to
jamming) generate the interrogator and transponder reply
f) Friendly Replies Uncorrelated-In- pulses suitable for a specified 10 - 90% rise time
Time (FRUIT) of 0.05 - 0.1 ps and a fall time of 0.05 - 0.2 ps.
g) Garble code, interleaved pulses, and A = pulse amplitude (constant)
echoes t,,= 3 , 5, 8, and 21ps pulse pairs
h) False (phantom) targets, fruit targets, respectively for modes 1, 2, 3/A, and C not
ring-around targets, and inline targets including the interrogator side lobe suppression
i) Antenna blockage (structures and pulse P2; and for transponders,
dynamic maneuvering if on aircraft)
j) Transponder reply generation
variability (A time)
k) CO-located interference systems where n = the number of discrete 0.45 ps reply
(primarily effects transponder)
code pulses present with a T, = 1.45 ps interval.
1) Multipath and altitude lobing
m) Mode C (barometric) altimeter errors For PPM, the information resides on the leading
(non-linear diaphragms, shaft edge of the pulse, which is true of IFF
eccentricity, etc.) interrogator and transponder systems after a
n) Equipment alignment minimum pulsewidth threshold is met. The
0) Tracking filter characteristics and cost additive uncertainty (errors) in the two IFF
functions channels is potentially a non-stationary process
p) Deceptive IFF code stealersh-epeaters and can be described as [7]:

Specific values for these uncertainty sources

will vary with the specific IFF system used and (7)
the environment where it resides (i.e. land-
based, shipboard, or aircraft-based). For most Where: T, = pulse risetime
of our discussions we will be assuming a A = pulse amplitude
land/sea-based interrogator with airbome rz(ti) = channel interference (noise,
transponder(s). The measurement of these distortions, jamming, code gable, etc.)
error sources individually may not always be
feasible, but combining them into total
uplinkldownlink characterizations will make Quantifying n(t,) is a complex process and
them more manageable. Expounding on this again will vary depending on the specific IFF
list and only concentrating on the major sources system and environment, which we will expand

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 on shortly. Regardless, the next step is to spectrally “near” L-band, co-located military
characterize the probability that a target is even systems such as the Joint Tactical Information
detected given that it has been interrogated. This Distribution System (JTIDS), values of pstr can
is related by the following expression [6]: be much less (pstr << 0.80) [SI. This is due to
internal reply rate suppressions caused by valid
interrogations and capturing co-located
interference signals causing the transponder to
go into reply rate limiting (nominally 1200
repliedsec). To a lesser extent, systems like the
Where: = probability of transponder reply Traffic Advisory and Collision Avoidance
System (TCAS) and Tactical Air Navigation
detection meeting m replies out of n possible (TACAN) also add to the duty cycle of the
criteria transponder. These effects can be reflected in (9)
n = sliding window length by effectively increasing numint.pr&. and h i n t .
m = minimum number of replies
threshold (at the interrogator) Even when a transponder does successfully reply
pstr = probability of a single to successive interrogations enough to satisfy an
transponder reply given the instantaneous m of n tracker to form a pending track, the
suppression condition of the transponder when interrogator receiver must receive the replies
the interrogation is incident (also called “round without code garble caused by FRUIT, closely
reliability”) spaced targets in azimuth, and in line targets.
FRUIT rates can exceed I00,000/sec for short
and. bursts and average around 20,000-40,000/sec for
short periods of time. FRUIT is deterministic,
but completely asynchronous, random, and
varies considerably depending on the density of
the aircraft transponder-to-interrogator
(9) environment. Thus, it is difficult to construct
stationary probability models. However, there
where: td+= transponder dead time generated by
are various means to virtually eliminate FRUIT
internal suppression for interrogation processing, interference including interrogation trigger
reply generation and transmission, transmitter jittering to eliminate synchronous interference,
recovery time, etc., (nominally 90-100 ys) azimuth width and start criteria measures to
numint= number of interrogators visible eliminate false targets, application of a hold
to the transponder (nominally 10-30) before stop criteria to avoid spilt targets, and
pr& = average interrogator pulse reply pattern comparison for echo cancellation
repetition frequency (nominally 300-400 Hz for [9]. If modern IFF processing is implemented,
long range air search) the false targets created from FRUIT should be
bwint = effective interrogator antenna no more than one per day, regardless of the
beam width density of the transponder reply environment as
long as the FRUIT processing is sufficiently
In an example as related by Stevens [6],eYd = robust and not overwhelmed.
0.914 given at least six transponder replies
received (in = 6 ) necessary in a sliding window IFF replies only begin to interfere with each
length of 9 (iz = 9) given a pstr = 0.80. Normally other in range when they are separated by less
pstr will be closer to 0.97 to >0.99 rather than than approximately 1.2 effective beam-widths
0.80 for most civil ATC and other relatively (one effective beam width plus the number of
benign environments. However, in high tempo misses required to allow a new centroid
joint military battlegroups with a multitude of declaration from the tracking algorithms) in
interrogators present, pstr can be at or less than azimuth at the point when their reply code pulses
0.80 for short periods of time due to transponder begin to overlap. Given that the IFF reply pulse
reply rate limiting which is not considered in (9). data is sampled, then the two replies must be
In fact, given a military aircraft when uncertainty separated by at least one clock period to
sources (a) through (0)(disregarding jamming guarantee that the pulse transition(s) is/are
for the moment) are considered in a battlegroup detected. This is described as [lo]:
environment, especially with the effects from

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 Where: Rcr= range differential between the two
targets at first instance of interference
til= length if IFF reply (p)
t,= sample period (p)
TDF time/distance conversion constant

This is illustrated in Figure 3 [ 101.

n U AI U U U
Leading Twget
U I N ma m U n n I
Figure 4. Initial Interlace of Two Transponder
Replies

........................................................................... /,.,,. .,,,..,,...I......,.,.................I ........... I .........................

First InterferenceRqim t+

If the IFF replies are non-interfering (which

Figure 3. Initial Interference of Two
includes full interlacing) then their ranges and
Transponder Replies
codes are considered reliable. If an IFF reply is
either the first or last in a series of interfering
Eventually the two transponder replies can
replies then it is reliable in range (based on
become interlaced whereupon they no longer F1@2 locations), but uncertain in code. If the
interfere with each other and can be properly
reply lies within a series of interfering targets,
detected. The first interlace occurs when the
then it is considered a “garbled” reply and both
falling edge of the trailing reply separates from
range and code are considered uncertain.
the rising edge of the reply of the leading target.
Azimuth calculations are similar where two
The range (RImI) between the two targets where
separate IFF replies begin to overlap. Just as in
they achieve their first interlace is [lo],
the range calculation, the replies must be
separated by one (reply) beam width plus the
t,. - 2tPIl.
- t, number of misses that allows a new centroid
R, = declaration in the tracking algorithm.
TDC
where t,,, is the pulse width (nominally 0.45 ps) IFF mode C produces altitude reports in 100-foot
of the interlaced reply. This is illustrated in increments. The uncertainty in mode C is
Figure 4 [ 101. dependent on the altimeter type used by the
reporting aircraft, its correct operation, and how
Combining equations (10) and (1 l), the extent of dynamic the altitude transitions are at the time of
interference regions (Rot) can be expressed as interrogation. Depending on the IFF processing,
[ 101: if the altitude differs by more than 1000 feet
between successive sweeps, the last reported
til. + t , - ( n - 1)(tPIl2
+t, 1 mode C altitude information is discarded.
Rcn = (12)
TDC In general, modem microprocessor controlled
where tp.vis the pulse spacing (nominally 1.45 ps IFF systems can provide very precise kinematic
leading edge to leading edge) of the interfering information. lo range and bearing accuracies of
reply, and the interlace ranges (RIwlr)are defined = 0.60 feet and = 0.3 - 0.5 degrees (non-
as: monopulse) and = 0.05 degrees (monopulse)
respectively are routine with modem IFF
systems. IFF is also by nature unaffected by

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 clutter, slow moving targets, and rapid radar detections. Multipath in IFF as in radar is the
cross section (RCS) changes, which should also result of the interrogation energy from
be used to effect the weight of IFF relative to horizontally polarized fan beam antennas
radar track update contributors whenever the following two separate paths to the target, one
velocity of the object is below a certain threshold direct and the other reflected off of a surface.
or clutter is above a given threshold. The results of the different path lengths create a
lobing effect where areas of constructive and
For shipboard IFF interrogator installations, mast destructive interference exist. This effect is
blockage can reduce IFF range across several readily seen in Figure 6., which shows the
degrees of bearing by many miles depending on measured IFF data from the AN/SPS-40 aboard
the IFF antenna and the extent that it is blocked. the USNS Capable [12].
There is no set amount of degradation; it is
dependent upon the superstructure configuration,
the placement of the IFF antennas, and their tilt
in altitude. These null areas need to be
accommodated into the MSI process so that the
lack of an IFF reply in obstructed areas can be
accounted for properly. Experiments found that
the blockage of the AN/SPS-67 and AN/SPS-49
radar IFF antennas on the LSD-41 ship class
were approximately f 13" and k 25" respectively
about the aft centerline of the ship Ell]. The
LHA-1 class was far worse as seen in Figure 5.

Figure 6. AN/SPS-40 IFF Multipath on Stalwart

class USNS CnpabZe (T-AGOS 16)

In Figure 6., the raw IFF target replies are only

present in the regions of multipath maximas and
the in-phase range doubling maximas and out-of-
phase vertical mutipath nulls are clearly seen
around the areas of IFF target replies. The white
curve is a representation of the standard
atmospheric model. An interesting note
concerns the IFF replies nearing 200 nmi at less
than 2,500 feet. These are actual replies
attributed to extreme L-band ducting during
testing. The multipath characteristic is
described by:
Figure 5. LHA-1 Antenna Coverage with (a)
AN/SPS-67 (inner ring) nulls at f 5" centerline
and f 11" port centered, (b) AN/SPS-48 (middle
ring) null at 45" port shifted from 0", and (c)
AN/SPS-40 (outer ring) nulls at 33" starboard
shifted and f 1I" centered due aft. Where: F = the pattern propagation factor (at a
point in space) of the field strength that is
The interested reader is referred to The Ohio present as a result of multipath effects
State University ElectroScience Laboratory NEC f(@ = interrogator antenna pattern (free-
program for extensive simulation of the space)
electromagnetic effects due to topside h = interrogator antenna height
configurations of multiple shipboard radiators. 8 = elevation angle of the target (above
ground)
Vertical L-band multipath nulls occur at all IFF A = wavelength of transmission signal
ranges which also results in a significant loss of

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 which equates to [6], directional antenna is the most resilient. The SIF
modes should not be relied upon to provide
secure information because of the ease in
developing SIF mode replies from readily
available equipment. Assuming jamming is
directed towards a transponder (also true for an
interrogator), since IFF is a communications

e,, + 1)A
=sin-'{ (2n4h } system it follows that the jamming-to-signal
power ratio (J/S)follows the form [ 141:

where: e,, = angle of multipath minima (null)

= angle of mutipath maxima
n = 0,1,2,3,...N
Where: E R P j , R = effective radiated power of the
The in-phase maximas double the effective IFF jammer and IFF interrogator respectively
range, while the minima severely reduce the R B , B j = propagation path lengths of
effective IFF range. These nulls can present a interrogator-to-transponder and jammer-to-
significant problem for IFF track continuity, start transponder respectively
or stop track functions, and can contribute to G B j , B R = transponder antenna gain in the
multiple track declarations. direction of the jammer and interrogator
respectively
Two methods exist to help significantly
eliminate IFF multipath effects. One is to Pulse jamming, whether intentional or not, can
correlate two IFF interrogator systems with significantly effect the pstr of a transponder. IFF
similar antenna types with the antennas separated transponders generally only have narrow pulse
by 20 - 25 feet in elevation. This allows for the rejection circuitry, and are generally unaffected
multipath nulls to altemate between maximas of by wide pulses that are within their 3 dB
the two systems thereby virtually eliminating bandwidth if rising edges are not spaced at an
loss of altitude coverage. The second is the approximate interrogation SIF pulse spacing.
result of shipboard experiments that show that if However, if the pulses are incident on the
an IFF interrogator antenna of sufficient gain and bandpass fringes within the noise bandwidth of
narrow beam width (= 54") is utilized. then any the transponder, then a form a skirt jamming
ship roll greater than approximately 2" is arises where sporadic non-linear responses due
sufficient to separate the direct and reflected to abrupt discontinuities of the multitude of odd
beam mutipaths [13]. The result is the direct and phase changes normally present in the bandpass
reflected beams exist in different locations in transition regions occur where frequency and
space and no longer provide altemating phase no longer have a linear relationship. Wide
interference patterns. For ease and effectiveness pulses get detected as a random series of narrow
of IFF tracking and incorporation into the data pulses and are processed as valid interrogations,
fusion process, the minimization of mutipath thus causing additional intemal reply
nulls through one of these techniques should be suppressions when valid interrogations are
performed. incident ( p s h << 1). Similarly as previously
mentioned, the wide (as compared to
The robustness of IFF to jamming either interrogator) pulse from JTIDS sometimes
intentional or accidental is questionable. Non- manifests itself as either a mode 1 or 2
encrypted modes or "SIF' modes (1, 2, 3/A, and interrogation to co-located transponders [81.
C) were never designed to be resistant to any
non-IFF form of pulse modulated FW because of The interrogator works differently since it relies
their rather isolated 1030/1090 MHz frequencies upon a DEFRUITing function to remove
at the time of design. Effort was taken by the asynchronous pulses prior to IFF reply
DoD establishment to reduce CW interference processing. The unlikely chances of spurious
(anti-jam) in both IFF interrogators and replies or jamming (not mimicking synchronous
transponders, but the interrogator system with its
pulse-to-pulse DEFRUITing capability and

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 transponder replies and no barrage) being passed
follows a Poisson distribution, given by: 6. REFERENCES

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5. ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS [IO] Utara, Christian J., White Paper “ANKJPX-

36(V) Central Identification Friend or Foe Target
The authors would like to thank their respective Range and Azimuth Resolution”, NAWCAD St.
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Moorestown, ZAI-AMELEX (supporting
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John Sudano at Lockheed Martin NE&SS for his Antennas”, NAWCAD St. Inigoes, September
suggestion for and thoughtful review of this 29, 1997.
manuscript.

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 [12] Shoemaker, William B., IFF on the William B. Shoemaker graduated from the
ANISPS-40 Multipath Diagram, USNS Capable United States Naval Academy in 1961 and the
testing, 1998. United States Naval Postgraduate School in 1968
with an MS in Electronics Engineering. After
[ 131 Shoemaker, William B., "Final Verification his commission, he was assigned to US Naval
of ITMS (AN/UPX-36(V)) aboard USNS destroyers as an anti-submarine and engineering
Capable", Memo, November 1999. officer. Following assignments brought him to
the Naval Ship Engineering Center in Hyattsville
[14] Lothes, Robert N., Szymanski, Michael B., Maryland as the Anti-Ship Missile Coordinator
and Wiley, Richard G . Radar Vulnerability to and assistant Radar Branch Head, eventually
Jamming, Artech House, MA, 1990. pp. 8-16. obtaining the rank of Lieutenant Commander
USN. While assigned to this duty station, Mr.
7. AUTHOR BIOGRAPHIES Shoemaker worked extensively with the
ANISPS-33 phased array and ANISPS-48C
Tod M. Schuck obtained radars. Mr. Shoemaker left active duty and
his BEE in 1989 from the returned to the Naval Sea Systems Command
Georgia Institute of (NAVSEA) as a civil servant working with the
Technology and an MSEE ANISPS-40 MTI and ANISYS-1 integrated
in 1995 from the Florida automatic detection radars. As a Space and
Institute of Technology. Naval Warfare Systems Command (SPAWAR)
Mr. Schuck joined the engineer, he integrated the ANfI'PS-59,
Naval Air Warfare Center ANfI'PS-63, and U.S. Army HAWK radars for
Aircraft Division Egyptian Air Defense. As a NASA
(NAWCAD -formerly representative to the Johns Hopkins University
NESEA) St. Inigoes, Maryland as a civil servant Applied Physics Lab (JHU APL), he oversaw the
in 1989 upon graduation. While at NAWCAD, fabrication and testing of the TOPEX radar
he worked extensively on IFF interference altimeter. Currently, Mr. Shoemaker is
mechanisms aboard aircraft and ships. He was supporting the Naval Air Warfare Center
also the technical lead for the COTS based Aircraft Division (NAWCAD) St. Inigoes
Shipboard Advanced Radar Target Identification developing AN/UPX-36(V) tracking algorithms
System (SARTIS) NCTR prototype and the and IFFIradar fusion techniques.
NATO Seasparrow Missile System (NSSMS)
Mk-17 Mod 3 COTS based Signal Data Jeff Willey
Processor (currently in production), which was obtained his BS in
honored with U.S. Vice President A1 Gore's 1978 from the
Silver Hammer Award. Other accomplishments Rensselaer
included the design, construction, and testing of Polytechnic
an IFF monopulse receiver for the AN/UPX- Institute, and an
36(V), design and construction of a portable IFF MSEE in 1981
transponder system for the fishing boat of U.S. from the University
President George Bush, and a RadarIIFF training of Connecticut.
manual for the Peace Pannon Hungarian Home Mr. Willey ioined
Defense Forces. Currently, Mr. Schuck is a NRL's Radar Division in 1981. Hi; patents
Senior Member of the Engineering Staff at include beam steering and control of UHF
Lockheed Martin Naval Electronics and phased array radar, and elimination of a
Surveillance Systems - Moorestown working as randomly polarized noise jammer from the
a systems engineer on the Common Combat and radar's mainlobe. Recent efforts have been in the
Decision (Common C&D) system and the development of non-cooperative target
Cooperative Engagement Capability (CEC) identification techniques using pulse-Doppler
programs. Mr. Schuck has published papers on and non-coherent radar. His publications also
IFF/NCTR fusion and Combat System include learning and error prediction in neural
architectures and has a patent pending for a network classifiers.
VME-based digitally tunable analog receiver for
NCTR.

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