Published in Daniel Snell, ed.

Blackwell’s Companion to the Ancient Near East,

2nd edition. Oxford: Blackwell, 2020: 399-420.
These are uncorrected proofs

Warfare in Mesopotamia
Sarah C. Melville
War, broadly defined as open, declared conflict between organized societies, is one of the most
enduring, complex, and multivalent of human activities. This chapter explores how the people of
the ancient Near East waged war from the 3rd millennium to the fall of the Neo-Babylonian Empire
in the 6th century BCE. Given the vast temporal and geographical expanse involved, we can
consider only those continuities and changes that most affected the state’s capacity to field an army,
military organization and technologies, tactics, and ideology. Since any one of those topics, in any
period under discussion, warrants a monograph, the following overview focuses on Mesopotamia,
and where relevant, Hatti, Egypt, Syria-Palestine, Urartu, and Elam. Although evidence is
distributed unevenly across time and among different cultures, a wide range of written and material
sources sheds light on the conduct and meaning of warfare in the ancient Near East.
The ancients decried war as evil, but there is no indication that they believed lasting peace
possible. To them, conflict was “inherent in an intelligent and complete creation” (Foster 2007:
78). People feared war’s destructive power, even as they sought its potential benefits. Warfare
toppled thrones, caused widespread devastation, altered cultures and societies, and depleted
populations. But it also spurred state formation and presented opportunities for social
advancement and improved living conditions. International conflict inspired technological
innovation and fostered the exchange of ideas between ethnic groups and across geographical
regions. Over time, as similarly organized opponents faced one another repeatedly, they developed
shared practices and expectations that helped limit the effects of war. At no time was violence the
only method of conflict resolution, nor did military objectives usually intend the enemy’s
annihilation.
Across the ancient Near East, from at least the 4th millennium BCE, urban-based agrarian
societies and nomadic tribes went to war to protect or procure raw materials, human resources,
and territory or to enhance and secure their own power. The ability of a given state to raise an
army and maintain it in the field depended on economic and resource capacity, social
organization, and cultural beliefs. Though the restrictions that these imposed varied from society to
society and over time, everyone faced similar military challenges, which they dealt with as best they
could. The following practical constraints shaped warfare in the Near East throughout ancient
times:

 Everyone was associated with an authority figure -- a clan patriarch, tribal chief, city ruler, or
king -- who made military decisions and led armies.
  An army could stay in the field only for as long as it had access to food, water, weapons,
and crucial gear.
 Warfare was seasonal. Laborers could only leave their fields for limited periods, usually
late spring through early fall, when crops were available to forage. Occasionally, well-
equipped armies overwintered at a siege site or conditions allowed an extended campaign
season.
 Due to the dry, rugged environment, the availability of potable water and food restricted
armies to established routes of march.
 Well organized and resourced states could support standing forces and manage campaigns
into distant territory, but only the most powerful could hold and rule what they conquered.
 Temporary levies made up the bulk of all armies, and the state provided their equipment,
sustenance, and remuneration.
 Armies consisted of infantry and equestrian units armed with hand-held weapons and
armor. Equipment varied a great deal, and was reused and repurposed as necessary.
 Battle and siege tactics, military strategy, engineering, and fortification styles were
established early and retained their fundamental character thereafter.
 Technological change tended to be incremental rather than revolutionary, since it took
time for new techniques to spread and new materials, such as iron, to become widely
available.
Although states expanded and contracted, rose to prominence, and disappeared altogether, no
king ever achieved widespread, lasting peace.
Kings, Gods, and Warfare
Monarchy, like religion, remained central to state organization and military power throughout
ancient times. The risks entailed in warfare required justification, therefore, military action became
inextricably bound up with ideologies of kingship and religion (Pongratz-Leisten 2015; Mander
2016).
During the Early Dynastic Period in Mesopotamia (2900- 2350 BCE), priest-kings led
armies on behalf of their gods. Gradually, power shifted from temples to the crown, but the
relationship between the two institutions always remained symbiotic. When kingship became
hereditary toward the end of the period, the king solidified his role as intermediary between the
divine and earthly realms, and so outranked all other humans. The warning that the biblical
prophet Samuel gave the Hebrews about monarchy applied equally well to other Near Eastern
cultures: “This is what the king who will reign over you will claim as his rights: He will take your
sons and make them serve with his chariots and horses, and they will run in front of his
chariots. Some he will assign to be commanders of thousands and commanders of fifties, and
others to plow his ground and reap his harvest, and still others to make weapons of war and
equipment for his chariots… and you yourselves will become his slaves” (Samuel 8:10-18).
In ideological terms, war became a contest between kings that the gods decided, whereby
the victorious ruler proved his legitimacy, and the loser revealed his inadequacy. Success on the
battlefield could transform a rebel or usurper into a legitimate king, while defeat signaled the gods’
disapproval. Both Sargon of Akkad (2334-2279 BCE) and Sargon II of Assyria (721-705 BCE)
used this kind of retrospective reasoning to justify seizing power, while the latter’s death in battle
tainted the memory of his otherwise successful reign (Melville 2016a).
Before going to war, and throughout the campaign, leaders sought to secure the gods’
support through divination. In one Early Dynastic (2900-2350 BCE) text, for example, the king of
the Sumerian city-state, Lagash, described how the city’s patron god, Ningirsu, came to him in a
dream and foretold the defeat of neighboring Umma (Frayne 2008 = RIME E1.9.3.vi.22-vii.6).
Using a more direct approach, the Babylonian king Nebuchadnezzar I (1125-1104 BC) claimed
that the god Shamash “ordered him to plunder the land of Elam” (Frame 1995 = RIMB
2.4.10.15). Divination queries followed standard procedures and language. A typical Assyrian
example from the 7th century BCE asked:
God, Shamash, great lord, give me a firm positive answer to what I am asking you! From
this day, the 10th day of this month, Sivan of this year, to the 29th day, the day of the moon’s
disappearance of this month Sivan of this year, for 20 days and nights, passing and the
coming days included, the term stipulated for the performance of (this) extispicy, within
this stipulated term, (should) Esarhaddon, king of Assyria, who is now intent on sending
men, horses and troops, as he wishes, to Sirish, (and) whom your great divinity knows, in
accordance with the command of your great divinity, Shamash, great lord, (and) your
favorable decisions, should the subject of this query, Esarhaddon, king of Assyria, strive
and plan? Should he send men horses and troops, as he wishes to Sirish? Is it pleasing to
your great divinity? (Starr, 1990: #28)
The text goes on to question how much resistance the enemy would offer and whether the
Assyrians would successfully “kill what there is to kill, plunder what there is to plunder, and loot
what there is to loot.” Prognostication in its various forms not only guided commanders, but
encouraged the troops to endure the hardships involved in war (Sazonov 2016; Abrahami 2016).
In the first millennium, when empires encompassed vast territories, astronomical divination kept
the king informed about the distant areas he ruled.
Kings and priests performed rituals during every stage of a campaign. A variety of experts,
including a celestial diviner, extispicy priest, exorcist, and lamentation priest usually accompanied
armies on campaign (Rochberg 2004: 44–97). No decision could be made without consulting the
gods. During the Old Babylonian period (c. 2000-1550 BCE), one commander assured the king of
Mari, “I had extispicies (reading of sheep’s entrails) done for the well-being of the troops of my
lord…and the extispicies were sound, and the troops of my lord may move from their position”
(Heimpel 2003: 216 = ARM 26 103). If a reading proved negative, priests sometimes repeated the
process or looked at other kinds of omens. Pre-battle ceremonies like the Babylonian rite called
“So that in battle arrows do not come near a man” promised physical protection and thus helped
allay soldiers’ fears (Frame and George 2005: 281).
Post-battle rituals purified the participants from the blood taint incurred in combat,
thanked the relevant gods, and celebrated victory. After his defeat of the Urartians in 714 BCE,
Sargon II enthused, “I entered my camp with joy and exultation, with players on lyres and flutes.
To Nergal, Adad, Ishtar, lords of battle, to the gods who dwell in heaven and the netherworld, and
to the gods who dwell in Assyria, I offered splendid sacred sacrifices” (Thureau-Dangin 1912 =
TCL III 156-63). The same king cited an eclipse and a favorable extispicy to justify his
unconventional side campaign against the city-state Muṣaṣir in the same year (Thureau-Dangin
1912 = TCL III 315-20). Rulers such as Sargon of Akkad (2334-2279 BCE) and Shalmaneser III
of Assyria (859-824 BCE) washed their weapons in the sea in purification rites to symbolize that
they had reached the edge of the civilized world (Frayne 1993: 14; Grayson 1996: 9). Upon
returning home, additional ceremonies involving military parades, the dedication of plunder to
temples, and the punishment of vanquished foes confirmed a war’s legitimacy (Noegel 2007;
Nadali 2013; Niditch 2014). Such events also invited civilians to appreciate the king and army, and
helped combatants reintegrate into society (Spalinger and Armstrong (eds.) 2013; Kelle 2014;
Melville 2016b). A successful war not only reinforced the established social hierarchy but
maintained order and affirmed cultural identities.
Warfare in the Third Millennium
Fortifications, cylinder seals, skeletal remains, and military artifacts found in fourth millennium
levels at Syro-Mesopotamian sites such as Hamoukar and Habuba Kabira, indicate that organized
warfare advanced along with fortified cities and systems of government well before writing had fully
developed (Nadali 2007; Algaze 2008: 70). Whether the earliest settlement walls served to keep
out raiders intent on stealing cattle and goods, or armies set on conquest is disputed, but by the
Early Dynastic period (c. 2900- c.2350 BCE) war had become a complex, organized enterprise.
Early Dynastic Mesopotamia (c. 2900- c.2350 BCE)
In southern Mesopotamia a constellation of city-states shared the Sumerian language, culture,
agricultural way of life, and warfighting methods. Urban defense systems included ditches, earthen
ramparts, and massive mudbrick curtain walls punctuated by fortified gateways (Zingarello 2015;
Butterlin and Rey 2016; Rey 2016). Some Sumerian city-states formed alliances for religious
purposes, mutual economic benefit, or to counteract a more powerful enemy. In roughly 2600
BCE the confederation known as the Kiengi League included the wealthy city-states Shuruppak,
Kish, Umma, Nippur, Adab, and Lagash. The king of Kish probably led this supra-regional
organization whose name, meaning the “assembly place”, referred to the area where soldiers from
these cities mustered before going on campaign (Foster 2005b: 83; Steible 2015). The object of the
campaigns is not clear, however. Nor did the confederation prevent war between its members or
protect them from ruin.
Both Shuruppak and Kish were destroyed during this period, whereas a border conflict
between Umma and Lagash continued intermittently for over a hundred and fifty years without
achieving a clear resolution. (Cooper 1983; Frayne 2008; Mander 2016: 11-14). When in about
2520 BCE a dispute arose over a strip of land located between the two city-states, the king of Kish,
as nominal head of the Kiengi League, arbitrated a settlement and set up a new boundary marker.
Nearly a hundred years later (c. 2450), after the king of Umma removed the stone and seized the
land, the conflict erupted again. This time the king of Kish did not intervene, for his city had lost
power and Lagash had dropped out of the league (Sallaberger and Westenholz 1999: 30, n. 58).
Once again, the king of Lagash emerged victorious and established new borders. A few years later,
when the king of Umma seized one of his enemy’s irrigation canals, the war started up again.
Although the rulers of Lagash prevailed each time, they did not attempt to take and destroy
Umma. Lagash was strong enough to impose hegemony over Umma, but did not have the
manpower to seize and occupy the city. Far from resolving problems, peace provided the loser
with the breathing space to re-arm, and as soon as he felt strong enough hostilities broke out anew.
The inscriptions that narrate the Umma-Lagash war follow a set pattern: a clear statement
of the enemy’s impious crime, obtaining the gods’ approval, victorious battle, celebratory rituals to
thank the gods, and the just king’s punishment of the enemy (Fink 2016: 55-56). Other
contemporary city-states followed similar military-religious procedures. For example, 24th century
letters from the Syrian city Ebla outline the course of its conflict with rival city Mari and adhere to
the typical pattern delineated above (Archi and Biga 2003). These same elements characterize
campaign accounts in later periods as well.
Aside from contingents of permanent royal or temple guards, Early Dynastic armies
consisted of common levies, occasionally augmented by mercenaries hired from neighboring cities.
Spearmen predominated, and wielded several types of spears including those affixed with a
notched butt knob for throwing atlatl-style (Weber and Zettler 1998: fig. 140; Schrakamp 2010).
Polearms, simple bows, slings, maces, and battle axes are also attested. Axes took a variety of
forms, including those with rounded, flat blades for cutting and those with thinner, heavier blades
for piercing. Bronze or copper daggers and short swords were prestige weapons too costly to make
for conscripts. Rare depictions of sickle swords and the recurve bow – both characteristic of
Middle Bronze Age (2100-1550 BCE) armies -- indicate the early invention of these weapons, if
not their widespread adoption (Aruz 2003: figure 52 and plate 98). Tower shields made of metal-
studded hide or bundled reeds protected archers and spearmen, who needed both hands to wield
their weapons. Evidence of smaller, personal shields does not appear in Mesopotamian art.
Leather, copper or bronze helmets, thick capes with appliqué metal discs, and possibly cardio-
phylax style chest protectors served as body protection (Hamblin 2006).
The depiction of massed soldiers on a monument known as the Stele of the Vultures that
commemorates the Umma-Lagash war has led to the assumption that the Sumerians fielded
armies capable of fighting in tight phalanx formations (Gilibert 2004-2005; Hamblin 2006: 57; Fink
2016). The fact that Sumerian city-states could not spare large numbers of agrarian workers to
complete the training necessary to fight in formation casts doubt on that conclusion. Royal
bodyguards could have trained together, but it is more likely that whatever array soldiers adopted
before battle dissolved upon contact with the enemy. After the first exchange of javelins and
arrows, battle probably involved loose, shifting groups engaged in hit-and-run close quarter combat
until one side retreated.
The ruler and other elites rode to battle on heavy, solid-wheeled war carts pulled by
donkeys, onagers or even bovids. The reins passed through the animals’ nose ring and thence to
the driver through a metal double-ring affixed to the wagon shaft (Weber and Zettler 1998: fig.
139). These two or four-wheeled vehicles carried a fighter and driver. Since the carts’ wide turning
radius, clumsy rein system, and weight hampered maneuverability, it is likely that they served as
transportation to and from the battlefield or as stationary firing platforms, rather than attack
vehicles. Indeed, the Stele of the Vultures depicts the king arriving at the battle on his chariot but
fighting on foot (Winter 1985; Alster 2003/2004). Large javelin-holding quivers attached to the cart
augmented the chariot warriors’ firepower. The driver would also have access to javelins for self-
protection or to cover the retreat of his passenger.
Not as closely bound together as the southern city-states, polities in northern Mesopotamia
and Syria developed a more competitive and aggressive political tradition:
Here were rival polities in walled cities, each with a surrounding territory of smaller
settlements, and, unlike Sumer, extensive, uncultivated lands between them peopled by
pastoral nomads. There was no central sanctuary as at Nippur, no ideology of a single land,
no legitimation of kinship save that won and kept by force of arms. No one could cut off or
divert the Euphrates or its tributaries to bring a city to submission, so any would-be
conqueror had to breach its massive walls. Alliances were forged regularly, by treaties with
solemn oaths or by marriage, and broken just as regularly. (Foster 2016: 165).
Ebla and Mari, the most powerful Syrian cities, waged war almost yearly to punish recalcitrant allies
or challenge enemies (Biga 2015). People in the region developed complex fortification systems to
withstand the siege towers and battering rams raised against them (Nadali 2009). In the north, as in
Sumer, “successful wars always saw a major exchange of goods from the royal treasury, the income
of booty and the expenditure of gifts for the victorious general and his army…” (Sallaberger and
Schrakamp 2015: 34-5). Victory also brought an influx of prisoners, some of whom faced slavery
or execution. Those more fortunate had families or city leaders to pay for their ransom (Catagnoti
2012: 49-50).
The Sargonic Period (2334-2113 BCE)
The warfare of Early Dynastic Mesopotamia led to a period of even greater conflict. After usurping
the throne from the king of Kish in about 2334 BCE, Sargon of Akkad initiated a period of
conquest and change that would set the stage for future empires. The Sargonic dynasty created the
world’s first territorial empire with provincial administrations and a central government (Foster
2016: 80-83). Unlike their predecessors, these Akkadian kings managed to consolidate power,
resources, and production sufficiently to embark on long-range campaigns and hold vanquished
territories. At its height, the Akkadian Empire claimed hegemony over territory as far afield the
Persian Gulf (Magan and Marhashi) and the Indus River Valley (Meluha), as well as formidable
city-states in Syria (Ebla, Nagir and Mari) and Assyria (Assur, Gasur and Nineveh). Expansion
depended on military power.
In contrast to earlier kings, the Akkadian rulers fought almost constantly. The inscriptions
of Sargon and his grandson Naram-sin claim multiple campaigns in a single year (Frayne 1993).
Administrative reforms, increased material resources, and manpower reserves afforded the
Akkadian kings much greater scope for military activity, for they could support substantial standing
forces as well as temporary levies. The process of centralization, through which the crown acquired
land, allowed kings to maintain permanent troops by allotting fields to soldiers for cultivation
(Foster 1993:27). For example, a tablet from Mugdan (Umm el-Jir), a settlement in Babylonia,
records the transfer of land from the local governor to the soldiers of the captain, who oversaw
their farm work as well as military activities (Hackman and Stephens1958 = BIN 8 144). The
system offered the advantage of not only feeding soldiers in the off-season, but producing surplus
to provision troops on campaign. Attacks on cities became more common under the Sargonic
kings. One of Naram-Sin’s inscriptions describes the conquest of Armanum, which boasted a
triple-wall defensive system (Foster 1982).
In addition to infantry, the Akkadian army included unit officers, city governors, generals,
and their support staff, as well as messengers, physicians, diviners, servants, and other
administrators (Abrahami 2008; Schrakamp 2010). Infantry grouped by weapon type probably
attacked in sequence. After ranged-weapon troops released missiles against the enemy, spearmen
moved in for close-order combat, followed by axmen, who dispatched fleeing or wounded enemies
(Foster 2016:167). Thrusting weapons included lances with long-shafts and a weighted butt knob
for balance, and shorter spears without the counter-weight. Axe types ranged from those with
narrow, flat blades and to those with thicker, heavier heads and curved handles. Body armor all
but disappears from the art of this period, though texts show that the palace issued helmets to
spearmen (Foster 1993: 27; Schrakamp 2010). The ungainly war carts of the Early Dynastic period
seem to disappear from the battlefield as well. Constant warfare eventually led to internal discord
and stagnation that invited outside intervention.
The Third Dynasty of Ur (2120- 2004 BCE)
Rulers of the Third Dynasty of Ur (2120- 2004 BCE) developed an even more centralized
economy focused on territorial expansion. Shulgi, the dynasty’s second ruler (c. 2094-2047 BC),
marshalled his resources to secure plunder and access to trade routes, especially in the east
(Garfinkle 2014). The economy soon became so militarized that “warfare offered the crown
opportunities to create social pathways that bound individuals more closely to the state” (Garfinkle
2013: 160). That is, like their Sargonic predecessors, the kings of Ur acquired land that could be
distributed to military personnel for services rendered. On the kingdom’s periphery, military
settlers guarded the border, farmed, and paid taxes to the crown for the privilege (Steinkeller
1987). Weapons, armor, and basic military organization generally followed the Akkadian model
(Lafont 2009).
The Ur III system facilitated expansion in the short term, but ultimately proved
unsustainable. Even massive cross-country walls erected in northern Mesopotamia could not hold
off nomadic incursions. In the wake of the state’s collapse, Amorite tribes settled in Sumer and
assimilated into the urbanized cultures there, though the disruption caused political fragmentation
that inhibited the formation of expansionist states and large standing armies. The Ur III dynasty
marked the final flowering of Sumerian culture, as Akkadian dominated thereafter.

The Second Millennium

The Middle Bronze Age (c. 2100-1550 BC)
Political volatility characterized the Middle Bronze Age in the Near East. Resource constraints and
relative economic parity necessitated alliances, as regional polities competed with one another for
supremacy: Mari, Yamhad and Qatna in Syria; the kingdom of Assyria in northern Mesopotamia;
Eshnunna in central Mesopotamia, and Isin, Larsa, and newcomer, Babylon, in the south. The
kingdom of Elam threatened from southwestern Iran. Ambitious leaders engaged in international
intrigue, shifting alliances, economic competition, and conventional warfare until Hammurabi
(1792-1750) maneuvered his way into brief supremacy by holding off Elam and defeating
Eshnunna and Mari (van der Mieroop 2008; Heimpel 2003).
Kings relied on traditional recruitment strategies to raise large armies of untrained levies
augmented and controlled by small contingents of permanent soldiers and officers. Individually, a
king could not raise a large enough force to defeat a coalition of his enemies. As one official from
Mari described the situation, “There is no king who is strong on his own: Hammurabi of Babylon
has a following of ten or fifteen kings, Rim-Sin of Larsa the same, Ibal-pi-El of Eshnunna the same,
Amut-pi-El of Qatna the same, and Yarim-Lim of Yamhad has a following of twenty kings”
(Dossin 1938: 117-18). If numbers in letters are to be believed, allied forces could be quite large. A
letter from Zimri-Lim to Hammurabi about supplying troops for a joint military operation
mentions thirty thousand men (Sasson 1969: 7-8; ARM II 67). The Mari archive also contains a
sequence of letters concerning the long, complex process of levying troops from allies and vassals.
In that case, however, Mari’s combined forces amounted to only 3,900 men (Heimpel 2003: 89-
93).
One of the period’s most important advances in military technology involved the chariot.
Technical innovations and wider availability of the domesticated horse inspired the development
of the proper battle chariot. The abandonment of the old rope and nose-ring in favor of a bridle
and rein system improved maneuverability and maximized horsepower. Spoked wheels and better
engineering made for a faster, lighter cab, now widened to enable the warrior to fight from the
moving chariot without the driver getting in the way. Although the chariot required constant
maintenance and horses were sometimes in short supply, chariotry soon became the combat arm
par excellence of Near Eastern armies (Hamblin 2006: 145-53).
Despite the prevalence of chariots, sieges appear to have been more common than large-
scale pitched battles during the Middle Bronze Age (Burke 2008). For the first time, texts describe
the construction of massive ramps to allow siege towers and battering rams to pass over ditches and
earthen ramparts, and approach the city walls. One letter to Zimri-Lim of Mari reporting on the
siege of the city Razama states that the besiegers “heaped up a ramp toward the city (and) the front
of the ramp reached the base of the city wall” (ARM 14 104; Vidal 2009). The letter goes on to
describe how the defenders responded by making multiple sorties and even digging tunnels,
presumably to undermine the ramp. Similar examples demonstrate that the full range of siege
tactics had become commonplace by this time. Attackers tried blockade, frontal assault, mining,
sapping, escalade, and ruse, while defenders countered by undermining ramps, burning siege
towers and battering rams, making sorties, and constructing secondary walls (Eph’al 2009). The
Old Babylonian scribal curriculum even included mathematical word problems about siege ramps,
although the problem sets did not reflect military practice. The army did not need to use
mathematics to engineer the ramps, which simply required manpower, hard work, and whatever
material soldiers could find (Melville and Melville 2008; D. Melville 2014).
Late Bronze Age (c.1550-1150 BCE)
During the Late Bronze Age, as economic development led once again to increased centralization,
the theater of war expanded, and richer states extended their power over a widening circle of
neighbors. Geographically distant peoples, who had previously interacted chiefly through trade,
diplomacy, or the occasional raid, now met in open warfare. In Egypt, the 18th (c. 1550-1298 BCE)
and 19th Dynasty (1297- 1190 BCE) pharaohs pushed northward into the Levant, where they
competed against the Mitanni in Syria and the Hittites from Anatolia for hegemony over Syro-
Palestinian city-states such as Ugarit and Kadesh. In Mesopotamia, the Kassites, having taken over
Babylonia from the east, sought to control Assyria and thereby check the Mitannian threat, while
the Assyrians tried with varying success to resist both the Mitanni and the Kassites.
Each power relied on vassals, allies, and military force to gain the upper hand and
neutralize enemies. For example, a treaty between the Hittite king Tudhaliya IV (c. 1237-1209
BCE) and his Syrian vassal Shaushgamuwa of Amurru explained the balance of power, at least as
Tudhaliya saw it: “The kings who are equal to me (are) the king of Egypt, the king of Karduniya
(Babylon), the king of Assyria [and the king of Aḫḫiyawa]. If the king of Egypt is My Majesty’s
friend, he shall also be your friend, but if he is My Majesty’s enemy, he shall also be your
enemy,” and so on (Singer 2003: 99). Treaties, diplomacy, and dynastic marriage ties decreased
the number of major international conflicts, and when war did break out, common practices and
shared expectations helped to limit the destruction (Podany 2012). However, kings relied on their
armies to create an impression of power. Anyone without a strong military or the protection of an
overlord would be easy prey for enemies.
During this time, the composite bow made of strips of wood, horn, and sinew glued
together saw widespread use in warfare, especially among elite chariot troops. Infantry in the
Assyrian army still used the less expensive simple bow (Llop 2016: 213). Armor developed as well.
Helmeted charioteers and archers adopted the bronze scale-armor jerkin, while shield-bearing
infantry typically wore only leather or bronze helmets. Shields of varying sizes and shapes were
constructed of wicker, or wood and leather with metal bosses. The bronze sickle sword spread
throughout the Near East, but was particularly popular in the Levant and Egypt (Maxell-Hyslop
2002). Sharpened along its outer edge like a scimitar, the sword was used for slashing, rather than
stabbing. As improved metal technology increased production capability, short stabbing swords
gradually replaced the sickle sword. Other close-combat weapons included clubs, metal rods,
wooden staves, and metal sheathed staffs (Darnell and Manassa 2007: 74-75). Bronze bladed
lances, spears and javelins, as well as maces, axes, and slings also continued in use.
Chariotry attained a new level of prestige during this period. Excavated Egyptian chariots
reveal that the lighter-weight cabs and a better yoking system increased speed and maneuverability,
so that chariot warriors could fight on the move (Cantrell 2011; Crouwel 2013; Genz 2013).
Effective chariotry required horses trained to work in teams. A Hittite tablet known as the Kikkuli
Text (c. 1350 BCE) describes the training of chariot horses and attests to the greater attention paid
to equitation across the Near East (CTH 284; Raulwing 2006). Chariots played an integral role on
the battlefield, but chariot tactics continue to be a matter of controversy, since no text or image
portrays chariot maneuvers in detail (Vita 2008; Archer 2010: 58-66).
The earliest detailed descriptions of battle tactics date to the Late Bronze period. In about
1457 BCE at Megiddo in northern Israel, the Egyptian army of Thutmose III engaged rebellious
Canaanite vassals led by the king of Kadesh (Redford 2003; Redford 2006). Thutmose outwitted
his adversary by choosing the direct, but treacherously narrow route to the battlefield. When the
armies engaged:
The southern flank of his majesty’s army was at the southern mountain [by?] the Kina
[brook] and the northern flank was northwest of Megiddo, while his majesty was in the
middle of them, [the god Amun] protecting his body in the melee and the strength of [the
god Seth fills] his limbs. There his majesty overpowered them while leading his army. They
fled, falling headlong [toward] Megiddo with fearful faces, having abandoned their horses
and chariots of gold and silver in order that they be dragged and hoisted by their clothes
into the city (Hoffmeier 2003: 11).
The Pharaoh led the center division of the three deployed, and successfully routed his enemies,
who fled into Megiddo, hoping to withstand a siege. Afterward, the Egyptians enclosed the city with
a ditch, rampart, and palisade of “fresh branches of all their fruit trees” (Hoffmeier 2003: 12). The
successful blockade forced a surrender, after which the Egyptians, following common practice,
plundered the city and deported the populace. Apparently, the Egyptians had enough troops to
circumvallate Megiddo, but not the quantity or quality necessary to risk a frontal assault. That
Thutmose chose blockade over attack also indicates that his troops had access to sufficient food
and water to starve out their enemies.
Another Egyptian Pharaoh, Ramses II (1279-1213 BCE), battled the Hittite king,
Muwatalli II (1295-1272 BCE), at Kadesh, in Syria, in about 1274 BC (Kitchen 2003: 32-40;
Spalinger 2005: 209-34). Ramses’ battle accounts give insight into military tactics. Allegedly, the
Hittites tried to misdirect the Egyptians by sending two men posing as deserters to give false
information about their army’s whereabouts. The ruse might have worked had the Egyptians not
beaten the truth out of a second group of captured Hittite soldiers. Subsequently, the Hittite army
launched a surprise attack on the Egyptian flank, and having routed it, pursued the fleeing troops
straight to Ramses’ camp. Despite the surprise, the Pharaoh managed to defeat Muwatalli’s army
decisively.
The Assyrians, who fielded similarly organized armies (Postgate 2008), also wrote about
deception in warfare. The Epic of Tukulti-Ninurta I (c. 1244-c. 1207 BCE) describes how his
Kassite enemy, Kashtiliash IV (c. 1232-1225 BCE), dragged-out a pre-battle exchange with the
Assyrian king “as a ruse until he could draw up his warriors, and until he had made ready his battle
plan, the chariotry was held back” (Foster 2005a: 311). After achieving the desired delay, and
despite resistance from his own soldiers, Kashtiliash then launched a surprise attack on the
unprepared Assyrians, who managed to withstand the onslaught and triumph. Notwithstanding the
propaganda value of accounts that painted the enemy as perfidious, it appears that using deception
to gain a battlefield advantage was not unusual. These battle accounts demonstrate that desertion,
trickery, ambush, and spying were standard aspects of war during this period.
Although the international system maintained stability for a time, it collapsed in the 12th
century, when a lethal combination of crises overwhelmed the great powers (Drews 1993; Cline
2015). Already weakened by famine, plague, natural disasters, and internal political divisions, the
Hittites, Kassites, and Syro-Palestinian city-states could not defend against armies of dispossessed
poor and migrating tribes bent on killing and taking plunder, rather than negotiating the balance of
power. Even though the Egyptians and Assyrians lost territory, they managed to hold off their
invaders. The type of international diplomacy and wars that characterized the Late Bronze Age
gave way to more intense competition and conflict in the new millennium.
The First Millennium
Experienced players on the geopolitical stage -- Assyria, Babylonia, Elam, Egypt, and the Syro-
Palestinian states – faced relatively new competitors, such as Phrygia and Urartu. Semi-nomadic
Aramaean, Chaldean, Median, and Arab tribes, together with less powerful peripheral city-states,
had a destabilizing effect on the larger powers. Efforts to gain hegemony over unreliable buffer
kingdoms often led to proxy or “cold” war situations, as skirmishes, espionage, and political
posturing kept border zones on perpetual alert. Despite cataclysmic changes to the geopolitical
map, the fundamental rules of political discourse and warfare survived. Kings represented their
people before the gods and led armies, while defeat suggested divine anger and abandonment, and
the “might makes right”, “winner takes all” mentality persisted.
Since the textual and material evidence from Assyrian sites far exceeds that of other
contemporary cultures, the following emphasizes Assyrian military practices. Fighting nearly
constantly, they gradually came to dominate the Near East and rule the largest empire the world
had yet seen. In many ways, however, the Assyrian military was the product of two thousand years
of Near Eastern warfare. Overall, they did not diverge much from the traditional ways and means
of war. Rather, they gained the advantage through superior political acuity, organizational ability,
technological knowhow, and logistical capability. The strategy of always taking war to the enemy
protected the Assyrian heartland from invasion and encouraged economic development there.
Although the Urartians, Babylonians, Elamites, Egyptians, Phrygians, and Syro-Palestinian states
put similar armies in the field, they rarely won wars against the Assyrians, who could recover more
quickly from setbacks.
Early on, however, the Assyrians struggled to regain territory lost to the Aramaeans during
the crisis at the end of the Bronze Age in the 12th century BCE. Ashurnasirpal II (883-859) and
Shalmaneser III (858-824), reestablished hegemony over the Euphrates and initiated the first stage
of Assyrian expansion. Since reduced territory had severely limited the economic and manpower
resources these kings could dedicate to war, they could not govern directly all the lands they
conquered. Instead, they made yearly campaigns to plunder target areas, enforce a tentative
hegemony, and deprive enemy leaders of the means to fight back.
The ninth century Assyrian kings used terror as an effective way to prevent further
resistance. Massive building projects, monumental inscriptions, and narrative reliefs added to the
impression of overwhelming might. A typical campaign account claimed:
At that time, in my accession year (and) in my first regnal year, after I nobly ascended the
royal throne, I mustered my chariots and troops. I entered the pass of the land Simesi
(and) approached the city Aridu, the fortified city of Ninnu. I besieged the city, captured
(it), massacred many of his (people), (and) carried off booty from him. I erected a tower of
heads in front of the city (and) burned their adolescent boys (and) girls. While I was
residing in the same city, Aridu, I received tribute from the people of the lands/mountains
 Hargu, Harrnasa, Simesi, Simerra, Sirisu, (and) Ulmanu: teams of horses, oxen, sheep,
(and) wine (Grayson 1996, Shalmaneser III AO. 102.2. i 14b-18a).

Without the economic foundation to support a large standing army and provincial administrations,
fear and rapine proved the most effective ways to win the resources needed to improve the
Assyrian core and fund additional expansion. As the Assyrian capacity to wage war increased,
wholesale massacres diminished, though brutal punishments remained an accepted way to
communicate political messages, as indeed they always had (Radner 2015). The Assyrians stand
out from other Near Eastern societies not in their willingness to use violence for political purposes,
but in their willingness to advertise the fact. Extreme punishments, such as flaying and impalement,
also helped the king fulfill ideological expectations, for he was duty-bound to avenge Assyrian
deaths and punish treaty-breakers.
In the Assyrian army, annual levies always predominated, but by the middle of the 8th
century, and increasingly thereafter, the core consisted of regulars that garrisoned frontier forts,
guarded provincial capitals, or served the royal family. Governors raised and outfitted troops in
their provinces through a conscription system similar to those used in earlier periods. The crown
appointed recruitment officers to oversee the annual muster and the maintenance of standing
forces (Postgate 2008). Except for specially exempted religious centers, such as Assur and Harran,
every village, town, and city within the empire had to supply men for military service. Troops
raised from among conquered peoples, whom the Assyrians deported to new areas, served in
special divisions under the command of the chief eunuch, who also administered the equestrian
corps of the standing army (Oded 1979; Dezső 2012b).
From the 9th century on, the Assyrian kings also made special arrangements with tribal
groups, such as the Gurreans from Anatolia or Itu’eans from the Middle Euphrates, to serve as
auxiliaries. The Itu’eans proved particularly versatile, acting as military police, messengers, and
reconnaissance forces (Postgate 2000: 100-04). In one letter, for example, the governor of Assur
asked the king to transfer 100 Itu’eans from Arrapha to oversee a group of carpenters in his (the
governor’s) absence (Parpola 1987: # 97). As heavy spearmen, Gurrean auxiliaries wore a
distinctive crested iron helmet with cheek pieces, a cardio-phylax chest protector, and boots. The
auxiliary light archers, the Itu’eans, wore no armor of any kind, preferring their native short kilt,
headband, and bare feet.
Assyrian heavy spearmen of the standing army wore conical iron helmets and scale armor,
as distinct from the Gurrean auxiliaries or levies equipped with the conical helmets but no body
armor (Barron 2010; Dezső 2012a). Neo-Assyrian kings standardized weaponry to the degree
possible without modern mass production techniques. In addition to composite recurve bows,
Assyrian soldiers used spears about nine feet long, with iron or bronze tanged or socketed blades.
Officers carried maces to designate rank, and most soldiers carried short, multipurpose stabbing
swords as backup in case their primary weapon failed. Fully armed soldiers carrying large, wicker
or leather woven body-shields protected vulnerable archers and slingers, who did not wear body
armor or use shields. Spearmen and sword-wielding levies used shields of varying sizes and
materials, including round or elliptical wicker bucklers, small rectangular or oval shields, and larger
round shields made of wood or leather and bronze, similar to the Greek hoplite’s aspis (de Backer
2016).
 Equestrian units played an important role in first millennium armies. After the 9th century,
Assyrian chariots became increasingly larger and heavier. By the 7th century, they had large spoked
wheels reinforced with iron hobs for traction. Teams of three to four horses pulled an extended
cab that held up to four men: a driver; a shield man, and one or two fighters (Postgate 2000: 93-98;
Dezső 2012b). The Assyrians often absorbed the chariotry of conquered foreign armies into their
own forces. After defeating the Syrian city Hamath in 720, for example, Sargon II (721-705 BCE)
drafted two hundred chariots into his army, and he acquired fifty more when he captured
Carchemish in 716 (Dalley 1985). Throughout the Neo-Assyrian period chariots continued to play
a battlefield role, but after Sargon’s reign emphasis shifted to cavalry, and by the time of the
Assyrian Empire’s last great king, Ashurbanipal (669-627 BCE), sculptured palace reliefs no longer
depicted Assyrian chariots in combat. Urartian chariotry was similar to that of the Assyrians,
whereas in the 7th century BCE, the Elamites fielded unusual flatbed war carts. The Elamite
vehicles had large, multi-spoked wheels and an unprotected body, so that all the occupants had to
sit or kneel (Barnett 1975: fig. 147, 151).

Cavalry revolutionized warfare in the 9th century, when for the first time, mounted soldiers
became a regular combat arm of the Assyrian army. At the time of Shalmaneser III (859-824 BCE)
troopers rode in pairs, with one rider controlling the reigns of both horses while the second
discharged a bow. Without saddles, stirrups, or martingales (reign holders), riders could not
control their horses while fighting. Cooperative cavalry pairs proved an ingenious, if ultimately
unsatisfactory, solution to this problem. Early equestrians could not operate together in formation
because riders sat too far back on the horses’ withers to control their mounts well enough to
coordinate with other rider-pairs (Archer 2010: 67). Within a century, the martingale and forward
seat positioning gave riders sufficient control to ride and fight as individuals, although apparently
they never managed the type of formations that characterized later Greek and Roman cavalries.
The idea of cavalry spread quickly throughout the Near East, and different cultures
developed their preferred tactics and weapons. Unlike the Assyrian cavalrymen, who carried both
thrusting spears and bows, Urartian horsemen favored javelins, while the Israelites rode as archers,
and Elamites fielded regular, spear-carrying cavalry (Gökce and Işik 2014; Cantrell 2011). During
the same period, Arab nomads rode camels into battle. Each camel carried a driver and an archer
(Barnett 1975: fig. 174).
The need to procure horses drove interstate competition over control of trade-routes and
access to good breeding land, particularly in Iran and eastern Anatolia. Indeed, the inability of
chariots to operate effectively in mountainous terrain may have inspired the development of
cavalry in the first place (Archer 2010: 71). Always struggling to provide mounts for the army,
Assyrian kings demanded horses as tribute, fought and traded for them, and collected them as tax-
payment. The crown built up vast herds of mares kept in state run corrals for breeding. Some of
the larger horse breeds, such as Kushite horses from Egypt, were reserved for chariot teams, while
the sleeker breeds from the Taurus and Zagros Mountains made better cavalry mounts (Heidhorn
1997). Mules, donkeys and sometimes camels served as pack animals.
Under the Assyrians, campaigning reached a new level of complexity that required more,
specialized personnel: engineers to build camps, bridges, and siege machinery; spies to gather
intelligence; foragers; grooms; scouts, and messengers. In addition, doctors, diviners, scribes,
cooks, and body servants attended the king and other elites. Some soldiers managed prisoners,
deportees, and plunder including horses, cattle, sheep, and goats. On campaign, high-ranking
officers lived in large, comfortable tents set up within a fortified enclosure. However, most soldiers
probably slept in the open around campfires, cooked their own food, and looked after their own
wounds.
Extended campaigning involved distinct spheres of supply, since consumption quickly
exceeded transport capacity. As the troops mustered and then marched through home territory,
they could live off distributed rations or provisions retrieved from prepared depots along the way,
and when a campaign took the army into allied or subject territory, it could expect to receive food
and fodder locally. In enemy lands, the army depended on skilled foragers to collect small cattle,
grain, and other foodstuffs (Marriott and Radner 2015). Soldiers received some rations, but
starvation and its attendant diseases always threatened.
As in other periods, battle tactics received cursory attention in campaign accounts, and so it
is difficult to discern exactly how the Assyrians and their contemporaries fought. Texts indicate that
armies could carry out maneuvers such as ambush, flanking, double envelopment, or oblique
order attack (Scurlock 1997; Nadali 2010; Fagan 2010). Large scale pitched battles were relatively
rare during this period, for they proved too costly for armies of equal strength and a poor gamble
for those facing longer odds. During his seventeen-year reign, for example, Sargon II (721-705
BCE) recorded only five major battles, three of which occurred in a single year, 720 BCE (Melville
2016a: 194). The more usual campaign strategy involved devastation or siege.
Looting and burning took vital stores away from the enemy and provided for the
campaigning army without entailing much risk. Devastation also put pressure on the enemy to do
battle or capitulate. Opponents rarely opted to meet the Assyrians in open battle, but fled into
fortified cities in hopes of withstanding a siege. Depending on conditions, the Assyrians sent
sappers to undermine the walls, or build ramps to bring siege towers, ladders, and battering rams
within striking distance. Contingents of archers and slingers provided covering fire for attacking
soldiers, while cavalry met enemy sorties or cut-off escape attempts (Eph’al 2009; De Backer
2013). Although the Assyrians mastered siege technology and tactics, difficult terrain or campaign
conditions sometimes prevented the use of towers and battering rams. In the Zagros Mountains,
for example, they often had to make costly frontal assaults without the protection of siege engines.
Once a city had been captured and the surrounding territory subdued, the Assyrians
usually deported the populace to new lands (Oded 1979). As Sennacherib (704-681 BCE)
recorded such a situation, “I surrounded (and) conquered the city Bīt-Kilamzaḫ, their fortified city.
I brought out of it people, young (and) old, horses, mules, donkeys, oxen, and sheep and goats,
and I counted (them) as booty. I destroyed, devastated, (and) turned into ruins their small(er)
settlements, which were without number. I burned with fire the pavilions (and) tents that they
relied upon, and reduced (them) to ashes” (Grayson and Novotny 2012 = RINAP III.3.22-23).
Widespread destruction of property and crops made it impossible for the indigenous people to
stay where they were, thus forcing them into dependence on their conquerors. Like the Assyrians,
the Urartians and Babylonians also carried out mass deportations (Çilingiroğlu 1983).
 After nearly three-hundred years of supremacy, the Assyrian Empire collapsed. The war
that brought it down dragged on for more than two decades (626-609 BCE). Attrition finally took
its toll and the army could not withstand simultaneous invasions from the Babylonians and Medes.
The Assyrian state never recovered, and the mantle of power passed to the Babylonians. The Neo-
Babylonian dynasty took over most of Assyria’s imperial territory and based their administration
on the Assyrian model. Little is known about the Babylonian army, which appears to have been
very similar to its Assyrian predecessor (MacGinnis 2010). In 539 BCE, the short-lived Babylonian
Empire gave way to the Persians, the first of a long line of foreign invaders into the Near East.

Conclusion
People in the ancient world did not exercise the level of control over their environment, bodies,
and daily lives that we enjoy today. Survival and the effort to secure a better future for family or
clan fostered competition and opportunism, and created social hierarchies. Elites exploited weaker
folk, but the best leaders aligned personal aims with the needs of the group. If the chance for gain
arose, no one could safely postpone action, for passivity signaled weakness and invited enemy
intervention. Under such conditions, warfare not only proved inevitable, it thrived.
Even though the state that could maintain the largest army usually prevailed, Near Eastern
peoples understood that dominance was impermanent. No matter how successful a king, the gods
might abandon him, and his victorious army fail. Contingency, self-interest, and opportunism thus
made lasting peace impossible. Yet these same factors sometimes helped prevent unnecessary
bloodshed. Leaders who recognized no hope of victory rarely offered resistance when a stronger
foe threatened. It was easier to submit, survive, and fight again another day. Hence, alliances
shifted, and political expedience made loyalty transient. The various peoples of the Near East not
only brought us the first wars, but the first peace treaties. They created the notion of just war and
developed religious ideologies that helped both the victor and the vanquished find meaning in
their experiences. Although the technologies of war have changed drastically since ancient times,
the political and social realities of conflict have remained remarkably constant.
Further reading:
A recent general work on ancient Near Eastern warfare is Trimm 2017. Neumann et al 2014 is a
collection of papers devoted to aspects of ANE warfare, while Richardson 2011 discusses new
trends in the military history of Mesopotamia. On Early Dynastic and Bronze Age war in
Mesopotamia and Egypt, see Hamblin 2006. For warfare and diplomacy in the Bronze Age, see
Podany 2012. Beal 1992 and Lorenze and Schrakamp 2011 deal with the Hittite military, while
Spalinger 2005 treats ancient Egypt. Recent contributions on Neo-Assyrian warfare include Fales
2010; Fuchs 2011; Dezső 2012a and 2012b; Melville 2016. On siege operations, see Eph’al 2009
and De Backer 2013. On rituals and religion in war, see Rivaroli 2015; Abrahami 2016; Kelle,
Ames and Wright (eds.) 2014; Ulanowski (ed.) 2016. Recent works devoted to fortifications
include Burke 2008; Mielke 2012; Frederiksen, Schnelle, Müth, and Schneider (eds.) 2016. For
chariots and cavalry, see Abrahami and Battini (eds.) 2008; Velmdmeijer and Ikram (eds.) 2013;
Archer 2010; Drews 2008. On peace in Mesopotamia, see Foster 2007 and Asher-Greve 2014.
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