REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CIVIL APPEAL NO(S). 3046/2019

(ARISING FROM SLP(C) NO(S). 4964/2019)

THE STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH & ORS. APPELLANT(S)

VERSUS

BUNTY RESPONDENT(S)

J U D G M E N T

1. Leave granted.

2. The State of Madhya Pradesh and Others are in appeal as

against the reversal of the judgment and order passed by the Single

Judge dismissing the writ application questioning the decision of

the Screening Committee holding the respondent/Bunty to be unfit

for appointment as a constable in the police service of the State

of Madhya Pradesh.

3. The respondent applied for the post of a Constable in the year

2013. He appeared and cleared the Police Constable Recruitment

Test (II). Physical endurance test was held on 06.05.2013. He

Signature Not Verified

Digitally signed by
was medically examined and selected on 09.05.2014.
NARENDRA PRASAD
Date: 2019.05.02
16:57:14 IST
On 05.06.2014
Reason:

he was called for verification of the marks sheet, caste

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certificate. He was called for police verification by the

Screening Committee on 25.02.2015. On 11.03.2015, the department,

on the basis of the Report of the Screening Committee, decided to

deny the appointment to the respondent/Bunty for the reasons

mentioned therein.

4. It is not in dispute that respondent/Bunty was involved in a

case involving moral turpitude for the commission of an offence

under Sections 392 and 411 of the IPC. He was given benefit of

doubt in the said case and was acquitted vide judgment and order

dated 7.1.2015 and same has attained finality.

5. As against the denial of the appointment respondent/Bunty filed

a writ petition before the High Court of Madhya Pradesh, Bench at

Indore. Learned Single Judge of the High Court considered the

matter in extensive detail and relied upon the decision of this

Court in Commissioner of Police, New Delhi and Another v. Mehar

Singh, (2013) 7 SCC 685, and that the petitioner had appeared

before the Screening Committee and it was found in objectivity by

the Screening Committee that he was involved in a case of moral

turpitude and the acquittal was not clean. He was found unfit for

being appointed as Police Constable in a disciplined force.

Reasons were communicated. Learned Single Judge also relied upon

the decision in State of M.P. and Others v. Dinesh Singh Parihar

and Others, rendered by the Division Bench of the High Court in

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Writ Appeal No.724/2014, dismissed the said writ application.

However, the Division Bench, by the impugned judgment and order,

has allowed the writ appeal preferred by the respondent/Bunty on

the ground that the judgment of acquittal is based on material on

record, he was acquitted since the offence was not proved beyond

reasonable doubt, appointment order has to be issued as a matter of

course. Hence, the appeal by special leave is filed before this

Court.

6. Learned counsel appearing on behalf of the State has relied

upon the decisions of this Court in Mehar Singh (supra), State of

Madhya Pradesh & Ors. v. Parvez Khan, (2015) 2 SCC 591, Union

Territory, Chandigarh Administration and Others v. Pradeep Kumar

and Another, (2018) 1 SCC 797, to contend that when the Screening

Committee has formed an opinion with objectivity considered the

allegations and overall material the decision is not open to

judicial review until and unless it has acted arbitrarily or its

decision is perverse. Learned counsel further submitted that mere

acquittal on the ground of benefit of the doubt could not have

enured in favour of the appellant so as to be entitled to

appointment, as a matter of course as observed by the Division

Bench of the High Court.

7. On the other hand, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the

respondent has relied on a decision of this Court in Avtar Singh v.

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Union of India and Others, (2016) 8 SCC 471, and Joginder Singh v.

Union Territory of Chandigarh and Others, (2015) 2 SCC 377.

Learned counsel appearing for the respondent has contended that it

was a case of no evidence and with respect to PW.12 also in the

representation filed before the Screening Committee with respect to

the said witness the reasons were assigned why he deposed against

the respondent. Thus, in the facts and circumstances of the case,

no case for interference is made out in the judgment and order

passed by the Division Bench. The respondent could not have been

termed to be unfit by the Screening Committee, in view of the

judgment of acquittal.

8. After hearing learned counsel for the parties, we are of the

opinion that the respondent had participated in the selection

process in the year 2013, at that time the said criminal case was

pending consideration and he has been acquitted subsequently, vide

judgment and order dated 7.1.2015 all throughout during selection

process the case was pending consideration and as certain witnesses

have turned hostile which is not unusual. The respondent knew very

well about the pendency of the case against him and it is not

uncommon to see that witnesses turned hostile. In the aforesaid

circumstance, it cannot be said to be case of clear acquittal, in

criminal case, he was given benefit of doubt not acquitted because

the case against him was found to be false. Thus, due to such

acquittal appointment could not have followed as a matter of course

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as observed by the Division Bench of the High Court.

9. Considering the nature of allegation in the case, it was a

case of impersonation as a police officer and thereby committing

the offence under Sections 392 and 411 of the IPC. It was a case

of the serious kind, which involved moral turpitude and having not

been granted the clean acquittal in the criminal case merely by the

grant of benefit of the doubt, clouds cannot be said to be clear as

to the antecedents of the respondent. Thus, the perception formed

by the Screening Committee that he was unfit to be inducted in the

disciplined police force was appropriate. In the aforesaid factual

matrix, decision of Scrutiny Committee could not be said to be such

which warranted judicial interference.

10. Learned Single Judge of the High Court in the factual matrix

projected, has rightly relied upon the decision in Mehar Singh

(supra), wherein this Court has observed as under:-

“35. The police force is a disciplined force. It

shoulders the great responsibility of maintaining
law and order and public order in society. People
repose great faith and confidence in it. It must
be worthy of that confidence. A candidate wishing
to join the police force must be a person of
utmost rectitude. He must have impeccable
character and integrity. A person having criminal
antecedents will not fit in this category. Even if
he is acquitted or discharged in the criminal
case, that acquittal or discharge order will have
to be examined to see whether he has been
completely exonerated in the case because even a
possibility of his taking to the life of crimes
poses a threat to the discipline of the police
force. The Standing Order, therefore, has
entrusted the task of taking decisions in these

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 matters to the Screening Committee. The decision
of the Screening Committee must be taken as final
unless it is mala fide. In recent times, the image
of the police force is tarnished. Instances of
police personnel behaving in a wayward manner by
misusing power are in the public domain and are a
matter of concern. The reputation of the police
force has taken a beating. In such a situation, we
would not like to dilute the importance and
efficacy of a mechanism like the Screening
Committee created by the Delhi Police to ensure
that persons who are likely to erode its
credibility do not enter the police force. At the
same time, the Screening Committee must be alive
to the importance of the trust reposed in it and
must treat all candidates with an even hand."

11. That apart, when we consider the decision of the three-Judge

Bench of this Court in Avtar Singh (supra) the Court observed:-

“38.4.3 If acquittal had already been recorded in a

case involving moral turpitude or offence of
heinous/serious nature, on technical ground and it
is not a case of clean acquittal, or benefit of
reasonable doubt has been given, the employer may
consider all relevant facts available as to
antecedents, and may take appropriate decision as
to the continuance of the employee.”

12. In Pradeep Kumar (supra) this Court has observed:-

“15. From the above details, we find that the

Screening Committee examined each and every case
of the respondents and reasonings for their
acquittal and taken the decision. While deciding
whether a person involved in a criminal case has
been acquitted or discharged should be appointed
to a post in a police force, nature of offence in
which he is involved, whether it was an honourable
acquittal or only an extension of benefit of doubt
because of witnesses turned hostile and flaws in
the prosecution are all the aspects to be
considered by the Screening Committee for taking

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 the decision whether the candidate is suitable for
the post. As pointed out earlier, the Screening
Committee examined each and every case and
reasonings for their acquittal and took the
decision that the respondents are not suitable for
the post of Constable in Chandigarh Police. The
procedure followed is as per Guideline 2(A)(b) an
object of such screening is to ensure that only
persons with impeccable character enter police
force. While so, the court cannot substitute its
views for the decision of the Screening
Committee."

13. The law laid down in the aforesaid decisions makes it clear

that in case acquittal in a criminal case is based on the benefit

of doubt or any other technical reason the employer can take into

consideration all relevant facts to take an appropriate decision as

to the fitness of an incumbent for appointment/continuance in

service. The decision taken by the Screening Committee in the

instant case could not have been faulted by the Division Bench.

14. Coming to the decision relied upon by the learned counsel

appearing for the respondent in Joginder Singh (supra) we are of

the opinion that it was not the case of the decision taken by the

Screening Committee on due consideration of the material on record

of the case. Thus, the decision is distinguishable. In the

peculiar facts and circumstances of the case, we are inclined to

hold that the decision of the Screening Committee was appropriate.

15. Thus, the judgment and order of the Division Bench cannot be

allowed to be sustained, the same is hereby set aside and the

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judgment and order passed by the Single Judge are restored. The

appeal is, accordingly, allowed. No orders as to costs.

Pending application(s), if any, shall stand disposed of.

...........................J.
[ARUN MISHRA]

...........................J.
[NAVIN SINHA]
NEW DELHI;
MARCH 14, 2019.