Economics Semester 1
Economics Semester 1
Economics Semester 1
ASSIGNMENT
FACULTY OF LAW
SESSION: 2021-2022
COURSE & SEMESTER: B.A. L.L.B. (FIRST SEMESTER)
PRESENTED BY: RITIK ANAND
ASSIGNMENT TOPIC: RELATION BETWEEN ECONOMICS AND LAW
ROLL NUMBER: 21225BLT060
PRESENTED TO: DR. ANJALI AGRAWAL
1
Acknowledgement
INDEX
Conclusion 10
Citations 11
Bibliography 12
3
Introduction
Modern law and economics dates from about 1960, when Ronald Coase
(who later received a Nobel Prize) published “The Problem of Social
Cost.” Gordon Tullock and Friedrich Hayek also wrote in the area, but
the expansion of the field began with Gary Becker’s 1968 paper on crime
(Becker also received a Nobel Prize). In 1972, Richard Posner, a law and
economics scholar and the major advocate of the positive theory of
efficiency, published the first edition of “Economic Analysis of Law and
founded the Journal of Legal Studies”, which became one of the classics
and foundational texts of the discipline.
Law and economics, also known as the economic analysis of law, differs
from other forms of legal analysis in two main ways. First, the theoretical
analysis focuses on efficiency. In simple terms, a legal situation is said to
be efficient if a right is given to the party who would be willing to pay the
most for it. There are two distinct theories of legal efficiency, and law
and economics scholars support arguments based on both. The positive
theory of legal efficiency states that the common law (judge-made law,
the main body of law in England and its former colonies, including the
United States) is efficient, while the normative theory is that the law
should be efficient. It is important that the two theories remain separate.
Most economists accept both.
Law and economics stresses that markets are more efficient than courts.
When possible, the legal system, according to the positive theory, will
force a transaction into the market. When this is impossible, the legal
system attempts to “mimic a market” and guess at what the parties
would have desired if markets had been feasible.
The second characteristic of law and economics is its emphasis on
incentives and people’s responses to these incentives. For example, the
purpose of damage payments in accident (tort) law is not to compensate
injured parties, but rather to provide an incentive for potential injurers
to take efficient (cost-justified) precautions to avoid causing the
accident. Law and economics shares with other branches of economics
the assumption that individuals are rational and respond to incentives.
When penalties for an action increase, people will undertake less of that
action. Law and economics is more likely than other branches of legal
analysis to use empirical or statistical methods to measure these
responses to incentives.
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The starting point for economic analysis of law is the assumption that
decisions may be based either on intuition and vague moral beliefs or on
scientific data. The rationale behind the economic analysis of law is
rather simple: to implement economics to the legal decision-making
process.
In simple words, economic analysis of law refers to the applying of
economic theories to the matters of law which is specifically the
microeconomic theories rather than the macro-economic theories. The
application of economics into the law system originated from the
scholars of Chicago school of Economics, where they used to explain the
effect of laws and rules of law with the help of economic concepts.
Moving further, economic analysis of law can be taken as an application
of economic tools to the law for the better understanding of the economy
as well as monitoring the economic factors in law and society.
Property
Contract law
The law governing exchange is crucial for a market economy. Most of the
doctrines of contract law seem consistent with economic efficiency. Law
and economics study of contract law has shown that, in general, it is
efficient for parties to be allowed to write their own contracts, and under
normal circumstances, for courts to enforce the agreed-on terms,
including the agreed-on price. The courts will generally not enforce
contracts if performance would be inefficient, but, rather, will allow
payment of damages. If, for example, I agree to build something for you
in return for $50,000, but meanwhile costs increase so that the thing
would cost me $150,000 to build, it is inefficient for me to build it.
Courts, recognizing this, allow me to compensate you with a monetary
payment instead. This is efficient.
Contracts and contract law are also designed to minimize problems of
opportunism. The danger of opportunism arises when two parties agree
to something, and one makes irreversible investments to carry out his
side of the bargain. So, for example, a company invests in a railroad spur
to a coal mine, making a contract in advance to ship the coal at a specific
price. Once the railroad is built, the mine owner can refuse to honor his
contract and can hold out for a lower shipping rate. As long as this rate
exceeds the railroad’s incremental costs, the railroad owner will be
tempted to accept. If he does so, he will not receive the full return on the
spur line that he needed to make the investment worthwhile. Doctrines
such as a duty to mitigate (to reduce the harmful effects of breach of
contract) are easily explained as being efficient.
However, not all doctrines are efficient. Contracting parties will
sometimes specify damages (called “liquidated damages”) to be paid if
there is a breach. If the courts decide that these liquidated damages are
too high—that they are a penalty rather than true damages—they will not
enforce the amount of contractual liquidated damages. This failure to
enforce agreed-on terms is a major puzzle to law and economics
scholars; it appears that the courts would do better to enforce the parties’
agreement, just as they do with respect to price and other terms of a
contract. Here, the positive theory of the efficiency of law seems to be
violated, but scholars argue that the courts should enforce these
agreements.
9
Tort law
Tort law and criminal law protect property rights from intentional or
unintentional harm. The primary purpose of these laws is to induce
potential tortfeasors (those who cause torts, or accidents) or criminals to
internalize—that is, take account of—the external costs of their actions,
although criminal law has other functions as well.
Tort law is part of the system of private law and is enforced through
private actions. The economic analysis of tort law has stressed issues
such as the distinction between negligence (a party must pay for harms
only when the party failed to take adequate or efficient precautions) and
strict liability (a party must pay for any injury caused by its actions).
Because most accidents are caused by a joint action of injurer and victim
(a driver goes too fast, and the pedestrian he hits does not look
carefully), efficient rules create incentives for both parties to take care;
most negligence rules (negligence, negligence with a defense of
contributory negligence, comparative negligence) create exactly these
incentives. Strict liability is important when the issue is not only the care
used in undertaking the activity, but also whether the activity is done at
all and the extent to which it is done (the level of the activity); highly
dangerous activities (e.g., blasting with explosives or keeping wild
animals as pets) are generally governed by strict liability.
Conclusion
Citations
Bibliography