Emotions Voting Belgium

This article from Politics of the Low Countries is published by Eleven international publishing and made available to Lorenzo
Terrière
Emotions and Vote Choice

An Analysis of the 2019 Belgian Elections
Caroline Close & Emilie van Haute*
Abstract
This article digs into the relationship between voters’ political resentment and their
electoral choice in 2019 by focusing on the respondents’ emotions towards politics.
Using the RepResent 2019 voter survey, eight emotions are analysed in their rela‐
tion to voting behaviour: four negative (anger, bitterness, worry and fear) and four
positive (hope, relief, joy and satisfaction). We confirm that voters’ emotional reg‐
ister is at least two-dimensional, with one positive and one negative dimension,
opening the possibility for different combinations of emotions towards politics. We
also find different emotional patterns across party choices, and more crucially, we
uncover a significant effect of emotions (especially negative ones) on vote choice,
even when controlling for other determinants. Finally, we look at the effect of elec‐
tion results on emotions and we observe a potential winner vs. loser effect with dis‐
tinctive dynamics in Flanders and in Wallonia.
Keywords: Belgium, elections, emotions, voting behaviour.
1 Introduction
Compared to the 2014 elections, the 2019 elections saw a substantial shift in
party preferences in all three regions. One of the most striking outcomes of the
election was the rise of ‘extreme’ or ‘radical’ parties on both side of the left-right
ideological spectrum. Decreasing levels of trust and rising dissatisfaction were
quickly pointed out as the main determinants of these voting choices. The analy‐
sis provided by Govaerts et al. (2020) indicates that vote choices in 2019, and
particularly votes for ‘populist’ parties (VB - Vlaams Belang, PTB-PVDA - Parti du
Travail de Belgique- Partij van de Arbeid), were driven by protest attitudes,
* Caroline Close is Assistant Professor at the Université libre de Bruxelles (Charleroi campus). Her
research and teaching interests include party politics, representation and political participation
from a comparative perspective. She has published her work in Party Politics, Political Studies,
Parliamentary Affairs, The Journal of Legislative Studies, Representation, Acta Politica and the
Journal of European Integration. She regularly contributes to research and publications on Belgian
politics. Emilie van Haute is Chair of the Department of Political Science at the Université libre
de Bruxelles (ULB) and researcher at the Centre d’étude de la vie politique (Cevipol). Her research
interests focus on party membership, intra-party dynamics, elections, and voting behaviour. Her
research has appeared in West European Politics, Party Politics, Electoral Studies, Political Studies,
European Political Science and Acta Politica. She is co-editor of Acta Politica.
Politics of the Low Countries 2020 (2) 3 - doi: 10.5553/PLC/258999292020002003006 353

This article from Politics of the Low Countries is published by Eleven international publishing and made available to Lorenzo Terrière
Caroline Close & Emilie van Haute
including political distrust, dissatisfaction with government and with the func‐
tioning of democracy, in addition to ideological motivations.
This article aims to dig deeper into the relationship between voters’ political
resentment and their electoral choice in 2019 by focusing on the respondents’
emotions towards politics. To analyse the link between emotions and vote choice
is quite innovative in Belgian political science, although it takes roots in a well-
established field: that of political psychology. This article provides a very first
exploration into the link between how voters feel towards politics and their vote
choice, using the RepResent 2019 voter survey. Eight emotions are analysed: four
negative (anger, bitterness, worry and fear) and four positive (hope, relief, joy and
satisfaction).
The general question of the article is the following: do emotions towards poli‐
tics matter? We answer that question in several steps. First, we look at the type
and degree of emotions among respondents and how they relate to each other.
We put to light different patterns of salience and distribution depending on the
emotion considered. Interestingly, we confirm that voters’ emotional register is
at least two-dimensional, with one positive and one negative dimension, opening
the possibility for different combinations of emotions towards politics. Second,
we analyse the relationship between emotions towards politics and vote choices
in Wallonia and Flanders at the 2019 federal election (given the comparatively
smaller sample and higher number of parties in Brussels, similar analyses respect‐
ing statistical thresholds could not be conducted in Brussels). We find different
emotional patterns across party choices, and more crucially, we uncover a signifi‐
cant effect of emotions, especially negative ones, even when controlling for other
determinants such as socio-demographics, political interest and political atti‐
tudes, including protest attitudes. Third, using the panel design of the survey, we
investigate whether vote choices potentially affected respondents’ degree of posi‐
tive and/or negative emotions after the election. We observe a potential winner
vs. loser effect with distinctive dynamics in Flanders and in Wallonia. Overall, the
emotional approach proposed in this article opens up innovative perspectives.
The article is structured as follows: It first briefly discusses the relevant liter‐
ature. Second, it presents the data and variables used and provides general
descriptive statistics. Third, it looks at emotions across vote choices through
bivariate and multivariate models. Fourth, it analyses emotions between wave 1
(pre-electoral) and wave 2 (post-electoral), and the impact of vote choices on
wave 1-wave 2 differentials. A final section concludes.
2 Literature Review
The study of electoral behaviour has for long been at the core of political sociol‐
ogy. This has led to the development of classic explanatory models of vote choice:
(1) the structural model considers long-term factors such as religion, socio-
economic status and residency (Lazarsfeld et al., 1948) (2) the rational choice
model (Downs, 1957) looks at voters’ evaluation of the performance of the
incumbent government (see e.g. Lewis-Beck, 1986), the political offer (issue-
354 doi: 10.5553/PLC/258999292020002003006 - Politics of the Low Countries 2020 (2) 3

voting, see e.g. Verba et al., 1976), or the choice of candidates and leaders (Bean
& Mughan, 1989; Blais et al., 2003; Marsh, 2007), and (3) the socio-psychological
model investigates party identification as cognitive and selective filters (Campbell
et al., 1960). More recently attitudes towards democracy and political institutions
were added as predictors, in line with the growing research on the crisis of repre‐
sentative democracy (Dalton, 2004; Norris, 1999, 2011).
Electoral studies in Belgium have frequently mobilised these classic
approaches (Delruelle et al., 1970; Delwit & van Haute, 2008; Deschouwer et al.,
2015; Frognier et al., 2007; Pilet et al., 2014). Nevertheless, they also contend
that the explanatory power of most of these socio-structural determinants tends
to decrease over time (Frognier et al., 2012). Scholars have also shown that dis‐
satisfaction with government and distrust towards institutions explain refusal to
participate (Henry et al., 2015; Hooghe et al., 2011) as well as extreme or protest
voting (Billiet & Witte, 1995; Henry et al., 2015; Hooghe et al., 2011; Pauwels,
2010).
Following the general emotional turn in social and political sciences (Blon‐
diaux &Traïni, 2018; Greco & Stenner, 2008; Faure & Négrier, 2017; Lemmings &
Brooks, 2014; Thompson & Hogget, 2012), recent studies on protest vote have
brought back psychological approaches to the study of voting behaviour (Rico et
al., 2017; Vasilopoulos & Marcus, 2017; Vasilopoulos et al., 2019).These studies
consider emotions as valuable and essential tools for rational thinking and deci‐
sion-making (Marcus, 2002). One of the main debates in this burgeoning litera‐
ture is whether emotions should be studied separately and multi-dimensionally,
or as general dimensions opposing positive and negative emotions.
The tenants of the discrete approach (Marcus et al., 2000) argue that specific
individual emotions have distinct, unique effects on voting behaviours, although
the existing research is divided as to how many emotions should be tested.
Studies range from five (Ekman, 1992) to seventeen or more (Roseman, 1996;
Redlawsk & Pierce, 2017). Some emotions, such as enthusiasm, would mobilise
voters to go out and vote. Other emotions, such as anxiety, lead voters to pay
more attention to the campaign and get information. This approach has been
widely applied to the study of protest voting. For instance, the analysis of emo‐
tions and extreme-right party support was motivated by the fact that the rhetoric
of these parties precisely aims at activating people’s fear and anger towards vari‐
ous types of threat, from deep societal changes related to immigration or
economic crisis, to security threats related to terrorism (Brader et al., 2008; Vasi‐
lopoulos et al., 2018). Hence, scholars have examined the role of anger and anxi‐
ety or fear in protest behaviour, and have brought new perspectives on the rela‐
tionship between emotions and vote choices (Rico et al., 2017; Vasilopoulou and
Wagner, 2017; Valentino et al., 2018; Vasilopoulos et al., 2019).
Several interesting findings emerged from their analyses. First, they acknowl‐
edge both theoretically and empirically that affective reactions can be multi-
dimensional: individuals can experience several emotions (fear, anger or even
enthusiasm) during a singular event or during a campaign, with various intensi‐
ties (Marcus & Mackuen, 1993). Second, by measuring both anger and fear and
testing their impact simultaneously, they have shown specific behavioural conse‐

quences for each. Fear would decrease support for the radical right, while anger
would prompt it (Vasilopoulos et al., 2019). Vasilopoulos and Wagner (2018) find
similar patterns in their study of Brexit: anger was positively associated with sup‐
port for the Leave option; while fear prompted more moderate opinions. The
explanatory mechanism would be that fear tends to inhibit reliance on estab‐
lished convictions such as party attachment and ideology (such as support for
authoritarian policies), and would increase emphasis on evaluating arguments,
candidates and policy issues (Valentino et al., 2008; Vasilopoulos & Marcus,
2017). By contrast, anger would tend to restrict from looking for counterargu‐
ments and would instead reinforce existing predispositions (Vasilopoulos, 2018;
Vasilopoulos et al., 2019). In other words, “anger orients the brain toward exist‐
ing habits of mind” (Valentino et al., 2018, p. 812), whereas fear or “anxiety will
instead trigger risk-avoidance and new information seeking in the political realm”
(Valentino et al., 2018, p. 812).
The main point of the tenants of the discrete approach is that research must
investigate individual emotions separately. However, the discrete effect of indi‐
vidual emotions has come under much scrutiny (Redlawsk & Pierce, 2017). In the
valenced view, the main point is to look at the dimensionality of emotions, and at
general positive vs negative effects (Lodge & Taber, 2000). This approach has
mainly been applied to the study of voters’ feelings and perceptions of individual
candidates, and linked to the literature on personalisation.
Redlawsk and Pierce (2017) argue that both views are reconcilable, which is
also the third approach by Lavine et al. (2012), who argue that voters can be
ambivalent when partisanship conflicts with negative emotions generated by a
candidate from a favoured party.
If the literature has investigated the effect of emotions on vote choice,
studies have also looked at the reversed relationship. Studies have looked at the
act of voting and its impact on citizens, their perceptions and emotions. Specifi‐
cally, Anderson et al. (2005) have for instance looked at the effect of being on the
winning or losing side of election results on legitimacy of institutions and the
acceptation of the results (Stiers et al., 2018). While this is commonly done in
majoritarian or bipartisan contexts, it is much more complex in a multilevel, mul‐
tiparty system as Belgium.
This article contributes to this literature by providing a first insight into the
relationship between emotions and vote choice in Belgium during the 2019 elec‐
tion. It departs from the above cited literature in at least four ways. First, the art‐
icle does not focus specifically on support for radical right parties, but looks at the
entire political spectrum (see for instance also Marcus, 1988) in Flanders and in
Wallonia. Second, this article measures emotions towards Belgian politics,
whereas existing studies use emotional reactions to the general state of the econ‐
omy (Vasilopoulos & Marcus, 2017), to the economic crisis (Rico et al., 2017), or
to specific threats such as terrorist attacks (Marcus et al., 2019; Vasilopoulos et
al., 2018). Third, while recent studies have extensively examined the effect of
anger and fear (or anxiety), this article includes a vast range of emotions, both
positive and negative. Finally, we must acknowledge that the article does not aim
to depict the psychological processes behind the relationship observed. We test

the effect of emotions on vote choice, without looking at the antecedents of emo‐
tions. We investigate whether emotions do have a distinct relation with vote
choice, even after controlling for other variables of interest such as satisfaction,
trust and efficacy. Following the literature, we expect negative emotions to have a
stronger effect on vote choice than positive emotions. We also expect negative
emotions to have a larger effect on the choice of voting for protest parties. Lastly,
we test whether vote choice potentially resulted in higher or lower negative and
positive emotions among voters, thereby investigating the winner/loser effect in
the Belgian context.
3 Data1 and Operationalisation
3.1 Measuring Emotions Towards Politics

One of the innovations of the RepResent project in the field of electoral sociology
is to give greater consideration to the ‘affective’ dimension of the vote (see van
Erkel & Turkenburg, 2020). One question asked respondents about the way they
‘feel’ about politics: ‘When you think about Belgian politics in general, how much
do you feel the following emotions’. The questionnaire invited respondents to tell
how much they feel each of the eight following emotions, on a scale from 0 (‘not
at all’) to 10 (‘a great deal’): anger, bitterness, worry, fear, hope, relief, joy and sat‐
isfaction. These emotions were presented in a non-randomized order. The ques‐
tion was included in the pre- and post-electoral waves of the survey, allowing us
to trace the evolution of respondents’ feelings before and after the election (see
Section 4). Note that all analyses are computed with unweighted data; additional
analyses computed with weighted data were done and did not show tremendous
differences in the findings.2
Table 1 provides descriptive statistics for each emotion (wave 1) and Figure 1
uses boxplots. We can clearly see that four emotions present high average scores:
anger, bitterness, worry, and fear – especially ‘worry’ which has the highest mean
and highest median (see boxplot), and a mode at 7. Compared with other ‘nega‐
tive’ emotions, fear shows a lower mean and median (horizontal line in Figure 1),
and the highest variation (standard deviation of 2.8). By contrast, respondents
seem to load relatively low on four additional emotions, especially on joy and
relief, but also hope and satisfaction. These last four emotions have means below
four on a 0-10 scale, while the means for the first four emotions range from 5.3 to
6.4. Half of the respondents are located between 0 (or 1) and 5 for relief, joy and
satisfaction (see Figure 1). Around one respondent out of four indicates feeling
no joy and no relief at all when thinking about Belgian politics. We can note that
five constitutes the mode for many emotions. This can result from the absence of
a ‘don’t know’ category in the proposed answers.
3.2 Emotions Towards Politics: A Positive Dimension and a Negative Dimension

Table 2 investigates the degree to which these emotions correlate, that is, for
instance, the extent to which respondents who are angry are also fearful at the

Table 1 Emotions – descriptive statistics, wave 1 (N = 3,903)

Mean Mode Std. deviation
Anger 6.0 5 2.6
Bitterness 5.7 5 2.7
Worry 6.4 7 2.5
Fear 5.1 5 2.8
Hope 3.8 5 2.6
Relief 3.0 0 2.4
Joy 2.9 0 2.4
Satisfaction 3.5 5 2.5
Source: RepResent 2019 voter survey, wave 1.
Figure 1 Emotions – boxplots, wave 1 (N = 3,903)
same time. The table indicates that four ‘negative’ emotions ‘go (relatively) well
together’: respondents who say they are angry, for instance, tend to report also
high levels of fear, worry and bitterness. When comparing the values of the coeffi‐
cients, we can see that four ‘positive’ emotions do correlate even more (coeffi‐
cients between 0.6 and 0.7) than negative emotions (coefficients around 0.4 and
0.5).
What is even more interesting is the correlation between positive and nega‐
tive emotions. We would logically expect that the more the respondent expresses
negative emotions, the less s/he will express positive emotions. Such a relation‐
ship should translate in a negative and relatively high correlation coefficient.
While Table 2 indeed displays negative coefficients between positive and negative
emotions, these are relatively low (below 0.3). Especially, correlation between fear
and positive emotions is very weak (below 0.1 in most cases).

Hence, two dimensions emerge: a dimension related to negative emotions, and a

dimension related to positive emotions.3 Therefore, we compute two indexes by
taking the mean of the sum of the respondents’ scores on positive or negative
emotion. The positive emotion index scores between 0 and 10, with a mean at 3.3
(Cronbach’s alpha = 0.92, which indicates that the index is reliable given that the
emotions correlate quite well); the negative emotion index scores between 0 and
10, with a mean at 5.8 (Cronbach’s alpha = 0.85). These two dimensions or
indexes need to be considered separately as they do not correlate that much
(Pearson’s correlation score = -0.239, at p<0.01 significance level). In other
words, voters can display various combinations of emotions: some express high
negative emotions and high positive emotions at the same time, while others
show high negative emotions and low positive ones, display low negative and high
positive or even low negative and low positive emotions. Based on the respond‐
ents’ scores on the two indexes, we observe that around 50% of them combine
relatively high negative emotions (between 6 and 10) with relatively low positive
emotions (between 0 and 5). About 30% combine low negative and low positive
emotions, 12% combine high positive and high negative ones, and only 8% of the
respondents combine high positive emotions with low negative ones.
The next two sections examine the relationship between emotions and the
vote. In line with the other articles of the Special Issue, we limit the analysis to
Flanders and Wallonia. Before detailing the dynamics observed within Flanders
and Wallonia, we can nevertheless examine differences between the three regions
(including thus Brussels) in terms of type and intensity of emotions (Table 3).
Voters in Flanders do feel lower negative emotions and higher positive emo‐
tions on average than voters in Wallonia and in Brussels. For positive emotions,
the differences are significant4 between the three regions, but for negative emo‐
tions, differences are significant only between Wallonia and Flanders (no signifi‐
cant differences found between Flanders, with 5.6 on average, and Brussels with
5.8). If we detail emotion by emotion, differences are significant between the
three regions for relief, joy and satisfaction, with voters in Flanders showing the
highest scores, Walloon voters the lowest scores and voters in Brussels being in
the middle. Walloon respondents show significant differences with voters in
Flanders on all emotions. Significant differences between Brussels and Wallonia
are found on fear and hope, and between Brussels and Flanders on bitterness.
These findings are in line with existing research using other indicators of
resentment, such as political trust and satisfaction with government. These exist‐
ing studies show that satisfaction and trust are consistently higher in Flanders
than in Brussels and Wallonia, and higher in Brussels than in Wallonia (Close et
al., 2020; Henry et al., 2015). Emotional indicators confirm this gap but reveal a
more nuanced picture. We find few significant differences between Flanders and
Brussels, or between Brussels and Wallonia on negative emotions. For instance,
levels of anger and fear are very similar in Flanders and Brussels. Finally, in terms
of intra-region variance, emotions vary slightly more in Brussels (standard error
between 2.2 and 2.9) than in the two other regions, especially Flanders (between
2.1 and 2.7). If we compare means between communities instead of regions,
Flemish and Francophone respondents show significant differences on all emo‐

Table 2 Emotions – correlation matrix (Kendall tau), wave 1 (N = 3,903)

Anger Bitter- Worry Fear Hope Relief Joy Satis-
ness faction
Anger 1 0.57 -0.54 0.46 -0.21 -0.21 -0.24 -0.29
Bitterness 0.57 1 -0.49 0.44 -0.18 -0.17 -0.18 -0.24
Worry 0.54 0.49 1 0.52 -0.18 -0.22 -0.24 -0.26
Fear 0.46 0.44 -0.52 1 -0.07 -0.04 -0.04 -0.12
Hope -0.21 -0.18 -0.18 -0.07 1 0.59 0.60 0.63
Relief -0.21 -0.17 -0.22 -0.04 0.59 1 0.73 0.68
Joy -0.24 -0.18 -0.24 -0.04 0.60 0.73 1 0.71
Satisfaction -0.29 -0.24 -0.26 -0.12 0.63 0.68 0.71 1
Source: RepResent 2019 voter survey.
Note: All correlations are significant at p < 0.01 level.
Table 3 Emotions in Brussels, Flanders and Wallonia – means, wave 1 (N =

3,903)
Anger Bitter- Worry Fear Hope Relief Joy Satis- Index Index
ness fac- neg. pos.
tion
Brussels 5.9 5.8 6.4 5.0 3.8 3.0 2.9 3.4 5.8 3.3
Flanders 5.9 5.4 6.2 4.9 4.1 3.3 3.3 3.9 5.6 3.6
Wallonia 6.2 6.0 6.7 5.4 3.5 2.6 2.3 2.9 6.1 2.8
Mean 6.0 5.7 6.4 5.1 3.8 3.0 2.9 3.5 5.8 3.3
tions (i.e. Francophones being less positive and more negative on average), the
smallest difference being found for anger.
4 Emotions and Vote Choice
4.1 Bivariate Analyses

The tables and figures below compare emotions across party voters, in Flanders
(Table 4 and Figure 2) and in Wallonia (Table 5 and Figure 3). We use respond‐
ents’ self-reported party choice at the federal level (in wave 2). The tables present,
for each party or vote choice, the average score of voters on every emotion; the
tables also include the average score on the negative and positive emotions
indexes. These indexes are then used in the figures. The figures present graphi‐
cally the position of each group of voters along two axes: the vertical axis
accounts for their score on the negative emotions index, the horizontal axis
accounts for their score on the positive emotions index.
In Flanders, CD&V (Christen-Democratisch en Vlaams) and OpenVLD (Open

Vlaamse Liberalen en Democraten) voters appear to express the highest positive

Table 4 Emotions and vote choice – Flanders, comparison of means (N =

1,928)
ness fac- neg. pos.
tion
CD&V 5.0 4.9 5.7 4.5 5.0 4.1 4.0 4.9 5.0 4.5
Groen 5.3 4.9 6.0 4.2 4.5 3.3 3.3 4.1 5.1 3.8
N-VA 5.4 4.9 5.9 4.5 4.7 3.7 3.7 4.6 5.2 4.2
OpenVL 5.2 4.9 5.7 4.5 4.8 4.1 4.1 4.7 5.1 4.4
D
PVDA 6.8 5.9 6.8 5.1 3.5 2.4 2.3 2.9 6.1 2.8
sp.a 6.1 5.6 6.6 5.2 3.8 3.0 3.0 3.5 5.9 3.3
VB 7.0 6.6 7.0 5.9 3.2 2.6 2.6 2.9 6.6 2.8
Other 7.0 6.2 6.4 5.6 2.6 2.4 2.3 2.4 6.3 2.4
party
Blank/ 6.3 5.8 6.3 5.4 3.4 3.0 2.8 2.7 6.0 3.0
null/
absten-
tion
Average 5.9 5.5 6.3 4.9 4.1 3.3 3.3 3.9 3.6 5.6
emotions (around 4.0-4.5), and the lowest negative ones (around 5.0). They are
closely followed by N-VA (Nieuw-Vlaamse Alliantie) voters, then by Groen voters,
with the latter showing slightly lower positive emotions – though the difference is
barely significant. VB voters stand out as the category expressing the highest level
of negative emotions, as a general mean and on each negative emotion separately
(except for anger on which ‘other party’ voters score as high: 7.0). VB voters do
feel significantly more angry and bitter than CD&V, OpenVLD, N-VA, Groen and
sp.a (Socialistische Partij Anders) voters; they also express significantly more fear
and worry than CD&V, OpenVLD, N-VA and Groen voters. Nevertheless, differ‐
ences are not statistically significant when compared to other ‘protest’ voters
(PVDA and other party voters) or to blank/null voters and abstainers. Besides, VB
voters are not those showing the lowest level of positive emotions – these are
found among ‘other party’ voters. However, this ‘other party’ category includes
only 27 respondents, we must therefore take these scores with great care. In
terms of level of positive emotions, VB and PVDA voters are very close.
Overall, in Flanders, two groups emerge: one is composed by CD&V,
OpenVLD, N-VA and Groen voters. The second group gathers VB, PVDA and
‘other party’ voters. The level of emotional resentment of sp.a voters stands in
between these two groups: they feel significantly less positive and more negative
towards politics than CD&V, OpenVLD and N-VA voters; but they do feel signifi‐
cantly less negative than VB voters. Sp.a and Groen voters do differ in their level
of negative emotions, sp.a voters being on average more negative by 0.8 point.

Figure 2 Average positive and negative emotions per vote choice – Flanders
The situation is less clear-cut in Wallonia. On the lower right-hand side of the
graph (Figure 2), MR (Mouvement réformateur) and cdH (Centre démocrate
humaniste) voters appear as the least negative and the most positive. MR voters
do feel significantly more positive than all other voters except cdH and PS (Parti
Socialiste) voters; and they do feel significantly less negative than all other voters
except those of the cdH. Hence, in terms of emotions, PS and MR voters do differ
more in their level of negative emotions than in their level of positive ones. In the
upper left-hand side of the graph, three groups are located very closely: PTB, PP
(Parti Populaire) and other party voters. Their degree of negative emotions (and
especially, of anger and worry) is significantly higher than that of cdh, MR, PS
and Ecolo voters; and their degree of positive emotions is significantly lower than
that of cdh, MR and PS voters. DéFI (Démocrate, Fédéraliste, Indépendant)
stands out in the middle of the graph, quite close to Ecolo and the PS.
4.2 Multivariate Analysis

In order to confirm the usefulness of these emotional indicators of resentment,
the tables below present multivariate models. These allow testing the impact of
emotions while ‘controlling for’ other determinants of the vote, such as socio-
demographic characteristics and political attitudes, as well as other indicators of
resentment: satisfaction with government, political trust and external political
efficacy. In doing so, the models allow us to evaluate how much emotions bring
into the explanation of vote choice.
We include the following socio-demographic variables like age, gender and
education. Then, we use three variables measuring respondents’ political prefer‐
ences. The first one accounts for respondents’ self-placement on a left-right scale,
from 0 (left) to 10 (right). The second one measures respondents’ ideological
positioning on a major socio-economic issue:

Table 5 Emotions and vote choice – Wallonia, comparison of means (N =

1,362)
ness fac- neg. pos.
tion
cdH 5.4 5.5 6.0 4.7 4.1 3.1 3.2 3.8 5.4 3.6
DéFI 6.2 6.0 6.8 5.8 3.3 2.3 2.0 2.7 6.2 2.6
Ecolo 5.6 6.0 6.6 5.2 3.6 2.4 2.2 2.9 5.8 2.8
MR 5.1 5.1 5.9 4.7 4.4 3.4 3.1 4.1 5.2 3.8
PP 7.4 6.7 7.7 5.9 2.3 1.4 1.4 1.6 6.9 1.7
PS 6.1 5.8 6.7 5.4 3.9 2.9 2.7 3.1 6.0 3.1
PTB 7.5 7.1 7.7 6.3 2.4 1.7 1.7 1.4 7.1 1.8
Other 7.4 7.2 7.4 6.1 2.3 1.6 1.5 1.9 7.0 1.8
party
Blank/ 6.9 5.6 6.8 5.5 2.6 1.9 1.8 2.2 6.5 2.2
null/
Absten-
tion
Average 6.2 5.8 6.6 5.4 3.5 2.6 2.4 2.9 6.1 2.8
Figure 3 Average positive and negative emotions per vote choice – Wallonia
Some people think that the government should intervene as little as possible
in the economy, others think that the government should intervene as much
as possible in the economy. Can you place your opinion on a scale from 0 to
10, where 0 means that the government must intervene as little as possible
and where 10 means that the government must intervene as much as possi‐
ble?

We reverse the values, so that a higher score indicates a right-wing position. The
third measure of political preferences uses respondents’ position on the immigra‐
tion issue:
Some believe that non-western foreigners should be able to live in Europe

while maintaining their own culture. Others believe that they must adapt to
European culture. Where would you place yourself on a scale from 0 to 10,
where 0 means that non-western foreigners must be able to fully retain their
own culture and 10 that they must fully adapt to European culture?
A high score indicates a right-wing or ethnocentric position. The third type of

control variables includes three traditional measures of resentment: satisfaction
with government, trust and external political efficacy. Satisfaction with govern‐
ment is measured using the question “How satisfied are you with the content of
the policies that have been implemented at the subsequent levels of government
during the past years?” We use satisfaction with the federal government, as we
try to explain voting choice at this level of power. The variable ranges from 0 ‘very
dissatisfied’ to 10 ‘totally satisfied’. Then, we create an index for trust by adding
respondents’ trust in political parties, federal parliament, politicians and the
European Union and dividing it by four (Cronbach’s alpha = 0,93). We obtain an
index ranging from 0 ‘no trust at all’ to 10 ‘complete trust’. Finally, we create an
index of external political efficacy using respondents’ opinion (from 1 ‘totally
disagree’ to 5 ‘totally agree’) over the following three items: (1) ‘In general, our
political system works honestly’ (2) ‘Our political decision-making processes are
sufficiently transparent’ (3) ‘In general, our political system works effectively’
(Cronbach’s alpha: 0.86).
In order to test the impact of emotions on vote choice, we faced two options.
One option was to test the impact of all emotions simultaneously, in order to see
if specific emotions increase the probability to vote for one or the other party.
However, this scenario entailed potential problems of multicollinearity. In order
to check for multicollinearity issues, we have used the VIF procedure and statis‐
tics. The VIF values reveal moderate scores (around 4-4.5) for relief, joy and satis‐
faction. As we have seen in the correlation table above (Table 2), these variables
correlated above 0.68. Correlation analyses (not displayed) further reveal that
these emotions correlate with satisfaction with the federal government (Pear‐
sons’ coefficients >0.54) and even more with trust (Pearsons’ coefficients >0.65).
These tests suggest that positive emotions (relief, joy and especially satisfaction)
are quite redundant with attitudinal measurement of resentment. The other
option – applied in the article – was to use the two indexes, positive and negative,
as the main predictors of vote choice, as the VIF values indicate low multicolli‐
nearity problems. Tables 6 and 7 below use these two indexes but we provide
additional tables (12 and 13) in the Appendix that keep disaggregated emotions
in the list of predictors. We use both types of models to interpret the findings.
The tables present the results of multinomial regression models. This kind of
model is probabilistic, meaning that it helps to evaluate the impact of predictors
on the probability that a respondent would vote for one party instead of another

(the reference category). For Flanders, the reference category is VB; for Wallonia,
the reference category is PTB. The reported coefficients are the odds ratios. When
the value of the coefficient is above one, the factor increases the probability to
vote for one party instead of the VB or the PTB; when the value of the coefficient
is below 1, the predictor decreases the probability to pick another party than VB
or PTB. Note that because the number of respondents is limited in several catego‐
ries of vote choice, we decided to group or delete certain categories of voters. In
Flanders, we have omitted the ‘other party’ voter category, since it included less
than 30 voters. In Wallonia, we grouped PP (N = 59 voters) and DéFi voters (N =
86) together with ‘other party’ voters (N = 46).
Overall, the findings in both regions suggest that negative emotions bring
additional explanation: the effect of the negative emotions index remains signifi‐
cant even when we control for other determinants, including traditional indica‐
tors of resent.5The models presented in Appendix confirm that negative emo‐
tions impact more significantly vote choice than positive emotions, yet they also
show that hope and satisfaction also affect vote choice. Looking at the adjusted
McFadden pseudo R2 of the models allows to compare their explanatory power:
for Flanders, they are very similar in both tables (0.195 in Table 6, 0.191 in Table
12), and the same is true for Wallonia (0.134 in Table 7, 0.131 in Table 13).
In Flanders, a high score on the negative emotion index decreases signifi‐
cantly the probability of voting for CD&V, N-VA, Groen and OpenVLD (0.01 sig‐
nificance level) rather than for VB. Looking at emotions separately, we see that
anger significantly decreases the probability to vote for CD&V, fear decreases the
probability to vote for Groen and PVDA, and bitterness decreases the probability
to pick N-VA instead of VB. However, Groen voters worry more about Belgian
politics, compared to VB voters. Interestingly, positive emotions are also at play.
Hope significantly decreases the probability to vote for the VB instead of Groen.
Satisfaction increases the probability to pick CD&V or N-VA instead of VB – the
effect is similar to the one observed with satisfaction with the federal govern‐
ment.
Conclusions can also be drawn party by party. CD&V voters are less angry
and more satisfied than VB voters; and they express more trust in political insti‐
tutions. Groen voters express less fear but more worry and hope than VB voters.
The profile of N-VA voters is quite similar to that of the CD&V, although they dif‐
fer from VB by expressing less bitterness, while trust has no significant impact.
OpenVLD voters appear less negative in general, and more trustful than VB vot‐
ers. PVDA voters differ from VB in their lower level of fear, as well as in their
higher trust (although this effect is not significant in Table 12). Sp.a voters do not
differ much in terms of emotions from VB voters; they are nevertheless more
trustful in political institutions.
Figures 4 graphically represents the impact of the negative emotion index on
the probability of party choices in Flanders. We can see that the probability of VB
voting is about 10% or less for respondents scoring very low on the index; and
this probability reaches 30-35% when respondents express intense negative emo‐
tions – all other variables kept constant. By contrast, the probability to pick N-VA

decreases significantly, from 40% when no negative emotion is expressed, to less

than 20% when negative emotions are at their maximum.
In Wallonia, higher scores on the negative emotions index decrease the prob‐
ability to vote for cdH, MR, PS and blank/null/abstention instead of PTB. Two
negative emotions matter: PTB voters are significantly angrier than Ecolo voters
and express significantly more bitterness than MR. Relief has an unexpected
effect: feeling more relief decreases the probability to vote for the cdH, Ecolo, and
other parties rather than for the PTB. By contrast to Flanders, fear and hope do
not affect vote choice once control variables are taken into account. Satisfaction
as an emotion plays an important role: dissatisfaction increases the probability to
vote PTB rather than any other party except the PS, even if we control for satis‐
faction with government (which increases the probability to vote MR and Ecolo,
compared to PTB).
If we look party by party, cdH, Ecolo and MR voters differ from PTB voters in
similar ways: they are older (except Ecolo voters in Table 7), more educated (espe‐
cially Ecolo and MR), more right-wing (especially MR ones), and more satisfied
with government policies (again, the effect is stronger for MR voters); and feel
more satisfied when thinking about Belgian politics. PS, cdH and Ecolo voters also
express more trust in institutions. Interestingly, there are very few differences
between PTB and PS voters, except regarding age and political efficacy: PS voters
are slightly older and perceive significantly more positively the functioning of the
representative system.
When looking at the predicted probabilities on Figure 5, the effect of negative
emotions on voting choice are less clear-cut than in Flanders. The probability of
PTB voting is about 5% for respondents scoring very low on the index and reaches
17% when respondents express intense negative emotions – all other variables
kept constant. By contrast, the probability of choosing MR or cdh is 10% point
lower when the index is at its maximum (10), compared to an index of 0. Interest‐
ingly, the level of negative emotions expressed does not impact much the proba‐
bility to vote for Ecolo and the PS, as the probability to opt for these two parties
is quite constant across the values of the negative emotions index.
5 Vote Choice and Emotions
In this final section, we briefly explore the evolution of emotions between wave 1
and wave 2, that is, before and after the 2019 election. We test whether vote
choice potentially resulted in higher or lower negative and positive emotions. We
expect that picking a winner party – defined as electoral winners, that is parties
that increased their vote share (in absence of government formation, see Curini
et al., 2012) – might increase the intensity of positive emotions and decrease the
intensity of negative ones. In Flanders, VB voters should show the highest
increase in positive emotions and the lowest increase in negative ones. In Wallo‐
nia, two winners can be identified, which have experienced the greatest increase
in support: PTB, and Ecolo.

Table 6 Explaining vote choice in Flanders – multinomial regression models

(odds ratio)
Ref. Category = VB CD&V Groen N-VA OpenV PVDA sp.a Blank/
LD null/
abs.
Age 1.04*** 1.00 1.04*** 1.02* 1.01 1.03*** 1.03**
Women 1.03 0.89 1.24 0.98 0.89 1.21 1.05
Education (ref.no/primary 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
educ.)
Secondary school 1.43 3.93* 1.27 1.08 0.94 1.14 1.36
Higher non-university 3.91*** 12.34** 2.23** 2.57** 2.09 1.43 1.65
degree *
University degree 5.55*** 25.15** 3.32*** 2.79* 1.57 1.89 1.14
*
Left-Right self-placement 0.53*** 0.33*** 0.97 0.62*** 0.30*** 0.35*** 0.58***
Right socio-eco 0.93 0.88* 1.09* 1.03 0.93 0.94 1.06
Right immigration 0.93 0.87** 1.04 0.97 0.86** 0.98 1.00
Satisfaction with fed. gvt 1.25** 0.97 1.30*** 1.11 0.90 0.92 0.89
Trust index 1.23* 1.52*** 1.11 1.30** 1.21* 1.49*** 1.09
External pol. Efficacy 1.07 1.30 0.95 0.99 0.79 0.94 0.85
Index pos. emotions 1.09 0.91 1.08 1.09 0.99 0.92 1.11
Index neg. emotions 0.84** 0.84** 0.80*** 0.82*** 0.91 0.94 0.90
N 1,894
McFadden’s R2 0.221
Adj. McFadden’s R2 0.195
Note: Exponentiated coefficients; ***p < 0.001, **p < 0.01, *p < 0.05.
We calculate for each individual the difference in each emotion between wave
1 and wave 2, as well as the difference between their score on the indexes in wave
1 and wave 2. Tables 8 and 9 report, for each party voters, their average differen‐
tials on the positive and negative emotions indexes. Two tables in Appendix
present party voters’ average differentials on each emotion separately (Tables 14
and 15). Tables 10 and 11 present simple linear regressions, where the dependent
variables are the respondents’ differentials on the positive and negative emotions
index, and the independent variables are the parties. These models test whether
picking one party instead of the reference category (VB in Flanders, PTB in Wallo‐
nia) resulted in increasing or decreasing positive and negative emotions towards
politics.
In Flanders, a clear pattern emerges: VB voters are the only one expressing signif‐
icantly more intense positive emotions after the election (Table 10). Their level of
hope increases quite substantially (+0.41, see Appendix). This is interesting, as
the analysis above revealed that lack of hope could differentiate VB voting from


Note: All other variables put at their means.
Figure 4 Negative emotions index and vote choice (Flanders) – predicted

probabilities
Groen voting. VB voters increase significantly their positive emotions: compari‐

sons are statistically significant when compared to CD&V and OpenVLD for hope,
joy and relief, and to CD&V for satisfaction. VB voters also stand out as the only
group (with abstainers/blank/null voters) that does not feel more intense nega‐
tive emotions after the election. Looking at emotions separately (see Appendix),
differentials on negative emotions are not statistically significant (e.g. anger
increases among most voters), except for fear. Groen voters appear as those fac‐
ing the highest increase in fear (+0.87); whereas VB voters show a level of fear
0.33 point lower than before the election. The linear regression models presented
in Table 10 confirm these trends. Voting for incumbent parties (CD&V, N-VA,
OpenVLD), for Groen, and also blank/null voting and abstaining significantly
decreases the level of positive emotions compared to voting for VB. Voting for
any of the parties instead of VB also increases the level of negative emotions.
Hence, the electoral success of this radical right party seems to have increased
levels of negative feelings and decreased levels of positive feelings towards poli‐
tics among other ‘loser’ voters.
Again, dynamics differ in Wallonia. Contrary to what happened in Flanders, the

average level of positive emotions has increased after the election; it has
increased more than the average level of negative emotions. Besides, the average
level of negative emotions has increased less in Wallonia than in Flanders. Most
party voters increase their level of positive emotions, and especially, PS and PTB
voters. If we look at each emotion independently (see Table 15 in Appendix), we
see that PS voters express significantly higher levels of hope, relief and satisfac‐
tion after the election. PS voters show increases in hope and satisfaction similar
to and even higher than PTB voters. In terms of negative emotions, cdH and MR

Table 7 Explaining vote choice in Wallonia – multinomial regression models

(odds ratio)
Ref. category= PTB cdH Ecolo MR PS Other Blank/
null/
abs.
Age 1.04*** 1.02 1.03** 1.02** 1.01 1.01
Women 1.10 1.01 1.26 1.08 1.12 1.07
Education (ref.no/primary educ.) 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
Secondary school 2.55 2.35* 2.33* 1.28 1.37 1.18
Higher non-university degree 4.22** 4.27*** 4.47*** 1.07 1.78 1.27
University degree 4.46** 6.95*** 6.73*** 1.53 2.78* 0.67
Left-right self-placement 1.34*** 1.12* 1.86*** 0.93 1.61*** 1.39***
Right socio-eco 1.03 1.06 1.08 1.00 1.06 1.01
Right immigration 0.97 1.03 1.11 1.06 1.14** 1.07
Satisfaction with fed. gvt 1.18 1.22** 1.69*** 1.04 1.08 1.02
Trust index 1.26* 1.28** 1.11 1.20* 1.12 0.99
External pol. Efficacy 1.21 1.31 1.38 1.69*** 1.18 1.28
Index pos. emotions 1.08 0.89 0.99 1.08 0.91 1.00
Index neg. emotions 0.81** 0.90 0.82** 0.90* 0.93 0.87*
N 1,355
McFadden’s R2 0.167
Adj. McFadden’s R2 0.134
Note: Exponentiated coefficients; ***p < 0.001, **p < 0.01, *p < 0.05.
voters increase their average level of negative emotions after the election, espe‐
cially cdH voters (Table 10) – which is coherent with the historically low score of
the cdH.
In Table 12, we see that few relationships emerge at the 0.05 significance
level. Compared to PTB voters, voters opting for MR, blank/null voting or
abstaining, experience a higher decrease in positive emotions after the election.
Compared to PTB voters, cdH voters significantly show a higher increase in nega‐
tive emotions after the election. Again, voters opting for one or the other mem‐
ber of the former (regional) government experience either a greater increase in
negative emotions either a decrease in positive ones. However, whereas we expec‐
ted PTB and Ecolo voters to experience both an increase in positive and a
decrease in negative emotions (since they could be considered as the two winners
of the election), we find ‘winner’ patterns among PS and PTB voters. This may
reflect that these voters were satisfied and even happy to see a left-wing ‘wave’ in
Wallonia (PTB, Ecolo and PS won together a majority of seats in the regional
parliament), or this may result from the capacity of the PS to appear as a winner,
despite a historically low score.


Note: All other variables put at their means.
Figure 5 Negative emotions index and vote choice (Wallonia) – predicted

probabilities
Table 8 Differential Wave 2 – Wave 1 (Flanders). N = 1,972

Positive emo- Negative emotions
tions
CD&V -0.57 +0.45
Groen -0.25 +0.41
N-VA -0.14 +0.22
OpenVLD -0.54 +0.33
PVDA +0.09 +0.02
sp.a +0.03 +0.25
VB +0.25 -0.08
Blank/null/abs. -0.38 -0.21
Average -0.14 +0.17
Sig. *** *
Note: *** p<0.001, *p < 0.05
6 Conclusion
This article constitutes one of the first attempts to analyse the role of emotions
towards politics on electoral choices in Belgium. At the empirical level, the main
contribution of this article has been to look at the role of emotions towards poli‐
tics in general, whereas existing studies examine emotions towards the general
state of the economy, or specific contextual events. Our analyses have allowed

Table 9 Differential Wave 2 – Wave 1 (Wallonia), N = 1,473

Positive emo- Negative emotions
tions
cdH +0.25 +0.48
Ecolo +0.13 +0.06
MR +0.03 +0.24
PS +0.51 +0.05
PTB +0.34 -0.02
Other +0.09 0.00
Blank/null/abs. -0.29 -0.06
Average +0.18 +0.09
Sig. ** -
Note: **p < 0.01, - not significant.
Table 10 Vote choice and changes in emotions – linear regression models

(Flanders)
Positive emotions Negative emotions
Ref. category: VB
CD&V -0.82*** 0.53**
Groen -0.50** 0.48*
N-VA -0.39*** 0.30*
OpenVLD -0.79*** 0.41*
PVDA -0.16 0.10
sp.a -0.22 0.33
Blank/null/abs. -0.63** -0.14
Constant 0.25** 0.00
N 1,898 1,898
R2 0.024 0.008
Adjusted R2 0.021 0.005
Note: ***p < 0.001, **p < 0.01, *p < 0.05.
assessing the potential explanatory power of emotional measures of democratic

resentment.
Second, the article innovates as it has looked beyond the role of negative emo‐
tions and addressed the role as well of (a lack of) positive ones. It has therefore
considered the emotional repertoire to be at least two-dimensional. Using both
types of emotions has allowed highlighting more fine-grained dynamics within
the two regions and across parties.

Table 11 Vote choice and changes in emotions – linear regression models

(Wallonia)
Ref. category: PTB Positive emotions Negative emotions
cdH -0.09 0.50
Ecolo -0.21 0.08
MR -0.31 0.26
PS 0.17 0.07
Other -0.25 0.02
Blank/null/abs. -0.63* -0.03
Constant 0.34** -0.02
N 1,357 1,357
0.014 0.004
Adjusted R2 0.010 -0.000
Note: *p < 0.01, **p < 0.05
Third, while recent studies have especially focused on the impact of (negative)
emotions on extreme right-wing voting, this article has also considered radical
left as well as mainstream parties as potential receptacles of negative emotions or
(lack of) positive ones. The article has looked in detail at the degree of each emo‐
tion for voters of all major parties of Flanders and Wallonia. Findings confirm
previous studies that suggest that negative feelings, especially anger and fear,
constitute major drivers of support for extreme-right parties (in our case, the
VB). But they also show that lack of hope may be important as well. In addition,
we uncovered that negative emotions and lack of positive ones can also prompt
support for radical left parties – although to a lesser extent.
Fourth, the panel survey design has allowed looking at emotions in a longitu‐
dinal way. By analysing the impact of vote choice on the evolution of emotions
between the pre and post-electoral period, we have again uncovered different
dynamics in Flanders and Wallonia. The results of the election in Flanders have
made VB voters more positive and less negative, whereas the political outcome of
the election has increased fear and decreased positive feelings among traditional
‘pillar’ party voters and Groen voters. Hence, the electoral success of this radical
right party may not only have affected emotions of its voters, but potentially
impacted on other party voters’ feelings – although we did not directly test
whether emotions changed as a result of voters’ perception of their own party or
other parties winning or losing. In Wallonia, the left-wing majority that came out
of the election in the regional parliament has increased satisfaction and hope
among voters of two left-wing parties: PTB and PS – although the Socialist Party
has endured a historical setback in 2019.
Overall, our findings suggest that emotions towards politics can be consid‐
ered as independent and specific dimensions of resent. Although they contribute
quite modestly in terms of explanatory power, their impact on vote choice is sig‐
nificant, and they vary through time depending on the outcome of the election.

We argue that emotions towards politics should more systematically be included

in opinion polls and electoral studies, as they have the potential to grasp more
volatile and context-driven feelings towards politics, compared to traditional and
more deeply rooted attitudes.
One way to do so is by joining force with qualitative research scholars. Quali‐
tative research can inform us on voter perceptions and their sources. Qualitative
interviews and focus groups can inform us on the sources of these perceptions, be
it the media and the electoral campaign, other institutionalised organisations,
etc. The results of the qualitative work can then be taken into account in the for‐
mulation of questions in large-scale voter surveys, and in the inclusion of more
fine-grained and specific emotional registers.
Notes
1 To test our hypotheses, we rely on the RepResent panel survey. The survey is
presented in length in the Introduction of this Special Issue.
2 Small differences in scores were for instance observed in bivariate analyses, i.e. scores
obtained for small groups did vary slightly (e.g. ‘other party voters’ and ‘blank/null/
abstention’ showing for instance less radical emotions when using weighted data).
3 A principal component analysis reveals slightly more complex patterns. Before rota‐
tion, two components emerge. One seems to capture the ‘type’ of emotions expressed
(eigen value at 3.6, 45% of explained variance), with positive emotions loading posi‐
tively (factor loadings between 0.75 and 0.84) while negative emotions loading nega‐
tively (factor loadings between -0.40 and -0.60). The second component (eigen value
at 2.4, 30% of explained variance) seems to capture the ‘intensity’ of the emotions
expressed, with all emotions loading positively but factor loadings being higher for
negative emotions (between 0.61 and 0.72) than for positive emotions (between 0.36
and 0.47). After rotation – whether promax, varimax or oblimin –, two clear compo‐
nents emerge: one component on which positive emotions highly and positively load
(factors around 0.8-0.9) while negative emotions negatively and weakly load (factors
around -0.1 - -0.2); the other one on which negative emotions positively and highly
load, but on which positive emotions negatively and weakly load.
4 Our comparisons of means throughout the article are based on Scheffé tests, as this
test is quite conservative and is better suited for exploratory analyses (see Lee & Lee,
2018). We only consider significance levels below p < 0.05.
5 Note that when we exclude attitudinal variables from the models (satisfaction, trust
and efficacy), the effect of the positive emotions index becomes significant (for
CD&V, N-VA, OpenVLD, and sp.a in Flanders; and for cdH, MR and PS in Wallonia),
and coefficients score around 1.2-1.3.
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Appendix
Table 12 Explaining vote choice in Flanders – multinomial regression models

(odds ratio)
Ref. category = VB CD&V Groen N-VA OpenV PVDA sp.a Blank/
LD null/
abs.
Age 1.04*** 1.00 1.03*** 1.01* 1.00 1.03*** 1.03**
Women 1.02 0.87 1.19 0.96 0.90 1.18 1.03
Education (ref.no/primary 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
educ.)
Secondary school 1.39 3.79* 1.30 1.07 0.87 1.19 1.39
Higher non-university 3.83*** 11.84** 2.27** 2.52** 1.96 1.47 1.70
degree *
University degree 5.50*** 23.82** 3.36*** 2.76* 1.37 1.95 1.19
*
Left-Right self-placement 0.53*** 0.34*** 0.97 0.62*** 0.30*** 0.35*** 0.57***
Right socio-eco 0.94 0.89 1.10* 1.04 0.94 0.94 1.06
Right immigration 0.92 0.86** 1.03 0.96 0.85** 0.97 1.00
Satisfaction with fed.gvt 1.23** 0.97 1.28*** 1.11 0.90 0.92 0.90
Trust index 1.23* 1.53*** 1.10 1.30** 1.20 1.50*** 1.09
External pol. Efficacy index 1.05 1.30 0.93 0.99 0.81 0.94 0.87

Table 12 (Continued)
Ref. category = VB CD&V Groen N-VA OpenV PVDA sp.a Blank/
LD null/
abs.
Anger 0.85** 0.90 0.92 0.92 1.11 0.95 0.99
Bitterness 1.02 0.95 0.90* 0.93 0.90 0.95 0.93
Worry 1.03 1.16* 1.04 1.04 1.07 1.09 0.98
Fear 0.96 0.87* 0.95 0.93 0.88* 0.96 1.00
Hope 1.12 1.18* 1.08 1.04 1.13 1.02 1.05
Relief 0.93 0.93 0.89 0.98 0.91 0.85 0.96
Joy 0.89 0.87 0.98 1.02 0.91 1.12 1.12
Satisfaction 1.20* 0.98 1.16* 1.05 1.09 0.94 0.98
N 1,894
McFadden pseudo R2 0.229
Adj. McFadden Pseudo R2 0.191
Note: Exponentiated coefficients; *p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, ***p < 0.001.

Table 13 Explaining vote choice in Wallonia – multinomial regression models

(odds ratio)
Ref. Category = PTB cdH Ecolo MR PS Other Blank/
null/
abs.
Age 1.04*** 1.02* 1.03** 1.03** 1.02* 1.02*
Women 1.15 0.99 1.20 1.09 1.10 1.08
Education (ref.no/primary educ.) 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
Secondary school 2.63 2.54* 2.42* 1.31 1.43 1.20
Higher non-university degree 4.24** 4.26*** 4.63*** 1.11 1.85 1.30
University degree 4.07* 6.50*** 6.60*** 1.57 2.74* 0.67
Left-right self-placement 1.34*** 1.14* 1.88*** 0.93 1.62*** 1.40***
Right socio-eco 1.03 1.06 1.09 0.99 1.06 1.01
Right immigration 0.97 1.03 1.11 1.06 1.14** 1.07
Satisfaction with fed.gvt 1.16 1.20** 1.68*** 1.04 1.07 1.01
Trust index 1.27* 1.26** 1.10 1.20* 1.12 0.99
External pol. Efficacy index 1.20 1.27 1.35 1.70*** 1.16 1.27
Anger 0.93 0.86* 0.91 0.97 0.96 1.02
Bitterness 0.97 1.02 0.88* 0.9 0.93 0.88*
Worry 0.91 0.97 0.95 0.99 0.97 0.93
Fear 0.99 1.06 1.07 1.01 1.05 1.04
Hope 0.91 1.02 0.97 0.99 0.96 0.90
Relief 0.69** 0.77** 0.86 0.89 0.76** 0.82
Joy 1.18 0.88 0.87 1.05 0.98 0.99
Satisfaction 1.44** 1.28* 1.34** 1.15 1.26* 1.36**
N 1,355
McFadden pseudo R2 0.177
Adj. McFadden Pseudo R2 0.131
Note: Exponentiated coefficients; * p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, ***p < 0.001.

Table 14 Wave 2- Wave 1 emotional differentials across party voters – Flanders

ness faction
CD&V +0.58 +0.41 +0.37 +0.45 -0.40 -0.57 -0.51 -0.80
Groen +0.17 +0.24 +0.35 +0.87 -0.27 -0.23 -0.09 -0.43
N-VA +0.29 +0.36 +0.04 +0.21 +0.04 -0.05 -0.21 -0.33
OpenVLD +0.36 +0.27 +0.23 +0.46 -0.51 -0.59 -0.59 -0.48
PVDA +0.08 0.00 -0.08 +0.09 -0.06 +0.17 +0.13 +0.11
sp.a +0.15 +0.19 +0.21 +0.48 +0.06 +0.09 +0.06 -0.10
VB +0.23 -0.08 -0.12 -0.33 +0.41 +0.29 +0.27 +0.02
Blank/null/abs. -0.06 -0.07 -0.42 -0.31 -0.33 -0.22 -0.50 -0.47
Mean +0.24 +0.18 +0.07 +0.19 -0.04 -0.09 -0.14 -0.28
Sig. - - - *** *** *** *** ***
-: not significant; p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, ***p < 0.001.
Table 15 Wave 2- Wave 1 emotional differentials across party voters –

Wallonia
ness faction
cdH +0.61 +0.51 +0.29 +0.51 +0.11 +0.47 +0.17 +0.27
Ecolo +0.18 -0.08 -0.07 +0.20 +0.07 0.00 +0.27 +0.18
MR +0.32 +0.31 +0.05 +0.26 +0.08 -0.22 +0.29 -0.04
PS -0.08 -0.04 +0.10 +0.24 +0.48 +0.49 +0.43 +0.64
PTB -0.19 +0.02 -0.03 +0.12 +0.35 +0.20 +0.39 +0.42
Other party -0.05 +0.09 -0.09 +0.05 -0.05 +0.18 +0.25 -0.03
Blank/null/abs. -0.25 +0.30 -0.33 +0.04 -0.43 -0.28 -0.11 -0.32
Mean +0.05 +0.11 -0.01 +0.19 +0.13 +0.12 +0.27 +0.19
Sig. - - - - * ** - ***
-: not significant; p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, ***p < 0.001.

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This article from Politics of the Low Countries is published by Eleven international publishing and made available to Lorenzo

Emotions and Vote Choice

Caroline Close & Emilie van Haute*

Keywords: Belgium, elections, emotions, voting behaviour.

Politics of the Low Countries 2020 (2) 3 - doi: 10.5553/PLC/258999292020002003006 353

Caroline Close & Emilie van Haute

354 doi: 10.5553/PLC/258999292020002003006 - Politics of the Low Countries 2020 (2) 3

Emotions and Vote Choice

Politics of the Low Countries 2020 (2) 3 - doi: 10.5553/PLC/258999292020002003006 355

Caroline Close & Emilie van Haute

356 doi: 10.5553/PLC/258999292020002003006 - Politics of the Low Countries 2020 (2) 3

Emotions and Vote Choice

3 Data1 and Operationalisation

3.1 Measuring Emotions Towards Politics

3.2 Emotions Towards Politics: A Positive Dimension and a Negative Dimension

Politics of the Low Countries 2020 (2) 3 - doi: 10.5553/PLC/258999292020002003006 357

Caroline Close & Emilie van Haute

Table 1 Emotions – descriptive statistics, wave 1 (N = 3,903)

Source: RepResent 2019 voter survey, wave 1.

Figure 1 Emotions – boxplots, wave 1 (N = 3,903)

358 doi: 10.5553/PLC/258999292020002003006 - Politics of the Low Countries 2020 (2) 3

Emotions and Vote Choice

Hence, two dimensions emerge: a dimension related to negative emotions, and a

Politics of the Low Countries 2020 (2) 3 - doi: 10.5553/PLC/258999292020002003006 359

Caroline Close & Emilie van Haute

Table 2 Emotions – correlation matrix (Kendall tau), wave 1 (N = 3,903)

Table 3 Emotions in Brussels, Flanders and Wallonia – means, wave 1 (N =

4 Emotions and Vote Choice

4.1 Bivariate Analyses

In Flanders, CD&V (Christen-Democratisch en Vlaams) and OpenVLD (Open

360 doi: 10.5553/PLC/258999292020002003006 - Politics of the Low Countries 2020 (2) 3

Emotions and Vote Choice

Table 4 Emotions and vote choice – Flanders, comparison of means (N =

Politics of the Low Countries 2020 (2) 3 - doi: 10.5553/PLC/258999292020002003006 361

Caroline Close & Emilie van Haute

Source: RepResent 2019 voter survey.

4.2 Multivariate Analysis

362 doi: 10.5553/PLC/258999292020002003006 - Politics of the Low Countries 2020 (2) 3

Emotions and Vote Choice

Table 5 Emotions and vote choice – Wallonia, comparison of means (N =

Source: RepResent 2019 voter survey.

Politics of the Low Countries 2020 (2) 3 - doi: 10.5553/PLC/258999292020002003006 363

Caroline Close & Emilie van Haute

Some believe that non-western foreigners should be able to live in Europe

A high score indicates a right-wing or ethnocentric position. The third type of

364 doi: 10.5553/PLC/258999292020002003006 - Politics of the Low Countries 2020 (2) 3

Emotions and Vote Choice

Politics of the Low Countries 2020 (2) 3 - doi: 10.5553/PLC/258999292020002003006 365

Caroline Close & Emilie van Haute

decreases significantly, from 40% when no negative emotion is expressed, to less

5 Vote Choice and Emotions

366 doi: 10.5553/PLC/258999292020002003006 - Politics of the Low Countries 2020 (2) 3

Emotions and Vote Choice

Table 6 Explaining vote choice in Flanders – multinomial regression models

Politics of the Low Countries 2020 (2) 3 - doi: 10.5553/PLC/258999292020002003006 367

Caroline Close & Emilie van Haute

Source: RepResent 2019 voter survey.

Figure 4 Negative emotions index and vote choice (Flanders) – predicted

Groen voting. VB voters increase significantly their positive emotions: compari‐