Lacson vs.

Executive Secretary (1999)

Summary Cases:

● Lacson vs. Executive Secretary, et al.

Subject: All statutes enjoy the presumption of constitutionality; Sandiganbayan jurisdiction; Charges fall
under Section 4 paragraph (b) of RA 8249; No violation of equal protection clause (valid classification);
RA No. 8249 not an ex post facto law; Ex post facto prohibition does not apply to RA No. 8249 since it is
not a penal law; Mode of exercising right of appeal is not included in the prohibition against ex post facto
laws; R.A. No. 8249 does not violate the one-title-one-subject rule; Jurisdiction of a court is determined
by the allegations in the complaint or information; Jurisdiction is with RTC, not Sandiganbayan
(Amended informationagainst Lacson contains no factual allegations showing intimate relation between
the offense charged and the discharge of official duties);

Facts:

In the dawn of May 18, 1995, eleven persons believed to be members of the Kuratong Baleleng gang,
reportedly an organized crime syndicate which had been involve in a spate of bank robberies in Metro
Manila, were slain along Commonwealth Avenue in Quezon City by elements of the Anti-Bank Robbery
and Intelligence Task Group (ABRITG).

Acting on a media expose of SPO2 Eduardo delos Reyes that what actually transpired was a summary
execution (or a rub out) and not a shoot-out between the Kuratong Baleleng gang members and the
ABRITG, Ombudsman Desierto formed a panel of investigators headed by Bienvenido Blancaflor. The
Blancaflor panel absolved from any criminal liability all the PNP officers and personnel involved in the
May 18, 1995 incident. However, a review board led by Francisco Villa modified the Blancaflor panel's
finding and recommended the indictment for multiple murder against the respondents.

Petitioner Panfilo Lacson was among those charged as principal in eleven informations for murder
before the Sandiganbayan. However, after conducting a reinvestigation, the Ombudsman filed an
amended information wherein petitioner Lacson was charged only as an accessory, together with
Romeo Acop and Francisco Zubia, Jr. (intervenors)

All the accused filed separate motions questioning the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, asserting that
pursuant to Section 2 of Republic Act No. 7975, the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan is limited to cases
where one or more of the "principal accused" are government officials with Salary Grade (SG) 27 or
higher, or PNP officials with the rank of Chief Superintendent (Brigadier General) or higher. The highest
ranking principal accused in the amended informations has the rank of only a Chief Inspector, and none
has the equivalent of at least SG 27. Thus, under the amended informations, the cases fall within the
jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court (RTC).

The Sandiganbayan ordered the cases transferred to the Quezon City RTC. The Office of the Special
Prosecutor moved for a reconsideration, insisting that the cases should remain with the Sandiganbayan.

While the motion for reconsideration was pending resolution, House Bills 2299 and 1094 were
introduced in Congress to amend the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan by deleting the word "principal"
form the phrase "principal accused" in Section 2 of RA 7975. The Bills were approved into law as R.A.
No. 8249 which took effect on February 25, 1997.

Subsequently, on March 5, 1997, the Sandiganbayan promulgated a Resolution denying the motion for
reconsideration of the Special Prosecutor. On the same day, the Sandiganbayan issued an ADDENDUM
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essentially affirming its jurisdiction to take cognizance of the cases given that trial has not yet begun in
all of them.

Petitioner Lacson now questions the constitutionality of Section 4 of RA No. 8249, including Section 7
thereof which provides that the said law "shall apply to all cases pending in any court over which trial has
not begun as of the approval hereof." Lacson argues that the retroactive application of the law was made
in bad faith and that it was made to suit the peculiar circumstances in which petitioner's cases were
under. Moreover, the title of the law is misleading in that it contains the "innocuous" provisions in
Sections 4 and 7 which actually expands rather than defines the old Sandiganbayan law (RA 7975),
thereby violating the one-title-one-subject requirement for the passage of statutes.
Held:

All statutes enjoy the presumption of constitutionality

1. The established rule is that every law has in its favor the presumption of constitutionality, and to justify
its nullification there must be a clear and unequivocal breach of the Constitution, not a doubtful and
argumentative one. The burden of proving the invalidity of the law lies with those who challenge it. That
burdenwas not convincingly discharged in the present case.

Sandiganbayan jurisdiction

2. The creation of the Sandiganbayan was mandated under the 1973 Constitution (Article XIII, Section5)
and retained in the 1987 Constitution under Article XI, Section 4.

3. Under the latest amendments introduced by Section 4 of R.A. No. 8249, the Sandiganbayan has
jurisdiction over the following cases:

SEC. 4. Jurisdiction - The Sandiganbayan shall exercise exclusive original jurisdiction in all cases
involving:

"a. Violations of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and
Corrupt Practices Act, Republic Act No. 1379, and Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII, Book II of the
Revised Penal Code, where one or more of the accused are officials occupying the following
positions in the government, whether in a permanet, acting or interim capacity, at the time of the
commission of the offense:
(1) Officials of the executive branch occupying the positions of regional director and higher,
otherwise classified as Grade '27' and higher, of the Compensation and Position
Classification Act of 1989 (Republic Act No. 6758), specifically including:

(a) Provincial governors, vice-governors, members of the sangguniang panlalawigan,

and provincial treasurers, assessors, engineers, and other provincial department
heads;

(b) City mayors, vice-mayors, members of the sangguniang panlungsod, city

treasurers, assessors, engineers, and other city department heads;

(c) Officials of the diplomatic service occupying the position of consul and higher;

(d) Philippine Army and air force colonels, naval captains, and all officers of higher
rank;

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 (e) Officers of the Philippine National Police while occupying the position of provincial
director and those holding the rank of senior superintendent or higher;

(f) City and provincial prosecutors and their assistants, and officials and prosecutors in
the Office of the Ombudsman and special prosecutor;

(g) Presidents, directors or trustees, or managers of government-owned or controlled

corporations, state universities or educational institutions or foundations;

(2) Members of Congress or officials thereof classified as Grade '27' and up under the
Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989;

(3) Members of the Judiciary without prejudice to the provisions of the Constitution;

(4) Chairman and members of the Constitutional Commissions, without prejudice to the
provisions of the Constitution;

(5) All other national and local officials classified as Grade '27' or higher under the
Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989.

"b. Other offenses or felonies whether simple or complexed with other crimes committed by the
public officials and employees mentioned in Subsection a of this section in relation to their office.

"c. Civil and criminal cases filed pursuant to and in connection with Executive Order Nos. 1,2, 14
and 14-A, issued in 1986.

In cases where none of the [principal] accused are occupying positions corresponding to salary
Grade '27' or higher, as prescribed in the said Republic Act 6758, or military and PNP officers
mentioned above, exclusive original jurisdiction thereof shall be vested in the proper regional trial
court, metropolitan trial court, municipal trial court, and municipal circuit trial court, as the case
may be, pursuant to their respective jurisdictions as provided in Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, as
amended.

"The Sandiganbayan shall exercise exclusive appellate jurisdiction over final judgment, resolution
or orders of the regional trial courts whether in the exercise of their own original jurisdiction of their
appellate jurisdiction as herein provided.

"The Sandiganbayan shall have exclusive original jurisdiction over petitions of the issuance of the
writs of mandamus, prohibition, certiorari, habeas corpus, injunctions, and other ancillary writs and
processes in aid of its appellate jurisdiction and over petitions of similar nature, including quo
warranto, arising or that may arise in cases filed or which may be filed under Executive Order Nos.
1, 2, 14 and 14-A, issued in 1986: Provided, That the jurisdiction over these petitions shall not be
exclusive of the Supreme Court.

"The procedure prescribed in Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, as well as the implementing rules that the
Supreme Court has promulgated and may hereafter promulgate, relative to appeals/petitions for
review to the Court of Appeals, shall apply to appeals and petitions for review filed with the
Sandiganbayan. In all cases elevated to the Sandiganbayan and from the Sandiganbayan to the
Supreme Court, the Office of the Ombudsman, through its special prosecutor, shall represent the
People of the Philippines, except in cases filed pursuant to Executive Order Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-A,
issued in 1986.
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 "In case private individuals are charged as co-principals, accomplices or accessories with the
public officers or employees, including those employed in government-owned or controlled
corporations, they shall be tried jointly with said public officers and employees in the proper courts
which shall exercise exclusive jurisdiction over them.

4. Section 7 of R.A. No. 8249 states:

"SEC. 7. Transitory provision. - This act shall apply to all cases pending in any court over which
trial has not begun as of the approval hereof."

5. Under Section 4 of R.A. 8249, the word "principal" before the word "accused" was deleted.

6. To fall under the exclusive original jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, the following requisites must
concur:

(1) the offense committed is a violation of:

(a) R.A. 3019, as amended (the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act)
(b) R.A. 1379 (the law on ill-gotten wealth)
(c) Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII, Book II of the Revised Penal Code (the law on bribery),
(d) Executive Order Nos. 1, 2, 14, and 14-A, issued in 1986 (sequestration cases) or
(e) other offenses or felonies whether simple or complexed with other crimes;

(2) the offender committing the offenses in items (a), (b), (c) and (e) is a public official or employee
holding any of the positions enumerated in paragraph a of Section 4. [Note: The Sandiganbayan
has jurisdiction over a private individual when the complaint charges him either as a co-principal,
accomplice or accessory of a public officer or employee who has been charged with a crime within
its jurisdiction.]

(3) the offense committed is in relation to the office.

Charges fall under Section 4 paragraph (b) of RA 8249

7. Considering that herein petitioner and intervenors are being charged with murder which is a felony
punishable under Title VIII of the Revised Penal Code, the governing provision on the jurisdictional
offense is paragraph b, Section 4 of R.A. 8249. This paragraph b pertains to "other offenses or felonies
whether simple or complexed with other crimes committed by the public officials and employees
mentioned in subsection a in relation to their office."

8. The phrase "other offenses or felonies" is too broad as to include the crime of murder, provided it was
committed in relation to the accused's official functions. Thus, under said paragraph b, what determines
the Sandiganbayan's jurisdiction is the official position or rank of the offender - that is, whether he is one
of those public officers or employees enumerated in paragraph a of Section 4. The offenses mentioned
in paragraphs a, b and c of the same Section 4 do not make any reference to the criminal participation of
the accused public officer as to whether he is charged as a principal, accomplice or accessory. In
enacting R.A. 8249, the Congress simply restored the original provisions of P.D. 1606 which does not
mention the criminal participation of the public officer as a requisite to determine the jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan.

No violation of equal protection clause (valid classification)

9. Petitioner and intervenors' posture that Section 4 and 7 of R.A. 8249 violate their right to equal
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protection of the law because its enactment was particularly directed only to the Kuratong Baleleng
cases in the Sandiganbayan, is without merit. Every classification made by law is presumed reasonable.
Thus, the party who challenges the law must present proof of arbitrariness.

10. It is an established precept in constitutional law that the guaranty of the equal protection of the laws
is not violated by a legislation based on reasonable classification. The classification is reasonable and
not arbitrary when there is concurrence of four elements, namely:

(1) it must rest on substantial distinction;

(2) it must be germane to the purpose of the law;
(3) must not be limited to existing conditions only, and
(4) must apply equally to all members of the same class

11. The challengers of Sections 4 and 7 of R.A. 8249 failed to rebut the presumption of constitutionality
and reasonableness of the questioned provisions. The classification between those pending cases
involving the concerned public officials whose trial has not yet commenced and whose cases could have
been affected by the amendments of the Sandiganbayan jurisdiction under R.A. 8249, as against those
cases where trial had already started as of the approval of the law, rests on substantial distinction that
makes real differences.

12. In the first instance, evidence against them were not yet presented, whereas in the latter the parties
had already submitted their respective proofs, examined witness and presented documents. Since it is
within the power of Congress to define the jurisdiction of courts subject to the constitutional limitations, it
can be reasonably anticipated that an alteration of that jurisdiction would necessarily affect pending
cases, which is why it has to provide for a remedy in the form of a transitory provision. Thus, petitioner
and intervenors cannot now claim that Sections 4 and 7 placed them under a different category from
those similarly situated as them.

13. Paragraph a of Section 4 provides that it shall apply to "all cases involving" certain public officials
and, under the transitory provision in Section 7, to "all cases pending in any court." Contrary to petitioner
and intervenors' arguments, the law is not particularly directed only to the Kuratong Baleleng cases. The
transitory provision does not only cover cases which are in the Sandiganbayan but also in "any court." It
just happened that the Kuratong Baleleng cases are one of those affected by the law. Moreover, those
cases where trial had already begun are not affected by the transitory provision under Section 7 of the
new law (R.A. 8249).

14. On the perceived bias that the Sandiganbayan Justices allegedly had against petitioner during the
committee hearings, the same would not constitute sufficient justification to nullify an otherwise valid law.
Their presence and participation in the legislative hearings was deemed necessary by Congress since
the matter before the committee involves the graft court of which one is the head of the Sandiganbayan
and the other a member thereof. The Congress, in its pleanry legislative powers, is particularly
empowered by the Constitution to invite persons to appear before it whenever it decides to conduct
inquiries in aid of legislation.
RA No. 8249 not an ex post facto law

15. Petitioner and intervenors further argued that the retroactive application of R.A. 8249 to the Kuratong
Baleleng cases constitutes an ex post facto law for they are deprived of their right to procedural due
process as they can no longer avail of the two tiered appeal which they had allegedly acquired under
R.A. 7975.

16. Section 22, Article VI, 1987 Constitution states: “No ex post facto law or bill of attainder shall be
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enacted"

17. In Calder v. Bull, an ex post facto law is one -

(a)which makes an act done criminal before the passing of the law and which was innocent when
committed, and punishes such action; or

(b) which aggravates a crime or makes it greater that when it was committed; or

(c) which changes the punishment and inflicts a greater punishment than the law annexed to the
crime when it was committed,

(d) which alters the legal rules of evidence and receives less or different testimony than the law
required at the time of the commission of the offense in order to convict the defendant.

(e) Every law which, in relation to the offense or its consequences, alters the situation of a person
to his disadvantage.

18. This Court added two more to the list, namely:

(f) that which assumes to regulate civil rights and remedies only but in effect imposes a penalty or
deprivation of a right which when done was lawful;

(g) deprives a person accused of crime of some lawful protection to which he has become entitled,
such as the protection of a former conviction or acquittal, or a proclamation of amnesty. [see In Re
Kay Villegas Kami; Tan v. Barrios]

Ex post facto prohibition does not apply to RA No. 8249 since it is not a penal law

19. Ex post facto law, generally, prohibits retrospectivity of penal laws. R.A. 8249 is not a penal law. It is
a substantive law on jurisdiction which is not penal in character. Penal laws are those acts of the
Legislature which prohibit certain acts and establish penalties for their violations or those that define
crimes, treat of their nature, and provide for their punishment. R.A. 7975, which amended P.D. 1606 as
regards the Sandiganbayan's jurisdiction, its mode of appeal and other procedural matters, has been
declared by the Court as not a penal law, but clearly a procedural statute, i.e. one which prescribes rules
of procedure by which courts applying laws of all kinds can properly administer justice. Not being a penal
law, the retroactive application of R.A. 8249 cannot be challenged as unconstitutional.
Mode of exercising right of appeal is not included in the prohibition against ex post facto laws

20. Petitioner's and intervenor's contention that their right to a two-tiered appeal which they acquired
under R.A. 7975 has been diluted by the enactment of R.A. 8249, is incorrect. The right to appeal is not
a natural right but statutory in nature that can be regulated by law. The mode of procedure provided for
in the statutory right of appeal is not included in the prohibition against ex post facto laws. R.A. 8249
pertains only to matters of procedure, and being merely an amendatory statute it does not partake the
nature of an ex post facto law. It does not mete out a penalty and, therefore, does not come within the
prohibition. Moreover, the law did not alter the rules of evidence or the mode of trial. It has been ruled
that adjective statutes may be made applicable to actions pending and unresolved at the time of their
passage. (see Oñas v. Sandiganbayan)

21. In any case, R.A. No. 8249 has preserved the accused's right to appeal to the Supreme Court to
review questions of law. On the removal of the intermediate review facts, the Supreme Court still has the
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power of review to determine if the presumption of innocence has been convincingly overcome

R.A. No. 8249 does not violate the one-title-one-subject rule

22. The challenged law does not violate the one-title-one-subject provisions of the Constitution. Much
emphasis is placed on the wording in the title of the law that it "defines" the Sandiganbayan jurisdiction
when what it allegedly does is to "expand" its jurisdiction. The expansion in the jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan, if it can be considered as such, does not have to be expressly stated in the title of the
law because such is the necessary consequence of the amendments.

23. The requirement that every bill must only have one subject expressed in the title is satisfied if the title
is comprehensive enough, as in this case, to include subjects related to the general purpose which the
statute seeks to achieve. Such rule is severally interpreted and should be given a practical rather than a
technical construction. There is here sufficient compliance with such requirement, since the title of R.A.
8249 expresses the general subject (involving the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan and the amendment
of P.D. 1606, as amended) and all the provisions of the law are germane to that general subject. The
Congress, in employing the word "define" in the title of the law, acted within its powers since Section 2,
Article VIII of the Constitution itself empowers the legislative body to "define, prescribe, and apportion the
jurisdiction of various courts.
Jurisdiction of a court is determined by the allegations in the complaint or information

24. The jurisdiction of a court is defined by the Constitution or statute. The elements of that definition
must appear in the complaint or information so as to ascertain which court has jurisdiction over a case.
Hence the elementary rule that the jurisdiction of a court is determined by the allegations in the
complaint or information and not by the evidence presented by the parties at the trial. (see People vs.
Magallanes)

25. The multiple murder charge against petitioner and intervenors falls under Section 4, paragraph (b) of
R.A. 8249. Section 4 requires that the offense charged must be committed by the offender in relation to
his office in order for the Sandiganbayan to have jurisdiction over it.

26. An offense is said to have been committed in relation to the office if the offense is "intimately
connected" with the office of the offender and perpetrated while he was in the performance of his official
functions. This intimate relation between the offense charged and the discharge of official duties must be
alleged in the Information.

27. The factor that characterizes the charge is the actual recital of the facts. The real nature of the
criminal charges is determined not from the caption or preamble of the information nor from the
specification of the provision of law alleged to have been violated, they being conclusions of law, but by
the actual recital of facts in the complaint or information.

Jurisdiction is with RTC, not Sandiganbayan (Amended informationagainst Lacson contains no

factual allegations showing intimate relation between the offense charged and the discharge of
official duties)

28. Applying these legal principles and doctrines to the present case, we find the amended informations
for murder against herein petitioner and intervenors wanting of specific factual averments to show the
intimate relation/connection between the offense charged and the discharge of official function of the
offenders.

29. While the information states that the principal accused committed the crime of murder "in relation to
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their public office, there is, however, no specific allegation of facts that the shooting of the victim by the
said principal accused was intimately related to the discharge of their official duties as police officers.
Likewise, the amended information does not indicate that the said accused arrested and investigated the
victim and then killed the latter while in their custody.

30. Even the allegations concerning the criminal participation of herein petitioner and intervenors as
among the accessories after-the-fact, the amended information is vague on this. It is alleged that the
said accessories concealed the crime by, among others, falsely representing that there were no arrests
made during the raid conducted by the accused. The sudden mention of the arrests made during the raid
conducted by the accused surprises the reader. There is no indication in the amended information that
the victim was one of those arrested by the accused during the "raid." Worse, the raid and arrests were
allegedly conducted "at Superville Subdivision, Parañaque, Metro Manila" but, as alleged in the
immediately preceding paragraph of the amended information, the shooting of the victim by the principal
accused occurred in Mariano Marcos Avenue, Quezon City." How the raid, arrests and shooting
happened in two places far away from each other is puzzling. Again, while there is the allegation in the
amended information that the said accessories committed the offense "in relation to office as officers and
members of the (PNP)," we, however, do not see the intimate connection between the offense charged
and the accused's official functions, which, as earlier discussed, is an essential element in determining
the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.

31. The mere allegation in the amended information that the offense was committed by the accused
public officer “in relation to his office" is not sufficient. That phrase is merely a conclusion of law. In
People vs. Montejo, the phrase “committed in relation to public office" does not appear in the information,
which only signifies that the said phrase is not what determines the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.
What is controlling is the specific factual allegations in the information that would indicate the close
intimacy between the discharge of the accused's official duties and the commission of the offense
charged, in order to qualify the crime as having been committed in relation to public office.

32. Consequently, for failure to show in the amended informations that the charge of murder was
intimately connected with the discharge of official functions of the accused PNP officers, the offense
charged in the subject criminal cases is plain murder and, therefore, within the exclusive original
jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court.

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