Model Theory Lecture Notes

Alex Kruckman
Updated: December 14, 2018

Contents
1 Syntax and semantics 2
1.1 Vocabularies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
1.2 S-indexed sets . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
1.3 Structures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
1.4 Terms and evaluation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
1.5 Formulas and satisfaction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
1.6 Theories and models . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11

2 Boolean algebras 12
2.1 Orders, lattices, Boolean algebras . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
2.2 Filters and ultrafilters . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
2.3 Stone duality . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17

3 Proofs and completeness for first-order logic 20

3.1 A proof system . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
3.2 Soundness and completeness . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
3.3 First applications of compactness . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31

4 Elementary embeddings 33
4.1 Homomorphisms and embeddings (again) . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
4.2 Elementary equivalence and elementary embeddings . . . . . . . 34
4.3 Counting . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
4.4 Boring and interesting theories . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
4.5 The Löwenheim–Skolem theorems . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
4.6 κ-categoricity and completeness . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41

5 Definability 46
5.1 Formulas and types . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46
5.2 Syntactic classes of formulas and equivalence . . . . . . . . . . . 49
5.3 Up and down: ∃-formulas and ∀-formulas . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52
5.4 Directed colimits: ∀∃ formulas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53

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 6 Quantifier elimination 58
6.1 Fraı̈ssé limits . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58
6.2 Quantifier elimination . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 68
6.3 Model completeness and model companions . . . . . . . . . . . . 74

7 Countable models 80
7.1 Saturated models . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 81
7.2 Atomic models and omitting types . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 83
7.3 ℵ0 -categorical theories . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 90
7.4 The number of countable models . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 91

1 Syntax and semantics

Tuesday 8/21 Mathematical logic, broadly speaking, is the field of mathematics which is con-
cerned with the language we use to describe and reason about mathematical
objects. That is, it highlights the distinction between syntax (the language)
and semantics (the object itself). This may sound philosophical, but mathe-
maticians constantly describe objects of interest by syntactic presentations, and
then reason about the object by manipulating the syntax, e.g. the description
of an algebraic variety as the locus of some system of polynomials, the coordi-
natization of a manifold by explicit charts, the specification of a construction
or function by an algorithm, the presentation of a group by generators and
relations, or the description of a function as an infinite series.
There are many kinds of syntax in mathematics (as evidenced by the exam-
ples just given), and there are many logical systems (or logics, for short). One
of the most important is first-order logic1 , which is the system we will study in
this course.
Like any logic, first-order logic has a proof theory and a model theory. Proof
theory is focused on syntax: systems for formal reasoning in the logic, and
their properties. On the other hand, model theory is focused on semantics. Our
objects of study are elementary classes (classes of mathematical structures which
can be axiomatized by theories in first-order logic), and relationships between
properties of a first-order theory, its elementary class of models, and definability
within these models.
Here, “mathematical structure” has a precise meaning: a structure is a set
(or a family of sets), equipped with distinguished elements, operations, and
relations. From the names for these distinguished elements, operations, and
relations, we build up formulas of first-order logic (syntax), which correspond
to new definable sets (and elements, operations, relations) in the structure (se-
mantics). For example, the distinguished operations in an algebraically closed
1 Why is first-order logic important? For practical reasons: it is fairly expressive, while also

exhibiting a number of nice properties, like compactness and a good proof system, which we
will discuss in this class. And for foundational reasons: ZFC set theory, expressed in first-order
logic, is the standard foundation for mathematics (but we will not discuss any foundational
issues in this class).

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field include addition and multiplication; the class of algebraically closed fields
is the class of models of a first-order theory ACF, and definable sets relative to
this theory are (Boolean combinations of) affine algebraic sets.
So model theory is very abstract, in that we study first-order theories and
elementary classes in general, rather than any particular theory or class. But we
will often ground ourselves and obtain applications by specializing the general
theory to particular examples.
In the first part of this course, we will define the language of first-order logic
one piece at a time, looking first at a piece of syntax, and then the corresponding
bit of semantics, as shown in the table below. Some of will probably seem
pedantic, since we will work at a high level of abstraction, but at the same
time the syntax is usually well-chosen to make the intended semantics seem
clear. But we will conclude this part with a very non-trivial theorem: Gödel’s
Completeness Theorem,2 which shows that the syntactic notion of provability
in first-order logic is equivalent to the semantic notation of logical entailment.
This is the only bit of proof theory we will do in this course; as an immediate
consequence, we get the purely model-theoretic Compactness Theorem, which
will be one of our main tools going forward.

Syntax Semantics
Vocabularies Structures
Terms Evaluation
Formulas Satisfaction
Theories Models
Provability (`) Entailment (|=)

1.1 Vocabularies
A first-order vocabulary V consists of:
1. A nonempty set S of sorts.

2. A set F of function symbols.3 Each function symbol f ∈ F has a type

(s1 , . . . , sn ) → s, where {s1 , . . . , sn , s} ⊆ S. In the case n = 0, we call the
function symbol a constant symbol of type s.
3. A set R of relation symbols. Each relation symbol R ∈ R has a type
(s1 , . . . , sn ), where {s1 , . . . , sn } ⊆ S. In the case n = 0, we call the relation
symbol a proposition symbol.
2 Notto be confused with Gödel’s Incompleteness Theorem!
3 We are purposefully vague about what counts as a symbol (or a sort, for that matter);
the name symbol is meant to suggest something that you could write down with a pencil on
paper, but we have no intention of formalizing this notion! In practice, real-world symbols on
paper can be encoded as mathematical objects (e.g. sets) in any way you like, and a symbol
can be any mathematical object. In particular, a vocabulary may be uncountably infinite.

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 In the case that S is a singleton {s}, we say that V is single-sorted.4 In
this case, we typically do not name the single sort. The type of a function
symbol f ∈ F is always (s, . . . , s) → s, and the length of the tuple (s, . . . , s) is
called the arity of f . Similarly, the type of a relation symbol R ∈ R is always
(s, . . . , s), and the length of the tuple (s, . . . , s) is called the arity of R. The
words unary, binary, and ternary mean arity 1, 2, and 3, respectively, and
we also write n-ary to mean arity n for n 6= 1, 2, 3. In the single-sorted setting,
constant symbols are 0-ary function symbols, and proposition symbols are 0-ary
relation symbols.
When V is finite, it is often convenient to list it as

(s1 , . . . , sl ; f1 , . . . , fm ; R1 , . . . , Rn ).

It is to be understood from the notation that S = {s1 , . . . , sl }, F = {f1 , . . . , fm },

and R = {R1 , . . . , Rn }. The types of the function and relation symbols are
suppressed. In the single-sorted case, the single sort is usually omitted.
Example 1.1. We begin with an example which demonstrates the use of mul-
tiple sorts. The vocabulary of vector spaces is:

(k, v; 0k , 1k , +k , ×k , −k , 0v , +v , −v , ·).

• 0k and 1k are constant symbols of type k.

• +k and ×k are function symbols of type (k, k) → k.

• −k is a function symbol of type k → k.
• 0v is a constant symbol of type v.
• +v is a function symbol of type (v, v) → v.

• −v is a function symbol of type v → v.

• · is a function symbol of type (k, v) → v.
This vocabulary can be extended in many ways, e.g. to the vocabulary of inner
product spaces, obtained by adding a function symbol h−, −i of type (v, v) → k.

Example 1.2. There are often multiple vocabularies which are appropriate
for a given kind of structure. Which one to use depends on the context. For
example, if we are only interested in vector spaces over a fixed field K, it may
be more convenient to use the vocabulary of K-vector spaces. This vocabulary
is single-sorted:
(0, +, −, (a)a∈K ).
• 0 is a constant symbol.
4 Classically,
model theory was only concerned with single-sorted vocabularies, but there
are advantages to developing the foundations in a multi-sorted setting.

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 • + is a binary function symbol.
• − is a unary function symbol.
• a is a unary function symbol, for every element a ∈ K.
Example 1.3. The vocabulary of graphs is single-sorted, with a single binary
relation symbol E. The vocabulary of orders is single-sorted with a single binary
relation symbol ≤. Of course, these vocabularies only differ in the name we’ve
chosen for the unique binary relation symbol; we try to choose symbols which
are suggestive of the semantics we have in mind.
Example 1.4. We can also mix function symbols and relation symbols in the
same vocabulary. The vocabulary of ordered groups is single-sorted:

(e, ·,−1 , ≤).

Here e is a constant symbol, · is a binary function symbol, −1 is a unary function

symbol, and ≤ is a binary relation symbol.

1.2 S-indexed sets

Given a nonempty set S, an S-indexed set is a family of sets (As )s∈S .
If A = (As )s∈S and B = (Bs )s∈S are S-indexed sets, an S-indexed map
f : A → B is a family of maps (fs : As → Bs )s∈S . We say that f is injec-
tive if each component fs is injective, and surjective if each component fs is
A
surjective. We denote the set of S-indexed maps A → B by BQ .
n
For each tuple (s1 , . . . , sn ) from S, we define A(s1 ,...,sn ) = i=1 Asi . In the
case n = 0, we have the empty product, which is a singleton set A() = {∗}. An
S-indexed map f : A → B induces a map f(s1 ,...,sn ) : A(s1 ,...,sn ) → B(s1 ,...,sn ) by

f(s1 ,...,sn ) (a1 , . . . , an ) = (fs1 (a1 ), . . . , fsn (an )).

Let A = (As )s∈S be an S-indexed set. TheF cardinality of A, denoted |A|,

is just the cardinality of the disjoint union s∈S As .
All of the standard operations on sets can be extended to S-indexed sets,
componentwise. For example, A ∪ B = (As ∪ Bs )s∈S , A ∩ B = (As ∩ Bs )s∈S ,
A \ B = (As \ Bs )s∈S , and A × B = (As × Bs )s∈S . We write A ⊆ B if As ⊆ Bs
for all s ∈ S.

1.3 Structures
Let V = (S; F; R) be a vocabulary. A V-structure A consists of:
1. An S-indexed set (As )s∈S , called the domain of A, which we also denote
by A.5
5 Contrary to the traditional approach, we allow empty sorts and empty structures: In an

V-structure A, we may have As = ∅ for some sort s, or even for every sort s.

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 2. A function f A : A(s1 ,...,sn ) → As , called the interpretation of f in A, for
each function symbol f ∈ F of type (s1 , . . . , sn ) → s. In the case of a
constant symbol c of type s, we have cA : {∗} → As , and we identify cA
with cA (∗) ∈ As .
3. A set RA ⊆ A(s1 ,...,sn ) , called the interpretation of R in A, for each
relation symbol R ∈ R of type (s1 , . . . , sn ). In the case of a proposition
symbol P , we have P A ⊆ {∗}, and P A is either {∗} (“true”, or 1) or ∅
(“false”, or 0).
If V is listed as (s1 , . . . , sl ; f1 , . . . , fn ; R1 , . . . , Rm ), then we often present a
structure A as
(As1 , . . . , Asl ; f1A , . . . , fnA ; R1A , . . . , RmA
).
If A and B are V-structures, a homomorphism h : A → B is an S-indexed
map such that:
1. For every function symbol f ∈ F of type (s1 , . . . , sn ) → s, and for every
tuple a = (a1 , . . . , an ) ∈ A(s1 ,...,sn ) ,

hs (f A (a)) = f B (h(s1 ,...,sn ) (a)).

2. For every relation symbol R ∈ R of type (s1 , . . . , sn ), and for every tuple
a = (a1 , . . . , an ) ∈ A(s1 ,...,sn ) ,

a ∈ RA =⇒ h(s1 ,...,sn ) (a) ∈ RB .

(We say h preserves R.)

A homomorphism h : A → B is an embedding if additionally it is injective
and for every relation symbol R ∈ R of type (s1 , . . . , sn ), and for every tuple
a = (a1 , . . . , an ) ∈ A(s1 ,...,sn ) ,

a ∈ RA ⇐⇒ h(s1 ,...,sn ) (a) ∈ RB .

(We say h preserves and reflects R.)

Thursday 8/23 Suppose A and B are V-structures and A ⊆ B. Then A is a substructure
of B if the inclusion map A → B is an embedding. That is, f A (a) = f B (a) for
all a ∈ A(s1 ,...,sn ) and all f ∈ F of type (s1 , . . . , sn ) → s, and a ∈ RA iff a ∈ RB
for all a ∈ A(s1 ,...,sn ) and R ∈ R of type (s1 , . . . , sn ).
Suppose A is an S-indexed subset of a V-structure B. We say that A is
V-closed if A is closed under the functions f B for all f ∈ F: if f has type
(s1 , . . . , sn ) → s, then for all (a1 , . . . , an ) ∈ A(s1 ,...,sn ) , we have f B (a1 , . . . , an ) ∈
As .
If A is V-closed, then there is a unique substructure of B with domain A,
called the induced substructure on A, defined by:

f A (a) = f B (a), for all f ∈ F of type (s1 , . . . , sn ) → s and a ∈ A(s1 ,...,sn ) .

RA (a) ⇐⇒ RB (a), for all R ∈ R of type (s1 , . . . , sn ) and a ∈ A(s1 ,...,sn ) .

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 If A is an arbitrary S-indexed subset of a V-structure B, then the induced
substructure on the V-closure of A is the smallest substructure of B containing
A. This is called the substructure generated by A and denoted hAi.
An isomorphism is a homomorphism h : A → B such that there exists an
inverse homomorphism h−1 : B → A. Equivalently, h is a surjective embedding.
We write A ∼ = B when A and B are isomorphic.
An automorphism of A is an isomorphism σ : A → A. The automorphisms
of A form a group under composition, denoted Aut(A). If C ⊆ A, we denote by
Aut(A/C) the subgroup of automorphisms of A fixing C pointwise:
Aut(A/C) = {σ ∈ Aut(A) | σs (c) = c for all c ∈ Cs }.
Later, we will meet other kinds of maps of interest between structures.

1.4 Terms and evaluation

Given the set S of sorts, we introduce an S-indexed set X = (Xs )s∈S of vari-
ables. We will assume that the sets Xs are pairwise disjoint and countably
infinite. The actual identity of the variables will not matter to us, so we will
feel free to use different names for them in different situations; the important
thing is that each variable has a fixed type s, and when we work with finitely
many variables at a time, we never run out of variables of any type.
A variable context is a finite tuple x = (x1 , . . . , xk ) of variables. If si is
the type of xi , we say the context has type (s1 , . . . , sk ). Note that there is an
empty variable context (). We will abuse notation freely when concatenating
variable contexts. For example, when x = (x1 , . . . , xk ) is a variable context
and y is another variable not in x, we write xy or x, y for the variable context
(x1 , . . . , xk , y).
A V-term of type s ∈ S in context x = (x1 , . . . , xk ) is one of the following:
• A variable xi of type s.
• A constant symbol c ∈ F of type s.
• A composite term f (t1 , . . . , tn ), where f ∈ F is a function symbol of
type (s1 , . . . , sn ) → s and ti is a V-term of type si in context x, for all
1 ≤ i ≤ n.
Note that the case of constant symbols is really a special case of the case of
composite terms, when n = 0.
This is a definition by recursion (simultaneously across all types s), so we
obtain a corresponding method of proof by induction. To prove a claim about
all V-terms in context x, it suffices to check the base case (the claim holds for
all variables in x), and the inductive step (given that the claim holds for the
terms t1 , . . . , tn , it holds for the composite term f (t1 , . . . , tn )). Sometimes it is
useful to handle the constant symbols as a separate base case.
We denote by Ts (x) the set of V-terms of type s in context x, and by T (x) =
(Ts (x))s∈S the S-indexed set of all V-terms in context x. We usually write t(x)
to denote that the term t is in context x.

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Example 1.5. In the vocabulary of vector spaces defined in Example 1.1, the
following are terms in context (x, y), where x has type k and y has type v:

Type k : 1k , x, (x +k 0k ) ×k x, −k (x) +k x
Type v : 0v , y, (x ×k x) · (y +v y), −v (−v (−v (y)))

Note that we the natural notation for our symbols when they differ from the for-
mal syntax described above, for example writing (x +k 0k ) instead of +k (x, 0k ).
Given a variable context x = (x1 , . . . , xk ) of type (s1 , . . . , sk ) and an S-
indexed set A, an interpretation of x in A is a function I : {x1 , . . . , xk } → A
such that I(xi ) ∈ Asi for all i.6 Of course, there is a unique interpretation of
the empty context (), namely the empty function. The set of all interpretations
of x in A is denoted Ax . We usually identify an interpretation xi 7→ ai with the
image tuple a = (a1 , . . . , ak ). Note that this identification describes a bijection
Ax ∼= A(s1 ,...,sk ) .
Let A be a V-structure, and let a = (a1 , . . . , ak ) be an interpretation of
x = (x1 , . . . , xk ) in A. Then there is an S-indexed map evala : T (x) → A
defined by recursion:
• evala (xi ) = ai .
• evala (c) = cA .
• evala (f (t1 , . . . , tn )) = f A (evala (t1 ), . . . , evala (tn )).

We use the notation tA (a) for evala (t(x)).

Instead of fixing the interpretation a and letting the term t(x) vary, we can
fix the term t(x) and let the interpretation a vary. Then t(x) determines a
function tA : Ax → As , by a 7→ tA (a).
Remark 1.6. If t(x) is a term in context x, and y is a variable not in x, then t
is also a term in context xy. Indeed, the context just restricts which variables
can be mentioned in t. When we want to consider t in context xy, we write
t(x, y). Note that if t(x) is a term in context x, a is an interpretation of x in A
and b is any interpretation of y in A, then tA (a) = tA (a, b).
Exercise 1. Let B be a V-structure, and A ⊆ B. Show that b ∈ hAi if and
only if there is a variable context x, a term t(x), and an interpretation a ∈ Ax
such that b = tA (a).
Exercise 2. Explain what the following statement means and prove it: T (x)
is the free V-structure on generators x. (This includes explaining how to make
T (x) into a V-structure. How do you interpret relation symbols in T (x)?)
6 If we defined variable contexts as S-indexed sets instead of as tuples, this would the the

same as an S-indexed map x → A. We maintain the view of variable contexts as tuples instead
of sets in order to not stray too far from traditional notation. The notational distinction
between tuples and the sets they enumerate is frequently abused in model theory.

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1.5 Formulas and satisfaction
An atomic V-formula in context x is one of the following:
• (t1 = t2 ), where t1 and t2 are V-terms of type s in context x, for some
s ∈ S.
• R(t1 , . . . , tn ), where R ∈ R is a relation symbol of type (s1 , . . . , sn ) and
ti is a V-term of type si in context x, for all 1 ≤ i ≤ n.
A V-formula in context x is one of the following:
• An atomic V-formula in context x.
• > or ⊥.
• (ψ ∧ χ), (ψ ∨ χ), or ¬ψ, where ψ and χ are V-formulas in context x.
• ∃y ψ, where y is a variable not in x and ψ is a V-formula in context xy.
This is a definition by recursion (simultaneously across all contexts x), so we
obtain a corresponding method of proof by induction. To prove a claim about
all V-formulas, it suffices to check the base case (the claim holds for all atomic
formulas, >, and ⊥), and the inductive steps (given that the claim holds for the
V-formulas ψ and χ, it holds for the formulas (ψ ∧ χ), (ψ ∨ χ), ¬ψ, and ∃y ψ).
We say that a variable y is bound in ϕ if some subformula of ϕ has the
form ∃y ψ. Note that according to our definitions, if ϕ is in context x, then no
variable in x can be bound in ϕ.
We will also employ the following standard shorthands:
• (t1 6= t2 ) is shorthand for ¬(t1 = t2 ).
• (ψ → χ) is shorthand for (¬ψ ∨ χ).
• (ψ ↔ χ) is shorthand for ((ψ → χ) ∧ (χ → ψ)).
Vn Wn
• i=1 ϕi and i=1 ϕi are shorthand for (. . . ((ϕ1 ∧ ϕ2 ) ∧ ϕ3 ) · · · ∧ ϕn ) and
(. . . ((ϕ1 ∨ ϕ2 ) ∨ ϕ3 ) · · · ∨ ϕn ), respectively. In the case n = 0, the empty
conjunction is > and the empty disjunction is ⊥.
• ∀y ψ is shorthand for ¬∃y ¬ψ.7
We denote by Lx the set of all V-formulas in context x, and we usually write
ϕ(x) to denote that the formula ϕ is in context x. We denote by L the set
of all V-formulas, which is also called the first-order language corresponding
to vocabulary V. When there is possibility for confusion, we can make the
vocabulary explicit by writing L(V).
7 It may seem perverse to define the universal quantifier in terms of the existential quantifier,

but doing this has the advantage that we have fewer cases to check in proofs by induction on
formulas. Of course, which logical connectives we take as primitive is a matter of convention.
We could have similarly taken (ψ ∧ χ) as shorthand for ¬(¬ψ ∨ ¬χ), or done away with ∧, ∨,
and ¬ altogether in favor of the Sheffer stroke ↑.

9
 It is notationally common to begin a discussion by fixing a first-order lan-
guage L, which is implicitly built from a vocabulary, which remains anonymous.
Then we write things like L-structure and L-formula in place of V-structure and
V-formula, where V is the vocabulary of L.8
Example 1.7. In the vocabulary of ordered groups defined in Example 1.4, the
following are formulas:

Context (x, y, z) : (x · y = e), (x ≤ y · z), ∃w (x · w ≤ z ∧ z ≤ y · w)

−1
Empty context () : ∀x x · x = e, ∃y (y 6= e ∧ ∀x x · y = y · x)

Note that we the natural notation for our symbols when they differ from the
formal syntax described above, for example writing x ≤ y instead of ≤(x, y) and
x−1 instead of −1 (x).
Let A be a V-structure, let ϕ be a V-formula in context x, and let a be an
interpretation of x in A. We define the relation A |= ϕ(a), read A satisfies
ϕ(a) or ϕ(a) is true in A, by induction on the structure of ϕ:
• If ϕ is (t1 = t2 ), then A |= ϕ(a) iff tA A
1 (a) = t2 (a).

• If ϕ is R(t1 , . . . , tn ), then A |= ϕ(a) iff (tA A A

1 (a), . . . , tn (a)) ∈ R .

• If ϕ is >, then A |= ϕ(a). If ϕ is ⊥, then A 6|= ϕ(a).

• If ϕ is (ψ ∧ χ), then A |= ϕ(a) iff A |= ψ(a) and A |= χ(a).
• If ϕ is (ψ ∨ χ), then A |= ϕ(a) iff A |= ψ(a) or A |= χ(a).
• If ϕ is ¬ψ, then A |= ϕ(a) iff A 6|= ψ(a).
• If ϕ is ∃y ψ, where y has type s, then A |= ϕ(a) iff there exists some b ∈ As
such that A |= ψ(a, b).
As a consequence of these definitions, our shorthands also have their ex-
pected meanings. For example:
• If ϕ is ψ → χ, then A |= ϕ iff A 6|= ψ or A |= χ, i.e. if A |= ψ, then A |= χ.
• If ϕ is ∀y ψ, where y has type s, then A |= ϕ iff there does not exist b ∈ As
such that A 6|= ψ(a, b), i.e. for all b ∈ As , A |= ψ(a, b).
Remark 1.8. As in Remark 1.6, if ϕ(x) is a formula in context x, and y is
a variable not in x and which is not bound in ϕ, then ϕ is also a formula in
context xy. When we want to consider ϕ in context xy, we write ϕ(x, y). Note
that if ϕ(x) is a formula in context x, a is an interpretation of x in A and b is
any interpretation of y in A, then A |= ϕ(a) if and only if A |= ϕ(a, b).
Exercise 3. Prove the assertions in Remarks 1.6 and 1.8 by induction on the
structure of terms and formulas.
8 In many sources, the distinction we have made between language and vocabulary is

blurred, and only the term language is used.

10
 1.6 Theories and models
Tuesday 8/28 A V-sentence ϕ is a V-formula in the empty context. When A is a V-structure,
there is a unique interpretation of the empty context in A. Then we write A |= ϕ
or A 6|= ϕ, without including the interpretation in the notation.
A V-theory T is a set of V-sentences. We write A |= T , read A satisfies T
or A is a model of T , if A |= ϕ for all ϕ ∈ T .
Let T be a theory, and let ϕ be a sentence. Then we write T |= ϕ, read T
entails ϕ, if every model of T satisfies ϕ. Of course, if ϕ ∈ T , then T |= ϕ by
unraveling the definitions.
A theory T is complete if for every sentence ϕ, either T |= ϕ or T |= ¬ϕ.
A theory T is satisfiable if T has a model. Note that T is satisfiable if and
only if T 6|= ⊥. Indeed, if T has a model A, then A 6|= ⊥, so T 6|= ⊥. On the
other hand, if T has no models, then T |= ⊥ vacuously.
Example 1.9. Let A be any V-structure. Then the complete theory of A is
Th(A) = {ϕ ∈ L() | A |= ϕ}.
The name is justified, since for any sentence ϕ, either A |= ϕ or A 6|= ϕ. In the
first case, ϕ ∈ Th(A), while in the second case A |= ¬ϕ, so ¬ϕ ∈ Th(A).
Example 1.10. Let V = (e, ·,−1 ) be the single-sorted vocabulary of groups.
The theory Tgrp of groups consists of the following sentences:
∀x∀y∀z ((x · y) · z = x · (y · z))
∀x ((x · e = x) ∧ (e · x = x))
∀x ((x · x−1 = e) ∧ (x−1 · x = e))
Of course, a V-structure is a group if and only if A |= Tgrp .
The theory Tgrp is not complete. For example, if ϕ is the sentence
∀x∀y (x · y = y · x),
then T 6|= ϕ and T 6|= ¬ϕ, since there are both abelian and non-abelian groups.
On the other hand, we have
Tgrp |= (∀x (x · x = e) → ∀x∀y (x · y = y · x)),
since all groups of exponent 2 are abelian.
Given a theory T , how can we tell when T |= ϕ, or even when T is satisfiable?
Well, we need to provide a proof. This can be an external proof, obtained by
“ordinary mathematical” reasoning about the models of T (as in the previous
example). How easy this is depends on how well we understand the models of T .
But it can also be useful to know that that is a robust notion of proof internal to
first-order logic, obtained by directly manipulating the syntax, without thinking
about models at all. Our goal is to define this notion of proof, denoted `, and
show that provability exactly captures entailment: T ` ϕ iff T |= ϕ.
As a warm-up, and to serve as firm footing from which to launch into com-
pleteness for first-order logic, we will take a detour through the world of Boolean
algebras and propositional logic.

11
 2 Boolean algebras
2.1 Orders, lattices, Boolean algebras
Thursday 8/30 A preorder (X; ) is a set X together with a binary relation  on X such that
for all x, y, z ∈ X:
• x  x.
• If x  y and y  z, then x  z.
A preorder is a partial order if it additionally satisfies:
• If x  y and y  x, then x = y.
If (X; ) is a preorder, then the relation x ∼ y iff x  y and y  x is an
equivalence relation on X. We denote the equivalence class of x by [x]. The
quotient X/∼ comes equipped with a relation ≤, defined by [x] ≤ [y] if and only
if x  y. Then (X/∼; ≤) is a partial order.
A lattice is a partial order (X; ≤) equipped with distinguished elements >
(“top”) and ⊥ (“bottom”) and binary operations ∧ (“meet”) and ∨ (“join”)
such that:
• > is the maximum element, i.e. for all x, x ≤ >.
• ⊥ is the minimum element, i.e. for all x, ⊥ ≤ x.
• x ∧ y is the greatest lower bound of x and y, i.e. for all z, z ≤ x ∧ y if and
only if z ≤ x and z ≤ y.
• x ∨ y is the least upper bound of x and y, i.e. for all z, x ∨ y ≤ z if and
only if x ≤ z and y ≤ z.
In a lattice, any finite set S = {x1 , . . . , xn } has a greatest lower bound:
^
S = (. . . ((x1 ∧ x2 ) ∧ x3 ) · · · ∧ xn ),

and a least upper bound:

_
S = (. . . ((x1 ∨ x2 ) ∨ x3 ) · · · ∨ xn ).

The greatest lower bound of the empty set is >, and the least upper bound of
the empty set is ⊥.
Example 2.1. Let A be any set. Then (P(A), A, ∅, ∩, ∪) is a lattice, called the
powerset lattice on A.
Now let A be a V-structure. Let Sub(A) be the set of all substructures
of A. Then Sub(A) forms a lattice, with top element > = A, bottom element
⊥ = h∅i, meet B ∧C = B ∩C, and join B ∨C = hB ∪Ci. When V is single-sorted
and contains only relation symbols, then Sub(A) is isomorphic to the powerset
lattice on A.

12
Exercise 4. Lattices also have a purely algebraic (or “equational”) definition,
which doesn’t mention the order relation ≤. We’ll use the term algebraic lattice
for this definition, to distinguish it from the previous definition.
An algebraic lattice is a set X equipped with distinguished elements >
and ⊥ and binary operations ∧ and ∨ such that:

1. (X; ∧, >) is a commutative idempotent monoid: for all x, y, z ∈ X,

(a) (x ∧ y) ∧ z = x ∧ (y ∧ z).
(b) x ∧ > = > ∧ x = x.
(c) x ∧ y = y ∧ x
(d) x ∧ x = x.
2. (X; ∨, ⊥) is a commutative idempotent monoid: for all x, y, z ∈ X,
(a) (x ∨ y) ∨ z = x ∨ (y ∨ z).
(b) x ∨ ⊥ = ⊥ ∨ x = x.
(c) x ∨ y = y ∨ x.
(d) x ∨ x = x.
3. ∧ and ∨ satisfy the “absorption laws”: for all x, y ∈ X,
(a) x ∨ (x ∧ y) = x.
(b) x ∧ (x ∨ y) = x.
Show that if (X; ≤, >, ⊥, ∧, ∨) is a lattice, then (X; >, ⊥, ∧, ∨) is an algebraic
lattice. Conversely, show that if (X; >, ⊥, ∧, ∨) is an algebraic lattice, then for
all x, y ∈ X, we have x ∧ y = x iff x ∨ y = y. And if we define x ≤ y iff these
equivalent conditions hold, then (X; ≤, >, ⊥, ∧, ∨) is a lattice.

A distributive lattice is a lattice which satisfies the distributive law: for

all x, y, z ∈ X,
x ∧ (y ∨ z) = (x ∧ y) ∨ (x ∧ z).
Exercise 5. Let X be a lattice. Show that X satisfies the distributive law if
and only if it satisfies the dual distributive law: for all x, y, z ∈ X,

x ∨ (y ∧ z) = (x ∨ y) ∧ (x ∨ z).

Example 2.2. The powerset lattice on any set is distributive. So is the sub-
algebra lattice Sub(A) of any V-structure when the function symbols in V have
arity at most 1, since in this case B ∨ C = hB ∪ Ci = B ∪ C when B and C
are substructures. But when V contains function symbols of arity at least 2,
Sub(A) is typically not distributive.

13
 If x is an element of a distributive lattice, then a complement of x is an
element y such that x ∧ y = ⊥ and x ∨ y = >.
A Boolean algebra is a distributive lattice equipped with an additional
unary operation ¬ (“complement”), such that ¬x is a complement of x.
It follows from Exercise 4 that we can also give a purely algebraic definition
of Boolean algebras, by adding the following axioms to the axioms listed there:
4. The distributive law: for all x, y, z ∈ X, x ∧ (y ∨ z) = (x ∧ y) ∨ (x ∧ z)
5. Complements: for all x ∈ X,
(a) x ∧ ¬x = ⊥.
(b) x ∨ ¬x = >.
Example 2.3. (a) Let A be a set. Then (P(A); ⊆, A, ∅, ∩, ∪, −) is a Boolean
algebra. Here −B = A \ B.
(b) Let A be an infinite set, and let P ∗ (A) = {B ⊆ A | B is finite, or cofinite}
(B is cofinite if A \ B is finite). Then (P ∗ (A); ⊆, A, ∅, ∩, ∪, −) is a Boolean
algebra.
(c) Let X be a topological space. Then the family O(X) of open sets in X is
not naturally equipped with a Boolean algebra structure, since open sets
are typically not closed under complement. But letting Cl(X) be the set of
clopen sets in X, (Cl(X); ⊆, X, ∅, ∩, ∪, −) does form a Boolean algebra.
Later, we’ll see more examples of Boolean algebras which are not algebras
of sets under the standard set operations (∩, ∪, and −). But there is a good
reason for giving examples of this form: Stone duality tells us that every Boolean
algebra is isomorphic to a subalgebra of a powerset algebra. In fact, every
Boolean algebra is isomorphic to the algebra of clopen sets in a topological
space!
Exercise 6. Let X be a distributive lattice. Show that if y and z are both
complements of x, then y = z. So in a Boolean algebra, ¬x is the unique
complement of x.
Exercise 7. Let B be a Boolean algebra. Show that for all x, y ∈ B,
(a) ¬¬x = x.
(b) (De Morgan’s Laws) ¬(x ∧ y) = (¬x ∨ ¬y) and ¬(x ∨ y) = (¬x ∧ ¬y).
(c) ¬> = ⊥ and ¬⊥ = >.
(d) x ≤ y iff ¬y ≤ ¬x.
Exercise 8. Let B be a Boolean algebra. For any x, y ∈ B, we define
x → y = ¬x ∨ y
x ↔ y = (x → y) ∧ (y → x).
Show that x ≤ y iff x → y = >, and x = y iff x ↔ y = >.

14
2.2 Filters and ultrafilters
In this subsection, we fix a Boolean algebra B. A subset F ⊆ B is a filter if:
1. F is closed upwards: If x ∈ F and x ≤ y, then y ∈ F .
2. F is closed under finite meets: > ∈ F , and if x, y ∈ F , then x ∧ y ∈ F .
A filter F is proper if ⊥ ∈
/ F (equivalently, F ( B).
Dually, a subset I ⊆ B is a ideal if:
1. I is closed downwards: If x ∈ I and y ≤ x, then y ∈ I.
2. I is closed under finite joints: ⊥ ∈ I, and if x, y ∈ I, then x ∨ y ∈ I.
It follows from Exercise 7 that if F is a filter, then ¬F = {¬x | x ∈ F } is an
ideal, and vice versa.
Let A be an arbitrary subset of B. Then we define:
^
Fil(A) = {x ∈ B | A0 ≤ x where A0 is a finite subset of A}.

We call Fil(A) the filter generated by A, a name which is justified by the

following lemma.
Lemma 2.4. Fil(A) is the smallest filter containing A.
Proof. If F is a filter containing A, then since F is closed under finite meets,
A0 ∈ F for any finite A0 ⊆ A. And since F is closed upwards, x ∈ F for any
V
x ∈ Fil(A). So Fil(A) ⊆ F . It remains to show that Fil(A)
V is a filter.
Closure upwards: If x ∈ Fil(A), and x ≤ y, then A0 ≤ x ≤ y for some
finite A0 ⊆ A, so y ∈ Fil(A). V
Closure under
V finite meets: V > ∈ Fil(A), since > = ∅. And if x, y ∈ F ,
witnessed by A1 ≤ x and A2 ≤ y for finite A1 , A2 ⊆ A, then
^ ^ ^
(A1 ∪ A2 ) = A1 ∧ A2 ≤ x ∧ y,

so x ∧ y ∈ Fil(A).
An ultrafilter is a proper filter U such that x ∈ U or ¬x ∈ U for all x ∈ B.
Exercise 9. Let B be a Boolean algebra.
0
1. If f : B → B 0 is a Boolean algebra homomorphism, then f −1 ({>B }) ⊆ B
is a filter. We say that F is the kernel of f .
2. Conversely, if F is a filter, then there is Boolean algebra B/F and a
surjective homomorphism πF : B → B/F such that F is the kernel of πF .
We call B/F the quotient of B by F . Hint: Define an equivalence
relation ∼F on B by

x ∼F y iff (x ↔ y) ∈ F.

15
 3. Show that the set of ultrafilters on B is in bijection with the set of homo-
morphisms B → 2, where 2 is the two-element Boolean algebra {>, ⊥}.
Tuesday 9/4 Lemma 2.5. For all x, y ∈ B, x ∧ y = ⊥ if and only if x ≤ ¬y.
Proof. By Exercises 8 and 7,
x ≤ ¬y iff x → ¬y = >
iff ¬x ∨ ¬y = >
iff x ∧ y = ⊥.
Lemma 2.6 (Ultrafilter Lemma). Every proper filter is contained in an ultra-
filter.
Proof. Let F be a proper filter. Consider the poset (F, ⊆), where F is the set
of all proper filters containing F . It is easy to check that the union of a chain
of proper filters is a filter, so by Zorn’s Lemma9 , F contains a maximal element
U . We will show that U is an ultrafilter.
Suppose x ∈ B such that x ∈ / U . We’d like to show that ¬x ∈ U . Consider
the filter F 0 = Fil(U ∪ {x}). We have F ⊆ U ( F 0 , so by maximality F 0 is not
0 0
V i.e. ⊥ ∈ F . By definition of F , there is some finite A ⊆ (U
proper,
0
∪ {x}) such
that A = ⊥. We may assume x ∈ A, so we may write A = A ∪ {x}, where
A0 ⊆ U , and u = A0 ∈ U . So we have u ∧ x = ⊥. By Lemma 2.5, u ≤ ¬x, so
V
¬x ∈ U .
Example 2.7. In the case that A = {x} is a singleton, we have
Fil(A) = ↑(x) = {y ∈ B | x ≤ y}.
We call ↑(x) the principal filter generated by x.
An atom is a minimal nonbottom element, i.e. an element x ∈ B such that
x 6= ⊥ but if y < x, then y = ⊥. The atoms in the powerset algebra P(A) for
nonempty A are exactly the singleton sets {a}. But not every Boolean algebra
has atoms.
Lemma 2.8. The principal filter ↑(x) is an ultrafilter if and only if x is an
atom.
Proof. Suppose x is an atom. Then for all y ∈ B, we have x = x ∧ (y ∨ ¬y) =
(x ∧ y) ∨ (x ∧ ¬y). Since both disjuncts are below x, both are either ⊥ or x.
And they are not both ⊥, since x 6= ⊥. So we have either x ∧ y = x, in which
case x ≤ y and y ∈ ↑(x), or x ∧ ¬y = x, in which case x ≤ ¬y, and ¬y ∈ ↑(x).
Conversely, suppose ↑(x) is an ultrafilter. Then x 6= ⊥, since ↑(x) is proper.
Suppose y < x. Then y ∈/ ↑(x), so ¬y ∈ ↑(x), and x ≤ ¬y, so y = y ∧ x = ⊥.
9 For those who are squeamish about the axiom of choice, don’t be! We will use it freely

in this class. But if you’re interested in foundational matters, you can take some comfort
in the fact that when B is a countable Boolean algebra, no choice is necessary to extend a
proper filter F to an ultrafilter. Simply enumerate B = {bi | i ∈ ω}, and build a sequence
of filters Fi by induction. Take F0 = F , and define Fi+1 S= Fi if bi ∈ Fi or ¬bi ∈ Fi , and
Fi+1 = Fil(Fi ∪ {bi }) otherwise. Now you may check that i∈ω Fi is an ultrafilter.

16
Example 2.9. When the Boolean algebra B is a powerset algebra P(A), we
abuse terminology by calling a filter U ⊆ P(A) a filter on A.
By Lemma 2.8, the principal filter ↑(X) = {Y ⊆ A | X ⊆ Y } for X ∈ P(A)
is an ultrafilter if and only if |X| = 1. In this case, we call

↑({a}) = {Y ⊆ A | a ∈ Y }

the principal ultrafilter generated by a.

When A is finite, every ultrafilter on A is principal. But when A is infinite,
there are non-principal ultrafilters on A. To see, this, define

C = {X ⊆ A | A \ X is finite}.

This is called the cofinite filter or Fréchet filter on A. When A is infinite,

C is a proper filter, and by Lemma 2.6, C extends to an ultrafilter on A. But
C is not contained in the principal ultrafilter generated by a for any a ∈ A,
since −{a} ∈ C. It should be noted that this proof really relies on the axiom
of choice: it is impossible to write down any explicit example of a non-principal
ultrafilter on an infinite set A.
The situation is different for other Boolean algebras, of course. Recall the
Boolean algebra P ∗ (A) from Example 2.3. In this algebra, the cofinite filter C
(defined just as above) is already an ultrafilter.

2.3 Stone duality

Let B be a Boolean algebra. We define

S(B) = {U | U ⊆ B is an ultrafilter}.

For every element x ∈ B, let [x] = {U ∈ S(B) | x ∈ U }. So U ∈ [x] iff x ∈ U .

This can be a bit confusing!
Lemma 2.10. For all x, y ∈ B,
(1) If x ≤ y, then [x] ⊆ [y].

(2) [>] = S(B) and [⊥] = ∅.

(3) [¬x] = S(B) \ [x].
(4) [x ∧ y] = [x] ∩ [y].
(5) [x ∨ y] = [x] ∪ [y].

Proof. (1) Suppose x ≤ y and U ∈ [x]. Then x ∈ U , so y ∈ U (U is closed

upward), and U ∈ [y].
(2) Every ultrafilter on B contains > and no ultrafilter contains ⊥.
(3) ¬x ∈ U if and only if x ∈
/ U (U contains exactly one of x and ¬x).

17
(4) If U ∈ [x] ∩ [y], then x ∈ U and y ∈ U , so x ∧ y ∈ U (U is closed under
meets), and U ∈ [x ∧ y]. Conversely, if U ∈ [x ∧ y], then x ∧ y ∈ U , so x ∈ U
and y ∈ U (U is closed upward), so U ∈ [x] ∩ [y].
(5) Using Exercise 7 and (3) and (4) above,

[x ∨ y] = [¬(¬x ∧ ¬y)]
= S(B) \ [¬x ∧ ¬y]
= S(B) \ ([¬x] ∩ [¬y])
= (S(B) \ [¬x]) ∪ (S(B) \ [¬y])
= [¬¬x] ∪ [¬¬y]
= [x] ∪ [y].

By conditions (2) and (4) of Lemma 2.10, the family {[x] | x ∈ B} contains
S(B) and is closed under intersection, so it forms a basis for a topology τ on
S(B). Note that each basic open set [x] is in fact clopen, since its complement
[¬x] is also basic open.
A Stone space is a compact Hausdorff space with a basis of clopen sets.10

Lemma 2.11. The space S(B) is a Stone space.

Proof. We have already observed that S(B) has a basis of clopen sets. For
the Hausdorff property, note that if U 6= V are points in S(B), then without
loss of generality U 6⊆ V , so there is some x ∈ U with x ∈ / V . Since V is an
ultrafilter, ¬x ∈ V . So [x] and [¬x] are disjoint open neighborhoods of U and
V , respectively.
It remains to show compactness. We will proveT the complemented form:
Suppose (Ci )i∈I is a family of closed sets such that i∈I Ci = ∅. Then already
there
T is a finite subfamily (Ci )i∈J , where J is a finite subset of I, such that
i∈J Ci = ∅. Further, we may assume that each Ci is a basic clopen set, i.e.
[xi ] for some xi ∈ B.
Let F = Fil({xi | i ∈ I}). Suppose for contradiction that F is proper.
ThenTit extends to an ultrafilter U , and since {xi | i ∈ I} ⊆ F ⊆ U , we have
U ∈ i∈I [x Vi ] = ∅, contradiction.
V Thus F isTnot proper, and there is some J ⊆ I
such that i∈J xi = ⊥. Then [ i∈J xi ] = i∈J [xi ] = ∅.
We call S(B) the Stone space of B. Recall that when X is any topolog-
ical space, the clopen algebra of X, (Cl(X); ⊆, X, ∅, ∩, ∪, −), is the Boolean
algebra of clopen sets in X.
The Stone duality theorem says that every Boolean algebra is the clopen
algebra of some topological space (namely its Stone space), and every Stone
space is the Stone space of some Boolean algebra (namely its clopen algebra).

10 Spaces with a basis of clopen sets are often called zero-dimensional; the dimension in

question is the small inductive dimension. It is a fact that a compact Hausdorff space is
zero-dimensional if and only if it is totally disconnected, i.e. every connected component is a
singleton. We will not prove that here.

18
Thursday 9/6 Theorem 2.12 (Stone duality). For every Boolean algebra B, B ∼
= Cl(S(B)).
Conversely, for every Stone space X, X ∼
= S(Cl(X)).
Proof. Let B be a Boolean algebra. Then the map [−] : B → Cl(S(B)) is defined
by b 7→ [b]. Lemma 2.10 exactly says that [−] is a homomorphism. To see that
it is an embedding, it suffices to show that if [x] ⊆ [y], then x ≤ y. Indeed,
injectivity follows, since if [x] = [y], then x ≤ y and y ≤ x, so x = y.
We show the contrapositive. So assume x 6≤ y. By Lemma 2.5, x ∧ ¬y 6= ⊥.
So the filter ↑(x∧¬y) is proper and extends to an ultrafilter U . Now x∧¬y ∈ U ,
so U ∈ [x] and U ∈ [¬y], so U ∈ / [y]. It follows that [x] 6⊆ [y].
It remains to show that [−] is surjective. So let C ⊆ S(B) be a clopen S set.
Since C is open, we can write it as a union of basic open sets, C = i∈I [xi ].
Since C is a closed subset of a compact space, it is compact, and the cover
{[xi ] | i ∈ I} W subcover {[xi ] | i ∈ J}, where J is a finite subset of I.
S has a finite
Then C = i∈J [xi ] = [ i∈J xi ].
Conversely, let X be a Stone space. We will use several times the fact that
if p 6= q are points of X, then there is a clopen set C separating p and q, i.e.
p ∈ C and q ∈ −C. Indeed, by Hausdorffness, p has an open neighborhood V
such that q ∈ / V . By shrinking V , we may assume it is a basic clopen set.
The map f : X → S(Cl(X)) is given by p 7→ Up = {C ∈ Cl(X) | p ∈ C}.
There are several things to check:
(a) Up is an ultrafilter. The clopen sets containing p are closed upward, closed
under intersection, include X, and do not include ∅. So Up is a proper filter.
And for any clopen set C, either p ∈ C or p ∈ −C, so Ux is an ultrafilter.
(b) f is injective. If p 6= q, then letting C be a clopen set separating p and q,
we have C ∈ Up and C ∈ / Uq , so Up 6= Uq .
T
(c) f is surjective. Let U be an ultrafilter on Cl(X). Let P = C∈U C. We
claim that P is a singleton {p} and f (p) = Up = U .
T
P is nonempty by compactness. Indeed,Tif C∈U C = ∅, then Tn there are
n
finitely many C1 , . . . , Cn ∈ U such that i=1 Ci = ∅. But i=1 Ci ∈ U ,
which is a contradiction.
If p, q ∈ P and the clopen set C separates p and q, then since either C or
−C is in U , either p or q is not in P , contradiction. It follows that p and q
are not separated, so p = q. Now it is clear that U ⊆ Up , since p ∈ C for
all c ∈ U . And conversely, if p ∈ C, then −C ∈ / U , so C ∈ U , and Up ⊆ U .
(d) f is continuous. A basic clopen set in S(Cl(X)) is of the form [C], where C is
a clopen subset of X. We claim that f −1 ([C]) = C. Indeed, f (p) = Up ∈ [C]
iff C ∈ Up iff p ∈ C.
(e) f is a homeomorphism. It suffices to show that the image of a closed set
is closed. So let C ⊆ X be closed. Then C is compact (a closed subset of
a compact space is compact). So f (C) is compact (the continuous image
of a compact set is compact). So f (C) is closed (a compact subset of a

19
 Hausdorff space is closed). What we have used here is just the general fact
that a continuous bijection from a compact space to a Hausdorff space is a
homeomorphism.
As an immediate corollary, we get the following topology-free representation
theorem for Boolean algebras.

Corollary 2.13. Every Boolean algebra B embeds as a subalgebra of a powerset

algebra.
Proof. For any topological space X, the clopen algebra Cl(X) is a subalgebra
of the powerset algebra P(X). So the Stone isomorphism B ∼ = Cl(S(B)) is an
embedding B ,→ P(S(B)).

Exercise 10. (This exercise is not essential; you should only do it if you are
already comfortable with the language of category theory.)
1. Let Bool be the category of Boolean algebras and homomorphisms, and let
Stone be the category of Stone spaces and continuous maps. By defining
their action on morphisms, show how to make S : Boolop → Stone and
Cl : Stoneop → Bool into contravariant functors between these categories.
2. Show that the pair (S, Cl) forms a contravariant equivalence of categories
Bool ≡ Stoneop . This is the modern formulation of the Stone duality
theorem.

3. Let FinBool and FinSet be the categories of finite Boolean algebras and
finite sets, respectively. Show that FinBool is equivalent to FinSetop .

3 Proofs and completeness for first-order logic

3.1 A proof system
We now return to first-order logic and define the provability relation `. Our
proof rules are given below.11
11 There are many sound and complete proof systems for first-order logic, i.e. many ways

to define the relation `. The system presented here is definitely not the most efficient: in
terms of the number of rules, or from the point of view of proof theory. But I find it to be
well-motivated and well-suited for proving completeness.

20
 Propositional rules: In these rules ϕ, χ, and ψ are formulas in context x.
ϕ `x χ χ `x ψ
r t
ϕ `x ϕ ϕ `x ψ

ϕ `x χ ϕ `x ψ
top andL andR and
ϕ `x > χ ∧ ψ `x χ χ ∧ ψ `x ψ ϕ `x χ ∧ ψ

χ `x ϕ ψ `x ϕ
bot orL orR or
⊥ `x ϕ χ `x χ ∨ ψ ψ `x χ ∨ ψ χ ∨ ψ `x ϕ

d not1 not2
ϕ ∧ (χ ∨ ψ) `x (ϕ ∧ χ) ∨ (ϕ ∧ ψ) ϕ ∧ ¬ϕ `x ⊥ > `x ϕ ∨ ¬ϕ

Equality rules: In these rules, t, t0 , and t00 are terms of type s in context
x for some s ∈ S. Also, ti is a term of type si in context x for all 1 ≤ i ≤ n,
f is a function symbol of type (s1 , . . . , sn ) → s, and R is a relation symbol of
type (s1 , . . . , sn ).
r= s= t=
> `x t = t t = t0 `x t0 = t t = t0 ∧ t0 = t00 `x t = t00

Vn fun
i=1 ti = t0i `x f (t1 , . . . , tn ) = f (t01 , . . . , t0n )

Vn rel
( i=1 ti = t0i ) ∧ R(t1 , . . . , tn ) `x R(t01 , . . . , t0n )

Quantifier rules: In these rules, y is a single variable of type s not in

context x, t is a term of type s in context x, ϕ is a formula in context xy, and
ψ is a formula in context x in which y is not bound (so we an also view it as a
formula in context xy).
ϕ `xy ψ
sub(t) e
ϕ[y 7→ t] `x ∃y ϕ ∃y ϕ `x ψ

In the rule (sub(t)), the notation ϕ[y 7→ t] means that the term t is sub-
stituted for every instance of the variable y appearing in ϕ. Note that this
substitution is only valid when y and t have the same type. If ϕ is a formula
in context xy and t is a term in context x, then we view ϕ[y 7→ t] as a formula
in context x. When we make the context explicit by writing the formula as
ϕ(x, y), we also write the new formula as ϕ(x, t).
The expression ϕ `x ψ is called a sequent. Notice that every sequent is
decorated by a variable context x, and that both formulas ϕ and ψ are in context
x. We just write ` instead of `() when the the context is empty.

21
 In a rule, the sequents appearing above the horizontal line are the premises,
and the sequent appearing below the horizontal line is the conclusion. A proof
tree is a finite tree, with each node labeled by a sequent. A proof tree is valid if
for every node, there is some rule such that the node is labeled by the conclusion,
and the children of the node are labeled by the premises, of an instance of that
rule. We assert ϕ ` ψ if this sequent labels the root of a valid proof tree.
Example 3.1. Let’s say our goal is to prove P ` ¬¬P , when P is a propositional
symbol. The following is a valid proof tree:

top not2
P `> > ` ¬P ∨ ¬¬P
r t
P `P P ` ¬P ∨ ¬¬P
and d
P ` P ∧ (¬P ∨ ¬¬P ) P ∧ (¬P ∨ ¬¬P ) ` (P ∧ ¬P ) ∨ (P ∧ ¬¬P )
t
P ` (P ∧ ¬P ) ∨ (P ∧ ¬¬P )

Here is another one:

not1 bot
P ∧ ¬P ` ⊥ ⊥ ` P ∧ ¬¬P
t r
P ∧ ¬P ` P ∧ ¬¬P P ∧ ¬¬P ` P ∧ ¬¬P
or andR
(P ∧ ¬P ) ∨ (P ∧ ¬¬P ) ` P ∧ ¬¬P P ∧ ¬¬P ` ¬¬P
t
(P ∧ ¬P ) ∨ (P ∧ ¬¬P ) ` ¬¬P

Putting these together yields P ` ¬¬P :

. .
. .
. .
. .
P ` (P ∧ ¬P ) ∨ (P ∧ ¬¬P ) (P ∧ ¬P ) ∨ (P ∧ ¬¬P ) ` ¬¬P
t
P ` ¬¬P

Example 3.2. Here is an example of tricky things you can do by shuffling

variables. Let x and y be single variables of the same type, let ϕ(y) be a
formula in context y, and let ϕ0 (x) be ϕ[y 7→ x], obtained by substituting x for
y everywhere. The following proof tree shows that ∃x ϕ0 ` ∃y ϕ.

sub(x)
ϕ0 `x ∃y ϕ
e
∃x ϕ0 ` ∃y ϕ

In the first line, we view ∃y ϕ in the context x (although x is not mentioned in

this sentence). Since ϕ0 is ϕ[y 7→ x], this is a valid instance of (sub(x)). Then
we can use (e) to introduce the quantifier and remove x from the context, since
x is not mentioned in ∃y ϕ.
We will make use of the fact that ∃x ϕ0 ` ∃y ϕ in the proof of completeness.

Remark 3.3. The proof rules probably look familiar to you: they are essentially
our axioms for Boolean algebras. Let’s make that precise.
Fix a variable context x, and recall that Lx is the set of all formulas in
context x. By (r) and (t), the relation ` is a preorder on Lx . We pass to the
associated partial order L
cx , writing ϕ
b for the equivalence class of a sentence ϕ

22
 b = ψb if and only if ϕ ` ψ and ψ ` ϕ). We say that two sentences in the
(so ϕ
same equivalence class are logically equivalent.
Now by (top) and (bot), this partial order has a top element > b and a
bottom element ⊥. By (andL ), (andR ), and (and), χ ∧ ψ is the greatest lower
b \
bound of χ b and ψ,
b and by (orL ), (orR ), and (or), χ \∨ ψ is the least upper
bound of χb and ψ. So the partial order is a lattice, with meet and join as above.
b
By (d), the lattice is distributive. There is something to be checked here,
since (d) only gives one inequality of the distributive law, namely
x ∧ (y ∨ z) ≤ (x ∧ y) ∨ (x ∧ z).
But the other inequality holds in any lattice. Indeed, note that x ∧ y ≤ x and
x ∧ z ≤ x, so
(x ∧ y) ∨ (x ∧ z) ≤ x.
Similarly, x ∧ y ≤ y ≤ y ∨ z, and x ∧ z ≤ z ≤ y ∨ z, so
(x ∧ y) ∨ (x ∧ z) ≤ y ∨ z.
It follows that
(x ∧ y) ∨ (x ∧ z) ≤ x ∧ (y ∨ z).
Finally, by (not1 ) and (not2 ), every element ϕb has a complement ¬ϕ.
c So
Lx is a Boolean algebra.
c
From this observation, we can already dispense with the hassle of construct-
ing explicit proof trees in many situations: for example, since the ` relation
is the order relation on the Boolean algebra of sentences, syntactic ¬ is the
complement operation in this Boolean algebra, and x = ¬¬x in any Boolean
algebra, we know that ϕ `x ¬¬ϕ, and also ¬¬ϕ `x ϕ, for any formula ϕ in
context x, without having to write out proof trees.
In the future, we will often dispense with the ϕ
b notation, identifying a for-
mula with its logical equivalence class when there is no danger in doing so.
Tuesday 9/11 When T is a theory and ϕ is a sentence, we write T ` ϕ, read Vn T proves ϕ,
if there are finitely many sentences ψ1 , . . . ψn ∈ T such that i=1 ψi ` ϕ. We
say that T is inconsistent if T ` ⊥, and otherwise T is consistent.
Note for any theory T , the set FT = {ϕ ∈ L() | T ` ϕ} of sentences provable
from T is exactly the filter generated by T in the Boolean algebra of sentences.
This filter is proper if and only if T is consistent. And this filter is an ultrafilter
if and only if T is complete (for provability), i.e. for every sentence ϕ, T ` ϕ
or T ` ¬ϕ. In the remainder of this section when we say T is complete, we mean
complete for provability. It will be a consequence of soundness and completeness
that a theory is complete for provability if and only if it is complete (as defined
in Section 1.6 in terms of |=).
Lemma 3.4. Suppose T is a consistent theory. Then there is a complete theory
T ∗ such that T ⊆ T ∗ .
Proof. Since T is consistent, the associated filter FT = {ϕ ∈ L() | T ` ϕ} is
proper. By the ultrafilter lemma, FT extends to an ultrafilter on L() , i.e. a
complete theory T ∗ , and T ⊆ FT ⊆ T ∗ .

23
3.2 Soundness and completeness
We now prove that the syntactic relation ` is equal to the semantic relation |=.
Theorem 3.5 (Soundness). If T ` ϕ, then T |= ϕ.
Proof. We say a sequent ϕ `x ψ is semantically valid if for every structure A
and every interpretation a of the context x, if A |= ϕ(a), then A |= ψ(a).

Claim: Every sequent which labels the root of a valid proof tree is seman-
tically valid.
The argument is by induction on the complexity of the proof tree. In the
base case, we must show that for every rule with no premises, every instance of
that rule is semantically valid. In the inductive step, for every instance of every
rule with premises, we may assume that the premises are semantically valid,
and we must show that the conclusion is semantically valid.
There are many cases to check, but they are all straightforward. So we just
illustrate a few for example. Consider the rule (and):
ϕ `x χ ϕ `x ψ
and
ϕ `x χ ∧ ψ .

We may assume by induction that the premises are semantically valid. Let A
be a structure and a ∈ Ax such that A |= ϕ(a). By the induction hypothesis,
A |= χ(a) and A |= ψ(a), so A |= (χ ∧ ψ)(a).
Consider the rule (rel):
Vn rel
( i=1 ti = t0i ) ∧ R(t1 , . . . , tn ) `x R(t01 , . . . , t0n )

This is a base case. Let A be a structure and a ∈ Ax such that

n
^
A |= (( ti = t0i ) ∧ R(t1 , . . . , tn ))(a).
i=1

0 A
Then (tA A A A
1 (a), . . . , tn (a)) ∈ R . But also ti (a) = (ti ) (a) for all 1 ≤ i ≤ n, so
also ((t1 ) (a), . . . , (tn ) (a)) ∈ R , and A |= R(t1 , . . . , t0n )(a).
0 A 0 A A 0

The quantifier rules are the most complicated, so we illustrate both of them.
sub(t)
ϕ[y 7→ t] `x ∃y ϕ

Let A be a structure and a ∈ Ax such that A |= ϕ[y 7→ t](a). That is,

writing ϕ as ϕ(x, y), we have A |= ϕ(a, tA (a)). So A |= ∃y ϕ(a, y), witnessed by
the element tA (a).
ϕ `xy ψ
e
∃y ϕ `x ψ
We may assume by induction that ϕ `xy ψ is semantically valid. Let A be
a structure and a ∈ Ax such that A |= ∃y ϕ(a, y). Then there is some b ∈ As

24
such that A |= ϕ(a, b). By the induction hypothesis, A |= ψ(a, b), but ψ(x) is a
formula in context x (it does not mention the variable y), so A |= ψ(a).

V the claim, assume T ` ϕ. Then there isV a finite subset

Having established
Σ ⊆fin T such that ψ∈Σ ψ ` ϕ. By the claim,V every model of ψ∈Σ ψ satisfies
ϕ. And since every model of T is a model of ψ∈Σ ψ, we have T |= ϕ.

So soundness just amounts to checking that the proof rules don’t say any-
thing wrong. We now embark on proving the converse, completeness, which is
much more involved.
We first prove an a priori weaker claim: Any consistent theory has a model.
In other words, if T 6` ⊥, then T 6|= ⊥. How can we take a syntactic assumption,
the consistency of T , and produce an actual model of T ? We take a cue from
the theory of free algebraic structures (e.g. free groups or the “term algebra”
from Exercise 2) and construct the model from the syntax of T .
Construction 3.6. Let T be any V-theory. For each sort s ∈ S, recall that Ts
is the set of V-terms of type s in the empty context. Define a relation ∼T on Ts
by t ∼T t0 if and only if T ` (t = t0 ).
By (r= ), (s= ), and (t= ), ∼T is an equivalence relation on Ts . We denote by
[t] the equivalence class of t.
Let M (T )s = Ts /∼T . We will define a V-structure M (T ) with domain
(M (T )s )s∈S .
For each function symbol f of type (s1 , . . . , sn ) → s, define

f M ([t1 ], . . . , [tn ]) = [f (t1 , . . . , tn )].

Vn
This is well-defined: if ti ∼T t0i for 1 ≤ i ≤ n, then T |= i=1 ti = t0i , so by
(fun), T |= f (t1 , . . . , tn ) = f (t01 , . . . , t0n ), and f (t1 , . . . , tn ) ∼T f (t01 , . . . , t0n ).
For each relation symbol R of type (S1 , . . . , Sn ), define

([t1 ], . . . , [tn ]) ∈ RM ⇐⇒ T ` R(t1 , . . . , tn ).

This is
Vnwell-defined: if ti ∼T t0i for 1 ≤ i ≤ n and T ` R(t1 , . . . , tn ), then
T |= ( i=1 ti = ti ) ∧ R(t1 , . . . , tn ), so by (rel), T |= R(t01 , . . . , t0n ).
0

Our equality rules ensure that the V-structure M (T ) is well-defined, but

we’d really like it to be a model of T . The problem is that T might contain
a sentence with a quantifier, like ∃x ϕ(x), and there is no guarantee that there
is a term t in the empty context such that M (T ) |= ϕ(t). In fact, if V has no
constant symbols, then there are no V-terms in the empty context at all, and
M (T ) is empty! The following definition rectifies this situation.
A theory T has Henkin witnesses if for any formula ϕ(y) in a context with
a single variable y of type s, if T ` ∃y ϕ(y), then there is a constant symbol cϕ
of type s such that T ` ϕ(cϕ ).
Lemma 3.7. Suppose T is a complete consistent theory with Henkin witnesses.
Then M (T ) |= T .

25
 Proof. The proof amounts to understanding the interpretations of terms and
formulas in M (T ). We proceed by induction on the structure of terms and
formulas. This proof has a feature common to all such inductions: while we
only care about whether M (T ) |= ϕ when ϕ is a sentence, in order to carry
out the induction, we have to formulate our claims for formulas in an arbitrary
variable context.

Claim 1: If t(x) is a term in context x = (x1 , . . . , xn ) and ([t1 ], . . . , [tn ]) is

an interpretation of x in M (T ), then tM (T ) ([t1 ], . . . , [tn ]) = [t(t1 , . . . , tn )]. Here
t(t1 , . . . , tn ) is the term in the empty context obtained by substituting ti for xi
in t for all 1 ≤ i ≤ n.
The proof is by induction on the complexity of terms.
• If t is a variable xi , then tM (T ) ([t1 ], . . . , [tn ]) = [ti ] = [t(t1 , . . . , tn )].
• If t is f (u1 , . . . , um ), where u1 , . . . , um are terms in context x, then:
M (T )
tM (T ) ([t1 ], . . . , [tn ]) = f M (T ) (u1 ([t1 ], . . . , [tn ]), . . . , uM
m
(T )
([t1 ], . . . , [tn ]))
= f M (T ) ([u1 (t1 , . . . , tn )], . . . , [um (t1 , . . . , tn )])
= [f (u1 (t1 , . . . , tn ), . . . , um (t1 , . . . , tn ))]
= [t(t1 , . . . , tn )].

Claim 2: If ϕ(x) is a formula in context x = (x1 , . . . , xn ) and ([t1 ], . . . , [tn ])

is an interpretation of x in M (T ), then M (T ) |= ϕ([t1 ], . . . , [tn ]) if and only if
T ` ϕ(t1 , . . . , tn ). Here ϕ(t1 , . . . , tn ) is the sentence obtained by substituting ti
for xi in ϕ for all 1 ≤ i ≤ n.
The proof is by induction on the complexity of formulas.
• If ϕ is t = t0 , where t and t0 are terms of type s ∈ S in context x, then

M (T ) |= ϕ([t1 ], . . . , [tn ]) iff tM (T ) ([t1 ], . . . , [tn ]) = t0M (T ) ([t1 ], . . . , [tn ])

iff [t(t1 , . . . , tn )] ∼T [t0 (t1 , . . . , tn )]
iff T ` t(t1 , . . . , tn ) = t0 (t1 , . . . , tn )
iff T ` ϕ(t1 , . . . , tn ).

• If ϕ is R(u1 , . . . , um ), where u1 , . . . , um are terms in context x, then

M (T )
M (T ) |= ϕ([t1 ], . . . , [tn ]) iff (ui ([t1 ], . . . , [tn ]))m
i=1 ∈ R
M (T )

iff ([ui (t1 , . . . , tn )])m

i=1 ∈ R
M (T )

iff T ` R(u1 (t1 , . . . , tn ), . . . , um (t1 , . . . , tn ))

iff T ` ϕ(t1 , . . . , tn ).

Thursday 9/13 • If ϕ is >, then M (T ) |= ϕ([t1 ], . . . , [tn ]) and T ` ϕ(t1 , . . . , tn ).

26
 • If ϕ is ⊥, then M (T ) 6|= ϕ([t1 ], . . . , [tn ]) and T 6` ϕ(t1 , . . . , tn ), since T is
consistent.
• If ϕ is χ ∧ ψ, then

M (T ) |= ϕ([t1 ], . . . , [tn ]) iff M (T ) |= χ([t1 ], . . . , [tn ])

and M (T ) |= ψ([t1 ], . . . , [tn ])
iff T ` χ(t1 , . . . , tn ) and T ` ψ(t1 , . . . , tn )
iff T ` ϕ(t1 , . . . , tn ).

• If ϕ is χ ∨ ψ, then

M (T ) |= ϕ([t1 ], . . . , [tn ]) iff M (T ) |= χ([t1 ], . . . , [tn ])

or M (T ) |= ψ([t1 ], . . . , [tn ])
iff T ` χ(t1 , . . . , tn ) or T ` ψ(t1 , . . . , tn )
iff T ` ϕ(t1 , . . . , tn ).

Here we used completeness: recall (from Lemma 2.10) that an ultrafilter

contains a join x ∨ y if and only if it contains x or it contains y.
• If ϕ is ¬χ, then

M (T ) |= ϕ([t1 ], . . . , [tn ]) iff M (T ) 6|= χ([t1 ], . . . , [tn ])

iff T 6` χ(t1 , . . . , tn )
iff T ` ϕ(t1 , . . . , tn ),

since T is complete.

• If ϕ is ∃y ψ(x, y), suppose M (T ) |= ϕ([t1 ], . . . , [tn ]). Then there is some

[u] ∈ M (T )y such that M (T ) |= ψ([t1 ], . . . , [tn ], [u]). By induction, T `
ψ(t1 , . . . , tn , u). By (sub(u)), T ` ∃y ψ(t1 , . . . , tn , y), so T ` ϕ(t1 , . . . , tn ).
Conversely, suppose T ` ϕ(t1 , . . . , tn ). So T ` ∃y ψ(t1 , . . . , tn , y). Let θ(y)
be ψ(t1 , . . . , tn , y). Since T has Henkin witnesses, T ` ψ(t1 , . . . , tn , cθ ).
By induction, M (T ) |= ψ([t1 ], . . . , [tn ], [cθ ]), so M (T ) |= ϕ([t1 ], . . . , [tn ]).
Now for every sentence ϕ ∈ T , we have T ` ϕ, so M (T ) |= ϕ by Claim 2.
So M (T ) |= T , as was to be shown.
Of course, not every theory has Henkin witnesses. So our next goal is to take
an arbitrary V-theory T and extend it to a complete V 0 -theory T 0 with Henkin
witnesses, where V 0 is a vocabulary obtained by adding new constant symbols
to V. It is in this step where we need to do some real proof-theoretic work, so
we pause to make some observations about our proof system.

(1) Which instances of the rule (sub(t)) are available to us depends on the
vocabulary. For example, if y is a variable of type s, the sentence ∃y > is

27
 true in a structure if and only if the sort s is nonempty. If V has a term t
of type s in the empty context (for example, a constant symbol of type s),
then we have > ` ∃x > by (sub(t)), since >[x 7→ t] = >.
The sequent > ` ∃x > is semantically valid, since sort s is nonempty in
every V-structure (it contains at least the interpretation of the term t). On
the other hand, if V has no terms of sort s in the empty context, then there
are V-structures in which the sort s is empty, and > 6` ∃x >.
Note that the term t does not actually appear in the proof tree for > ` ∃x >,
just in the rule! This is why we make t explicit when writing (sub(t)). When
we say that a symbol or a variable occurs in a proof tree, we mean that it
appears in any of the sentences in the sequents in the tree, or in a term t
used in an instance of (sub(t)). When there could be any confusion about
which vocabulary a proof takes place in, we will be careful to specify it.
(2) If ϕ `x ψ in vocabulary V, and V ⊆ V 0 , then also ϕ `x ψ in vocabulary
V 0 . In the other direction, a proof in vocabulary V is a finite tree, and each
instance of a rule uses only finitely many symbols in V, so if ϕ `x ψ, then
there is a finite vocabulary V 0 ⊆ V (finitely many sorts, function symbols,
and relation symbols) such that ϕ `x ψ in vocabulary V 0 .
(3) Given a valid proof tree, a variable y which occurs in the tree, and a variable
y 0 of the same type which does not occur in the tree, we can replace y by
y 0 everywhere in the tree, and the resulting tree is still valid. This can be
checked by examining each rule and noting that replacing y by y 0 results in
an instance of the same rule.
(4) By Exercise 7, if ϕ `x ψ, then ¬ψ `x ¬ϕ. We will use this contrapositive
trick in applications of the rule (e). Specifically, suppose ϕ is a formula
in context xy and ψ is a formula in context x in which y is not bound. If
ψ `xy ¬ϕ, then ψ `x ¬∃y ϕ.
Proof: If ψ `xy ¬ϕ, then ϕ `xy ¬ψ. By (e), ∃y ϕ `x ¬ψ, so ψ `x ¬∃y ϕ.

Lemma 3.8 (Lifting constants). Suppose V 0 = V ∪ {c}, where c is a constant

symbol of type s. Let ϕ and ψ be V 0 -formulas in context x such that ϕ `x ψ.
Let z be a variable of type s which is not in the context x and does not appear
bound in ϕ or ψ. Then ϕ[c 7→ z] `xz ψ[c 7→ z] via a proof in the vocabulary V.
Proof. By point (3) above, we may assume that z does not occur in the proof
tree for ϕ `x ψ. Then we can check, rule by rule, that if we replace the constant
symbol c by the variable z (which does not occur in the rule) and add z to
the contexts of all terms and formulas in the premises and conclusions, we get
another instance of the same rule in vocabulary V.
The least trivial case is the rule (sub(t)). So suppose we have an instance
of this rule:
sub(t)
ϕ[y 7→ t] `x ∃y ϕ

28
where ϕ is a V 0 -formula in context xy, and t is a V 0 -term in context x. Let
t0 = t[c 7→ z], and let ϕ0 = ϕ[c 7→ z]. We view t0 as a V-term in context xz and
ϕ0 as a V-formula in context xzy. Then

sub(t0 )
ϕ0 [y 7→ t0 ] `xz ∃y ϕ0

is an instance of (sub(t0 )) in vocabulary V, and ∃y ϕ0 = (∃y ϕ)[c 7→ z] and

ϕ0 [y 7→ t0 ] = (ϕ[y 7→ t])[c 7→ z], so the conclusion is the sequent obtained by
replacing c by z everywhere in the previous instance.
The lemma on lifting constants is the one place in the proof of completeness
where we use the fact that all rules are stated for formulas in arbitrary variable
contexts, not just for sentences.

Lemma 3.9. Suppose T is a consistent V-theory. Then there is a vocabulary

V 0 extending V by new constant symbols and a complete consistent V 0 -theory T 0
with Henkin witnesses such that T ⊆ T 0 .
Proof. The idea is simple: We just add the necessary constant symbols to the
vocabulary and the necessary sentences to the theory. After showing that we
don’t lose consistency, we take a completion. But now that we have added
new constant symbols to the theory, there are new formulas that need Henkin
witnesses themselves. So we have to repeat the process infinitely many times.
Let V0 = V. Let T = T0 . By Lemma 3.4, there is a complete consistent
V0 -theory T00 with T = T0 ⊆ T00 .
Suppose we have constructed a vocabulary Vi and a complete consistent Vi -
theory Ti0 . For each Vi -formula ϕ(y) in a context with a single variable y of sort
s, such that Ti0 ` ∃y ϕ(y), let cϕ be a new constant symbol of sort s. Let Vi+1
be the vocabulary obtained by adding all such constant symbols to Vi . And let
Ti+1 = Ti0 ∪ {ϕ(cϕ ) | cϕ ∈ Vi+1 \ Vi }.

Claim 1: If we view Ti0 as a Vi+1 -theory, it is consistent.

It suffices to show that for any finite set C = {cϕ1 , . . . , cϕm } of constant
symbols in Vi+1 \ Vi , Ti0 is consistent in vocabulary Vi (C) = Vi ∪ C. Indeed, if
Ti0 ` ⊥ in vocabulary Vi+1 , by observation (2) above the proof only uses finitely
many of the new constant symbols. We proceed by induction on m = |C|.
In the base case, when m = 0, we know that Ti0 is a consistent Vi -theory.
So suppose m ≥ 1 and C = {cϕ1 , . . . , cϕm } is a set of m new constant symbols.
Let C − = {cϕ1 , . . . , cϕm−1 }. By induction, Ti0 is a consistent Vi (C − )-theory. If
Ti0 ` ⊥ in vocabulary Vi (C), then there is sentence ψ, which is a conjunction of
finitely many sentences in Ti0 , such that ψ ` ⊥ in Vi (C). Let cϕm have type s.
By the lemma on lifting constants, we have ψ[cϕm 7→ z] `z ⊥ in Vi (C − ), where
z is a variable of type s which is not bound in ψ. Since cϕm does not appear in
ψ, ψ[cϕm 7→ z] is just ψ(z), the sentence ψ viewed in context z.
Let ϕ0m = ϕm [y 7→ z]. By (bot), ψ `z ¬ϕ0m , and by observation (4) above
(using (e)), ψ ` ¬∃z ϕ0m , and Ti0 ` ¬∃z ϕ0m in V(C − ).

29
 But also Ti0 ` ∃y ϕm in Vi , and hence in Vi (C − ) by observation (2), so
Ti0 ` ∃z ϕ0m in Vi (C − ) by Example 3.2. We have shown that Ti0 is an inconsistent
Vi (C − )-theory, contradicting the inductive hypothesis.

Claim 2: Ti+1 is consistent.

All proofs in the proof of this claim take place in Vi+1 . It suffices to show
that for any finite set S = {ϕ1 (cϕ1 ), . . . , ϕm (cϕm )} of sentences in Ti+1 \ Ti0 , the
theory Ti0 ∪ S is consistent. Indeed, if Ti+1 ` ⊥, this is witnessed by ψ ` ⊥,
where ψ is a finite conjunction of sentences from Ti+1 . We proceed by induction
on m = |S|.
In the base case, when m = 0, we know that Ti0 is a consistent Vi+1 -theory
by Claim 1. So suppose m ≥ 1, and S = {ϕ1 (cϕ1 ), . . . , ϕm (cϕm )}. Let S − =
{ϕ1 (cϕ1 ), . . . , ϕm−1 (cϕm−1 )}. By induction, Ti0 ∪ S − is consistent. If Ti0 ∪ S `
⊥, then there is a finite conjunction ψ of sentences from Ti0 ∪ S − such that
ψ ∧ ϕm (cϕm ) ` ⊥.
By Lemma 2.5, ψ ` ¬ϕm (cϕm ). By the lemma on lifting constants, we have
ψ[cϕm 7→ z] `z ¬ϕm (cϕm )[cϕm 7→ z], where z is a variable which does not appear
bound in ψ or ϕm . Since cϕm does not occur in ψ, ψ[cϕm 7→ z] is just ψ(z), the
sentence ψ viewed in context z. Since also cϕm does not occur in the original
Vi -formula ϕm (y), we have ϕm (cϕm )[cϕm 7→ z] = ϕm [y 7→ z]. Call this formula
ϕ0m .
Then we have ψ `z ¬ϕ0m . By observation (4) above (using (e)), ψ ` ¬∃z ϕ0m ,
and Ti0 ∪ S − ` ¬∃z ϕ0m .
But just as in Claim 1, we also have Ti0 ` ∃y ϕm in Vi , and hence Ti0 ∪ S − `
∃z ϕ0m in Vi+1 by Example 3.2 and observation (2). We have shown that Ti0 ∪S −
is inconsistent, contradicting the inductive hypothesis.

0
Tuesday 9/18 We finish the inductive step by defining S Ti+1 to be a0 consistent completion
0
of Ti+1 , by Lemma 3.4. Finally, let V = i∈ω Vi and T = i∈ω Ti0 .
S
T 0 is complete: for any V 0 -sentence ϕ, since ϕ is finite, ϕ is a Vi -sentence for
some i ∈ ω, so Ti0 ` ϕ or Ti0 ` ¬ϕ in Vi , since Ti is a complete Vi -theory. Since
Ti0 ⊆ T 0 , T 0 ` ϕ or T 0 ` ¬ϕ in V 0 by observation (2).
T 0 is consistent: If T 0 ` ⊥, then ψ ` ⊥, where ψ is a finite conjunction of
sentences in T 0 . Since ψ is finite, ψ is a finite conjunction of sentences in Ti0 for
some i ∈ ω, and the proof is a proof in Vj for some i ≤ j ∈ ω, by observation
(2). Then ψ is also a finite conjunction of sentences in Tj0 , and Tj0 ` ⊥ in Vj ,
contradicting consistency of Tj0 .
T 0 has Henkin witnesses: If T 0 ` ∃y ϕ(y), then as above we already have
0
Tj ` ∃y ϕ(y) in Vj for some j ∈ ω. Then there is a constant cϕ in Vk+1 such
0
that Tk+1 ` ϕ(cϕ ) in Vk+1 , so T 0 ` ϕ(cϕ ) in V 0 .
Theorem 3.10 (Completeness). If T |= ϕ, then T ` ϕ.

Proof. Lemmas 3.7 and 3.9 together show that every consistent theory has a
model. Indeed, if a V-theory T is consistent, then there is a vocabulary V 0
extending V by new constant symbols and a complete V 0 -theory T 0 with Henkin

30
witnesses such that T ⊆ T 0 . Then M (T 0 ) |= T 0 . Since T ⊆ T 0 , M (T 0 ) |= T . And
letting M be the reduct of M (T 0 ) to V (this just means we forget about the
extra constant symbols in V 0 , which aren’t mentioned in T ), we have M |= T .
Now we prove the theorem. If T |= ϕ, then every model of T satisfies ϕ, i.e.
T ∪ {¬ϕ} has no models. Since every consistent theory has a model, it follows
that T ∪ {¬ϕ} is inconsistent, so there is a finite conjunction ψ of sentences in
T such that ψ ∧ ¬ϕ ` ⊥. By Lemma 2.5, ψ ` ϕ, so T ` ϕ.
Corollary 3.11 (Compactness). Let T be a theory such that every finite subset
of T is satisfiable. Then T is satisfiable.
Proof. Suppose for contradiction that T is not satisfiable, i.e. TV |= ⊥. By
completeness, TV` ⊥, so there is a finite subset Σ ⊆ T such that ψ∈Σ ψ ` ⊥.
By soundness, ψ∈Σ ψ |= ⊥, so Σ |= ⊥, contradiction.
The reason for the name is that the compactness theorem is a translation
(using the completeness theorem) of the topological compactness of the Stone
space S() of L() , the Boolean algebra of sentences. Precisely, given a theory T ,
each sentence ϕ ∈ T corresponds to a clopen set [ϕ] ⊆ S() . The hypothesis that
every finiteTsubset of T is satisfiable tells us that for any finite Σ ⊆fin T , the
clopen set ϕ∈Σ [ϕ] is nonempty. Indeed, this intersection contains the ultra-
filter on L() corresponding to the complete theory of any model of Σ. T Topo-
logical compactness of S() says that as a consequence, the closed set ϕ∈T [ϕ]
is nonempty. A point in the intersection corresponds to a complete consistent
theory existending T , which has a model by completeness.

3.3 First applications of compactness

Example 3.12. The vocabulary of arithmetic is V = {≤, 0, 1, +, ×}. Consider
the V-structure N = (N; ≤, 0, 1, +, ×). The complete theory Th(N) is called
true arithmetic, and its model N is the standard model of arithmetic. Let’s
use compactness to show that Th(N) has nonstandard models.
Let V 0 = V ∪ {c}, where c is a new constant symbol. For each n ∈ N, let tn
be the term 1 + 1 + · · · + 1. Define T 0 = Th(N) ∪ {c 6= tn | n ∈ N}.
| {z }
n times
By compactness, so show that T 0 is satisfiable, it suffices to show that any
finite subset is satisfiable. For any finite subset Σ ⊆fin T 0 , pick some n ∈ N such
that (c 6= tn ) ∈
/ Σ. Then (N; n) |= Σ, where the notation (N; n) means that we
take (N; ≤, 0, 1, +, ×) and additionally interpret the constant symbol c as the
element n.
It follows that T 0 is satisfiable, i.e. it has a model (N ; ≤, 0, 1, +, ×, c). This
model contains standard elements of the form tN n for all n ∈ N, but it also
contains the element cN , which is not equal to any standard element. It follows
that N is not isomorphic to N, despite the fact that it satisfies all of the same
V-sentences.
Exercise 11. Let N be a nonstandard model of Th(N) (that is, N |= Th(N),
but N 6∼
= N).

31
 (1) Show that the map n 7→ tN n is an embedding N → N . We will identify N
with its image under this embedding.
(2) Show that any nonstandard element a ∈ N \ N is greater than all standard
elements, i.e. N |= n ≤ a for all n ∈ N.

(3) Imprecise question: what does the ordering of the nonstandard elements
under ≤ look like? Is there a greatest nonstandard element? A least one?
Are there infinitely many? Is their ordering dense? etc. etc.
(4) Show that N contains nonstandard “prime numbers”. Hint: Show that for
any V-formula ϕ(x) in a single free variable x, if there are arbitrarily large
elements of N satisfying ϕ(x), then there are nonstandard elements in N
satisfying ϕ(x).
Thursday 9/20 The compactness theorem is also a useful tool for showing that certain classes
of structures cannot be axiomatized by first-order theories.
Example 3.13. The vocabulary of graphs is single-sorted and consists of a
single binary relation symbol E. We will show that there is no theory T such
that G |= T if and only if G is a connected graph.
Suppose for contradiction that such a theory T exists. Let V 0 be the vocab-
ulary obtained by adding two new constant symbols c and d to the vocabulary
of graphs, and let T 0 = T ∪ {ϕn | n ∈ ω}, where ϕ0 is the sentence (c 6= d), ϕ1
is the sentence ¬(cEd), and ϕn is the sentence expressing that there is no path
of length n from c to d:
n−2
!
^
¬∃x1 . . . ∃xn−1 cEx1 ∧ xn−1 Ed ∧ xi Exi+1 .
i=1

We will show that T 0 is consistent. For every natural number n, let Gn be

a connected graph containing elements an and bn such that the length of the
shortest path from an to bn is n (for example, we can take Gn to consist of a
path from an to bn of length n).
Now any finite subset of T 0 is contained in T ∪ {ϕk | k < n} for some large
enough n, and (Gn ; an , bn ) |= T ∪ {ϕk | k < n}. So by compactness, T 0 is
consistent.
Let (G; a, b) be a model of T 0 . Since G |= T , G is a connected graph, but
since (G; a, b) |= ϕn for all n, there is no path of any length from a to b. This
is a contradiction.
We will later reframe this trick of adding constant symbols as the method
of realizing types. You can use a similar idea to solve the following exercise.
Exercise 12. Work in the vocabulary of rings, (0, 1, +, −, ·). Show that there
is a theory T such that K |= T if and only if K is a field of characteristic 0. In
contrast, show that there is no theory T such that K |= T if and only if K is
isomorphic to an algebraic extension field of Q.

32
4 Elementary embeddings
4.1 Homomorphisms and embeddings (again)
In this section, we fix a language L, obtained from the vocabulary V. We orig-
inally defined homomorphisms and embeddings just after defining structures.
Let’s return to them and think about their relationship with terms and for-
mulas. The first observation is that homomorphisms respect the evaluation of
complex terms.
Proposition 4.1. Let h : A → B be a homomorphism. Then for any term t in
context x and any interpretation a ∈ Ax , we have h(tA (a)) = tB (h(a)).12
Proof. An easy induction on the complexity of terms.
For any formula ϕ(x), we say that an S-indexed map h : A → B preserves
ϕ(x) if for any a ∈ Ax , if A |= ϕ(a), then B |= ϕ(h(a)). And we say that h
reflects ϕ(x) if for any a ∈ Ax , if B |= ϕ(h(a)), then A |= ϕ(a). Note that h
preserves ϕ(x) if and only if it reflects ¬ϕ(x).
Proposition 4.2. Let h : A → B be an S-indexed map.
(1) h is a homomorphism if and only if it preserves all atomic formulas.
(2) h is an embedding if and only if it preserves and reflects all atomic formulas
(equivalently, it preserves all atomic and negated atomic formulas).
Proof. Suppose h preserves all atomic formulas. Then for every function symbol
f , let ϕ(x, y) be the atomic formula f (x) = y. If f A (a) = b, then A |= ϕ(a, b),
so B |= ϕ(h(a), h(b)), and f B (h(a)) = h(b) = h(f A (a)).
Similarly, for every relation symbol R, let ϕ(x) be the atomic formula R(x).
If a ∈ RA , then A |= ϕ(a), so B |= ϕ(h(a)), and h(a) ∈ RB .
We have shown that h is a homomorphism. If, moreover, h reflects all
atomic formulas, then the argument above shows that a ∈ RA if and only if
h(a) ∈ RA for every relation symbol R. And for all a, a0 ∈ A, if h(a) = h(a)0 ,
then B |= ϕ(a, a0 ), where ϕ(x, y) is the atomic formula x = y, so A |= ϕ(a, a0 ),
and a = a0 . It follows that h is injective, so h is an embedding.
Now let ϕ(x) be an atomic formula, and a ∈ Ax .
Case 1: ϕ is t = u. Suppose h is a homomorphism. If A |= ϕ(a), then
tA (a) = uA (a), so h(tA (a)) = h(uA (a)), and tB (h(a)) = uB (h(a)) by Proposi-
tion 4.1, so B |= ϕ(h(a)). If h is an embedding, then the implications above is
an equivalence, using the fact that h is injective.
Case 2: ϕ is R(t1 , . . . , tn ). Suppose h is a homomorphism. If A |= ϕ(a),
then (tA n A A n B B n
i (a))i=1 ∈ R , so (h(ti (a)))i=1 ∈ R , and (ti (h(a)))i=1 ∈ R
B
by
Proposition 4.1, so B |= ϕ(h(a)). If h is an embedding, then the implications
above is an equivalence.
12 Here the context x = (x , . . . , x ) is a tuple of variables, and each x has a type s . Then
1 n i i
the interpretation a = (a1 , . . . , an ) is a tuple from A, such that each ai ∈ Asi . Formally, we
should write h(s1 ,...,sn ) (a) for the image of a under the induced map A(s1 ,...,sn ) → B(s1 ,...,sn ) .
But from now on we will default to the simpler notation h(a).

33
 It is often useful to note that the class of structures which admit a homo-
morphism or an embedding from a structure A are the models of a particular
theory.
Given a V-structure A and a subset B ⊆ A, let V(B) be the vocabulary
obtained from V by adding a new constant symbol of type s for every element
b ∈ Bs . When there is no chance for confusion, we will also denote the constant
symbol by b. We view A as a V(B) structure in the obvious way. In particular,
V(A) is obtained by naming every element of A by a constant symbol.
The positive diagram of a V-structure A, denoted Diag+ (A), is the set of
all atomic V(A)-sentences true in A. That is, for every atomic V-formula ϕ(x)
and every a ∈ Ax such that A |= ϕ(a), the V(A)-sentence ϕ(a) is in Diag+ (A).
Similarly, the diagram of A, denoted Diag(A), is the set of all atomic and
negated atomic V(A)-sentences true in A.
The following proposition now follows immediately from Proposition 4.2.
Proposition 4.3. Let A be a V-structure, and let B be a V(A)-structure.
1. B |= Diag+ (A) if and only if the map a 7→ aB is a homomorphism A → B.

2. B |= Diag(A) if and only if the map a 7→ aB is an embedding A → B.

4.2 Elementary equivalence and elementary embeddings

Structures M and N are elementarily equivalent, written M ≡ N , if for all
sentences ϕ ∈ L() ,
M |= ϕ iff N |= ϕ.
Equivalently, Th(M ) = Th(N ).
An embedding h : M → N is an elementary embedding if it preserves
(and reflects) all formulas. That is, for all formulas ϕ(x) ∈ Lx and all interpre-
tations a ∈ M x ,
M |= ϕ(a) iff N |= ϕ(h(a)).
Of course, if h preserves all formulas, then in particular it preserves the
negation of every formula, so it also reflects every formula.
In particular, elementary embeddings preserve and reflect all sentences, so
if h : M → N is an elementary embedding, then M ≡ N .
If M ⊆ N and the inclusion is an elementary embedding, we write M ≺ N ,
and say that M is an elementary substructure of N , or N is an elementary
extension of M .
The V(M )-theory ThV(M ) (M ) is called the elementary diagram of M ,
and denoted EDiag(M ): it contains all of the information about all first-order
formulas satisfied by all tuples from M . Similarly to Proposition 4.3, we have:
Proposition 4.4. Let M be a V-structure, and let N be a V(M )-structure.
Then N |= EDiag(M ) if and only if the map a 7→ aN is an elementary embedding
M → N.

34
 The following is a criterion for identifying elementary substructures. The
advantage of this criterion is that condition (2) only refers to truth in the larger
structure N .
Theorem 4.5 (Tarski–Vaught Test). Suppose M is a substructure of N . The
following are equivalent:

(1) M  N .
(2) For every formula ϕ(x, y) (where x is a tuple of variables and y is a single
variable) and every tuple a ∈ M x , if N |= ∃y ϕ(a, y), then there is some
element b ∈ M such that N |= ϕ(a, b).

Proof. (1)⇒(2): Suppose N |= ∃y ϕ(a, y). Since a ∈ M x and M  N , M |=

∃y ϕ(a, y). So there is some b ∈ M such that M |= ϕ(a, b), and since M  N ,
also N |= ϕ(a, b).
(2)⇒(1): We prove by induction on formulas ϕ(x) that for all a ∈ M x ,
M |= ϕ(a) if and only if N |= ϕ(a).
The base case, when ϕ(x) is atomic, is handled by the fact that M is a
substructure of N . Then the inclusion M → N is an embedding, which preserves
and reflects atomic formulas.
The inductive steps for Boolean combinations are straightforward. So we
consider the case when ϕ(x) is ∃y ψ(x, y).
Assume M |= ϕ(a). Then there is some b ∈ M such that M |= ψ(a, b). By
induction N |= ψ(a, b), so N |= ϕ(a).
Conversely, assume N |= ϕ(a), i.e. N |= ∃y ψ(a, y). By (2), there is some
b ∈ M such that N |= ψ(a, b). By induction, M |= ψ(a, b), so M |= ϕ(a).
Tuesday 9/25 The following easy lemma will also be useful sometimes.
Lemma 4.6. Suppose f : M1 → M2 and g : M2 → M3 are embeddings. If g
and g ◦ f are both elementary embeddings, then so is f .
Proof. For any ϕ(x) ∈ Lx and any a ∈ M1x , M1 |= ϕ(a) iff M3 |= ϕ(g(f (a))) iff
M2 |= ϕ(f (a)).
We have now characterized three types of maps, based on the formulas
they preserve: homomorphisms preserve atomic formulas, embeddings preserve
atomic and negated atomic formulas, and elementary embeddings preserve all
formulas. By this template, you can define many other types of maps between
structures, by requiring that they preserve other sets of formulas. The strongest
kinds of maps we will consider are the isomorphisms.
Proposition 4.7. Every isomorphism is an elementary embedding.

Proof. Let h : M → N be an isomorphism. We prove by induction on formulas

ϕ(x) that for all a ∈ M x , M |= ϕ(a) if and only if N |= ϕ(h(a)). Just as in the
proof of Theorem 4.5, the base case of atomic formulas is handled by the fact that
isomorphisms are embeddings, and the inductive steps for Boolean combinations

35
are straightforward. So we consider the case when ϕ(x) is ∃y ψ(x, y). If M |=
ϕ(x), then there is some b such that M |= ψ(a, b), and by induction N |=
ψ(h(a), h(b)), so N |= ϕ(h(a)). Conversely, if N |= ϕ(h(a)), there is some b such
that N |= ψ(h(a), b), so by induction M |= ψ(a, h−1 (b)), and M |= ϕ(a).
It follows that isomorphic structures are elementarily equivalent. We have
already seen that the converse is not true in general (Example 3.12), but it is
true for some structures, as discussed in the next section. The following example
shows that not every embedding between elementarily equivalent structures is
an elementary embedding.
Example 4.8. Consider the structure (N; ≤). The map h : N → N given by
n 7→ n + 1 is an embedding of N in itself, but it is not an elementary embedding.
For example, letting ϕ(x) be the formula ∀y (x ≤ y), we have N |= ϕ(0), but
N 6|= ϕ(h(0)).

4.3 Counting
We now want to answer the following question: Given a theory T , what are the
possible cardinalities of models of T ? To address this question, we will need
to recall just a little bit of set theory. A good reference for the facts below is
Introduction to Set Theory by Hrabáček and Jech.

• The ordinals are a linearly ordered number system extending the natural
numbers, characterized by the following properties:
– 0 is an ordinal.
– For every ordinal α, there is a next largest ordinal α + 1 (this is a
successor ordinal).
– For every set of ordinals S, there is a least upper bound sup S (this
is called a limit ordinal).
– Every ordinal is either 0, a successor, or a nonzero limit.
• The ordinals begin

0, 1, 2, . . . , ω, ω + 1, ω + 2, . . . , ω + ω(= ω · 2), . . . , ω · 3, . . . , ω · ω(= ω 2 ), . . .

• Formally, an ordinal α is identified with the set of ordinals less than α.

So 0 = ∅, 1 = {0}, 2 = {0, 1}, ω = {0, 1, 2, . . . }, etc. And if α and β are
ordinals, α ∈ β if and only if α < β.
• The linear order on the ordinals is a well-order: every nonempty set
of ordinals has a least element. This allows us to do constructions and
proofs by transfinite induction. In addition to the usual base case and
successor step for induction on ω, it is also necessary to prove a limit step:
Given a limit ordinal γ, if some property holds for all α < γ, then it holds
for γ.

36
 • The ordinals (like all sets) are divided into equivalence classes for the
“same cardinality” equivalence relation: |α| = |β| if there is a bijection
between α and β. A cardinal is an ordinal which is the least element of
its equivalence class.
• The axiom of choice implies that every set is in bijection with an ordinal13 .
It follows that every set X is in bijection with a unique cardinal. This
cardinal is called the cardinality of X, denoted |X|14 .
• The finite cardinals are 0, 1, 2, . . . , i.e. the natural numbers. ℵ0 = ω is the
smallest infinite cardinal. ℵ1 is the smallest uncountable cardinal. Then
we have ℵ2 , ℵ3 , . . . , ℵω , ℵω+1 , . . . . The infinite cardinals can be indexed
by the ordinals: every cardinal is of the form ℵα where α is an ordinal.
• Many facts about infinite cardinals are independent from ZFC set theory.
The most famous independent statement is the Continuum Hypothesis:
2ℵ0 = ℵ1 , where 2ℵ0 is the cardinality of P(ω), or of R. Cantor proved
that ℵ0 < 2ℵ0 .

• However, we will use the following theorems about cardinalities:

– Given sets X and Y , with |X| = κ and |Y | = λ, κ+λ is the cardinality
of |X t Y |, and κ · λ is the cardinality of X × Y . If κ and λ are both
infinite, then κ + λ = κ · λ = max(κ, λ).
S
– if (Xi )i∈I is an indexed family of sets, then the cardinality of i∈I Xi
is bounded above by the maximum of |I| and |Xi | for all i ∈ I. Indeed,
if κ = maxi∈I |Xi |, then

[ G
Xi ≤ κ = |I × κ| = max(|I|, κ).
i∈I i∈I

– If X is infinite, then the cardinality of the set X <ω of finite sequences

from X is equal to the cardinality of X. Indeed,

[
|X| ≤ |X <ω | = X n ≤ max(ℵ0 , max |X n |) = max(ℵ0 , |X|) = |X|.
n∈ω
n∈ω

Recall that L is the set of all first-order formulas (in a fixed vocabulary V),
in any variable context. By |V|, we mean |S ∪ F ∪ R|.
Lemma 4.9. |L| = max(|V|, ℵ0 )
13 In fact, it is equivalent. This form of the axiom of choice is called the well-ordering

principle.
14 If we were not willing to assume the axiom of choice (but we are!), it would still be possible

to define the cardinality of X as the equivalence class of X under the “same cardinality”
equivalence relation. But the class of cardinalities is quite badly behaved without choice; for
example, it is not linearly ordered

37
Proof. First, note that |L| ≥ |V|, since we can associate a distinct formula to
each sort, function symbol, and relation symbol in V. For a sort s ∈ S, take
x = x, where x is a variable of type s. For a function symbol f ∈ F, take
f (x1 , . . . , xn ) = y. For a relation symbol R ∈ R, take R(x1 , . . . , xn ).
Also, |L| ≥ ℵ0 , since there are trivially infinitely many formulas. For exam-
ple, >, ¬>, ¬¬>, ¬¬¬>, etc. is an infinite sequence of formulas.
So |L| ≥ max(|V|, ℵ0 ). Conversely, note that a formula is a finite sequence
of symbols, which could be function symbols from F, relation symbols from
R, variables from our supply X = (Xs )s∈S , or syntactic symbols from the set
Syn = {=, >, ⊥, ∧, ∨, ¬, ∃, (, )}. Let Symb(L) S = F ∪ R ∪ X ∪ Syn. Recall that
each set Xs is countably infinite, so |X| = s∈S Xs = max(|S|, ℵ0 ). It follows
that |Symb(L)| = max(|F|, |R|, |S|, ℵ0 ) = max(|V|, ℵ0 ), since if V is infinite,
then |V| = max(|F|, |R|, |S|), while if V is finite, both sides are ℵ0 .
Now since every formula is a finite sequence from Symb(L):

|L| ≤ |Symb(L)|<ω = |Symb(L)| = max(V, ℵ0 ).

4.4 Boring and interesting theories

A V-structure A is boring if As is finite for all s ∈ S. Otherwise, it is interest-
ing.15 A theory T is boring if all of its models are boring. On the other hand,
T is interesting if it has an interesting model. In particular, all interesting
theories are consistent.
Recall that we defined the cardinality of an S-indexedF set A to be the car-
dinality of the disjoint union of its components: |A| = | s∈S As |. As usual,
we say that A is finite when |A| = n for some n ∈ N. When the vocabulary V
has only finitely many sorts, a structure is boring if and only if it is finite. But
when V has infinitely many sorts, there are infinite boring structures.
Proposition 4.10. Assume V is a finite vocabulary. If A is a boring V-
structure, then there is a sentence ϕA such that B |= ϕA if and only if B ∼
= A.
Proof. Since V has only finitely many sorts and A is boring, A is actually fi-
nite. Let a1 , . . . , an be an enumeration of A, and let xi be a variable of type s
corresponding to each element ai ∈ As .
First, we write down a formula expressing that the variables xi enumerate
the structure. Let χ(x1 , . . . , xn ) be the formula
   
^ _
 xi 6= xj  ∧ ∀y y = xi  .
1≤i<j≤n 1≤i≤n

Now we write down the interpretations of all function and relation symbols in
V. For each function symbol f , let ψf (x1 , . . . , xn ) be the conjunction of all for-
mulas of the form f (xi1 , . . . , xik ) = xj such that A |= f (ai1 , . . . , aik ) = aj . And
for each relation symbol R, let ψR (x1 , . . . , xn ) be the conjunction of all formulas
15 This terminology is not standard in model theory.

38
 of the form R(xi1 , . . . , xik ) or ¬R(xi1 , . . . , xik ) such that A |= R(ai1 , . . . , aik ) or
A |= ¬R(ai1 , . . . , aik ), respectively. These are finite conjunctions, since A is
finite.
Then define ϕA to be
   !
^ ^
∃x1 . . . ∃xn χ(x1 , . . . , xn ) ∧  ψf (x1 , . . . , xn ) ∧ ψR (x1 , . . . , xn )  .
f ∈F R∈R

The conjunctions in ϕA are finite since V is finite.

Now if B |= ϕA , then letting b1 , . . . , bn be witnesses for the existential quan-
tifiers, it is clear that the map ai 7→ bi is an isomorphism A → B.
Thursday 9/27 Exercise 13. Remove the finiteness hypothesis from Proposition 4.10, as fol-
lows: Let V be any vocabulary. If A is a boring V-structure, then for any
V-structure B, B ≡ A implies B ∼ = A. (Suggestions: First try to prove this
when V has only finitely many sorts, but an arbitrary set of function and rela-
tion symbols. Then extend to the case with infinitely many sorts.)
The upshot is that first-order logic is powerful enough to pin down boring
structures completely up to isomorphism. Ironically, this means that we will be
almost totally uninterested in boring structures and boring theories. Much of
the interest in model theory comes from working with structures in which not
everything is definable, and moving between distinct models of a theory.

4.5 The Löwenheim–Skolem theorems

We are finally ready to show that there are non-trivial elementary embeddings
(i.e. elementary embeddings which are not isomorphisms), and to address the
question of possible cardinalities of models of T (at least for interesting T ).
Theorem 4.11 (Downwards Löwenheim–Skolem). Suppose M is a structure
and A ⊆ M . Then there is an elementary substructure N  M such that
A ⊆ N and |N | ≤ max(|A|, |L|).
Proof. We define a sequence of subsets of M , (Ai )i∈ω , by induction. Let A0 = A.
Given Ai , for every formula ϕ(x, y) (where x is a tuple of variables and y
is a single variable) and every a ∈ Axi , if M |= ∃y ϕ(a, y), pick some element
bϕ(a,y) ∈ M such that M |= ϕ(a, b). Define

Ai+1 = Ai ∪ {bϕ(a,y) | ϕ(x, y) ∈ Lxy , a ∈ Axi }.

S
Finally, let N = i∈ω Ai .
We want to view N as a substructure of M . To do this, we need to check
that N is closed under the interpretations of all the function symbols in V. So
suppose f is a function symbol of type (s1 , . . . , sn ) → s, and let a ∈ N(s1 ,...,sn ) .
Since a is a finite tuple, there is already some i ∈ ω such that a ∈ (Ai )(s1 ,...,sn ) .
Then M |= ∃y (f (a) = y), so there is some b ∈ Ai+1 such that M |= (f (a) = b).
So f M (a) = b ∈ N .

39
 Next, we show that N  M using the Tarski–Vaught test, Theorem 4.5.
So suppose ϕ(x, y) is a formula and a ∈ N x , such that M |= ∃y ϕ(a, y). Then
there is already some i ∈ ω such that a ∈ Axi , and by construction there is some
b ∈ Ai+1 ⊆ N such that M |= ϕ(a, b), as was to be shown.
It remains to show the bound on the cardinality of N . Let κ = max(|A|, |L|).
We show by induction that |Ai | ≤ κ for all i ∈ ω. In the base case, A0 = A, and
the inequality is clear. So we consider Ai+1 . For any formula ϕ(x, y), where x
is a tuple of length n, the set Bϕ(x,y) = {bϕ(a,y) | a ∈ Axi } has cardinality at
most |Ai |n . This is equal to |Ai | when Ai is infinite, and it is finite when Ai is
finite. So in either case, |Bϕ(x,y) | ≤ max(|Ai |, ℵ0 ) ≤ κ by induction, and since
κ is infinite.
Now by induction again, and since |L| ≤ κ:

[
|Ai+1 | = Ai ∪ Bϕ(x,y)
ϕ(x,y)∈L

≤ |Ai | + max(|L|, κ)
≤ κ.
S
Finally, we have |N | = | i∈ω Ai | ≤ max(ℵ0 , κ) = κ.
Theorem 4.11 was the source of Skolem’s “paradox”. In modern language:
ZFC set theory proves that there are uncountably infinite sets (like P(ω)). But
if ZFC is consistent, then it has a countably infinite model. How can a countably
infinite model of set theory contain uncountably infinite sets? The resolution of
the paradox is that if M is a countable model of ZFC, then working outside the
model, we can put M in bijection with the real natural numbers. But in M ,
there is no element of M which is a bijection between the element of M called
P(ω) and the element of M called ω.
Theorem 4.12 (Upwards Löwenheim–Skolem). Suppose M is an interesting
structure and κ is a cardinal with κ ≥ max(|M |, |L|). Then there is an elemen-
tary extension M  N with |N | = κ.
Proof. Recall that V(M ) is the vocabulary obtained by adding new constant
symbol to V naming every element of M . To find an elementary extension of
M , we will find a model of the V(M )-theory EDiag(M ).
Since M is interesting, there is some sort s ∈ S such that Ms is infinite. Let
V 0 = V(M ) ∪ {cα | α < κ} be the vocabulary obtained by adding κ many new
constant symbols of type s to V(M ).
Let T 0 = EDiag(M ) ∪ {cα 6= cβ | α < β < κ}. We will show by compactness
that T 0 is consistent. A finite subset of T 0 is contained in the theory EDiag(M )∪
{cαi 6= cαj | i 6= j} for some finitely many α1 < · · · < αn < κ. Since Ms is
infinite, we can pick n distinct elements a1 , . . . , an ∈ Ms . Then interpreting the
constant cαi as ai , M itself is a model of this finite subset of T 0 .
Now let N 0 be a model of T 0 . Then by Proposition 4.4, the map a 7→ aN is
an elementary embedding M → N 0 . Identifying M with its image under this

40
 0
map, we may assume M  N 0 . And |N 0 | ≥ κ, since the elements (cN α )α<κ are
all distinct.
0
To get an elementary extension of cardinality exactly κ, let A = M ∪ {cN
α |
α < κ}, so |A| = κ. By Theorem 4.11, there is an elementary substructure
N  N 0 such that M ⊆ A ⊆ N and |N | ≤ max(|A|, |L|) = κ. Also A ⊆ N , so
|N | = κ. And M  N by Lemma 4.6.
Corollary 4.13. Let T be an interesting theory, and suppose κ ≥ |L|. Then T
has a model of cardinality κ.
Proof. Let M be an interesting model of T . If |M | = κ, we are done.
If |L| ≤ κ < |M |, let A be an arbitrary subset of M of cardinality κ. By
Theorem 4.11, there exists N  M such that |N | ≤ max(|A|, |L|) = κ, and since
A ⊆ N , also κ ≤ |N |. So N is model of T of cardinality κ.
If κ > |M |, then since κ ≥ |L|, we have max(|M |, L) ≤ κ. By Theorem 4.12,
there exists N of cardinality κ with M  N , so N |= T .
Note that the Löwenheim–Skoelm theorems do not guarantee existence of
models of cardinality κ when κ < |L|. Model theory has very little to say in
general about models which are smaller than the cardinality of the language.

4.6 κ-categoricity and completeness

We have shown that every interesting theory has a proper class of models up
to isomorphism, at least one of every cardinality κ ≥ |L|. In particular (using
Exercise 13), the theories which have just a single model up to isomorphism are
exactly the complete boring theories.
This suggests an interesting question: If you fix an infinite cardinal κ, are
there theories which have exactly one model of cardinality κ up to isomorphism?
The answer is yes: such theories are called κ-categorical.

Proposition 4.14 (Vaught’s Test). Suppose T is a consistent theory with no

boring models, and that T is κ-categorical for some κ ≥ |L|. Then T is complete.
Proof. Suppose for contradiction that T is not complete. Then there is some
sentence ϕ such that T1 = T ∪{ϕ} and T2 = T ∪{¬ϕ} are both consistent. Since
T has no boring models, both T1 and T2 are interesting. By Corollary 4.13,
there are models M1 |= T1 and M2 |= T2 such that |M1 | = |M2 | = κ. But
then by κ-categoricity, M1 ∼
= M2 . This contradicts the fact that M1 |= ϕ and
M2 |= ¬ϕ.
Vaught’s test gives us our first really explicit examples of complete theories.

Example 4.15. Let V∅ be the vocabulary with a single sort and no function
or relation symbols. A V∅ -structure is just a set. For every n, let ϕn be the
sentence ^
∃x1 . . . ∃xn xi 6= xj .
1≤i<j≤n

41
 Then A |= ϕn if and only if |A| ≥ n. Let T∞ = {ϕn | n ∈ ω}. The models of T∞
are exactly the infinite sets. T∞ is κ-categorical for every infinite cardinal κ,
since an isomorphism of V∅ -structures is just a bijection, and there is a bijection
between any two sets of cardinality κ. Since also T∞ has no boring (finite)
models, T∞ is complete by Vaught’s test.

Example 4.16. Consider the vocabulary of strict orders, (<). Let DLO be the
theory of (non-empty) dense linear orders without endpoints. This is axioma-
tized by the following sentences:
• ∀x ¬(x < x).

• ∀x ∀y ∀z ((x < y ∧ y < z) → x < z).

• ∀x ∀y (x < y ∨ y < x ∨ x = y).
• ∃x >.
• ∀x ∀y (x < y → ∃z (x < z ∧ z < y)).

• ∀x ∃y x < y.
• ∀x ∃y y < x.
Note that (Q, <) |= DLO. It is a theorem of Cantor (which we will prove below)
that DLO is ℵ0 -categorical. Also, no model of DLO is finite, since any nonempty
finite linear order has a maximum element. So DLO is complete by Vaught’s
test.
We will now prove Cantor’s classical theorem on dense linear orders without
endpoints. This theorem, from 1895, predates everything else in these notes
(Gödel’s completeness theorem is from 1929, and model theory did not really
become an independent branch of logic until the 1950s). We will give a modern
proof using the “back-and-forth” method, which is an important technique in
model theory.
Tuesday 10/2 Theorem 4.17. Any two countable dense linear orders without endpoints are
isomorphic.

Proof. Let M and N be countable models of DLO. Since they are countably
infinite, we can enumerate them as M = (mi )i∈ω and N = (ni )i∈ω , respectively.
By induction, we will construct for all i ∈ ω: a finite substructure Ai ⊆ M ,
a finite substructure Bi ⊆ N , and an isomorphism fi : Ai → Bi . In the course
of the construction, we will ensure that when i ≤ j, Ai ⊆ Aj , Bi ⊆ Bj , and
fj |Ai = fi . We will also ensure
S that for all i ∈Sω, mi ∈ Ai+1 and ni ∈ Bi+1 .
This suffices, since then i∈ω Ai = M , i∈ω Bi = N , and the coherent
sequence of isomorphisms (fi )i∈ω induce an isomorphism f : M → N .
In the base case, take A0 = B0 = ∅ and f0 the empty function.
Given fi : Ai → Bi , we first go “forth”. If mi ∈ Ai , let A∗i = Ai , Bi∗ = Bi ,
and fi∗ = fi . Otherwise, let a− be the greatest element of Ai less than mi

42
(or −∞ if there is none), and let a+ be the least element of Ai greater than
mi (or +∞ if there is none). Since fi is an isomorphism Ai → Bi , letting
fi (−∞) = −∞ and fi (+∞) = +∞, we can find some element n in the interval
(fi (a− ), fi (a+ )) in N . This uses density, no greatest element, no least element,
or non-emptyness, depending on whether a− = −∞ and whether a+ = +∞.
Define A∗i = Ai ∪ {mi }, Bi∗ = Bi ∪ {n}, and fi∗ to be the map extending fi by
mi 7→ n. Then fi∗ is an isomorphism.
Given fi∗ : A∗i → Bi∗ , we now go “back”. If ni ∈ Bi∗ , let Ai+1 = A∗i , Bi+1 =
Bi , and fi+1 = fi∗ . Otherwise, just as above we find an element m ∈ M
∗

such that the map fi+1 extending fi∗ by m 7→ ni gives an isomorphism from
Ai+1 = A∗i ∪ {m} to Bi+1 = Bi∗ ∪ {ni }. This completes the construction.
The following exercise generalizes the back-and-forth method to give a useful
criterion for isomorphism between countable structures and elementary equiva-
lence between arbitrary structures.
Exercise 14. A partial isomorphism M 99K N is an isomorphism from a
substructure of M to a substructure of N . If σ and τ are partial isomorphisms
M 99K N , we say τ extends σ if dom(σ) ⊆ dom(τ ) and σ(a) = τ (a) for all
a ∈ dom(σ) (i.e. set theoretically, σ ⊆ τ ). A back-and-forth system between
M and N is a non-empty family P of partial isomorphisms M 99K N such that:
• For all σ ∈ P and all a ∈ M , there exists τ ∈ P such that τ extends σ
and a ∈ dom(τ ).
• For all σ ∈ P and all b ∈ N , there exists τ ∈ P such that τ extends σ and
b ∈ ran(τ ).
We say M and N are partially isomorphic, written M ∼
=p N , if there is a
back-and-forth system between M and N .
(a) Show that if M ∼
= N , then M ∼
=p N .
=p N , then M ∼
(b) Show that if M and N are countable and M ∼ = N.
(c) Show that if M ∼
=p N , then M ≡ N .
(d) Suppose M is a substructure of N , and that there is a back-and-forth system
P between M and N such that for every finite A ⊆fin M , the identity map
hAi → hAi, viewed as a partial isomorphism M 99K N , is in P . Show that
M  N.
Exercise 15. Work in the vocabulary of strict orders (<). Show that Q  R
(where both sets are equipped with their usual orders). Hint: Use Exer-
cise 14(d), and consider the set P of all partial isomorphisms σ : Q 99K R such
that dom(σ) is finite.
Example 4.18. Consider the vocabulary of rings (0, 1, +, −, ·). Let ACF be
the theory of algebraically closed fields. This is axiomatized by the following
sentences:

43
 • The field axioms.
• The following sentence ϕd for every degree d ≥ 1:

∀a0 . . . ∀ad−1 ∃y (y d + ad−1 · y d−1 + · · · + a1 · y + a0 = 0)

Of course, in the sentence ϕd , we are using some shorthands, like writing y n

for y · . . . · y and omitting the parentheses that show the order of the additions
| {z }
n times
(associativity of addition is not built into the syntax, but rather follows from
the other field axioms).
The theory ACF is not complete, but we can describe all of its completions.
For any prime number p, we define ACFp = ACF ∪ {p = 0}, and we define
ACF0 = ACF ∪ {p 6= 0 | p prime}. Here p is shorthand for the term 1 + . . . + 1.
| {z }
p times
We will show below that the theories ACF0 and ACFp for any prime p are all
κ-categorical for every uncountable cardinal κ. Since these theories also have
no boring models (every algebraically closed field is infinite), it follows from
Vaught’s test that they are complete.
Note that ACF0 is not ℵ0 -categorical, since the fields Q(t1 , . . . , tn ) are all
countably infinite but non-isomorphic for distinct n. Replacing Q with Fp shows
that ACFp is not ℵ0 -categorical.
To prove the following proposition, we’ll use some field theory (a reference is
Lang’s Algebra, Chapter VIII). The relevant fact is that an algebraically closed
field is determined up to isomorphism by its charactersitic and its transcendence
degree over the prime field.
Proposition 4.19. Let p be a prime number or 0, and let κ be an uncountable
cardinal. Then ACFp is κ-categorical.
Proof. Let M |= ACFp . Then M contains an isomorphic copy F of the prime
field (F ∼ = Q if p = 0, F ∼= Fp otherwise). We can factor the field extension
F ⊆ M as F ⊆ K ⊆ M , where K = F (B) is a purely transcendental extension
of F , generated by a transcendence basis B, and M is the algebraic closure of
K. Now some counting shows that |M | = |K| = max(|B|, ℵ0 ).
It follows that if also N |= ACFp with prime field F 0 and transcendence
basis B 0 , and |M | = |N | = κ, then we have |B| = |B 0 | = κ, since κ is un-
countable. So we can start with an isomorphism F → F 0 , extend this to an
isomorphism F (B) → F (B 0 ) by picking a bijection B → B 0 , and extend this to
an isomorphism M → N between the algebraic closures.
Corollary 4.20 (Transfer principle for algebraically closed fields). Let ϕ be a
sentence in the vocabulary of rings. The following are equivalent:

(1) Some algebraically closed field of characteristic 0 satisfies ϕ.

(2) Every algebraically closed field of characteristic 0 satisfies ϕ.

44
 (3) For all but finitely many primes p, some algebraically closed field of char-
acteristic p satisfies ϕ.
(4) For all but finitely many primes p, every algebraically closed field of char-
acteristic p satisfies ϕ.
Proof. (1)⇒(2): If M |= ACF0 and M |= ϕ, then ACF0 6|= ¬ϕ, so ACF0 |= ϕ
by completeness.
(2)⇒(4): We have ACF0 |= ϕ, so by compactness there are finitely many
primes p1 , . . . , pn such that ACF ∪ {pi 6= 0 | 1 ≤ i ≤ n} |= ϕ. For any prime
q not among these finitely many exceptions, any algebraically closed field of
characteristic q satisfies ACF ∪ {pi 6= 0 | 1 ≤ i ≤ n}, hence satisfies ϕ.
(4)⇒(3): Trivial.
(3)⇒(1): Assume for contradiction that (1) fails. Then every algebraically
closed field of characteristic 0 satisfies ¬ϕ. By (2)⇒(4) for ¬ϕ, we have that for
all but finitely many primes p, every algebraically closed field of characteristic p
satisfies ¬ϕ. This contradicts (3) (since there are infinitely many primes!).
Thursday 10/4 Exercise 16. Fix a field K, and consider the vocabulary of K-vector spaces
described in Example 1.2. Let T be the theory of K-vector spaces.
(a) If V is a K-vector space with a basis B, find |V | in terms of |K| and |B|.
(b) For which cardinals κ is T κ-categorical?
(c) T is not a complete theory. Describe its completions.
In all parts above, you should consider carefully what happens when K is finite.
Do not get the wrong impression from the examples above: κ-categoricity is
a very unusual property for a theory (even a complete theory) to have! Later
in this class, we will study ℵ0 -categorical theories in general. It turns out that
ℵ0 -categorical theories have very special properties, which are quite different
from the properties of κ-categorical theories for uncountable κ.
I will end this section by mentioning Morley’s Categoricity Theorem:
Theorem 4.21 (Morley 1965 for countable L, Shelah 1974 for general L). Sup-
pose κ > |L| and T is a complete κ-categorical theory. Then T is λ-categorical
for all λ > |L|.
The statement of Morley’s theorem is interesting, in that it confirms a pat-
tern we see in the examples above, but the real value in this theorem is the
methods of proof, which inspired much of modern model theory. The proof (in
a reformulation by Baldwin and Lachlan) shows that whenever T is κ-categorical
and κ > |L|, there is some way of associating to every model of T a kind of
abstract “geometry” (more precisely, a matroid ). This geometry comes with a
notion of basis and dimension, and the isomorphism type of a model is com-
pletely determined by its dimension. This abstract dimension generalizes car-
dinality in the case of infinite sets, linear dimension in the case of K-vector
spaces, and transcendence degree in the case of algebraically closed fields of
fixed characteristic.

45
5 Definability
5.1 Formulas and types
Up to now, we have been primarily concerned with sentences and theories,
which express properties of structures. We will now turn our eyes inward, fixing
a theory T of interest, and think about formulas and types, which express
properties of (tuples of) elements from models of T .
So for the following discussion, we fix a vocabulary V, the associated first-
order language L, and a (not necessarily complete) theory T .
The first observation is that if M |= T , there are certain special subsets of
M (and more generally of M x ), namely those which are defined by formulas.
Given a formula ϕ(x), we define

ϕ(M ) = {a ∈ M x | M |= ϕ(a)}.

This is called a definable set in M . More generally, given a formula ϕ(x; y)

(here the context xy has been partitioned into a tuple of variables x and a
tuple of variables y), and any b ∈ M y , we define

ϕ(M ; b) = {a ∈ M x | M |= ϕ(a; b)}.

This is called a definable set (with parameters) in M .

Further, given formulas ϕ(x; y) and ψ(y), we can look at the definable
family of definable sets {ϕ(M ; b) | b ∈ ψ(M )}.
The second observation is that a single formula ϕ(x) gives a definable set
in every model of T . And if h : M → N is an elementary embedding, then h
induces a function ϕ(M ) → ϕ(N ). And similarly, given ϕ(x; y), h induces a
function ϕ(M ; b) → ϕ(N ; h(b)). So it makes sense to consider definable sets not
just as subsets of a fixed model, but varying over the whole category of models
of T . We will fix our definitions in this more general setting.
We say that formulas ϕ(x) and ψ(x) in context x are T -equivalent if

T |= ∀x (ϕ(x) ↔ ψ(x)).

That is, for any model M |= T , ϕ(M ) = ψ(M ).

Here x = (x1 , . . . , xn ) may be a tuple of variables, in which case ∀x is
shorthand for ∀x1 . . . ∀xn . If x is the empty context (i.e. ϕ and ψ are sentences),
then ∀x is the empty sequence of quantifiers. We use similar shorthand for ∃x
when x is a tuple of variables.
We write Lx (T ) for the set of formulas in context x, modulo T -equivalence.
Exercise 17. Show that Lx (T ) has a natural Boolean algebra structure. In
fact, it is isomorphic to the quotient of the Boolean algebra L cx of formulas
modulo logical equivalence defined in Remark 3.3, by the filter consisting of all
(equivalence classes of) formulas ϕ(x) such that T |= ∀x ϕ(x) (see Exercise 9).
For any M |= T , the map ϕ(x) 7→ ϕ(M ) is a homomorphism Lx (T ) → P(M x ).
If T is complete, this homomorphism is injective.

46
 Having done the exercise, it will be clear to you that the logical operations
∧, ∨, and ¬ correspond to intersection, union, and complement of definable
sets in context x, respectively. The existential quantifier, on the other hand,
corresponds to coordinate projection. That is, for any model M , context x,
and new variable y, there is a coordinate projection map πx : M xy → M x ,
defined by (a1 , . . . , an , b) 7→ (a1 , . . . , an ). Then for any formula ϕ(x, y), we have
(∃y ϕ)(M ) = πx (ϕ(M )).
A partial type in context x is a set of formulas in context x. We say that
a partial type Σ(x) is realized by a ∈ M x , written M |= Σ(a) if M |= ϕ(a) for
all ϕ(x) ∈ Σ(x). We say that Σ(x) is satisfiable if it is realized in some model
M |= T . A (complete) type p(x) is a satisfiable partial type such that for
every formula ϕ(x) in context x, either ϕ(x) ∈ p(x), or ¬ϕ(x) ∈ p(x).
For any M |= T and any a ∈ M x , we define tp(a) = {ϕ(x) | M |= ϕ(a)}.
Then tp(a), the complete type of a is a complete type in context x.
Just like theories correspond to filters on the Boolean algebra L() of sen-
tences, and complete theories correspond to ultrafilters on this Boolean algebra,
partial types in context x correspond to filters on Lx (T ) and complete types
correspond to ultrafilters. The Stone space of ultrafilters on Lx (T ), called the
type space in context x, is denoted Sx (T ).
Proposition 5.1 (Compactness for partial types). Let Σ(x) be a partial type
such that every finite subset Σ0 (x) ⊆fin Σ(x) is satisfiable (we say Σ(x) is
finitely satisfiable). Then Σ(x) is satisfiable.
Proof. If x = (x1 , . . . , xn ), where xi has type si , let V 0 = V ∪ {c1 , . . . , cn }, where
ci is a new constant symbol with type si . Let T 0 be the V 0 -theory T ∪Σ(c) (where
Σ(c) is obtained by replacing the variable xi by ci in all formulas in Σ(x)). By
hypothesis, every finite subset of T 0 is satisfiable: For any Σ0 (x) ⊆fin Σ(x),
if N |= T and N |= Σ0 (a), then letting N 0 be the expansion of N in which
0
cNi = ai , we have N 0 |= T ∪ Σ0 (c). By compactness, there exists M 0 |= T 0 .
0
0
Letting ai = cM i , we have M |= Σ(a).

A T -definable set is just a T -equivalence class of formulas. Given T -

definable sets X and Y , defined by ϕX (x) and ϕY (y) respectively, a T -definable
function f : X → Y is a T -equivalence class of formulas ϕf (x, y)16 such that

T |= ∀x∀y (ϕf (x, y) → (ϕX (x) ∧ ϕY (y)))

T |= ∀x (ϕX (x) → ∃! y ϕf (x, y))

where ∃! y ϕ(x, y) (read “there exists a unique y”) is shorthand for

∃y (ϕ(x, y) ∧ ∀z(ϕ(x, z) → z = y)).

In other words, a definable function is a definable set which is the graph of a

function when evaluated in any model of T .
16 Formally, if there is any overlap between the variables x and y, we should replace y by a

fresh tuple y 0 with the same types. But let’s agree to gloss over this an similar issues.

47
 Example 5.2. For any term t(x) of type s in context x, the evaluation function
tM is defined by the formula t(x) = y. The domain of this function is defined
by > (in context x), and the codomain is defined by > (in context y).
But not every definable function is given by a term. For example, let T
be the theory of fields. Let X be the set of nonzero elements (defined by the
formula x 6= 0). Then the multiplicative inverse function X → X is definable
by the formula x · y = 1.
Note that we can compose definable functions: If f : X → Y and g : Y → Z
are definable functions, then g◦f : X → Z is definable by ∃y (ϕf (x, y)∧ϕg (y, z)).
And for any definable set X inVcontext x1 , . . . , xn , we have the identity function
n
X → X, defined by ϕX (x) ∧ i=1 (xi = yi ).
Now we have some nice categorical structure associated to any theory T :
• The category Def(T ), whose objects are T -definable sets and whose mor-
phisms are T -definable functions.
• The category Mod(T ), whose objects are models of T and whose mor-
phisms are elementary embeddings.
• A functor Eval : Def(T ) × Mod(T ) → Set, whose action on objects is given
by (ϕ(x), M ) 7→ ϕ(M ).
Exercise 18. Define the action of Eval on morphisms, and check that it is a
functor.

Tuesday 10/9 We also want to consider definable sets, definable functions, and types with
parameters. Given a set A ⊆ M , recall that V(A) is the vocabulary obtained
from V by adding a new constant symbol for every element of A. And we
can view a formula like ϕ(x; b), where b is a tuple from A, as an ordinary
V(A)-formula. Thus blurring the distinction between constant symbols and
parameters, we can simply repeat the definitions above, replacing T by T (A) =
ThV(A) (M ). Note that T (A) is always complete.
• An A-definable set is just a T (A)-definable set.
• An A-definable function is just a T (A)-definable function.

• We write Lx (A) for the Boolean algebra of A-definable sets in context x.

• We write Sx (A) for the Stone space of Lx (A), the type space over A in
context x.
• For any a ∈ M x , define tp(a/A) = {ϕ(x) ∈ Lx (A) | M |= ϕ(a)}, the
complete type of a over A.
Proposition 5.3 (Realizing types). Suppose A ⊆ M and p(x) ∈ Sx (A). Then
p(x) is realized in some elementary extension of M .

48
Proof. By definition, p(x) is satisfiable in a model N of T (A) = ThV(A) (M ), i.e.
there is a tuple b in N x such that N |= T (A) ∪ p(b). It suffices to replace T (A)
by EDiag(M ) = ThV(M ) (M ).
So in the vocabulary V(M ), consider the partial type EDiag(M ) ∪ p(x). We
seek to show that this partial type is finitely satisfiable. Since EDiag(M ) and
p(x) are both closed under conjunction, it suffices to consider a single formula in
EDiag(M ) and a single formula in p(x). We write these as ψ(a, m) and ϕ(a, x),
respectively, assuming that a is a tuple enumerating all elements of A that are
mentioned in either formula, and m is a tuple enumerating those elements of
M \ A mentioned in ψ.
Now since M |= ψ(a, m), ∃y ψ(a, y) ∈ T (A). So N |= ∃y ψ(a, y). Letting n ∈
N y be witnesses for the existential quantifiers, and letting N 0 be the expansion
0
of N to a V(M )-structure by interpreting mN i = ni and the rest of the constants
arbitrarily (whenever a constant c has type s, ∃x > ∈ T (A) when x has type
s, so Ns is nonempty), we have that N 0 |= ψ(a, m) ∧ ϕ(a, b). By compactness,
EDiag(M ) ∪ p(x) is satisfiable, as was to be shown.
Example 5.4. We can now see how classical algebraic geometry is closely re-
lated to the model theory of algebraically closed fields. An affine variety V is
defined by a set of of polynomials {p1 (x1 , . . . , xn ), . . . , pk (x1 , . . . , xn )}. If the
coefficients of the pi come from a field k, we say the variety is defined over k.
Then for any algebraically closed field extension F of k, the set of F -points of
V is

V (F ) = {(a1 , . . . , an ) ∈ F n | pi (a1 , . . . , an ) = 0 for all 1 ≤ i ≤ k}.

Of
Vk course, this is just a definable set with parameters from k, defined by
i=1 pi (x1 , . . . , xn ) = 0. The fact that we can consider the F -points of V for
various fields F corresponds to the ability to evaluate definable sets in various
models (as long as they extend the field of definition k).
Similarly, a morphism of affine varieties V → W is given by a polynomial in
each coordinate, modulo agreement on all points of V . Every such morphism is
exactly a definable function between the corresponding definable sets.
We will see later, as a consequence of quantifier elimination for ACFp , that
all embeddings of algebraically closed fields are elementary embeddings, all de-
finable sets are Boolean combinations of zero-sets of polynomials (these are
called constructible sets in the Zariski topology), and all definable functions
between definable sets are rational maps (also allowing pth roots in the case of
characteristic p).

5.2 Syntactic classes of formulas and equivalence

We now identify some syntactic classes of formulas that we will be particularly
interested in. For all n ∈ ω, we define the classes of ∃n -formulas (also called
Σn ) and ∀n -formulas (also called Πn ).

49
 • A quantifier-free formula is a formula which contains no quantifiers.
We define both the class of ∃0 -formulas and the class of ∀0 -formulas to
consist of the quantifier-free formulas.
• The ∃n+1 -formulas are the smallest class containing the ∀n -formulas and
closed under the formula-building operations ∧, ∨, and ∃ (no ¬ or ∀).
• The ∀n+1 -formulas are the smallest class containing the ∃n -formulas and
closed under the formula-building operations ∧, ∨, and ∀ (no ¬ or ∃).
So the number n counts the quantifier complexity in the sense of the number
of alternations of types of quantifiers in building up the formula. We will be par-
ticularly interested in the ∃n -formulas and ∀n -formulas when n ≤ 2: We often
call ∃1 -formulas simply ∃-formulas or existential formulas, ∀1 -formulas sim-
ply ∀-formulas or universal formulas, and ∀2 -formulas simply ∀∃-formulas.
Note that we have ∃n ⊆ ∀n+1 and ∀n ⊆ ∃n+1 for all n ∈ ω, each class ∃n
and ∀n contains > and ⊥ and is closed under ∧ and ∨, and (by induction), the
negation of an ∃n -formula is logically equivalent to a ∀n -formula and vice versa.
Exercise 19. Show that every quantifier-free formula ϕ(x) is logically equiva-
lent to a formula in disjunctive normal form:
 
_n mi
^
 χij (x) ,
i=1 j=1

where each χij (x) is atomic or negated atomic. This is really an exercise about
Boolean algebra, using de Morgan’s laws and distributivity.
Our goal in this section is to understand when a formula or partial type is
T -equivalent one in a nice syntactic form like those above.
Lemma 5.5. Let n ≥ 1. Let p(x) and q(x) be complete types, and suppose that
every ∃n -formula in p(x) is in q(x). Then if M |= p(a), there exists a structure
N and an embedding h : M → N which preserves ∃n -formulas and such that
N |= q(h(a)).
Proof. Consider the V(M )-theory Diag∃n (M ) ∪ q(a), where Diag∃n (M ) is the
set of all ∃n V(M )-sentences true in M . It suffices to show that this theory is
consistent.
By compactness, and since Diag∃n (M ) is closed under conjunction, it suf-
fices to show that for any formula ψ(a, m) ∈ Diag∃n (M ), the V(M )-theory
{ψ(a, m)} ∪ q(a) is consistent. Here the constants m are those which appear in
ψ but not in the tuple a.
Since M |= ∃y ψ(a, y) and p(x) is complete, ∃y ψ(x, y) ∈ p(x). And this
formula is ∃n , so it is in q(x). Then for any realization of q(x), M 0 |= q(a0 ), there
is some m0 ∈ M 0 such that M 0 |= ψ(a0 , m0 ). So M 0 witnesses that {ψ(a, m)} ∪
q(a) is consistent, interpreting the constants a as a0 , m as m0 , and the remaining
constants naming elements of M arbitrarily (here we use the fact that when a

50
 sort Ms is nonempty, the ∃1 -formula ∃z > ∈ p(x) where z has type s, so it is
also in q(x), and it follows that Ms0 is nonempty).
Let’s extend some terminology from formulas to partial types (and hence
also to theories, which are partial types in the empty context). Partial types
Σ(x) and Σ0 (x) are T -equivalent if for every model M |= T and every a ∈ M x ,
M |= Σ(a) if and only if M |= Σ0 (a). T
Given a partial type Σ(x), we define [Σ(x)] = ψ(x)∈Σ(x) [ψ(x)] = {p(x) ∈
Sx (T ) | Σ(x) ⊆ p(x)}. This is a closed set in Sx (T ). We also have that Σ(x)
and Σ0 (x) are T -equivalent if and only if [Σ(x)] = [Σ0 (x)]. Indeed, there is a
tuple satisfying Σ(x) but not Σ0 (x) if and only if there is a complete type in
[Σ(x)] but not in [Σ0 (x)].
Let p(x) and q(x) be complete types. A formula ϕ(x) separates p from q if
ϕ(x) ∈ p(x) and ϕ(x) ∈ / q(x). Note that this notion is not symmetric in p and
q, but ϕ(x) separates p from q if and only if ¬ϕ(x) separates q from p.

Lemma 5.6 (Separation lemma for partial types). Suppose ∆ is a class of for-
mulas in context x which contains ⊥ and is closed under ∨, up to T -equivalence.
Let Σ(x) be a partial type, such that for any complete types p and q such that
Σ(x) ⊆ p and Σ(x) 6⊆ q, there is a ∆-formula which separates p from q. Then
Σ(x) is T -equivalent to a set of ∆-formulas.

Proof. Fix a type q ∈ / [Σ(x)]. For any p ∈ [Σ(x)], there is some

S ψp (x) ∈ ∆ such
that p ∈ [ψp (x)] and q ∈ / [ψp (x)]. It follows that [Σ(x)] ⊆ p∈[Σ(x)] [ψp (x)]. By
compactness
Sn ([Σ(x)] is closed,
Wn hence compact), Wn this cover has a finite subcover
[Σ(x)] ⊆ i=1 [ψpi (x)] = [ i=1 ψpi (x)], and i=1 ψpi (x) is T -equivalent to some
formula χq (x) ∈ ∆. In the case that the disjunction is empty, χq (x) is ⊥.
Now we have [Σ(x)] ⊆ [χq (x)] and q ∈ [¬χq (x)] T for all q ∈ / [Σ(x)]. So letting
Σ0 (x) = {χq (x) | q ∈
/ [Σ(x)]}, we have [Σ(x)] = q∈[Σ(x)]
/ [χq (x)] = [Σ0 (x)].

The proof above used topological compactness in the type space Sx (T ). It is

also possible to rewrite the
S proof purely in terms of formulas. For example, the
assertion that [Σ(x)] ⊆ p∈[ϕ(x)] [ψp (x)] is equivalent to saying that the partial
type T ∪ Σ(x) ∪ {¬ψp (x) | ϕ(x) ∈ p(x)} is inconsistent. By compactness, there
are finitely many p1 , . . . , pn such that T ∪ Σ(x) ∪ {¬ψpi (x) | 1 S
≤ i ≤ n} is
n
inconsistent, which is equivalent to our conclusion that Σ(x) ⊆ i=1 [ψpi (x)].
But topological intuition can be very helpful in discovering proofs like these, i.e.
in seeing exactly how to apply compactness.

Thursday Lemma 5.7. Suppose a formula ϕ(x) is T -equivalent to a partial type Σ(x).
10/11 Vn many formulas ψ1 (x), . . . , ψn (x) ∈ Σ(x) such that ϕ(x)
Then there exist finitely
is T -equivalent to i=1 ψi (x).
T S
Proof. Since [ϕ(x)] = [Σ(x)] = ψ(x)∈Σ(x) [ψ(x)], [¬ϕ(x)] = ψ(x)∈Σ(x) [¬ψ(x)].
Sn
By
Tn compactness, Vnpicking a finite subcover, [¬ϕ(x)] = i=1 [¬ψi (x)], so [ϕ(x)] =
i=1 [ψi (x)] = [ i=1 ψi (x)].

51
Corollary 5.8 (Separation lemma for formulas). Suppose ∆ is a class of for-
mulas in context x which contains > and ⊥ and is closed under ∧ and ∨, up to
T -equivalence. Let ϕ(x) be a formula, such that for any complete types p and q
such that ϕ(x) ∈ p and ϕ(x) ∈ / q, there is a ∆-formula which separates p from
q. Then ϕ(x) is T -equivalent to a ∆-formula.

Proof. Applying Lemma 5.6 to the partial type {ϕ(x)}, we find that ϕ(x) is
T -equivalent
Vn to a set Σ(x) of ∆-formulas. By Lemma 5.7, ϕ(x) is T -equivalent
to i=1 ψi (x), where each ψi (x) ∈ Σ(x). Since ∆ contains > and is closed under
∧ up to T -equivalence, ϕ(x) is T -equivalent to a ∆-formula.

5.3 Up and down: ∃-formulas and ∀-formulas

Proposition 5.9. Embeddings preserve ∃-formulas.
Proof. Let h : M → N be an embedding. We argue that h preserves ϕ(x) by
induction on the complexity of the construction of ϕ(x) as an ∃-formula.
In the base case, h preserves quantifier-free formulas, and the induction steps
for ∧ and ∨ are easy. So it suffices to consider the case when ϕ(x) is ∃y ψ(x, y),
and by induction h preserves ψ(x, y). If M |= ϕ(a), then there is some b ∈ M y
such that M |= ψ(a, b). Then N |= ψ(h(a), h(b)), so N |= ϕ(h(a)).
A partial type Σ(x) is a partial ∃n -type when every formula in it is a ∃n -
formula. We use the same terminology for partial ∀n -types, ∃n -theories, and
∀n -theories.
Theorem 5.10. A partial type Σ(x) is preserved by embeddings between models
of T if and only if it is T -equivalent to a partial ∃-type.
Proof. One direction is immediate from Proposition 5.9. For the converse,
we appeal to Lemma 5.6. Let p(x) and q(x) be complete types such that
Σ(x) ⊆ p(x) and Σ(x) 6⊆ q(x). Suppose for contradiction that there is no ∃-
formula separating p(x) from q(x). Then every ∃-formula in p(x) is in q(x). By
Lemma 5.5, picking a realization M |= p(a), there is an embedding h : M → N
such that N |= q(h(a)).
But then M |= Σ(a), and Σ(x) is preserved by embeddings, so N |= Σ(h(a)).
Since also N |= q(h(a)) and q(x) is complete, Σ(x) ⊆ q(x). This is a contradic-
tion.
Theorem 5.11. A partial type Σ(x) is reflected by embeddings between models
of T if and only if it is T -equivalent to a partial ∀-type.
Proof. Proposition 5.9 implies that embeddings reflect ∀-formulas, since these
are exactly the negations of ∃-formulas. So again, one direction of the theorem
is immediate.
For the converse, we again appeal to Lemma 5.6. Let p(x) and q(x) be com-
plete types such that Σ(x) ⊆ p(x) and Σ(x) 6⊆ q(x). Suppose for contradiction
that there is no ∀-formula separating p(x) from q(x). Then every ∀-formula in

52
p(x) is in q(x). Turning this around, every ∃-formula in q(x) is in p(x), since p
and q are complete. By Lemma 5.5, picking a realization M |= q(a), there is an
embedding h : M → N such that N |= p(h(a)).
But then N |= Σ(h(a)), and Σ(x) is reflected by embeddings, so M |=
Σ(a). Since also N |= q(a) and q(x) is complete, Σ(x) ⊆ q(x). This is a
contradiction.
It follows immediately from Lemma 5.7 that a formula is preserved (re-
spectively, reflected) by embeddings between models of T if and only if it is
T -equivalent to an ∃-formula (respectively, a ∀-formula).
Here are some more variants of the results above.
Exercise 20. Let T be any theory.
(a) The class of models of T is closed under substructure if and only if T is
equivalent to a ∀ theory.
(b) Let T∀ be the set of universal consequences of T . Then the class of models
of T∀ is exactly the class of substructures of models of T .
As an example of Exercise 20(a), the theory of groups in the vocabulary
(·, e,−1 ) is axiomatizable by universal sentences, and indeed the class of groups
is closed under substructure. It is also possible to axiomatize groups in the
vocabulary (·), but this time universal sentences do not suffice, e.g. we need an
axiom like ∃x ∀y (x · y = y ∧ y · x = y). And indeed, in this vocabulary there are
substructure of groups which are not subgroups, e.g. (N, +) is a substructure of
(Z, +).
As an example of Exercise 20(b), Letting T = ACF, T∀ is equivalent to the
theory of integral domains.
Exercise 21. A formula is positive quantifier-free if it is built up from
atomic formulas by >, ⊥, ∧, and ∨ (no quantifiers or negation). A ∃+ -formula,
also called a positive existential formula, is built up from positive quantifier-
free formulas by ∧, ∨, and ∃. Show that a formula ϕ(x) is preserved by homo-
morphisms between models of T if and only if it is T -equivalent to a ∃+ -formula.
Which formulas are reflected by homomorphisms between models of T ?

5.4 Directed colimits: ∀∃ formulas

A poset (I, ≤) is directed if it is nonempty, and for all i, j ∈ I there exists
k ∈ I such that i ≤ k and j ≤ k. A directed system, indexed by the directed
poset (I, ≤), is a family of V-structures (Mi )i∈I and a family of homomorphisms
fij : Mi → Mj for all i ≤ j in I, such that fii is the identity map on Mi for all
i ∈ I, and if i ≤ j and j ≤ k, then fjk ◦ fij = fik . That is, it is (the image
of) a functor from the poset (I, ≤) (viewed as a category) to the category of
V-structures and homomorphisms.
A chain is a directed system indexed by the poset (ω, ≤):

M 0 → M1 → M2 → . . .

53
 Given a directed system (Mi )i∈I (we usually omit the fij from the notation),
we define the directed colimit M = lim Mi .
−→ F
The domain is the quotient of the disjoint union i∈I Mi by the following
equivalence relation: If a ∈ Mi and b ∈ Mj , then a ∼ b if and only if there
is some i ≤ k and j ≤ k such that fik (a) = fjk (b). Directedness of (I, ≤) is
used in checking transitivity of this relation. For each i ∈ I, there is a map
σi : Mi → M , sending a to its equivalence class.
For each function symbol f ∈ F and each possible input tuple b = (b1 , . . . , bn )
from M , by directedness there is some i ∈ I such that b is in the image of σi ,
so bj = σi (aj ) for all 1 ≤ j ≤ n. Define f M (b1 , . . . , bn ) = σi (f Mi (a1 , . . . , an )).
Similarly, for each relation symbol R ∈ R and each possible tuple b =
(b1 , . . . , bn ) from M , set (b1 , . . . , bn ) ∈ RM if and only if there exists i ∈ I and
(a1 , . . . , an ) ∈ RMi such that bj = σi (aj ) for all 1 ≤ j ≤ n.
Exercise 22. Check that:
(a) lim Mi is well-defined as a V-structure.
−→
(b) Each map σi is a homomorphism.
(c) If each map fij is an embedding, then each map σi is an embedding.
(d) lim Mi satisfies the universal property of the colimit: Given a structure N
−→
and a homomorphism hi : Mi → N for all i ∈ I, such that hj ◦ fij = hi
whenever i ≤ j, there is a unique homomorphism h : lim Mi → N such that
−→
h ◦ σi = hi for all i ∈ I. And if all the maps fij and hi are embeddings,
then h is an embedding. That is, our definition of lim Mi gives the colimit
−→
in the category of V-structures and homomorphisms, and in the category of
V-structures and embeddings.

Tuesday 10/16 A directed colimit along a chain is called a chain colimit. If each map
fij is an (elementary) embedding, we say that lim Mi is a directed colimit
−→
along (elementary) embeddings. The directed colimit S of a directed system
(Mi )i∈I along embeddings can essentially be thought of as i∈I Mi , if we think
of each embedding fij as an inclusion.
Example 5.12. Every V-structure M is the directed colimit of its finitely gen-
erated substrutures. Here the directed system has objects {hAi | A ⊆fin M }
and embeddings all the inclusions hAi ⊆ hBi.
Proposition 5.13. If M = lim Mi is a directed colimit along elementary em-
−→
beddings, then each map σi is an elementary embedding.

Proof. Let ϕ(x) be a formula. We show by induction on the complexity of ϕ(x)

that for all i ∈ I and all a ∈ Mix , Mi |= ϕ(a) if and only if M |= ϕ(σi (a)).
By Exercise 22, each map σi : Mi → M is an embedding, so it preserves and
reflects atomic formulas. This handles the base case. The inductive steps for
Boolean combinations are easy.

54
 So we consider the case when ϕ(x) is ∃y ψ(x, y). Suppose Mi |= ∃ϕ(a). Let-
ting b witness the quantifier, Mi |= ψ(a, b), so M |= ψ(σi (a), σi (b)) by induction,
and M |= ϕ(σi (a)).
Conversely, suppose M |= ϕ(σi (a)). Letting b witness the quantifier, there
is some j ∈ I and some b0 ∈ Mj such that b = σj (b0 ). By directedness, we
may assume that j ≥ i. Then M |= ψ(σj (fij (a)), σj (b0 )), and by induction
Mj |= ψ(fij (a), b0 ), so Mj |= ϕ(fij (a)). But fij is an elementary embedding, so
Mi |= ϕ(a).
We say that a formula ϕ(x) is preserved in the directed colimit M =
lim Mi if for all i ∈ I, and all a ∈ Mix , if Mj |= ϕ(fij (a)) for all j ≥ i, then
−→
M |= ϕ(σi (a)).
Proposition 5.14. Directed colimits along embeddings preserve ∀∃-formulas.
Proof. Let ϕ(x) be a ∀∃-formula, and let M = lim Mi be a directed colimit along
−→
embeddings. We show by induction on the construction of ϕ(x) as a ∀∃-formula
that it is preserved in the directed colimit.
In the base case, when ϕ(x) is an ∃-formula, if Mi |= ϕ(a), then M |=
ϕ(σi (a)) by Proposition 5.9, since σi is an embedding.
The inductive steps for ∧ and ∨ are easy. So we consider the case when
ϕ(x) is ∀y ψ(x, y). We assume that Mj |= ϕ(fij (a)) for all j ≥ i. To show that
M |= ϕ(σi (a)), let b ∈ M y . Then there is some j ∈ I and some b0 ∈ Mj such
that b = σj (b0 ). By directedness, we may assume that j ≥ i. Now for all k ≥ j,
Mk |= ∀y ψ(fik (a), y), so Mk |= ψ(fjk (fij (a)), fjk (b0 )). By induction, M |=
ψ(σj (fij (a)), σj (b0 )), so M |= ψ(σi (a), b). Since b was arbitrary, M |= ϕ(σi (a)),
as desired.
Theorem 5.15. Let Σ(x) be a partial type. The following are equivalent:
(1) Σ(x) is preserved by directed colimits of models of T along embeddings.
(2) Σ(x) is preserved by chain colimits of models of T along of embeddings.
(3) Σ(x) is T -equivalent to a partial ∀∃-type.
Proof. (3)⇒(1) is immediate from Proposition 5.14.
(1)⇒(2) is trivial, since chain colimits are special kinds of directed colimits.
(3)⇒(1): We use Lemma 5.6. Let p(x) and q(x) be complete types such
that Σ(x) ⊆ p(x) and Σ(x) 6⊆ q(x). Suppose for contradiction that there is no
∀2 -formula separating p(x) from q(x). Then every ∀2 -formula in p(x) is in q(x).
Turning this around, every ∃2 -formula in q(x) is in p(x).
Pick an arbitrary realization of q(x): Let M0 |= T and a ∈ M0x such that
M0 |= q(a). By Lemma 5.5, there exists a structure N0 and an embedding
h0 : M0 → N0 which preserves ∃2 -formulas and such that N0 |= p(h0 (a)). In
particular, h preserves ∀1 -formulas and reflects ∃1 -formulas.
Now view N0 as a V(M0 )-structure by interpreting each constant symbol
m as h0 (M ). Then ThV(M0 ) (N0 ) and EDiag(M0 ) are complete theories (com-
plete types in the empty context), and every ∃1 -sentence in ThV(M0 ) (N0 ) is in

55
 EDiag(M0 ), since h reflects ∃1 -formulas. By Lemma 5.5 again, there is a model
M1 |= EDiag(M0 ) and an embedding h00 : N0 → M1 .
Since M1 |= EDiag(M0 ), the interpretation of the constants defines an el-
ementary embedding M0 → M1 (we assume for simplicity that M1 is an el-
ementary extension of M0 ). Since h00 is an V(M0 )-embedding, the diagram
commutes:
= N0
h0 h00

!
M0 / M1


Since M0  M1 , M1 |= q(a), and we can repeat the construction. By

induction, we obtain the following commutative diagram:

h1 ◦h00 h2 ◦h01
/ N1 / ···
= N0 = = NO ω
h0 h00 h1 h01 h2

! ! 
M0 / M1 / M2 / ··· Mω
 

Let Mω = limi∈ω Mi and Nω = limi∈ω Ni . The map h : Mω → Nω induced by

−→ −→
the hi and the map h0 : Nω → Mω induced by the h0i are inverses, so Mω ∼= Nω .
Since Mω is a directed colimit along elementary embeddings, M0  Mω . In
particular, Mω |= T (so also Nω |= T ), and Mω |= q(a).
Since N0 |= Σ(h0 (a)) and Σ(x) is preserved by chain colimits of models of T
along embeddings, Nω |= Σ(h(a)). But h is an isomorphism, so also Mω |= Σ(a),
and since q(x) is complete, Σ(x) ⊆ q(x). This is a contradiction.
Just as in Exercise 20, the class of models of a theory T is closed under
directed colimits if and only if T is equivalent to a ∀∃-theory. And it follows
immediately from Lemma 5.7 that a formula is preserved by directed colimits of
models of T along embeddings if and only if it is T -equivalent to a ∀∃-formula.
Thursday We conclude this section with a nice application (which only uses the “easy
10/18 direction” Proposition 5.14, not the full strength of Theorem 5.15).
Theorem 5.16 (Ax–Grothendieck). Any injective polynomial map Cn → Cn
is surjective.
In fact, we will prove a stronger theorem and derive the Ax–Grothendieck
theorem as a corollary.
Theorem 5.17. Let ϕ be a ∀∃-sentence in the language of rings which is true
in every finite field. Then ϕ is true in every algebraically closed field.
Proof. Fix a prime number p, and let K = Fp , the algebraic closure of the
prime field Fp . Then K is the directed colimit of its finitely generated substruc-
tures, which are all finite fields, using the fact that a finitely generated algebraic
extension of Fp is finite.

56
 More explicitly, K = lim(Fpn )n>0 , where the index set {n ∈ ω | n > 0} is
−→
not ordered by the usual order ≤, but rather by the divisibility order |.
Now we assumed that ϕ is true in every finite field, and since it is ∀∃, it is
preserved in directed colimits, so K |= ϕ, and by completeness, ACFp |= ϕ.
We have shown that ϕ holds in all algebraically closed fields of finite charac-
teristic. It follows that it holds in all algebraically closed fields of characteristic
0 by the transfer theorem, Corollary 4.20.
Proof of Theorem 5.16. To say that f : Cn → Cn is a polynomial map is to
say that f is given by n polynomials (pi )ni=1 , with each pi ∈ C[x1 , . . . , xn ], and
f (a1 , . . . , an ) = (p1 (a1 , . . . , an ), . . . , pn (a1 , . . . , an )).
Now for each degree d, we can express the statement of the theorem, re-
stricted to polynomials of degree at most d, by the following sentence ϕd :

∀f (∀x ∀x0 ((f (x) = f (x0 )) → (x = x0 )) → ∀y ∃x (f (x) = y))

There are a few things to explain here.
(1) The quantifier ∀f means to quantify over all systems of n polynomials in n
variables of degree at most d, which means to quantify over the coefficients
of these polynomials. So really we have n(d + 1) quantifiers, over variables
(aji )1≤i≤n,0≤j≤d , which specify polynomials pi = a0i + a1i x + · · · + adi xd for
1 ≤ i ≤ n.
(2) Similarly, the quantifiers over x, x0 and y are over n-tuples, e.g. x =
(xi )1≤i≤n .
(3) The formulas f (x) = f (x0 ), x = x0 , and V
f (x) = y are really conjunctions of
n
n atomic formulas, e.g. f (x) = f (x0 ) is i=1 (pi (x) = pi (x0 )).
(4) ϕd is logically equivalent to a ∀∃-sentence. We have to be slightly careful
about the presence of →, because ϕ → ψ is shorthand for ¬ϕ ∨ ψ, and ¬ is
not allowed in the construction of ∀∃-formulas. But we can rewrite ϕd as
the logically equivalent ∀∃-sentence:
∀f (∃x ∃x0 ¬((f (x) = f (x0 )) → (x = x0 )) ∨ ∀y ∃x (f (x) = y)).

Now for all d and any finite field F , we have F |= ϕd , since an injective map
from a finite set to itself is always surjective. By Theorem 5.17, C |= ϕd for all
d, as desired.
Exercise 23. (a) The converse of the Ax–Grothendieck theorem fails: x 7→ x2
is a surjective but not injective polynomial map C → C. Where exactly
does the proof go wrong?
(b) Prove the following strengthening of Ax–Grothendieck: Let V ⊆ Cn be
an algebraic set (an algebraic set is the set of zeros of a finite family of
polynomials, i.e. V = {a ∈ Cn | qi (a) = 0 for all 1 ≤ i ≤ k}, where
qi ∈ C[x1 , . . . , xn ] for all 1 ≤ i ≤ k). Then any injective polynomial map
V → V is surjective.

57
 6 Quantifier elimination
6.1 Fraı̈ssé limits
Tuesday 10/23 For simplicity, we will restrict our attention to single-sorted finite relational
vocabularies V (relational means there are no function symbols or constant
symbols). Most of Fraı̈ssé theory works without these restrictions, and in even
more general contexts. But I think it’s best at the beginning to avoid the
technicalities that arise.
These restrictions have two main consequences for us. First, any subset of a
V-structure is the domain of an induced substructure (there’s no need to close
under the interpretations of function symbols). Second, for n ∈ ω, there are
only finitely many V-structures of size n up to isomorphism, and there are only
countably many finite V-structures up to isomorphism.
Given a structure M , we denote by age(M ) the class of all finite structures
which embed in M (equivalently, which are isomorphic to substructures of M ).
This terminology and extensions of it were introduced by Fraı̈ssé. For example,
Fraı̈ssé says that M is younger than N if age(M ) ⊆ age(N ).
Which classes K of finite structures occur as the age of some structure?
Fraı̈ssé identified the following necessary and sufficient conditions:
• (Isomorphism Closed) If A ∈ K and B ∼
= A, then B ∈ K.
• (Hereditary Property - HP) If A ∈ K and B is a substructure of A, then
B ∈ K.
• (Joint Embedding Property - JEP) For all A, B ∈ K, there exists C ∈ K
and embeddings f : A → C and g : B → C.

?C _
f g

A B

Proposition 6.1. For a class K of finite structures, the following are equivalent:
(1) K = age(M ) for some structure M .
(2) K = age(M ) for some countable structure M .

(3) K is isomorphism closed and has HP and JEP.

Proof. (2)⇒(1) is trivial.
(1)⇒(3): Let M be any structure. The fact that age(M ) is isomorphism
closed and has HP is immediate from the definition: If f : A → M is an em-
bedding, and B is isomorphic to A or a substructure of A, then composing
with f gives an embedding B → M . For the JEP, suppose F : A → M and
G : A → M are embeddings. Let C be the substructure of M with domain

58
F (A)∪G(B). Then C ∈ age(M ) and F and G restrict to embeddings f : A → C
and g : B → C.
(3)⇒(2): Let K be a class of finite structures which is isomorphism closed
and has HP and JEP. Let (Ai )i∈ω be an enumeration of representatives for
the isomorphism classes in K (there are countably many, since we are in a
finite relational vocabulary). We define a chain (Bi )i∈ω of structures in K by
induction. Let B0 = A0 . Given Bi , use JEP to find a structure Bi+1 with
embeddings fi : Bi → Bi+1 and gi : Ai+1 → Bi+1 .

A0 = B 0
f0
/ f1
/ B2 f2
/ B3 f3
/ ...
: B1 > >
g0 g1 g2

A1 A2 A3 ...

Let M = lim Bi . Then K ⊆ age(M ), since every structure A in K is iso-

−→
morphic to Ai for some i ∈ ω, and Ai embeds in Bi , which embeds in M .
Conversely, suppose C ∈ age(M ), witnessed by h : C → M . Since C is finite,
h(C) is contained in σi (Bi ) for some i ∈ ω (where σi : Bi → M is the canonical
embedding), so C is isomorphic to a substructure of Bi , and hence is in K by
HP and isomorphism closure.
Of course, there may be many countable structures with the same age. For
example, any two countable linear orders have the same age, since there is a
unique (up to isomorphism) finite linear order of size n for each n ∈ ω.
Given a class of finite structures K, we say that a structure M is a Fraı̈ssé
limit of K if M if countable, age(M ) = K, and M is K-homogeneous: If
f : A → M and g : A → B are embeddings, with A, B ∈ K, then there exists an
embedding h : B → M such that f = h ◦ g.

A
f
/M
>
g
 h
B

Before tackling the question of the existence of the Fraı̈ssé limit M of K, we

will prove that it has the following pleasant properties:
1. It is unique up to isomorphism.

2. If N is any countable structure with age(N ) ⊆ K, then N embeds in M .

3. It is strongly K-homogeneous: Every isomorphism between finite sub-
structures of M in K extends to an automorphism of M .
Let’s pause to note that when age(M ) = K, strong K-homogeneity implies
K-homogeneity. If f : A → M and g : A → B are embeddings with A, B ∈ K,
then there is another embedding h0 : B → M , since B ∈ age(M ). Now there is

59
 an isomorphism σ : h0 (g(A)) → f (A) such that (σ◦h0 ◦g)(a) = f (a) for all a ∈ A,
and by strong K-homogeneity, this isomorphism extends to an automorphism
b : M → M . Then h = σ
σ b ◦ h0 is an embedding B → M such that h ◦ g = f .
σ ◦ h0 ◦ g)(a) = (σ ◦ h0 ◦ g)(a) = f (a).
Indeed, for all a ∈ A, (h ◦ g)(a) = (b
To warm up, we prove point 2 by going “forth”.

Proposition 6.2. Suppose M is a Fraı̈ssé limit of K. If N is any countable

structure with age(N ) ⊆ K, then N embeds in M .
Proof. Enumerate N as (ni )i∈ω , and let Ni be the induced substructure of N
with domain {nj | j ≤ i}. Since age(N ) ⊆ age(M ) = K, there is an embedding
f0 : N0 → M , and given an embedding fi : Ni → M , we can extend it to an
embedding fi+1 : Ni+1 → M by K-homogeneity. The union of the embeddings
(fi )i∈ω is an embedding N → M .
Now we prove points 1 and 3 by going “back-and-forth”.
Lemma 6.3. Suppose M and M 0 are Fraı̈ssé limits of K, A ⊆ M and A0 ⊆ M 0
are finite substructures, and f : A → A0 is an isomorphism. Then f extends to
an isomorphism fb: M → M 0 .

MO
fb
/ M0
O

A
f
/ A0

Proof. Enumerate M as (mi )i∈ω and M 0 as (m0i )i∈ω . Let M0 = A, M00 = A0 ,

and f0 = f . We will build a sequence of isomorphisms fi : Mi → Mi0 such that fi
extends fj when j ≤ i, Mi contains {mj | j < i}, and Mi0 contains {m0j | j < i}.
Given fi : Mi → Mi0 , let Ni+1 be the induced substructure of M with domain
Mi ∪{mi }. Viewing fi as an embedding Mi → M 0 , use K-homogeneity to extend
it to an embedding Ni+1 → M 0 . Let Ni+1 0
be the image of this embedding, and
0
let gi+1 be the isomorphism Ni+1 → Ni+1 .
0
Now let Mi+1 be the induced substructure of M 0 with domain Ni+1
0
∪ {m0i }.
−1
Viewing gi+1 as an embedding Ni+1 to M , use K-homogeneity to extend it to
0
an embedding Mi+1 → M . Let Mi+1 be the image of this embedding, and let
0
fi+1 : Mi+1 → Mi+1 be the induced isomorphism.
Then the union of the isomorphisms (fi )i∈ω is an isomorphism M → M 0
extending f = f0 , as desired.
Thursday Corollary 6.4. If M is a Fraı̈ssé limit of K, then M is strongly K-homogeneous.
10/25
Proof. This is just Lemma 6.3, taking M = M 0 and f : A → A0 to be the
isomorphism between finite substructures.

Corollary 6.5. K has at most one Fraı̈ssé limit up to isomorphism.

60
Proof. Suppose M and M 0 are Fraı̈ssé limits of K. Again, we apply Lemma 6.3,
this time taking f : A → A0 to be the unique isomorphism between the empty
substructures of M and M 0 .
There is a slight point to be made here: since we allow 0-ary relation symbols,
i.e. proposition symbols, in our vocabulary, it is possible to have multiple non-
isomorphic V-structures. But a structure M has a unique empty structure, so
age(M ) contains a unique empty structure up to isomorphism (this also follows
directly from JEP). It follows that the empty substructures of M and M 0 are
isomorphic.
Thanks to this result, we typically refer to the Fraı̈ssé limit of a class K.
We now turn to existence. For K to admit a Fraı̈ssé limit, it must be at
least isomorphism closed with HP and JEP. We need one more necessary and
sufficient condition:
• (Amalgamation Property - AP) For all A, B, C in K and embeddings
f : A → B and g : A → C, there exists D ∈ K and embeddings f 0 : B → D
and g 0 : C → D such that f 0 ◦ f = g 0 ◦ g.

>D`
f0 g0

B` >C

f g

K is a Fraı̈ssé class if it is isomorphism closed and has HP, JEP, and AP.
Theorem 6.6. For a class K of finite structures, the following are equivalent:
(1) K has a Fraı̈ssé limit.
(2) K is a Fraı̈ssé class.
Proof. Suppose first that K has a Fraı̈ssé limit M . Then K = age(M ), so
it is isomorphism closed and has HP and JEP. For AP, let f : A → B and
g : A → C be embeddings between structures in K. Since B ∈ age(M ), there
is an embedding f 0 : B → M , and f 0 ◦ f : A → M is also an embedding. Using
K-homogeneity, there is an embedding g 0 : C → M such that g 0 ◦ g = f 0 ◦ f . We
conclude by taking D to be the substructure of M with domain f 0 (B) ∪ g 0 (C)
and restricting the codomains of f 0 and g 0 to D.
Conversely, suppose K is a Fraı̈ssé class. We will build a sequence (Bi ) of
structures in K and embeddings fi : Bi → Bi+1 by induction, modifying the
construction in Proposition 6.1 to ensure K-homogeneity.
Let (Ai )i∈ω be an enumeration of representatives for the isomorphism classes
in K. A task is either a structure Ai on the list or an embedding g : C → Ai ,
where Ai is some structure on the list and C is a substructure of some Bi in

61
our inductive construction. We will list the tasks by pairs in ω × ω. To start,
define task (i, 0) to be the structure Ai . We will define tasks (i, j) for j > 0
during stage i of the construction. Fix a bijection17 t : ω → ω × ω such that
t(0) = (0, 0) and t(n) = (m, m0 ) with m < n for all n > 0 (this ensures that task
t(n) has already been defined before stage n). We will accomplish task t(n) at
stage n of the construction.
At stage 0, let B0 = A0 . This completes task t(0) = (0, 0), by ensuring that
A0 embeds in B0 . See the general case below for how to define the tasks (0, j)
for j > 0.
At stage n, we are given Bn−1 and a task t(n). If this task is a structure
Ai , use JEP to embed Bn−1 and Ai into a structure Bn in K. On the other
hand, if the task is an embedding g : C → Ai , where C is a substructure of some
Bk with k < n, let f : C → Bn−1 be the embedding obtained by restricting
the embedding Bk → Bn−1 to C. Then use AP to embed Bn−1 and C into a
structure Bn in K in a way that makes the square over C commute.

BO k / ... / Bn
O

C / Ai

We finish stage n by defining the tasks (n, j) for j > 0. Enumerate the
embeddings gj : C → Ai , where C is a substructure of Bn and Ai is on our list
of isomorphism representatives. There are countably many such embeddings,
since Bn has finitely many finite substructures C, there are countably many of
the Ai , and for fixed C and Ai , there are finitely many embeddings C → Ai .
Define task (n, j) to be the embedding gj−1 .
After defining the entire sequence (Bn )n∈ω , we have also completed every
task. Let M = lim Bn . Then M is countable, since it is a directed colimit of
−→
finite structuers, and age(M ) = K exactly as in Proposition 6.1. It remains to
check K-homogeneity.
So suppose f : C → M and g : C → A are embeddings, with A, C ∈ K.
Then the image of C in M is contained in the image of some Bn , so f = σn ◦ f 0 ,
for some f 0 : C → Bn , where σn : Bn → M is the canonical embedding. After
composing with isomorphisms, we can safely assume that C is a substructure
of Bn and A is Ai for some i. So g : C → A was added as a task (n, j) = t(m)
for some j, and there is an embedding A → Bm making the square commute.
Composing with the canonical embedding σm : Bm → M finishes the proof.
Example 6.7. Here are some examples of Fraı̈ssé classes and their Fraı̈ssé limit.
• The class of finite graphs. The Fraı̈ssé limit is called the random graph
(or the Rado graph), which we will discuss further below.
17 The usual “diagonals” bijection, which enumerates ω × ω as (0, 0), (0, 1), (1, 0), (0, 2),

(1, 1), (2, 0),. . . works.

62
 • The class of finite triangle-free graphs. The Fraı̈ssé limit is called the
Henson graph.
• The class of finite linear orders. The Fraı̈ssé limit is the countable dense
linear order without endpoints (Q, <).
• The class of finite equivalence relations. The Fraı̈ssé limit is the equiva-
lence relation with countably infinitely many countably infinite classes.
Example 6.8. The simplest isomorphism-closed class of finite structures with
HP and JEP but not AP is the class of acyclic graphs, also known as forests18 .
Let A consist of two vertices x and y, not connected by an edge. Let B be A
together with a new vertex connecting x and y by a path of length 2. And let
C be A together with two new vertices conncting x and y by a path of length
3. Then B and C cannot be amalgamated over A.
When the vocabulary is finite, for any finite structure A, enumerated (ai )ni=1 ,
there is a quantifier-free formula θA (x1 , . . . , xn ) such that B |= θA (b1 , . . . , bn ) if
and only if the map ai 7→ bi is an embedding A → B. This formula is essentially
just the conjunction of all atomic formulas true in A (see Proposition 4.10).
Now if K is a Fraı̈ssé class, we can axiomatize the theory of Fraı̈ssé limits of
K as follows:
• ∀ axioms for K: For every finite structure A not in K, let χA be

∀x1 . . . ∀xn ¬θA (x1 , . . . , xn ).

• ∀∃ extension axioms: For every finite structure B in K enumerated (bi )ni=1

and every substructure A ⊆ B which is an initial segment in the enumer-
ation, (bi )m
i=1 for 0 ≤ m ≤ n, let ϕA,B be

∀x1 . . . ∀xm (θA (x1 , . . . , xm ) → ∃xm+1 . . . ∃xn θB (x1 , . . . , xn )).

We call TK , the set of all axioms of the above forms, the generic theory
of K. If M |= TK and M is countable, then M is a Fraı̈ssé limit of K.
• Since M |= χA for all A ∈ / K, no structure not in K embeds in M , so
age(M ) ⊆ K. The converse follows from K-homogeneity, since for any
structure B in K, the empty substructure of B is isomorphic to the empty
substructure of M (K contains a unique empty structure, by HP and JEP),
so B embeds in M over the empty structure.
• For K-homogeneity, suppose f : A → M and g : A → B are embeddings
with A and B in K. We may assume A is a substructure of B. Enumerate
B as (bi )ni=1 , ensuring that A is the initial segment (bi )m i=1 . Then M |=
θA (f (b1 ), . . . , f (bm )), and M |= ϕA,B , so there exists cm+1 , . . . , cn such
that M |= θB (f (b1 ), . . . , f (bm ), cm+1 , . . . , cn ). Extend f to a map B → M
by bi 7→ ci for all m < i ≤ n.
18 A tree is a connected acyclic graph, and a forest is a disjoint union of trees

63
 When K contains arbitrarily large finite structures, it follows that TK is
ℵ0 -categorical, and hence complete by Vaught’s test.
Tuesday 10/30 It is often possible to give a simpler axiomatization of TK than the one
described above. One simplification which is always possible is to assume in the
extension axiom ϕA,B that |B| = |A| + 1. We call such an axiom a one-point
extension axiom. Indeed, if M satisfies all one-point extension axioms, then
it is easy to show that it is K-homogeneous by induction on |B| − |A|, extending
an embedding of A into M to B one point at a time.
Here are some further examples of simplifications of TK .
Example 6.9. Let Klo be the class of finite linear orders. The universal part
of TKlo can be axiomatized by the theory of linear orders:
∀x∀y∀z ((x < y ∧ y < z) → x < z)
∀x∀y (x < y ∨ y < x ∨ x = y)
∀x ¬(x < x)
Indeed, if M satisfies the three sentences above, then already age(M ) ⊆ Klo .
The ∀∃ part of TKlo can be reduced to the following axioms:
∀x∃y x < y
∀x∃y y < x
∀x∀y(x < y → ∃z (x < z ∧ z < y))
Indeed, if M satisfies all six of the sentences above, then it satisfies all of the
one-point extension axioms. For any finite subset A ⊆ M and any embedding
A → B where |B| = |A| + 1, the new element in b is either greater than every
point in A, less than every point in A, or between two points of A, and one of
the three ∀∃-sentences above handles each of those cases.
Of course, this verifies that the Fraı̈ssé limit of Klo is the countable dense
linear order without endpoints.
Example 6.10. Let G be the class of finite graphs. The universal part of TG
can be axiomatized by the theory of graphs:
∀x ¬(xEx)
∀x∀y (xEy → yEx)
Indeed, if M satisfies the two sentences above, then already age(M ) ⊆ G.
The ∀∃ part of TG can be reduced to the following schema, one sentence
ϕm,n for every pair m, n ∈ ω:
  
^ ^ ^
∀x1 . . . ∀xm ∀y1 . . . ∀yn  xi 6= yj  → ∃z zExi ∧ ¬zEyj 
i,j 1≤i≤m 1≤j≤n

This is simpler than the general one-point extension axiom ϕA,B since we don’t
have to describe the graph structure on A = {x1 , . . . , xm , y1 , . . . , yn }, we just
need to know which elements of A the new element z connects to.

64
 In the case of linear orders, we have a concrete representative of the Fraı̈ssé
limit, namely (Q, <). The Fraı̈ssé limit of the class of finite graphs a bit more
complicated. However, there are several pleasant presentations of this structure.
Here are two of them:
• Consider the relation E on ω, defined by mEn if and only if n < m and
the binary expansion of m has a 1 in the nth position (the 2n place), or
m < n and the binary expansion of n has a 1 in the mth position (the 2m
place). Then (ω, E) is a Fraı̈ssé limit of G.
Indeed, E is a symmetric and irreflexive binary relation on ω, and given
any distinct numbers x1 , . . . , xm , y1 , . . . , yn ∈ ω, we can find a natural
number which is greater than all of these numbers and whose binary ex-
pansion ensures it is related to x1 , . . . , xm and not related to y1 , . . . , yn .
• Build a graph with domain ω at random as follows: For every pair {m, n}
with m 6= n, flip a coin and put an edge between n and m if it comes up
heads. That is, mEn and nEm holds with probability 1/2, independently
for all pairs {m, n}. This is called the Erdős–Rényi coin-flipping process.
Then, with probability 1, (ω, E) is a Fraı̈ssé limit of G. This is why the
Fraı̈ssé limit of G is called the random graph.
We can check this with a simple probabilistic argument. Consider a
fixed one-point extension axiom ϕm,n . Suppose we have distinct elements
x1 , . . . , xm , y1 , . . . , yn from ω. For any z not among these elements, the
probability that z is a witness for the extension axiom (i.e. z is connected
to the xi and not connected to the yj ) is exactly 2−(m+n) . And crucially,
the probabilities that z and z 0 are witnesses are independent. Since there
are infinitely many z not among the xi and yj , we have infinitely many in-
dependent chances to find a witness, each with positive probability. By the
Borel-Cantelli Lemma, we find infinitely many witnesses in ω with proba-
bility 1. Now there are countably many sequences of xi and yj , there are
countably many extension axioms, and the intersection of countably many
probability 1 events has probability 1. So (ω, E) |= TG with probability 1.
A variant of the probabilistic argument above gives a remarkable fact: the
first-order zero-one law for the class of finite graphs.
Let K be an isomorphism-closed class of finite structures which contains at
least one structure of size n for each n ∈ ω. Write K[n] for the set of structures
in K with domain [n] = {1, . . . , n}. We write
|{A ∈ K[n] | A |= ϕ}|
Pn (ϕ) =
|K[n] |
for the probability that a structure A in K[n] , selected uniformly at random,
satisfies ϕ. The asymptotic probability of ϕ is limn→∞ Pn (ϕ), if this limit
exists.
The almost-sure theory of K is the set of all sentences with asymptotic
probability 1. This is the set of first-order properties of structures in K that
hold of almost all large finite structures in K.

65
 Lemma 6.11. The almost-sure theory Tas of K is consistent and closed under
entailment.
Proof. We first show that Tas is closed under entailment. Suppose Tas |= θ.
Vk
Then there are finitely many sentences ψ1 , . . . , ψk ∈ Tas such that i=1 ψi |= θ.
Since each ψi has asymptotic probability 1, for any ε > 0, there is some N such
that for all n > N and all 1 ≤ i ≤ k,

Pn (ψi ) ≥ 1 − ε/k.
Vk Vk
Since Pn (¬ψi ) ≤ ε/k, we have Pn (¬ i=1 ψi ) ≤ ε. And since i=1 ψi |= θ, it
follows that !
k
^
Pn (θ) ≥ Pn ψi ≥ 1 − ε.
i=1

So limn→∞ Pn (θ) = 1, and θ ∈ Tas .

It follows that Tas is consistent. If not, then Tas |= ⊥, so ⊥ ∈ Tas , and
limn→∞ Pn (⊥) = 1, but Pn (⊥) = 0 for all n, which is a contradiction.
We say that K has a first-order zero-one law if for every sentence ϕ,

lim Pn (ϕ) = 0 or 1.
n→∞

Equivalently, K has a first-order zero-one law if and only if its almost-sure theory
is complete.
Thursday 11/1 Theorem 6.12. Let G be the class of all finite graphs. Then G has a first-order
zero-one law, and its almost-sure theory is equivalent to TG , the theory of the
random graph.
Proof. The proof has two components: a logical argument and a probabilistic
argument. We deal with the logical argument first.
Claim: It suffices to show that every one-point extension axiom ϕm,n has
asymptotic probability 1.
Let Tas be the almost-sure theory of G. Since the axioms of the theory of
graphs hold of all structures in G, these sentences have asymptotic probability 1.
Assuming also that every one-point extension axiom has asymptotic probability
1, we have TG ⊆ Tas . By Lemma 6.11, every consequence of TG is in Tas .
But since TG is complete and Tas is consistent, Tas must be equal to the set
of consequences of TG . So Tas is complete, and G has a first-order zero-one law.
Having established the claim, we fix a one-point extension axiom ϕm,n , and
let m + n = k. Observe that the uniform probability measure PN on G[N ]
agrees with the Erdős–Rényi coin-flipping process: for any {i, j} ⊆ [N ] with
i 6= j, exactly half of the graphs in G[N ] have iEj, and these probabilities are
independent between pairs.
Now fix some distinct x1 , . . . , xm , y1 , . . . , yn ∈ [N ]. The probability that
some z is a witness to the extension axiom ϕm,n for these xi and yj is 2−(m+n) .

66
Define δ = 2−(m+n) > 0. There are N − k possible witnesses z, and each is a
witness with probability δ, independently. So the probability that there is no
witness to the extension axiom over the xi and yj is (1 − δ)N −k . It follows that

PN (¬ϕm,n ) ≤ N k (1 − δ)N −k ,

since N k is an upper bound for the number of choices of the xi and yj .

Now when we compute limN →∞ PN (¬ϕm,n ), k is fixed and N grows, so the
polynomial N k is dominated by the exponential decay (1 − δ)N −k (since 1 − δ <
1), and limN →∞ PN (¬ϕm,n ) = 0. Hence, ϕm,n has asymptotic probability 1.
Example 6.13. To see the necessity of considering properties expressible by
first-order sentences, note that the following limit does not exist:

|{A ∈ K[n] | |A| is even}|

lim .
n→∞ |K[n] |

Indeed, the property “|A| is even” is not expressible by a first-order sentence

relative to the theory of graphs.
We have also seen that the property “A is connected” is not expressible by
a first-order sentence relative to the theory of graphs. However, the random
graph is connected with diameter 2, since it satisfies ∀x∀y∃z (xEz ∧ zEy). It
follows that this sentence is in the almost-sure theory of G: almost all large
finite graphs have diameter 2, so almost all large finite graphs are connected.
Exercise 24. Let K be the class of all finite V-structures, for any single-sorted
finite relational vocabulary V.
(a) Show that K is a Fraı̈ssé class, and axiomatize its generic theory TK .
(b) Show that K has a first-order zero-one law, and its almost-sure theory is TK
(the argument will be very similar to the argument for the random graph).
When there are function symbols in the language, we typically do not have
a first-order zero-one law, as the following exercise demonstrates.
Exercise 25. Let V be the vocabulary with a single unary function symbol f .
Let K be the class of all finite V structures. Let ϕ be the sentence ∀x (f (x) 6= x).
Show that
1
lim Pn (ϕ) = .
n→∞ e
Example 6.14. Let G4 be the class of all finite triangle-free graphs. Erdős,
Kleitman, and Rothschild showed that almost all triangle-free graphs are bipar-
tite, i.e.
|{A ∈ (G4 )[n] | A is bipartite}|
lim = 1.
n→∞ |(G4 )[n] |
Kolaitis, Promel, and Rothschild refined this result, showing that G4 has a
first-order zero-one law, and its almost-sure theory is equal to the generic theory

67
of bipartite graphs. To be more precise, the class of all finite bipartite graphs
in the vocabulary of graphs is not a Fraı̈ssé class (it fails amalgamation, since
paths of lengths 2 and 3 cannot be amalgamated over their endpoints). But
if we view bipartite graphs in the vocabulary Vbi = (E, L, R), where L and R
are unary relations naming the bipartition, then the class Gbi of finite bipartite
graphs is a Fraı̈ssé class, with a generic theory TGbi . And the theorem is that the
almost-sure theory of G4 is equal to the subtheory of TGbi consisting of those
sentences which do not mention L and R.
In particular, the almost-sure theory of G4 is not equal to the generic theory
TG4 , since the Fraı̈ssé limit of G4 contains odd-length cycles (for example, the
pentagon), which cannot be embedded in any bipartite graph. This raises an
interesting question (which is a major open problem at the border of model the-
ory and combinatorics): We say that a theory has the finite model property
if every sentence in the theory has a finite model. The theory of the random
graph, TG , has the finite model property (in fact, almost all finite graphs are
models, by the zero-one law). Does TG4 have the finite model property?
It is even an open question whether there exists a finite triangle-free graph
satisfying the one-point extension axioms over subsets of size at most 4.

6.2 Quantifier elimination

A theory T has quantifier elimination if every formula is T -equivalent to a
quantifier-free formula.
This notion is extremely important in “applied” model theory: If we want to
understand a given first-order theory, the first step is to understand the defin-
able sets, i.e. the formulas up to T -equivalence. And in the best-case scenario,
when T has quantifier elimination, we find that every definable set is a Boolean
combination of sets defined by atomic formulas, which are hopefully easy to
understand.
For M |= T and a ∈ M x , define
qftp(a) = {ϕ(x) | ϕ is quantifier-free and M |= ϕ(a)}.
Note that qftp(a) ⊆ tp(a). Intuitively, qftp(a) describes the isomorphism-
type of the substructure hai of M generated by a.
Proposition 6.15. Let a ∈ M x and a0 ∈ (M 0 )x , where M and M 0 are models
of T . Then qftp(a) = qftp(a0 ) if and only if hai ∼
= ha0 i by an isomorphism
0
mapping a to a .
Proof. Let A = hai and A0 = ha0 i. Suppose f : A → A0 is an isomorphism with
f (a) = a0 . Let ϕ(x) be a quantifier-free formula. Then ϕ(x) is both universal
and existential, so it is preserved and reflected by embeddings (in particular,
the inclusions A → M and A0 → M 0 and the isomorphism f : A → A0 ). Then:
M |= ϕ(a) ⇐⇒ A |= ϕ(a)
⇐⇒ A0 |= ϕ(f (a))
⇐⇒ M 0 |= ϕ(a0 ).

68
So qftp(a) = qftp(a0 ).
Conversely, suppose qftp(a) = qftp(a0 ). Recall (Exercise 1), that b ∈ A = hai
if and only if there is some term t(x) such that b = tM (a), and similarly for
A0 = ha0 i (of course, the term t need not be unique).
0
Define a map f : A → A0 by f (tM (a)) = tM (a0 ). This is well-defined, since
if tM (a) = (t0 )M (a), then the formula t(x) = t0 (x) is in qftp(a) = qftp(a0 ), so
0 0
tM (a0 ) = (t0 )M (a0 ).
1. f is injective: If tM (a) 6= (t0 )M (a), then t(x) 6= t0 (x) is in qftp(a0 ), so
0 0
tM (a0 ) 6= (t0 )M (a0 ).
0
2. f is surjective: For any b ∈ A0 , b = tM (a0 ) for some term t(x), and
b = f (tM (a)).
3. f maps a to a0 . Any element ai from the tuple a is equal to tM (a) where
0
t(x) is the variable xi . Then f (ai ) = tM (a0 ) = a0i .
4. f respects functions symbols. For any function symbol g and terms
t1 (x), . . . , tn (x) of the appropriate types, let t(x) be the composite term
g(t1 , . . . , tn ). Then we have
f (g M (tM M M
1 (a), . . . , tn (a))) = f (t (a))
0
= tM (a0 )
0 0 0
0 0
= g M (tM M
1 (a ), . . . , tn (a ))
0
= g M (f (tM M
1 (a)), . . . , f (tn (a))).

5. f preserves and reflects relation symbols. For any relation symbol R and
terms t1 (x), . . . , tn (x) of the appropriate types, let ϕ(x) be the quantifier-
free formula R(t1 , . . . , tn ). Then we have
(tM M
1 (a), . . . , tn (a)) ∈ R
M
⇐⇒ ϕ(x) ∈ qftp(a)
⇐⇒ ϕ(x) ∈ qftp(a0 )
0 0 0
0 0
⇐⇒ (tM M
1 (a ), . . . , tn (a )) ∈ R
M

⇐⇒ (f (tM M M
1 (a)), . . . , f (tn (a))) ∈ R .

Our first test for quantifier elimination is simple: if complete types are de-
termined by quantifier-free types, then T has quantifier-elimination.
Proposition 6.16. Suppose that for all contexts x and all complete types p and
q in Sx (T ), if p and q contain the same quantifier-free formulas, then p = q.
Then T has quantifier elimination.
Proof. Let ϕ(x) be any formula, and consider complete types p and q such
that ϕ(x) ∈ p and ϕ(x) ∈ / q. Then p 6= q, so p and q do not contain the
same quantifier-free formulas. Since the quantifier-free formulas are closed under
negation, we may assume there is some quantifier-free formula ψ(x) such that
ψ(x) ∈ p and ψ(x) ∈ / q. By Corollary 5.8, ϕ(x) is T -equivalent to a quantifier-
free formula.

69
 As an application of this test, we can show easily that theories of Fraı̈ssé
limits eliminate quantifiers.
Corollary 6.17. Let V be a single-sorted finite relational vocabulary, and let
K be a Fraı̈ssé class of V-structures. The generic theory TK has quantifier
elimination.
Proof. We apply Proposition 6.16. Suppose p and q are complete types in
Sx (TK ) which contain the same quantifier-free formulas. Let M |= TK be a
countable model and a, a0 ∈ M x such that M |= p(a) and M |= q(a0 ). (How?
Find a realization a of p in M1 |= TK , and then find a realization a0 of q in an
elementary extension M1  M2 by Proposition 5.3, and finally take a countable
elementary substructure M  M2 containing a and a0 by Löwenheim–Skolem.)
Now M is a Fraı̈ssé limit of K. And since p and q contain the same quantifier-
free formulas, hai and ha0 i are isomorphic by an isomorphism mapping a to
a0 . By strong K-homogeneity, this isomorphism extends to an automorphism
σ : M → M such that σ(a) = a0 . But then tp(a) = tp(a0 ), so p = q. By
Proposition 6.16, TK has quantifier elimination.
Tuesday 11/6 We will now develop a slightly more refined test for quantifier-elimination.
First, we reduce the problem on the syntactic side, then we prove a semantic
equivalence.
A formula ϕ(x) is primitive existential if it has the form ∃y ψ(x, y), where
y is a single variable and ψ(x, y) is a conjunction of atomic and negated atomic
formulas.
Lemma 6.18. Suppose that every primitive existential formula is T -equivalent
to a quantifier-free formula. Then T has quantifier elimination.
Proof. We prove by induction that every formula is T -equivalent to a quantifier-
free formula. This is clear for atomic formulas, and the induction steps for
Boolean combinations are trivial. So it suffices to consider the case of a formula
∃y ψ(x, y). By the inductive hypothesis, ψ(x, y) is T -equivalent to a quantifier-
free formula ϕ(x, y), which is logically equivalent to a formula in disjunctive
normal form (Exercise 19),
_n
ϕi (x, y),
i=1

where each ϕi is a conjunction of atomic and negated atomic formulas. So

∃y ψ(x, y) is T -equivalent to
n
_
∃y ϕi (x, y),
i=1

which is logically equivalent to

n
_
∃y ϕi (x, y).
i=1

70
Now each formula ∃y ϕi (x, y) is primitive existential, so by assumption it is
T -equivalent to W
a quantifier-free formula χi (x, y), and our original formula is
n
T -equivalent to i=1 χi (x, y).
Let M and M 0 be V-structures, and suppose A ⊆ M . A map f : A → M 0 is
partial elementary if for all formulas ϕ(x) and all a ∈ Ax , M |= ϕ(a) if and
only if M 0 |= ϕ(f (a)).
Theorem 6.19. The following are equivalent:
(1) T has quantifier elimination.
(2) For any models M |= T and M 0 |= T , if A is a substructure of M and
f : A → M 0 is an embedding, then f is partial elementary.
(3) For any models M |= T and M 0 |= T , if A is a finitely generated substructure
of M , f : A → M 0 is an embedding, and ϕ(x) is a primitive existential
formula, then for all a ∈ Ax , if M |= ϕ(a), then M 0 |= ϕ(f (a)).
Proof. (1)⇒(2): Suppose T has quantifier elimination and f : A → M 0 is an
embedding, where A is a substructure of M |= T , and M 0 |= T . Let ϕ(x) be
a formula and a ∈ Ax . Then ϕ(x) is T -equivalent to a quantifier-free formula
ψ(x). Since ψ(x) is both universal and existential, it is preserved and reflected
by embeddings. So

M |= ϕ(a) ⇐⇒ M |= ψ(a)
⇐⇒ A |= ψ(a)
⇐⇒ M 0 |= ψ(f (a))
⇐⇒ M 0 |= ϕ(f (a)).

(2)⇒(3): Trivial from the definition of partial elementary map.

(3)⇒(1): By Lemma 6.18, it suffices to show that every primitive existential
formula is equivalent to a quantifier-free formula. We apply the separation
lemma for formulas, Corollary 5.8. So let ϕ(x) be a primitive existential formula,
and let p(x) and q(x) be complete types such that ϕ(x) ∈ p(x) and ϕ(x) ∈ / q(x).
Suppose for contradiction that no quantifier-free formula separates p from q, i.e.
(since quantifier-free formulas are closed under negation) that p and q contain
the same quantifier-free formulas.
Let a ∈ M x and a0 ∈ (M 0 )x with M, M 0 |= T , M |= p(a), and M 0 |= q(a0 ).
Let A = hai and A0 = ha0 i. In particular, A is a finitely generated substructure of
M . Since p and q contain the same quantifier-free formulas, qftp(a) = qftp(a0 ),
so A ∼= A0 by an isomorphism mapping a to a0 . We may view this isomorphism
as an embedding f : A → M 0 . But then ϕ(x) ∈ p(x) implies M |= ϕ(a), so by
assumption M 0 |= ϕ(a0 ), and ϕ(x) ∈ q(x), contradiction.
As an application, we prove that the theory of algebraically closed fields has
quantifier elimination.
Theorem 6.20. ACF has quantifier elimination.

71
Proof. We use the test in Theorem 6.19. So suppose K and K 0 are algebraically
closed fields, A ⊆ K is a finitely generated substructure, and f : A → K 0 is an
embedding. Let ∃y ϕ(x, y) be a primitive existential formula, and let a ∈ Ax
such that K |= ∃y ϕ(a, y).
Let B = f (A), so f can be viewed as an isomorphism A ∼ = B. Now A and B
are subrings of K and K 0 , respectively. Let A1 and B1 be the subfields of K and
K 0 generated by A and B, respectively. So A1 ∼ = Frac(A) and B1 ∼ = Frac(B),
∼
and f extends to an isomorphism f1 : A1 = B1 .
Let A2 and B2 be the relative algebraic closures of A1 and B1 inside K
and K 0 , respectively. Since K and K 0 are algebraically closed, A2 and B2
are isomorphic to the algebraic closures of A1 and B1 , and f1 extends to an
isomorphism F2 : A2 ∼ = B2 .
Now let b ∈ K such that K |= ϕ(a, b). Let A3 = A2 (b), the subfield of K
generated by A2 and b, and let K 00 be a proper elementary extension of K 0 (this
exists because K 0 is infinite, i.e. not boring). We claim that we can find an
embedding g : A2 (b) → K 00 .
Case 1: b ∈ A2 . Then A2 (b) = A2 , and we can take g = f2 (composed with
the inclusions B2 ⊆ K 0  K 00 ).
Case 2: b ∈ / A2 . Then since A2 is relatively algebraically closed in K, the
field A2 (b) is a transcendental extension of A2 , isomorphic to A2 (x). Since K 00
is a proper extension of B2 , and B2 is algebraically closed, any b0 ∈ K 00 \ B2 is
transcendental over B2 . So B2 (b0 ) is isomorphic to B2 (x), and f2 extends to an
isomorphism f3 : A2 (b) ∼ = B2 (b0 ), which we view as an embedding A2 (b) → K 00 .
Note that we only needed the elementary extension K 00 to handle the case
when K 0 doesn’t already contain an element transcendental over B2 , i.e. when
K 0 = B2 .

00
K K
<
f3


A2 (b) K0

A2
f2
/ B2

A1
f1
/ B1

A
f
/B
To finish, observe that since K |= ϕ(a, b), and ϕ(x, y) is quantifier-free, we
have A2 (b) |= ϕ(a, b), so K 00 |= ϕ(f3 (a), f3 (b)), so K 00 |= ∃y ϕ(f (a), y), and since
K 0  K 00 , also K 0 |= ∃y ϕ(f (a), y), as desired.

Let’s think about what this theorem means in context. The vocabulary of

72
rings has no relation symbols, so every atomic formula has the form t(x) = t0 (x),
where t and t0 are terms in context x. Modulo the theory of rings, this formula
is equivalent to t(x)−t0 (x) = 0, and each term can be rewritten as a polynomial,
so every atomic formula is equivalent to one of the form p(x) = 0, where p is a
polynomial. The definable set {x ∈ K n | p(x) = 0} is a closed set in the Zariski
topology on K n . On the other hand, the negated atomic formula p(x) 6= 0
defines a Zariski open set.
Now a quantifier-free formula ϕ(x) defines a Boolean combination of Zariski
closed sets. Such a set is called a constructible set19 .
As we have noted before, the operation of adding an existential quantifier to a
formula corresponds to the coordinate projection of definable sets. For example,
the projection of the set {(x, y) ∈ K 2 | xy = 1} onto the first coordinate is the
set {x ∈ K | x 6= 0}. This corresponds to the fact that the formula ∃y (xy = 1)
is ACF-equivalent to the quantifier-free formula x 6= 0.
Keeping this in mind, we find that quantifier elimination for ACF is equiv-
alent to (a form of) Chevalley’s theorem on constructible sets. Of course, there
are fancier scheme-theoretic versions of this theorem in algebraic geometry.

Corollary 6.21 (Chevalley’s theorem). A coordinate projection of a Zariski

constructible set is Zariski constructible.
Quantifier elimination can also be a tool for proving completeness.
Proposition 6.22. (1) If T is complete, then all models of T have isomorphic
minimal substructures. That is, for any M, M 0 |= T , h∅iM ∼
= h∅iM 0 .
(2) The converse is true if T has quantifier elimination.
(3) If V has no 0-ary function symbols (constant symbols) or 0-ary relation sym-
bols (proposition symbols), then quantifier elimination implies completeness.

Proof. For (1), suppose T is complete. Then the quantifier-free type of the
empty tuple in M |= T is the set of all quantifier-free sentences true in M . Since
T is complete, every quantifier-free sentence true in M is entailed by T . So if
M, M 0 |= T , qftpM (∅) = qftpM 0 (∅). Then h∅iM ∼= h∅iM 0 by Proposition 6.15.
For (2), suppose that T has quantifier elimination and all models of T have
isomorphic minimal substructures. Suppose for contradiction that T is not
complete. Then there is a sentence ϕ and models M |= T ∪ {ϕ} and M 0 |=
T ∪ {¬ϕ}. But the isomorphism h∅iM → h∅iM 0 is a partial elementary map by
Theorem 6.19, so M |= ϕ if and only if M 0 |= ϕ, contradiction.
For (3), note that if V has no constant symbols, then h∅iM is empty for all
V-structures M . And if V has no proposition symbols, then there is a unique
empty V-structure up to isomorphism. It follows that for any M, M 0 |= T ,
h∅iM ∼= h∅iM 0 .
19 Sometimes a constructible set is defined to be a finite union of locally closed sets, i.e. sets

which are open in their closure. This is equivalent: a locally closed set is the intersection of
an open set and a closed set, and any Boolean combination of closed sets can be written as a
finite union of locally closed sets, thanks to the disjunctive normal form

73
 Another way of proving (3) is to note that if T has quantifier-elimination,
then every sentence is T -equivalent to a quantifier-free sentence. But if there are
no constant symbols or proposition symbols, the only quantifier-free sentences
are > and ⊥.
This gives us a new proof that for fixed p, either prime or 0, the theory ACFp
is complete. Indeed, since ACF ⊆ ACFp , ACFp has quantifier elimination. And
for any M, M 0 |= ACFp , h∅iM ∼ = h∅iM 0 ∼= Fp .
If a theory T has a reasonable (meaning computable) axiomatization, then
as soon as we know T is complete, we have an algorithm for deciding which
sentences are entailed by T . For any sentence ϕ, start searching for a proof
T ` ϕ, and simultaneously start searching for a proof T ` ¬ϕ. Since T is
complete, one of these searches eventually terminates.
But the algorithm described above is hopelessly inefficient. In many situa-
tions, a more efficient algorithm can be found via effective quantifier elimination,
i.e. an algorithm for finding a quantifier-free formula which is T -equivalent to
a given formula. Applying this algorithm to an arbitrary sentence ϕ produces
a quantifier-free sentence ψ which is T -equivalent to it. But a quantifier-free
sentence ψ is just a Boolean combination of atomic statements about h∅i, the
truth value of which can be easily checked.
The proof we gave above that ACF has quantifier elimination was entirely
ineffective. But an effective quantifier elimination algorithm exists for ACF; in
this case, a quantifier-free sentences comes down to an explicit list of the char-
acteristics p in which the sentence is true. And effective quantifier elimination
algorithms also exist for other interesting theories, like Th(R; 0, 1, +, −, ·, ≤),
the theory of real closed ordered fields (this is know as Tarski’s Theorem).
Exercise 26. Let s : ω → ω be the successor function n 7→ n + 1. Show that
Th(ω; s) does not have quantifier elimination, but Th(ω; s, 0) does (where 0 is
a constant symbol naming the element 0).
Exercise 27. Let K be a field, and let T be the theory of infinite vector
spaces over K in the single-sorted vocabulary of Example 1.2. Show that T has
quantifier elimination.
Exercise 28. Let T be the theory of infinite-dimensional vector spaces over
algebraically closed fields of characteristic 0 in the two-sorted vocabulary of
Example 1.1. That is, T consists of the vector space axioms, the axioms of
ACF0 in the field sort k, and axioms asserting that the vector space v is not
n-dimensional for any n (if it is not clear to you how to axiomatize this theory,
then you can consider it part of the exercise). Show that T does not have
quantifier elimination.

6.3 Model completeness and model companions

Thursday 11/8 One advantage of showing that T has quantifier elimination is that the notions of
elementary embedding and elementary substructure become much simpler. If T

74
has quantifier elimination, then every embedding between models of T is an ele-
mentary embedding (every formula is T -equivalent to a quantifier-free formula,
and quantifier-free formulas are preserved and reflected by embeddings).
Some theories have this nice property, without having quantifier elimination
in full. A theory T is model complete if every embedding between models of
T is an elementary embedding.
Part (a) of the following exercise explains the name “model complete”. Part
(b) shows that quantifier elimination could also be called “substructure com-
pleteness”.
Exercise 29. (a) Show that T is model complete if and only if for any model
M |= T , T ∪ Diag(M ) is a complete V(M )-theory.

(b) Show that T has quantifier elimination if and only if for any model M |= T ,
and any substructure A ⊆ M , T ∪ Diag(A) is a complete V(A)-theory.
Proposition 6.23. Every model complete theory T has a ∀∃ axiomatization,
i.e. T is equivalent to a ∀∃-theory.

Proof. By Theorem 5.15, it suffices to show that T is preserved by directed

colimits. So suppose (Mi )i∈I is a directed system of V-structures, such that
Mi |= T for all i ∈ I, and let M = lim Mi . Since T is model complete, this is
−→
a directed colimit along elementary embeddings, so by Proposition 5.13, each
map σi : Mi → M is an elementary embedding. In particular, M |= T .

Example 6.24. In 1996, Wilkie showed that Th(R; 0, 1, +, −, ·, ex ), where ex

is viewed as a unary function symbol, is model complete. It follows that this
theory has a ∀∃ axiomatization, but we don’t know what it is. In fact, giving
an explicit axiomatization of this theory would almost certainly require proving
the real Schanuel’s conjecture: If x1 , . . . , xn are real numbers such that
Q(x1 , . . . , xn , ex1 , . . . , exn ) has transcendence degree less than n over Q, then
x1 , . . . , xn are linearly dependent over Q.
Suppose M ⊆ N are V-structures. We say that M is existentially closed
in N if for any ∃-formula ϕ(x) and any a ∈ M x , if N |= ϕ(a), then M |= ϕ(a).
We say that a model M |= T is existentially closed (in models of T ) if
whenever M ⊆ N and N |= T , M is existentially closed in N .

Theorem 6.25. The following are equivalent:

(1) T is model complete.
(2) Every model of T is existentially closed.

(3) Every formula is T -equivalent to a ∀-formula.

(4) Every formula is T -equivalent to an ∃-formula.

75
Proof. (1)⇒(2): If M, N |= T and M ⊆ N , then since T is model complete,
M  N , so M is existentially closed in N .
(2)⇒(3): First note that (2) implies that all ∃-formulas are reflected by
embeddings between models of T . Indeed, if f : M → N is an embedding,
with M, N |= T , then M ∼ = f (M ) ⊆ N , and f (M ) is existentially closed in N .
So if N |= ϕ(f (a)), where ϕ(x) is an ∃-formula, then f (M ) |= ϕ(f (a)), and
M |= ϕ(a).
So by Theorem 5.11, every ∃-formula is T -equivalent to a ∀-formula.
We now prove that every formula is T -equivalent to a ∀-formula. By defini-
tion, the class of ∀-formulas contains the atomic formulas and > and ⊥ and is
closed under ∧, ∨, and ∀. So it suffices to show that up to T -equivalence, the
class of ∀-formulas is closed under ¬ and ∃.
For ¬, if ϕ(x) is a ∀-formula, then ¬ϕ(x) is an ∃-formula, which is T -
equivalent to a ∀-formula by the observation above. For ∃, if ϕ(x, y) is a ∀-
formula, then ∃y ϕ(x, y) is logically equivalent to ¬∀y ¬ϕ(x, y), and we have
shown that the ∀-formulas are closed under ¬ and ∀, up to T -equivalence.
(3)⇔(4): Suppose every formula is T -equivalent to a ∀-formula. Then for
any formula ϕ(x), the formula ¬ϕ(x) is T -equivalent to a ∀-formula ψ(x), so
ϕ(x) is T -equivalent to ¬ϕ(x), which is logically equivalent to an ∃-formula.
The converse is similar.
(4)⇒(1): Suppose f : M → N is an embedding, where M, N |= T . Let ϕ(x)
be a formula, and let a ∈ M x . By (4) and its equivalent (3), ϕ(x) is T -equivalent
to both a universal formula ψ∀ (x) (which is reflected by f ) and an existential
formula ψ∃ (x) (which is preserved by f ). So

M |= ϕ(a) =⇒ M |= ψ∃ (a)
=⇒ N |= ψ∃ (f (a))
=⇒ N |= ϕ(f (a)).

And conversely,

N |= ϕ(f (a)) =⇒ N |= ψ∀ (f (a))

=⇒ M |= ψ∀ (a)
=⇒ M |= ϕ(a).

This theorem captures the way in which model complete theories come very
close to having quantifier elimination: every formula is equivalent to both a
∀-formula and an ∃-formula, but not necessarily a quantifier-free formula.
Example 6.26. Consider the theory of the real field, T = Th(R; 0, 1, +, −, ·).
The relation x ≤ y is T -definable by the formulas

∃z (z · z = y − x) or (x = y) ∨ ∀z (z · z 6= x − y),

but neither of these formulas is T -equivalent to a quantifier-free formula. Indeed,

if they were equivalent to ϕ(x, y), then the formula ϕ(x, 0) would define {x ∈
R | x ≤ 0}. But ϕ(x, 0) is a Boolean combination of polynomial equations in

76
one variable x. Such a formula can never define an infinite and coinfinite set,
since a polynomial in one variable has at most finitely many zeros.
In fact, the theory of the real field is model complete, which we may prove
later in these notes, if time permits.
The condition that M is existentially closed can be viewed as an abstraction
of the condition that a field is algebraically closed. Indeed, the algebraically
closed fields are exactly the existentially closed models of the theory of fields.
As an application, let’s derive Hilbert’s Nullstellensatz as a direct conse-
quence of the model completeness of ACF.
Theorem 6.27 (weak Nullstellensatz). Let k be a field, let K be its algebraic
closure, and let I be a proper ideal in the polynomial ring k[x1 , . . . , xn ]. Then
there is a tuple (a1 , . . . , an ) ∈ K n such that p(a1 , . . . , an ) = 0 for all p ∈ I.
Proof. Let m be a maximal ideal in k[x1 , . . . , xn ] extending I. Then the quotient
ring F = k[x1 , . . . , xn ]/m is a field, and letting bi = xi + m in F , we have
p(b1 , . . . , bn ) = 0 for all p ∈ I. Let L be the algebraic closure of F . We have
a natural embedding k → L, and L is algebraically closed, so we may assume
that k ⊆ K ⊆ L, and by model completeness K is existentially closed in L.
Now I = (p1 , . . . , pm ) is finitely generated, since
Vmk[x1 , . . . , xn ] is Noetherian
(Hilbert’s basis theorem). And L |= ∃x1 . . . ∃xn i=1 pi (x1 , . . . , xn ) = 0. This
is an ∃-formula V with parameters from k (the coefficients of the pi ), so also
m
K |= ∃x1 . . . ∃xn i=1 pi (x1 , . . . , xn ) = 0, as was to be shown.
We say theories T and T 0 are companions if every model of T embeds in a
model of T 0 and vice versa. We say that T ∗ is a model companion of T if T
and T ∗ are companions and T ∗ is model complete.
Proposition 6.28. If a theory T has a model companion, then it is unique (up
to equivalence).
Proof. Suppose T ∗ and T 0 are both model companions of T . Then T ∗ and T 0
are companions (it is easy to see that the companion relation is transitive, in
fact an equivalence relation on theories).
Let M0 be a model of T ∗ . Then M0 embeds in a model N0 |= T 0 . And N0
embeds in a model M1 |= T ∗ . Continuing in this way, we build a chain:
 
M0 / M1 / .> . . M
=
∼
=
! !
N0 / N1 / ... N


Now letting M = lim Mi and N = lim Ni , we have M ∼ = N . Since T ∗ is model

−→ −→
complete, M is a directed colimit along a chain of elementary embeddings, so
σ0 : M0 → M is an elementary embedding. Similarly, since T 0 is model complete,
N is a directed colimit of models of T 0 along a chain of elementary embeddings,
so N |= T 0 . So M0  M ∼ = N |= T 0 .

77
 We have shown that every model of T ∗ is a model of T 0 . The symmetric
argument shows that T ∗ and T 0 are equivalent.
Tuesday 11/27 Example 6.29. The theory of fields and the theory of integral domains are
companions. Their common model companion is ACF.

Exercise 30. Let K be the class of finite substructures of models of a theory

T , and suppose K is a Fraı̈ssé class. Then the generic theory TK is the model
companion of T . In particular, the model companion of Th(Z; <) is Th(Q; <).
Exercise 31. For any theory T , let S(T ) be the class of all substructures of
models of T , and let T∀ = {ϕ | ϕ is a ∀-sentence, and T |= ϕ} be the set of all
universal consequences of T . For any theories T and T 0 , show that the following
are equivalent:
(1) T and T 0 are companions.
(2) S(T ) = S(T 0 ).

(3) T∀ = T∀0 .
In the special case that T is a ∀∃-theory, we can characterize the model
companion of T in terms of the existentially closed models of T . The main
point is the following proposition, which is an abstraction of the fact that every
field embeds in an algebraically closed field.

Proposition 6.30. Let T be a ∀∃-theory. Then every model of T embeds in an

existentially closed model of T .
Proof. Let M0 be a model of T . For some cardinal κ, let (ϕα )α<κ be an enu-
meration of all ∃-formulas with parameters from M0 .
We build a directed system (M0α )α≤κ of models of T indexed by the directed
set (κ + 1, <), by transfinite induction. Let M00 = M0 . For the successor step,
given M0α , if there is any N |= T such that M0α ⊆ N and N |= ϕα , then pick
some such N and let M0α+1 = N . Otherwise, let M0α+1 = M0α .
0
When β is a nonzero limit ordinal, we have (M0α )α<β , such that M0α ⊆ M0α
when α ≤ α0 , and M0α |= T for all α. Let M0β = lim M0α . Note that M0β |= T ,
−→
since T is ∀∃ and hence preserved by directed colimits. Finally, let M1 = M0κ .
Now we have M0 ⊆ M1 , and for any existential formula ϕ with parameters
from M0 , if there exists N |= T such that M1 ⊆ N and N |= ϕ, then already
M1 |= ϕ. Indeed, ϕ = ϕα for some α, and M0α ⊆ M0α+1 ⊆ M1 ⊆ N , so
M0α+1 |= ϕα , and hence M1 |= ϕα , since ϕα is existential, and hence is preserved
by embeddings.
But M1 may not yet be existentially closed, since we’ve only handled exis-
tential formulas with parameters from M0 . So we repeat this process, building
a chain (Mi )i∈ω , such that for any existential formula ϕ with parameters from
Mi , if there exists N |= T such that Mi+1 ⊆ N and N |= ϕ, then already
Mi+1 |= ϕ. Let Mω = lim Mi (again, Mω |= T since T is ∀∃).
−→

78
 We claim that Mω is existentially closed. Suppose N |= T and Mω ⊆ N , and
let ϕ(a) be an existential formula with a ∈ Mωx such that N |= ϕ(a). Then there
is some n such that a ∈ Mnx . We have Mn ⊆ Mω ⊆ N , and by construction
Mn+1 |= ϕ(a). So also Mω |= ϕ(a), since ϕ(x) is existential.
Proposition 6.31. Suppose T is a ∀∃ theory, N |= T , and M ⊆ N . If M is
existentially closed in N , then M |= T .
Proof. We show by induction on the construction of ϕ(x) as a ∀∃-formula that
for all a ∈ M x , if N |= ϕ(a), then M |= ϕ(a). The conclusion follows, when
applied to the ∀∃ sentences in T .
The base case, when ϕ(x) is an ∃-formula, is just the fact that M is existen-
tially closed in N . And the inductive steps for ∧ and ∨ are easy. So suppose
the inductive hypothesis holds for ϕ(x, y), and consider the formula ∀y ϕ(x, y).
If a ∈ M x and N |= ∀y ϕ(a, y), then in particular for all b ∈ M y , we have
N |= ϕ(a, b), so by induction M |= ϕ(a, b), and M |= ∀y ϕ(a, y).
Theorem 6.32. Let T be a ∀∃-theory. Then T has a model companion T ∗ if
and only if the class of existentially closed models of T is an elementary class.
In this case, T ∗ is the theory of existentially closed models of T .
Proof. Suppose first that the class of existentially closed models of T is ele-
mentary, with theory T ∗ . We claim that T ∗ is a model companion of T . By
Proposition 6.30, every model of T embeds in a model of T ∗ , and conversely
every model of T ∗ is itself a model of T . So T ∗ and T are companions. It re-
mains to show that T ∗ is model complete. But every model of T ∗ is existentially
closed in models of T , so in particular existentially closed in models of T ∗ , so
we are done by Theorem 6.25.
Conversely, suppose T has a model companion T ∗ . By Proposition 6.23, we
may assume that T ∗ is also a ∀∃-theory. We claim that M |= T ∗ if and only if
M is an existentially closed model of T .
If M is an existentially closed model of T , then because T and T ∗ are
companions, there are embeddings M ⊆ N ⊆ M 0 , where N |= T ∗ and M 0 |= T .
Then M is existentially closed in N : if ϕ(x) is existential, and N |= ϕ(a), with
a ∈ M x , then M 0 |= ϕ(a), so M |= ϕ(a), since M is existentially closed in M 0 .
By Proposition 6.31, M |= T ∗ , since T ∗ is ∀∃.
In the other direction, if M |= T ∗ , we want to show that M is an existentially
closed model of T . So suppose M ⊆ N , where N |= T . Since T and T ∗ are
companions, such an N exists, and for any such N , there exists a model M 0 |= T ∗
with M ⊆ N ⊆ M 0 . Since T ∗ is model complete, M is existentially closed in M 0 ,
so by the argument above, M is existentially closed in N . By Proposition 6.31,
M is a model of T , since T is ∀∃, and since N was an arbitrary model of T , M
is existentially closed.
Exercise 32. Let T be the theory of torsion-free abelian groups. Show that T
has a model companion, and explicitly axiomatize it.
The following exercises show that not every theory has a model companion.

79
 Exercise 33. Let V = (f, R), where f is a unary function symbol and R is a
binary relation symbol. Consider the ∀-theory T axiomatized by the following
single sentence:
∀x∀y (R(x, y) → R(x, f (y))).
(a) Show that for any existentially closed model M |= T and any a, b ∈ M with
b∈
/ hai, we have M |= ∃z (R(z, a) ∧ ¬R(z, b)).
(b) Show that for any model M |= T and any a ∈ M such that hai is infinite,
there exists an elementary extension M  M 0 , and some b ∈ M 0 such that
b∈/ hai and M 0 |= ∀z (R(z, a) → R(z, b)).

(c) Show that the class of existentially closed models of T is not elementary, so
T does not have a model companion.
Exercise 34. Show that the theory of groups does not have a model companion.
Hint 1: We say that elements a and b in a group G are conjugate if there
exists c ∈ G such that b = c−1 ac. You may use as a black box the fact that for
any group G and any two elements a, b ∈ G of the same order, there exists a
group H such that G ⊆ H and a and b are conjugate in H.
Hint 2: Show that if a group G contains elements of arbitrarily large finite
order, then there is an elementary extension G  G0 and elements a, b ∈ G0 ,
each of infinite order, such that a and b are not conjugate in G.

7 Countable models
Thursday Throughout this chapter, we assume that V is a countable vocabulary, so that
11/29 L is countably infinite. Further, we assume that T is a complete, consistent,
interesting theory. We will study the category of countable models of T and
elementary embeddings.
We have already seen one kind of behavior that this category can have: in the
ℵ0 -categorical case, it has a single object up to isomorphism. Our main examples
of ℵ0 -categorical theories are Fraı̈ssé limits. More generally, T may have a
universal countable model, into which every other countable model embeds
elementarily. Or T may have a prime model, which embeds elementarily into
every other model.20 The arguments will take inspiration from Fraı̈ssé theory.
We will characterize the existence of universal and prime models, as well
as ℵ0 -categoricity, in terms of properties of the type spaces Sx (T ), and we
will characterize the universal and prime models themselves (as saturated and
atomic models, respectively) in terms of the types they realize. We will show
that the existence of a universal model implies the existence of a prime model.
And as a curious application of all this theory, we will prove Vaught’s “never
two” theorem.
20 But these are not terminal and initial objects, in general: the elementary embeddings will

rarely be unique.

80
7.1 Saturated models
A countable model M |= T is saturated if for all finite A ⊆fin M and every
single variable x, every type p(x) ∈ Sx (A) is realized in M .
The condition that A is finite is essential: the partial type {x 6= a | a ∈ M }
is consistent, hence extends to a complete type in Sx (M ), which is not realized
in M .
Example 7.1. The algebraically closed field F = Q(x0 , x1 , x2 , . . . ) is a satu-
rated model of ACF0 . Indeed, suppose A ⊆ F is finite. Let K be the subfield of
F generated by A, and let K be its algebraic closure inside F . Let p(x) ∈ Sx (A).
By quantifier elimination in ACF0 , every formula is equivalent to a Boolean
combination of polynomial equations f (x) = 0, where f ∈ K[x]. If p(x) contains
any positive polynomial equation f (x) = 0, then it is an algebraic type over A,
which is realized in F (by an element of K). Otherwise, p(x) must contain the
formulas f (x) 6= 0 for all non-zero polynomials f (x) ∈ K[x]. This completely
determines p(x) has the unique transcendental type over A. It remains to
show that this transcendental type is realized in F .
Note that K is finitely generated over Q as a field, so K has finite transcen-
dence degree over F , and K is a proper subfield of F . Since K is algebraically
closed, any element of F \ K realizes the transcendental type over A.
Note the similarity between the definition of saturation and the definition of
K-homogeneity in the context of Fraı̈ssé theory. The proofs in the next theorem
should also look familiar.
Theorem 7.2. Suppose M |= T is a countable saturated model. Then:
1. M is universal: If N |= T is countable, then there is an elementary em-
bedding N → M .
2. If M 0 |= T is another countable saturated model, a ∈ M x , a0 ∈ (M 0 )x such
that tpM (a/∅) = tpM 0 (a0 /∅), then there is an isomorphism f : M ∼ = M0
0
such that f (a) = a .
3. M is unique up to isomorphism.
Proof. We first make the following observation. If A ⊆ M is a set, f : A → M 0 is
a partial elementary map, and p ∈ Sx (A), then there is a type f∗ p ∈ Sx (f (A)),
defined by {ϕ(x, f (a)) | ϕ(x, a) ∈ p}.
The only thing to check is that f∗ p is consistent. If not, then by compact-
ness, and since p and hence f∗ p is closed under conjunction, there is a formula
ϕ(x, f (a)) ∈ f∗ p which is inconsistent. So M 0 |= ¬∃x ϕ(x, f (a)). But since f is
partial elementary, also M |= ¬∃x ϕ(x, a). This means that ϕ(x, a) is inconsis-
tent, contradicting consistency of p.
For (1), we go forth, just as in the proof of Proposition 6.2. Enumerate
N as (ni )i∈ω . Let f0 be the empty function. We define a partial elementary
map fi with domain Ai = {n0 , . . . , ni−1 } for each i ∈ ω by induction. Given
fi , consider p(x) = tp(ni /Ai ). Since f (Ai ) is finite and M is saturated, there

81
is a realization mi of (fi )∗ p ∈ Sx (f (Ai )). Let fi+1 extend fi by fi+1 (ni ) =
mi . Then fi+1 is partial elementary, since for any formula ϕ(x0 , . . . , xi ), N |=
ϕ(n0 , . . . , ni ) iff ϕ(n0 , . . . , ni−1 , x) ∈ p iff ϕ(f (n0 ), . . . , f (ni−1 ), x) ∈ f∗ p iff M |=
ϕ(f (n0 ), . . . , f (ni−1 ), f (ni )).S
Finally, the union f = i∈ω fi is an elementary embedding N → M .
For (2), we only have to modify the proof of (1) to go back and forth, just
as in the proof of Lemma 6.3.
(3) follows immediately from (2), since if M 0 |= T is another countable
saturated model, then M ≡ M 0 , so the empty tuples in M and M 0 realize the
same types, and M ∼ = M 0.
So saturated models are nice. Now we want to know when they exist. We
say that T is small if |Sx (T )| ≤ ℵ0 for all contexts x.
Theorem 7.3. The following are equivalent:
(1) T is small.
(2) T has a saturated countable model.

(3) T has a universal countable model.

Proof. We have already proven (2) ⇒ (3).
For (3) ⇒ (1), suppose T has a universal countable model M . Let x be a
context. For any type p ∈ Sx (T ), p is realized by a in some countable model
N |= T , and there is an elementary embedding f : N → M . Then M |= p(f (a)).
So M realizes every type in Sx (T ), but there are only countably many tuples in
M x , so there are only countably many types in Sx (T ).
For (1) ⇒ (2), it remains to construct a saturated model. We begin with
the observation that if M |= T is any model and A ⊆fin M is a finite subset,
then |Sx (A)| ≤ ℵ0 . Indeed, letting y = (y1 , . . . , yn ) be a tuple of variables
enumerating A = {a1 , . . . , an }, there is a map Sx (A) → Sxy (T ) by replacing
the parameters from A by their corresponding variables in all formulas. Here is
another way to describe this map: let p(x) ∈ Sx (A), and let a be a realization of
p(x) in some elementary extension M 0 of M . Then p(x) 7→ tpM 0 (aa1 . . . an /∅).
This map is injective, so |Sx (A)| ≤ |Sxy (T )| ≤ ℵ0 , since T is small.
Now let M0 be any countable model of T . There are countably many finite
subsets A ⊆fin M0 , and for each such A, the type space Sx (A) is countable. So
we can enumerate all of the types over finite subsets of M0 . Iteratively applying
Proposition 5.3 and Löweheim–Skolem, we can find a countable elementary
extension M0  M1 such that every type over a finite subset of M0 is realized
in M1 .
Repeating, we build an elementary chain M0  M2  M2  . . . . Letting
Mω = lim Mi , we have M0  Mω , so Mω |= T , and as a countable union of
−→
countable models, Mω is countable. And Mω is saturated, since if A ⊆fin Mω
and p ∈ Sx (A), we have A ⊆ Mk for some k, and p is realized in Mk+1 .

82
 Note that it is not true in general that every universal countable model of T
is saturated. The fact is just that the existence of a universal countable model
is equivalent to the existence of a saturated countable model.
Moving outside the realm of countable models for a moment: In general, for
an infinite cardinal κ, we say that a model M |= T is κ-saturated if for every
A ⊆ M such that |A| < κ and every single variable x, every type p(x) ∈ Sx (A)
is realized in M . And we say that M is saturated if it is |M |-saturated.
Exercise 35. Show that if M |= T is κ-saturated, then |M | ≥ κ.
Example 7.4. The complex field C is saturated. For any A ⊆ C with |A| < |C|,
let K be the algebraic closure of the subfield generated by A. Then |K| =
max(|A|, ℵ0 ), so |K| < |C|. Now as we argued above, there is one complete type
in Sx (A) for every element of K, and these are all realized in C by elements of
K. And there is one additional type in Sx (A), namely the transcendental type
over A. This is realized by any element of C \ K. Note that the same argument
applies to any uncountable algebraically closed field.
Example 7.5. The real field R is not saturated (and not even ℵ0 -saturated).
Indeed, for any n > 0, there is a formula without parameters expressing x ≤ n1 .
In the field language, this can be written as ∃y (y 2 = 1 − n · x), where n is the
term obtained by adding 1 to itself n times. We can also express 0 < x by
(x 6= 0) ∧ ∃y (y 2 = x). Now consider the partial type
1
{0 < x} ∪ {x ≤ | n > 0}.
n
This is consistent by compactness, so it extends to a complete type in Sx (∅),
which is not realized in R.
Tuesday 12/4 Exercise 36. (Some set theory involved) Show that for any theory T and any
infinite cardinal κ, T has a κ-saturated model. Hint: You may assume κ is a
regular cardinal by replacing κ by κ+ if necessary. Then build an elementary
chain of length κ.
Exercise 37. (Some more set theory involved) Show that for any theory T and
any uncountable regular cardinal κ such that κλ = κ for all cardinals 0 < λ < κ,
T has a saturated model of cardinality κ.
In particular, if κ is a strongly inaccessible cardinal, T has a saturated
model of cardinality κ. And if the continuum hypothesis holds, then T has a
saturated model of cardinality 2ℵ0 . But both of these set-theoretic assumptions
(the existence of a strongly inaccessible cardinal, the continuum hypothesis) go
beyond ZFC. It is consistent with ZFC that certain theories (the “unstable”
ones, for example Th(R; 0, 1, +, −, ·)) have no saturated models at all.

7.2 Atomic models and omitting types

We have seen that to produce universal countable models, we need to realize as
many types as possible. On the other end of the spectrum, to produce prime
countable models, we need to realize as few types as possible.

83
 Let p(x) ∈ Sx (A) be a complete type. We say that p is isolated (over
A) if there is a formula ϕ(x) ∈ Lx (A) such that ϕ(x) ∈ p(x), and for every
formula ψ(x) ∈ p(x), T |= ∀x (ϕ(x) → ψ(x)). In other words, ϕ(x) completely
determines the other formulas in p(x), so p(x) is the only complete type in Sx (A)
containing ϕ(x). That is, the point p ∈ Sx (A) is topologically isolated by the
basic clopen set [ϕ].
Note that if A ⊆ M |= T and p(x) ∈ Sx (A) is isolated over A by the
formula ϕ(x, a), then since p(x) is consistent, M |= ∃x ϕ(x, a). Any witness to
the existential quantifier realizes p(x). The moral is: we can’t avoid realizing
isolated types.
A model M |= T is atomic if it only realizes isolated types over ∅: for all
contexts x and all a ∈ M x , tp(a) ∈ Sx (T ) is isolated.
Lemma 7.6. Let a ∈ M x and b ∈ M y be tuples from M . Then tp(ab) ∈ Sxy (T )
is isolated if and only if tp(a) ∈ Sx (T ) and tp(b/a) ∈ Sx (a) are both isolated.
Proof. Suppose tp(ab) is isolated by ϕ(x, y). Then tp(a) is isolated by ∃y ϕ(x, y),
and tp(b/a) is isolated by ϕ(a, y).
Conversely, suppose tp(a) is isolated by ψ(x) and tp(b/a) is isolated by
χ(a, y). Then tp(ab) is isolated by ψ(x) ∧ χ(x, y).
Exercise 38. Verify the assertions made in the proof of Lemma 7.6.
Proposition 7.7. A model M |= T is atomic if and only if for every finite
A ⊆fin M and every element b ∈ M , tp(b/A) is isolated.

Proof. Suppose M |= T is atomic. For any A ⊆fin M , and any b ∈ M , let a be a

finite tuple enumerating A. Then tp(ab) is isolated, so by Lemma 7.6, tp(b/A)
is isolated.
Conversely, assume tp(b/A) is isolated for every finite A ⊆fin M and every
b ∈ M . We show that for any tuple a ∈ M x , tp(a) ∈ Sx (T ) is isolated, by
induction on the length of the tuple a.
In the base case, the tuple is empty. Since T is complete, S() (T ) (which is
the space of completions of T ) is a singleton, which is isolated.
Now suppose we are given a tuple a = (a1 , . . . , an ). Let a0 = (a1 , . . . , an−1 ).
By induction, tp(a0 ) is isolated, and by assumption tp(an /a0 ) is isolated, so by
Lemma 7.6, tp(a) is isolated.

Example 7.8. The algebraically closed field F = Q is an atomic model of

ACF0 . We have seen that for any A ⊆fin F , there is a unique transcendental
type over A, and every other type is algebraic, i.e. contains a positive polynomial
equation f (x) = 0 for some f ∈ K[x], where K is the subfield of F generated
by A.
Every such algebraic type is isolated. Indeed, if p(x) is any complete type,
then Ip = {f (x) | f (x) = 0 is in p(x)} ⊆ K[x] is a prime ideal in the polyno-
mial ring. Since K[x] is a PID, Ip has a generator g, which is an irreducible
polynomial, and the formula g(x) = 0 isolates the type p(x). To see this, note
that if a, a0 are any two realizations of the formula g(x) = 0 in any elementary

84
extension of F , then a and a0 are both roots of the irreducible polynomial g(x),
so they are conjugate by an automorphism (this is the fact that Galois groups
act transitively on the roots of g(x)), so tp(a) = tp(a0 ) = p(x).
Every element of F is algebraic over Q, and hence over K for any finitely
generated subfield K, and it follows from Proposition 7.7 that F is atomic. On
the other hand, for any such K, the transcendental type over K is not isolated
and is not realized in F .
It turns out that atomic models are prime and satisfy the same uniqueness
and homogeneity properties that saturated models do.
Theorem 7.9. Suppose M |= T is a countable atomic model. Then:
1. M is prime: If N |= T , then there is an elementary embedding M → N .
2. M is unique up to isomorphism.
3. If a, a0 ∈ M x such that tp(a) = tp(a0 ), then there is an automorphism
f : M → M such that f (a) = a0 .
Proof. For (1), we go forth. Enumerate M as (mi )i∈ω . Let f0 be the empty func-
tion. We define a partial elementary map fi with domain Ai = {m0 , . . . , mi−1 }
for each i ∈ ω by induction. Given fi , consider p(x) = tp(mi /Ai ). Since
A is finite and N is atomic, p(x) is isolated by some formula ϕ(x, a). Then
(fi )∗ p ∈ Sx (f (Ai )) is also isolated by ϕ(x, fi (a)), since fi is partial elementary.
Indeed, for any formula ψ(x, b) ∈ p(x), we have M |= ∀x (ϕ(x, a) → ψ(x, b)), so
N |= ∀x (ϕ(x, fi (a)) → ψ(x, fi (b))).
Thus there is a realization ni of (fi )∗ p in N . Let fi+1 extend fi by fi+1 (mi ) =
ni . Then fi+1 is Spartial elementary, just as in the proof of Theorem 7.2. Finally,
the union f = i∈ω fi is an elementary embedding M → N .
For (2) and (3), we only have to modify the proof of (1) to go back and
forth, just as in the proof of Theorem 7.2.
We are now faced with the challenge of constructing atomic models. This is a
difficult point: the compactness theorem gives us a very flexible tool for realizing
types in models of T . But how can we ensure that a given (non-isolated) type
is omitted in a model of T ? To solve this problem we need to return to a more
“hands-on” approach to constructing models of T : the Henkin construction.
Theorem 7.10 (Omitting types). Suppose p ∈ Sx (T ) is a non-isolated type.
Then there is a countable model M |= T such that p is not realized in M .
Before proving the theorem, let’s note a consequence.
Corollary 7.11. A model M |= T is prime if and only if M is countable and
atomic.
Proof. We have already shown that a countable atomic model of T is prime.
Conversely, suppose M is a prime model of T . By Löwenheim–Skolem, T
has a countable model N . Since M embeds into N , M is also countable.

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 Now let a ∈ M x , and suppose for contradiction that p(x) = tp(a) is non-
isolated. By omitting types, there is a model N |= T such that p(x) is not
realized in N . But since M is prime, there is an elementary embedding f : M →
N , and f (a) realizes p(x) in N , which is a contradiction.
Thursday 12/6 Proof of Theorem 7.10. We will build a model of T by constructing a complete
consistent theory with Henkin witnesses, T 0 , extending T . Further, we will do
this in a way that ensures that the canonical model of T 0 does not realize the
non-isolated type p.
Since T is complete, for every sort s, T decides whether s is empty. That
is, either T |= ∃x > (we say s is non-empty for T ) or T |= ¬∃x > (we say s
is empty for T ), where x is a variable of type s. If s is non-empty for T , let
Cs be a countably infinite set of new constant symbols of type s. Otherwise, let
Cs = ∅. Let C = (Cs )s∈S , and let V 0 = V ∪ C.
Rather than completing T to a V 0 -theory T 0 by appealing to the ultrafilter
lemma, we will build T 0 “by hand”; this crucially uses the fact that the language
L0 is countable. In the construction of T 0 , we have three goals:
Goal 1: Ensure that T 0 is complete (and consistent).
Goal 2: Ensure that T 0 has Henkin witnesses.
Goal 3: Ensure that the canonical model of T 0 does not realize p. We will do
this by ensuring that for every tuple of constants c ∈ C x , there is some
formula ϕ(x) ∈ p such that ¬ϕ(c) ∈ T 0 .
In order to achieve these goals, we make three lists.
List 1: Let (ψi )i∈ω be an enumeration of all V 0 -sentences. At stage i, we will
add ψi or ¬ψi to T 0 .
List 2: Let (ϕi (y))i∈ω be an enumeration of all V 0 -formulas in a single free
variable y. Further, ensure that each such formula ϕ(y) occurs infinitely
many times in the enumeration. At stage i, we will ensure that there is
a Henkin witness for ϕi (y).
List 3: Let (ci )i∈ω be an enumeration of C x . At stage i, we will ensure that
there is some formula ϕ(x) ∈ p such that ¬ϕ(ci ) ∈ T 0 .
We now build a sequence of consistent V 0 -theories Ti by induction, such
that Ti contains T together with only finitely many V 0 -sentences. Let T0 =
T , and note that T0 is a consistent V 0 -theory, since any model of T can be
expanded to a V 0 -structure by interpreting the new constants arbitrarily. For
the inductive step, given the theory Ti , we build a theory Ti+1 by completing
the tasks described above.
First, let Ti0 = Ti ∪ {ψi } if this theory is consistent. Otherwise, let Ti0 =
Ti ∪ {¬ψi }, and note that this theory is consistent.
Second, if Ti0 |= ∃y ϕi (y), where y has sort s, note that since T ⊆ Ti0 and
T is complete, s is non-empty for T . Since Ti0 contains only finitely many V 0 -
sentences beyond T , it only mentions finitely many of the constant symbols in

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Cs . Let cϕi ∈ Cs be a constant symbol not mentioned in Ti0 , and let Ti00 =
Ti0 ∪ {ϕi (cϕi )}.
We must check that Ti00 is consistent. So let M |= Ti0 . Since Ti0 |= ∃y ϕ(y),
there is some a ∈ M such that M |= ϕ(a). We can change the interpretation of
the constant symbol c to a without changing the fact that M |= Ti0 , since c is
not mentioned in Ti0 . So the new structure M 0 is a model of Ti00 .
Third, we can list the finitely many new constant symbols mentioned in
Ti00 as (ci , d), where ci is the tuple appearing in our enumeration of C x , and
d consists of the remaining constant symbols not in ci . Then we can write
Ti00 = T ∪ {χj (ci , d) | 1 ≤ j ≤ n},Vwhere each χj is a V-formula.
n
If the V-formula χ(x) : ∃y j=1 χj (x, y) is not in p(x), let Ti+1 = Ti00 ∪
{χ(ci )}, and note that this is consistent, since any model of Ti00 satisfies the new
sentence.
Otherwise, χ(x) ∈ p. But since p is non-isolated, χ(x) fails to isolate p. So
there is some other complete type q ∈ [χ] ⊆ Sx (T ) with q 6= p. Let ϕ(x) be a
formula such that ϕ(x) ∈ p and ¬ϕ(x) ∈ q, and let Ti+1 = Ti00 ∪ {ϕ(ci )}.
We must check in this case that Ti+1 is consistent. So let M |= T be any
model realizing q. Interpret the variables in ci as the tuple in M x realizing
q. In particular, M |= ϕ(ci ) and M |= χ(ci ). Now interpret the constant
symbols Vnin d as the witnesses for the existential quantifiers in χ(x). So we have
M |= =1 χj (ci , d). Interpreting the rest of the constant symbols arbitrarily,
M |= Ti+1 .
We have completed our construction. We let T 0 = i∈ω Ti , and we check
S
that we have achieved our goals.
Goal 1: T 0 is complete, since for every V 0 -sentence ψ, ψ appears as ψi on List
1, and either ψi or ¬ψi was added to T 0 in stage i. T 0 is consistent (by
compactness), since it is a union of consistent theories.
Goal 2: T 0 has Henkin witnesses. Suppose ϕ(y) is a V 0 -formula in a single free
variable y, such that T 0 |= ∃y ϕ(y). Then by compactness there is a
finite subset of T 0 which entails ∃y ϕ(y), so there is some i such that
Ti |= ∃y ϕ(y). Now since ϕ(y) appears infinitely many times on List 2,
there is some i∗ ≥ i such that Ti∗ |= ∃y ϕ(y) and ϕ(y) = ϕi∗ (y). By
construction, Ti+1 |= ϕ(cϕi∗ ), to T 0 |= ϕ(cϕi∗ ).
Goal 3: Let M (T 0 ) be the canonical model of T 0 . We will show that M does
not realize p. The key observation is that every element of M is named
by a new constant symbol from C. Indeed, let a ∈ M (T 0 )s . Then a is
an equivalence class of terms of type s in the empty context. Let t be
a representative of this class. Then letting y be a variable of type s,
T 0 |= ∃y y = t. So since T 0 has Henkin witnesses, there is a constant
0 0
symbol c ∈ Cs such that T 0 |= c = t, and hence cM (T ) = tM (T ) = a,
since every term evaluates in the canonical model to its equivalence
class.
Now we observe that for any tuple a ∈ M (T 0 )x , we can pick some
0
tuple of constants c such that cM (T ) = a, and c appears as ci on List

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 3. Then there is some formula ϕ(x) ∈ p such that Ti+1 |= ¬ϕ(c), so
M (T 0 ) |= ¬ϕ(a), and hence p is not realized in M (T 0 ).

We have shown how to omit a single non-isolated type. But to build an

atomic model, we want to omit every non-isolated type. To do this, we need to
improve the omitting types theorem.
Recall that a set Y in a topological space X is nowhere dense if for every
open U ⊆ X, Y is not dense in U . Equivalently, the closure of Y has empty
interior. A set Y is meager if it is a countable union of nowhere dense sets.
In particular, a singleton set {p} in a Hausdorff (or even T1 ) space is nowhere
dense if and only if p is non-isolated. Indeed, if p is isolated, i.e. U = {p} is
open, then p is dense in U . Conversely, if p is somewhere dense (not nowhere
dense), then {p} = {p} has non-empty interior, i.e. {p} is open, so p is isolated.
It follows that if P ⊆ X is a countable set of non-isolated points, then P is
meager.

Theorem 7.12 (Improved omitting types theorem). For each context x, let
Px ⊆ Sx (T ) be a meager set. Then there is a countable model M |= T such that
for all contexts x, no type in Px is realized in M .
Proof. We follow the proof of the omitting types theorem. The main thing that
changes is Goal 3: we now need to ensure that the canonical model of T 0 does
not realize any type in any set Px . We will do this by ensuring that for every
context x and every tuple of constants c ∈ C x , there is some formula ϕ(x) such
that Px ∩ [ϕ] = ∅ and ϕ(c) ∈ T 0 .
We alsoSneed to adjust our List 3. First, for each meager set Px , we decom-
pose Px = n∈ω Qn,x , where Qn,x is nowhere dense. And instead of enumerating
C x , we enumerate triples (x, c, Qn,x ), where x is a context, c ∈ C x , and Qn,x
appears in the decomposition of Px .
At a particular stage, we need to deal with a triple (x, c, Qn,x ). We define
the formula χ(x) in the same way, but this time we note that since Qn,x is
nowhere dense, in particular it is not dense in [χ]. So there is a basic open set
[ϕ] ⊆ [χ] such that [ϕ] is disjoint from Qn,x . And we add ϕ(c) to T 0 .
Finally, in the verification that M (T 0 ) omits all of the types in the sets Px ,
we note that if x is a context, c ∈ C x , and p is a type in Px , then p ∈ Qn,x
for some n. Then there was some stage when we handled the triple (x, c, Qn,x ),
so tp(c) contains a formula ϕ(x) which is not contained in any of the types in
Qn,x . So c does not realize p in M (T 0 ).
Corollary 7.13. Suppose T has a countable saturated model. Then T has a
countable atomic model.
Proof. By Theorem 7.3, T is small. For every context x, let Px = {p(x) ∈
Sx (T ) | p(x) is non-isolated}. Then since |Sx (T )| ≤ ℵ0 , we have |Px | ≤ ℵ0 , and
Px is a meager set. By the improved omitting types theorem, there is a model
M |= T omitting every non-isolated type. So M is atomic.

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 Corollary 7.13 gives a sufficient condition for the existence of a countable
atomic model, in terms of the cardinality of the types spaces Sx (T ). The char-
acterization of the existence of a countable atomic model has a more topological
flavor. We say that isolated types are dense if the set of isolated types is
dense in the type space Sx (T ) for every context x. That is, for every consistent
formula ϕ(x), there is an isolated type p(x) such that ϕ(x) ∈ p(x).
Theorem 7.14. The following are equivalent, for a theory T :
(1) Isolated types are dense.
(2) T has a countable atomic model.

(3) T has a prime model.

Proof. We have already proven (2)⇔(3).
For (1)⇒(2), let Px = {p(x) ∈ Sx (T ) | p(x) is non-isolated}. Note that
Px is closed, since its complement is the set of all isolated types, which is a
union of open sets. And Px has empty interior, since if U ⊆ Px is a non-empty
open set, then U contains an isolated type, which is a contradiction. So Px is
nowhere dense, hence meager. By the improved omitting types theorem, T has
a countable atomic model.
For (2)⇒(1), suppose M |= T is prime. Let ϕ(x) be a consistent formula.
Then T |= ∃x ϕ(x), so there is some a ∈ M x such that M |= ϕ(a). Since M is
atomic, p(x) = tp(a) is an isolated type in Sx (T ) containing ϕ(x).

Example 7.15. Let V = ((Rn )n∈ω ), where each Rn is a unary relation sym-
bol. Consider the V-structure C with domain 2ω , the set of all infinite binary
sequences (equivalently the Cantor space), such that RnC is the set of all se-
quences such that the nth term is 1. Let T = Th(C).
It is possible to show that T has quantifier elimination, so a complete type
p(x) in one variable x is determined by the set {n | Rn (x) ∈ p(x)}. It follows
that Sx (T ) is homeomorphic to the Cantor space 2ω . This space has no isolated
types. So T has no countable saturated model and no countable atomic model.
A countable model realizes only countably many types in Sx (T ), and we can
use the improved omitting types theorem to build a countable model omitting
the types in any meager subset of the Cantor space Sx (T ).

Example 7.16. Let T = Th(Q; <, (q)q∈Q ), the theory of the rational order
with a constant naming each element. By quantifier elimination, a type p(x) in
one variable x is determined by the formulas of the form x = q, x < q, and q < x
in p(x), for q ∈ Q. In particular, for every q ∈ Q, there is a type pq (x) isolated
by the formula x = q. And for every downwards-closed set L ⊆ Q, there is a
non-isolated type pL (x) which contains {q < x | q ∈ L} ∪ {x < q | q ∈ / L}.
Since there is one cut in Q for every real number, T is not small, so it
does not have a countable saturated model. But the isolated types are dense
(a similar analysis applies to every variable context x), and T has an atomic
model, namely Q.

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 7.3 ℵ0 -categorical theories
Thursday
12/13 As an additional appliation of the omitting types theorem, we will characterize
ℵ0 -categorical theories. This is often called the Ryll-Nardzewski theorem, and
additionally attributed to Engeler and Svenonius, all independently.

Theorem 7.17. The following are equivalent, for a theory T :

(1) T is ℵ0 -categorical.
(2) For all contexts x, every type in Sx (T ) is isolated.
(3) For all contexts x, Sx (T ) is finite.

(4) For all contexts x, Lx (T ) is finite (i.e. there are only finitely many formulas
in context x up to T -equivalence).
Proof. (1) ⇒ (2): Let M |= T be the unique countable model up to isomorphism.
Then M is prime, hence atomic. Let p ∈ Sx (T ). Then p is realized in a countable
model, which is isomorphic to M , so p is realized in M , and p is isolated.
(2) ⇒ (1): Since every type relative to T is isolated, every model of T is
atomic. But we proved that any two countable atomic models of a complete
theory are isomorphic. So T is ℵ0 -categorical.
(2) ⇒ (3): Since every type in Sx (T ) is isolated, {{p} | p ∈ Sx (T )} is an
open cover of Sx (T ). By compactness, this open cover must be finite, so Sx (T )
is finite.
(3) ⇒ (2): A finite T1 space is discrete. More concretely: Let p ∈ Sx (T ). For
every qV∈ Sx (T ) with q 6= p, pick some formula ϕq (x) ∈ p such that ¬ϕq (x) ∈ q.
Then q∈Sx (T ) ϕq (x) isolates p.
(3) ⇔ (4): Sx (T ) is the set of ultrafilters on the Boolean algebra Lx (T ), and
by Stone duality, Lx (T ) is isomorphic to the clopen algebra of Sx (T ). So Sx (T )
is finite if and only if Lx (T ) is.
We have now completed our classification of complete interesting theories in
countable languages, according to the existence of prime and universal models,
in terms of the topology and cardinality of the type spaces Sx (T ):

• Sx (T ) is finite for all x ⇔ every type in Sx (T ) is isolated: T is ℵ0 -

categorical, and the unique countable model is both prime and universal.
Example: The theory of the random graph, see Example 6.10.
• Sx (T ) is countable for all x, and Sx (T ) is infinite for some x: T has both
a prime and a universal model, and these are different. Example: ACF0 ,
see Examples 7.1 and 7.8.

• Isolated types are dense, and Sx (T ) is uncountable for some x: T has

a prime model but no universal model. Example: Th(Q; <, (q)q∈Q ), see
Example 7.16.

90
 • Isolated types are not dense: T has neither a prime model nor a universal
model. Example: Th(2ω ; (Rn )n∈ω ), see Example 7.15.

Exercise 39. Suppose T is a single-sorted ℵ0 -categorical theory. Show that T

is uniformly locally finite: For every n ∈ ω there exists an m ∈ ω such that for
any M |= T and any A ⊆ M with |A| = n, |hAi| ≤ m.
Hint: Suppose for contradiction that for some n, there is no bound on the
size of substructures generated by sets of size n. Find an infinite set of formulas
in (n + 1) variables which are pairwise T -inequivalent.
Exercise 40. Let Tfields be the theory of fields, and let T be a complete inter-
esting theory with Tfields ⊆ T . Show that T is not ℵ0 -categorical.

7.4 The number of countable models

Given a theory T and a cardinal κ, we write I(T, κ) for the number of models
of T of cardinality κ, up to isomorphism.
Exercise 41. (Assume V is countable.) For any theory T , I(T, κ) ≤ 2κ .
What are the possible values of I(T, ℵ0 )? Here is a summary of what we
know so far:
• Any ℵ0 -categorical theory T has I(T, ℵ0 ) = 1.
• If T = ACFp for p prime or 0, then I(T, ℵ0 ) = ℵ0 .
• If T is a theory with Sx (T ) = 2ℵ0 for some context x, such as the theories
in Examples 7.16 and 7.15, then I(T, ℵ0 ) = 2ℵ0 . This is because every
type is realized in some countable model, but any countable model can
only realize countably many types.
Here is an example showing that I(T, ℵ0 ) can be finite but not 1.
Example 7.18. Let T = Th(Q; <, (cn )n∈ω ), where the constant symbol cn is
interpreted as the natural number n. Then T can be axiomatized by the theory
of dense linear orders without endpoints, together with axioms cn < cm when
n < m. It is an exercise to show that these axiomatize a complete theory.
Now T has exactly 3 countable models up to isomorphism:
1. Atomic: The sequence (cn ) has no upper bound. Any such model is
isomorphic to (Q; <, (cn )n∈ω ), where limn→∞ cn = ∞.
2. Saturated: The sequence (cn ) has an upper bound, but no least up-
per bound. Any such model is isomorphic to (Q; <, (cn )n∈ω ), where
limn→∞ cn = π.
3. Neither atomic nor saturated: The sequence (cn ) has a least upper bound.
Any such model is isomorphic to (Q; <, (cn )n∈ω ), where limn→∞ cn = 1.
Exercise 42. Let n ≥ 3. Find an example of a theory T such that I(T, ℵ0 ) = n.

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 Curiously, the case n = 2 is impossible. It’s worthwhile keeping Example 7.18
in mind while working through the proof.
Theorem 7.19 (Vaught). There is no complete theory T with exactly two count-
able models up to isomorphism.
Proof. Let T be a complete theory. We may assume T is small, since otherwise
it must have uncontably many countable models up to isomorphism. So T has
a countable saturated model M1 and a countable atomic model M0 .
We may also assume T is not ℵ0 -categorical. So there is some context x and
some non-isolated type p(x) ∈ Sx (T ). This type is realized in M1 but not in
M0 , so M0 ∼ 6 M1 . Our goal is now to find a third model of T .
=
Let a ∈ M1x be a realization of p, and consider the expanded language V(a)
by new constants naming the elements of a. Let M1 (a) be the expansion of M1
to a V(a)-structure, and let T (a) = ThV(a) (M1 (a)).
Now M1 (a) is still a countable saturated model of T (a), because any V(a)-
type over a finite tuple b from M1 (a) is essentially the same as a V-type over
the finite tuple ab, and hence realied in M1 . So T (a) is small, and hence it has
a countable atomic model M1/2 (a).
T (a) is not ℵ0 -categorical by the Ryll-Nardzewski theorem, since any infi-
nite family of V-formulas which are pairwise not T -equivalent remain not T (a)-
equivalent when viewed as V(a)-formulas. So there is some context y and some
non-isolated type q(y) ∈ Sy (T (a)), which is omitted in M1/2 (a).
Let M1/2 be the reduct of M1/2 (a) to V (forget about the new constant
symbols). Then M1/2 realizes p(x), so it is not isomorphic to M0 . And M1/2
omits q(y), viewed as a type over the finitely many parameters a, so M1/2 ∼6 M1 .
=
This is a contradiction.
Returning to theories with infinitely many countable models, we have seen
examples where I(T, ℵ0 ) = ℵ0 and I(T, ℵ0 ) = 2ℵ0 . Those interested in set
theory will wonder about the possibility of cardinals between ℵ0 and 2ℵ0 .
Conjecture 7.20 (Vaught). There is no theory T such that
ℵ0 < I(T, ℵ0 ) < 2ℵ0 .
Vaught’s conjecture is one of the oldest open problems in model theory.
Note that if we assume the continuum hypothesis, it is trivial, since there are
no cardinals between ℵ0 and 2ℵ0 = ℵ1 . The question is whether it is possible to
prove Vaught’s conjecture from the axioms of ZFC.
Using tools from descriptive set theory, Morley came close to settling the
conjecture.
Theorem 7.21 (Morley). There is no complete theory T such that
ℵ1 < I(T, ℵ0 ) < 2ℵ0 .
In light of the theorems of Vaught and Morley, the possibilities for I(T, ℵ0 )
when T is complete are: 1, 3, 4, 5, . . . , ℵ0 , ℵ1 , 2ℵ0 . And Vaught’s conjecture con-
cerns the open case of ℵ1 .

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