3.

TERRORIST-BASED CRISIS MANAGEMENT PROCEDURES

3.1 proactive phase
3.1. Predict
The first and foremost concern of crisis management is to be able to predict likee1ihood of
crises occurring through the continuous gathering/updating of inputs analysis of the threat. The
inputs consist basically of Intelligence and Events.
a. Intelligence
This involves collection, evaluation, processing, updating dissemination of information obtained
from all possible sources. Intelligence for this management may be categorized as strategic,
tactical and operational. The requirements and sources of intelligence are indicated below.
(1) Strategic Intelligence (International Threat Groups)
(a) Requirements
- Identity of Groups, leaders and members, known travel, recruitment
- Background, organizations, training, financing, logistics: support, weapons
- Usual areas of operation, international connections. state support
- Usual methods of operation
- Likely targets
(b) Sources
- Police and military
- Diplomatic channels
- Friendly intelligence
- Press
- Clandestine reporting
(2) Tactical Intelligence (Local / operating threat groups)
(a) Requirements (Same as Strategic Intelligence)
(b) Sources
- Police and military
- Intelligence Service
- Captured/surrendered members of threat groups
- Concerned citizens
- Press
(3) Operational Intelligence (Needed for Specific Incident)
(a) Requirements
- Number, location, identities and background of threat groups
- Number, location, identities and background of hostages
- Weapons and explosives in the hands of threat groups
- Detailed information on site of the incident and environs
* Building design and construction, floor plans, utilities, locks, access points
* Aircraft design and construction, communication equipment on board, and access points
* Ship design and construction, communication equipment on board
* Vehicle design and construction
* Terrain features of area and access routes
* Airfield data
* Weather data
b) Sources
- Observers at scene
- Witnesses at scene when incident began
- Building plans
- Aircraft design plans and airport layout, designers
- Security and maintenance personnel
- Airport and airline personnel
- Released or escaped hostages
- Hostage negotiators
- Technical operators
- Ship design and layout, naval architecture
b. Events
All significant information on events/incidents which could have a been on the types of crises
herein addressed or data obtained during occurrence of similar incidents or actual crisis, serve
as inputs which can facilitate analyses necessary for the identification of probable threat groups
and targets, or for formulating preventive measures, security procedures and probable courses
of action when similar incidents occur.
c. Threat Analysis
AFP/PNP units must be able to identify the threat, its nature. characteristics, operational
capabilities and probable targets and know their of vulnerabilities so that steps can be taken to
keep a potential threat from becoming reality. Threats may come in the form of kidnapping,
assassination, ambuscade arson, bombing, take-over of vital or high-value installations or
disruption of important national/international events.

2. Prevent
business concerns and individuals establish passive and active security measures and
systems , lessen the chances of success of terrorist-based crises/emergencies.
Additionally, systems and measures warning of the advent of crises/ emergencies may have to
be established to prevent them from turning to. full-blown proportions needing massive
responses.
Lastly, prophylactic actions may have to be undertaken to reverse or neutralize threat or threat
groups.
a. Operations Security
This pertains to the institution of proper security measures in the performance of assigned unit
missions and during military/police operations. Precautionary measures must be taken into
consideration to prevent the potential threat groups from the unit plans and operations. The
techniques of information security, physical security and the signal security and deception which
are considered interrelated and simultaneous must be continuously applied. The key to an
effective operations security system. :¬protecting information to provides awareness of the
threats and denies the threat group an opportunity to obtain sensitive information that can be
used of installation. Awareness and training likewise adds to the effectiveness of the program.
b. Personnel Security
This pertains to the protection of personnel against subversion and blackmail. All personnel are
generally susceptible to the threat of terrorist attack. They become terrorist targets not
necessarily because of who they are but of where and what happen to be. Good preventive or
precautionary measures can decrease the threat these attacks. Terrorist also select specific
people as targets for kidnapping, ex1cruC:¬hostage-taking and assassination. They gather
extensive intelligence information the personalities targeted through extensive surveillance.
(1) Consideration on Personnel Threat Assessment

(a) Rank and Risk

In general, higher ranking personnel have greater risk levels high threat areas, special
measures must be taken to secure high-ranking officer dignitaries and their dependents. Some
personnel may be selected as terrorist target by expertise or special knowledge they possess.
(b) Threat Level
Personnel who are considered as potential targets may categorized into primary, secondary or
random targets.
Primary targets usually include ranking military/police office government officials, foreign
dignitaries, other VIPs and individuals possess sensitive information. They are normally
selected or their publicity value to the terrorists.
Secondary targets are those selected as alternate terrorist gets These are personnel of lower
rank and risk than the primary targets but can by terrorist for publicity. Most action taken by the
CPPINPA terrorist elements against secondary targets due to their inherent exposure and
easier access secondary targets are normally attacked through ambuscades, raids, and
sparrow operations.
Randomly selected targets are those military/ Police or law enforcement personnel who are on
off-duty or engaged in private activities and become targets of opportunity.
3-3. Prepare (FIG 9)
In addition to the preventive measures being undertaken, all government agencies,
military/police units and installation must have Crisis Management Action Plans to enable them
to react in cases when crisis incidents occur. In general, military/ police commanders must
organize, train and equip special reaction, security and negotiation elements and provide
procedures for their immediate activation when the need arises.
a. Plan
This stage calls for the preparation of appropriate plans to meet all foreseeable emergencies
and crisis situations.
b. Organize
Crisis Management Organizations composed of police, military and government leaders are
established at the national, regional, provincial and municipal levels to ensure an integrated and
coordinated approach towards managing various types of crisis at all levels.
c. Train
Commanders of units designated to compose the tactical and support units and negotiation
team should periodically conduct training and exercised to ensure its operational readiness.
This requires the regular and progressive conduct of necessary individual training to enhance
the expertise of each participant; as well as scheduled and unscheduled unit training to develop
team work, precision and responsiveness in the implementation of any crisis contingency plan
whether during exercises or in actual crisis situations.

3.2 categories of threat groups

d. The Threat Groups
(1) Broad Categories of Threat Groups
(a) Political Terrorists
These are ideologically-inspired individuals or groups. They want prestige and power for a
collective goal or higher cause. Many of its members have extensive criminal backgrounds.
They often recruit new members from prisons. beginning their indoctrination and training while
still confined thereat. These recruits see membership in the terrorist group s an opportunity to
exercise violent behavior and they have pathological need for the support and identification
provided by group membership.
The CPP/NPA, MILF and MNLF Lost Command are basically considered as belonging to the
category of political terrorists, being called Dissident Terrorists (DTs) and Southern Philippine
Terrorists (SPTs), respectively. The ultra armed elements are likewise classified under this
category. While these groups advocate different ideologies, their characteristics, organizations,
and modus operandi re similar in that they may follow violent patterns of terrorist actions such
as hostage takings, assassinations, bombing of buildings, bridges and power lines, arsons,
ambuscade, etc.
(b) Criminals
These are people who commit terrorists acts for personal either than ideological gain. Some of
their terroristic acts such as kidnapping or extortion, are planned. Others are not planned, but
happen as a result of the confrontation and encounter with law enforcement agencies to an on-
going crime. For instance, a number of bank robberies have evolved into hostage-taking
situations when policemen arrive in response to an alarm while the robbery is still in progress.
(c) Mentally-Damaged Individuals
These people commit terrorists acts during a period of psychiatric disturbance. This type maybe
the most difficult terrorists to deal with. Many of them are impulsive and unpredictable.
(d) Religious Extremists
Mainly belonging to Southern Religious Fundamentalists orient of other faiths, they are apt to
execute hostages belonging to other religious groups.
(e) Economically-motivated groups/individuals mainly belonging labor groups. Depending on
their ideological orientations, motivations and long understanding situation, recourse to violence
may be resorted to many reasons favorable them.

3.3 terrorist characteristics

(a) Common Characteristics - The following are characteristics common to terrorist groups:
- They promote fear.
- Usually militarily weaker than the opposing security force.
- Do not necessarily equate tactical with mission success. Publicly may be the main terrorist
objective.
- Highly mobile.
- Exploit the fact that terror is cheap. A few perpetrators with inexpensive small arms can create
disruptions
affecting whole nations.
- Possess limited resources.
- Operate most often under cover.
- Believe small groups means security and efficiency.

(3) Threat Characteristics Matrix - The threat characteristics are categorized

into four: ORGANIZATIONAL (FIG 4), BEHAVIORAL (FIG 5), RESOURCE (FIG 6) AND
OPERATIONAL (FIG 7).
3.4 threat characteristics matrix

3.5 stages preparation in the personnel security progress

(a) Planning
This includes a threat analysis and an assessment of the available Personnel security
resources. Awareness and personnel security education procedures ~ be developed and
integrated into the day-to-day unit operation and training special procedures must be developed
for secondary and random targets. Special insurgency plans must be developed for visiting
dignitaries and VIPs.
(b) Awareness
Military/Police, dignitaries, civilian employees and their dependents ~ be made aware of the
terrorist threat in general as the perceived threat level at respective installations. This can be
achieved through periodic briefings, public formation drive and the dissemination of printed
materials. The need for personnel capacity awareness must be developed at this stage.
(c) Education
The specific personnel security procedures to be followed are presented during this stage.
Because logistics constraints make it impossible to protect possible terrorist targets, self-
protection and effective crime prevention procedures, cdeterrent measures must be undertaken.
Personnel must be informed of the various terrorist techniques used in attacking personnel such
as sparrow operations, letter IT ambuscades and the like.
(d) Physical Security
This pertains to the observance of physical means or measures to safeguard the installation
against sabotage. Physical security encompasses protection of information, material and
personnel against terrorist actions. Sufficient physical security measures have been devised to
ensure the protection of military/police installation in general Effort must be seriously exerted
towards the proper and religious implementation of these measures. Physical security measures
include outer and inner defence barrier protection, alarm, surveillance and guarding systems,
and personnel control system.
3.6 initial action, action and post-action activities
a. The initial action is normally taken by any police/military unit taking notice of the
existence of a crisis incident. This unit is referred to as the initial action unit.
b. The unit commander of the initial action unit shall perform the following procedures:
(1) Take immediate appropriate action to resolve problem. If the situation is beyond its capability
to handle, the matter should be reported to the Crisis Management Committee (CMC).
(2) The unit should take the necessary measures to initially contain the situation.
(3) The unit shall monitor and report the progress of the incident until CMC takes cognizance of
the situation.
(4) The unit shall likewise secure the scene, protect itself as much as possible without gunfire,
establish perimeter security and command, evacuate innocent civilians if possible, and prevent
escape of the perpetrators, until the tactical action/intervention elements/units gradually take
over as they arrive.
(5) Other than the aforecited tasks, the initial action unit shall not engage in any tactical action
against the perpetrators except in its own defense.
(6) During this stage, the CMC shall establish the Crisis Management Operations Center
(CMOC) at the appropriate AFPIPNP Headquarters’ Operations Center.
(7) The CMC shall officially declare the crisis situation and activate the military/police units,
government agencies and non-government organizations included in the ad hoc crisis
management organization at that level.
(8) The CMC designates the On-Scene Commander (OSC) and directs him to proceed to the
crisis incident scene.
(9) The OSC establishes the On-Scene Command Post (OSCP) at a suitable area within the
incident scene and informs the CMC through CMOC accordingly.
3-5 ACTION STAGE
The action phase begin as soon as the On-Scene Command Post (OSCP) is established and
the Reaction/Intervention and Support units and the Negotiation Team arrive and are deployed.
The On-Scene Command (OSC) relieves the initial action commander and completes staffing of
the OSCP. The OSC discusses the incident with his commanders and staff and decides on the
plans and actions to take. The action phase consists of two distinct and independent activities:
negotiation and .ct1cal action/intervention which can take place simultaneously or in
succession.
a. NEGOTIATION
(1) The chief negotiator undertakes the negotiation as soon as he has been properly briefed and
has received appropriate instruction from the OSC.
(2) He shall keep the OSCP informed of the progress of negotiations and take instructions only
from the OSC.
(3) He arranges or settles by conferring or discussing with the terrorist and at mediating. His
primary role is to persuade the perpetrators to make the best of bargain.
a. (4) The chief negotiator does .not command and neither does the on-scene tactical
commander negotiate.
(5) The Negotiation Team may allow intermediaries, such as national or ca. political leaders,
members of the clergy, immediate family members of the perpetrators or hostages, or other
respected/credible leaders in the community, to ~p in the negotiation. However, they should be
supported and backed up by trained members of the negotiation Team. Likewise, the
recommendation/advice of such intermediaries mayor may not be accepted by the OSC, whose
decision shall be final countermanded by the Chairman, CMC or by higher competent authority.
(6) The Negotiation Team shall be composed or personnel trained and experienced in the art of
negotiation.
(7) Negotiators may employ psychologists and interpreters to facilitate with the perpetrators as
the situation warrants.
8) All negotiations shall be terminated as soon as the perpetrators take hostile actions or begin
killing hostages.
(9) No further negotiations shall be undertaken once the reaction intervention Unit Commander
initiates tactical operation to neutralize the perpetrators.
b. Tactical Action/Intervention
(1) The Reaction Intervention Commander makes a complete on the crisis incident situation and
plans his courses of action upon arrival at the scene while the negotiation is in progress.
(2) He shall maintain close and continuous contact with the OSCP and keep same informed of
the development in the inner perimeter and of all tactical aC7 being taken.
(3) He shall take instructions only from the OSC but continuously inm the negotiation.
(4) He shall coordinate all his support requirements with the OSCP
(5) He shall exercise authority over all CMC action groups throughout the conduct of the tactical
action phase.
(6) When the negotiations fail or when the perpetrators begin killing hostage or undertaking
further hostile actions, the reaction intervention commander shall upon clearance with the OSC,
assault or undertake appropriate tactical action again the perpetrators until they are neutralized.
(7) Hot pursuit operations may be conducted in case the perpetrators escape;
3-6. Post Action
a. This phase begins as' soon as the perpetrators surrender, or when they are captured or
neutralized. The On-Scene Commander shall ensure that the following are
accomplished:
a. Processing and Debriefing
(1) Hostages/victims
(2) Perpetrators
(3) Witnesses
(4) Key participants of the incident
b. Protection of the Incident Scene
The incident scene must be cordoned and protected to prevent looters and e evidences as
necessary.
c. Investigation of the Incident
The investigation of the incident must proceed and shall be completed as possible as part of the
necessary documents for filing the case in court.
d. Documentation
(1) Sworn Statements of the following:
(a) Witnesses
(b) Hostages
(c) Perpetrators
(d) Key participants in the incidents
(2) Recovery and preservation of evidences
(3) Preservation of pictorials, video coverage and all written records.
(4) Post-Incident Reports
e. Filing and Prosecution of Cases
After all the necessary documentations are completed, the case shall be filed in court and the
perpetrators are prosecuted.
f. Training and Retraining of Units/ Personnel
Special units and negotiators shall continue with their training in order to improve their
proficiency and enhance their readiness.
g. Damage Compensation and Rehabilitation
(1) Initiates recommendation for the compensation, and provide appropriate assistance to
civilian killed or injured during the tactical operations.
a. (2) Initiate recommendation for the rehabilitation/construction of d destroyed properties
and essential infrastructures

4. CRISIS MANAGEMENT ORGANIZATION

4.1 national level organization
As a matter of policy, natural calamities and disasters will be the responsibilities the National
Disaster Coordinating Council (NDCC). Terrorist-based crises/emergencies on the other hand will be
the responsibility of the National Peace and Order Council (NPOC).

4.2 crisis management organization

4/3 national level crisis management organization

a. All crisis incidents at national level shall be handled by the NPOC Crisis Management
Committee, headed by the Secretary of the Department of the Interior Government.
b. The NPOC CMC shall give the necessary orders to those concerned for the of the Ad Hoc
National Crisis Management Organization.
c. The National Crisis Management Operations Center (NCMOC) shall be shed at IRC, NHQ
Building, Camp Crame and the On-Scene Command Post be established at the most
appropriate location in the vicinity of the crisis incident
d. The participation of all AFP units in CMC-directed operations involving PNP shall be as
directed by the Chief of Staff, AFP in coordination with Chief, PNP.
e. The NPOC CMC shall monitor crisis incident situations in the lower levels re prepared to
make decisions on matters referred by such lower level CMC.

4.4 on-scene command post

The On-Scene Command Post shall be established at the vicinity of the incident site where it
can best monitor and control the crisis management opera: All instructions from the CMC shall
be relayed to the OSCP through the C~IC

An On-Scene Commander (OSC) shall be designated by the Chairman, (from among the senior
officers of the PNP Headquarters. He may be the Regional Director, RECOM Operations
Officer, Provincial Director, Commander or Station Commander or any officer in the locality
chosen depend upon the nature, gravity and possible implications of the incident. He shall be
respond for everything happening to the crisis incident scene. He shall exercise direct and
control over all negotiation, operations, support and public affair groups ass: to him by the CMC,
regardless of the presence of any officer more senior than unless relieved by higher competent
authority. All orders at the scene of the incident shall emanate from the On-Scene-Commander
only. He shall and clear all his actions, if necessary, with the CMC.

4.5 tactical action/intervention units/elements

Crisis Management Action Groups

Negotiation Group (FIG. 20) - This group shall be composed of selected officials/
personalities and military/police personnel for the purpose of initiating with the terrorist
elements and performing liaison functions between them .4 the On-Scene Command Post.
This group shall be under the direct control and supervision of the On-Scene Commander.
(1) Negotiation Team - The Negotiating Team shall be headed by a chief negotiator
properly selected by the Chairman, CMC from among trained negotiators. may include
psychologist or an interpreter as required by toe situation. The primary concern of the
Negotiation Team is to save lives, prevent destruction of property, ~ pave the way for a
peaceful resolution of the crisis situation.
(2) Liaison Team - This team shall work in coordination with the Negotiation and the OSC and the
Tactical Action Commander to ensure smooth coordination shall coordinates for all the required
support of the Negotiation Team.
b. Operations Group (FIG. 21) - This group shall be composed of regular and special military and
police units/elements deployed in the crisis incident site to perform security functions and conduct
tactical operations/interventions necessary and appropriate to neutralize the terrorist
elements/perpetrators at the earliest possible time and at minimum risk and cost to life and
property.

(1.) Security Units/Elements

These are military or police personnel who shall compose the area and perimeter security.
Depending on the magnitude of the crisis, area security outside the immediate vicinity of the
incident shall be established to prevent other forces friendly to the perpetrators from
interfering or sending reinforcements either with men or materials.
(a) Area Security Units/Elements\

AFP/Police units/elements tasked to provide general area security to contain evidence

/criminal elements who may take advantage of the crisis incident
(b) Perimeter Security

AFP/Police units/elements tasked to provide outer and inner meter security in the
immediate vicinity of the incident.
Outer Perimeter Security effort shall be directed outward and be distant enough from the scene to
be out of the range of fire, prevent authorized TV coverage of the inner perimeter actions, prevent
terrorist supporters observing action, and to perform crowd control functions to ensure that no one
5 (terrorist reinforcements, press, curious spectators and other persons) who supposed to be at the
scene of the incident.
Inner Perimeter Security shall be directed inward. They must questioned as close to the
incident site as practicable, but out of the sight of Their two main functions are containment
and intelligence collection.
2) Tactical Action/ Intervention Units / Elements
These are AFP/Police units/elements and its specially organized, trained and to perform
highly specialized anti-terrorist operations such as sniper persons, bomb detection and
disposal and the like.

(3) Utilities Liaison Team - On orders of the OSC, coordinates with power, and water utility tries
to regulate supply to the area where hostage taking for the purpose of enhancing
government negotiation position.
c. Service Support Group (FIG. 22)
This group shall be composed of civilian agencies/organizations and military /police units
tasked to provide the necessary administrative, operational and logistical support to the On-
Scene Command Post. These support activities include feed distribution, medical
evacuation, communication-electronics, transportation and be services. The Service
Support shall have the following elements:
(1) Legal/Investigation Teams

These teams provides the necessary investigative support to the on-scene commander.
They conduct the investigation, collation and preservation of evidence documentation and
provide legal advice to the on-scene commander.
(2) Intelligence Team
This team is responsible for the collection and processing of all operations intelligence
needed by the On-Scene Commander and his staff. The team must all intelligence
gathered, and must be able to task other government elements for needed information. It
maintains maps and diagrams showing current situation.
(3)Communications-Electronics Team
This team is responsible for insuring effective communications between the OSC and CMC,
between the Reaction/Intervention Unit and the On-Scene Command Post (OSCP) between
the Support Group Teams and the OSCP, and between the negotiations and the terrorist
elements. It ~ay also ensure that control is established over all other communications into
and out of the crisis incident site.
(4) Logistics Team
This team is composed of support personnel who provide food and drinks ammunition,
clothing, supplies, equipment, transportation, lighting electricity if needed and other
logistical services. They also maintain facilities where off-duty persons can eat, rest and
where briefings can be held. This team must be able to request needed items from
appropriate agencies.
(5) Medical Team
The medical team provides medical supplies and services. It shall maintain contact with
hospitals to ensure that they are prepared to handle any eventuality shall plan for the
reception, treatment and evacuation of hostages and other casualties and after conclusion
of the crisis incident.
(6) Fire-Fighting Team
It shall provide fire-fighting units to extinguish fires intentionally set by the perpetrators or fires
resulting from the operation of the reaction/intervention.
(7) Administrative Support Team
These are personnel assigned to the OSCP to keep written record often incoming and outgoing
communications and ensures continuity between shifts permits accurate Post incident Reports.

4.6 inter-agency relationship at the lower levels

The lower level Crisis Management Committees shall be under the direct umbrella of the
corresponding lower level Peace and Order Councils. These committees shall be guided by the
policies set forth by such POCs.
All civilian government agencies, non-government agencies, military and police forces shall be
placed under the control and supervision of the corresponding lower level CMC for the duration
of the crisis incident. In cases of crisis incidents where immediate military/police action is
needed...
The Chairman of the CMC any of the lower levels may coordinate directly with the designated
military/police commander responsible in his locality for the employment of the necessary crisis
action force/units.
For purpose of implementing this interim doctrine, all AFP/PNP units designated as crisis
management operations forces/units shall be placed under the operational control of the
Chairman of the particular CMC having cognizance of a crisis incident, by the C, PNP, Chief of
staff, AFP, or the Area Commander concerned. on orders of the Chairman, Crisis Management
Committee.
In both of the foregoing instances, the AFP/PNP units designated to compose the crisis
management force shall take orders directly from the designated military police tactical
commander during the conduct of operations. These units shall revert to the control of their
assigned Command upon termination of the crisis incident