QUIZ #3

TODAY May 17

Color coded na lang muna tayo haha

Arvin
Athena
Kim

Answer with grammatically correct sentences:

1. Distinguish Neothomist Natural Law from the original concept of Natural

Law.
Aquinas believed that there is a natural order to the world, established by God,
which governs human behavior. This natural law is inherent in the nature of things and
can be discovered through reason. Through the use of reason, humans can understand
the fundamental principles of morality and apply them to specific situations.

Neothomisim, on the other hand, seeks to apply Aquinas's philosophical

framework to contemporary issues, engaging with modern developments in science,
ethics, metaphysics, and epistemology. They often emphasize the compatibility between
reason and faith, seeking to reconcile insights from philosophy with theological truths.

Similarities:
Neothomism Natural Law refers to the revival and reinterpretation of Thomistic
philosophy, particularly in the 19th and 20th centuries. Neothomist thinkers sought to
apply Thomistic principles to contemporary philosophical and theological debates.
Meanwhile, the original concept of Natural Law has ancient origins, with roots in
Greek philosophy (e.g., Aristotle) and Roman legal thought (e.g., Cicero). It was further
developed by thinkers like Thomas Aquinas, who integrated Christian theology with
Aristotelian philosophy.

Differences:
While both concepts emphasize reason and natural order, Neothomist Natural
Law tends to have a stronger theological foundation and a more explicit integration of
philosophical and theological insights.
Thus, Neothomist Natural Law gives significant weight to the authority of
tradition, including Thomistic philosophy and Catholic teachings, in shaping moral
principles and ethical norms.
 2. Apply the ruling in Coca-Cola Bottlers, In. case in the Historical and
Anthropological Jurisprudence. (How to relate this?? Lol)
Wait haha ang hirap naman iconnect neto!

Case ko toh. Gawan ko ng BS. Wait. HAha

From Jaypee’s readings:

According to F. K. von Savigny (Friedrich Carl von Savigny), Historical and
Anthropological Jurisprudence maintains that law is the product of historical
development and jurisprudence, and not found in the explanation of universal,
unchanging ideals such as maintained by the Classical Natural Law theories. Due to the
discovery of various cultures and societies, this theory sought to locate law in the
customs and traditions of the people which grew and gradually found expression at the
passage of time.

Thus, according to Historical Jurisprudence, the true source or origin of law is the
general or common consciousness of people. This is known as national spirit, national
character, or the spirit of the people that gives birth to positive law.

Three Phases in the Making of Law

1. Custom
○ The basis of positive law has its existence in the common consciousness of the
people.
○ By what means can we recognize it?
■ When it reveals itself in external act when it steps forth in usage,
manners, custom.
■ In the uniformity of a continuing and therefore lasting manner of action we
recognize the belief of the people as its common root.
2. Legislation
○ The making of law is not due to the will of the legislator.
○ The legislator is the source of the people’s law which reveals their common
consciousness.
○ The lawmaker stands at the center of society and attempts to provide an
exposition or explanation of this.
○ Written law is the organ of people’s law.
○ Lawmaker concentrates in himself their spirit, feelings, needs, so that we have to
regard him as the true representative of the spirit of the people.
3. Juristic Law or legal Science
○ Authorities of law are depended upon to compile, complete, and develop the law.
■ The law that they compile and create reflects or mirrors the common
consciousness of the people.
 ○ The law, originally he common property of the collective people, by the more
extended relations of active life is developed in so special a manner that it can no
longer be mastered by the knowledge uniformly spread among the people.
○ A special order of persons skilled in law who as an actual part of the people, in
this order of thought, represent the whole.

In the case of Coca-cola Bottlers, the theory of Historical and Anthropological

Jurisprudence may be related on the Court’s ruling that Menez (respondent) failed to
establish that there is a competent, credible and preponderant evidence to prove that he
suffered physical injuries when he allegedly ingested kerosene from the "Sprite" bottle in
question.

"Physical effects on the body" and "adverse effect on his body" are not very clear
and definite as to whether or not Meñez suffered physical injuries and if these
statements indicate that he did, what their nature was or how extensive they were.

Consequently, in the absence of sufficient evidence on physical injuries that

Meñez sustained, he is not entitled to moral damages.

Applying the theory of Savigny, it has been established in multiple jurisprudence

and the historical data of the Supreme court that the presentation of preponderance of
evidence is needed to prove that he was seriously injured. Furthermore, it has been
established in society that just because an injury has been committed does not
automatically grant reparations for the allegedly aggrieved. The consequences of
culpability should be weighed and measured against the wrong done. Therefore, Menez
cannot simply claim moral damages because he drank a bit of kerosene.

(Eto na lang kaya ng braincells ko Lol)

Guys, itong number 3 ang hindi ako sure pero baka tama ka Arvin.

3. State the concept of Sociological Jurisprudence.

From Jaypee’s readings:

Sociological Jurisprudence is the legal theory which is the result of understanding
the sociology of law. The sociology of law studies law as a phenomenon in society as
one of the important and valuable aspects of social life. This concerns the interaction of
law with the other aspects of society.
It also involves two (2) questions:
 a. “How does society affect law?” - This question is concerned on the
supposition of a legal theory which maintains that society is the source of
law. It also explains law in terms of this source or origin in the same
manner that the historical jurisprudence of Savigny claimed that the origin
of law is the common consciousness or the national spirit of the people
through which an explanation of law may be generated.

b. “How does law affect society?” - This question involves a theory of law that
focuses on the effect of law and discusses how law functions and
operates.

In essence, Sociological Jurisprudence states these three (3) main points:

a. Law is to be seen as an entirely social phenomenon.
b. Law must be understood empirically.
c. Law must be understood systematically.

From ChatGPT:
Sociological jurisprudence is a branch of legal theory that focuses on the relationship between
law and society. It emphasizes understanding law within its social context and considers how
societal factors influence the creation, interpretation, and enforcement of legal norms. This
approach contrasts with more traditional views that see law primarily as a set of abstract rules
and principles.

4. In David vs Gloria Macapagal Arroyo, what is the “calling out” power of the
president? When may the president invoke this power?

The calling out power of the President is laid down in Section 18, Article VII of the
1987 Constitution. This pertains to the power of the President, as Commander-in-Chief,
to call out the armed forces of the Philippines to prevent or suppress lawless violence,
invasion or rebellion. The only criteria to invoke the calling out power is “whenever it
becomes necessary.”

In this case, the Court held that the issuance of PP No. 1017 was constitutional
as there are factual bases to support the exercise of the calling-out power by former
President Arroyo.

In the case of David v. Macapagal-Arroyo, G.R. No. 171396, May 3, 2006, the
Supreme Court held that under the “calling-out power,” the President may summon the
armed forces to aid him/her in suppressing lawless violence, invasion, and rebellion.
This involves ordinary police action.
 Every act that goes beyond the President’s calling-out power is considered illegal
or ultra vires. For this reason, a President must be careful in the exercise of his/her
powers. He/she cannot invoke a greater power when he wishes to act under a lesser
power. There lies the wisdom of our Constitution, the greater the power, the greater are
the limitations.
The only criterion for the exercise of the calling-out power is that “whenever it
becomes necessary,” that the President may call the armed forces “to prevent or
suppress lawless violence, invasion, or rebellion” were present in the instant case.
Thus, then President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo found it necessary to issue
Presidential Proclamtion No. 1017. Owing to her office’s vast intelligence network, she
is in the best position to determine the actual condition of the country.

5. Is the right to stage a protest or rally an inherent right free from control by
the government? Read the case of Kilusang Mayo Uno, et al. vs Lomibao,
GR. No. 167798, April 25. 2006.

Char, kay Athena pala ito.

No. The right to stage a protest or rally, albeit guaranteed under the 1987
Constitution, is not entirely free from government control. Such right is subject to
regulation to ensure public order and safety.

In this case, the Supreme Court ruled that the requirement for a permit to hold
public assemblies under Batas Pambansa Bilang 880 (B.P. Blg. 880), otherwise
known as “The Public Assembly Act of 1985” is constitutional. The Court
reasoned that the regulation is a reasonable exercise of the state’s police power
aimed at maintaining public order and safety. It also clarified that the right to
assemble is subject to certain limitations and regulations to prevent chaos and
ensure the rights of others.

No, the exercise of the right to peaceably assemble, to stage a protest or rally, or
to petition the government for redress of grievances is not absolute for it may be
regulated by the duly constituted authorities.

The right to peaceably assemble and petition the government for grievances
finds place in the Bill of Rights. While it enjoys primacy and constitutional
protection, the right is not absolute. According to the KMU v. Lomibao, the Court
held that the exercise of such right is subject to regulation. The State’s power to
regulate is called police power, which is invoked to regulate and promote the
order and safety of the people in the exercise of their right to stage protests.

The imposition of BP 880 is constitutional. It does not in any way curtail the
exercise of the right to freedom of speech nor is a ban to public assemblies. The
law merely regulates the manner, time and place of the public assemblies in
accordance with the exercise of police power of the State to promote the order
and safety.
READINGS/NOTES
The Procedural Naturalism of Lon L. Fuller
Like Finnis, Lon Fuller (1964) rejects the conceptual naturalist idea that there are necessary
substantive moral constraints on the content of law. But Fuller, unlike Finnis, believes that law is
necessarily subject to a procedural morality. On Fuller’s view, human activity is necessarily
goal-oriented or purposive in the sense that people engage in a particular activity because it
helps them to achieve some end. Insofar as human activity is essentially purposive, according
to Fuller, particular human activities can be understood only in terms that make reference to
their purposes and ends. Thus, since lawmaking is essentially purposive activity, it can be
understood only in terms that explicitly acknowledge its essential values and purposes:

The only formula that might be called a definition of law offered in these writings is by now
thoroughly familiar: law is the enterprise of subjecting human conduct to the governance of
rules. Unlike most modern theories of law, this view treats law as an activity and regards a
legal system as the product of a sustained purposive effort (Fuller 1964, 106).

To the extent that a definition of law can be given, then, it must include the idea that law’s
essential function is to “achiev[e] [social] order through subjecting people’s conduct to the
guidance of general rules by which they may themselves orient their behavior” (Fuller 1965,
657).

Fuller’s functionalist conception of law implies that nothing can count as law unless it is capable
of performing law’s essential function of guiding behavior. And to be capable of performing this
function, a system of rules must satisfy the following principles:

● (P1) the rules must be expressed in general terms;

● (P2) the rules must be publicly promulgated;
● (P3) the rules must be prospective in effect;
● (P4) the rules must be expressed in understandable terms;
● (P5) the rules must be consistent with one another;
● (P6) the rules must not require conduct beyond the powers of the affected
parties;
● (P7) the rules must not be changed so frequently that the subject cannot rely on
them; and
● (P8) the rules must be administered in a manner consistent with their wording.

On Fuller’s view, no system of rules that fails minimally to satisfy these principles of legality can
achieve law’s essential purpose of achieving social order through the use of rules that guide
behavior. A system of rules that fails to satisfy (P2) or (P4), for example, cannot guide behavior
because people will not be able to determine what the rules require. Accordingly, Fuller
concludes that his eight principles are “internal” to law in the sense that they are built into the
existence conditions for law.

These internal principles constitute a morality, according to Fuller, because law necessarily has
positive moral value in two respects: (1) law conduces to a state of social order and (2) does so
by respecting human autonomy because rules guide behavior. Since no system of rules can
achieve these morally valuable objectives without minimally complying with the principles of
legality, it follows, on Fuller’s view, that they constitute a morality. Since these moral principles
are built into the existence conditions for law, they are internal and hence represent a
conceptual connection between law and morality. Thus, like the classical naturalists and unlike
Finnis, Fuller subscribes to the strongest form of the Overlap Thesis, which makes him a
conceptual naturalist.

Nevertheless, Fuller’s conceptual naturalism is fundamentally different from that of classical

naturalism. First, Fuller rejects the classical naturalist view that there are necessary moral
constraints on the content of law, holding instead that there are necessary moral constraints on
the procedural mechanisms by which law is made and administered: “What I have called the
internal morality of law is … a procedural version of natural law … [in the sense that it is]
concerned, not with the substantive aims of legal rules, but with the ways in which a system of
rules for governing human conduct must be constructed and administered if it is to be
efficacious and at the same time remain what it purports to be” (Fuller 1964, 96- 97).

Second, Fuller identifies the conceptual connection between law and morality at a higher level
of abstraction than the classical naturalists. The classical naturalists view morality as providing
substantive constraints on the content of individual laws; an unjust norm, on this view, is
conceptually disqualified from being legally valid. In contrast, Fuller views morality as providing
a constraint on the existence of a legal system: “A total failure in any one of these eight
directions does not simply result in a bad system of law; it results in something that is not
properly called a legal system at all” (Fuller 1964, 39).

Fuller’s procedural naturalism is vulnerable to a number of objections. H.L.A. Hart, for example,
denies Fuller’s claim that the principles of legality constitute an internal morality; according to
Hart, Fuller confuses the notions of morality and efficacy:

[T]he author’s insistence on classifying these principles of legality as a “morality” is a source

of confusion both for him and his readers…. [T]he crucial objection to the designation of
these principles of good legal craftsmanship as morality, in spite of the qualification “inner,”
is that it perpetrates a confusion between two notions that it is vital to hold apart: the notions
of purposive activity and morality. Poisoning is no doubt a purposive activity, and reflections
on its purpose may show that it has its internal principles. (“Avoid poisons however lethal if
they cause the victim to vomit”….) But to call these principles of the poisoner’s art “the
morality of poisoning” would simply blur the distinction between the notion of efficiency for a
 purpose and those final judgments about activities and purposes with which morality in its
various forms is concerned (Hart 1965, 1285-86).

On Hart’s view, all actions, including virtuous acts like lawmaking and impermissible acts like
poisoning, have their own internal standards of efficacy. But insofar as such standards of
efficacy conflict with morality, as they do in the case of poisoning, it follows that they are distinct
from moral standards. Thus, while Hart concedes that something like Fuller’s eight principles
are built into the existence conditions for law, he concludes they do not constitute a conceptual
connection between law and morality.

Unfortunately, Hart overlooks the fact that most of Fuller’s eight principles double as moral
ideals of fairness. For example, public promulgation in understandable terms may be a
necessary condition for efficacy, but it is also a moral ideal; it is morally objectionable for a state
to enforce rules that have not been publicly promulgated in terms reasonably calculated to give
notice of what is required. Similarly, we take it for granted that it is wrong for a state to enact
retroactive rules, inconsistent rules, and rules that require what is impossible. Poisoning may
have its internal standards of efficacy, but such standards are distinguishable from the principles
of legality in that they conflict with moral ideals.

Nevertheless, Fuller’s principles operate internally, not as moral ideals, but merely as principles
of efficacy. As Fuller would likely acknowledge, the existence of a legal system is consistent with
considerable divergence from the principles of legality. Legal standards, for example, are
necessarily promulgated in general terms that inevitably give rise to problems of vagueness.
And officials all too often fail to administer the laws in a fair and even-handed manner even in
the best of legal systems. These divergences may always be prima facie objectionable, but they
are inconsistent with a legal system only when they render a legal system incapable of
performing its essential function of guiding behavior. Insofar as these principles are built into the
existence conditions for law, it is because they operate as efficacy conditions and not because
they function as moral ideals.
 PROCEDURAL NATURAL LAW (Lon Fuller)

I. Introduction

Procedural Natural Law

● Also known as procedural jurisprudence.

● Idea: Natural law is not just a collection of moral principles or moral truths, but rather a
procedural process that guides human decision-making and action.
● Natural law is not just about what we should do, but also about how we should go about
making decisions.

Lon Fuller

● Natural law is methodological or procedural in character, owing from the law’s purposive
nature.
● Due to law’s purpose and its processes law tends to become moral.
● Purposive theory of law.

Purposive Theory of Law

● Also known as the Internal Morality of Law

● Fuller's theory focuses on the internal logic and moral structure of law, rather than its
external effects or consequences.
● The purpose of law is not simply to impose rules or regulate behavior, but rather to
create a system of governance that is morally just and fair.
● He argues that laws must be designed to achieve this purpose, and that the legitimacy of
a legal system depends on its ability to fulfill this purpose.

Procedural Justice v. Substantive justice

Procedural

● Procedural justice refers to the fairness and integrity of the legal process, including the
rules and procedures used to resolve disputes, enforce laws, and protect individual
rights.
● Procedural justice is concerned with the way in which justice is administered, rather than
the outcome of the process.
● A legal system must be procedurally just in order to be considered morally decent.
● Procedural justice is essential for maintaining social trust and legitimacy in the legal
system.

Substantive
 ● Substantive justice refers to the fairness and equity of the outcome or result of a legal
process.
● Substantive justice is concerned with whether the outcome of the process is just and
morally correct.
● A just society should prioritize the well-being of its most disadvantaged members.
● Substantive justice is essential for ensuring that individuals receive fair treatment and
that societal injustices are addressed.

II. Methodology

Fuller’s theory of law

● Law is a methodological or procedural natural law, which emphasizes the law’s

purposive character.
● Law is the enterprise of subjecting human conduct to the governance of rules.
● The law is not just a collection of rules and regulations, but a system that has its own
inherent morality.

III. The Two Moralities

Concept of the Two Moralities

1. Morality of Duty
○ It lays down the basic rules without which an ordered society is impossible, or
without which an ordered society directed toward certain specific goals must fail
of its mark.
○ It is the morality of the Old Testament and the Ten Commandments.
■ It speaks in terms of ‘thou shalt not,’ and less frequently of ’thou shalt.’
○ It does not condemn men for failing to embrace opportunities for the fullest
realization of their powers. Instead, it condemns them for failing to respect the
basic requirements of social living.
○ Starts at the bottom of human achievement.
○ Concerned with the moral obligations and responsibilities that we have towards
others.
○ This approach emphasizes the importance of fulfilling our duties and obligations,
even if it means sacrificing our own desires or interests.
○ The morality of duty is based on the idea that we have a moral obligation to act in
a way that is consistent with our moral principles, regardless of whether it is easy
or difficult.
○ In this approach, morality is seen as a set of rules or norms that guide our
behavior. We are morally obligated to follow these rules because they are
necessary for maintaining social order and protecting individual rights.
○ Ex: Paying taxes
2. Morality of Aspiration
 ○ It is the morality of the Good Life, of excellence, of the fullest realization of human
powers.
○ Exemplified in Greek philosophy.
○ Instead of ideas of right and wrong, of moral claim and moral duty, we have
rather the conception of proper and fitting conduct, conduct such as beseems a
human being functioning at his best.
○ Starts at the top of human achievement.
○ Concerned with the moral ideals and values that we strive to achieve.
○ This approach emphasizes the importance of pursuing excellence, perfection,
and the greater good, even if it requires significant effort or sacrifice.
○ The morality of aspiration is based on the idea that we have a moral duty to strive
for what is best, even if it is not always easy or achievable.
○ In this approach, morality is seen as a set of ideals or values that guide our
behavior. We are morally obligated to strive for these ideals because they are
essential for personal growth, social progress, and human flourishing.
○ Ex: Striving for personal excellence and achievement

IV. Internal Morality of Law

Concept of Internal Morality to Law

● There is something that can be called a ‘merger’ of law and morality, and to which the
term ‘intersection’ is scarcely appropriate.
● Law, considered merely as an order, contains its own implicit morality. This morality of
order must be respected if we are to create anything that can be called law, even bad
law. Law by itself is powerless to bring this morality into existence.
● The authority to make law must be supported by moral attitudes that accord to it the
competency it claims.
○ Morality external to law.
● We still cannot have law until our monarch is ready to accept the internal morality of law
itself.
● In the life of a nation these external and internal moralities of law reciprocally influence
one another; a deterioration of the one will almost inevitably produce a deterioration in
the other.
● The concept of internal morality to law refers to the idea that a law or legal system is not
just a set of rules and regulations, but also reflects a moral code or set of values that
guide the behavior of individuals and society as a whole.

Eight ways to fail to make law: (Morality of Aspiration)

1. Failure to achieve rules at all, so that every issue must be decided on an ad hoc basis;
2. Failure to publicize, or at least to make available to the affected party, the rules he is
expected to observe;
 3. The abuse of retroactive legislation, which not only cannot itself guide action, but
undercuts the integrity of rules prospective in effect, since it puts them under the threat
of retrospective change;
4. Failure to make rules understandable;
5. Enactment of contradictory rules;
6. Rules that require conduct beyond the powers of the affected party;
7. Introducing such frequent changes in the rules that the subject cannot orient his action
by them; and
8. Failure of congruence between the rules as announced and their actual administration.

Eight legal excellence or requirements to law: (Law’s internal morality)

1. General
○ Without generality, there will be insufficient guidance.
○ Rules must be suitably general to inform the public or citizenry as to what to do or
how to behave.
2. Public
○ Rules must be made public; if not, again people would not know how to behave.
3. Prospective
○ Rules must be prospective.
○ Rules with a retrospective effect can no longer guide individuals as to the past.
○ Applied prospectively, individuals would now know what conduct to avoid.
○ An element of fairness comes with this requirement.
○ Quite often, punishment is meted to those who break the law. It is but fair that the
individual know what conduct to avoid to escape punishment.
4. Clear
○ Laws must be clear; otherwise they will again fail to prescribe what is to be done.
5. Consistent
○ Laws must be consistent. This is because inconsistencies give rise to mixed
signals and therefore again fail to guide.
6. Capable of being complied with
○ Laws must not require the impossible, lest the individual be punished for
something he could not avoid doing.
7. Constant through time
8. Congruent with official behavior
○ There must be some congruence between official behavior and the prescriptions
of the law.
○ Officials, in other words, ought to apply the law.
■ Otherwise, citizens will get away with illegal behavior and the enterprise
of law once again fails.

Fuller’s Argument on the 8 essential features of a legal system:

● A legal system that fails to fulfill these criteria is not morally decent and may not be
considered a legitimate system of governance.
Procedural v. Constructive

Focus: Procedural natural law focuses on the moral principles that govern human behavior,
while constructive natural law focuses on the creation of new moral norms and principles.

Method: Procedural natural law emphasizes the importance of following a moral procedure,
while constructive natural law emphasizes the role of human creativity and innovation in
shaping moral principles.

Role of Reason: Procedural natural law emphasizes the role of reason in discovering moral
principles, while constructive natural law emphasizes the role of reason in shaping moral
principles.

Moral Authority: Procedural natural law tends to rely on traditional authority figures, such as
God or experts, while constructive natural law tends to emphasize individual autonomy and
self-authority.
 CONSTRUCTIVE NATURAL LAW (Ronald Dworkin)

I. Introduction

Constructive Natural Law

● Philosophical framework that combines elements of natural law theory with a

constructivist approach.
● Dworkin argues that moral and legal principles are not discovered through empirical
observation or deduction, but rather constructed through a process of critical reasoning
and interpretation.

Dworkin

● Emphasizing the importance of critical reasoning, social context, and ongoing

construction in shaping our moral and legal principles.

II. Methodology

Proposition of Law

● All the various statements and claims people make about what the law allows or
prohibits or entitles them to have.
● Propositions of law - are true or false (or neither) in virtue of other
● Grounds of law - more familiar kinds of propositions on which these propositions of law
are (as we might put it) parasitic.

Constructive Interpretation

● Is a matter of imposing purpose on an object or practice in order to make of it the best

possible example of the form or genre to which it is taken to belong.
● Interpretation involves the search not for author’s meaning but interpreter’s meaning; it is
meaning imposed on the object of interpretation.

Three Stages of Interpretation:

1. Pre-interpretive Stage
○ The rule and standards taken to provide the tentative content of the practice are
identified.
○ A very great degree of consensus is needed if the interpretive attitude is to be
fruitful.
2. Interpretive Stage
○ The interpreter settles on some general justification for the main elements of the
practice identified at the preinterpretive stage.
 ○ Consist of an argument why a practice of that general shape is worth pursuing, if
it is.
○ It must fit enough for the interpreter to be able to see himself as interpreting that
practice.
3. Post-interpretive or reforming stage
○ He adjusts his sense of what the practice ‘really’ requires so as better to serve
the justification he accepts at the preinterpretive stage.

Concept of Paradigm

● Paradigms will be treated as concrete examples any plausible interpretation must fit, and
argument against an interpretation will take the form, whenever this is possible, of
showing that it fails to include or account for a paradigm case.
● Paradigms anchor interpretations, but no paradigm is secure from challenge by a new
interpretation that accounts for other paradigms better and leaves that one isolated as a
mistake.
● The paradigm of gender might have survived other transformations for a long time, just
because it seemed so firmly fixed, until it became an unrecognized anachronism.

Theory of Adjudication

Two Dimensions by which any theory of adjudication should be judged:

1. Dimension of fit
○ The interpretation he takes up must nevertheless flow throughout the text; it must
have general explanatory power, and it is flawed if it leaves unexplained some
major structural aspect of the text, a subplot treated as having great dramatic
importance or a dominant and repeated metaphor.
2. Dimension of justification
○ Requires him to judge which of these eligible readings makes the work in
progress best, all things considered.

III. Theories of law

1. Conventionalism
2. Pragmatism
3. Law as Integrity

Conventionalism

Main Characteristics

● Conventionalism derives from a basic common-sense intuition.

● “The law is the law. It is not what the judges think it is, but what it really is. Their job is to
apply it, not to change it to fit their own ethics or politics.”
 ● Conventionalism explains how the content of past political decisions can be made
explicit and noncontestable. It makes the law depend on distinct social conventions it
designates as legal conventions.
○ Ex: In America, it is settled by convention that law is made by statutes enacted by
Congress or the state legislatures in the manner prescribed by the Constitution.
● Conventionalism corrects the popular layman’s view that there is always a law to
enforce. Law by convention is never complete, because new issues constantly arise that
have not been settled one way or the other by whatever institutions have conventional
authority to decide them.

Appeal

● Conventionalism’s appealing or attractive feature depends on the characteristics of

certainty, predictability, fairness, and protected expectations.

Two versions of Conventionalism

1. Strict Conventionalism
○ Restricts the law of a community to the explicit extension of its legal conventions
like legislation and precedent.
○ Gives only the negative advice that judges must not pretend to be deciding such
cases on legal grounds.
2. Soft Conventionalism
○ The law of the community includes everything within the implicit extension of
these conventions.
○ Instructs judges to decide according to their own interpretation of the concrete
requirements of legislation and precedent, even though this may be controversial,
and this advice is not irrelevant in hard cases.

Flaws in Conventionalism

1. Dimension of Fit
○ It fails for the following paradoxical reason: our judges actually pay more
attention to so-called conventional sources of law like statutes and precedents
than conventionalism allows them to do.
○ A self-consciously strict conventionalist judge would lose interest in legislation
and precedent at just the point when it became clear that the explicit extension of
these supposed conventions had run out.
○ He would then acknowledge that there was no law, and he would have no further
concern for consistency with the past; he would proceed to make new law by
asking what law the present legislature would make or what the people want or
what would be in the community’s best interests for the future.
2. Dimension of Justice

Legal Pragmatism
 ● Legal decisions and interpretations should be based on a pragmatic consideration of the
practical consequences of different options, rather than solely on theoretical or abstract
considerations.

Main Characteristics

● It offers a very different interpretation of our legal practice: that judges do and should
make whatever decisions seem to them best for the community’s future, not counting
any form of consistency with the past as valuable for its own sake.
● Legal pragmatist finds the necessary justification for coercion in the justice or efficiency
or some other contemporary virtue of the coercive decision itself, as and when it is made
by judges, and he adds that consistency with any past legislative or judicial decision
does not in principle contribute to the justice or virtue of any present one.

Law as Integrity

Main Characteristics

● Law as integrity accepts law and legal rights wholeheartedly.

● It supposes that law’s constraints benefit society not just by providing predictability or
procedural fairness, but by securing some kind of equality among citizens that make
their community more genuine and improves its moral justification for exercising the
political power it does.
● Rights and responsibilities flow from past decisions and so count as legal, not just when
they are explicit in these decisions but also when they follow from the principles of
personal and political morality the explicit decisions presuppose by way of justification.

Appeal

● Integrity in legislation
○ Restricts what our legislators and other lawmakers may properly do in expanding
or changing our public standards.
● Integrity in adjudication
○ Requires our judges, so far as this is possible, to treat our present system of
public standards as expressing and respecting a coherent set of principles, and,
to that end, to interpret these standards to find implicit standards between and
beneath the explicit ones.
● Integrity in legislation and integrity in adjudication are necessarily related. Indeed the
judge, in adjudicating and applying the law, tries to maintain the integrity of the statutes
the lawmakers have enacted.

Three Models of Community

1. De Facto Model
 ○ Members of a community treat their association as only a de facto accident of
history and geography, among other things, and so as not a true associative
community at all.
2. Rulebook Model associated with Conventionalism
○ It supposes that members of a political community accept a general commitment
to obey rules established in a certain way that is special to that community.
3. Model of principle associated with Law as Integrity
○ It insists that people are members of a genuine political community only when
they accept that their fates are linked in the following strong way: they accept that
they are governed by common principles, not just by rules hammered out in a
political compromise.
○ Members of a society of principle accept that their political rights and duties are
not exhausted by the particular decisions their political institutions have reached,
but depend, more generally, on the scheme of principles those decisions
presuppose and endorse.
 HISTORICAL AND ANTHROPOLOGICAL JURISPRUDENCE
(F. K. von Savigny & Sir Henry Maine )

From Wikipedia:
● Friedrich Carl von Savigny (February 21, 1779 –October 25, 1861) was a German jurist
and historian.
○ Main points of contention:
1. Law is part and parcel of national life.
2. Opposed the idea that law can be arbitrarily imposed on a country
irrespective of its state of civilization and history.
3. The practice and theory of jurisprudence cannot be divorced without injury to
both.

● Sir Henry James Sumner Maine (August 15, 1822–February 3, 1888), was a British
comparative jurist and historian. He can be seen as one of the forefathers of modern
legal anthropology, legal history and sociology of law.
○ Main points of contention:
1. Law and society developed “from status to contract.”
2. In the ancient world, individuals were tightly bound by status dealing
within a particular group.
3. In the modern one, individuals are viewed as autonomous agents; they
are free to make contracts and form associations with whomever they
choose.

From Jaypee’s Reading:

● Historical and Anthropological Jurisprudence maintains that law is the product of
historical development and jurisprudence, and not found in the explanation of
universal, unchanging ideals such as maintained by the Classical Natural Law theories.
● Due to the discovery of various cultures and societies, this theory sought to locate law
in the customs and traditions of the people which grew and gradually found
expression at the passage of time.

A. SAVIGNY (The Concept of “People”)

● Savigny’s Theory of Law: Savigny established the Historical School of Law in Germany.
● He expounded a theory about law based on its origin or source. It studied the history of
law in Germany, particularly the influence and effect of Roman Law to German Law in
this age.
● In his extensive and comprehensive research, he arrived at the conclusion that the
source or origin of law provides a significant characteristic of law that reflects where the
true essence of law may be derived.
● According to this, the characteristic of law may be perceived from the general or
common consciousness of the people.
● The concept of “people” dominantly emerges in Savigny’s theory.
 ○ “The generation of law has been preliminarily posited in the people as the
active, personal subject.
○ There remains over as a common nature, the united life of a plurality of men,
regulated in a definite manner.
● He mentioned the natural strength and unity of the people.
○ When we regard the people as a natural unity and merely as the subject of
positive law, we ought not to think only of the individuals comprised in that people
at any particular time;
○ That unity rather runs through generations constantly replacing one
another, and
○ Thus, it unites the present with the past and the future.
● This doctrine of the national spirit of the people as a source of law may be
compared to other legal theories today.
○ Savigny doubted the legal positivist contention that the origin of law is the
“arbitrary” (or irrational) wishes of particular members of society.
● Savigny differentiated this proposed view of the theorists of Classical Natural Law
Theory that the origin of law is an objectively true morality that may mirror the “general
spirit of humanity”.
● From this perspective, the two (2) theories may also be harmonized.
● The view in which the individual people is regarded as the generator and subject of
positive or practical law may appear too confined to some who might be inclined to
ascribe that generation rather to the general spirit of humanity than to that of a particular
people. On closer examination these two views do not appear conflicting. What works in
an individual people is merely the general human spirit which reveals itself in that people
in a particular manner. The generation of law is a fact and one common to the whole.

F.K. Von Savigny’s Theory of Law

● Established the Historical School of Law in Germany.

● Conclusion: the source or origin of law provides a significant characteristic of law that
reflects where the true essence of law may be derived.

Definition of Positive Law

● The characteristic of law may be perceived from the general or common consciousness
of the people.
● People’s law (Volksrecht)
○ In the general consciousness of the people lives positive law.
● It is the spirit of the people living and working in common in all the individuals, which
gives birth to positive law.
● We acknowledge an invisible origin of positive law
● The true source or origin of law is the general or common consciousness of people.
○ National spirit, national character, or the spirit of the people. (Volksgeist)
Concept of People

● The generation of law has been preliminarily posited in the people as the active,
personal subject.
● There are various associations in one nation, and there may arise a peculiar law that is
contrary to the law of the people.
○ Even where the unity of the people is undoubted, within its limits are often found
inner circles.
○ In these circles, a special generation of law may have its seat as particular law,
side by side with the general law of the nation.
● Unity runs through generations constantly replacing one another, and thus it unites the
present with the past and the future.
● What works in an individual people is merely the general human spirit which reveals
itself in that people in a particular manner.
● The generation of law is a fact and one common to the whole.

Introductory Definition of Positive Law

● A putative law is valid or binding if it originates from or manifests the Volkgeist, or the
general or common consciousness, national character, or national spirit of the people.
● It is the spirit of the people living and working in common in all the individuals which
gives birth to the positive law.
● That wherever men live together, they stand in an intellectual communion, where there is
the seat of the generation of law.

Empirical Basis and Foundation of Savigny’s Definition of Law

● Volkgeist is one unique, ultimate, and mysterious truth.

● The idea of the Volkgeist is truly metaphysical.
● A theory is descriptive is the method it uses in the analysis of law has an empirical basis.
● Historical Jurisprudence
○ The method that it uses in analyzing law is empirical.
○ It analyzes law by means of empirical investigations and historical depictions and
developments of law.
○ It is correctly placed as a social science theory with a descriptive character.
● The existence of a common consciousness or national spirit may be perceived and is
tangible.
○ Common consciousness lies in the biological nature of the people.
● Nation is an organism that is born, grows, wanes, and dies.
○ Law is an essential characteristic of this organism.
○ The law grows together with its waning, and strengthens together with the
strengthening of the nation, and in the end dies when the nation loses its very
nationhood.

Two Categories of Proof

 1. The logical and non-logical empirical proof
○ Logical proof lies in the universal uniform recognition of positive law and in the
feeling of inner necessity with which its conception is accompanied.
■ May be determined by perceiving only our own thoughts and
consciousness.
○ Non-logical proof is accomplished by means of comparison or analogy.
■ It lies in the analogy of other peculiarities of people which have in like
manner an origin invisible and reaching beyond authentic history.
■ Social life, speech
■ The individual nature of a particular people is determined and recognized
solely by those common directions and activities.
2. The comprehensive historical and empirical analysis of law
○ By means of a thorough empirical investigation, that comprehensively examines
the history of law, and its origin and development.
○ The comprehensive argument from an empirical basis, concerning the existence
of a common consciousness or Volksgeist, is formulated and completed by
means of these three phases stages.

Three Phases in the Making of Law

4. Custom
○ The basis of positive law has its existence in the common consciousness of the
people.
○ By what means can we recognize it?
■ When it reveals itself in external act when it steps forth in usage,
manners, custom.
■ In the uniformity of a continuing and therefore lasting manner of action we
recognize the belief of the people as its common root.
5. Legislation
○ The making of law is not due to the will of the legislator.
○ The legislator is the source of the people’s law which reveals their common
consciousness.
○ The lawmaker stands at the center of society and attempts to provide an
exposition or explanation of this.
○ Written law is the organ of people’s law.
○ Lawmaker concentrates in himself their spirit, feelings, needs, so that we have to
regard him as the true representative of the spirit of the people.
6. Juristic Law or legal Science
○ Authorities of law are depended upon to compile, complete, and develop the law.
■ The law that they compile and create reflects or mirrors the common
consciousness of the people.
○ The law, originally he common property of the collective people, by the more
extended relations of active life is developed in so special a manner that it can no
longer be mastered by the knowledge uniformly spread among the people.
 ○ A special order of persons skilled in law who as an actual part of the people, in
this order of thought, represent the whole.

B. MAINE (The Stages in the Development of Law)

● First Stage: Themistes or Judgments
○ Law originates not as custom but from judgments handed down by human
authorities (such as kings) or attributed to superhuman ones (such as gods).
○ These judgments (“themistes”) arise in the legal history of the world before the
idea of a rule.
○ The judge predates the lawmaker.
○ But the ‘epoch of kingly rule’ is succeeded by ‘an era of oligarchies’ in which the
purely charismatic authority of particular rulers gives way to the rule of military,
political, religious, or other elites.
○ At this stage, the authority to make ‘inspired’ judgments requiring no special
justification has ceased to exist.

● Second Stage: Customary Law.

○ Judgments are no longer considered divinely inspired but are justified as being
based on established custom.
○ Customary law may be viewed as having a divine origin.
○ Law, in this stage of evolution, is unwritten.
○ Its knowledge can easily be monopolized by a juristic elite.
○ This unwritten law should not be confused with English common law which
became written—whatever classical common law thought might suggest—once
cases and legal arguments were recorded in the year books and elsewhere.

● Third Stage: Codes

○ Codes become possible with the discovery and diffusion of the art of writing.
○ These gave rulers or communities a means of breaking the knowledge-monopoly
of juristic elites.
○ Codes tended to mix ‘religious, civil, and merely moral ordinances, without any
regard to differences in their essential character’ because the separation of law
from morality and from religion belongs ‘very distinctly to the later stages of
mental progress.’
○ In writing of the era of codes, mark the transition from unwritten to written law.

● Maine depicted the history of law in terms of five (5) stages:

○ 1st: In the earliest period, law was created by the personal commands of
patriarchal rulers, who were considered by their subjects to act under divine
inspiration.
○ 2nd: Period of customary law, which expounded and applied by an aristocracy
or small privileged class which claimed a monopoly of legal knowledge.
○ 3rd: Codidification of these customs as the result of social conflicts.
 ○ 4th: Modification of strict archaic law by the help of fiction, equity, and
legislation. These instrumentalities are designed to bring the law into harmony
with a progressing society.
○ 5th: Scientific jurisprudence weaves all these various forms of law into a
consistent and systematic whole.
○ Not all societies succeed in passing through all these stages, and their legal
development in particular aspects does not show a uniform line.

From ChatGPT:
● Friedrich Carl von Savigny was a prominent German jurist and legal scholar who made
significant contributions to the field of legal philosophy and jurisprudence.
● One of his notable works is “Historical and Anthropological Jurisprudence,” which is a
foundational text in the study of legal history and anthropology.
● In this work, Savigny emphasized the importance of understanding law in its historical
and cultural context.
● He argued that law is not an abstract set of rules but rather a product of historical
development and cultural evolution.
● Savigny believed that legal systems and institutions are shaped by the customs,
traditions, and values of a society, and therefore, to truly understand law, one must
examine its historical roots and the cultural milieu in which it operates.
● His approach to jurisprudence emphasized the organic growth of law, viewing it as a
reflection of the collective consciousness and spirit (Volksgeist) of a people.
● He advocated for a method of legal interpretation that takes into account the historical
context and the underlying principles embedded in the legal traditions of a community.
● Overall, Savigny’s “Historical and Anthropological Jurisprudence” laid the groundwork for
the development of historical and anthropological approaches to law, influencing
subsequent generations of legal scholars and historians in their study of legal systems
and their cultural and historical dimensions.
 NEOTHOMIST NATURAL LAW (John Finnis)

From Wikipedia:
● John Mitchell Finnis (July 28, 1940) is an Australian legal philosopher and jurist
specializing in jurisprudence and the philosophy of law.
● He is an original interpreter of Aristotle and Aquinas, and counts Germain Grisez as a
major influence and collaborator.
● He has made contributions to epistemology, metaphysics, and moral philosophy.
● He was Professor of Law and Legal Philosophy at the University of Oxford from 1989 to
2010, where he is now Professor of Law and Legal Philosophy Emeritus.

From Jaypee’s Reading:

● Finnis’s concept of law is as follows: The conceptual point of law is to facilitate the
common good by providing authoritative rules that solve coordination problems that arise
in connection with the common pursuit of these basic goods.
● The term “law” refers primarily to rules made, in accordance with regulative legal
rules, by a determinate and effective authority (itself identified and, standardly,
constituted as an institution by legal rules) for a “complete” community; and
● Buttressed by sanctions in accordance with the rule-guided stipulations of adjudicative
institutions;
● This ensemble of rules and institutions being directed to reasonably resolving any of the
community’s co-ordination problems (and to ratifying, tolerating, regulating, or overriding
co-ordination solutions from any other institutions or sources of norms) for the common
good of that community.
Hhe tackled the problem of whether an unjust law qualifies as law, which to him merely
constituted a subordinate concern of Natural Law Theory.

From ChatGPT:
Neothomism refers to a contemporary revival or adaptation of the philosophical and theological
ideas of Thomas Aquinas, a 13th-century Catholic theologian and philosopher. Thomism, the
intellectual tradition based on Aquinas's work, has had a significant influence on Western
thought, particularly within the Catholic Church. Neothomism emerged in the late 19th and early
20th centuries as a response to various intellectual challenges facing Christianity, including the
rise of modern science, secularism, and skepticism.

Neothomists seek to apply Aquinas's philosophical framework to contemporary issues,

engaging with modern developments in science, ethics, metaphysics, and epistemology. They
often emphasize the compatibility between reason and faith, seeking to reconcile insights from
philosophy with theological truths. Neothomism has influenced various academic disciplines,
including philosophy, theology, ethics, and political theory, and continues to be a significant
intellectual tradition within Catholic thought.
Neothomism has had a notable impact on legal theory and jurisprudence, particularly within the
context of natural law theory. Natural law, as understood within the Thomistic tradition, posits
that there are objective moral principles inherent in the nature of reality, discoverable through
human reason and accessible to all people.

In the realm of law, Neothomists apply this understanding of natural law to legal theory and
practice in several ways:

1. **Ethical Foundation**: Neothomist legal theorists argue that law should be grounded
in objective moral principles derived from natural law. They contend that legal systems
should strive to promote justice and the common good, reflecting the inherent moral
order of the universe.

2. **Human Dignity and Rights**: Neothomism emphasizes the inherent dignity of every
human being, rooted in their rational nature. From this perspective, legal systems should
respect and protect human rights that flow from this dignity, such as the rights to life,
liberty, and property.

3. **Legal Interpretation and Just Governance**: Neothomist legal scholars often

advocate for a method of legal interpretation that seeks to discern the moral principles
underlying laws and legal systems. They argue for a form of governance that prioritizes
the promotion of virtue and the flourishing of individuals and communities.

4. **Natural Law and Positive Law**: Neothomists engage with the relationship between
natural law and positive law (man-made laws enacted by governments). While
recognizing the necessity of positive law for social order, they contend that positive laws
should be consistent with, and derived from, natural law principles.

5. **Critique of Legal Positivism**: Neothomist legal theorists often critique legal

positivism, which holds that the validity of law derives solely from social sources such as
legislation or judicial decisions. Instead, they argue for a broader understanding of law
that acknowledges its moral foundations.

In summary, Neothomism provides a philosophical framework for understanding law as

grounded in objective moral principles derived from natural law. Its influence on legal theory has
contributed to ongoing debates about the nature of law, justice, and the relationship between
morality and legality.

Seven Basic Human Goods

1. Life
○ Corresponding to the drive for self-preservation
○ Includes bodily (including cerebral) health, and freedom from the pain that
betokens organic malfunctioning or injury.
○ Include in this category the transmission of life of procreation by children.
 2. Knowledge
○ Considered as desirable for its own sake, not merely instrumentally.
3. Play
○ An element of play can enter into any human activity, even the drafting of
enactments, but is always analytically distinguishable from its ‘serious’ context;
and some activities, enterprises, and institutions are entirely or primarily pure
play.
4. Aesthetic Experience
○ Many forms of play, such as dance or song or football, are the matrix or occasion
of aesthetic experience.
○ Aesthetic experience, unlike play, need not involve an action of one’s own; what
is sought after and valued for its own sake may simply be the beautiful form
‘outside’ one, and the ‘inner’ experience of appreciation of its beauty.
5. Sociability (friendship)
○ Minimum of peace and harmony amongst men, and which ranges through the
form in the flowering of a full friendship.
○ Friendship involves acting for the sake of one’s friend’s purposes, one’s friend’s
well-being.
6. Practical Reasonableness
7. Religion

● For morally good persons, the ideal is integral human fulfillment. They settle for the
happiness they have in benefiting themselves and others as they live a morally good life.

Conceptual point of law

● to facilitate the common good by providing authoritative rules that solve coordination
problems that arise in connection with the common pursuit of these basic goods.
● Law refers to rules made, in accordance with regulative legal rules, by a determinate and
effective authority for a 'complete' community, and buttressed by sanctions in
accordance with the rule-guided stipulations of adjudicative institutions, this ensemble of
rules and institutions being directed to reasonably resolving any of the community's
coordination problems for the common good of that community.
● The essential function of law is to provide a justification for state coercion.
● An unjust law can be legally valid, but it cannot provide an adequate justification for use
of the state coercive power and is hence not obligatory in the fullest sense; thus, an
unjust law fails to realize the moral ideals implicit in the concept of law.
○ An unjust law, on this view, is legally binding, but is not fully law.

Authoritative Character of Law

● Finnis borrowed from Raz’s concept of an exclusionary reason in explaining his concept
of authority.
○ a person treats something as authoritative when he treats it as an exclusionary
reason.
○ Exclusionary reason - reason for judging or acting in the absence of understood
reasons, or for disregarding at least some reasons which are understood and
relevant and would in the absence of the exclusionary reason have sufficed to
justify proceeding in some other way.
 SOCIOLOGICAL JURISPRUDENCE (Sociology of Law)

From Jaypee’s Reading:

● Sociological jurisprudence is the legal theory which is the result of understanding the
sociology of law.
● The sociology of law studies law as a phenomenon in society as one of the important
and valuable aspects of social life.
● This concerns the interaction of law with the other aspects of society.
● It involves two (2) questions:
a. How does society affect law; and
b. How does law affect society.
● “How does society affect law?”
○ Concerns the supposition of a legal theory which maintains that society is the
source of law; and
○ Explains law in terms of this source or origin in the same manner that the
historical jurisprudence of Savigny claimed that the origin of law is the common
consciousness or the national spirit of the people through which an
explanation of law may be generated.
● “How does law affect society?”
○ Involves a theory of law that focuses on the effect of law and discusses how
law functions and operates.
○ Dean Pound explains: “Jurisprudence is not so much a social science as a
technology, and the analogy of engineering is applied to social problems. He is
concerned primarily with the effects of law upon society and only to a
lesser extent with the question of the social determination of law. Emphasis
is laid upon the need to accumulate factual information and statistics…”
● “Sociology of law” (a branch of sociology) remains useful for identifying a body of
research on legal processes and for scholars committed to extending this research.
● Sociological interpretation of legal ideas is not a particular, specialized way of
approaching law, merely co-existing with other kinds of understanding, but the sociology
of law is a transdisciplinary enterprise and aspiration to broaden understanding of law.
● It certainly insists on its criteria ofsocial, systematic, and empirical—these criteria
are inscribed in some sense and degree in the nature of law as a social phenomenon.
● Sociology of law is inclusive rather than exclusive.
● Sociological insight is found in many disciplinary fields of knowledge and practice.
● The essence of a sociological interpretation of legal ideas lies in three (3) postulates.
a. Law is to be seen as an entirely social phenomenon.
● To be understood as an aspect of social relationships in general, as
wholly concerned with the co-existence of individuals in social groups.
b. Law must be understood empirically.
● Through detailed examination of variation and continuity in actual
historical patterns of social co-existence, rather than in relation to
idealized or abstractly imagined social conditions.
c. Law must be understood systematically.
● Rather than anecdotally or impressionalistically; the aim is:
○ To broaden understanding from the specific to the general.
○ To assess the significance of particularities in a wider perspective;
○ To situate the richness of the unique in a broader theoretical
context; and
○ To provide orientation for its interpretation.
CASE DIGESTS
 DAY 6

Arigo v. Swift

G.R. No. 206510 | September 16, 2014.

VILLARAMA, JR., J

Doctrine:

Locus standi is "a right of appearance in a court of justice on a given question.”

Specifically, it is "a party's personal and substantial interest in a case where he has
sustained or will sustain direct injury as a result" of the act being challenged, and "calls
for more than just a generalized grievance." However, the rule on standing is a
procedural matter which this Court has relaxed for non-traditional plaintiffs like ordinary
citizens, taxpayers and legislators when the public interest so requires, such as when
the subject matter of the controversy is of transcendental importance, of overreaching
significance to society, or of paramount public interest.

Facts:

The USS Guardian is an Avenger-class mine countermeasures ship of the US Navy. In

December 2012, the US Embassy in the Philippines requested diplomatic clearance for
the said vessel "to enter and exit the territorial waters of the Philippines and to arrive at
the port of Subic Bay for the purpose of routine ship replenishment, maintenance, and
crew liberty."

While transiting the Sulu Sea, the ship ran aground on the northwest side of South Shoal
of the Tubbataha Reefs, about 80 miles east-southeast of Palawan. No one was injured
in the incident, and there have been no reports of leaking fuel or oil.

Vice Admiral Scott Swift, expressed regret for the incident in a press statement.
Likewise, US Ambassador to the Philippines Harry K. Thomas, Jr., in a meeting at the
Department of Foreign Affairs, "reiterated his regrets over the grounding incident and
assured Foreign Affairs Secretary that the United States will provide appropriate
compensation for damage to the reef caused by the ship."

Petitioner’s Contention: Petitioners claim that the grounding, salvaging and

post-salvaging operations of the USS Guardian cause and continue to cause
environmental damage of such magnitude as to affect the provinces of Palawan,
Antique, Aklan, Guimaras, Iloilo, Negros Occidental, Negros Oriental, Zamboanga del
Norte, Basilan, Sulu, and Tawi-Tawi, which events violate their constitutional rights to a
balanced and healthful ecology.

Respondent’s Contention: (1) the grounds relied upon for the issuance of a TEPO or writ
of Kalikasan have become fait accompli as the salvage operations on the USS Guardian
were already completed; (2) the petition is defective in form and substance; (3) the
petition improperly raises issues involving the VFA between the Republic of the
Philippines and the United States of America; and (4) the determination of the extent of
responsibility of the US Government as regards the damage to the Tubbataha Reefs
rests exclusively with the executive branch.

Issue:

1. Whether or not the Philippine courts have jurisdiction to sue the US Government
and over the persons of the respondents?
2. Whether or not the waiver of immunity from suit found in the VFA applies in this
case?

Ruling:

1. NO. The immunity of the State from suit, known also as the doctrine of sovereign
immunity or non-suability of the State is expressly provided in Article XVI of the
1987 Constitution which states:

“Section 3. The State may not be sued without its consent.”

In the case of the foreign state sought to be impleaded in the local jurisdiction, the
added inhibition is expressed in the maxim par in parem, non habet imperium. All
states are sovereign equals and cannot assert jurisdiction over one another. A contrary
disposition would, in the language of a celebrated case, "unduly vex the peace of
nations." [De Haber v. Queen of Portugal, 17 Q. B. 171]

The US respondents were sued in their official capacity as commanding officers of the
US Navy who had control and supervision over the USS Guardian and its crew.
Considering that the satisfaction of a judgment against said officials will require
remedial actions and appropriation of funds by the US government, the suit is deemed
to be one against the US itself. The principle of State immunity therefore bars the
exercise of jurisdiction by this Court over the persons of respondents Swift, Rice and
Robling.
In the case of warships, they continue to enjoy sovereign immunity subject to the
following exceptions:

Article 31

Responsibility of the flag State for damage caused by a warship or other government
ship operated for non-commercial purposes. The flag State shall bear international
responsibility for any loss or damage to the coastal State resulting from the
non-compliance by a warship or other government ship operated for non-commercial
purposes with the laws and regulations of the coastal State concerning passage
through the territorial sea or with the provisions of this Convention or other rules of
international law.

The Court fully concur with Justice Carpio's view that non-membership in the UNCLOS
does not mean that the US will disregard the rights of the Philippines as a Coastal
State over its internal waters and territorial sea. Thus, the US is expected to bear
"international responsibility" under Art. 31 in connection with the USS Guardian
grounding which adversely affected the Tubbataha reefs.

2. NO. The VFA is an agreement which defines the treatment of United States troops
and personnel visiting the Philippines to promote "common security interests"
between the US and the Philippines in the region.

As it is, the waiver of State immunity under the VFA pertains only to criminal
jurisdiction and not to special civil actions such as the present petition for issuance of
a writ of Kalikasan. In fact, it can be inferred from Section 17, Rule 7 of the Rules that a
criminal case against a person charged with a violation of an environmental law is to
be filed separately:

SEC. 17. Institution of separate actions. — The filing of a petition for the issuance of
the writ of kalikasan shall not preclude the filing of separate civil, criminal or
administrative actions.

It is considered view that a ruling on the application or non-application of criminal

jurisdiction provisions of the VFA to US personnel who may be found responsible for
the grounding of the USS Guardian, would be premature and beyond the province of a
petition for a writ of Kalikasan. The court also find it unnecessary at this point to
determine whether such waiver of State immunity is indeed absolute. In the same vein,
we cannot grant damages which have resulted from the violation of environmental
laws. The Rules allows the recovery of damages, including the collection of
administrative fines under R.A. No. 10067, in a separate civil suit or that deemed
instituted with the criminal action charging the same violation of an environmental law.

The Courts agree with respondents in asserting that this petition has become moot in
the sense that the salvage operation sought to be enjoined or restrained had already
been accomplished when petitioners sought recourse from this Court. But insofar as
the directives to Philippine respondents to protect and rehabilitate the coral reef
structure and marine habitat adversely affected by the grounding incident are
concerned, petitioners are entitled to these reliefs notwithstanding the completion of
the removal of the USS Guardian from the coral reef.

The VFA was duly concurred in by the Philippine Senate and has been recognized as a
treaty by the United States as attested and certified by the duly authorized
representative of the United States government. The VFA being a valid and binding
agreement, the parties are required as a matter of international law to abide by its
terms and provisions. The present petition under the Rules is not the proper remedy to
assail the constitutionality of its provisions.

Leonen J., Concurring:

“The writ of kalikasan is not an all-embracing legal remedy to be wielded like a

political tool. It is both an extraordinary and equitable remedy which assists to prevent
environmental catastrophes. It does not replace other legal remedies similarly
motivated by concern for the environment and the community's ecological welfare.
Certainly, when the petition itself alleges that remedial and preventive remedies have
occurred, the functions of the writ cease to exist.”
 Lejano v. People; People v. Webb

Doctrine:
Not all denials and alibis should be regarded as fabricated. Indeed, if the accused is
truly innocent, he can have no other defense but denial and alibi. A judge must keep an
open mind. He must guard against slipping into hasty conclusion, often arising from a
desire to quickly finish the job of deciding a case.

Facts:
On June 30, 1991, Estrellita Vizconde and her daughters Carmela, 19 years old, and
Jennifer, 7, were brutally slain at their home in Pitong Daan Subdivision in Parañaque
City. The NBI presented its star-witness Jessiva M. Alfaro. She pointed to accused
Hubert Jeffrey P. Webb, Antonio "Tony Boy" Lejano, Artemio "Dong" Ventura, Michael A.
Gatchalian, Hospicio "Pyke" Fernandez, Peter Estrada, Miguel "Ging" Rodriguez, and
Joey Filart as the culprits, and police officer, Gerardo Biong, as an accessory after the
fact.

RTC found all the accused guilty and imposed the penalty of reclusion perpetua, while
Biong was sentenced to an indeterminate prison term of 11 years, 4 months, and 1 day
to 12 years. The CA affirmed.

The Court granted Webb’s request to submit for DNA analysis the semen specimen
taken from Carmela's cadaver. However, the NBI informed the Court that it no longer
has custody of the specimen, the same having been turned over to the trial court. The
trial records, however, shows that the specimen was not among the object evidence
that the prosecution offered in evidence in the case.

Alfaro’s story: (Detailed)

On June 29, 1991 at 8:30pm, Jessica Alfaro drove her Mitsubishi Lancer, with
boyfriend Peter Estrada as passenger, to the Ayala Alabang Commercial Center
parking lot to buy shabu from Artemio Ventura. The latter introduced her to his friends,
Webb, Lejano, Rodriguez, Fernandez, Gatchalian, and Filart.

Webb approached and requested her to relay a message for him to Carmela to which
she agreed. The group drove to Carmela's house at 80 Vinzons Street, Pitong Daan
Subdivision, BF Homes, Parañaque City and thereafter, Alfaro gave Carmela Webb’s
message. Carmela told Alfaro to return after 20 mins.
Only Alfaro returned. Allegedly Carmela told her that she had to leave the house, and
requested Alfaro to return before midnight and she would leave the pedestrian gate,
the iron grills that led to the kitchen, and the kitchen door unlocked. Alfaro trailed
Carmela up to Aguirre Avenue where she dropped off a man whom Alfaro believed was
Carmela's boyfriend. Alfaro told Webb of Carmela's male companion, Webb's mood
changed for the rest of the evening.

The group went to the Vizconde house. Alfaro was the first to pass through the
pedestrian gate that had been left open. The group went through the open iron grill
gate and passed the dirty kitchen. Carmela opened the aluminum screen door of the
kitchen for them. After a while, Alfaro went out to smoke. When she returned inside
the house, Alfaro saw Ventura searching a lady's bag that lay on the dining table. Out
of curiosity, she approached the master's bedroom from where the static noise came,
opened the door a little, and peeked inside. As she walked in, she saw Webb on top of
Carmela while she lay with her back on the floor. Two bloodied bodies lay on the bed.
Lejano was at the foot of the bed about to wear his jacket. Carmela was gagged,
moaning, and in tears while Webb raped her, his bare buttocks exposed.

Issue:
Whether or not Alfaro's testimony as eyewitness, describing the crime and identifying
Webb, Lejano, Gatchalian, Fernandez, Estrada, Rodriguez, and two others as the
persons who committed it, is entitled to belief.

Ruling:
No. A positive declaration from a witness that he saw the accused commit the crime
should not automatically cancel out the accused's claim that he did not do it.

To be acceptable, the positive identification must meet at least two criteria:

1. Positive identification of the offender must come from a credible witness. She
is credible who can be trusted to tell the truth, usually based on past
experiences with her. Her word has, to one who knows her, its weight in gold.
2. Witness' story of what she personally saw must be believable, not inherently
contrived. A witness who testifies about something she never saw runs into
inconsistencies and makes bewildering claims.

Alfaro and her testimony fail to meet the above criteria. She did not show up at the NBI
as a spontaneous witness bothered by her conscience. She had been hanging around
that agency for sometime as a stool pigeon, one paid for mixing up with criminals and
squealing on them. Her superior even testified that she volunteered to play the role of
a witness in the Vizconde killings when she could not produce a man she promised to
the NBI.

Although her testimony included details, Alfaro had prior access to the details that the
investigators knew of the case. She took advantage of her familiarity with these details
to include in her testimony the clearly incompatible act of Webb hurling a stone at the
front door glass frames even when they were trying to slip away quietly.

Further, her testimony was inherently incredible. Her story that Gatchalian, Fernandez,
Estrada, Rodriguez, and Filart agreed to take their turns raping Carmela is incongruent
with their indifference, exemplified by remaining outside the house, milling under a
street light, visible to neighbors and passersby, and showing no interest in the
developments inside the house.

Ultimately, Alfaro's quality as a witness and her inconsistent, if not inherently

unbelievable, testimony cannot be the positive identification that jurisprudence
acknowledges as sufficient to jettison a denial and an alibi.
 Remitere v. Vda. De Yulo
G.R. No. L-19751 | February 28, 1966
Zaldivar, J.

Doctrine:
The lack of cause of action as a ground for dismissal must appear on the face
of the complaint. A pleading should state the ultimate facts essential to the rights of
action or defense asserted, as distinguished from a mere conclusion of facts or
conclusion of law.

Facts:
The plaintiffs-appellants filed a complaint against the defendants-appellees.
The complaint prayed that the:
1. defendants be ordered to reconvey the two (2) lots in question to the plaintiffs;
2. defendant Register of Deeds be ordered to cancel the certificates of titles in the
name of the defendant Remedios Montinola Viuda de Yulo and to issue new
ones in the names of the plaintiffs; and
3. defendants pay the costs.
The defendants-appellees filed a motion to dismiss the complaint on the
grounds that (1) the complaint does not state a cause of action; and (2) even assuming
that a cause of action exists, the same has already been prescribed.
The lower court dismissed the complaint.

Issue:
Did the lower court correctly dismiss the complaint?

Ruling:
Yes. The lower court correctly dismissed the complaint because the complaint
alleged no ultimate facts as the basis of the plaintiffs-appellants’ rights, which were
violated by the defendants-appellees.
The Revised Rules of Court requires that the complaint should contain a
“concise statement of the ultimate facts constituting the plaintiff's cause or causes of
action.” 1 A cause of action has been defined as an act or omission of one party in
violation of the legal right/s of the other. Its essential elements are:

1
Rules of Court, 1997 Rules of Civil Procedures, Rule 8 — Manner of Making Allegations in Pleadings
Section 1— Every pleading shall contain in a methodical and logical form, a plain, concise, and direct statement of the
ultimate facts on which the party pleading relies for his claim or defense, as the case may be, omitting the statement
of mere evidentiary facts.
 1) Legal right of the plaintiff;
2) Correlative obligations of the defendant; and
3) Act or omission of the defendant in violation of said legal right.
Ultimate fact means the essential facts constituting the plaintiff’s cause of
action. A fact is essential if it cannot be stricken out without leaving the statement of
the cause of action insufficient. It refers to principal, determinate, constitutive facts,
upon the existence of which, the entire cause of action rests. A pleading should state
the ultimate facts essential to the rights of action or defense asserted, as
distinguished from a mere conclusion of fact or conclusion of law.
The lack of a cause of action as a ground for dismissal must appear on the face
of the complaint. To determine whether the complaint states a cause of action, only
the facts alleged therein, and no other, should be considered.
Here, a reading of the complaint will readily impress one that no ultimate facts,
which may constitute the basis of the plaintiffs-appellants’ rights that had been
violated are alleged. Neither are there allegations of ultimate facts showing acts or
omissions on the part of the defendants-appellees that constitute a violation of the
rights of plaintiffs-appellants. Also, an allegation that a contract is valid or void, as in
the case, is a mere conclusion of law.
Therefore, the order of dismissal appealed from is affirmed.
 DAY 7

Hacienda Luisita, Inc. v. Presidential Agrarian Reform Council (Nov. 22, 2011)

Doctrine:

There is, thus, nothing unconstitutional in the formula prescribed by RA 6657. The
policy on agrarian reform is that control over the agricultural land must always be in
the hands of the farmers. Then it falls on the shoulders of DAR and PARC to see to it
the farmers should always own majority of the common shares entitled to elect the
members of the board of directors to ensure that the farmers will have a clear majority
in the board.

Facts:

Hacienda Luisita de Tarlac, once a 6,443 hectare mixed

agricultural-industrial-residential expanse several municipalities of Tarlac and owned
by Compania General de Tabacos de Filipinas (Tabacalera). Tarlac Development
Corporation (Tadeco) then owned and controlled by Jose Cojuangco Sr. Group.

Some 93% of the then farmworker-beneficiaries (FWBs) complement of Hacienda

Luisita signified in a referendum their acceptance of the proposed HLI’s Stock
Distribution Option Plan. The Stock Distribution Option Agreement (SDOA), styled as a
Memorandum of Agreement (MOA), was entered into by Tadeco, HLI, and the 5,848
qualified FWBs and attested to by then DAR Secretary Philip Juico. The SDOA
embodied the basis and mechanics of the SDP, which would eventually be submitted to
the PARC for approval.

The PARC issued the assailed Resolution No. 2005-32-01, approve and confirm the
recommendation of the PARC Executive Committee adopting in toto the report of the
PARC ExCom Validation Committee affirming the recommendation of the DAR to
recall/revoke the SDO plan of Tarlac Development Corporation/Hacienda Luisita
Incorporated.

The Court, in a bid to resolve the dispute through an amicable settlement, issued a
Resolution84 creating a Mediation Panel composed of then Associate Justice Ma.
Alicia Austria-Martinez, as chairperson, and former CA Justices Hector Hofileña and
Teresita Dy-Liacco Flores, as members. Meetings on five (5) separate dates. Despite
persevering and painstaking efforts on the part of the panel, mediation had to be
discontinued when no acceptable agreement could be reached.

Issue:
1. WON the PARC’s has the authority to revoke the Stock Distribution Plan
2. WON Section.31 of RA 6657 is unconstitutional
3. WON the operative act is applicable in the instant case

Ruling:

1. Yes, PARC has the authority to revoke the Stock Distribution Plan.

Under Sec. 31 of RA 6657, as implemented by DAO 10, the authority to approve

the plan for stock distribution of the corporate landowner belongs to PARC.
However, contrary to petitioner HLI’s posture, PARC also has the power to
revoke the SDP which it previously approved. It may be, as urged, that RA 6657
or other executive issuances on agrarian reform do not explicitly vest the PARC
with the power to revoke/recall an approved SDP. Such power or authority,
however, is deemed possessed by PARC under the principle of necessary
implication, a basic postulate that what is implied in a statute is as much a part
of it as that which is expressed.

The court explained that “every statute is understood, by implication, to contain

all such provisions as may be necessary to effectuate its object and purpose, or
to make effective rights, powers, privileges or jurisdiction which it grants,
including all such collateral and subsidiary consequences as may be fairly and
logically inferred from its terms.” Further, “every statutory grant of power, right
or privilege is deemed to include all incidental power, right or privilege.

2. The court answer is negative. The instant challenge on the constitutionality of Sec.
31 of RA 6657 and necessarily its counterpart provision in EO 229. It is not the lis
mota of the case and it was not property raised and presented.

The Court cannot be goaded into resolving a constitutional issue that FARM
failed to assail after the lapse of a long period of time and the occurrence of
numerous events and activities which resulted from the application of an
alleged unconstitutional legal provision.
 It has been emphasized in a number of cases that the question of
constitutionality will not be passed upon by the Court unless it is properly raised
and presented in an appropriate case at the first opportunity. FARM is, therefore,
remiss in belatedly questioning the constitutionality of Sec. 31 of RA 6657. The
second requirement that the constitutional question should be raised at the
earliest possible opportunity is clearly wanting.

The last but the most important requisite that the constitutional issue must be
the very lis mota of the case does not likewise obtain. The lis mota aspect is not
present, the constitutional issue tendered not being critical to the resolution of
the case. The unyielding rule has been to avoid, whenever plausible, an issue
assailing the constitutionality of a statute or governmental act.

There is, thus, nothing unconstitutional in the formula prescribed by RA 6657.

The policy on agrarian reform is that control over the agricultural land must
always be in the hands of the farmers. Then it falls on the shoulders of DAR and
PARC to see to it the farmers should always own majority of the common shares
entitled to elect the members of the board of directors to ensure that the
farmers will have a clear majority in the board.

3. The “operative fact” doctrine is a legislative or executive act, prior to its being
declared as unconstitutional by the courts, is valid and must be complied with.

This doctrine was reiterated in the more recent case of City of Makati v. Civil
Service Commission, wherein we ruled that: Moreover, we certainly cannot
nullify the City Government’s order of suspension, as we have no reason to do
so, much less retroactively apply such nullification to deprive private
respondent of a compelling and valid reason for not filing the leave application.
For as we have held, a void act though in law a mere scrap of paper nonetheless
confers legitimacy upon past acts or omissions done in reliance thereof.
Consequently, the existence of a statute or executive order prior to its being
adjudged void is an operative fact to which legal consequences are attached. It
would indeed be ghastly unfair to prevent private respondent from relying upon
the order of suspension in lieu of a formal leave application.

In the instant case, although the assailed Resolution No. 2005-32-01 states that
it revokes or recalls the SDP, what it actually revoked or recalled was the PARC’s
approval of the SDP embodied in Resolution No. 89-12-2. Consequently, what
was actually declared null and void was an executive act, PARC Resolution No.
89-12-2, and not a contract (SDOA). It is, therefore, wrong to say that it was the
SDOA which was annulled.
 Ang Ladlad LGBT Party v. COMELEC

Doctrine:

Facts:
Ang Ladlad is an organization composed of men and women who identify themselves
as lesbians, gays, bisexuals, or transgendered individuals. Ang Ladlad applied for
registration with the COMELEC in 2006 which was denied on the ground that the
organization had no substantial membership base.

In 2009, Ang Ladlad again filed a Petition for registration with the COMELEC. It argued
that the LGBT Community is a marginalized and under-represented sector that is
particularly disadvantaged because of their sexual orientation and gender identity.
Further, it complied with the guidelines provided in Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW Labor Party
v. COMELEC. Moreover, it laid out its national membership base consisting of individual
members and organizational supporters, and outlined its platform of governance.

COMELEC 2nd Division dismissed the petition on moral grounds, stating that the
definition of the LGBT sector makes it crystal clear that petitioner tolerated immorality
which offends religious beliefs.

Ang Ladlad filed a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 to annul the COMELEC
Resolution and sought the issuance of preliminary mandatory injunction against the
COMELEC, which had previously announced that it would begin printing the final ballots
for the May 2010 elections.

Issue:
Whether the denial of Ang Ladlad's petition for registration violated their constitutional
rights to privacy, freedom of speech and assembly, and equal protection of laws.

Ruling:
Yes.
Compliance with the Constitution and RA 7941 - Party List System Act
Respondent mistakenly opines that our ruling in Ang Bagong Bayani stands for the
proposition that only those sectors specifically enumerated in the law or related to said
sectors may be registered under the party-list system. As we explicitly ruled in Ang
Bagong Bayani-OFW Labor Party v. Commission on Elections, "the enumeration of
marginalized and under-represented sectors is not exclusive".
There has been no misrepresentation. Ang Ladlad's initial petition shows that it never
claimed to exist in each province of the Philippines. Rather, petitioner alleged that the
LGBT community in the Philippines was estimated to constitute at least 670,000
persons. Ang Ladlad also represented itself to be "a national LGBT umbrella
organization with affiliates around the Philippines. Aside from COMELEC's moral
objection and the belated allegation of non-existence, nowhere in the records has the
respondent ever found/ruled that Ang Ladlad is not qualified to register as a party-list
organization

Therefore, the Court finds that Ang Ladlad has sufficiently demonstrated its compliance
with the legal requirements for accreditation.

Religion as the Basis for Refusal to Accept Ang Ladlad's Petition for Registration
What our non-establishment clause calls for is "government neutrality in religious
matters." Clearly, "governmental reliance on religious justification is inconsistent with
this policy of neutrality."

Thus, the Court finds that it was grave violation of the non-establishment clause for the
COMELEC to utilize the Bible and the Koran to justify the exclusion of Ang Ladlad.

Public Morals as a Ground to Deny Ang Ladlad's Petition for Registration

The Philippines has not seen fit to criminalize homosexual conduct. Evidently, therefore,
these "generally accepted public morals" have not been convincingly transplanted into
the realm of law. The Assailed Resolutions have not identified any specific overt
immoral act performed by Ang Ladlad.

Respondent has failed to explain what societal ills are sought to be prevented, or why
special protection is required for the youth. Neither has the COMELEC condescended to
justify its position that petitioner's admission into the party-list system would be so
harmful as to irreparably damage the moral fabric of society.

Thus, the bare invocation of morality will not remove an issue from our scrutiny.

Equal Protection
Aristotle said “Equality consists in the same treatment of similar persons." The equal
protection clause guarantees that no person or class of persons shall be deprived of the
same protection of laws which is enjoyed by other persons or other classes in the same
place and in like circumstances.
No law exists to criminalize homosexual behavior or expressions or parties about
homosexual behavior. The asserted state interest by the COMELEC - moral disapproval
of an unpopular minority — is not a legitimate state interest that is sufficient to satisfy
rational basis review under the equal protection clause.

Hence, laws of general application should apply with equal force to LGBTs, and they
deserve to participate in the party-list system on the same basis as other marginalized
and under-represented sectors.

Freedom of Expression and Association

Under our system of laws, every group has the right to promote its agenda and attempt
to persuade society of the validity of its position through normal democratic means.

In Estrada v. Escritor: The Court held that when public deliberation on moral judgments
is finally crystallized into law, the laws will largely reflect the beliefs and preferences of
the majority. Nevertheless, in the very act of adopting and accepting a constitution and
the limits it specifies — including protection of religious freedom "not only for a minority,
however small — not only for a majority, however large — but for each of us" — the
majority imposes upon itself a self-denying ordinance.

COMELEC is certainly not free to interfere with speech for no better reason than
promoting an approved message or discouraging a disfavored one. Both expressions
concerning one's homosexuality and the activity of forming a political association that
supports LGBT individuals are protected as well.

To the extent, therefore, that the petitioner has been precluded, because of COMELEC's
action, from publicly expressing its views as a political party and participating on an
equal basis in the political process with other equally-qualified party-list candidates, we
find that there has, indeed, been a transgression of petitioner's fundamental rights.
 Pestilos v. Generoso
G.R. No. 182601 | November 10, 2014
Brion, J.

Doctrine:
The following must be present for a valid warrantless arrest:
1. The crime should have been just committed; and
2. The arresting officer’s exercise of discretion is limited by the standard of
probable cause to be determined from the facts and circumstances within his
personal knowledge.

Facts:
An altercation ensued between the petitioners and Atty. Generoso. Atty.
Generoso called the Batasan Hills Police Station to report the incident. Police officers
arrived at the scene of the crime less than one (1) hour after the alleged altercation.
They saw Atty. Generoso was badly beaten. Atty. Generoso pointed to the petitioners as
those who mauled him. The police officers invited the petitioners to go to the police
station for investigation. The petitioners went with them.
At the inquest proceeding, the City Prosecutor of Quezon City found that the
petitioners stabbed Atty. Generoso with a bladed weapon. Atty. Generoso fortunately
survived the attack. In an Information, the petitioners were indicted for attempted
murder. They filed an Urgent Motion for Regular Preliminary Investigation on the ground
that they had not been lawfully arrested.
● Petitioners’ allegation: They alleged that no valid warrantless arrest took place
since the police officers had no personal knowledge that they were the
perpetrators of the crime. Thus, the inquest proceeding was improper, and a
regular procedure for preliminary investigation should have been performed
pursuant to Rule 112 of the Rules of Court.
The RTC issued its order denying the petitioners’ Urgent Motion. The CA found
that the RTC did not commit any grave abuse of discretion in denying the said Motion.

Issue:
Did the police officers validly arrest the petitioners without a warrant?

Ruling:
Yes. The police officers validly arrested the petitioners without a warrant because
they had personal knowledge of facts or circumstances justifying the petitioners’
warrantless arrests.
 Section 5 (b), Rule 113 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, and our
jurisprudence provide that the following must be present for a valid warrantless arrest:
1. The crime should have been just committed; and
2. The arresting officer’s exercise of discretion is limited by the standard of
probable cause to be determined from the facts and circumstances within his
personal knowledge.
The existence of probable cause objectifies the reasonableness of the
warrantless arrest for compliance with the Constitutional mandate against
unreasonable arrests. In determining the reasonableness of the warrantless arrests,
police officers should comply with the requirements set under Section 5 (b), Rule 113,
specifically, the requirement of:
1. Immediacy;
2. Police officer’s personal knowledge of facts or circumstances; and
3. Propriety of the determination of probable cause that the person sought to be
arrested committed the crime.

Here, the arresting officers went to the scene of the crime upon the complaint of
Atty. Generoso of his alleged mauling. The police officers responded to the scene of the
crime less than one (1) hour after the alleged mauling. The alleged crime transpired in a
community where Atty. Generoso and the petitioners reside. Atty. Generoso positively
identified the petitioners as those responsible for his mauling. When the petitioners
were confronted by the arresting officers, they did not deny their participation in the
incident, although they narrated a different version of what transpired.
Therefore, these circumstances were well within the police officers’ observation,
perception, and evaluation at the time of the arrest. These qualify as the police officers’
personal observation, which are within their personal knowledge, prompting them to
make the warrantless arrests.
 DAY 8

Garcia v. Loyola School of Theology

G.R. No. L-40779 | November 28, 1975
FERNANDO, J

Doctrine:

The academic freedom enjoyed by institutions of higher learning as recognized in

the Constitution is more often identified with the right of a faculty member to pursue his
studies in his particular specialty and thereafter to make known or publish the result of
his endeavors without fear that retribution would be visited on him in the event that his
conclusions are found distasteful or objectionable to the power that be, whether in the
political, economic, or academic establishment.

Facts:

Epicharis T. Garcia filed a petition for mandamus against the Faculty Admission
Committee of the Loyola School of Theology. Garcia was denied re-admission to the
school and challenged the validity of the reason given for her denial. She alleged that
she was admitted to pursue graduate studies leading to a Master of Arts in Theology in
the summer of 1975 but was denied re-admission in the following semester.

The reason given for her denial was that her frequent questions and difficulties were not
always pertinent and had the effect of slowing down the progress of the class. The
Faculty Admission Committee contended that Garcia was only admitted to take some
courses for credit in the summer of 1975 and was not admitted to a degree program.
The Loyola School of Theology is a seminary for the priesthood, and Garcia, being a lay
person and a woman, is not studying for the priesthood.

Garcia's Contention:
● Garcia argued that the reason given for her denial was not a valid ground for
expulsion.
● She claimed that her frequent questions and difficulties should not have been
used as a basis for denying her re-admission.
● Garcia asserted her right to continue studying theology and challenged the
validity of the reason given by the Faculty Admission Committee.

Faculty Admission Committee's Contention:

 ● The Faculty Admission Committee argued that Garcia was only admitted to take
some courses for credit and was not admitted to a degree program.
● The committee has discretion in admitting or continuing to admit any particular
student, considering academic or intellectual standards as well as other factors
such as personality traits, character orientation, space limitations, facilities,
professors, and optimum classroom size.
● They emphasized that the Loyola School of Theology is a seminary for the
priesthood, and Garcia, being a lay person and a woman, is not studying for the
priesthood.

Issue:

Whether or not there is valid expulsion Garcia?

Ruling:

YES.

1. Petitioner cannot compel by mandamus, the respondent to admit her into further
studies in the Loyola School of Theology. For respondent has no clear duty to so
admit the petitioner. The Loyola School of Theology is a seminary for the priesthood.
Petitioner is admittedly and obviously not studying for the priesthood, she being a
lay person and a woman. And even assuming ex gratia argumenti that she is
qualified to study for the priesthood, there is still no duty on the part of respondent to
admit her to said studies, since the school has clearly the discretion to turn down
even qualified applicants due to limitations of space, facilities, professors and
optimum classroom size and component considerations.

2. The recognition in the Constitution of institutions of higher learning enjoying

academic freedom. It is more often identified with the right of a faculty member to
pursue his studies in his particular specialty and thereafter to make known or
publish the result of his endeavors without fear that retribution would be visited on
him in the event that his conclusions are found distasteful or objectionable to the
powers that be, whether in the political, economic, or academic establishments.

3. For it is to be noted that the reference is to the "institutions of higher learning" as

the recipients of this boon. It would follow then that the school or college itself is
possessed of such a right. It decides for itself its aims and objectives and how best
to attain them. It is free from outside coercion or interference save possibly when
 the overriding public welfare calls for some restraint. It has a wide sphere of
autonomy certainly extending to the choice of students. This constitutional provision
is not to be construed in a niggardly manner or in a grudging fashion. That would be
to frustrate its purpose, nullify its intent.

4. It could amount to minimizing the full respect that must be accorded the academic
freedom expressly granted by the Constitution "to institutions of higher learning." It is
equally difficult to yield conformity to the approach taken that colleges and
universities should be looked upon as public utilities devoid of any discretion as to
whom to admit or reject. Education, especially higher education, belongs to a
different, and certainly higher, category.

5. Loyola School of Theology is the result solely of a legal appraisal of the situation
before us. The decision is not to be construed as in any way reflecting on the
scholastic standing of petitioner. There was on the part of respondent due
acknowledgment of her intelligence. Nonetheless, for reasons explained in the letter
of Father Lambino, it was deemed best, considering the interest of the school as well
as of the other students and her own welfare, that she continue her graduate work
elsewhere. There was nothing arbitrary in such appraisal of the circumstances
deemed relevant.

The courts simply do not have the competence nor inclination to constitute themselves
as Admission Committees of the universities and institutions of higher learning and to
substitute their judgment for that of the regularly constituted Admission Committees of
such educational institutions. Were the courts to do so, they would conceivably be
swamped with petitions for admission from the thousands refused admission every
year, and next the thousands who flunked are were dropped would also be petitioning
the courts for a judicial review of their grades.
 Republic v. Cagandahan

Doctrine:
Where the person is biologically or naturally intersex the determining factor in his
gender classification would be what the individual, having reached the age of majority,
with good reason thinks of his/her sex.

Facts:
Respondent Jennifer Cagandahan filed a petition for correction entries in birth
certificate before the RTC. She alleged that she was registered as a female in the
Certificate of Live Birth but while growing up, she developed secondary male
characteristics and was diagnosed with Congenital Adrenal Hyperplasia (CAH). CAH is
a condition where persons afflicted possess both male and female characteristics.
Tests revealed that her ovarian structures had minimized, she has stopped growing and
she has no breast or menstrual development. For all interests and appearances, as well
as in mind and emotion, she has become a male person. Thus, she prayed that her birth
certificate be corrected such that her gender be changed from female to male and her
first name be changed from Jennifer to Jeff.
OSG contends that the petition below is fatally defective for non-compliance with
Rules 103 and 108 of the ROC since local civil registrar was not impleaded, as it is an
indispensable party in a petition for cancellation of correction of entries.

Issue:
Whether or not the RTC erred in ordering the correction of entries in the birth
certificate of respondent to change her sex or gender - from female to male - on the
ground of her medical condition known as CAH, and her name - from Jennifer to Jeff -
under Rules 103 and 108 of the ROC.

Ruling:
No. The Court ruled that where the person is biologically or naturally intersex the
determining factor in his gender classification would be what the individual, like
respondent, having reached the age of majority, with good reason thinks of his/her sex.
Respondent here thinks of himself as a male and considering that his body
produces high levels of male hormones (androgen) there is preponderant biological
support for considering him as being male. Respondent here has simply let nature take
its course and has not taken unnatural steps to arrest or interfere with what he was born
with. He has already ordered his life to that of a male.
 In the absence of evidence that respondent is an "incompetent" and in the
absence of evidence to show that classifying respondent as a male will harm other
members of society who are equally entitled to protection under the law, the Court
affirms as valid and justified the respondent's position and his personal judgment of
being a male.

As to the Name
Court has held that a change of name is not a matter of right but of judicial
discretion, to be exercised in the light of the reasons adduced and the consequences
that will follow.
The trial court's grant of respondent's change of name from Jennifer to Jeff
implies a change of a feminine name to a masculine name.
Considering the consequence that respondent's change of name merely
recognizes his preferred gender, we find merit in respondent's change of name. Such a
change will conform with the change of the entry in his birth certificate from female to
male.
 Silverio v. Republic
G.R. No. 174689 | October 19, 2007
Corona, J.

Doctrine:
No law in the Philippines that allows the change of entry in the birth certificate as
to sex on the ground of sex reassignment.

Facts:
Petitioner filed a petition for the change of his first name and sex in his birth
certificate in the RTC. His name was registered as “Rommel Jacinto Dantes Silverio” in
his certificate of live birth (birth certificate). His sex was registered as “male.” He
alleged that he is a male transsexual. He underwent sex reassignment surgery. From
then on, petitioner lived as a female and was in fact engaged to be married.
Petitioner invoked his sex reassignment as the ground for his petition for change
of name and sex. He claims that the change of his name and sex in his birth certificate
is allowed under Articles 407 to 413 of the Civil Code, Rules 103 and 108 of the Rules of
Court, and R.A. No. 9048.2

Issues:
1. Are there Philippine laws that allow the change of entry in the birth certificate as
to sex on the ground of sex reassignment?
2. May entries in the birth certificate as to first name or sex be changed on the
ground of equity?

Ruling:
1. No law in the Philippines that allows the change of entry in the birth certificate as
to sex on the ground of sex reassignment.
Section 4 of R.A. No. 9048 provides the grounds for which change of first
name may be allowed:
1. Petitioner finds the first name or nickname to be ridiculous, tainted with
dishonor, or extremely difficult to write or pronounce;
2. The new first name or nickname has been habitually and continuously
used by the petitioner and he has been publicly known by that first name
or nickname in the community; or
3. The change will avoid confusion.

2
An Act Authorizing the City or Municipal Civil Registrar, or the Consul General to Correct a Clerical or Typographical
Error in an Entry and/or Change of First Name or Nickname in the Civil Register Without Need of a Judicial Order,
Amending for this Purpose Articles 376 and 412 of the Civil Code of the Philippines.
 R.A. No. 9048 does not sanction a change of first name on the ground of
sex reassignment. Before a person can legally change his given name, he must
present proper or reasonable cause or any compelling reason justifying such
change. He must also show that he will be prejudiced by the use of his true and
official name. Furthermore, a correction in the civil registry involving the change
of sex is not a mere clerical or typographical error. It is a substantial change for
which the applicable procedure is Rule 108 of the Rules of Court.
Under the Civil Register Law, a birth certificate is a historical record of the
facts as they existed at the time of birth. Thus, the sex of a person is determined
at birth. Considering that there is no law legally recognizing sex reassignment,
the determination of a person’s sex made at the time of his or her birth, if not
attended by error, is immutable.
Here, petitioner’s basis in praying for the change of his first name was his
sex reassignment. He intended to make his first name compatible with the sex he
thought he transformed himself into through surgery. However, a change of name
does not alter one’s legal capacity or civil status. Hence, petitioner failed to show,
or even allege, any prejudice that he might suffer as a result of using his true and
official name. Moreover, the birth certificate of petitioner contained no error. All
entries therein, including those corresponding to his first name and sex, were all
correct. No correction is necessary.
While petitioner may have succeeded in altering his body and appearance
through the intervention of modern surgery, no law authorizes the change of entry
as to sex in the civil registry for that reason. Thus, there is no legal basis for his
petition for the correction or change of the entries in his birth certificate.

2. No, the entries in the birth certificate as to first name or sex cannot be changed
on the ground of equity.
The changes sought by petitioner will have serious and wide-ranging legal
and public policy consequences. It is for the legislature to determine what
guidelines should govern the recognition of the effects of sex reassignment. The
Supreme Court has no authority to fashion a law on that matter, or on anything
else.
Therefore, the Court cannot enact a law where no law exists. It can only
apply or interpret the written word of Congress. The remedies petitioner seeks
involve questions of public policy to be addressed solely by the legislature, not by
the courts.
 DAY 9

Maynard v. Hill (125 US 190, 1888)

Doctrine:

The court determined that the legislator’s power extends to all rightful subject of
legislation. Including marriage and divorce. And there is no direct prohibition against
legislative divorce or constitutional prohibition against the legislative control over the
marriage relation.

Facts:

In 1850, David S. Maynard abandoned his first wife, Lydia A. Maynard, and moved
from Ohio to Oregon Territory. In April 1852, Oregon awarded David and his wife equal
shares in 640 acres of land, provided that he farm the tract until April 1856. In December
1852, the Oregon legislature passed special legislation dissolving the Maynards'
marriage, and David remarried in 1853.

In April 1856, David completed the four-year term of cultivation required to obtain
title to his tract. However, after complex procedural hearings, state officials determined
that neither of David's two wives was entitled to a half portion of the tract, since neither
wife was married to David for the entire four-year term.

Oregon sold the forfeited half portion to Hill and Lewis (defendants). Lydia died in
1879, and her children, Henry C. Maynard and Frances J. Patterson (plaintiffs), sued Hill
and Lewis for ownership of the half portion. Both the trial court and the Supreme Court
of the Washington Territory denied the children's claim, and they appealed to the United
States Supreme Court.

Issue:

1. Whether the legislature has the power to dissolve a marriage and how such
dissolution affects the property rights of the wife?

2. Whether or not the territory courts err in dismissing the heirs' action in equity to
charge the patent holders as trustees of certain lands and to compel a conveyance
of those lands?

Ruling:
1. The Court noted that Congress prohibited Oregon's legislature from impairing
contracts but otherwise did not restrict the legislature's power to dissolve marriages.

The court determined that the legislator’s power extends to all rightful subject of
legislation. Including marriage and divorce. And there is no direct prohibition
against legislative divorce or constitutional prohibition against the legislative
control over the marriage relation. Ultimately, the supreme court upheld the
legislative power to grant divorces and the divorce act in question. The court
reasoned that the settlers wife can only have land interest through her husband.
After the divorce, her interests cannot exceed his. Therefore, the wife does not
have the right over the donation claim.

2. The Supreme Court of the United States affirmed the judgment of the territory court.
According to the Court, at the time of the divorce, David only had a possessory right
to the land because he had not yet occupied it for the statutory period of time.
Because David had no vested interest in the land, Lydia could have no interest
greater than that of David. The wife was not entitled to the east half of the donation
claim. To entitle her to that half she must have continued as his wife during his
residence and cultivation of the land.
 Ansay v. Board of Directors of the National Development Company

Doctrine:
An element of natural obligation before it can be cognizable by the court is
voluntary fulfillment by the obligor.

Facts:
Appellants Primitivo Ansay et al are the employees of National Development
Company (NDC), while the appellees are the Board of Directors of DC. Appellants filed
against appellees before the CFI a complaint praying for a 20% Christmas bonus for the
years 1954 and 1955.
Appellees filed a motion to dismiss. The CFI affirmed the dismissal of the
complaint and held that the petitioners have no cause of action to secure such bonus
because: (1) a bonus is an act of liberality; and (2) that the court has no power to
compel a party to comply with a moral obligation.
Appellants contend that there exists a cause of action in their complaint because
their claim rests on moral ground or what in brief is defined by law as a natural
obligation.

Issue:
Whether or not the appellees have the natural obligation to give Christmas bonus.

Ruling:
No. Article 1423 of the New Civil Code classifies obligations into civil or natural.
"Civil obligations are a right of action to compel their performance. Natural obligations,
not being based on positive law but on equity and natural law, do not grant a right of
action to enforce their performance, but after voluntary fulfillment by the obligor, they
authorize the retention of what has been delivered or rendered by reason thereof"
An element of natural obligation before it can be cognizable by the court is
voluntary fulfillment by the obligor. Certainly retention can be ordered but only after
there has been voluntary performance. Here, there has been no voluntary performance.
In fact, the court cannot order the performance.
 Tomimbang v. Tomimbang
G.R. No. 165116 | August 4, 2009
Peralta, J.

Doctrine:
Obligations may be modified by changing their object or principal conditions.

Facts:
Petitioner and respondent are siblings. Their parents donated to petitioner an
eight-door apartment with the condition that petitioner shall be the administrator
thereof. To finance renovations, petitioner applied for a loan from PAG-IBIG but failed.
Respondent offered to extend a credit line to her for which she accepted. Quarrel
occurred between them. Petitioner stopped making monthly payments and ignored the
demand letter sent by respondent’s counsel.
Respondent filed a complaint against petitioner. He claims that he and petitioner
entered into a new agreement whereby petitioner was to start making monthly
payments on her loan. In his view, there was a novation of the original agreement and
petitioner’s obligation was already due and demandable.
Petitioner contends that the loan is not yet due and demandable because the
suspensive condition (completion of the renovation of the apartment units) has not yet
been fulfilled.

Issue:
Has the petitioner’s obligation become due and demandable?

Ruling:
Yes, petitioner’s obligation become due and demandable.
Article 1291(1) of the Civil Code provides that an obligation may be modified by
changing their object or principal conditions. Novation may either be extinctive or
modificatory. Extinctive novation extinguishes an existing obligation and creates a new
one in its stead. Modificatory novation is where the change brought about by any
subsequent agreement is merely incidental to the main obligation. The new agreement
will merely supplement it or supplant some of its provisions.
Here, petitioner’s partial performance of her obligation is proof that their original
agreement had been novated by the deletion of the condition that payments shall be
made only after completion of renovations. Hence, her obligation is already due and
demandable.
 Coca-Cola Bottlers Phils., Inc. v. Meñez

Doctrine:

Quasi-delict being the source of obligation upon which Meñez bases his cause of
action for damages against CCBPI, the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative
remedies is not applicable.

Facts:

Research Scientist Ernani Guingona Meñez [Meñez] was a frequent customer of

Rosante Bar and Restaurant [Rosante] of Dumaguete City. Meñez went to Rosante and
ordered two (2) bottles of beer. Thereafter, he ordered pizza and a bottle of "Sprite."

Meñez then took a bite of pizza and drank from the straw the contents of the
Sprite bottle. He noticed that the taste of the softdrink was not one of Sprite but of a
different substance repulsive to taste. The substance smelled of kerosene. He then felt
a burning sensation in his throat and stomach and could not control the urge to vomit.
He left his table for the toilet to vomit but was unable to reach the toilet room. Instead,
he vomited on the lavatory found immediately outside the said toilet.

Meñez even handed the bottle to the waitresses who passed it among
themselves to smell it. All of the waitresses confirmed that the bottle smelled of
kerosene and not of Sprite.

Respondent’s Contention:

In answer to the complaint filed, CCBPI and Rosante set out their own version of
facts. Rosante alleged that Meñez was heard to have only felt nausea but did not vomit
when he went to the comfort room. Rosante further denied that the waitresses
confirmed the content of the bottle to be kerosene. In fact, Meñez refused to have the
waitresses smell it.

As an affirmative defense, Rosante argued that Meñez has no cause of action

against it as it merely received said bottle of Sprite allegedly containing kerosene from
CCBPI, as a matter of routinary procedure. It argued that Rosante is not expected to
open and taste each and every content in order to make sure it is safe for every
customer.

RTC’s Ruling:

The RTC dismissed the complaint for insufficiency of evidence. The RTC found
the evidence for Meñez to be ridden with gaps. The RTC held that the complaint was
devoid of merit as it should have first ventilated [Meñez's] grievance with the Bureau of
Food and Drugs

CA’s Ruling:

The CA ruled that the RTC erred in dismissing the case for failing to comply with
an administrative remedy because it is not a condition precedent in pursuing a case for
damages under Article 2187 of the Civil Code which is the basis of Meñez's complaint
for damages.

Issue:

Whether or not Meñez violate the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative

remedies by not resorting to Bureau of Food and Drugs.

Ruling:

No. The CA correctly ruled that prior resort to BFD is not necessary for a suit for
damages under Article 2187 of the Civil Code to prosper. Article 2187 unambiguously
provides:

ART. 2187. Manufacturers and processors of foodstuffs, drinks, toilet

articles and similar goods shall be liable for death or injuries caused by any
noxious or harmful substances used, although no contractual relation exists
between them and the consumers.

Quasi-delict being the source of obligation upon which Meñez bases his cause of
action for damages against CCBPI, the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative
remedies is not applicable.

Meñez has not presented competent, credible and preponderant evidence to

prove that he suffered physical injuries when he allegedly ingested kerosene from the
"Sprite" bottle in question. Nowhere in the CA Decision is the physical injury of Meñez
discussed. The RTC Decision states the diagnosis of the medical condition of Meñez in
the medical abstract prepared by Dr. Abel Hilario Gomez, who was not presented as a
witness, and signed by Dr. Magbanua, Jr. "the degree of poisoning on the plaintiff Meñez
was mild, since the amount ingested was minimal and did not have severe physical
effects on his body."

The statements of the doctors who tended to the medical needs of Meñez were
equivocal. "Physical effects on the body" and "adverse effect on his body" are not very
clear and definite as to whether or not Meñez suffered physical injuries and if these
statements indicate that he did, what their nature was or how extensive they were.
Consequently, in the absence of sufficient evidence on physical injuries that Meñez
sustained, he is not entitled to moral damages.
 DAY 10

Bayan, KMP, Gabriela, Del Prado v. Ermita

Doctrine:
The right to peaceably assemble and petition for redress of grievances is,
together with freedom of speech, of expression, and of the press, a right that enjoys
primacy in the realm of constitutional protection. For these rights constitute the very
basis of a functional democratic polity, without which all the other rights would be
meaningless and unprotected.

Facts:
Petitioners allege that their rights as organizations and individuals were violated
when the rally they participated in was violently dispersed by policemen implementing
B.P. No. 880 and the Calibrated Preemptive Response (CPR). Others alleged that they
were injured, arrested and detained when a peaceful mass action was preempted and
violently dispersed by the police.
Herein respondent Executive Secretary Ermita made a statement that: In view of
the intelligence reports about the plans of anti-government groups, the PNP and LGUs
were instructed to strictly enforce a “no permit, no rally” policy, disperse groups that run
afoul of this standard and arrest all persons violating the laws on the proper conduct of
mass actions and demonstrations. The rule of calibrated preemptive response is now in
force, in lieu of maximum tolerance.

Issue:
1. Whether or not BP No. 880 is unconstitutional.
2. Whether or not Calibrated Preemptive Response is unconstitutional and illegal.

Ruling:
1. No. B.P. No. 880 cannot be condemned as unconstitutional as it does not curtail
or unduly restrict freedoms. B.P. No. 880 is not an absolute ban of public
assemblies but a restriction that simply regulates the time, place and manner of
the assemblies. It is a "content-neutral" regulation of the time, place, and manner
of holding public assemblies. A fair and impartial reading of B.P. No. 880 shows
that it refers to all kinds of public assemblies that would use public places.
Moreover, "maximum tolerance" is for the benefit of rallyists, not the
government, and is independent of the content of the expressions in the rally.
 Furthermore, the delegation to the mayors of the power to issue rally
"permits" is valid because it is subject to the constitutionally-sound "clear and
present danger" standard. This means that a permit can only be denied on the
ground of clear and present danger to public order, public safety, public
convenience, public morals or public health.
2. Yes. The CPR, insofar as it would purport to differ from or be in lieu of maximum
tolerance, is null and void.
The so-called calibrated preemptive response policy has no place in our
legal firmament and must be struck down as a darkness that shrouds freedom. It
merely confuses our people and is used by some police agents to justify abuses.
The Court rules that in view of the maximum tolerance mandated by B.P.
No. 880, CPR serves no valid purpose if it means the same thing as maximum
tolerance and is illegal if it means something else. Accordingly, what is to be
followed is and should be that mandated by the law itself, namely, maximum
tolerance.
 Kilusang Mayo Uno v. Lomibao
G.R. No. 167798 | April 19, 2006
Carpio, J.

Doctrine:
The 1987 Constitution grants the “right of the people to information on matters
of public concern.” Personal matters are exempt or outside the coverage of the people’s
right to information on matters of public concern. Thus, the right to privacy does not bar
the adoption of reasonable ID systems by government entities.

Facts:
Executive Order (EO) No. 420, issued by President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo in
April 2005, directs all government agencies and government-owned and controlled
corporations to adopt a uniform data collection and format for their existing
identification (ID) systems.
Petitioners allege that EO 420 is unconstitutional because it infringes on the
citizen’s right to privacy.

Issue:
Is EO 420 is unconstitutional?

Ruling:
No, EO 420 is valid and its constitutionality is upheld.
Section 7, Article III of the 1987 Constitution grants the “right of the people to
information on matters of public concern.” Personal matters are exempt or outside the
coverage of the people’s right to information on matters of public concern. Thus, the
right to privacy does not bar the adoption of reasonable ID systems by government
entities.
EO 420 shows no constitutional infirmity because it narrowly limits the data that
can be collected, recorded, and shown and it further provides strict safeguards to
protect the confidentiality of the data collected. The personal data collected and
recorded under EO 420 are treated as strictly confidential being private matters and not
matters of public concern, these data cannot be released to the public or the press.
Hence, EO 420 is a proper subject of executive issuance under the President’s
constitutional power of control over government entities in the Executive department, as
well as under the President's constitutional duty to ensure that laws are faithfully.
Therefore, EO 420 is valid.
 People v. Aquino

Doctrine:

Abuse of superior strength is present whenever there is a notorious inequality of

forces between the victim and the aggressor/s that is plainly and obviously
advantageous to the aggressor/s and purposely selected or taken advantage of to
facilitate the commission of the crime.

If the victim's wounds are not fatal (in the elements of frustrated homicide), the
crime is only attempted homicide. Thus, the prosecution must establish with certainty
the nature, extent, depth, and severity of the victim's wounds.

Facts:

On May 15, 2001, the accused, armed with a knife, attacked and stabbed Jackie
Caguioa, causing his death. They also attacked and stabbed Ernesto Caguioa, but he
survived due to timely medical assistance. The accused were charged with murder and
frustrated murder.

The prosecution presented witnesses who testified that the accused, together
with other individuals, assaulted Jackie and Ernesto. They were restrained by some of
the accused while others stabbed them. The accused then fled the scene, leaving
behind the injured victims. Jackie died on the way to the hospital.

The defense, on the other hand, presented witnesses who claimed that the
victims were the aggressors and that the accused acted in self-defense. They alleged
that Ernesto hit one of the accused with a water pipe, and Jackie stabbed one of the
accused before they were attacked.

RTC’s Contention:

In its decision, the RTC found Mardy, Mario, and Juanito guilty of murder and
frustrated murder. 16 It reasoned that the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses
clearly showed that they took advantage of their superior strength.

CA’s Contention:

CA affirmed the conviction of accused-appellants but modified the penalty for

frustrated murder and the amount of damages awarded.

Issue:
 Whether the guilt of accused-appellants for murder and frustrated murder has
been proven beyond reasonable doubt?

Ruling:

NO. Generally, the elements of murder are: 1) That a person was killed; 2) That
the accused killed him; 3) That the killing was attended by any of the qualifying
circumstances mentioned in Art. 248; and 4) That the killing is not parricide or
infanticide.

That Jackie Caguioa died, that accused-appellants killed him, and that the killing
is neither parricide nor infanticide remain undisputed. These circumstances are already
established by the trial and appellate courts. Accused-appellants did not offer any
substantial reason to deviate from the well-known rule that findings of fact and
assessment of credibility of witnesses are matters best left to the trial court.

Abuse of superior strength is present whenever there is a notorious inequality of

forces between the victim and the aggressor/s that is plainly and obviously
advantageous to the aggressor/s and purposely selected or taken advantage of to
facilitate the commission of the crime. To take advantage of superior strength means to
purposely use force excessively out of proportion to the means of defense available to
the person attacked.

The prosecution in this case failed to adduce evidence of a relative disparity in

age, size, and strength, or force, except for the showing that two assailants stabbed the
victim while three others restrained him. However, the presence of several assailants
does not ipso facto indicate an abuse of superior strength.

Sections 8 and 9, Rule 110 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure require that both the
qualifying and aggravating circumstances must be specifically alleged in the
information to be appreciated as such. In this case, the information for frustrated
murder merely alleged the qualifying circumstance of evident premeditation.

In this case, the Accused-appellants are guilty of attempted homicide. The

elements of frustrated homicide are: (1) the accused intended to kill his victim, as
manifested by his use of a deadly weapon in the assault; (2) the victim sustained fatal
or mortal wound/s but did not die because of timely medical assistance; and (3) none of
the qualifying circumstance for murder under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, as
amended, is present. If the victim's wounds are not fatal, the crime is only attempted
homicide. Thus, the prosecution must establish with certainty the nature, extent, depth,
and severity of the victim's wounds.
 In the case at bar, the prosecution failed to prove that Ernesto's wounds would
have certainly resulted in his death were it not for the medical treatment he received. On
the contrary, Dr. Carlito V. Arenas, who attended to Ernesto, testified that the possibility
of death from such wounds is remote.
 David v. Macapagal-Arroyo

Doctrine:
The right to freedom of expression, is not to be limited, much less denied, except
on a showing of a clear and present danger of a substantive evil that Congress has a
right to prevent.

Facts:
The Officer of the President announced the cancellation of all programs and
activities related to the 20th anniversary celebration of Edsa People Power I; and
revoked the permits to hold rallies issued earlier by the local governments. However,
petitioners were undeterred by the announcement and marched from various parts of
Metro Manila with the intention of converging at the EDSA shrine. Subsequently, they
were violently dispersed by huge clusters of anti-riot police using truncheons, big
fiberglass shields, water cannons, and tear gas to stop and break up the marching
groups, and scatter the massed participants.
During the dispersal, warrantless arrest was made on Randolf David, a professor
at the University of the Philippines and newspaper columnist. Also arrested was his
companion, Ronald Llamas, president of party-list Akbayan.
Moreover, on the basis of PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5, CIDG raided the Daily Tribune
offices in Manila. The raiding team confiscated news stories by reporters, documents,
pictures, and mock-ups of the Saturday issue.
Respondents stated that the proximate cause behind the issuances of PP 1017
and G.O. No. 5 was the conspiracy among some military officers, leftist insurgents of
the New People's Army (NPA), and some members of the political opposition in a plot to
unseat or assassinate President Arroyo. They considered the aim to oust or assassinate
the President and take-over the reigns of government as a clear and present danger. The
Solicitor General argued that the intent of the Constitution is to give full discretionary
powers to the President in determining the necessity of calling out the armed forces.

Issue:
1. Whether or not PP 1017 is unconstitutional as it violates the constitutional
guarantees of freedom of the press, of speech and of assembly.
2. Whether or not G.O. No. 5 is unconstitutional.

Ruling:
1. The Court finds and so holds that PP 1017 is constitutional. A plain reading of PP
1017 shows that it is not primarily directed to speech or even speech-related
 conduct. It is actually a call upon the AFP to prevent or suppress all forms of
lawless violence. The proclamation is sustained by Section 18, Article VII of the
Constitution.
However, PP 1017's extraneous provisions giving the President express or
implied power (1) to issue decrees; (2) to direct the AFP to enforce obedience to
all laws even those not related to lawless violence as well as decrees
promulgated by the President; and (3) to impose standards on media or any form
of prior restraint on the press, are ultra vires and unconstitutional.
The Court also rules that under Section 17, Article XII of the Constitution,
the President, in the absence of a legislation, cannot take over privately-owned
public utility and private business affected with public interest.

2. The Court finds G.O. No. 5 valid. It is an Order issued by the President — acting as
Commander-in-Chief — addressed to subalterns in the AFP to carry out the
provisions of PP 1017. It also provides a valid standard — that the military and
the police should take only the "necessary and appropriate actions and measures
to suppress and prevent acts of lawless violence."
But the words "acts of terrorism" found in G.O. No. 5 have not been legally
defined and made punishable by Congress and should thus be deemed deleted
from the said G.O.

Therefore, (1) the warrantless arrest of petitioners Randolf S. David and Ronald Llamas;
(2) the dispersal of the rallies and warrantless arrest of the KMU and NAFLU-KMU
members; (3) the imposition of standards on media or any prior restraint on the press;
and (4) the warrantless search of the Tribune offices and the whimsical seizures of
some articles for publication and other materials, are not authorized by the Constitution,
the law and jurisprudence.
 DAY 11

Regensburg Lecture of Pope Benedict XVI

Summary:
● Title: Faith, Reason, and the University – Memories and Reflections
● Main Topic: Relationship between faith and reason
● Controversy: Quote critical of some aspects of Islam
● Later Clarification: Emphasis on respect for Muslims and interfaith dialogue

The Regensburg Lecture, formally titled “Faith, Reason and the University –
Memories and Reflections,” was a speech delivered by Pope Benedict XVI on September
12, 2006, at the University of Regensburg in Germany.

The lecture aimed to discuss the relationship between faith and reason. Pope
Benedict, a theologian himself, argued for a harmonious coexistence between the two.
The lecture also included a quote by Byzantine emperor Manuel II Palaiologos critical of
some aspects of Islam.

This quote sparked controversy, with some Muslims feeling it was disrespectful
to their faith. Pope Benedict later clarified his position, emphasizing respect for Muslims
and the importance of dialogue between faiths.

The Regensburg Lecture is significant in discussions about religion, philosophy,

and the role of faith in modern society, as it highlights the ongoing debate about the
compatibility of religious beliefs with reason and intellectual inquiry.
 QUIZ # 2
MAY 3, 2024

Color coded na lang muna tayo haha

Arvin
Athena
Kim

DITO, kanya-kanyang dibs kung ano inyo

1. Why is the law referred to as practical reason and social fact? Define this
concept.

According to Raz, the law is greatly defective unless it includes the role of
law in practical reasoning. The law is practical because it plays the role in it’s
subject’s reasoning on what to do. Furthermore, legal philosophy is nothing but
practical philosophy. That it’s purpose is much more applicable in the live of
people who abide by it and drives them to do the right thing.

“The definitional concept of supreme authority thus completes the

exclusion of law as theory or science from further inquiry in response to the
question “What is law?’ The authority of law as such is unconcerned with what
people believe. Law claims a practical authority which is directed to what people
do.The law must be capable of entering the practical deliberations of those to
whom it is addressed. Once there, it has or claims some privileged role, reflecting
the power of legal standards of conduct. Those questioners who enter the
analytic dimension again will find a conveniently ambiguous concept embracing
coercive, conventional, and moral interpretations of the supreme authority of law.
These philosophies all concern the power of law in practical deliberations in their
competing ways, which alternatively support this element of the definition.”

The law is a social fact because to not follow the law implemented by the
societal norms followed by the people. And to not follow these social facts is to
deviate from the norms of the society. And may result in alienation of an
individual.

“In the most general terms the positivist social thesis is that what is law
and what is not is a matter of social fact.” The “moral thesis is that the moral
value of law (both of a particular law and of a whole legal system) or the moral
merit it has is a contingent matter dependent on the content of the law and the
circumstances of the society to which it applies.” “The only semantic thesis
which can be identified as common to most positive theories is a negative one,
namely, that terms like ‘rights’ and ‘duties’ cannot be used in the same meaning
in legal and moral contexts.”

( I just used the most sensible way of explaining Practical reasoning and Social
Facts as applied in law. Kaya sinama ko na rin yung mga words from the reviewer
itself [italicized])

2. In what instances is the law a practical reason and a social fact? State some
Examples.

Law is practical in a sense that it’s implementation will result into an

orderly society without the use of violence or constant reminder from a law
enforcers. With the set of laws, it is more practical to impose punishments to
prevent arbitrary judgements that may result in unjust rulings.

In a society where the law on usage of plastic is strictly implemented for

decades due to it’s harmful effect to the environment and the locality is
considered as a social fact. The prohibition of dropping of harmful wastes in the
natural bodies of water is considered a social fact. These laws and prohibitions
are considered as social facts because the society is aware of it’s harmful effects
that it was ingrained in their psyche.

Legal reasoning is practical in the sense that its natural conclusion is an

action rather than a state of knowledge.

Example of law as practical reason: Traffic laws

Imagine a four-way stop without a stop sign. It is a four-way yield but the
law provides a reason for drivers to come to a complete stop and take turns
proceeding. This is an example when the law is considered in its practical reason
as it promotes safety and order in an intersection.

Example of law as a Social Fact: Criminal laws

Criminal law is deeply rooted in social norms and collective morality.

Crimes such as murder and theft are not only prohibited by law but also
condemned by society as wrongful or illegal acts. Legal sanctions (either
imprisonment or fines) are put into place to deter misdeeds and punish criminals.
These criminal behaviors reflect societal judgments about right and wrong; thus,
making criminal law a manifestation of social facts.

3. Define Natural Law jurisprudence. What is Natural law?

The Natural Law Theory asserts that there is an intrinsic or conceptual

connection between law and morality. This theory presupposes that the
characteristic of being moral is part of the meaning of ‘positive law’ itself. The
positive law itself must be moral.
As such, Natural Law has been defined as the rule of conduct which is
prescribed to us by the Creator in the constitution of the nature with which He
has endowed us.

According to Natural Law Theory, there is an intrinsic or conceptual

connection between law and morality. By “law,” this means the “positive law” and
by “morality” this means any kind of morality, whether conventional or critical,
specific to time, place, or universal.
In other words, under the Theory of Natural Law, law has an intrinsic
connection with morality, and the characteristic of being moral is part of the
meaning of positive law itself. Thus, the positive law itself must be moral.
In sum, Natural Law is the participation of the eternal law in the rational
creature. This is the aspect of the eternal law that man can know or discover
through reason.

Classical Natural Law Jurisprudence is a theory of law that dominated the

philosophy of law during Classical Greek and Roman times up to the 16th or 17th
Century.
This theory has two (2) essential characteristics:
a. First, which it shares in common with all natural law theories; and
 b. Second, which it distinguishes it from all the other natural law
theories.

Furthermore, according to Classical Natural Law Jurisprudence, the basis

or ground for the connection between law and morality is due to its second
characteristic, which is the moral order is part and parcel of the natural order.
This view, which connects the moral to the natural, the ‘is’ and the ‘ought’,
or fact and value combines and unites the two (2) kinds of law as a “descriptive
law” and a “prescriptive law” into the law of nature.

(ito yung nasa readings)

4. What is Classical Natural Rights Jurisprudence?

The primary moral concept of Natural Rights Theory is that of 'right'. Men
naturally have rights. Rights exist in human beings by nature. Rights thus are
primary and duty derivative. Duties are derived from the existence of these
natural rights. In particular, because all men have rights, each man has the duty
to respect the other's rights.
Natural Rights Theory has two main or essential characteristics, such as:
1. Connection between Law and Morality
2. Moral Order is Part of the Natural Order

Natural Rights Legal Theory, otherwise known as Modern Natural Law

Theory, is a variant of Classical Natural Law Legal Theory. These are its salient or
five (5) features:
a. The Existence of Self-Evident Truths
b. The Adherence to Natural Equality
c. The Existence of Natural Rights
d. The Derivation of Power from the Consent of the Governed
e. The Limitations on the Powers of Government

5. Apply Classical Natural Jurisprudence in the case of Arigo vs. Swift (G.R. No.
206510, 16 Sept. 2014).

The Classical Natural Right Jurisprudence applies to Arigo v. Swift with

respect to the assertion of the locus standi of the petitioners to file the petition.
The petitioners claim that the salvaging operations of the USS Guardian cause
and continue to cause environmental damage to their health in violation of their
constitutional right to a balanced and healthful ecology.

According to the Supreme Court, the public right of citizens to a balanced

and healthful ecology need not be written in the Constitution for it is assumed,
like other civil and political rights guaranteed in the Bill of Rights, to exist from
the inception of mankind. Furthermore, such right carries with it the correlative
duty to refrain from impairing the environment.

As mentioned, the right to a healthful and balanced ecology asserted by

the petitioners is deemed as existent by nature or in simple terms, an inherent
right. Correlative to this right is the duty to care for the environment.

The Court has ruled that while the petitioners have locus standi, the
petition has become moot and academic in a sense that the salvage operations
have already been accomplished. Although there is a law violated herein, the
relief of the petitioners to recover damages may not be granted. This is with
respect to the Classical Natural Law Jurisprudence which provides that a positive
law and morality are interconnected and may not be separated.

IKLIAN LANG NATIN ANG SAGOT DON SA MISMONG QUIZ. PARANG

KODIGO LANG ITO. INGAT TAYO FRIENDS LOL
Pili na lang ng matripang sagot HAHA
(Hinuluan ko lang ito ah, kayo na magparaphrase haha)
Yessireeee. BS Galore

The Classical Natural Jurisprudence is relevant in the case of Arigo v. Swift

because the Supreme Court balanced the two (2) schools of thought: natural law
and positive law wherein the Court emphasized the petitioners’ inherent right to a
healthy environment and, at the same, time enforced the doctrine of State
immunity.

Here, the Court ruled that the respondents (Swift et al.,) were sued in their
official capacity as commanding officers of the United States of America (US)
Navy who had control and supervision over the USS Guardian and its crew; and
that the alleged act or omission resulting in the unfortunate grounding of the USS
Guardian on the Tubbataha Reefs Natural Park (TRNP) was committed while they
were performing official military duties. Moreover, considering that the
satisfaction of a judgment against said officials will require remedial actions and
appropriation of funds by the US government, the suit is deemed one against the
US itself. Thus, the principle or doctrine of State immunity bars the exercise of
jurisdiction by the Philippine Supreme Court over the persons of respondents.

Notwithstanding the immunity enjoyed by the respondents, the US

government has recognized and committed itself to compensate for the damage
caused by the said warship to the TRNP. Both the US and the Philippine
governments were in talks to negotiate or discuss such matters. The US Embassy
has also declared it is closely coordinating with local scientists and experts in
assessing the extent of the damage and appropriate methods of rehabilitation.
While the Court acknowledged that the petitioners have indeed the locus
standi or legal standing to file the petition, the petition has become moot because
the salvage operation they have sought to be enjoined or restrained has already
been accomplished.

As mentioned above, the theory of Classical Natural Jurisprudence

recognizes the idea that there are universal principles of justice derived from
nature itself, which are inherent and immutable. These rights include but are not
limited to, the right to life, liberty, and property. These principles can be
discovered through reason and apply to all human beings.

In summary, the theory of Classical Natural Jurisprudence provides a moral

framework supporting the environmental protection efforts in repairing the
damage caused by the USS Guardian to the TRNP.

OKAY NA YAN. HAHAHHAHA

Lilipat ko na sagot ko

ALRIGHTY. SALAMAT, MAH HOMIES!