108.Alvarez v. CFI, 64 Phil.

33

FACTS:

The petitioner asks that the warrant, ordering the search of his house and the seizure, at any time of the
day or night, of certain accounting books, documents and papers belonging to him in his residence
situated in Infanta, Province of Tayabas, as well as the order of a later date, authorizing the agents of the
Anti-Usury Board to retain the articles seized, be declared illegal and set aside, and prays that all the
articles in question be returned to him.

The chief of the secret service of the Anti-Usury Board, of the Department of Justice, presented to Judge
Eduardo Gutierrez David an affidavit alleging that according to reliable information, the petitioner kept in
his house in Infanta, Tayabas, books, documents, receipts, lists, chits and other papers used by him in
connection with his activities as a money-lender charging usurious rates of interest in violation of the law.
In his oath at the and of the affidavit, the chief of the secret service stated that his answers to the
questions were correct to the best of his knowledge and belief. He did not swear to the truth of his
statements upon his own knowledge of the facts but upon the information received by him from a
reliable person.

Upon the affidavit in question the Judge, on said date, issued the warrant which is the subject matter of
the petition, ordering the search of the petitioner's house at nay time of the day or night, the seizure of the
books and documents above-mentioned and the immediate delivery thereof to him to be disposed of in
accordance with the law.

ISSUE:
WON the search warrant is valid

RULING: ( GALING LANG SA MOSANG NIYANG FRIEND YUNG INFO HINDI NIYA TALAGA ALAM
YUNG FACTS NANIWALA LANG AGAD SIYA TAS NAG SUMBONG )
NO. Section 1, paragraph 3, of Article III of the Constitution provides that no warrants shall issue but
upon probable cause, to be determined by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation
of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce.

If the affidavit of the applicant or complainant is sufficient, the judge may dispense with that of other
witnesses.

Inasmuch as the affidavit of the agent in this case was insufficient because his knowledge of the
facts was not personal but merely hearsay, it is the duty of the judge to require the affidavit of one or
more witnesses for the purpose of determining the existence of probable cause to warrant the issuance of
the search warrant.

When the affidavit of the applicant of the complaint contains sufficient facts within his personal and direct
knowledge, it is sufficient if the judge is satisfied that there exist probable cause; when the applicant's
knowledge of the facts is mere hearsay, the affidavit of one or more witnesses having a personal
knowledge of the fact is necessary. We conclude, therefore, that the warrant issued is likewise illegal
because it was based only on the affidavit of the agent who had no personal knowledge of the facts.

(WALA SA CASE TO PERO NAKAY NACHURA)

[Cupcupin v. People, G.R. No. 132389, November 19, 2002]
The oath required must refer to the truth of the facts within the personal knowledge of the applicant or
his witnesses, because the purpose is to convince the committing magistrate, not the individual making
the affidavit and seeking the issuance of the warrant, of the existence of probable cause
109.Burgos v. Chief of Staff, 133 SCRA 800 (1984)

FACTS:

Petitioners assail the validity of the Two [2] search warrants issued on December 7, 1982 by respondent
Judge Ernani Cruz-Pano, on the business addresses of the "Metropolitan Mail" and "We Forum"
newspapers, respectively, were searched, and office and printing machines, equipment, paraphernalia,
motor vehicles and other articles used in the printing, publication and distribution of the said newspapers,
as well as numerous papers, documents, books and other written literature alleged to be in the
possession and control of petitioner Jose Burgos, Jr. publisher-editor of the "We Forum" newspaper, were
seized.

Respondents urge dismissal of the petition on ground of laches. Considerable stress is laid on the fact
that while said search warrants were issued on December 7, 1982, the instant petition impugning the
same was filed only on June 16, 1983 or after the lapse of a period of more than six [6] months.

Laches is failure or negligence for an unreasonable and unexplained length of time to do that which, by
exercising due diligence, could or should have been done earlier. It is negligence or omission to assert a
right within a reasonable time, warranting a presumption that the party entitled to assert it either has
abandoned it or declined to assert it.

Although the reason given by petitioners may not be flattering to our judicial system, We find no ground to
punish or chastise them for an error in judgment. On the contrary, the extrajudicial efforts exerted by
petitioners quite evidently negate the presumption that they had abandoned their right to the possession
of the seized property, thereby refuting the charge of laches against them.

ISSUE:
WON the search warrant is valid

RULING:
NO. Probable cause for a search is defined as such facts and circumstances which would lead a
reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense has been committed and that the objects
sought in connection with the offense are in the place sought to be searched. And when the search
warrant applied for is directed against a newspaper publisher or editor in connection with the
publication of subversive materials, as in the case at bar, the application and/or its supporting
affidavits must contain a specification, stating with particularity the alleged subversive material
he has published or is intending to publish.

Mere generalization will not suffice. Thus, the broad statement in Col. Abadilla's application that
petitioner "is in possession or has in his control printing equipment and other paraphernalia,
news publications and other documents which were used and are all continuously being used as
a means of committing the offense of subversion punishable under Presidential Decree 885, as
amended ..." is a mere conclusion of law and does not satisfy the requirements of probable
cause. Bereft of such particulars as would justify a finding of the existence of probable cause, said
allegation cannot serve as basis for the issuance of a search warrant and it was a grave error for
respondent judge to have done so.

In mandating that "no warrant shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined by the judge, ...
after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce; the
Constitution requires no less than personal knowledge by the complainant or his witnesses of the facts
upon which the issuance of a search warrant may be justified.

Another factor which makes the search warrants under consideration constitutionally objectionable is that
they are in the nature of general warrants.
110.Soliven v. Makasiar, 167 SCRA 394 (1988)

FACTS NA WALA SA CASE:

Si Soliven editor-in-chief siya tapos si Beltran dito journalist and newspaper columnist. So kaya may nag
ka kaso silang libel dahil:

Minention sa isang coloumn (siguro sa newspaper ganun) about doon sa 1987 coup attempt na si
Corazon Aquino had been hiding under the bed during the coup. Ayun napikon si Corazon Aquino
sinampahan ng kaso si Beltran (siya kasi yung nag post) tas yung editor in chief na si soliven.

FACTS:
In these consolidated cases, three principal issues were raised:

(1) whether or not petitioners were denied due process when informations for libel were filed against
them although the finding of the existence of a prima facie case was still under review by the
Secretary of Justice and, subsequently, by the President;
(2) whether or not the constitutional rights of Beltran were violated when respondent RTC judge
issued a warrant for his arrest without personally examining the complainant and the witnesses, if
any, to determine probable cause; and
(3) whether or not the President of the Philippines, under the Constitution, may initiate criminal
proceedings against the petitioners through the filing of a complaint-affidavit.

Due to subsequent events nagging moot and academic daw yung first issue

ISSUE:
WON constitutional rights of Beltran were violated when respondent RTC judge issued a warrant for his
arrest without personally examining the complainant and the witnesses, if any, to determine probable
cause

RULING:
NO. It is sufficient that the judge “personally determine” the existence of probable cause. It is not
necessary that he should personally examine the complainant and his witnesses (GALING
NATURA SAME CASE)

The addition of the word "personally" after the word "determined" and the deletion of the grant of
authority by the 1973 Constitution to issue warrants to "other responsible officers as may be authorized by
law," has apparently convinced petitioner Beltran that the Constitution now requires the judge to
personally examine the complainant and his witnesses in his determination of probable cause for the
issuance of warrants of arrest. This is not an accurate interpretation.

What the Constitution underscores is the exclusive and personal responsibility of the issuing judge to
satisfy himself of the existence of probable cause. In satisfying himself of the existence of probable cause
for the issuance of a warrant of arrest, the judge is not required to personally examine the complainant
and his witnesses. Following established doctrine and procedure, he shall:

(1) personally evaluate the report and the supporting documents submitted by the fiscal regarding
the existence of probable cause and, on the basis thereof, issue a warrant of arrest; or
(2) if on the basis thereof he finds no probable cause, he may disregard the fiscal's report and
require the submission of supporting affidavits of witnesses to aid him in arriving at a conclusion
as to the existence of probable cause.

It has not been shown that respondent judge has deviated from the prescribed procedure. Thus,
with regard to the issuance of the warrants of arrest, a finding of grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction cannot be sustained.
111.Silva v. Presiding Judge of RTC, Negros

FACTS:

M/Sgt. Ranulfo Villamor, Jr., as chief of the PC Narcom Detachment, filed an "Application for Search
Warrant” against petitioners Nicomedes Silva and Marlon Silva. This application was accompanied by a
"Deposition of Witness" executed by Pfc. Arthur M. Alcoran and Pat. Leon T. Quindo.

On the same day. Judge Nickarter A. Ontal, then Presiding Judge, pursuant to the said "Application for
Search Warrant" and "Deposition of Witness", issued Search Warrant No. 1, directing the aforesaid police
officers to search the room of Marlon Silva in the residence of Nicomedes Silva for violation of Republic
Act No. 6425, otherwise known as the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972.

In the course of the search, the serving officers also seized money belonging to Antonieta Silva in the
amount of P1,231.40.

Antonieta Silva filed a motion for the return of the said amount on the grounds that the search warrant
only authorized the serving officers to seize marijuana dried leaves, cigarettes and joint, and that said
officers failed or refused to make a return of the said search warrant in gross violation of Section 11, Rule
126 of the Rules of Court. 4

Acting on said motion, Judge Ontal issued an Order, stating that the court "holds in abeyance the
disposition of the said amount of P1,231.40 pending the filing of appropriate charges in connection with
the search warrant."

Petitioners filed a motion to quash Search Warrant No. 1 on the grounds that:

(1) it was issued on the sole basis of a mimeographed "Application for Search Warrant" and
"Deposition of Witness", which were accomplished by merely filling in the blanks and
(2) the judge failed to personally examine the complainant and witnesses by searching questions
and answers in violation of Section 3, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court. 6

ISSUE:
WON the search warrant is valid

RULING: (APAT LANG KASI TINANONG AMP TAS LEADING QUESTIONS PA!!!)
NO.Thus, Sections 3 and 4, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court provide for the requisites for the issuance of a
search warrant, to wit:
SEC. 3. Requisite for issuing search warrant. — A search warrant shall not issue but upon probable cause in connection with
one specific offense to be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant
and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the things to be seized.

SEC. 4. Examination of complainant; record. — The judge must, before issuing the warrant, personally examine in the
form of searching questions and answers, in writing and under oath the complainant and any witnesses he may
produce on facts personally known to them and attach to the record their sworn statements together with any
affidavits submitted.

Based on the aforecited constitutional and statutory provisions, the judge must, before issuing a search
warrant, determine whether there is probable cause by examining the complainant and witnesses through
searching questions and answers.

In the case at bar, we have carefully examined the questioned search warrant as well as the
"Application for Search Warrant" and "Deposition of Witness", and found that Judge Ontal failed
to comply with the legal requirement that he must examine the applicant and his witnesses in the
form of searching questions and answers in order to determine the existence of probable cause.
The joint "Deposition of Witness" executed by Pfc. Alcoran and Pat. Quindo, which was submitted
together with the "Application for Search Warrant" contained, for the most part suggestive questions
answerable by merely placing "yes" or "no" in the blanks provided thereon.

The questions propounded to the witnesses were in fact, not probing but were merely routinary. The
deposition was already mimeogragphed and all that the witnesses had to do was fill in their answers on
the blanks provided.

A perusal of the deposition of P/Lt. Florencio Angeles shows that it was too brief and short. Respondent
Judge did not examine him "in the form of searching questions and answers". On the contrary,
the questions asked were leading as they called for a simple "yes" or "no" answer. As held in
Quintero vs. NBI, "the questions propounded by respondent Executive Judge to the applicant's witness'
are not sufficiently searching to establish probable cause. Asking of leading questions to the deponent
in an application for search warrant, and conducting of examination in a general manner, would
not satisfy the requirements for issuance of a valid search warrant.
112.Lim v. Felix, G.R. No. 94054-7, February 19, 1991

FACTS:

At about 7:30 o'clock in the morning, at the vicinity of the airport road of the Masbate Domestic
Airport, located at the municipality of Masbate province of Masbate, Congressman Moises Espinosa,
Sr. and his security escorts, were attacked and killed by a lone assassin. Dante Siblante another
security escort of Congressman Espinosa, Sr. survived the assassination plot, although, he himself
suffered a gunshot wound.

An investigation of the incident then followed.

Thereafter, and for the purpose of preliminary investigation, the designated investigator, Harry O.
Tantiado, TSg, of the PC Criminal Investigation Service filed an amended complaint with the
Municipal Trial Court of Masbate accusing, among others, Vicente Lim, Sr., Mayor Susana Lim of
Masbate, Jolly T. Fernandez, Florencio T. Fernandez, Jr., Nonilon A. Bagalihog, Mayor Nestor C.
Lim and Mayor Antonio Kho of the crime of multiple murder and frustrated murder in connection with
the airport incident.

After conducting the preliminary investigation, the court issued an order:

After weighing the affidavits and answers given by the witnesses for the prosecution
during the preliminary examination in searching questions and answers, concludes
that a probable cause has been established for the issuance of a warrant of arrest of
named accused in the amended complaint

The entire records of the case consisting of two hundred sixty one (261) pages were transmitted to
the Provincial Prosecutor of Masbate. Respondent Acting Fiscal Antonio C. Alfane was designated
to review the case. Fiscal Alfane filed with the Regional Trial Court of Masbate, four (4) separate
informations of murder against the twelve (12) accused with a recommendation of no bail.

Petitioners Vicente Lim, Sr. and Susana Lim filed with us a verified petition for change of venue. It
was accepted. The change of venue was from the Regional Trial Court of Masbate to the Regional
Trial Court of Makati to avoid a miscarriage of justice.

The cases were raffled to Branch 56 presided by respondent Judge Nemesio S. Felix.

Petitioners Vicente Lim, Sr. and Susana Lim filed with the respondent court several motions and
manifestations which in substance prayed for the following:

1. An order be issued requiring the transmittal of the initial records of the

preliminary inquiry or investigation conducted by the Municipal Judge Barsaga of
Masbate for the best enlightenment of this Honorable Court in its personal
determination of the existence of a probable cause or prima facie evidence as well
as its determination of the existence of guilt, pursuant to the mandatory mandate
of the constitution that no warrant shall issue unless the issuing magistrate shall
have himself been personally convinced of such probable cause.

2. Movants be given ample opportunity to file their motion for preliminary investigation as a
matter of right; and

3. In the event that this court may later be convinced of the existence of a probable cause,
to be allowed to file a motion for reduction of bail or for admission of bail.

In another manifestation, the Lims reiterated that the court conduct a hearing to determine if there
really exists a prima facie case against them in the light of documents which are recantations of
some witnesses in the preliminary investigation. The motions and manifestations were opposed by
the prosecution.

The respondent court issued an order denying for lack of merit the motions and manifestations and
issued warrants of arrest against the accused including the petitioners herein. The respondent Judge
said:
 In the instant cases, the preliminary investigation was conducted by the Municipal Trial Court
of Masbate, Masbate which found the existence of probable cause that the offense of
multiple murder was committed and that all the accused are probably guilty thereof, which
was affirmed upon review by the Provincial Prosecutor who properly filed with the Regional
Trial Court four separate informations for murder. Considering that both the two competent
officers to whom such duty was entrusted by law have declared the existence of probable
cause, each information is complete in form and substance, and there is no visible defect on
its face, this Court finds it just and proper to rely on the prosecutor's certification in each
information which reads:

ISSUE:
WON judge may issue a warrant of arrest without bail by simply relying on the prosecution’s
certification and recommendation that a probable cause exists

RULING:
NO. If a Judge relies solely on the certification of the Prosecutor as in this case where all the records
of the investigation are in Masbate, he or she has not personally determined probable cause. The
determination is made by the Provincial Prosecutor. The constitutional requirement has not been
satisfied. The Judge commits a grave abuse of discretion.

The records of the preliminary investigation conducted by the Municipal Court of Masbate and
reviewed by the respondent Fiscal were still in Masbate when the respondent Fiscal issued the
warrants of arrest against the petitioners. There was no basis for the respondent Judge to make his
own personal determination regarding the existence of a probable cause for the issuance of a
warrant of arrest as mandated by the Constitution. He could not possibly have known what
transpired in Masbate as he had nothing but a certification. Significantly, the respondent
Judge denied the petitioners' motion for the transmittal of the records on the ground that the
mere certification and recommendation of the respondent Fiscal that a probable cause exists
is sufficient for him to issue a warrant of arrest.

We reiterate that in making the required personal determination, a Judge is not precluded from
relying on the evidence earlier gathered by responsible officers. The extent of the reliance depends
on the circumstances of each case and is subject to the Judge's sound discretion. However, the
Judge abuses that discretion when having no evidence before him, he issues a warrant of
arrest.

Indubitably, the respondent Judge committed a grave error when he relied solely on the
Prosecutor's certification and issued the questioned Order dated July 5, 1990 without having
before him any other basis for his personal determination of the existence of a probable
cause.
113.Mata v. Bayona , 128 SCRA 388 (1984)

FACTS:

Specifically, the contention is that the search warrant issued by respondent Judge was based merely on
the application for search warrant and a joint affidavit of private respondents which were
wrongfully it is alleged subscribed, and sworn to before the Clerk of Court of respondent Judge.
Furthermore, there was allegedly a failure on the part of respondent Judge to attach the
necessary papers pertinent to the issuance of the search warrant to the records of Criminal Case No.
4298-CC wherein petitioner is accused under PD 810, as amended by PD 1306, the information against
him alleging that Soriano Mata offered, took and arranged bets on the Jai Alai game by "selling illegal
tickets known as ‘Masiao tickets’ without any authority from the Philippine Jai Alai & Amusement
Corporation or from the government authorities concerned."

Petitioner claims that during the hearing of the case, he discovered that nowhere from the records
of the said case could be found the search warrant and other pertinent papers connected to the
issuance of the same, so that he had to inquire from the City Fiscal its whereabouts, and to which
inquiry respondent Judge replied, "it is with the court." The Judge then handed the records to the Fiscal
who attached them to the records.

This led petitioner to file a motion to quash and annul the search warrant and for the return of the articles
seized, citing and invoking, among others, Section 4 of Rule 126 of the Revised Rules of Court. The
motion was denied by respondent Judge, stating that the court has made a thorough investigation and
examination under oath of Bernardo U. Goles and Reynaldo T. Mayote, members of the Intelligence
Section of 352nd PC Co./Police District II INP; that in fact the court made a certification to that effect; and
that the fact that documents relating to the search warrant were not attached immediately to the record of
the criminal case is of no moment, considering that the rule does not specify when these documents are
to be attached to the records.

ISSUE:
WON the search warrant is tainted with illegality for being violative of the Constitution and the Rules of
Court.

RULING:

YES. Under the Constitution "no search warrant shall issue but upon probable cause to be determined
by the Judge or such other responsible officer as may be authorized by law after examination under oath
or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce." More emphatic and detailed is the
implementing rule of the constitutional injunction, Section 4 of Rule 126 which provides that the judge
must before issuing the warrant personally examine on oath or affirmation the complainant and any
witnesses he may produce and take their depositions in writing, and attach them to the record, in addition
to any affidavits presented to him.

Mere affidavits of the complainant and his witnesses are thus not sufficient. The examining Judge
has to take depositions in writing of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce and to
attach them to the record. Such written deposition is necessary in order that the Judge may be able to
properly determine the existence or non-existence of the probable cause, to hold liable for perjury the
person giving it if it will be found later that his declarations are false.

We, therefore, hold that the search warrant is tainted with illegality by the failure of the Judge to conform
with the essential requisites of taking the depositions in writing and attaching them to the record,
rendering the search warrant invalid.

The judge’s insistence that she examined the complainants under oath has become dubious by
petitioner’s claim that at the particular time when he examined all the relevant papers connected with the
issuance of the questioned search warrant, after he demanded the same from the lower court since they
were not attached to the records, he did not find any certification at the back of the joint affidavit of the
complainants.
114.20th Century Fox Film Corp. v. CA, 164 SCRA 655 (1988)

FACTS:

In a letter-complaint, petitioner 20th Century Fox Film Corporation through counsel sought the National
Bureau of Investigation's (NBI) assistance in the conduct of searches and seizures in connection with the
latter's anti-film piracy campaign. Specifically, the letter-complaint alleged that certain videotape outlets all
over Metro Manila are engaged in the unauthorized sale and renting out of copyrighted films in videotape
form which constitute a flagrant violation of Presidential Decree No. 49 (otherwise known as the Decree
on the Protection of Intellectual Property).

Acting on the letter-complaint, the NBI conducted surveillance and investigation of the outlets pinpointed
by the petitioner and subsequently filed three (3) applications for search warrants against the video
outlets owned by the private respondents.

On September 4, 1985, the lower court issued the desired search warrants.

Armed with the search warrants, the NBI accompanied by the petitioner's agents, raided the video outlets
and seized the items described therein. An inventory of the items seized was made and left with the
private respondents.

Acting on a motion to lift search warrants and release seized properties filed by the private respondents,
the lower court issued an order, lifting the three (3) search warrants issued earlier against the private
respondents by the court.

The lower court denied a motion for reconsideration filed by the petitioner

ISSUE:
WON the search warrant was validly lifted

RULING:

YES.

All three witnesses during the proceedings in the application for the three search warrants testified of their
own personal knowledge. Yet, Atty. Albino Reyes of the NBI stated that the counsel or representative of
the Twentieth Century Fox Corporation will testify on the video cassettes that were pirated, so that he did
not have personal knowledge of the alleged piracy. The witness Bacani also said that the video cassettes
were pirated without stating the manner it was pirated and that it was Atty. Domingo that has knowledge
of that fact.

On the part of Atty. Domingo, he said that the re-taping of the allegedly pirated tapes was from master
tapes allegedly belonging to the Twentieth Century Fox, because, according to him, it is of his personal
knowledge.

At the hearing of the Motion for Reconsideration, Senior NBI Agent Atty. Albino Reyes testified that when
the complaint for infringement was brought to the NBI, the master tapes of the allegedly pirated tapes
were shown to him and he made comparisons of the tapes with those purchased by their man Bacani.
Why the master tapes or at least the film reels of the allegedly pirated tapes were not shown to the
Court during the application gives some misgivings as to the truth of that bare statement of the
NBI agent on the witness stand.

PINAKA RULING
The lower court, therefore, lifted the three (3) questioned search warrants in the absence of probable
cause that the private respondents violated P.D. 49. As found out by the court, the NBI agents who
acted as witnesses did not have personal knowledge of the subject matter of their testimony
which was the alleged commission of the offense by the private respondents. Only the petitioner's
counsel who was also a witness during the application for the issuance of the search warrants stated that
he had personal knowledge that the confiscated tapes owned by the private respondents were pirated
tapes taken from master tapes belonging to the petitioner. However, the lower court did not give much
credence to his testimony in view of the fact that the master tapes of the allegedly pirated tapes were not
shown to the court during the application.
The application for search warrants was directed against video tape outlets which allegedly were
engaged in the unauthorized sale and renting out of copyrighted films belonging to the petitioner pursuant
to P.D. 49.

The essence of a copyright infringement is the similarity or at least substantial similarity of the
purported pirated works to the copyrighted work. Hence, the applicant must present to the court
the copyrighted films to compare them with the purchased evidence of the video tapes allegedly
pirated to determine whether the latter is an unauthorized reproduction of the former. This linkage
of the copyrighted films to the pirated films must be established to satisfy the requirements of probable
cause. Mere allegations as to the existence of the copyrighted films cannot serve as basis for the
issuance of a search warrant.
115.Nolasco v. Cruz Paño, 132 SCRA 152 (1985)

FACTS:
Prior to August 6, 1984 (hereinafter to be referred to without the year), AGUILAR-ROQUE was one of the
accused of Rebellion. At 11:30 A.M. on August 6th, AGUILAR-ROQUE and NOLASCO were arrested by a
Constabulary Security Group (CSG) at the intersection of Mayon Street and P. Margall Street, Quezon
City. The stated time is an allegation of petitioners, not denied by respondents. The record does not
disclose that a warrant of arrest had previously beeen issued against NOLASCO.

At 12:00 noon, elements of the CSG searched the premises. Earlier that day at around 9:00 A.M., Lt. Col.
Virgilio G. Saldajeno of the CSG, applied for a Search Warrant from respondent Hon. Ernani Cruz Paño,
Executive Judge of the Regional Trial Court, determined to be the leased residence of AGUILAR-ROQUE
as a “suspected underground house of the CPP/NPA. AGUILAR-ROQUE has been long wanted by the
military for being a high ranking officer of the Communist Party of the Philippines, particularly connected
with the MV Karagatan/Doña Andrea cases.

In connection with the search made at 12:00 N. of August 6th, the following may be stated:
(a) TOLENTINO was a person then in charge of the premises. He was arrested by the searching party
presumably without a warrant of arrest.
(b) The searching party seized 428 documents and written materials, 2 and additionally a portable
typewriter, and 2 wooden boxes, making 431 items in all.
(c) According to the Return, submitted in the SEARCH WARRANT CASE on August 10th, 4 the search was
made in the presence of Dra. Marciana Galang, owner of the premises, and of two (2) Barangay Tanods. No
mention was made that TOLENTINO was present. The list of the 428 articles and documents attached to the
Return was signed by the two Barangay Tanods, but not by Dra. Galang.

The three petitioners, AGUILAR-ROQUE, NOLASCO and TOLENTINO, were charged upon complaint
filed by the CSG against petitioners for "Subversion/Rebellion and/or Conspiracy to Commit
Rebellion/Subversion."

CSG filed a Motion for Reconsideration praying that AGUILAR-ROQUE and NOLASCO be charged with
Subversion. The Motion was denied.

The CSG submitted an Amended Return in the SEARCH WARRANT CASE praying that the CSG be
allowed to retain the seized 431 documents and articles, “in connection with cases that are presently
pending against Mila Aguilar Roque before the Quezon City Fiscal’s Office and the court.”

Petitioners were required by Judge Paño to comment on the Amended Return, which AGUILAR-ROQUE
did, raising the issue of the inadmissibility of any evidence obtained pursuant to the Search Warrant.
Judge Paño ruled that the seized documents “shall be subject to disposition of the tribunal trying the case
against respondent.” Petitioners filed a Motion to Suppress in the SUBVERSIVE DOCUMENTS CASE,
praying that such of the 431 items belonging to them be returned to them. It was claimed that the
proceedings under the Search Warrant were unlawful. Judge Santos denied the Motion on the ground
that the validity of the Search Warrant has to be litigated in the SEARCH WARRANT CASE. He was
apparently not aware of the Order of Judge Paño issued in the SEARCH WARRANT CASE.

PETITIONERS principally assert that the Search Warrant is void because it is a general warrant since it
does not sufficiently describe with particularity the things subject of the search and seizure, and that
probable cause has not been properly established for lack of searching questions propounded to the
applicant’s witness

ISSUE:
WON the Search Warrant is void.

RULING:
YES.The Search Warrant authorizes the seizure of personal properties vaguely described and not
particularized. It is an all-embracing description which includes everything conceivable regarding
the Communist Party of the Philippines and the National Democratic Front. It does not specify
what the subversive books and instructions are; what the manuals not otherwise available to the public
contain to make them subversive or to enable them to be used for the crime of rebellion. There is absent
a definite guideline to the searching team as to what items might be lawfully seized thus giving the officers
of the law discretion regarding what articles they should seize as, in fact, taken also were a portable
typewriter and 2 wooden boxes. It is thus in the nature of a general warrant and infringes on the
constitutional mandate requiring particular description of the things to be seized. In the recent rulings of
this Court, search warrants of similar description were considered null and void for being too general.

116.People v. Malmstedt, 198 SCRA 401 (1991)

FACTS:

Accused Mikael Malmstedt, a Swedish national, entered the Philippines for the third time in December
1988 as a tourist.

In the evening of 7 May 1989, accused left for Baguio City. Upon his arrival thereat in the morning of the
following day, he took a bus to Sagada and stayed in that place for two (2) days.

Accused went to the Nangonogan bus stop in Sagada to catch the first available trip to Baguio City. From
Baguio City, accused planned to take a late afternoon trip to Angeles City, then proceed to Manila to catch
his flight out of the country, scheduled on 13 May 1989. From Sagada, accused took a Skyline bus

In the morning of that same day, Captain Alen Vasco, the Commanding Officer of the First Regional
Command (NARCOM) stationed at Camp Dangwa, ordered his men to set up a temporary checkpoint at
Kilometer 14, Acop, Tublay, Mountain Province, for the purpose of checking all vehicles coming from the
Cordillera Region. The order to establish a checkpoint in the said area was prompted by persistent
reports that vehicles coming from Sagada were transporting marijuana and other prohibited drugs.
Moreover, information was received by the Commanding Officer of NARCOM, that same morning, that a
Caucasian coming from Sagada had in his possession prohibited drugs.

At about 1:30 o'clock in the afternoon, the bus where accused was riding was stopped. Sgt. Fider and
CIC Galutan boarded the bus and announced that they were members of the NARCOM and that they
would conduct an inspection.

During the inspection, CIC Galutan noticed a bulge on accused's waist. Suspecting the bulge on
accused's waist to be a gun, the officer asked for accused's passport and other identification
papers. When accused failed to comply, the officer required him to bring out whatever it was that
was bulging on his waist. The bulging object turned out to be a pouch bag and when accused
opened the same bag, as ordered, the officer noticed four (4) suspicious-looking objects wrapped
in brown packing tape, prompting the officer to open one of the wrapped objects. The wrapped
objects turned out to contain hashish, a derivative of marijuana.

Thereafter, accused was invited outside the bus for questioning. But before he alighted from the bus,
accused stopped to get two (2) travelling bags from the luggage carrier.

Upon stepping out of the bus, the officers got the bags and opened them. A teddy bear was found in each
bag. Feeling the teddy bears, the officer noticed that there were bulges inside the same which did not feel
like foam stuffing. It was only after the officers had opened the bags that accused finally presented his
passport.

Accused was then brought to the headquarters of the NARCOM at Camp Dangwa, La Trinidad, Benguet
for further investigation. At the investigation room, the officers opened the teddy bears and they were
found to also contain hashish. In the chemistry report, it was established that the objects examined were
hashish. a prohibited drug which is a derivative of marijuana. Thus, an information was filed against
accused for violation of the Dangerous Drugs Act.

(NOT THAT IMPORTANT FACTS KASI HINDI ITO YUNG MAIN ISSUE PERO RELEVANT PARIN)
During the arraignment, accused entered a plea of "not guilty." For his defense, he raised the issue of
illegal search of his personal effects. He also claimed that the hashish was planted by the NARCOM
officers in his pouch bag and that the two (2) travelling bags were not owned by him, but were merely
entrusted to him by an Australian couple whom he met in Sagada. He further claimed that the Australian
couple intended to take the same bus with him but because there were no more seats available in said
bus, they decided to take the next ride and asked accused to take charge of the bags, and that they
would meet each other at the Dangwa Station.

Likewise, accused alleged that when the NARCOM officers demanded for his passport and other
Identification papers, he handed to one of the officers his pouch bag which was hanging on his neck
containing, among others, his passport, return ticket to Sweden and other papers. The officer in turn
handed it to his companion who brought the bag outside the bus. When said officer came back, he
charged the accused that there was hashish in the bag. He was told to get off the bus and his picture was
taken with the pouch bag placed around his neck. The trial court did not give credence to accused's
defense.

The claim of the accused that the hashish was planted by the NARCOM officers, was belied by his failure
to raise such defense at the earliest opportunity. When accused was investigated at the Provincial
Fiscal's Office, he did not inform the Fiscal or his lawyer that the hashish was planted by the NARCOM
officers in his bag. It was only two (2) months after said investigation when he told his lawyer about
said claim, denying ownership of the two (2) travelling bags as well as having hashish in his
pouch bag.

The trial court found accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt for violation of the Dangerous Drugs Act.

(ETO NA YUNG FACTS NA KASAMA SA LESSON)

Seeking the reversal of the decision of the trial court finding him guilty of the crime charged, accused
argues that the search of his personal effects was illegal because it was made without a search
warrant and, therefore, the prohibited drugs which were discovered during the illegal search are not
admissible as evidence against him.

ISSUE:
WON the search was valid

RULING: (D kasi binigay agad yung passport napag dudahan tuloy + may trending na madami nag
tratansport ng drugs doon + may recent info na may foreigner na may drugs na dala daw)
YES. A lawful arrest without a warrant may be made by a peace officer or a private person under the
following circumstances.

Sec. 5 Arrest without warrant; when lawful. –– A peace officer or a private person may, without a
warrant, arrest a person:

(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed is actually committing, or is
attempting to commit an offense;

(b) When an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has personal knowledge of facts
indicating that the person to be arrested has committed it; and

(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal establishment or
place where he is serving final judgment or temporarily confined while his case is pending, or
has escaped while being transferred from one confinement to another.

Accused was searched and arrested while transporting prohibited drugs (hashish). A crime was
actually being committed by the accused and he was caught in flagrante delicto. Thus, the search
made upon his personal effects falls squarely under paragraph (1) of the foregoing provisions of
law, which allow a warrantless search incident to a lawful arrest.

While it is true that the NARCOM officers were not armed with a search warrant when the search was
made over the personal effects of accused, however, under the circumstances of the case, there was
sufficient probable cause for said officers to believe that accused was then and there committing a crime.

Aside from the persistent reports received by the NARCOM that vehicles coming from Sagada were
transporting marijuana and other prohibited drugs, their Commanding Officer also received information
that a Caucasian coming from Sagada on that particular day had prohibited drugs in his possession. Said
information was received by the Commanding Officer of NARCOM the very same morning that
accused came down by bus from Sagada on his way to Baguio City.

When NARCOM received the information, a few hours before the apprehension of herein accused, that a
Caucasian travelling from Sagada to Baguio City was carrying with him prohibited drugs, there was no
time to obtain a search warrant.

It must be observed that, at first, the NARCOM officers merely conducted a routine check of the bus
(where accused was riding) and the passengers therein, and no extensive search was initially made. It
was only when one of the officers noticed a bulge on the waist of accused, during the course of the
inspection, that accused was required to present his passport. The failure of accused to present his
identification papers, when ordered to do so, only managed to arouse the suspicion of the officer that
accused was trying to hide his identity. For is it not a regular norm for an innocent man, who has
nothing to hide from the authorities, to readily present his identification papers when required to
do so?
The receipt of information by NARCOM that a Caucasian coming from Sagada had prohibited
drugs in his possession, plus the suspicious failure of the accused to produce his passport,
taken together as a whole, led the NARCOM officers to reasonably believe that the accused
was trying to hide something illegal from the authorities.

117.Nolasco v. Cruz Paño, G.R. No. L-69803, January 30, 1987

FACTS: (SAME CASE SA NO.115)

Prior to August 6, 1984 (hereinafter to be referred to without the year), AGUILAR-ROQUE was one of the
accused of Rebellion. At 11:30 A.M. on August 6th, AGUILAR-ROQUE and NOLASCO were arrested by
a Constabulary Security Group (CSG) at the intersection of Mayon Street and P. Margall Street, Quezon
City. The stated time is an allegation of petitioners, not denied by respondents. The record does not
disclose that a warrant of arrest had previously beeen issued against NOLASCO.

At 12:00 noon, elements of the CSG searched the premises. Earlier that day at around 9:00 A.M., Lt. Col.
Virgilio G. Saldajeno of the CSG, applied for a Search Warrant from respondent Hon. Ernani Cruz Paño,
Executive Judge of the Regional Trial Court, determined to be the leased residence of AGUILAR-ROQUE
as a “suspected underground house of the CPP/NPA. AGUILAR-ROQUE has been long wanted by the
military for being a high ranking officer of the Communist Party of the Philippines, particularly connected
with the MV Karagatan/Doña Andrea cases.

In connection with the search made at 12:00 N. of August 6th, the following may be stated:
(a) TOLENTINO was a person then in charge of the premises. He was arrested by the searching party presumably
without a warrant of arrest.
(b) The searching party seized 428 documents and written materials, 2 and additionally a portable typewriter, and 2 wooden
boxes, making 431 items in all.
(c) According to the Return, submitted in the SEARCH WARRANT CASE on August 10th, 4 the search was made in the
presence of Dra. Marciana Galang, owner of the premises, and of two (2) Barangay Tanods. No mention was made that
TOLENTINO was present. The list of the 428 articles and documents attached to the Return was signed by the two
Barangay Tanods, but not by Dra. Galang.

The three petitioners, AGUILAR-ROQUE, NOLASCO and TOLENTINO, were charged upon complaint
filed by the CSG against petitioners for "Subversion/Rebellion and/or Conspiracy to Commit
Rebellion/Subversion."

CSG filed a Motion for Reconsideration praying that AGUILAR-ROQUE and NOLASCO be charged with
Subversion. The Motion was denied.

The CSG submitted an Amended Return in the SEARCH WARRANT CASE praying that the CSG be
allowed to retain the seized 431 documents and articles, “in connection with cases that are presently
pending against Mila Aguilar Roque before the Quezon City Fiscal’s Office and the court.”

Petitioners were required by Judge Paño to comment on the Amended Return, which AGUILAR-ROQUE
did, raising the issue of the inadmissibility of any evidence obtained pursuant to the Search Warrant.
Judge Paño ruled that the seized documents “shall be subject to disposition of the tribunal trying the case
against respondent.” Petitioners filed a Motion to Suppress in the SUBVERSIVE DOCUMENTS CASE,
praying that such of the 431 items belonging to them be returned to them. It was claimed that the
proceedings under the Search Warrant were unlawful. Judge Santos denied the Motion on the ground
that the validity of the Search Warrant has to be litigated in the SEARCH WARRANT CASE. He was
apparently not aware of the Order of Judge Paño issued in the SEARCH WARRANT CASE.

PETITIONERS principally assert that the Search Warrant is void because it is a general warrant since it
does not sufficiently describe with particularity the things subject of the search and seizure, and that
probable cause has not been properly established for lack of searching questions propounded to the
applicant’s witness

ISSUE:
WON the the properties that were seized by an illegal search warrant should be returned.

RULING:
No. Notwithstanding the irregular issuance of the Search Warrant and although, ordinarily, the articles
seized under an invalid search warrant should be returned, they cannot be ordered returned in the
case at bar to AGUILAR-ROQUE. Some searches may be made without a warrant.
Considering that AGUILAR-ROQUE has been charged with Rebellion, which is a crime against
public order; that the warrant for her arrest has not been served for a considerable period of time;
that she was arrested within the general vicinity of her dwelling; and that the search of her
dwelling was made within a half hour of her arrest, we are of the opinion that in her respect, the
search at No. 239-B Mayon Street, Quezon City, did not need a search warrant; this, for possible
effective results in the interest of public order.

118.Luz v. People, G.R. No. 197788, February 29 2012

FACTS:
PO2 Emmanuel L. Alteza, who was then assigned at the Sub-Station 1 of the Naga City Police Station as
a traffic enforcer, in the morning, he saw the accused, who was coming from the direction of Panganiban
Drive and going to Diversion Road, Naga City, driving a motorcycle without a helmet; that this prompted
him to flag down the accused for violating a municipal ordinance which requires all motorcycle drivers to
wear helmet (sic) while driving said motor vehicle; that he invited the accused to come inside their sub-
station since the place where he flagged down the accused is almost in front of the said sub-station; that
while he and SPO1 Rayford Brillante were issuing a citation ticket for violation of municipal ordinance, he
noticed that the accused was uneasy and kept on getting something from his jacket; that he was alerted
and so, he told the accused to take out the contents of the pocket of his jacket as the latter may have a
weapon inside it; that the accused obliged and slowly put out the contents of the pocket of his jacket
which was:

1. a nickel-like tin or metal container about two (2) to three (3) inches in size,

2. including two (2) cellphones,

3. one (1) pair of scissors and one

4. Swiss knife;

5. that upon seeing the said container, he asked the accused to open it; that after the accused
opened the container, he noticed a cartoon cover and something beneath it; and that upon his
instruction, the accused spilled out the contents of the container on the table which turned out to
be four (4) plastic sachets, the two (2) of which were empty while the other two (2) contained
suspected shabu.

petitioner, assisted by counsel, entered a plea of "Not guilty" to the charge of illegal possession of
dangerous drugs. A forensic chemist testified for the prosecution. On the other hand, petitioner testified
for himself and raised the defense of planting of evidence and extortion.

RTC convicted petitioner of illegal possession of dangerous drugs. It found the prosecution evidence
sufficient to show that he had been lawfully arrested for a traffic violation and then subjected to a valid
search, which led to the discovery on his person of two plastic sachets later found to contain shabu. The
RTC also found his defense of frame-up and extortion to be weak, self-serving and unsubstantiated.

petitioner filed under Rule 45 the instant Petition for Review on Certiorari. Petitioner claims that there was
no lawful search and seizure, because there was no lawful arrest. He claims that the finding that there
was a lawful arrest was erroneous, since he was not even issued a citation ticket or charged with violation
of the city ordinance. Even assuming there was a valid arrest, he claims that he had never consented to
the search conducted upon him.

ISSUE:
WON arrest, searches and seizure were invalid.

RULING:
NO. There was no valid arrest of petitioner. When he was flagged down for committing a traffic
violation, he was not, ipso facto and solely for this reason, arrested.

Arrest is the taking of a person into custody in order that he or she may be bound to answer for the
commission of an offense. It is effected by an actual restraint of the person to be arrested or by that
person’s voluntary submission to the custody of the one making the arrest. Neither the application of
actual force, manual touching of the body, or physical restraint, nor a formal declaration of arrest, is
required. It is enough that there be an intention on the part of one of the parties to arrest the other, and
that there be an intent on the part of the other to submit, under the belief and impression that submission
is necessary.

At the time that he was waiting for PO3 Alteza to write his citation ticket, petitioner could not be said to
have been "under arrest." There was no intention on the part of PO3 Alteza to arrest him, deprive him of
his liberty, or take him into custody. Prior to the issuance of the ticket, the period during which petitioner
was at the police station may be characterized merely as waiting time.

Land Transportation and Traffic Code, the general procedure for dealing with a traffic violation is not the
arrest of the offender, but the confiscation of the driver’s license of the latter

There being no valid arrest, the warrantless search that resulted from it was likewise illegal.
The following are the instances when a warrantless search is allowed:

(i) a warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest;

(ii) search of evidence in "plain view;"

(iii) search of a moving vehicle;

(iv) consented warrantless search;

(v) customs search;

(vi) a "stop and frisk" search; and

(vii) exigent and emergency circumstances. None of the above-mentioned instances, especially a
search incident to a lawful arrest, are applicable to this case.

It must be noted that the evidence seized, although alleged to be inadvertently discovered, was not in
"plain view." It was actually concealed inside a metal container inside petitioner’s pocket. Clearly, the
evidence was not immediately apparent.

Neither was there a consented warrantless search. Consent to a search is not to be lightly inferred, but
shown by clear and convincing evidence. It must be voluntary in order to validate an otherwise illegal
search; that is, the consent must be unequivocal, specific, intelligently given and uncontaminated by any
duress or coercion. While the prosecution claims that petitioner acceded to the instruction of PO3 Alteza,
this alleged accession does not suffice to prove valid and intelligent consent. In fact, the RTC found that
petitioner was merely "told" to take out the contents of his pocket.

Neither does the search qualify under the "stop and frisk" rule. While the rule normally applies when a
police officer observes suspicious or unusual conduct, which may lead him to believe that a criminal act
may be afoot, the stop and frisk is merely a limited protective search of outer clothing for weapons

It also appears that, according to City Ordinance No. 98-012, which was violated by petitioner, the
failure to wear a crash helmet while riding a motorcycle is penalized by a fine only. Under the Rules
of Court, a warrant of arrest need not be issued if the information or charge was filed for an offense
penalized by a fine only. It may be stated as a corollary that neither can a warrantless arrest be
made for such an offense.

The subject items seized during the illegal arrest are inadmissible. The drugs are the very corpus delicti of
the crime of illegal possession of dangerous drugs. Thus, their inadmissibility precludes conviction and
calls for the acquittal of the accused.
119.People v. Musa, 217 SCRA 597 (1993)

FACTS:

T/Sgt. Jesus Belarga, leader of a NARCOTICS COMMAND (NARCOM) team, instructed Sgt. Amado Ani
to conduct surveillance and test buy on a certain Mari Musa. Information received from civilian informer
was that this Mari Musa was engaged in selling marijuana in said place. So Sgt. Amado Ani, another
NARCOM agent, proceeded to Suterville, in company with a NARCOM civilian informer, to the house of
Mari Musa to which house the civilian informer had guided him. The same civilian informer had also
described to him the appearance of Mari Musa. Amado Ani was able to buy one newspaper-wrapped
dried marijuana for P10.00. Sgt. Ani returned to the NARCOM office and turned over the newspaper-
wrapped marijuana to T/Sgt. Jesus Belarga. Sgt. Belarga inspected the stuff turned over to him and found
it to be marijuana.

The next day., a buy-bust was planned. Sgt. Amado Ani was assigned as the poseur buyer for which
purpose he was given P20.00 (with SN GA955883) by Belarga.

Ani approached Mari Musa, who came out of his house, and asked Ani what he wanted. Ani said he
wanted some more stuff. Ani gave Mari Musa the P20.00 marked money. After receiving the money, Mari
Musa went back to his house and came back and gave Amado Ani two newspaper wrappers containing
dried marijuana. Ani opened the two wrappers and inspected the contents. Convinced that the contents
were marijuana, Ani walked back towards his companions and raised his right hand. The two NARCOM
teams, riding the two civilian vehicles, sped towards Sgt. Ani. Ani joined Belarga's team and returned to
the house.

Ani first approached Mari Musa, there were four persons inside his house: Mari Musa, another boy, and
two women, one of whom Ani and Belarga later came to know to be Mari Musa's wife. The second time,
Ani with the NARCOM team returned to Mari Musa's house, the woman, who was later known as Mari
Musa's wife, slipped away from the house. Sgt. Belarga frisked Mari Musa but could not find the P20.00
marked money with him. Mari Musa was then asked where the P20.00 was and he told the NARCOM
team he has given the money to his wife (who had slipped away). Sgt. Belarga also found a plastic bag
containing dried marijuana inside it somewhere in the kitchen. Mari Musa was then placed under arrest
and brought to the NARCOM office.

ISSUE:
WON the plastic containing Marijuana hanging on the kitchen wall may be used as an evidence against
the accused

RULING: ( HINDI LANG ADMISSIBLE AS EVIDENCE YUNG NAKITANG SHABU SA KITCHEN KASI
HINDI SI PLAIN VIEW. PERO YUNG GG PARIN SIYA KASI DAHIL DOON SA BUYBUST )
NO. The "plain view" doctrine may not, however, be used to launch unbridled searches and indiscriminate
seizures nor to extend a general exploratory search made solely to find evidence of defendant's guilt. The
"plain view" doctrine is usually applied where a police officer is not searching for evidence against the
accused, but nonetheless inadvertently comes across an incriminating object.
The "plain view" doctrine may not be used to extend a general exploratory search from one object to
another until something incriminating at last emerges.

In the instant case, the appellant was arrested and his person searched in the living room. Failing to
retrieve the marked money which they hoped to find, the NARCOM agents searched the whole
house and found the plastic bag in the kitchen. The plastic bag was, therefore, not within their
"plain view" when they arrested the appellant as to justify its seizure. The NARCOM agents had to
move from one portion of the house to another before they sighted the plastic bag.

Moreover, when the NARCOM agents saw the plastic bag hanging in one corner of the kitchen,
they had no clue as to its contents. They had to ask the appellant what the bag contained. When the
appellant refused to respond, they opened it and found the marijuana. Unlike Ker v. California, where the
marijuana was visible to the police officer's eyes, the NARCOM agents in this case could not have
discovered the inculpatory nature of the contents of the bag had they not forcibly opened it.

121.People v. Solayao, 262 SCRA 255 (1996)

FACTS:
SPO3 Jose Niño, narrated that about 9:00 o'clock in the evening, with CAFGU members Teofilo
Llorad, Jr. and Cecilio Cenining, went to Barangay Caulangohan, Caibiran, Biliran. They were to
conduct an intelligence patrol as required of them by their intelligence officer to verify reports on the
presence of armed persons roaming around the barangays of Caibiran.

The team of Police Officer Niño proceeded to Barangay Onion where they met the group of
accused-appellant Nilo Solayao numbering five. The former became suspicious when they observed
that the latter were drunk and that accused-appellant himself was wearing a camouflage uniform or a
jungle suit. Accused-appellant's companions, upon seeing the government agents, fled.

Police Officer Niño told accused-appellant not to run away and introduced himself as "PC," after
which he seized the dried coconut leaves which the latter was carrying and found wrapped in it a 49-
inch long homemade firearm locally know as "latong." When he asked accused-appellant who
issued him a license to carry said firearm or whether he was connected with the military or any
intelligence group, the latter answered that he had no permission to possess the same. Thereupon,
SPO3 Niño confiscated the firearm and turned him over to the custody of the policemen of Caibiran
who subsequently investigated him and charged him with illegal possession of firearm.

Accused-appellant, in his defense, did not contest the confiscation of the shotgun but averred that
this was only given to him by one of his companions, Hermogenes Cenining, when it was still
wrapped in coconut leaves. He claimed that he was not aware that there was a shotgun concealed
inside the coconut leaves since they were using the coconut leaves as a torch. He further claimed
that this was the third torch handed to him after the others had been used up. Accused-appellant's
5

claim was corroborated by one Pedro Balano that he indeed received a torch from Hermogenes
Cenining which turned out to be a shotgun wrapped in coconut leaves.

Trial court found accused-appellant guilty of illegal possession of firearm.

Accused-appellant comes to this Court on appeal and assigns the following errors:

I. The trial court erred in admitting in evidence the homemade firearm.

ISSUE:
WON the trial court erred in admitting in evidence the homemade firearm.

RULING:
NO. This Court, nevertheless, ruled that the search and seizure in the Posadas case brought about
by the suspicious conduct of Posadas himself can be likened to a "stop and frisk" situation. There
was probable cause to conduct a search even before an arrest could be made.
In the present case, after SPO3 Niño told accused-appellant not to run away, the former identified
himself as a government agents. The peace officers did not know that he had committed, or was
actually committing, the offense of illegal possession of firearm. Tasked with verifying the report that
there were armed men roaming in the barangays surrounding Caibiran, their attention was
understandably drawn to the group that had aroused their suspicion. They could not have known
that the object wrapped in coconut leaves which accused-appellant was carrying hid a firearm.

As with Posadas, the case at bar constitutes an instance where a search and seizure may be
effected without first making an arrest. There was justifiable cause to "stop and frisk" accused-
appellant when his companions filed upon seeing the government agents. Under the circumstances,
the government agents could not possibly have procured a search warrant first.

Thus, there was no violation of the constitutional guarantee against unreasonable searches and
seizures. Nor was there error on the part of the trial court when it admitted the homemade firearm as
evidence.

122.Malacat v. Court of Appeals, 283 SCRA 159 (1997)

FACTS:

Rodolfo Yu of the Western Police District, Metropolitan Police Force of the Integrated National
Police, testified that, at about 6:30 p.m., in response to bomb threats reported seven days earlier, he
was on foot patrol with three other police officers (all of them in uniform) along Quezon Boulevard,
Quiapo, Manila, near the Mercury Drug store at Plaza Miranda. They chanced upon two groups of
Muslim-looking men, with each group, comprised of three to four men, posted at opposite sides of
the corner of Quezon Boulevard near the Mercury Drug Store. These men were acting
suspiciously with "Their eyes. . . moving very fast."

Yu and his companions positioned themselves at strategic points and observed both groups for
about thirty minutes. The police officers then approached one group of men, who then fled in
different directions. As the policemen gave chase, Yu caught up with and apprehended
petitioner. Upon searching petitioner, Yu found a fragmentation grenade tucked inside
petitioner's "front waist line." Yu's companion, police officer Rogelio Malibiran, apprehended
Abdul Casan from whom a .38 caliber revolver was recovered. Petitioner and Casan were then
brought to Police Station No. 3 where Yu placed an "X" mark at the bottom of the grenade and
thereafter gave it to his commander.

On cross-examination, Yu declared that they conducted the foot patrol due to a report that a group of
Muslims was going to explode a grenade somewhere in the vicinity of Plaza Miranda. Yu recognized
petitioner as the previous Saturday, 25 August 1990, likewise at Plaza Miranda, Yu saw petitioner
and 2 others attempt to detonate a grenade. The attempt was aborted when Yu and other policemen
chased petitioner and his companions; however, the former were unable to catch any of the latter.
Yu further admitted that petitioner and Casan were merely standing on the corner of Quezon
Boulevard when Yu saw them on 27 August 1990. Although they were not creating a commotion,
since they were supposedly acting suspiciously, Yu and his companions approached them. Yu did
not issue any receipt for the grenade he allegedly recovered from petitioner.

On cross-examination, Serapio admitted that he took petitioner's confession knowing it was

inadmissible in evidence.

Petitioner was the lone defense witness. At around 6:30 in the evening of 27 August 1990, he went
to Plaza Miranda to catch a breath of fresh air. Shortly after, several policemen arrived and ordered
all males to stand aside. The policemen searched petitioner and two other men, but found nothing in
their possession. However, he was arrested with two others, brought to and detained at Precinct No.
3, where he was accused of having shot a police officer. The officer showed the gunshot wounds he
allegedly sustained and shouted at petitioner "[i]to ang tama mo sa akin." This officer then inserted
the muzzle of his gun into petitioner's mouth and said, "[y]ou are the one who shot me." Petitioner
denied the charges and explained that he only recently arrived in Manila. However, several other
police officers mauled him, hitting him with benches and guns. Petitioner was once again searched,
but nothing was found on him. He saw the grenade only in court when it was presented.

The trial court ruled that the warrantless search and seizure of petitioner was akin to it a "stop and
frisk," where a "warrant and seizure can be effected without necessarily being preceded by an
arrest" and "whose object is either to maintain the status quo momentarily while the police officer
seeks to obtain more information." Probable cause was not required as it was not certain that a
crime had been committed, however, the situation called for an investigation, hence to require
probable cause would have been "premature." The RTC emphasized that Yu and his companions
were "[c]onfronted with an emergency, in which the delay necessary to obtain a warrant, threatens
the destruction of evidence" and the officers "[h]ad to act in haste," as petitioner and his companions
were acting suspiciously, considering the time, place and "reported cases of bombing." Further,
petitioner's group suddenly ran away in different directions as they saw the arresting officers
approach, thus "[i]t is reasonable for an officer to conduct a limited search, the purpose of
which is not necessarily to discover evidence of a crime, but to allow the officer to pursue his
investigation without fear of violence.

The trial court then ruled that the seizure of the grenade from petitioner was incidental to a lawful
arrest, and since petitioner "[l]ater voluntarily admitted such fact to the police investigator for the
purpose of bombing the Mercury Drug Store," concluded that sufficient evidence existed to establish
petitioner's guilt beyond reasonable doubt.

ISSUE:
WON the warrantless arrest was valid

RULING:
NO. The warrantless arrest was invalid.

In the instant petition, the trial court validated the warrantless search as a "stop and frisk" with "the
seizure of the grenade from the accused [as an appropriate incident to his arrest," hence
necessitating a brief discussion on the nature of these exceptions to the warrant requirement.

At the outset, we note that the trial court confused the concepts of a "stop-and-frisk" and of a search
incidental to a lawful arrest. These two types of warrantless searches differ in terms of the requisite
quantum of proof before they may be validly effected and in their allowable scope.

In a search incidental to a lawful arrest, as the precedent arrest determines the validity of the
incidental search, the legality of the arrest is questioned in a large majority of these cases, e.g.,
whether an arrest was merely used as a pretext for conducting a search. In this instance, the law
requires that there first be a lawful arrest before a search can be made — the process cannot be
reversed. At bottom, assuming a valid arrest, the arresting officer may search the person of the
arrestee and the area within which the latter may reach for a weapon or for evidence to destroy, and
seize any money or property found which was used in the commission of the crime, or the fruit of the
crime, or that which may be used as evidence, or which might furnish the arrestee with the means of
escaping or committing violence.

Here, there could have been no valid in flagrante delicto or hot pursuit arrest preceding the search in
light of the lack of personal knowledge on the part of Yu, the arresting officer, or an overt physical
act, on the part of petitioner, indicating that a crime had just been committed, was being committed
or was going to be committed.

Having thus shown the invalidity of the warrantless arrest in this case, plainly, the search conducted
on petitioner could not have been one incidental to a lawful arrest.

We now proceed to the justification for and allowable scope of a "stop-and-frisk" as a "limited
protective search of outer clothing for weapons," as laid down in Terry

Here, there are at least three (3) reasons why the "stop-and-frisk" was invalid:

1. First, we harbor grave doubts as to Yu's claim that petitioner was a member of the group
which attempted to bomb Plaza Miranda two days earlier. This claim is neither supported by
any police report or record nor corroborated by any other police officer who allegedly chased
that group. Aside from impairing Yu's credibility as a witness, this likewise diminishes the
 probability that a genuine reason existed so as to arrest and search petitioner. If only to
further tarnish the credibility of Yu's testimony, contrary to his claim that petitioner and his
companions had to be chased before being apprehended, the affidavit of arrest (Exh. "A")
expressly declares otherwise, i.e., upon arrival of five (5) other police officers, petitioner and
his companions were "immediately collared."

2. Second, there was nothing in petitioner's behavior or conduct which could have reasonably
elicited even mere suspicion other than that his eyes were "moving very fast" — an
observation which leaves us incredulous since Yu and his teammates were nowhere near
petitioner and it was already 6:30 p.m., thus presumably dusk. Petitioner and his companions
were merely standing at the corner and were not creating any commotion or trouble, as Yu
explicitly declared on cross-examination

3. Third, there was at all no ground, probable or otherwise, to believe that petitioner was armed
with a deadly weapon. None was visible to Yu, for as he admitted, the alleged grenade was
"discovered" "inside the front waistline" of petitioner, and from all indications as to the
distance between Yu and petitioner, any telltale bulge, assuming that petitioner was indeed
hiding a grenade, could not have been visible to Yu

128.Valmonte v. General de Villa, 178 SCRA 211 and 185 SCRA 665

FACTS:

Petitioner Valmonte and ULAP Assocation filed for prohibition with preliminary injunction and/or
temporary restraining order, seeking the declaration of checkpoints in Valenzuela, Metro Manila or
elsewhere, as unconstitutional and the dismantling and banning of the same or, in the alternative, to
direct the respondents to formulate guidelines in the implementation of checkpoints, for the protection
of the people.

According to Petitioners, they filed the petition because they were subjected to searches and seizures
without the benefit of a warrant. The petitioners averred that there’s a recent incident happened, where
a certain Benjamin Parpoon, was allegedly killed in cold blood by the members of the National Capital
Region District Command (NCRDC) manning the checkpoint along McArthur Highway at Malinta,
Valenzuela, for ignoring and/or refusing to submit himself to the checkpoint and for continuing to speed
off inspire of warning shots fired in the air.

Petitioner Valmonte also claims that, on several occasions, he had gone thru these checkpoints
where he was stopped and his car subjected to search/check-up without a court order or search
warrant.

Petitioners further contend that the said checkpoints give the respondents a blanket authority to
make searches and/or seizures without search warrant or court order in violation of the
Constitution; and, instances have occurred where a citizen, while not killed, had been harassed.

ISSUE:
WON the installations of the checkpoints violated their constitutional right against illegal search and
seizures.

RULING:
NO. Not all searches and seizures are prohibited. Those which are reasonable are not forbidden. A
reasonable search is not to be determined by any fixed formula but is to be resolved according to the
facts of each case.

In the case at bar, the setting up of the questioned checkpoints in Valenzuela (and probably in other
areas) may be considered as a security measure to enable the NCRDC to pursue its mission of
establishing an effective territorial defense and maintaining peace and order for the benefit of the
public. Checkpoints may also be regarded as measures to thwart plots to destabilize the government, in
the interest of public security. In this connection, the Court may take judicial notice of the shift to urban
centers and their suburbs of the insurgency movement, so clearly reflected in the increased killings in
cities of police and military men by NPA "sparrow units," not to mention the abundance of unlicensed
firearms and the alarming rise in lawlessness and violence in such urban centers, not all of which are
reported in media, most likely brought about by deteriorating economic conditions — which all sum up
to what one can rightly consider, at the very least, as abnormal times. Between the inherent right of the
state to protect its existence and promote public welfare and an individual's right against a warrantless
search which is however reasonably conducted, the former should prevail.

NOTE

Petitioner Valmonte's general allegation to the effect that he had been stopped and searched without
a search warrant by the military manning the checkpoints, without more, i.e., without stating the
details of the incidents which amount to a violation of his right against unlawful search and
seizure, is not sufficient to enable the Court to determine whether there was a violation of
Valmonte's right against unlawful search and seizure. Not all searches and seizures are
prohibited. Those which are reasonable are not forbidden. A reasonable search is not to be
determined by any fixed formula but is to be resolved according to the facts of each case.

102.Guazon v. De Villa, 181 SCRA 623

FACTS:

Guazon and forty other petitioners, who of legal age, bona fide residents of Manila, and have a common
or general interest in the preservation of the rule of law, question the conduct of military and police
officers in conducting “Areal Target Zonings” or “Saturation Drives” in Manila. According to them, the
police and military officers have a common pattern of human rights abuses stating that:

1) the police have no search warrant and warrant of arrest;

2) the raiders rouse residents by banging on the walls or windows and ordering the residents within to
come out of their residence;

3) the residents are herded like cows and were stripped down half-naked and examined for tattoo marks;
4) the raiders ransacked their houses and that their money and valuable belongings have disappeared;

5) and that some arrested were detained without charges and that they were subject to physical and
mental torture.

The respondents stressed that they have legal authority to conduct saturation drives, and that the
accusations of the petitioners are total lies.

ISSUE:
WON the Saturation Drives violate the constitutional rights of the residents.

RULING:
NO! (GAWA GAWA KWENTO LANG SINA PETITIONERS WALA NAMAN EVIDENCE)

According to the Supreme Court, everything stated before them consists only of allegations. According to
petitioners, more than 3,407 persons were arrested in the saturation drives covered by the petition. No
estimates are given for the drives in Block 34, Dagat-dagatan, Navotas; Apelo Cruz Compound, Pasig; and
Sun Valley Drive near the Manila International Airport area. Not one of the several thousand persons
treated in the illegal and inhuman manner described by the petitioners appears as a petitioner or has
come before a trial court to present the kind of evidence admissible in courts of justice. Moreover,
there must have been tens of thousands of nearby residents who were inconvenienced in addition to the
several thousand allegedly arrested. None of those arrested has apparently been charged and none of
those affected has apparently complained.

The areal target zonings in this petition were intended to flush out subversives and criminal elements
particularly because of the blatant assassinations of public officers and police officials by elements
supposedly coddled by the communities where the "drives" were conducted.

Moreover, there is nothing in the Constitution which denies the authority of the Chief Executive, to order
police actions to stop unabated criminality, rising lawlessness, and alarming communist activities.

Where there is large scale mutiny or actual rebellion, the police or military may go in force to the combat
areas, enter affected residences or buildings, round up suspected rebels and otherwise quell the mutiny
or rebellion without having to secure search warrants and without violating the Bill of Rights.

103.People vs. Andre Marti, 193 SCRA 57 (1991)

FACTS:
The appellant Andre Marti, together with his common-law wife went to Manila Packing and Export
Forwarders to send four (4) parcels of boxes alleged to contained books, cigars, and gloves for his friend
Waltier Fierz living in Zurich, Switzerland.

The attendant, Anita Reyes, received their package and asked the appellant if she could examine and
inspect the packages. The appellant refused and Anita Reyes no longer insists on examining the
packages.

Before delivery of appellant's box to the Bureau of Customs and/or Bureau of Posts, Mr. Job Reyes and
husband of Anita Reyes, following standard operating procedure, opened the boxes for final inspection.
When Job Reyes opened appellant's box, a peculiar odor emitted therefrom. His curiosity aroused, he
squeezed one of the bundles allegedly containing gloves and felt dried leaves inside. Opening one of the
bundles, he pulled out a cellophane wrapper protruding from the opening of one of the gloves. He made
an opening on one of the cellophane wrappers and took several grams of the contents thereof.

Job Reyes forthwith prepared a letter reporting the shipment to the NBI and requesting a laboratory
examination of the samples he extracted from the cellophane wrapper. He brought the letter and a sample
of appellant's shipment to the Narcotics Section of the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI), at about
1:30 o'clock in the afternoon of that date, (August 14, 1987).

Job Reyes informed the NBI that the rest of the shipment was still in his office. Therefore, Job Reyes and
three (3) NBI agents, and a photographer went to the Reyes' office at Ermita, Manila. Job Reyes brought
out the box in which appellant's packages were placed and, in the presence of the NBI agents, opened
the top flaps, removed the styrofoam and took out the cellophane wrappers from inside the gloves. Dried
marijuana leaves were found to have been contained inside the cellophane wrappers.

The package which allegedly contained books was likewise opened by Job Reyes. He discovered that the
package contained bricks or cake-like dried marijuana leaves. The package which allegedly contained
Tabacalera cigars was also opened. It turned out that dried marijuana leaves were neatly stocked
underneath the cigar.

It turned out that the dried leaves were marijuana flowering tops as certified by the forensic chemist.

Accused appealed to the court averring that his constitutional right to illegal searches and seizures is
violated when his parcels were opened without his permission.
ISSUE:
WON an act of a private individual, allegedly in violation of appellant's constitutional rights, be invoked
against the State?

RULING:
NO! The protection against unreasonable searches and seizures cannot be extended to acts committed
by private individuals so as to bring it within the ambit of alleged unlawful intrusion by the government.

Therefore, In the absence of governmental interference, the liberties guaranteed by the Constitution
cannot be invoked against the State.

The case at bar assumes a peculiar character since the evidence sought to be excluded was primarily
discovered and obtained by a private person, acting in a private capacity and without the intervention
and participation of State authorities.
If the search is made upon the request of law enforcers, a warrant must generally be first secured if it is to
pass the test of constitutionality. However, if the search is made at the behest or initiative of the proprietor
of a private establishment for its own and private purposes, as in the case at bar, and without the
intervention of police authorities, the right against unreasonable search and seizure cannot be invoked for
only the act of private individual, not the law enforcers, is involved.

104.Bache and Co. v. Ruiz, 37 SCRA 323 (1971)

FACTS:

On 24 Feb 1970, Commissioner Vera of Internal Revenue, wrote a letter addressed to J Ruiz requesting
the issuance of a search warrant against petitioners for violation of Sec 46(a) of the NIRC, in relation to all
other pertinent provisions thereof, particularly Sects 53, 72, 73, 208 and 209, and authorizing Revenue
Examiner de Leon make and file the application for search warrant which was attached to the letter. The
next day, de Leon and his witnesses went to CFI Rizal to obtain the search warrant. At that time J Ruiz
was hearing a certain case; so, by means of a note, he instructed his Deputy Clerk of Court to take the
depositions of De Leon and Logronio. After the session had adjourned, J Ruiz was informed that the
depositions had already been taken. The stenographer read to him her stenographic notes; and
thereafter, J Ruiz asked respondent Logronio to take the oath and warned him that if his deposition was
found to be false and without legal basis, he could be charged for perjury. J Ruiz signed de Leon’s
application for search warrant and Logronio’s deposition. The search was subsequently conducted.

ISSUE:
WON there had been a valid search warrant

RULING: (IN SHORT D VALID)

The SC ruled in favor of Bache on three grounds.

1. J Ruiz failed to personally examine the complainant and his witness.

Personal examination by the judge of the complainant and his witnesses is necessary to enable him
to determine the existence or non-existence of a probable cause.

2. The search warrant was issued for more than one specific offense.

The search warrant in question was issued for at least four distinct offenses under the Tax Code. As
ruled in Stonehill “Such is the seriousness of the irregularities committed in connection with the
disputed search warrants, that this Court deemed it fit to amend Section 3 of Rule 122 of the former
Rules of Court that ‘a search warrant shall not issue but upon probable cause in connection with one
specific offense.’ Not satisfied with this qualification, the Court added thereto a paragraph, directing
that ‘no search warrant shall issue for more than one specific offense

3. The search warrant does not particularly describe the things to be seized.

The documents, papers and effects sought to be seized are described in the Search Warrant
“Unregistered and private books of accounts (ledgers, journals, columnars, receipts and
 disbursements books, customers ledgers); receipts for payments received; certificates of stocks and
securities; contracts, promissory notes and deeds of sale; telex and coded messages; business
communications, accounting and business records; checks and check stubs; records of bank
deposits and withdrawals; and records of foreign remittances, covering the years 1966 to 1970.” The
description does not meet the requirement in Art III, Sec. 1, of the Constitution, and of Sec. 3, Rule
126 of the Revised Rules of Court, that the warrant should particularly describe the things to be
seized. A search warrant may be said to particularly describe the things to be seized when the
description therein is as specific as the circumstances will ordinarily allow or when the description
expresses a conclusion of fact not of law by which the warrant officer may be guided in making the
search and seizure or when the things described are limited to those which bear direct relation to the
offense for which the warrant is being issued.

Stonehill v. Diokno, 20 SCRA 383 (1967)

FACTS:

Petitioners, who have prior deportation cases pending, and the corporation they form were
alleged to committed "violation of Central Bank Laws, Tariff and Customs Laws, Internal Revenue
(Code) and the Revised Penal Code,” to which they were served 4 search warrants, directing any peace
officer to search petitioners’ persons and/or premises of their offices, warehouses and/or residences for:
“books of accounts, financial records, vouchers, correspondence, receipts, ledgers, journals, portfolios,
credit journals, typewriters, and other documents and/or papers showing all business transactions
including disbursements receipts, balance sheets and profit and loss statements and Bobbins (cigarette
wrappers).”

The items allegedly illegally obtained can be classified into two groups:

1. those found and seized in the offices of aforementioned corporations, and

2. those found in petitioners’ residences.

Petitioners aver that the warrant is illegal for, inter alia:

1. they do not describe with particularity the documents, books and things to be seized;
2. cash money, not mentioned in the warrants, were actually seized;
3. the warrants were issued to fish evidence against the aforementioned petitioners in deportation
cases filed against them;
4. the searches and seizures were made in an illegal manner; and
5. the documents, papers and cash money seized were not delivered to the courts that issued the
warrants, to be disposed of in accordance with law x x x.

Respondent-prosecutors invoke the Moncado vs People’s Court ruling: even if the searches and
seizures under consideration were unconstitutional, the documents, papers and things thus
seized are admissible in evidence against petitioners herein.

ISSUE:
WON the search warrants were valid

RULING:
NO.
Though Stonehill et. al. are not the proper parties to assail the validity of the search warrant
issued against their corporation and thus they have no cause of action (only the officers or board
members of said corporation may assail said warrant, and that corporations have personalities
distinct from petitioners’ personalities), the 3 warrants issued P a g e 1 to search petitioners’
residences are hereby declared void. Thus, the searches and seizures made therein are made illegal.

The constitution protects the people’s right against unreasonable search and seizure. It provides:

1. that no warrant shall issue but upon probable cause, to be determined by the judge in the
manner set forth in said provision; and
2. that the warrant shall particularly describe the things to be seized.

The warrant was issued from mere allegation that petitioners committed a “violation of Central Bank
Laws, Tariff and Customs Laws, Internal Revenue (Code) and Revised Penal Code.” As no specific
violation has been alleged, it was impossible for the judges who issued said warrants to have found the
existence of probable cause, for the same presupposes the introduction of competent proof that the party
against whom it is sought has performed or committed violations of the law. In other words, it would be a
legal heresy, of the highest order, to convict anybody of a “violation of Central Bank Laws, Tariff and
Customs Laws, Internal Revenue (Code) and Revised Penal Code,” — as alleged in the aforementioned
applications — without reference to any determinate provision of said laws or codes. General warrants
are also to be eliminated, as the legality or illegality of petitioners’ transactions is immaterial to the
invalidity of the general warrant that sought these effects to be searched and seized: “Books of accounts,
financial records, vouchers, journals, correspondence, receipts, ledgers, portfolios, credit journals,
typewriters, and other documents and/or papers showing all business transactions including
disbursement receipts, balance sheets and related profit and loss statements.”

The Court also holds that the only practical means of enforcing the constitutional injunction against
unreasonable searches and seizures is, in the language of the Federal Supreme Court: x x x If letters and
private documents can thus be seized and held and used in evidence against a citizen accused of an
offense, the protection of the 4th Amendment, declaring his rights to be secure against such searches and
seizures, is of no value, and, so far as those thus placed are concerned, might as well be stricken from
the Constitution. The efforts of the courts and their officials to bring the guilty to punishment, praiseworthy
as they are, are not to be aided by the sacrifice of those great principles established by years of endeavor
and suffering which have resulted in their embodiment in the fundamental law of the land.
106.Saluday v. People, G.R. No. 215305, April 3, 2019

FACTS:
On 5 May 2009, Bus No. 66 of Davao Metro Shuttle was flagged down by Task Force Davao of the
Philippine Army at a checkpoint near the Tefasco Wharf in Ilang, Davao City. SCAA Junbert M. Buco
(Buco), a member of the Task Force, requested all male passengers to disembark from the vehicle while
allowing the female passengers to remain inside. He then boarded the bus to check the presence and
intercept the entry of any contraband, illegal firearms or explosives, and suspicious individuals.

SCAA Buco checked all the baggage and personal effects of the passengers, but a small, gray-black pack
bag on the seat at the rear of the bus caught his attention. He lifted the bag and found it too heavy for
its small size. SCAA Buco then looked at the male passengers lined outside and noticed that a
man in a white shirt (later identified as petitioner) kept peeping through the window towards the
direction of the bag. Afterwards, SCAA Buco asked who the owner of the bag was, to which the
bus conductor answered that petitioner and his brother were the ones seated at the back.

SCAA Buco then requested petitioner to board the bus and open the bag. Petitioner obliged and
the bag revealed the following contents: (1) an improvised .30 caliber carbine bearing serial number
64702; (2) one magazine with three live ammunitions; (3) one cacao-type hand grenade; and (4) a ten-
inch hunting knife. SCAA Buco then asked petitioner to produce proof of his authority to carry firearms
and explosives. Unable to show any, petitioner was immediately arrested and informed of his rights by
SCAA Buco.

Both the RTC and CA convicted the petitioner with illegal possession of high powered firearm,
ammunition and explosive. Hence, this petition. Petitioner argued that the seized items were inadmissible
on the ground that the search conducted by Task Force Davao was illegal.

ISSUE:
WON the search and seizure was illegal.

RULING:

No. THE SEARCH AND SEIZURE IS LEGAL.

The bus inspection conducted by Task Force Davao at a military checkpoint constitutes a reasonable
search. Bus No. 66 of Davao Metro Shuttle was a vehicle of public transportation where passengers have
a reduced expectation of privacy. Further, SCAA Buco merely lifted petitioner's bag. This visual and
minimally intrusive inspection was even less than the standard x-ray and physical inspections
done at the airport and seaport terminals where passengers may further be required to open their
bags and luggage Considering the reasonableness of the bus search, Section 2, Article III of the
Constitution finds no application, thereby precluding the necessity for a warrant.

As regards the warrantless inspection of petitioner's bag, the OSG argues that petitioner consented to
the search, thereby making the seized items admissible in evidence. Petitioner contends otherwise
and insists that his failure to object cannot be construed as an implied waiver.

Doubtless, the constitutional immunity against unreasonable searches and seizures is a personal right,
which may be waived. However, to be valid, the consent must be voluntary such that it is unequivocal,
specific, and intelligently given, uncontaminated by any duress or coercion. Relevant to this determination
of voluntariness are the following character stics of the person giving consent and the environment in
which consent is given:

(a) the age of the consenting party;

(b) whether he or she was in a public or secluded location;
(c) whether he or she objected to the search or passively looked on; (d) his or her
education and intelligence;
(d) the presence of coercive police procedures;
(e) the belief that no incriminating evidence will be found;
(f) the nature of the police questioning;
(g) the environment in which the questioning took place; and
(h) the possibly vulnen1ble subjective state of the person consenting.

Similarly in this case, petitioner consented to the baggage inspection done by SCAA Buco. When SCAA
Buco asked if he could open petitioner's bag, petitioner answered "yes, just open it" based on petitioner's
own testimony. This is clear consent by petitioner to the search of the contents of his bag.

The search of persons in a public place is valid because the safety of others may be put at risk. Given the
present circumstances, the Court takes judicial notice that public transport buses and their tenninals, just
like passenger ships and seaports, are in that category.

To emphasize, the guidelines do not apply to privately-owned cars. Neither are they applicable to
moving vehicles dedicated for private or personal use, as in the case of taxis, which are hired by only
one or a group of passengers such that the vehicle can no longer be flagged down by any other person
until the passengers on board alight from the vehicle.
107.People v. O’cochlain, G.R. No. 229071, December 10, 2019
FACTS:
This case is an appeal from the decision of the CA which affirmed the decision of the RTC Laoag in 2013,
who found the accused, Eanna O'Cochlain, guilty of violating RA 9165 or the Comprehensive Dangerous
Drugs Act of 2002.

In the final security checkpoint inside the Laoag City International Airport, the Security Screening Officer
conducted a pat down search on the accused, a 53-yearl old Irish national married to a Filipina. Two
rolled sticks of dried marijuana leaves, weighing less than a gram was seized from his possession. Eanna
was charged with and convicted of illegal possession of marijuana under Section 11, Article II of R.A.
9165, or The Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002.

The accused contends that the two sticks of rolled paper allegedly containing marijuana were not marked,
inventoried, and photographed immediately upon confiscation. He argued that noncompliance with the
chain of custody rule under Section 21 of R.A. 9165 renders the evidence inadmissible and should have
automatically destroyed the case.

ISSUE:
WON the warrantless search and seizure at the airport premises was valid

RULING:
YES. In general, airport screening search is a constitutionally reasonable administrative search. The
search and seizure of an illegal drug during a routine airport inspection made pursuant to the aviation
security procedures has been sustained by this Court in a number of cases. However, the instant case
does not qualify as a legitimate administrative search in an airport. What was seized from the accused
were illegal drugs, not explosive, flammable, corrosive or poisonous substances or materials, or
dangerous elements or devices that may be used to commit hijacking or acts of terrorism. Airport search
is reasonable when limited in scope to the object of the Anti-Hijacking program, not the war on illegal
drugs.

Nonetheless, there is a valid consented warrantless search in this case. The constitutional immunity
against unreasonable searches and seizures is a personal right which may be waived. A person may
voluntarily consent to have government officials conduct a search or seizure that would otherwise be
barred by the Constitution. Section 2, Article III of the Constitution does not proscribe voluntary
cooperation.

The Court found that there was a valid warrantless search based on express consent. The request to frisk
the accused was orally articulated to him in such language that left no room for doubt that he fully
understood what was requested. The accused verbally replied to the request demonstrating that he also
understood the nature and consequences of the request. It was also reasonable to assume that Eanna is
an educated and intelligent man since he a 53-year-old working professional (claimed to be employed or
attached to a drug addiction center) and a well-travelled man who knew his right against unreasonable
searches or that he intentionally conceded the same.

His subsequent arrest without warrant, was justified since it was affected upon the discovery and
recovery of an illegal drug in his person in flagrante delicto.