COGNITIVE SCIENCE 3, 167-172 (1979)

T H E O R E T I C A L NOTES

Problem Finding:
a Theoretical Note

J. W. GETZELS
The Universit3,of Chicago

Despite the self-evident role of problems in initiating thought and the function of
new problems in guiding thought toward new solutions, very little is known
about how problems are found and formulated. Although there are dozens of
theoretical statements, hundreds of psychometric instruments, and literally
thousands of empirical studies of problem solving, there is hardly any systematic
work on problem finding (Getzels, 1964; Getzels, 1975; Henle, 1975; Getzels &
Csikszentmihalyi, 1976). Indeed, Cognitive Science itself, to cite it as an in-
stance of many other journals in the field of cognition, informs potential contrib-
utors that it publishes articles "on such topics as the representation of knowl-
edge, language processing, image processing, question answering, inference,
learning, problem solving, and planning" (see "Information for Authors"), but
fails to make any mention of "question asking" or "problem posing"--as if
questions and problems, like the weather, were just there naturally.
The purpose of this note--and it is to be taken only as a note--is to call
attention to the relative neglect of the "problem of the problem" by offering
some tentative observations regarding the significance of problem finding in
thought, the nature and variety of problems, and the human being as problem-
finder.

ON THE SIGNIFICANCE OF PROBLEM FINDING

Need problems be found? Is not the world already teeming with problems and
dilemmas at home and in business, in economics and in education, in art and in
science? The world is of course teeming with dilemmas. But the dilemmas do not
present themselves automatically as problems capable of resolution or even sen-
sible contemplation. They must be posed and formulated in fruitful and often
radical ways if they are to be moved toward solution. The way the problem is
posed is the way the dilemma will be resolved (Getzels, 1975).

167
168 GETZELS

As Einstein (Einstein & Infeld, 1938) put the issue:

The formulation of a problem is often more essential than its solution, which may be
merely a matter of mathematical or experimental skill. To raise new questions, new
possibilities, to regard old questions from a new angle, requires creative imagination
and marks real advance in science (p. 92).

This is true not only in science but in art and in all learning and inquiry.
Henry Moore (1955) describes the process of problem finding in these words:
I sometimes begin drawing with no preconceived problem to solve, with only a desire
to use pencil on paper and only to make lines, tones and styles with no conscious aim.
But as my mind takes in what is so produced a point arrives where some idea becomes
conscious and crystallizes, and then control and ordering begin to take place (p. 77).

What Moore is describing is~the birth o f a productive or creative problem.

Prior to its emergence there is no structure and no task; there is nothing to solve.
After the problem emerges, the skills of the artist (and the same holds for the
scientist) take over; control and ordering begin. The crucial cognitive step is how
the formless situation where there is no problem to s o l v e - - f o r Moore only the
idle lines; for Roentgen, to cite an instance from science, only a fogged photo-
graphic p l a t e - - i s transformed into a situation where a problem for solution
emerges. For the quality of the problem that is found is a forerunner o f the quality
of the solution that is attained, and finding the productive problem may be no less
an intellectual achievement than attaining the productive solution. In the case of
Moore or Roentgen as instances, it is perhaps not too much to say that from this
point of view a creative solution is the response to a creative problem.

ON THE NATURE AND VARIETY OF PROBLEMS

I have presented elsewhere (Getzels, 1964) a classification o f some dozen types

of problems, the details of which will take us too far afield in this note. It will
suffice for present purposes to distinguish only three illustrative classes o f prob-
lems or problem situations: presented problem situations, discovered problem
situations, and created problem situations, depending on whether the problem
already exists, who propounds it, and whether it has a known formulation,
known method of solution, or known solution (Getzels, 1975; Getzels &
Csikszentmihalyi, 1967; 1976).
In a presented problem situation, or to be precise in one form of it, the
problem exists, and it is propounded to the problem-solver. For example, a
teacher teaches that the area of a rectangle is side a multiplied by side b, and the
pupil is required to solve the " p r o b l e m " : What is the area of a rectangle when
a = 3, b = 4? Here the problem is g i v e n - - i t is p r e s e n t e d - - t o the problem-
solver, and in the particular instance, it has a known formulation, known method
of solution, and known solution to others if not yet to the problem-solver.
Consider now what we have called the discovered problem situation, or
 THEORETICAL NOTES 169

one form of it as an instance. Here the problem also exists but it is envisaged by
oneself rather than propounded by another, and it may or may not have a known
formulation, known method of solution, or known solution. For example, a
four-year-old asks spontaneously, "Why does it get lighter outside when you put
the light out inside?" (Henle, 1971). Or Roentgen sees a fogged photographic
plate as others had before him and asks, "Why is the plate f o g g e d ? " - - a self-
initiated problem that led not only to the X-ray but to a revolution in atomic
science. Here the problem was not presented to the individual by another--
neither to the four-year-old nor to Roentgen; they discovered the problems them-
selves, and even took some pleasure in doing so. This is clearly a different order
of problem situation from the presented problem situation.
Consider finally the created problem situation. Here the problem does not
exist at all until someone invents or creates it. For example, N.R.F. Maier invents
a series of puzzles or problems to test the problem-solving abilities of his subjects;
the scientist conceives of the problem: What is the nature and speed of light; the
artist creates a still-life problem where no such problem existed before. Surely it
makes no sense to think of these situations as merely obstacles one meets through
ill-fortune, ignorance, or ineptitude. Quite the contrary; these problems are situa-
tions that one strives to find and formulate. Indeed, a well-formulated problem is
at once a result of knowledge, a stimulus to more knowledge, and is itself
knowledge (Henle, 1971). As Polanyi (1958) put it:
T o see a p r o b l e m is a definite addition to k n o w l e d g e , as m u c h as it is to see a tree, or
to see a m a t h e m a t i c a l p r o o f - - o r a j o k e . . . T o r e c o g n i z e a p r o b l e m w h i c h c a n be
solved and is w o r t h solving is in fact a d i s c o v e r y in its o w n right (p. 120).

ON THE HUMAN BEING AS PROBLEM-FINDER

The portion of human activity that is held in highest esteem as uniquely

human--activity that can be described only as pure science, fine art, basic
research, systematic philosophy--is devoted as much to finding or creating prob-
lems as to solving problems. This behavior is not undertaken to overcome obsta-
cles that must be overcome because they are a threat to personal well-being; often
the problems are sought out even at the risk of personal well-being and some-
times of life itself.
This engagement of human beings with the problematic from the earliest
wonder and play of the child to the highest advances in art and science is
characteristic also of activities like working at puzzles, reading mystery stories,
deciphering cryptograms, traveling to strange places, exploring deep caves (see
Berlyne, 1966; Hebb & Thompson, 1954). In all these activities, the human being
is not reacting to problems as obstacles which threaten his pleasure or well-being;
rather he is finding problems because they--the problems themselves--give him
pleasure and serve his well-being.
170 GETZELS

This capacity for discovering and inventing problems and not only for
solving problems, which other organisms also do, makes human thought
uniquely humanl and the deeper the problems found and posed (and in due course
solved) the greater the human achievement (Bunge, 1967). Put in the terms of
our illustrative taxonomy, the production of discovered or created problems is
often a more significant accomplishment than the production of solutions to
presented problems.
It is in fact the discovery and creation of problems rather than any superior
knowledge, technical skill, or craftsmanship that often sets the creative person
apart from others in his field. Surely, the difference between the imaginative
scholar and the mere pedant is not that the one is better informed than the
other---quite often the contrary is the case; the difference between the innovative
scientist and the technician is not that the one is methodologically more proficient
than the other--again, quite often the contrary is the case; the difference between
the original artist and the copyist is not that the one is more graphically talented
in the sense that he is a better craftsman than the other--here too quite often the
contrary is the case (Getzels & Csikszentmihalyi, 1976).
It is rather that the one (the pedant, the technician, the copyist) is content or
only able to apply his knowledge, technical skill, or graphic talent to situations
where the problems for solution have already been formulated, and the other (the
scholar, the scientist, the artist) is impelled and able to apply his knowledge,
skill, or talent to situations where he himself discovers, creates, or "finds"
problems still needing formulation and solution. And indeed finding and formu-
lating the problems--as the thirty-one "Queries" propounded by Newton in his
Opticks, to cite one instance for many others--may be as important a cognitive
achievement as the solutions that were ultimately obtained (Bunge, 1967). No, in
the instance cited as of many others such, the discovered or created problems
were more important, for they supplied research problems for generations of
investigators, who might otherwise have had nothing to do had they not been
presented with the discovered problems.
The intent of this note has not been so much to propose, to say nothing of
urge, acceptance of the illustrative conceptual or taxonomic suggestions I
sketched, as to call attention to the neglect of problemfinding as against problem
solving in cognitive science (both lower and upper case). To be sure, problem
finding and problem solving meld into one another, and are not as discontinuous
as my necessarily schematic account may have implied. Nonetheless, there are
differences well worth study between the act of thought in problem solving that
begins with an already formulated problem and one that must begin with discov-
ering or creating the problem itself. The distinction made by Einstein (Einstein &
Infeld, 1938) between the detective and the scientist both of whom seek solutions
to problems is to the point: "For the detective the crime is given, the problem
posed: Who killed Cock Robin? The scientist must at least in part, commit his
own crime" (p. 76).
 THEORETICAL NOTES 171

REFERENCES

Berlyne, D. E. Curiosity and exploration. Science, 1966, 153, 25-33.

Bunge, M. Scientific research 1: T,qe search for system. New York: Springer-Verlag, 1967.
Einstein, A., & Infeld, L. The evolution of physics. New York: Simon & Schuster, 1938.
Getzels, J. W. Creative thinking, problem-solving, and instruction. In E. R. Hilgard (Ed.), Theories
of learning and instruction. Sixty-third Yearbook of the Society for the Study of Education,
Pt. 1. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1964.
Getzels, J. W. Problem-finding and the inventiveness of solutions. Journal of Creative Behavior,
1975, 9, 12-18.
Getzels, J. W., & Csikszentmihalyi, M. Scientific creativity. Science Journal, 1967, 3, 80-84.
Getzels, J. W., & Csikszentmihalyi, M. The creative vision: A longitudinal study of problem finding
in art. New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1976.
Hebb, D. O., & Thompson, D. R. The significance of animal studies. In G. Lindzey (Ed.), Hand-
book of social psychology. Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley, 1954.
Henle, M. The snail beneath the shell. Abra.ras, 1971, 1, 119-133.
Henle, M. Fishing for ideas. American Psychologist, 1975, 30, 795-799.
Moore, H. Notes on sculpture. In B. Ghiselin (Ed.), The creative process. New York: Mentor, 1955.
Polanyi, M. Personal knowledge. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1958.