CISA | CYBERSECURITY AND INFRASTRUCTURE SECURITY AGENCY

SPACE WEATHER EFFECTS ON

COMMUNICATIONS SYSTEMS

EFFECTS, OPERATIONAL IMPACTS, AND MITIGATIONS FOR

COMMUNICATIONS SYSTEMS

Mark MacAlester
Communications Liaison
May 6, 2021
 Who’s Right?
“While Hurricanes Harvey, Irma, Jose, and Maria tore through the Caribbean
region, X-class flares, solar energetic particle (SEP) events, and Earth-
Hurricane directed coronal mass ejections (CMEs) plowed through the heliosphere.
Watch Net Caribbean emergency communication system operators reported critical
impacts to high-frequency (HF) radio links used in disaster response and
aviation tracking.”
• Redmon, R. J., Seaton, D.B., Steenburgh,R., He, J., & Rodriguez, J. V. (2018). September 2017’s geoeffective space weather and impacts to
Caribbean radio communications during hurricane response. Space Weather, 16. https://doi.org/10.1029/2018SW001897

Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) operators, their federal,

Government state, and local emergency management partners supporting operations in the
Operators U.S. Virgin Islands and Puerto Rico used HF communications extensively.
None reported any space weather related impacts to HF communications.

Mark MacAlester
Communications Liaison 2
May 6, 2021
Premise

What is the operational impact caused by a space

weather effect
• On a specific communications technology
• Operated according to a set of procedures
• At a specific geographical location
• At a specific time during a space weather event
Several slides are animated.
Mark MacAlester
Communications Liaison 3
May 6, 2021
Let’s Talk Communications
Communications Basics and Space Weather
• Radio (a.k.a “wireless”)
• Satellite
• Terrestrial Telecommunications Systems (a.k.a.
“wireline”)

Mark MacAlester
Communications Liaison 4
May 6, 2021
Radio Communications

Mark MacAlester
Communications Liaison 5
May 6, 2021
 Ionospheric Skywave Communications
> ~60 MHz
passes Frequency + Angle + Power + Antenna Gain = Skywave Communications
through F
Layer
F2
F1 “Sporadic E”
“Auroral E”
E
D  Near Vertical Incidence
Skywave (NVIS)
< ~3 MHz
absorbed or
refracted by
D Layer

Skip Zone
Zone between transmitter and where
signal returns to Earth where reception
is not possible.

Mark MacAlester
Communications Liaison 6
May 6, 2021
 Solar Flare Radio Blackout Effect (Visual)
DAY NIGHT
X-Rays increase No D Layer to
electron density absorb radio
which increases
absorption of radio signals.
signals from lower
frequencies to higher
frequencies for
~minutes to 3 hours.
If ultraviolet (UV) light
in addition to X-ray,
UV increases F layer
ionization which can
enhance F Layer HF
communications.)
Mark MacAlester
Communications Liaison 7
May 6, 2021
 Radiation and Geomagnetic Storms (Visual)
Solar Radiation Storm Geomagnetic Storm
Polar Cap Absorption event: Increased ionization increases absorption at E Layer
Solar Energetic Protons increase ionization which increases and above, disrupting communications < 20MHz.
absorption of radio in D and E layers near poles for ~minutes to Aurora heats atmosphere:
days. Molecular neutrals rise to F
Layer over all of auroral oval
Full-coverage and move toward the equator:
Suppresses ion creation,
from pole to
increases ion loss in F Layer.
equatorward Higher frequencies pass
extent through for ~1-3 days + ~1-2
Extent varies
with storm days near poles.
Not highly
Density and intensity Downwelling of ions pushed
correlated to the
extent varies out of F Layer can enhance
visible aurora If storm arrives late
with storm HF skywave equatorward
afternoon, may not see
intensity Higher ion effects until after sunrise of and distant from the aurora
density on day next day for ~2 hours
side (higher
absorption) NOT TO SCALE Mark MacAlester
Communications Liaison 8
May 6, 2021
 Mitigation Techniques

F2

Use Digital over Analog F Layer Depletion: Use Use NVIS

Use Data over Voice Lower Frequency if practical

D (and E) Layer Absorption: Move to Higher Frequency Use Higher Power

Mark MacAlester
Communications Liaison 9
May 6, 2021
 Mitigation Techniques (Continued)
Use Networks (Example)
• Station Relay WINLINK
 If origin and
destination stations
Global Radio Email
cannot talk directly, Live System
manually pass traffic Information
between stations
that can talk.
• Internet Connected

https://www.winlink.org/RMSChannels

Mark MacAlester
Communications Liaison 10
May 6, 2021
 Mitigation Techniques (Continued)
The more stations
available in a network,
the higher the probability
of successfully passing
traffic.

SHARES is a federal
program where federal,
state, territorial, tribal,
and local governments
—and some private
sector companies—
share HF frequencies
and resources.

Mark MacAlester
Communications Liaison 11
May 6, 2021
 Applying a Risk Profile for HF Skywave
Worst Case Analog Voice Single Frequency Single Station Pair Low Power Low Skill

Hurricane Watch Net Analog Voice Single Frequency Station Relay High Power High Skill
(2017)
7.268 MHz & 14.325 MHz ~50 Stations in Net
40m Band 20m Band

FEMA PR/USVI Digital Voice Automatic Link Establishment Station Relay High Power Medium Skill
(and data) > 40 Channels from 2 MHz to 28 Used Near Vertical Incidence Skywave for intra- and
MHz inter-island HF
US Government
(e.g. SHARES, COTHEN)
Digital Voice Automatic Link Establishment Networked Stations High Power Medium Skill
(and data)

Amateur Austin, TX Digital Data Multiple Frequencies Networked Stations High Power High Skill

Mark MacAlester
Communications Liaison 12
May 6, 2021
 [Not a] Radio Blackout Event
Radio Spectrum
3 MHz 30 MHz 300 MHz 3 GHz

HF VHF UHF

0 Hz

Solar Flare “Radio Blackout”

3 MHz 30 MHz 300 MHz 3 GHz

VHF UHF

0 Hz 5 – 40 MHz
5 - 40 MHz Skywave
Possible interference to VHF, UHF, and microwave satellite
Skywave only! communications with direct line-of-sight from receiver to the sun for
seconds up to ~15 minutes
Mark MacAlester
Communications Liaison 13
May 6, 2021
 Terrestrial Line-of-Sight (LOS) Radio
Ionosphere

Terrestrial LOS
Communications
are not directly VHF
impacted by UHF Air
space weather. (Includes FirstNet)
(with one exception)
LOS Microwave

Marine
Land Mobile Radio
Optical (free space optics and fiber cables)

Mark MacAlester
Communications Liaison 14
May 6, 2021
Solar Radio Bursts (the exception)

Omnidirectional antennas likely not

impacted — unless transmitting and
receiving antennas are on a direct line of
sight with the Sun when a SRB occurs.

Directional sun-
facing antennas may
be impacted when
the sun is within their ~ 20 Min.
line of sight, which
can occur at dawn
and dusk.

Mark MacAlester
Communications Liaison 15
May 6, 2021
Satellite Communications

Mark MacAlester
Communications Liaison 16
May 6, 2021
 Satellite Basics - Orbits
Low-Earth Orbit (LEO) Medium-Earth Orbit (MEO) Geostationary Orbit (GEO)
~180 – 2,000 km 2,000 – < 35,786 km 35,786 km
~110 – 1240 miles ~1,240 – < 22,236 miles 22,236 miles

Mark MacAlester
Communications Liaison 17
May 6, 2021
 Satellite Basics - Frequencies
VHF UHF L Band S Band C Band X Band Ku Band K Band Ka Band V Band

70- 200-400 1-2 GHz 2-4 GHz 4-8 GHz 8-12 GHz 12-18 GHz 18-27 GHz 27-40 GHz 40-75 GHz
150 MHz
MHz
Polarization allows satellite
VHF and UHF providers to support two customers
are often used on the same frequency.
for satellite
telemetry.

Mark MacAlester
Communications Liaison 18
May 6, 2021
 Electromagnetic Interference

Radio Blackout (R Scale) and Solar Radio

Burst Solar radio and microwave radiation at
No warning
the same frequency or frequencies that a
Short duration (seconds to ~15 minutes)
satellite is using can cause electromagnetic
More disruptive to higher frequencies.
interference, a form of “natural jamming.”
Impact depends on use case.
Most likely to impact satellites on a direct line
Overall risk is low.
from the Sun to the receiver.

Mark MacAlester
Communications Liaison 19
May 6, 2021
 Satellite Physical Effects (and Mitigations)
Solar Radiation Storm (S Scale) Solar Radiation Storm (S Scale) Single
Particles damage solar panels Event Upset creates command or memory
shortens useful life. 01001101 errors, usually temporary.
 Mitigated by proper design, quality control, 00001101  New artificial intelligence can diagnose and fix
and operational monitoring upsets on the satellite with little or no human
Geomagnetic Storm (G Scale) Upper intervention
atmosphere expansion increases drag
for very-low-earth-orbit satellites and - + Geomagnetic Storm (G Scale) Surface
debris.
 Not a significant issue for LEO satellite and Deep Dielectric charging can cause
constellations above 400 - 600 km arcs that can damage electronics.
 Mitigated by extra fuel reserve for station  Mitigated by proper design and quality control
keeping as part of operational design
 New artificial intelligence can maneuver
satellites to avoid collisions

Mark MacAlester
Communications Liaison 20
May 6, 2021
 Scintillation and Frequency
VHF UHF L Band S Band C Band X Band Ku Band K Band Ka Band V Band

70- 200-400 1-2 GHz 2-4 GHz 4-8 GHz 8-12 GHz 12-18 GHz 18-27 GHz 27-40 GHz 40-75 GHz
150 MHz
MHz

Westward
Electrojet

Eastward
Electrojet

Mark MacAlester
Communications Liaison 21
May 6, 2021
 Scintillation Effects on SATCOM
Effects are not continuous and may be highly localized.

DAY Close relationship between scintillation and the auroral oval.

NIGHT
~300+ km F2 F2

~150-300 km F1 Auroral Electrojet (blobs)

Phase
~95-150 km
E Faraday Rotation
Change

Absorption
~75-95 km D Refraction
Diffusion
Scatter

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Communications Liaison 22
May 6, 2021
Wireline Communications

Mark MacAlester
Communications Liaison 23
May 6, 2021
Terrestrial Wireline Basics - US
Fiber Optic Cable • Long haul cable ~88%-90% fiber optic
Copper Cable • Rural and “last mile” may still be ~40%-45% copper
Signal Cable Landing
Regeneration Stations
Hut Undersea Cable
Central
Office
Mobile
Distribution Node Switching
Center

• Fiber Optic Cables on land do not conduct electricity (mitigation)

Mark MacAlester
• Damaging geomagnetically induced currents (GIC) require long- Communications Liaison 24
distance conductors (10s to 100s of km/mi) May 6, 2021
 GIC and Undersea Cables
Repeaters require power, which is provided by
Undersea Repeaters copper conduit built into the undersea cable.
regenerate optical signals  Copper conduit is susceptible to geomagnetically
approximately every ~40-70 induced currents
kilometers.  Research into vulnerability is ongoing and
depends on cable length, geographic orientation,
and electrical architecture

Cable Cable
Landing Long distances between landing stations Landing
Station can lead to significant voltage differentials, Station
which induce electric current.

Risk currently unknown Mark MacAlester

Communications Liaison 25
May 6, 2021
Conclusion

• Effects ionospheric skywave radio (HF). Not a total Radio Blackout!

• Mitigation is possible.
• Line-of-sight radio not effected, except for specific Solar Radio Burst cases.

• Move to lower orbits and higher frequencies is changing the risk profile.
• Even in extreme storms, C-band and above not effected by scintillation.
• Concern for changes in orbital debris orbits.

• Limited impact possible for legacy long-distance copper cables on land.

• Unknown risk for submarine cables.
Mark MacAlester
Communications Liaison 26
May 6, 2021
Acknowledgements
The author would like to thank:

 Bill Murtagh, Bob Rutledge, Mihail Codrescu, and the Staff at the NOAA Space Weather Prediction Center in Boulder, CO, for their
outstanding support and patience with space weather physics and effects on communications systems

 Antti Pulkkinen and the Heliophysics Division at NASA’s Goddard Space Flight Center

 Bruce Tsurutani, Leif Scheick, Dennis Lee, and Anthony Mannucci at NASA’s Jet Propulsion Laboratory

 Mike Hapgood at RAL Space

 The Communications Information Sharing and Analysis Center

 Michael Corey, Carl Luetzelschwab, Tom Whiteside, and others from the American Radio Relay League (ARRL)

 Bobby Graves at the Hurricane Watch Net

 Bob Speakman and the communications technicians of FEMA’s Mobile Emergency Response Support

 Mark Jenson and the J6 team at NORAD and USNORTHCOM

 Stephen White at the Air Force Research Laboratory

Mark MacAlester
 And many others -- Thank you! Communications Liaison 27
May 6, 2021
 For more information:
cisa.gov

Questions?
Email: [email protected]

Mark MacAlester
Communications Liaison 28
May 6, 2021
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