Introduction - To - Logic - and - Critical - Think 2024
Introduction - To - Logic - and - Critical - Think 2024
Introduction - To - Logic - and - Critical - Think 2024
Critical Thinking
Version 2.0
Preface
Chapter 1: Reconstructing and analyzing arguments
1.1 What is an argument?
1.2 Identifying arguments
1.3 Arguments vs. explanations
1.4 More complex argument structures
1.5 Using your own paraphrases of premises and conclusions to
reconstruct arguments in standard form
1.6 Validity
1.7 Soundness
1.8 Deductive vs. inductive arguments
1.9 Arguments with missing premises
1.10 Assuring, guarding, and discounting
1.11 Evaluative language
1.12 Evaluating a real-life argument
Chapter 2: Formal methods of evaluating arguments
2.1 What is a formal method of evaluation and why do we need them?
2.2 Propositional logic and the four basic truth functional connectives
2.3 Negation and disjunction
2.4 Using parentheses to translate complex sentences
2.5 “Not both” and “neither nor”
2.6 The truth table test of validity
2.7 Conditionals
2.8 “Unless”
2.9 Material equivalence
2.10 Tautologies, contradictions, and contingent statements
2.11 Proofs and the 8 valid forms of inference
2.12 How to construct proofs
2.13 Short review of propositional logic
2.14 Categorical logic
2.15 The Venn test of validity for immediate categorical inferences
2.16 Universal statements and existential commitment
2.17 Venn validity for categorical syllogisms
Chapter 3: Evaluating inductive arguments and probabilistic and statistical
fallacies
3.1 Inductive arguments and statistical generalizations
3.2 Inference to the best explanation and the seven explanatory virtues
3.3 Analogical arguments
3.4 Causal arguments
3.5 Probability
3.6 The conjunction fallacy
3.7 The base rate fallacy
3.8 The small numbers fallacy
3.9 Regression to the mean fallacy
3.10 Gambler’s fallacy
Chapter 4: Informal fallacies
4.1 Formal vs. informal fallacies
4.1.1 Composition fallacy
4.1.2 Division fallacy
4.1.3 Begging the question fallacy
4.1.4 False dichotomy
4.1.5 Equivocation
4.2 Slippery slope fallacies
4.2.1 Conceptual slippery slope
4.2.2 Causal slippery slope
4.3 Fallacies of relevance
4.3.1 Ad hominem
4.3.2 Straw man
4.3.3 Tu quoque
4.3.4 Genetic
4.3.5 Appeal to consequences
4.3.6 Appeal to authority
Answers to exercises
Glossary/Index
Preface
Preface
This is an introductory textbook in logic and critical thinking. The goal of the
textbook is to provide the reader with a set of tools and skills that will enable
them to identify and evaluate arguments. The book is intended for an
introductory course that covers both formal and informal logic. As such, it is not
a formal logic textbook, but is closer to what one would find marketed as a
“critical thinking textbook.” The formal logic in chapter 2 is intended to give an
elementary introduction to formal logic. Specifically, chapter 2 introduces
several different formal methods for determining whether an argument is valid
or invalid (truth tables, proofs, Venn diagrams). I contrast these formal methods
with the informal method of determining validity introduced in chapter 1. What
I take to be the central theoretical lesson with respect to the formal logic is
simply that of understanding the difference between formal and informal
methods of evaluating an argument’s validity. I believe there are also practical
benefits of learning the formal logic. First and foremost, once one has
internalized some of the valid forms of argument, it is easy to impose these
structures on arguments one encounters. The ability to do this can be of use in
evaluating an argumentative passage, especially when the argument concerns a
topic with which one is not very familiar (such as on the GRE or LSAT).
However, what I take to be of far more practical importance is the skill of being
able to reconstruct and evaluate arguments. This skill is addressed in chapter 1,
where the central ideas are that of using the principle of charity to put
arguments into standard form and of using the informal test of validity to
evaluate those arguments. Since the ability to reconstruct and evaluate
arguments is a skill, one must practice in order to acquire it. The exercises in
each section are intended to give students some practice, but in order to really
master the skill, one must practice much, much more than simply completing the
exercises in the text. It makes about as much sense to say that one could
become a critical thinker by reading a critical thinking textbook as that one
could become fluent in French by reading a French textbook. Logic and critical
thinking, like learning a foreign language, takes practice because it is a skill.
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Preface
write chapter 3 with an eye towards this understanding. As with all the chapters,
I have tried to walk the fine line between being succinct without sacrificing
depth.
Chapter 4 picks out what I take to be some of the most common fallacies, both
formal and informal. In my experience, many critical thinking textbooks end up
making the fallacies sound obvious; one is often left wondering how anyone
could commit such a fallacy. In my discussion of the fallacies I have tried to
correct this not only in the particular examples I use in the text and exercises,
but also by discussing what makes a particular fallacy seductive.
I have used numerous different textbooks over the years that I have been
teaching logic and critical thinking courses. Some of them were very good;
others were not. Although this textbook is my attempt to improve on what I’ve
encountered, I am indebted to a number of textbooks that have shaped how I
teach logic and critical thinking. In particular, Sinnott-Armstrong and Fogelin’s
Understanding Arguments: An Introduction to Informal Logic and Copi and
Cohen’s Introduction to Logic have influenced how I present the material here
(although this may not be obvious). My interest in better motivating the
seductiveness of the fallacies is influenced by Daniel Kahneman’s work in
psychology (for which he won the Nobel Prize in economics in 2002).
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Preface
textbooks). If education is necessary for securing certain basic human rights (as
philosophers like Martha Nussbaum have argued), then lack of access to
education is itself an issue of justice. Providing high quality, low-cost textbooks
is one, small part of making higher education more affordable and thus more
equitable and just. This open textbook is a contribution towards that end.
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Chapter 1: Reconstructing and analyzing arguments
This is an introductory textbook in logic and critical thinking. Both logic and
critical thinking centrally involve the analysis and assessment of arguments.
“Argument” is a word that has multiple distinct meanings, so it is important to
be clear from the start about the sense of the word that is relevant to the study
of logic. In one sense of the word, an argument is a heated exchange of
differing views as in the following:
Sally: Abortion is morally wrong and those who think otherwise are
seeking to justify murder!
Bob: Abortion is not morally wrong and those who think so are right-wing
bigots who are seeking to impose their narrow-minded views on all the
rest of us!
Sally and Bob are having an argument in this exchange. That is, they are each
expressing conflicting views in a heated manner. However, that is not the sense
of “argument” with which logic is concerned. Logic concerns a different sense
of the word “argument.” An argument, in this sense, is a reason for thinking
that a statement, claim or idea is true. For example:
In this example Sally has given an argument against the moral permissibility of
abortion. That is, she has given us a reason for thinking that abortion is morally
wrong. The conclusion of the argument is the first four words, “abortion is
morally wrong.” But whereas in the first example Sally was simply asserting that
abortion is wrong (and then trying to put down those who support it), in this
example she is offering a reason for why abortion is wrong.
We can (and should) be more precise about our definition of an argument. But
before we can do that, we need to introduce some further terminology that we
will use in our definition. As I’ve already noted, the conclusion of Sally’s
argument is that abortion is morally wrong. But the reason for thinking the
conclusion is true is what we call the premise. So we have two parts of an
argument: the premise and the conclusion. Typically, a conclusion will be
supported by two or more premises. Both premises and conclusions are
statements. A statement is a type of sentence that can be true or false and
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Chapter 1: Reconstructing and analyzing arguments
The reason that none of these sentences are statements is that it doesn’t make
sense to ask whether those sentences are true or false (rather, they are requests
or commands, and questions, respectively).
So, to reiterate: all arguments are composed of premises and conclusions, which
are both types of statements. The premises of the argument provide a reason
for thinking that the conclusion is true. And arguments typically involve more
than one premise. A standard way of capturing the structure of an argument is
by numbering the premises and conclusion. For example, recall Sally’s
argument against abortion:
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Chapter 1: Reconstructing and analyzing arguments
Exercise 1: Which of the following sentences are statements and which are
not?
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Chapter 1: Reconstructing and analyzing arguments
The best way to identify whether an argument is present is to ask whether there
is a statement that someone is trying to establish as true by basing it on some
other statement. If so, then there is an argument present. If not, then there
isn’t. Another thing that can help in identifying arguments is knowing certain
key words or phrases that are premise indicators or conclusion indicators. For
example, recall Sally’s abortion argument:
The word “because” here is a premise indicator. That is, “because” indicates
that what follows is a reason for thinking that abortion is morally wrong. Here is
another example:
I know that the student plagiarized since I found the exact same
sentences on a website and the website was published more than a year
before the student wrote the paper.
In this example, the word “since” is a premise indicator because what follows it
is a statement that is clearly intended to be a reason for thinking that the
student plagiarized (i.e., a premise). Notice that in these two cases, the premise
indicators “because” and “since” are interchangeable: I could have used
“because” in place of “since” or “since” in the place of “because” and the
meaning of the sentences would have been the same. In addition to premise
indicators, there are also conclusion indicators. Conclusion indicators mark that
what follows is the conclusion of an argument. For example,
In this example, the word “so” is a conclusion indicator because what follows it
is a statement that someone is trying to establish as true (i.e., a conclusion).
Here is another example of a conclusion indicator:
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Chapter 1: Reconstructing and analyzing arguments
Although these words and phrases can be used to identify the premises and
conclusions of arguments, they are not failsafe methods of doing so. Just
because a sentence contains them does not mean that you are dealing with an
argument. This can easily be shown by examples like these:
Although “since” can function as a premise indicator and although “so” can
function as a conclusion indicator, neither one is doing so here. This shows that
you can’t simply mindlessly use occurrences of these words in sentences to show
that there is an argument being made. Rather, we have to rely on our
understanding of the English sentence in order to determine whether an
argument is being made or not. Thus, the best way to determine whether an
argument is present is by asking the question: Is there a statement that
someone is trying to establish as true or explain why it is true by basing it on
some other statement? If so, then there is an argument present. If not, then
there isn’t. Notice that if we apply this method to the above examples, we will
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Chapter 1: Reconstructing and analyzing arguments
Another way of explaining why these occurrences of “so” and “since” do not
indicate that an argument is present is by noting that both premise indicators
and conclusion indicators are, grammatically, conjunctions. A grammatical
conjunction is a word that connects two separate statements. So, if a word or
term is truly being used as a premise or conclusion indicator, it must connect
two separate statements. Thus, if “since” were really functioning as a premise
indicator in the above example then what followed it would be a statement. But
“1999” is not a statement at all. Likewise, in the second example “so” is not
being used as a conclusion indicator because it is not conjoining two separate
statements. Rather, it is being used to modify the extent of “happy.” In
contrast, if I were to say “Tom was sleeping, so he couldn’t have answered the
phone,” then “so” is being used as a conclusion indicator. In this case, there
are clearly two separate statements (“Tom was sleeping” and “Tom couldn’t
have answered the phone”) and one is being used as the basis for thinking that
the other is true.
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Chapter 1: Reconstructing and analyzing arguments
Obviously, in the latter case the substitution of one conclusion indicator for
another makes the sentence meaningless, which means that the “so” that
occurred originally wasn’t functioning as a conclusion indicator.
1. The woman in the hat is not a witch since witches have long noses and
she doesn’t have a long nose.
2. I have been wrangling cattle since before you were old enough to tie
your own shoes.
3. Albert is angry with me so he probably won’t be willing to help me wash
the dishes.
4. First I washed the dishes and then I dried them.
5. If the road wasn’t icy, the car wouldn’t have slid off the turn.
6. Albert isn’t a fireman and he isn’t a fisherman either.
7. Are you seeing that rhinoceros over there? It is huge!
8. The fact that obesity has become a problem in the U.S. is shown by the
fact that obesity rates have risen significantly over the past four decades.
9. Bob showed me a graph with the rising obesity rates and I was very
surprised to see how much they’ve risen.
10. Albert isn’t a fireman because Albert is a Greyhound, which is a kind of
dog, and dogs can’t be firemen.
11. Charlie and Violet are dogs and since dogs don’t sweat, it is obvious that
Charlie and Violet don’t sweat.
12. The reason I forgot to lock the door is that I was distracted by the clown
riding a unicycle down our street while singing Lynyrd Skynyrd’s “Simple
Man.”
13. What Bob told you is not the real reason that he missed his plane to
Denver.
14. Samsung stole some of Apple’s patents for their smartphones, so Apple
stole some of Samsung’s patents back in retaliation.
15. No one who has ever gotten frostbite while climbing K2 has survived to
tell about it, therefore no one ever will.
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Chapter 1: Reconstructing and analyzing arguments
So far I have defined arguments in terms of premises and conclusions, where the
premises are supposed to provide a reason (support, evidence) for accepting
the conclusion. Many times the goal of giving an argument is simply to establish
that the conclusion is true. For example, when I am trying to convince someone
that obesity rates are rising in the U.S. I may cite evidence such as studies from
the Center for Disease Control (CDC) and the National Institute of Health (NIH).
The studies I cite would function as premises for the conclusion that obesity
rates are rising. For example:
We know that obesity is on the rise in the U.S. because multiple studies
carried out by the CDC and NIH have consistently shown a rise in obesity
over the last four decades.
We could put this simple argument into standard form like this:
1. Multiple studies by the CDC and NIH have consistently shown a rise in
obesity over the last four decades.
2. Therefore, obesity is on the rise in the U.S.
The standard form argument clearly distinguishes the premise from the
conclusion and shows how the conclusion is supposed to be supported by the
evidence offered in the premise. Again, the goal of this simple argument would
be to convince someone that the conclusion is true. However, sometimes we
already know that a statement or claim is true and we are trying to establish why
it is true rather than that it is true. An argument that attempts to show why its
conclusion is true is an explanation. Contrast the previous example with the
following:
The reason that the rate of obesity is on the rise in the U.S. is that the
foods we most often consume over the past four decades have
increasingly contained high levels of sugar and low levels of dietary fiber.
Since eating foods high in sugar and low in fiber triggers the insulin
system to start storing those calories as fat, it follows that people who
consume foods high in sugar and low in fiber will tend to store more of
the calories consumed as fat.
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Chapter 1: Reconstructing and analyzing arguments
This passage gives an explanation for why obesity is on the rise in the U.S.
Unlike the earlier example, here it is taken for granted that obesity is on the rise
in the U.S. That is the claim whose truth we are trying to explain. We can put
the obesity explanation into standard form just like any other argument. In
order to do this, I will make some paraphrases of the premises and conclusion of
the argument (for more on how to do this, see section 1.5 below).
Notice that in this explanation the premises (1-3) attempt to give a reason for
why the conclusion is true, rather than a reason for thinking that the conclusion is
true. That is, in an explanation we assume that what we are trying to explain
(i.e., the conclusion) is true. In this case, the premises are supposed to show
why we should expect or predict that the conclusion is true. Explanations often
give us an understanding of why the conclusion is true. We can think of
explanations as a type of argument, we just have to distinguish two different
types of argument: those that attempt to establish that their conclusion is true
(arguments), and those that attempt to establish why their conclusion is true
(explanations).
1. Wanda rode the bus today because her car was in the shop.
2. Since Wanda doesn’t have enough money in her bank account, she
has not yet picked up her car from the shop.
3. Either Bob or Henry rode the bus to work today. But it wasn’t Henry
because I saw him riding his bike to work. Therefore, it was Bob.
4. It can’t be snowing right now since it only snows when it is 32 degrees
or below and right now it is 40 degrees.
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Chapter 1: Reconstructing and analyzing arguments
5. The reason some people with schizophrenia hear voices in their head
is that the cognitive mechanism that monitors their own self-talk is
malfunctioning and they attribute their own self-talk to some external
source.
6. Fracking should be allowed because, although it does involve some
environmental risk, it reduces our dependence on foreign oil and
there is much greater harm to the environment due to foreign oil
drilling than there is due to fracking.
7. Wanda could not have ridden the bus today because today is a city-
wide holiday and the bus service is not operating.
8. The Tigers lost their star pitcher due to injury over the weekend,
therefore the Tigers will not win their game against the Pirates.
9. No one living in Pompeii could have escaped before the lava from Mt.
Vesuvius hit. The reason is simple: the lava was flowing too fast and
there was nowhere to go to escape it in time.
10. The reason people’s allergies worsen when they move to Cincinnati is
that the pollen count in Cincinnati is higher than almost anywhere else
in the surrounding area.
So far we have seen that an argument consists of a premise (typically more than
one) and a conclusion. However, very often arguments and explanations have a
more complex structure than just a few premises that directly support the
conclusion. For example, consider the following argument:
A. This account of the eruption of Mt. Vesuvius was not actually written
by an eyewitness.
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Chapter 1: Reconstructing and analyzing arguments
However, the argument’s structure is more complex than simply having a couple
of premises that provide evidence directly for the conclusion. Rather, some
statement provides evidence directly for the main conclusion, but that statement
itself is supported by another statement. To determine the structure of an
argument, we must determine which statements support which. We can use our
premise and conclusion indicators to help with this. For example, the passage
contains the phrase, “the reason is…” which is a premise indicator, and it also
contains the conclusion indicator, “therefore.” That conclusion indicator helps
us to identify the main conclusion, but the more important thing to see is that
statement A does not itself provide evidence or support for any of the other
statements in the argument, which is the clearest reason why statement A is the
main conclusion of the argument. The next question we must answer is: which
statement most directly supports A? What most directly supports A is:
C. The lava from Mt. Vesuvius was flowing too fast and there was
nowhere for someone living in Pompeii to go in order to escape it in
time.
1. The lava from Mt. Vesuvius was flowing too fast and there was
nowhere for someone living in Pompeii to go in order to escape it in
time.
2. Therefore, no one living in Pompeii could have survived the eruption
of Mt. Vesuvius. (from 1)
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Chapter 1: Reconstructing and analyzing arguments
The main argument here (from 2 to 3) contains a subargument, in this case the
argument from 1 to 2. In general, the main argument is simply the argument
whose premises directly support the main conclusion, whereas a subargument
is an argument that provides indirect support for the main conclusion by
supporting one of the premises of the main argument. You can always add
further subarguments to the overall structure of an argument by providing
evidence that supports one of the unsupported premises.
Another type of structure that arguments can have is when two or more
premises provide direct but independent support for the conclusion. Here is an
example of an argument with that structure:
I know that Wanda rode her bike to work today because when she arrived
at work she had her right pant leg rolled up (which cyclists do in order to
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Chapter 1: Reconstructing and analyzing arguments
keep their pants legs from getting caught in the chain). Moreover, our
coworker, Bob, who works in accounting, saw her riding towards work at
7:45 am.
The conclusion of this argument is “Wanda rode her bike to work today” and
there are two premises that provide independent support for it: the fact that
Wanda had her pant leg cuffed and the fact that Bob saw her riding her bike.
Here is the argument in standard form:
1. Wanda arrived at work with her right pant leg rolled up.
2. Cyclists often roll up their right pant leg.
3. Bob saw Wanda riding her bike towards work at 7:45.
4. Therefore, Wanda rode her bike to work today. (from 1-2, 3
independently)
Again, notice that next to statement 4 of the argument I have written the
premises from which that conclusion follows. In this case, in order to avoid any
ambiguity, I have noted that the support for the conclusion comes
independently from statements 1 and 2, on the one hand, and from statement 3,
on the other hand. It is important to point out that an argument or subargument
can be supported by one or more premises. We see this in the present
argument since the conclusion (4) is supported jointly by 1 and 2, and singly by
3. As before, we can represent the structure of this argument spatially, as figure
2 shows:
There are endless different argument structures that can be generated from
these few simple patterns. At this point, it is important to understand that
arguments can have these different structures and that some arguments will be
longer and more complex than others. Determining the structure of very
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Chapter 1: Reconstructing and analyzing arguments
complex arguments is a skill that takes some time to master. Even so, it may
help to remember that any argument structure ultimately traces back to some
combination of these.
Exercise 4: Write the following arguments in standard form and show how
the argument is structured using a diagram like the ones I have used in
this section.
1. There is nothing wrong with prostitution because there is nothing
wrong with consensual sexual and economic interactions between
adults. Moreover, since there’s no difference between a man who
goes on a blind date with a woman, buys her dinner and then has sex
with her and a man who simply pays a woman for sex, that is another
reason for why there is nothing wrong with prostitution.
2. Prostitution is wrong because it involves women who have typically
been sexually abused as children. We know that most of these
women have been abused from multiple surveys done with women
who have worked in prostitution and that show a high percentage of
self-reported sexual abuse as children.
3. There was someone in this cabin recently because there was warm
water in the tea kettle and because there was wood still smoldering in
the fireplace. But the person couldn’t have been Tim because Tim has
been with me the whole time. Therefore, there must be someone else
in these woods.
4. It is possible to be blind and yet run in the Olympic Games since
Marla Runyan did it at the 2000 Sydney Olympics.
5. The train was late because it had to take a longer, alternate route
since the bridge was out.
6. Israel is not safe if Iran gets nuclear missiles since Iran has threatened
multiple times to destroy Israel and if Iran had nuclear missiles it would
be able to carry out this threat. Moreover, since Iran has been
developing enriched uranium, they have the key component needed
for nuclear weapons—every other part of the process of building a
nuclear weapon is simple compared to that. Therefore, Israel is not
safe.
7. Since all professional hockey players are missing front teeth and
Martin is a professional hockey player, it follows that Martin is missing
front teeth. And since almost all professional athletes who are missing
their front teeth have false teeth, it follows that Martin probably has
false teeth.
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Chapter 1: Reconstructing and analyzing arguments
8. Anyone who eats the crab rangoon at China Food restaurant will
probably have stomach troubles afterward. It has happened to me
every time, which is why it will probably happen to other people as
well. Since Bob ate the crab rangoon at China Food restaurant, he will
probably have stomach troubles afterward.
9. Albert and Caroline like to go for runs in the afternoon in Hyde Park.
Since Albert never runs alone, we know that any time Albert is
running, Caroline is running too. But since Albert looks like he has just
run (since he is panting hard), it follows that Caroline must have ran
too.
10. Just because Jeremy’s prints were on the gun that killed Tim and the
gun was registered to Jeremy, it doesn’t follow that Jeremy killed Tim
since Jeremy’s prints would certainly be on his own gun and someone
else could have stolen Jeremy’s gun and used it to kill Tim.
Although sometimes we can just lift the premises and conclusion verbatim from
the argument, we cannot always do this. Paraphrases of premises or conclusions
are sometimes needed in order to make the standard form argument as clear as
possible. A paraphrase is the use of different words to capture the same idea in
a clearer way. There will always be multiple ways of paraphrasing premises and
conclusions and this means that there will never be just one way of putting an
argument into standard form. In order to paraphrase well, you will have to rely
on your understanding of English to come up with what you think is the best way
of capturing the essence of the argument. Again, typically there is no single
right way to do this, although there are certainly better and worse ways of doing
it. For example, consider the following argument:
Just because Jeremy’s prints were on the gun that killed Tim and the gun
was registered to Jeremy, it doesn’t follow that Jeremy killed Tim since
Jeremy’s prints would certainly be on his own gun and someone else
could have stolen Jeremy’s gun and used it to kill Tim.
What is the conclusion of this argument? (Think about it before reading on.)
Here is one way of paraphrasing the conclusion:
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Chapter 1: Reconstructing and analyzing arguments
The fact that Jeremy’s prints were on the gun that killed Tim and the gun
was registered to Jeremy doesn’t mean that Jeremy killed Tim.
This statement seems to capture the essence of the main conclusion in the
above argument. The premises of the argument would be:
Notice that while I have paraphrased the first premise, I have left the second
premise almost exactly as it appeared in the original paragraph. As I’ve said,
paraphrases are needed in order to try to make the standard form argument as
clear as possible and this is what I’ve tried to do in capturing premise 1 as well
as the conclusion of this argument. So here is the reconstructed argument in
standard form:
However, as I have just noted, there is more than one way of paraphrasing the
premises and conclusion of the argument. To illustrate this, I will give a second
way that one could accurately capture this argument in standard form. Here is
another way of expressing the conclusion:
That is clearly what the above argument is trying to ultimately establish and it is
a much simpler (in some ways) conclusion than my first way of paraphrasing the
conclusion. However, it also takes more liberties in interpreting the argument
than my original paraphrase. For example, in the original argument there is no
occurrence of the word “know.” That is something that I am introducing in my
own paraphrase. That is a totally legitimate thing to do, as long as introducing
new terminology helps us to clearly express the essence of the premise or
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Chapter 1: Reconstructing and analyzing arguments
1. Tim was killed by a gun that was registered to Jeremy and had
Jeremy’s prints on it.
2. It is possible that Jeremy’s gun was stolen from him.
3. If Jeremy’s gun was stolen from him, then Jeremy could not have
killed Tim.
4. Therefore, we do not know that Jeremy killed Tim. (from 1-3)
Notice that this standard form argument has more premises than my first
reconstruction of the standard form argument (which consisted of only three
statements). I have taken quite a few liberties in interpreting and paraphrasing
this argument, but what I have tried to do is to get down to the most essential
logic of the original argument. The paraphrases of the premises I have used are
quite different from the wording that occurs in the original paragraph. I have
introduced phrases such as “it is possible that” as well as conditional
statements (if…then statements), such as premise 3. Nonetheless, this
reconstruction seems to get at the essence of the logic of the original argument.
As long as your paraphrases help you to do that, they are good paraphrases.
Being able to reconstruct arguments like this takes many years of practice in
order to do it well, and much of the material that we will learn later in the text
will help you to better understand how to capture an argument in standard form,
but for now it is important to recognize that there is never only one way of
correctly capturing the standard form of an argument. And the reason for this is
that there are multiple, equally good, ways of paraphrasing the premises and
conclusion of an argument.
1
How do we know that a paraphrase is accurate? Unfortunately, there is no simple way to
answer this question. The only answer is that you must rely on your mastery and understanding
of English in order to determine for yourself whether the paraphrase is a good one or not. This
is one of those kinds of skills that is difficult to teach, apart from just improving one’s mastery of
the English language.
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Chapter 1: Reconstructing and analyzing arguments
1.6. Validity
So far we have discussed what arguments are and how to determine their
structure, including how to reconstruct arguments in standard form. But we
have not yet discussed what makes an argument good or bad. The central
concept that you will learn in logic is the concept of validity. Validity relates to
how well the premises support the conclusion, and it is the golden standard that
every argument should aim for. A valid argument is an argument whose
conclusion cannot possibly be false, assuming that the premises are true.
Another way of putting this is as a conditional statement: A valid argument is an
argument in which if the premises are true, the conclusion must be true. Here is
an example of a valid argument:
1. Violet is a dog
2. Therefore, Violet is a mammal (from 1)
You might wonder whether it is true that Violet is a dog (maybe she’s a lizard or
a buffalo—we have no way of knowing from the information given). But, for the
purposes of validity, it doesn’t matter whether premise 1 is actually true or false.
All that matters for validity is whether the conclusion follows from the premise.
And we can see that the conclusion, Violet is a mammal, does seem to follow
from the premise, Violet is a dog. That is, given the truth of the premise, the
conclusion has to be true. This argument is clearly valid since if we assume that
“Violet is a dog” is true, then, since all dogs are mammals, it follows that “Violet
is a mammal” must also be true. As we’ve just seen, whether or not an
argument is valid has nothing to do with whether the premises of the argument
are actually true or not. We can illustrate this with another example, where the
premises are clearly false:
This is a valid argument. Why? Because when we assume the truth of the
premises (everyone born in France can speak French, Barack Obama was born in
France) the conclusion (Barack Obama can speak French) must be true. Notice
that this is so even though none of these statements is actually true. Not
everyone born in France can speak French (think about people who were born
there but then moved somewhere else where they didn’t speak French and
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never learned it) and Obama was not born in France, but it is also false that
Obama can speak French. So we have a valid argument even though neither
the premises nor the conclusion is actually true. That may sound strange, but if
you understand the concept of validity, it is not strange at all. Remember:
validity describes the relationship between the premises and conclusion, and it
means that the premises imply the conclusion, whether or not that conclusion is
true. In order to better understand the concept of validity, let’s look at an
example of an invalid argument:
This argument is invalid because it is possible for the premise to be true and yet
the conclusion false. Here is a counterexample to the argument. Gerald Ford
was President of the United States but he was never elected president, since
Ford Replaced Richard Nixon when Nixon resigned in the wake of the
Watergate scandal.2 So it doesn’t follow that just because someone is President
of the United States that they were elected President of the United States. In
other words, it is possible for the premise of the argument to be true and yet the
conclusion false. And this means that the argument is invalid. If an argument is
invalid it will always be possible to construct a counterexample to show that it is
invalid (as I have done with the Gerald Ford scenario). A counterexample is
simply a description of a scenario in which the premises of the argument are all
true while the conclusion of the argument is false. If you can construct a
counterexample to an argument, the argument is invalid.
2
As it happens, Ford wasn’t elected Vice President either since he was confirmed by the Senate,
under the twenty fifth amendment, after Spiro Agnew resigned. So Ford wasn’t ever elected by
the Electoral College—as either Vice President or President.
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Is this argument valid? You might think so since you might think that anyone
who did such a thing would surely die. But is it possible to not die in the
scenario described by the premise? If you think about it, you’ll realize that there
are lots of ways someone could survive. For example, maybe someone else who
was wearing a parachute jumped out of the plane after them, caught them and
attached the parachute-less person to them, and then pulled the ripcord and
they both landed on the ground safe and sound. Or maybe Joan was
performing a stunt and landed in a giant net that had been set up for that
purpose. Or maybe she was just one of those people who, although they did
fall to the ground, happened to survive (it has happened before). All of these
scenarios are consistent with the information in the first premise being true and
also consistent with the conclusion being false. Thus, again, any of these
counterexamples show that this argument is invalid. Notice that it is also
possible that the scenario described in the premises ends with Joan falling to
her death. But that doesn’t matter because all we want to know is whether it is
possible that she doesn’t. And if it is possible, what we have shown is that the
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conclusion does not logically follow from the premise alone. That is, the
conclusion doesn’t have to be true, even if we grant that the premise is. And
that means that the argument is not valid (i.e., it is invalid).
1. A person can be President of the United States only if they were born
in the United States.
2. Obama is President of the United States.
3. Kenya is not in the United States.
4. Therefore, Obama was not born in Kenya (from 1-3)
In order to apply the informal test of validity, we have to ask whether we can
imagine a scenario in which the premises are both true and yet the conclusion is
false. So, we have to imagine a scenario in which premises 1, 2, and 3 are true
and yet the conclusion (“Obama was not born in Kenya”) is false. Can you
imagine such a scenario? You cannot. The reason is that if you are imagining
that it is a) true that a person can be President of the United States only if they
were born in the United States, b) true that Obama is president and c) true that
Kenya is not in the U.S., then it must be true that Obama was not born in Kenya.
Thus we know that on the assumption of the truth of the premises, the
conclusion must be true. And that means the argument is valid. In this
example, however, premises 1, 2, and 3 are not only assumed to be true but are
actually true. However, as we have already seen, the validity of an argument
does not depend on its premises actually being true. Here is another example
of a valid argument to illustrate that point.
1. A person can be President of the United States only if they were born
in Kenya
2. Obama is President of the United States
3. Therefore, Obama was born in Kenya (from 1-2)
Clearly, the first premise of this argument is false. But if we were to imagine a
scenario in which it is true and in which premise 2 is also true, then the
conclusion (“Obama was born in Kenya”) must be true. And this means that the
argument is valid. We cannot imagine a scenario in which the premises of the
argument are true and yet the conclusion is false. The important point to
recognize here—a point I’ve been trying to reiterate throughout this section—is
that the validity of the argument does not depend on whether or not the
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premises (or conclusion) are actually true. Rather, validity depends only on the
logical relationship between the premises and the conclusion. The actual truth
of the premises is, of course, important to the quality of the argument, since if
the premises of the argument are false, then the argument doesn’t provide any
reason for accepting the conclusion. In the next section we will address this
topic.
1.7 Soundness
A good argument is not only valid, but also sound. Soundness is defined in
terms of validity, so since we have already defined validity, we can now rely on it
to define soundness. A sound argument is a valid argument that has all true
premises. That means that the conclusion of a sound argument will always be
true. Why? Because if an argument is valid, the premises transmit truth to the
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conclusion on the assumption of the truth of the premises. But if the premises
are actually true, as they are in a sound argument, then since all sound
arguments are valid, we know that the conclusion of a sound argument is true.
Compare the last two Obama examples from the previous section. While the
first argument was sound, the second argument was not sound, although it was
valid. The relationship between soundness and validity is easy to specify: all
sound arguments are valid arguments, but not all valid arguments are sound
arguments.
Although soundness is what any argument should aim for, we will not be talking
much about soundness in this book. The reason for this is that the only
difference between a valid argument and a sound argument is that a sound
argument has all true premises. But how do we determine whether the premises
of an argument are actually true? Well, there are lots of ways to do that,
including using Google to look up an answer, studying the relevant subjects in
school, consulting experts on the relevant topics, and so on. But none of these
activities have anything to do with logic, per se. The relevant disciplines to
consult if you want to know whether a particular statement is true is almost never
logic! For example, logic has nothing to say regarding whether or not protozoa
are animals or whether there are predators that aren’t in the animal kingdom. In
order to learn whether those statements are true, we’d have to consult biology,
not logic. Since this is a logic textbook, however, it is best to leave the question
of what is empirically true or false to the relevant disciplines that study those
topics. And that is why the issue of soundness, while crucial for any good
argument, is outside the purview of logic.
The concepts of validity and soundness that we have introduced apply only to
the class of what are called “deductive arguments”. A deductive argument is
an argument whose conclusion is supposed to follow from its premises with
absolute certainty, thus leaving no possibility that the conclusion doesn’t follow
from the premises. For a deductive argument to fail to do this is for it to fail as a
deductive argument. In contrast, an inductive argument is an argument whose
conclusion is supposed to follow from its premises with a high level of
probability, which means that although it is possible that the conclusion doesn’t
follow from its premises, it is unlikely that this is the case. Here is an example of
an inductive argument:
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Notice that the conclusion, Tweets probably flies, contains the word “probably.”
This is a clear indicator that the argument is supposed to be inductive, not
deductive. Here is the argument in standard form:
Given the information provided by the premises, the conclusion does seem to
be well supported. That is, the premises do give us a strong reason for
accepting the conclusion. This is true even though we can imagine a scenario in
which the premises are true and yet the conclusion is false. For example,
suppose that we added the following premise:
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This is a valid argument and since it is a valid argument, there are no further
premises that we could add that could overturn the argument’s validity. (True,
premise 2 is false, but as we’ve seen that is irrelevant to determining whether an
argument is valid.) Even if we were to add the premise that Tweets is 6 ft tall
and can run 30 mph, it doesn’t overturn the validity of the argument. As soon as
we use the universal generalization, “all healthy, normally function birds can
fly,” then when we assume that premise is true and add that Tweets is a healthy,
normally functioning bird, it has to follow from those premises that Tweets can
fly. This is true even if we add that Tweets is 6 ft tall because then what we have
to imagine (in applying our informal test of validity) is a world in which all birds,
including those that are 6 ft tall and can run 30 mph, can fly.
Quite often, an argument will not explicitly state a premise that we can see is
needed in order for the argument to be valid. In such a case, we can supply the
premise(s) needed in order so make the argument valid. Making missing
premises explicit is a central part of reconstructing arguments in standard form.
We have already dealt in part with this in the section on paraphrasing, but now
that we have introduced the concept of validity, we have a useful tool for
knowing when to supply missing premises in our reconstruction of an argument.
In some cases, the missing premise will be fairly obvious, as in the following:
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However, as stated, the argument is invalid. (Before reading on, see if you can
provide a counterexample for this argument. That is, come up with an imaginary
scenario in which the premise is true and yet the conclusion is false.) Here is just
one counterexample (there could be many): Gary is a convicted sex-offender but
the country in which he lives does not restrict convicted sex-offenders from
working with children. I don’t know whether there are any such countries,
although I suspect there are (and it doesn’t matter for the purpose of validity
whether there are or aren’t). In any case, it seems clear that this argument is
relying upon a premise that isn’t explicitly stated. We can and should state that
premise explicitly in our reconstruction of the standard form argument. But
what is the argument’s missing premise? The obvious one is that no sex-
offenders are allowed to work with children, but we could also use a weaker
statement like this one:
This argument is now valid: there is no way for the conclusion to be false,
assuming the truth of the premises. This was a fairly simple example where the
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missing premise needed to make the argument valid was relatively easy to see.
As we can see from this example, a missing premise is a premise that the
argument needs in order to be as strong as possible. Typically, this means
supplying the statement(s) that are needed to make the argument valid. But in
addition to making the argument valid, we want to make the argument
plausible. This is called “the principle of charity.” The principle of charity
states that when reconstructing an argument, you should try to make that
argument (whether inductive or deductive) as strong as possible. When it
comes to supplying missing premises, this means supplying the most plausible
premises needed in order to make the argument either valid (for deductive
arguments) or inductively strong (for inductive arguments).
Although in the last example figuring out the missing premise was relatively easy
to do, it is not always so easy. Here is an argument whose missing premises are
not as easy to determine:
Since children who are raised by gay couples often have psychological
and emotional problems, the state should discourage gay couples from
raising children.
The conclusion of this argument, that the state should not allow gay marriage, is
apparently supported by a single premise, which should be recognizable from
the occurrence of the premise indicator, “since.” Thus, our initial reconstruction
of the standard form argument looks like this:
1. Children who are raised by gay couples often have psychological and
emotional problems.
2. Therefore, the state should discourage gay couples from raising
children.
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Notice that this is a normative statement, which is indicated by the use of the
word “should.” There are many other words that can be used to capture
normative statements such as: good, bad, and ought. Thus, we can reconstruct
the argument, filling in the missing normative premise like this:
1. Children who are raised by gay couples often have psychological and
emotional problems.
2. The state should always do what it can to decrease harm to children.
3. Therefore, the state should discourage gay couples from raising
children. (from 1-2)
However, although the argument is now in better shape, it is still invalid because
it is still possible for the premises to be true and yet the conclusion false. In
order to show this, we just have to imagine a scenario in which both the
premises are true and yet the conclusion is false. Here is one counterexample to
the argument (there are many). Suppose that while it is true that children of gay
couples often have psychological and emotional problems, the rate of
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Thus, one way of making the argument (at least closer to) valid would be to add
the following two missing premises:
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1. Children who are raised by gay couples often have psychological and
emotional problems.
2. The rate of psychological problems in children of gay couples is
higher than in children of heterosexual couples.
3. The higher incidence of psychological problems in children of gay
couples is not due to any kind of injustice in society, but to the fact
that the parents are gay.
4. The state should always do what it can to decrease harm to children.
5. Therefore, the state should discourage gay couples from raising
children. (from 1-4)
In this argument, premises 2-4 are the missing or assumed premises. Their
addition makes the argument much stronger, but making them explicit enables
us to clearly see what assumptions the argument relies on in order for the
argument to be valid. This is useful since we can now clearly see which premises
of the argument we may challenge as false. Arguably, premise 4 is false, since
the state shouldn’t always do what it can to decrease harm to children. Rather,
it should only do so as long as such an action didn’t violate other rights that the
state has to protect or create larger harms elsewhere.
The important lesson from this example is that supplying the missing premises
of an argument is not always a simple matter. In the example above, I have
used the principle of charity to supply missing premises. Mastering this skill is
truly an art (rather than a science) since there is never just one correct way of
doing it (cf. section 1.5) and because it requires a lot of skilled practice.
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6. The watch must be broken because every time I have looked at it, the
hands have been in the same place.
7. Olaf drank too much Guinness and fell out of his second story
apartment window. Therefore, drinking too much Guinness caused
Olaf to injure himself.
8. Mark jumped into the air. Therefore, Mark landed back on the
ground.
9. In 2009 in the United States, the net worth of the median white
household was $113,149 a year, whereas the net worth of the median
black household was $5,677. Therefore, as of 2009, the United States
was still a racist nation.
10. The temperature of the water is 212 degrees Fahrenheit. Therefore,
the water is boiling.
11. Capital punishment sometimes takes innocent lives, such as the lives
of individuals who were later found to be not guilty. Therefore, we
should not allow capital punishment.
12. Allowing immigrants to migrate to the U.S. will take working class jobs
away from working class folks. Therefore, we should not allow
immigrants to migrate to the U.S.
13. Prostitution is a fair economic exchange between two consenting
adults. Therefore, prostitution should be allowed.
14. Colleges are more interested in making money off of their football
athletes than in educating them. Therefore, college football ought to
be banned.
15. Edward received an F in college Algebra. Therefore, Edward should
have studied more.
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Assuring: informing someone that there are further reasons although one
is not giving them now
We will discuss these in order, starting with assuring. Why would we want to
assure our audience? Presumably when we make a claim that isn’t obvious and
that the audience may not be inclined to believe. For example, if I am trying to
convince you that the United States is one of the leading producers of CO2
emissions, then I might cite certain authorities such as the Intergovernmental
Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) as saying so. This is one way of assuring our
audience: by citing authorities. There are many ways to cite authorities, some
examples of which are these:
3
This characterization and discussion draws heavily on chapter 3, pp. 48-53 of Sinnott-
Armstrong and Fogelin’s Understanding Arguments, 9th edition (Cengage Learning).
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Yet another way of assuring one’s audience is to make an audience member feel
that it would be stupid, odd, or strange to deny the claim one is making. One
common way to do this is by implying that every sensible person would agree
with the claim. Here are some examples:
Another common way of doing this is by implying that no sensible person would
agree with a claim that we are trying to establish as false:
Assurances are not necessarily illegitimate, since the person may be right and
may in fact have good arguments to back up the claims, but the assurances are
not themselves arguments and a critical thinker will always regard them as
somewhat suspect. This is especially so when the claim isn’t obviously true.
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The weakest of these claims is E, whereas the strongest is A and each claims
descending from A-E is increasingly weaker. It doesn’t take very much for E to
be true: there just has to be at least one U.S. President who was monogamous.
In contrast, A is much less likely than E to be true because it require every U.S.
President to have been monogamous. One way of thinking about this is that
any time A is true, it is also true that B-E is true, but B-E could be true without A
being true. That is what it means for a claim to be stronger or weaker. A weak
claim is more likely to be true whereas a strong claim is less likely to be true. E
is much more likely to be true than A. Likewise, D is somewhat more likely to be
true than C, and so on.
So, guarding involves taking a stronger claim and making it weaker so there is
less room to object to the claim. We can also guard a claim by introducing a
probability clause such as, “it is possible that…” and “it is arguable that…” or
by reducing our level of commitment to the claim, such as moving from “I know
that x” to “I believe that x.” One common use of guarding is in reconstructing
arguments with missing premises using the principle of charity (section 1.9). For
example, if an argument is that “Tom works for Merrill Lynch, so Tom has a
college degree,” the most charitable reconstruction of this argument would fill
in the missing premise with “most people who work for Merrill Lynch have
college degrees” rather than “everyone who works for Merrill Lynch has a
college degree.” Here we have created a more charitable (plausible) premise
by weakening the claim from “all” to “most,” which as we have seen is a kind of
guarding.
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1. Although drilling for oil in Alaska will disrupt some wildlife, it is better
than having to depend on foreign oil, which has the tendency to draw
us into foreign conflicts that we would otherwise not be involved in.
2. Let there be no doubt: the entity that carried out this attack is a known
terrorist organization, whose attacks have a characteristic style—a style
that is seen in this attack today.
3. Privatizing the water utilities in Detroit was an unprecedented move
that has garnered a lot of criticism. Nonetheless, it is helping Detroit
to recover from bankruptcy.
4. Most pediatricians agree that the single most important factor in
childhood obesity is eating sugary, processed foods, which have
become all too common in our day and age.
5. Although not every case of AIDS is caused by HIV, it is arguable that
most are.
6. Abraham Lincoln was probably our greatest president since he helped
keep together a nation on the brink of splintering into two.
7. No one with any sense would support Obamacare.
8. Even if universal healthcare is expensive, it is still the just thing to do.
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Bob is tall.
Bob is good.
“Tall” is a descriptive term since being tall is, in itself, neither a good nor bad
thing. Rather, it is a purely descriptive term that does not pass any sort of
judgment, positive or negative, on the fact that Bob is tall. In contrast, “good”
is a purely evaluative term, which means that the only thing the word does is
make an evaluation (in this case, a positive evaluation) and doesn’t carry any
descriptive content. “Good,” “bad,” “right,” and “wrong” are examples of
purely evaluative terms. The interesting kinds of terms are those that are both
descriptive and evaluative. For example:
Bob is nosy.
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Notice that while the phrase “very curious about other people’s affairs” does
capture the descriptive sense of “nosy,” it doesn’t capture the evaluative sense
of nosy, since it doesn’t carry with it the negative connotation that “nosy” does.
Bob is a rebel.
John is honest.
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I have asserted that Jane could pass the course. But I have also presupposed
that Jane is not a very good student (or not very smart) by using the word
“even.” If I were to say “nuh-uh,” this would naturally be taken as rejecting the
claim that Jane could pass (i.e., I would be saying that she couldn’t pass). And if
I were to agree, I would naturally be taken as agreeing that she could pass. But
notice that there isn’t any simply yes/no way to disagree with the presupposition
that Jane isn’t a smart/good student. Since presuppositions are more difficult
to challenge, they can end up influencing what people in the conversation are
taking for granted and in this way presupposition can influence what people
accept as true without any argument or evidence. Of course, a person could
explicitly challenge the implicit presupposition that Jane isn’t smart or a good
student, but that takes extra effort and many times people don’t realize that a
presupposition has just slipped into a conversation.
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The rhetorical devices surveyed in the last two sections may be effective ways of
persuading people, but they are not the same thing as offering an argument.
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And if we attempt to see them as arguments, they turn out to be pretty poor
arguments. One of the many things that psychologists study is how we are
persuaded to believe or do things. As an empirical science, psychology
attempts to describe and explain the way things are, in this case, the processes
that lead us to believe or act as we do. Logic, in contrast, is not an empirical
science. Logic is not trying to tell us how we do think, but what good thinking is
and, thus, how we ought think. The study of logic is the study of the nature of
arguments and, importantly, of what distinguishes a good argument from a bad
one. “Good” and “bad” are what philosophers call normative concepts
because they involve standards of evaluation.5 Since logic concerns what makes
something a good argument, logic is sometimes referred to as a normative
science. They key standard of evaluation of arguments that we have seen so far
is that of validity. In chapter 2 we will consider some more precise, formal
methods of understanding validity. Other “normative sciences” include ethics
(the study of what a good life is and how we ought to live) and epistemology
(the study of what we have good reason to believe).
I. My fellow Americans, tonight I want to talk to you about Syria, why it matters and
where we go from here. Over the past two years, what began as a series of peaceful
protests against the repressive regime of Bashar al-Assad has turned into a brutal civil
war. Over a hundred thousand people have been killed. Millions have fled the country.
In that time, America has worked with allies to provide humanitarian support, to help the
moderate opposition and to shape a political settlement.
5
We encountered normative concepts when discussing normative statements in section 1.9.
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II. But I have resisted calls for military action because we cannot resolve someone else's
civil war through force, particularly after a decade of war in Iraq and Afghanistan.
III. The situation profoundly changed, though, on Aug. 21st, when Assad's government
gassed to death over a thousand people, including hundreds of children. The images
from this massacre are sickening, men, women, children lying in rows, killed by poison
gas, others foaming at the mouth, gasping for breath, a father clutching his dead
children, imploring them to get up and walk. On that terrible night, the world saw in
gruesome detail the terrible nature of chemical weapons and why the overwhelming
majority of humanity has declared them off limits, a crime against humanity and a
violation of the laws of war.
IV. This was not always the case. In World War I, American GIs were among the many
thousands killed by deadly gas in the trenches of Europe. In World War II, the Nazis
used gas to inflict the horror of the Holocaust. Because these weapons can kill on a mass
scale, with no distinction between soldier and infant, the civilized world has spent a
century working to ban them. And in 1997, the United States Senate overwhelmingly
approved an international agreement prohibiting the use of chemical weapons, now
joined by 189 governments that represent 98 percent of humanity.
V. On Aug. 21st, these basic rules were violated, along with our sense of common
humanity.
VI. No one disputes that chemical weapons were used in Syria. The world saw thousands
of videos, cellphone pictures and social media accounts from the attack. And
humanitarian organizations told stories of hospitals packed with people who had
symptoms of poison gas.
VII. Moreover, we know the Assad regime was responsible. In the days leading up to
Aug. 21st, we know that Assad's chemical weapons personnel prepared for an attack
near an area where they mix sarin gas. They distributed gas masks to their troops. Then
they fired rockets from a regime-controlled area into 11 neighborhoods that the regime
has been trying to wipe clear of opposition forces.
VIII. Shortly after those rockets landed, the gas spread, and hospitals filled with the
dying and the wounded. We know senior figures in Assad's military machine reviewed
the results of the attack. And the regime increased their shelling of the same
neighborhoods in the days that followed. We've also studied samples of blood and hair
from people at the site that tested positive for sarin.
IX. When dictators commit atrocities, they depend upon the world to look the other way
until those horrifying pictures fade from memory. But these things happened. The facts
cannot be denied.
X. The question now is what the United States of America and the international
community is prepared to do about it, because what happened to those people, to
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those children, is not only a violation of international law, it's also a danger to our
security.
XI. Let me explain why. If we fail to act, the Assad regime will see no reason to stop
using chemical weapons.
XII. As the ban against these weapons erodes, other tyrants will have no reason to think
twice about acquiring poison gas and using them. Over time our troops would again
face the prospect of chemical warfare on the battlefield, and it could be easier for
terrorist organizations to obtain these weapons and to use them to attack civilians.
XIII. If fighting spills beyond Syria's borders, these weapons could threaten allies like
Turkey, Jordan and Israel.
XIV. And a failure to stand against the use of chemical weapons would weaken
prohibitions against other weapons of mass destruction and embolden Assad's ally, Iran,
which must decide whether to ignore international law by building a nuclear weapon or
to take a more peaceful path.
XV. This is not a world we should accept. This is what's at stake. And that is why, after
careful deliberation, I determined that it is in the national security interests of the United
States to respond to the Assad regime's use of chemical weapons through a targeted
military strike. The purpose of this strike would be to deter Assad from using chemical
weapons, to degrade his regime's ability to use them and to make clear to the world
that we will not tolerate their use. That's my judgment as commander in chief.
The first question to ask yourself is: What is the main point or conclusion of this
speech? What conclusion is Obama trying to argue for? This is no simple
question and in fact requires a good level of reading comprehension in order to
answer it correctly. One of the things to look for is conclusion or premise
indicators (section 1.2). There are numerous conclusion indicators in the speech,
which is why you cannot simply mindlessly look for them and then assume the
first one you find is the conclusion. Rather, you must rely on your
comprehension of the speech to truly find the main conclusion. If you carefully
read the speech, it is clear that Obama is trying to convince the American public
of the necessity of taking military action against the Assad regime in Syria. So
the conclusion is going to have to have something to do with that. One clear
statement of what looks like a main conclusion comes in paragraph 15 where
Obama says:
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The phrase, “that is why,” is a conclusion indicator which introduces the main
conclusion. Here is my paraphrase of that conclusion:
Before Obama argues for this main conclusion, however, he gives an argument
for the claim that Assad did use chemical weapons on his own civilians. This is
what is happening in paragraphs 1-9 of the speech. The reasons he gives for
how we know that Assad used chemical weapons include:
These premises do indeed provide support for the conclusion that Assad used
chemical weapons on civilians, but it is probably best to see this argument as a
strong inductive argument, rather than a deductive argument. The evidence
strongly supports, but does not compel, the conclusion that Assad was
responsible. For example, even if all these facts were true, it could be that some
other entity was trying to set Assad up. Thus, this first subargument should be
taken as a strong inductive argument (assuming the premises are true, of
course), since the truth of the premises would increase the probability that the
conclusion is true, but not make the conclusion absolutely certain.
Although Obama does give an argument for the claim that Assad carried out
chemical weapon attacks on civilians, that is simply an assumption of the main
argument. Moreover, although the conclusion of the main argument is the one I
have indicated above, I think there is another, intermediate conclusion that
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Chapter 1: Reconstructing and analyzing arguments
Obama argues for more directly and that is that if we don’t respond to Assad’s
use of chemical weapons, then our own national security will be put at risk. We
can clearly see this conclusion stated in paragraph 10. Moreover, the very next
phrase in paragraph 11 is a premise indicator, “let me explain why.” Obama
goes on to offer reasons for why failing to respond to Assad’s use of chemical
weapons would be a danger to our national security. Thus, the conclusion
Obama argues more directly for is:
So, if that is the conclusion that Obama argues for most directly, what are the
premises that support it? Obama gives several in paragraphs 11-14:
I have tried to make explicit each step of the reasoning, much of which Obama
makes explicit himself (e.g., premises A-D). The main threats to national security
that failing to respond to Assad would engender, according to Obama, are that
U.S. troops and U.S. allies could be put in danger of facing chemical weapons
and that Iran would be emboldened to develop a nuclear program. There is a
missing premise that is being relied upon for these premises to validly imply the
conclusion. Here is a hint as to what that missing premise is: Are all of these
things truly a threat to national security? For example, how is Iran having a
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We can also make explicit within the standard form argument other intermediate
conclusions that follow from the stated premises. Although we don’t have to do
this, it can be a helpful thing to do when an argument contains multiple
premises. For example, we could explicitly state the conclusion that follows
from the four conditional statements that are the first four premises:
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Chapter 1: Reconstructing and analyzing arguments
As always, in this standard form argument I’ve listed in parentheses after the
relevant statements which statements those statements follow from. The only
thing now missing is how we get from this intermediate conclusion to what I
earlier called the main conclusion. The main conclusion (i.e., that it is in national
security interests to respond to Assad with military force) might be thought to
follow directly. But it doesn’t. It seems that Obama is relying on yet another
unstated assumption. Consider: even if it is true that we should respond to a
threat to our national security, it doesn’t follow that we should respond with
military force. For example, maybe we could respond with certain kinds of
economic sanctions that would force the country to submit to our will.
Furthermore, maybe there are some security threats such that responding to
them with military force would only create further, and worse, security threats.
Presumably we wouldn’t want our response to a security threat to create even
bigger security threats. For these reasons, we can see that Obama’s argument,
if it is to be valid, also relies on missing premises such as these:
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Chapter 1: Reconstructing and analyzing arguments
Missing premise 2: The only way that the United States can adequately
respond to the security threat that Assad poses is by military force.
These are big assumptions and they may very well turn out to be mistaken.
Nevertheless, it is important to see that the main conclusion Obama argues for
depends on these missing premises—premises that he never explicitly states in
his argument. So here is the final, reconstructed argument in standard form. I
have italicized each missing premise or intermediate conclusion that I have
added but that wasn’t explicitly stated in Obama’s argument.
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Chapter 1: Reconstructing and analyzing arguments
12. The only way that the United States can adequately respond to the
security threat that Assad poses is by military force.
13. It is in the national security interests of the United States to respond
adequately to any national security threat.
14. Therefore, it is in the national security interests of the United States to
respond to Assad’s use of chemical weapons with military force. (from
11-13)
This is just another way of representing what I have already represented in the
standard form argument, using parentheses to describe the structure. As is
perhaps even clearer in the spatial representation of the argument’s structure,
this argument is complex in that it has numerous subarguments. So while
statement 11 is a premise of the main argument for the main conclusion
(statement 14), statement 11 is also itself a conclusion of a subargument whose
premises are statements 5, 6, 9, and 10. And although statement 9 is a premise
in that argument, it itself is a conclusion of yet another subargument whose
premises are statements 1, 7 and 8. Almost any interesting argument will be
complex in this way, with further subarguments in support of the premises of the
main argument.
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This chapter has provided you the tools to be able to reconstruct arguments like
these. As we have seen, there is much to consider in reconstructing a complex
argument. As with any skill, a true mastery of it requires lots of practice. In
many ways, this is a skill that is more like an art than a science. The next chapter
will introduce you to some basic formal logic, which is perhaps more like a
science than an art.
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Chapter 2: Formal methods of evaluating arguments
2.1 What are formal methods of evaluation and why do we need them?
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Chapter 2: Formal methods of evaluating arguments
introduced the formal methods, you will understand what it means to evaluate
an argument without knowing what the statements of the argument mean. By
the end of this chapter, if not before, you will understand what it means to
evaluate an argument by its form, rather than its content.
It is sunny today.
It is warm today.
These two statements are conjoined with an “and.” So the conjunction is really
two statements that are conjoined by the “and.” Thus, if I have told you that it
is both sunny and warm today, it follows logically that it is sunny today. Here is
that simple argument in standard form:
This is a valid inference that passes the informal test of validity. But we can also
see that the form of the inference is perfectly general because it would work
equally well for any conjunction, not just this one. This inference has a particular
form that we could state using placeholders for the statements, “it is sunny
today” and “it is warm today”:
1. A and B
2. Therefore, A
We can see that any argument that had this form would be a valid argument.
For example, consider the statement:
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Regardless of whether you know what the statements in the first premise mean,
we can still see that the inference is valid because the inference has the same
form that I just pointed out above. Thus, you may not know what “Kant” is (one
of the most famous German philosophers of the Enlightenment) or what a
“deontologist” or “Pietist” is, but you can still see that since these are
statements that form a conjunction, and since the inference made has a
particular form that is valid, this particular inference is valid. That is what it
means for an argument to be valid in virtue of its form. In the next section we
will delve into formal logic, which will involve learning a certain kind of
language. Don’t worry: it won’t be as hard as your French or Spanish class.
2.2 Propositional logic and the four basic truth functional connectives
Propositional logic (also called “sentential logic”) is the area of formal logic that
deals with the logical relationships between propositions. A proposition is
simply what I called in section 1.1 a statement.1 Some examples of propositions
are:
Snow is white
Snow is cold
Tom is an astronaut
1 Some philosophers would claim that a proposition is not the same as a statement, but the
reasons for doing so are not relevant to what we’ll be doing in this chapter. Thus, for our
purposes, we can treat a proposition as the same thing as a statement.
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We can also connect propositions together using certain English words, such as
“and” like this:
The floor has been mopped and the dishes have been washed.
p and q
Any conjunction has this same form. For example, the complex proposition, “it
is sunny and hot today,” has this same form which we can see by writing the
conjunction this way:
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Chapter 2: Formal methods of evaluating arguments
Although we could write the conjunction that way, it is more natural in English to
conjoin the adjectives “sunny” and “hot” to get “it is sunny and hot today.”
Nevertheless, these two sentences mean the same thing (it’s just that one
sounds more natural in English than the other). In any case, we can see that “it
is sunny today” is the proposition in the “p” place of the form of the
conjunction, whereas “it is hot today” is the proposition in the “q” place of the
form of the conjunction. As before, this conjunction is true only if both conjuncts
are true. For example, suppose that it is a sunny but bitterly cold winter’s day.
In that case, while it is true that it is sunny today, it is false that it is hot today—in
which case the conjunction is false. If someone were to assert that it is sunny
and hot today in those circumstances, you would tell them that isn’t true.
Conversely, if it were a cloudy but hot and humid summer’s day, the conjunction
would still be false. The only way the statement would be true is if both
conjuncts were true.
In the formal language that we are developing in this chapter, we will represent
conjunctions using a symbol called the “dot,” which looks like this: “⋅” Using
this symbol, here is how we will represent a conjunction in symbolic notation:
p⋅q
p q p⋅q
T T T
T F F
F T F
F F F
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Chapter 2: Formal methods of evaluating arguments
Here is how to understand this truth table. The header row lists the atomic
propositions, p and q, that the conjunction is composed of, as well as the
conjunction itself, p ⋅ q. Each of the following four rows represents a possible
scenario regarding the truth of each conjunct, and there are only four possible
scenarios: either p and q could both be true (as in row 1), p and q could both be
false (as in row 4), p could be true while q is false (row 2), or p could be false
while q is true (row 3). The final column (the truth values under the conjunction,
p ⋅ q) represents how the truth value of the conjunction depends on the truth
value of each conjunct (p and q). As we have seen, a conjunction is true if and
only if both conjuncts are true. This is what the truth table represents. Since
there is only one row (one possible scenario) in which both p and q are true (i.e.,
row 1), that is the only circumstance in which the conjunction is true. Since in
every other row at least one of the conjuncts is false, the conjunction is false in
the remaining three scenarios.
At this point, some students will start to lose a handle on what we are doing with
truth tables. Often, this is because one thinks the concept is much more
complicated than it actually is. (For some, this may stem, in part, from a math
phobia that is triggered by the use of symbolic notation.) But a truth table is
actually a very simple idea: it is simply a representation of the meaning of a
truth-functional operator. When I say that a conjunction is true only if both
conjuncts are true, that is just what the table is representing. There is nothing
more to it than that. (Later on in this chapter we will use truth tables to prove
whether an argument is valid or invalid. Understanding that will require more
subtlety, but what I have so far introduced is not complicated at all.)
There is more than one way to represent conjunctions in English besides the
English word “and.” Below are some common English words and phrases that
commonly function as truth-functional conjunctions.
It is important to point out that many times English conjunctions carry more
information than simply that the two propositions are true (which is the only
information carried by our symbolic connective, the dot). We can see this with
English conjunctions like “but” and “however” which have a contrastive sense.
If I were to say, “Bob voted, but Caroline didn’t,” then I am contrasting what
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There is clearly a temporal implication that Bob brushed his teeth first and then
got into bed. It might sound strange to say:
since this would seem to imply that Bob brushed his teeth while in bed. But
each of these conjunctions would be represented in the same way by our dot
connective, since the dot connective does not care about the temporal aspects
of things. If we were to represent “Bob got into bed” with the capital letter A
and “Bob brushed his teeth” with the capital letter B, then both of these
propositions would be represented exactly the same, namely, like this:
A⋅B
Both of these are conjunctions that are represented in the same way. You
should see that both of them have the form, p ⋅ q.
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Chapter 2: Formal methods of evaluating arguments
Maya is married
Alice is married
But that cannot be right since the fact that Maya is married and that Alice is
married is not the same as saying that Maya and Alice are married to each other,
which is clearly the implication of the original sentence. Furthermore, if you
tried to add “to each other” to each proposition, it would no longer make
sense:
Perhaps we could say that the two conjuncts are “Maya is married to Alice” and
“Alice is married to Maya,” but the truth values of those two conjuncts are not
independent of each other since if Maya is married to Alice it must also be true
that Alice is married to Maya. In contrast, the following is an example of a truth-
functional conjunction:
Unlike the previous example, in this case we can clearly identify two propositions
whose truth values are independent of each other:
Maya is a woman
Alice is a woman
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Chapter 2: Formal methods of evaluating arguments
But another way of adding the negation is with the phrase, “it is not the case
that” like this:
There are many different ways of expressing negations in English. Here are a
few ways of expressing the previous proposition in different ways in English:
Each of these English sentences express the same true proposition, which is
simply the negation of the atomic proposition, “Cincinnati is the capital of
Ohio.” Since that statement is false, its negation is true.
There is one respect in which negation differs from the other three truth-
functional connectives that we will introduce in this chapter. Unlike the other
three, negation does not connect two different propositions. Nonetheless, we
call it a truth-functional connective because although it doesn’t actually connect
two different propositions, it does change the truth value of propositions in a
truth-functional way. That is, if we know the truth value of the proposition we
are negating, then we know the truth value of the resulting negated proposition.
We can represent this information in the truth table for negation. In the
following table, the symbol we will use to represent negation is called the
“tilde” (~). (You can find the tilde on the upper left-hand side of your keyboard.)
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Chapter 2: Formal methods of evaluating arguments
p ~p
T F
F T
As we have seen, it is easy to form sentences in our symbolic language using the
tilde. All we have to do is add a tilde to left-hand side of an existing sentence.
For example, we could represent the statement “Cincinnati is the capital of
Ohio” using the capital letter C, which is called a constant. In propositional
logic, a constant is a capital letter that represents an atomic proposition. In that
case, we could represent the statement “Cincinnati is not the capital of Ohio”
like this:
~C
~T
~C ⋅ ~T
Can you figure out what this complex proposition says? (Think about it; you
should be able to figure it out given your understanding of the truth-functional
connectives, negation and conjunction.) The propositions says (literally):
“Cincinnati is not the capital of Ohio and Toledo is not the capital of Ohio.” In
later sections we will learn how to form complex propositions using various
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The English word that most commonly functions as disjunction is the word “or.”
It is also common that the “or” is preceded by an “either” earlier in the
sentence, like this:
What this sentence asserts is that one or the other (and possibly both) of these
individuals tracked mud through the house. Thus, it is composed out of the
following two atomic propositions:
If the fact is that Charlie tracked mud through the house, the statement is true.
If the fact is that Violet tracked mud through the house, the statement is also
true. This statement is only false if in fact neither Charlie nor Violet tracked mud
through the house. This statement would also be true even if it was both Charlie
and Violet who tracked mud through the house. Another example of a
disjunction that has this same pattern can be seen in the “click it or ticket”
campaign of the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration. Think about
what the slogan means. What the campaign slogan is saying is:
This is a kind of warning: buckle your seatbelt or you’ll get a ticket. Think about
the conditions under which this statement would be true. There are only four
different scenarios:
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p q pvq
T T T
T F T
F T T
F F F
As before, the header of this truth table represents two propositions (first two
columns) and their disjunction (last column). The following four rows represent
the conditions under which the disjunction is true. As we have seen, the
disjunction is true when at least one of its disjuncts is true, including when they
are both true (the first three rows). A disjunction is false only if both disjuncts are
false (last row).
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As we have defined it, the wedge (v) is what is called an “inclusive or.” An
inclusive or is a disjunction that is true even when both disjuncts are true.
However, sometimes a disjunction clearly implies that the statement is true only
if either one or the other of the disjuncts is true, but not both. For example,
suppose that you know that Bob placed either first or second in the race
because you remember seeing a picture of him in the paper where he was
standing on a podium (and you know that only the top two runners in the race
get to stand on the podium). Although you can’t remember which place he was,
you know that:
Bob placed first in the race or Bob placed second in the race.
That sentence makes explicit the fact that this statement is a disjunction of two
separate statements. However, it is also clear that in this case the disjunction
would not be true if all the disjuncts were true, because it is not possible for all
the disjuncts to be true, since Bob cannot have placed both first and second.
Thus, it is clear in a case such as this, that the “or” is meant as what is called an
“exclusive or.” An exclusive or is a disjunction that is true only if one or the
other, but not both, of its disjuncts is true. When you believe the best
interpretation of a disjunction is as an exclusive or, there are ways to represent
that using a combination of the disjunction, conjunction and negation. The
reason we interpret the wedge as an inclusive or rather than an exclusive or is
that while we can build an exclusive or out of a combination of an inclusive or
and other truth-functional connectives (as I’ve just pointed out), there is no way
to build an inclusive or out of the exclusive or and other truth-functional
connectives. We will see how to represent an exclusive or in section 2.5.
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1. Either Bob will mop or Tom will mop. (B = Bob will mop; T = Tom will
mop)
2. It is not sunny today. (S = it is sunny today)
3. It is not the case that Bob is a burglar. (B = Bob is a burglar)
4. Harry is arriving either tonight or tomorrow night. (A = Harry is
arriving tonight; B = Harry is arriving tomorrow night)
5. Gareth does not like his name. (G = Gareth likes his name)
6. Either it will not rain on Monday or it will not rain on Tuesday. (M = It
will rain on Monday; T = It will rain on Tuesday)
7. Tom does not like cheesecake. (T = Tom likes cheesecake)
8. Bob would like to have both a large cat and a small dog as a pet. (C =
Bob would like to have a large cat as a pet; D = Bob would like to
have a small dog as a pet)
9. Bob Saget is not actually very funny. (B = Bob Saget is very funny)
10. Albert Einstein did not believe in God. (A = Albert Einstein believed
in God)
We have seen how to translate certain simple sentences into our symbolic
language using the dot, wedge, and tilde. The process of translation starts with
determining what the atomic propositions of the sentence are and then using
the truth functional connectives to form the compound proposition. Sometimes
this will be fairly straightforward and easy to figure out—especially if there is
only one truth-functional operator used in the English sentence. However, many
sentences will contain more than one truth-functional operator. Here is an
example:
What are the atomic propositions contained in this English sentence? Clearly,
the sentence is asserting two things:
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I will use the constant C to represent this atomic proposition and G to represent
the proposition, “Bob will play video games.” Now that we have identified our
two atomic propositions, how can we build our complex sentence using only
those atomic propositions and the truth-functional connectives? Let’s start with
the statement “Bob will not go to class.” Since we have defined the constant
“C” as “Bob will go to class” then we can easily represent the statement “Bob
will not go to class” using a negation, like this:
~C
The original sentence asserts that, but it is also asserts that Bob will play video
games. That is, it is asserting both of these statements. That means we will be
connecting “~C” with “G” with the dot operator. Since we have already
assigned “G” to the statement “Bob will play video games,” the resulting
translation should look like this:
~C ⋅ G
Notice that whereas the earlier sentence asserted that Bob will not go to class,
this sentence does not. Rather, it asserts that Bob will not do both things (i.e.,
go to class and play video games), but only one or the other (and possibly
neither). That is, this sentence does not tell us for sure that Bob will/won’t go to
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class or that he will/won’t play video games, but only that he won’t do both of
these things. Using the same translations as before, how would we translate this
sentence? It should be clear that we cannot use the same translation as before
since these two sentences are not saying the same thing. Thus, we cannot use
the translation:
~C ⋅ G
since that translation says for sure that Bob will not go to class and that he will
play video games. Thus, our translation must be different. Here is how to
translate the sentence:
~(C ⋅ G)
I have here introduced some new symbols, the parentheses. Parentheses are
using in formal logic to show groupings. In this case, the parentheses represent
that the conjunction, “C ⋅ G,” is grouped together and the negation ranges
over that whole conjunction rather than just the first conjuct (as was the case
with the previous translation). When using multiple operators, you must learn to
distinguish which operator is the main operator. The main operator of a
sentence is the one that ranges over (influences) the whole sentence. In this
case, the main operator is the negation, since it influences the truth value of all
the rest of the sentence. In contrast, in the previous example (~C ⋅ G), the main
operator was the conjunction rather than the negation since it influences both
parts of sentence (i.e., both the “~C” and the “G”). We can see the need for
parentheses in distinguishing these two different translations. Without the use
of parentheses, we would have no way to distinguish these two sentences, which
clearly have different meanings.
Noelle will either feed the dogs or clean her room, but she will not do the
dishes.
Can you tell how many atomic propositions this sentence contains? It contains
three atomic propositions which are:
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Chapter 2: Formal methods of evaluating arguments
What I’ve written in parentheses to the right of the statement is the constant that
I’ll use to represent these atomic statements in my symbolic translation. Notice
that the sentence is definitely not asserting that each of these statements is true.
Rather, what we have to do is use these atomic propositions to capture the
meaning of the original English sentence using only our truth-functional
operators. In this sentence we will actually use all three truth-functional
operators (disjunction, conjunction, negation). Let’s start with negation, as that
one is relatively easy. Given how we have represented the atomic proposition,
D, to say that Noelle will not do the dishes is simply the negation of D:
~D
Now consider the first part of the sentence: Noelle will either feed the dogs or
clean her room. You should see the “either…or” there and recognize it as a
disjunction, which we represent with the wedge, like this:
FvC
Now, how are these two compound propositions, “~D” and “F v C” themselves
connected? There is one word in the sentence that tips you off—the “but.” As
we saw earlier, “but” is a common way of representing a conjunction in English.
Thus, we have to conjoin the disjunction (F v C) and the negation (~D). You
might think that we could simply conjoin the two propositions like this:
F v C ⋅ ~D
However, that translation would not be correct, because it is not what we call a
well-formed formula. A well-formed formula is a sentence in our symbolic
language that has exactly one interpretation or meaning. However, the
translation we have given is ambiguous between two different meanings. It
could mean that (Noelle will feed the dogs) or (Noelle will clean her room and
not do the dishes). That statement would be true if Noelle fed the dogs and
also did the dishes. We can represent this possibility symbolically, using
parentheses like this:
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Chapter 2: Formal methods of evaluating arguments
F v (C ⋅ ~D)
The point of the parentheses is to group the main parts of the sentence
together. In this case, we are grouping the “C ⋅ ~D” together and leaving the
“F” by itself. The result is that those groupings are connected by a disjunction,
which is the main operator of the sentence. In this case, there are only two
groupings: “F” on the one hand, and “C ⋅ ~D” on the other hand.
But the original sentence could also mean that (Noelle will feed the dogs or
clean her room) and (Noelle will not wash the dishes). In contrast with our earlier
interpretation, this interpretation would be false if Noelle fed the dogs and did
the dishes, since this interpretation asserts that Noelle will not do the dishes (as
part of a conjunction). Here is how we would represent this interpretation
symbolically:
(F v C) ⋅ ~D
Notice that this interpretation, unlike the last one, groups the “F v C” together
and leaves the “~D” by itself. These two grouping are then connected by a
conjunction, which is the main operator of this complex sentence.
The fact that our initial attempt at the translation (without using parentheses)
yielded an ambiguous sentence shows the need for parentheses to
disambiguate the different possibilities. Since our formal language aims at
eliminating all ambiguity, we must choose one of the two groupings as the
translation of our original English sentence. So, which grouping accurately
captures the original sentence? It is the second translation that accurately
captures the meaning of the original English sentence. That sentence clearly
asserts that Noelle will not do the dishes and that is what our second translation
says. In contrast, the first translation is a sentence that could be true even if
Noelle did do the dishes. Given our understanding of the original English
sentence, it should not be true under those circumstances since it clearly asserts
that Noelle will not do the dishes.
Either both Bob and Karen are washing the dishes or Sally and Tom are.
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As before, I’ve written the constants than I’ll use to stand for each atomic
proposition to the right of each atomic proposition. You can use any letter
you’d like when coming up with your own translations, as long as each atomic
proposition uses a different capital letter. (I typically try to pick letters that are
distinctive of each sentence, such as picking “B” for “Bob”.) So how can we use
the truth functional operators to connect these atomic propositions together to
yield a sentence that captures the meaning of the original English sentence?
Clearly B and K are being grouped together with the conjunction “and” and S
and T are also being grouped together with the conjunction “and” as well:
(B ⋅ K)
(S ⋅ T)
(B ⋅ K) v (S ⋅ T)
The main operator of this sentence is the disjunction (the wedge). Again, it is
the main operator because it groups together the two main sentence groupings.
Let’s finish this section with one final example. Consider the sentence:
Tom will not wash the dishes and will not help prepare dinner; however,
he will vacuum the floor or cut the grass.
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It is clear from the English (because of the “not”) that we need to negate both
W and P. It is also clear from the English (because of the “and”) that W and P
are grouped together. Thus, the first part of the translation should be:
(~W ⋅ ~P)
It is also clear that the last part of the sentence (following the semicolon) is a
grouping of V and C and that those two propositions are connected by a
disjunction (because of the word “or”):
(V v C)
(~W ⋅ ~P) ⋅ (V v C)
As we have seen in this section, translating sentences from English into our
symbolic language is a process that can be captured as a series of steps:
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Chapter 2: Formal methods of evaluating arguments
see if another way of grouping the parts together better captures what
the original sentence conveys.
Try using these steps to create your own translations of the sentences in exercise
10 below.
Exercise 10: Translate the following English sentences into our symbolic
language using any of the three truth functional operators (i.e.,
conjunction, negation, and disjunction). Use the constants at the end of
each sentence to represent the atomic propositions they are obviously
meant for. After you have translated the sentence, identify which truth-
functional connective is the main operator of the sentence. (Note: not
every sentence requires parentheses; a sentence requires parentheses
only if it contains more than two atomic propositions.)
1. Bob does not know how to fly an airplane or pilot a ship, but he does
know how to ride a motorcycle. (A, S, M)
2. Tom does not know how to swim or how to ride a horse. (S, H)
3. Theresa writes poems, not novels. (P, N)
4. Bob does not like Sally or Felicia, but he does like Alice. (S, F, A)
5. Cricket is not widely played in the United States, but both football and
baseball are. (C, F, B)
6. Tom and Linda are friends, but Tom and Susan aren’t—although Linda
and Susan are. (T, S, L)
7. Lansing is east of Grand Rapids but west of Detroit. (E, W)
8. Either Tom or Linda brought David home after his surgery; but it
wasn’t Steve. (T, L, S)
9. Next year, Steve will be living in either Boulder or Flagstaff, but not
Phoenix or Denver. (B, F, P, D)
10. Henry VII of England was married to Anne Boleyn and Jane Seymour,
but he only executed Anne Boleyn. (A, J, E)
11. Henry VII of England executed either Anne Boleyn and Jane Boleyn or
Thomas Cromwell and Thomas More. (A, J, C, M)
12. Children should be seen, but not heard. (S, H)
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Two common English phrases that can sometimes cause confusion are “not
both” and “neither nor.” These two phrases have different meanings and thus
are translated with different symbolic logic sentences. Let’s look at an example
of each.
The first sentence uses the phrase “not both” and the second “neither nor.”
One way of figuring out what a sentence means (and thus how to translate it) is
by asking the question: What scenarios does this sentence rule out? Let’s apply
this to the “not both” statement (which we first saw back in the beginning of
section 2.4). There are four possible scenarios, and the statement would be
true in every one except the first scenario:
To say that Carla will not have both cake and ice cream allows that she can have
one or the other (just not both). It also allows that she can have neither (as in
the fourth scenario). So the way to think about the “not both” locution is as a
negation of a conjunction, since the conjunction is the only scenario that cannot
be true if the statement is true. If we use the constant “C” to represent the
atomic sentence, “Carla has cake,” and “I” to represent “Carla has ice cream,”
then the resulting symbolic translation would be:
~(C ⋅ I)
Thus, in general, statements of the form “not both p and q” will be translated as
the negation of a conjunction:
~(p ⋅ q)
Note that the main operator of the statement is the negation. The negation
applies to everything inside the parentheses—i.e., to the conjunction. This is
very different from the following sentence (without parentheses):
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~p ⋅ q
The main operator of this statement is the conjunction and the left conjunct of
the conjunction is a negation. In contrast with the “not both” form, this
statement asserts that p is not true, while q is true. For example, using our
previous example of Carla and the cake, the sentence
~C ⋅ I
would assert that Carla will not have cake and will have ice cream. This is a very
different statement from ~(C ⋅ I) which, as we have seen, allows the possibility
that Carla will have cake but not ice cream. Thus, again we see the importance
of parentheses in our symbolic language.
Earlier (in section 2.3) we made the distinction between what I called an
“exclusive or” and an “inclusive or” and I claimed that although we interpret the
wedge (v) as an inclusive or, we can represent the exclusive or symbolically as
well. Since we now know how to translate the “not both,” I can show you how
to translate a statement that contains an exclusive or. Recall our example:
As we saw, this disjunction contains the two disjuncts, “Bob placed first in the
race” (F) and “Bob placed second in the race” (S). Using the wedge, we get:
FvS
However, since the wedge is interpreted as an inclusive or, this statement would
allow that Bob got both first and second in the race, which is not possible. So
we need to be able to say that although Bob placed either first or second, he
did not place both first and second. But that is just the “not both” locution. So,
to be absolutely clear, we are asserting two things:
and
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We have already seen that the first sentence is translated: “F v S.” The second
sentence is C I False simply a “not both F and
S” statement: C ~I False
~C I False
~(F ⋅ S)
Now all we have to do is conjoin the two sentences using the dot:
(F v S) ⋅ ~(F ⋅ S)
That is the correct translation of an exclusive or. Notice that when conjoining
the “F v S” to the “~(F ⋅ S)” I needed to put parentheses around the “F v S” to
show that it was grouped together. Thus, it would have been incorrect to write:
F v S ⋅ ~(F ⋅ S)
since that is not a well-formed formula. The problem, as before, is that this
sentence is ambiguous between two sentences that have different meanings:
F v (S ⋅ ~(F ⋅ S))
(F v S) ⋅ ~(F ⋅ S)
While both of these sentences are well-formed, only the latter is the correct
translation of the exclusive or.
This statement might be true if, for example, Carla was on a diet (and was
sticking to her diet). Using the same method I introduced earlier, we can ask
under what conditions the statement would be true or false. As before, there
are only four possibilities, which I represent symbolically this time:
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~C ~I True
There is only one circumstance in which this statement is true and that is the one
in which it is false that Carla eats cake and false that Carla eats ice cream. That
should be obvious from the meaning of the “neither nor” locution. Thus, the
correct translation of a “neither nor” statement is as a conjunction of two
negations:
~C ⋅ ~I
The main operator of this statement is the dot, which is conjoining the ~C with
the ~I. Thus, the form of any “neither nor” statement can always be translated
as a conjunction of two negations:
~p ⋅ ~q
As we will see in a later section (where we will prove it), this statement is also
equivalent to a negation of a disjunction:
~(p v q)
Thus, the English locution “neither nor” can also be translated using this
statement form.
Exercise 11: For each of the following, write out what atomic proposition
each constant stands for. Then translate the sentences using the
constants you have defined. Finally, after you have translated the
sentence, identify which truth-functional connective is the main operator
of the sentence.
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Chapter 2: Formal methods of evaluating arguments
So far, we have learned how to translate certain English sentences into our
symbolic language, which consists of a set of constants (i.e., the capital letters
that we use to represent different atomic propositions) and the truth-functional
connectives. But what is the payoff of doing so? In this section we will learn
what the payoff is. In short, the payoff will be that we will have a purely formal
method of determining the validity of a certain class of arguments—namely,
those arguments whose validity depends on the functioning of the truth-
functional connectives. This is what logicians call “propositional logic” or
“sentential logic.”
In the first chapter, we learned the informal test of validity, which required us to
try to imagine a scenario in which the premises of the argument were true and
yet the conclusion false. We saw that if we can imagine such a scenario, then
the argument is invalid. On the other hand, if it is not possible to imagine a
scenario in which the premises are true and yet the conclusion is false, then the
argument is valid. Consider this argument:
Using the informal test of validity, we can see that if we imagine that the first
premise and the second premise are true, then the conclusion must follow.
However, we can also prove this argument is valid without having to imagine
scenarios and ask whether the conclusion would be true in those scenarios. We
can do this by a) translating this sentence into our symbolic language and then
b) using a truth table to determine whether the argument is valid. Let’s start
with the translation. The first premise contains two atomic propositions. Here
are the propositions and the constants that I’ll use to stand for them:
D = The convict escaped by hiding out in the back of the delivery van
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As we can see, the first premise is a disjunction and so, using the constants
indicated above, we can translate that first premise as follows:
SvD
~S
Finally, the conclusion is simply the atomic sentence, D. Putting this all together
in standard form, we have:
1. S v D
2. ~S
3. ∴ D
We will use the symbol “∴“ to denote a conclusion and will read it “therefore.”
The next thing we have to do is to construct a truth table. We have already seen
some examples of truth tables when I defined the truth-functional connectives
that I have introduced so far (conjunction, disjunction, and negation). A truth
table (as we saw in section 2.2) is simply a device we use to represent how the
truth value of a complex proposition depends on the truth of the propositions
that compose it in every possible scenario. When constructing a truth table, the
first thing to ask is how many atomic propositions need to be represented in the
truth table. In this case, the answer is “two,” since there are only two atomic
propositions contained in this argument (namely, S and D). Given that there are
only two atomic propositions, our truth table will contain only four rows—one
row for each possible scenario. There will be one row in which both S and D are
true, one row in which both S and D are false, one row in which S is true and D is
false, and one row in which S is false and D is true.
D S SvD ~S D
T T
T F
F T
F F
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The two furthest left columns are what we call the reference columns of the truth
table. Reference columns assign every possible arrangement of truth values to
the atomic propositions of the argument (in this case, just D and S). The
reference columns capture every logically possible scenario. By doing so, we
can replace having to use your imagination to imagine different scenarios (as in
the informal test of validity) with a mechanical procedure that doesn’t require us
to imagine or even think very much at all. Thus, you can think of each row of the
truth table as specifying one of the possible scenarios. That is, each row is one
of the possible assignments of truth values to the atomic propositions. For
example, row 1 of the truth table (the first row after the header row) is a scenario
in which it is true that the convict escaped by hiding out in the back of the
delivery van, and is also true that the convict escaped by crawling through the
sewage pipes. In contrast, row 4 is a scenario in which the convict did neither of
these things.
The next thing we need to do is figure out what the truth values of the premises
and conclusion are for each row of the truth table. We are able to determine
what those truth values are because we understand how the truth value of the
compound proposition depends on the truth value of the atomic propositions.
Given the meanings of the truth functional connectives (discussed in previous
sections), we can fill out our truth table like this:
D S SvD ~S D
T T T F T
T F T T T
F T T F F
F F F T F
To determine the truth values for the first premise of the argument (“S v D”) we
just have to know the truth values of S and D and the meaning of the truth
functional connective, the disjunction. The truth table for the disjunction says
that a disjunction is true as long as at least one of its disjuncts is true. Thus,
every row under the “S v D” column should be true, except for the last row since
on the last row both D and S are false (whereas in the first three rows at least
one or the other is true). The truth values for the second premise (~S) are easy
to determine: we simply look at what we have assigned to “S” in our reference
column and then we negate those truth values—the Ts becomes Fs and the Fs
becomes Ts. That is just what I’ve done in the fourth column of the truth table
above. Finally, the conclusion in the last column of the truth table will simply
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repeat what we have assigned to “D” in our reference column, since the last
conclusion simply repeats the atomic proposition “D.”
The above truth table is complete. Now the question is: How do we use this
completed truth table to determine whether or not the argument is valid? In
order to do so, we must apply what I’ll call the “truth table test of validity.”
According to the truth table test of validity, an argument is valid if and only if
for every assignment of truth values to the atomic propositions, if the premises
are true then the conclusion is true. An argument is invalid if there exists an
assignment of truth values to the atomic propositions on which the premises are
true and yet the conclusion is false. It is imperative that you understand (and
not simply memorize) what these definitions mean. You should see that these
definitions of validity and invalidity have a similar structure to the informal
definitions of validity and invalidity (discussed in chapter 1). The similarity is that
we are looking for the possibility that the premises are true and yet the
conclusion is false. If this is possible, then the argument is invalid; if it isn’t
possible, then the argument is valid. The difference, as I’ve noted above, is that
with the truth table test of validity, we replace having to use your imagination
with a mechanical procedure of assigning truth values to atomic propositions
and then determining the truth values of the premises and conclusion for each
of those assignments.
Applying these definitions to the above truth table, we can see that the
argument is valid because there is no assignment of truth values to the atomic
propositions (i.e., no row of our truth table) on which all the premises are true
and yet the conclusion is false. Look at the first row. Is that a row in which all
the premises are true and yet the conclusion false? No, it isn’t, because not all
the premises are true in that row. In particular, “~S” is false in that row. Look at
the second row. Is that a row in which all the premises are true and yet the
conclusion false? No, it isn’t; although both premises are true in that row, the
conclusion is also true in that row. Now consider the third row. Is that a row in
which all the premises are true and yet the conclusion false? No, because it isn’t
a row in which both the premises are true. Finally, consider the last row. Is that
a row in which all the premises are true and yet the conclusion false? Again, the
answer is “no” because the premises aren’t both true in that row. Thus, we can
see that there is no row of the truth table in which the premises are all true and
yet the conclusion is false. And that means the argument is valid.
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1. (A v B) v C
2. ~A
3. ∴ C
The first thing to recognize about this argument is that there are three atomic
propositions, A, B, and C. And that means our truth table will have 8 rows
instead of only 4 rows like our last truth table. The reason we need 8 rows is
that it takes twice as many rows to represent every logically possible scenario
when we are working with three different propositions. Here is a simple formula
that you can use to determine how many rows your truth table needs:
You read this formula “two to the n-th power.” So if you have one atomic
proposition (as in the truth table for negation), your truth table will have only two
rows. If you have two atomic propositions, it will have four rows. If you have
three atomic propositions, it will have 8 rows. The number of rows needed
grows exponentially as the number of atomic propositions grows linearly. The
table below represents the same relationship that the above formula does:
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Chapter 2: Formal methods of evaluating arguments
So, our truth table for the above argument needs to have 8 rows. Here is how
that truth table looks:
A B C (A v B) v C ~A C
T T T
T T F
T F T
T F F
F T T
F T F
F F T
F F F
Here is an important point to note about setting up a truth table. You need to
make sure that your reference columns capture each distinct possible
assignment of truth values. One way to make sure you do this is by following
the same pattern each time you construct a truth table. There is no one right
way of doing this, but here is how I do it (and recommend that you do it too).
Construct the reference columns so that the atomic propositions are arranged
alphabetically, from left to right. Then on the right-most reference column (the
C column above), alternate true and false each row, all the way to the bottom.
On the reference column to the left of that (the B column above), alternate two
rows true, two rows false, all the way to the bottom. On the next column to the
left (the A column above), alternate 4 true, 4 false, all the way to the bottom.
The next step is to determine the truth values of the premises and conclusion.
Note that our first premise is a more complex sentence that consists of two
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disjunctions. The main operator is the second disjunction since the two main
grouping, denoted by the parentheses, are “A v B” and “C”. Notice, however,
that we cannot figure out the truth values of the main operator of the sentence
until we figure out the truth values of the left disjunct, “A v B.” So that is where
we need to start. Thus, in the truth table below, I have filled out the truth values
directly underneath the “A v B” part of the sentence by using the truth values I
have assigned to A and B in the reference columns. As you can see in the truth
table below, each line is true except for the last two lines, which are false, since
a disjunction is only false when both of the disjuncts are false. (If you need to
review the truth table for disjunction, please see section 2.3.)
A B C (A v B) v C ~A C
T T T T
T T F T
T F T T
T F F T
F T T T
F T F T
F F T F
F F F F
Now, since we have figured out the truth values of the left disjunct, we can
figure out the truth values under the main operator (which I have emphasized in
bold in the truth table below). The two columns you are looking at to determine
the truth values of the main operator are the “A v B” column that we have just
figured out above and the “C” reference column to the left. It is imperative to
understand that the truth values under the “A v B” are irrelevant once we have
figured out the truth values under the main operator of the sentence. That
column was only a means to an end (the end of determining the main operator)
and so I have grayed those out to emphasize that we are no longer paying any
attention to them. (When you are constructing your own truth tables, you may
even want to erase these subsidiary columns once you’ve determined the truth
values of the main operator of the sentence. Or you may simply want to circle
the truth values under the main operator to distinguish them from the rest.)
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Chapter 2: Formal methods of evaluating arguments
A B C (A v B) v C ~A C
T T T T T
T T F T T
T F T T T
T F F T T
F T T T T
F T F T T
F F T F T
F F F F F
Finally, we will fill out the remaining two columns, which is very straightforward.
All we have to do for the “~A” is negate the truth values that we have assigned
to our “A” reference column. And all we have to do for the final column “C” is
simply repeat verbatim the truth values that we have assigned to our reference
column “C.”
A B C (A v B) v C ~A C
T T T T T F T
T T F T T F F
T F T T T F T
T F F T T F F
F T T T T T T
F T F T T T F
F F T F T T T
F F F F F T F
The above truth table is now complete. The next step is to apply the truth table
test of validity in order to determine whether the argument is valid or invalid.
Remember that what we’re looking for is a row in which the premises are true
and the conclusion is false. If we find such a row, the argument is invalid. If we
do not find such a row, then the argument is valid. Applying this definition to
the above truth table, we can see that the argument is invalid because of the 6th
row of the table (which I have highlighted). Thus, the explanation of why this
argument is invalid is that the sixth row of the table shows a scenario in which
the premises are both true and yet the conclusion is false.
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Chapter 2: Formal methods of evaluating arguments
Exercise 12: Use the truth table test of validity to determine whether or
not the following arguments are valid or invalid.
1. 4.
1. A v B 1. (A v B) ⋅ (A v C) 7.
2. B 2. ~A 1. ~(A ⋅ B)
3. ∴ ~A 3. ∴ B v C 2. ∴ ~A v ~B
2. 5. 8.
1. A ⋅ B 1. R ⋅ (T v S) 1. ~(A v B)
2. ∴ A v B 2. T 2. ∴ ~A v ~B
3. ∴ ~S
3.
1. ~C 6. 9.
2. ∴ ~(C v A) 1. A v B
2. ∴ A ⋅ B
1. (R v S) ⋅ ~D
2. ~R
3. ∴ S ⋅ ~D
2.7 Conditionals
So far, we have learned how to translate and construct truth tables for three
truth functional connectives. However, there is one more truth functional
connective that we have not yet learned: the conditional.2 The English phrase
that is most often used to express conditional statements is “if…then.” For
example,
It is raining.
2Actually, there is one more truth functional connective that we will not be learning and that is
what is called the “biconditional” or “material equivalence.” However, since the biconditional is
equivalent to a conjunction of two different conditionals, we don’t actually need it. Although I
will discuss material equivalence in section 2.9, we will not be regularly using it.
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Chapter 2: Formal methods of evaluating arguments
The proposition that follows the “if” is called the antecedent of the conditional
and the proposition that follows the “then” is call the consequent of the
conditional. The conditional statement above is not asserting either of these
atomic propositions. Rather, it is telling us about the relationship between
them. Let’s symbolize “it is raining” as “R” and “the ground is wet” as “G.”
Thus, our symbolization of the above conditional would be:
R⊃G
The “⊃” symbol is called the “horseshoe” and it represents what is called the
“material conditional.” A material conditional is defined as being true in every
case except when the antecedent is true and the consequent is false. Below is
the truth table for the material conditional. Notice that, as just stated, there is
only one scenario in which we count the conditional false: when the antecedent
is true and the consequent false.
p q p⊃q
T T T
T F F
F T T
F F T
Let’s see how this applies to the above conditional, “if it is raining, then the
ground is wet.” As before, we can think about the meaning of the truth
functional connectives by asking whether the sentences containing those
connectives would be true or false in the four possible scenarios. The first two
are pretty easy. If I assert the above conditional “if it is raining then the ground
is wet” when it is both raining and the ground is wet (i.e., the first line of the
truth table below), then the conditional statement would be true in that
scenario. However, if I assert it and it is raining but the ground isn’t wet (i.e., the
second line of the truth table below), then my statement has been shown to be
false. Why? Because I’m asserting that any time it is raining, the ground is wet.
But if it is raining but the ground isn’t wet, then this scenario is a
counterexample to my claim—it shows that my claim is false. Now consider the
scenario in which it is not raining but the ground is wet. Would this scenario
show that my conditional statement is false? No, it wouldn’t. The reason is that
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R G R⊃G
T T T
T F F
F T T
F F T
If you pass all the exams, you will pass the course.
Let’s symbolize “you pass all the exams” as “E” and “you pass the course” as
“C.” We would then symbolize the conditional as:
E⊃C
E C E⊃C
T T T
T F F
F T T
F F T
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Chapter 2: Formal methods of evaluating arguments
Suppose that you pass all the exams and pass the class (first row). That would
confirm my conditional statement E ⊃ C. Suppose, on the other hand, that
although you passed all the exams, you did not pass the class (second row).
This would should my statement is false (and you would have legitimate grounds
for complaint!). How about if you don’t pass all the exams and yet you do pass
the course (third row)? My statement allows this to be true and it is important to
see why. When I assert E ⊃ C I am not asserting anything about the situation in
which E is false. I am simply saying that one way of passing the course is by
passing all of the exams; but that doesn’t mean there aren’t other ways of
passing the course. Finally, consider the case in which you do not pass all the
exams and you also do not pass the course (fourth row). For the same reason,
this scenario is compatible with my statement being true. Thus, again, we see
that a material conditional is false in only one circumstance: when the
antecedent is true and the consequent is false.
There are other English phrases that are commonly used to express conditional
statements. Here are some equivalent ways of expressing the conditional, “if it
is raining then the ground is wet”:
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Chapter 2: Formal methods of evaluating arguments
All of these conditional statements are symbolized the same way, namely R ⊃ G.
The antecedent of a conditional statement always lays down what logicians call
a sufficient condition. A sufficient condition is a condition that suffices for
some other condition to obtain. To say that x is a sufficient condition for y is to
say that any time x is present, y will thereby be present. For example, a
sufficient condition for dying is being decapitated; a sufficient condition for
being a U.S. citizen is being born in the U.S. The consequent of a conditional
statement always lays down a necessary condition. A necessary condition is a
condition that must be in present in order for some other condition to obtain.
To say that x is a necessary condition for y is to say that if x were not present, y
would not be present either. For example, a necessary condition for being
President of the U.S. is being a U.S. citizen; a necessary condition for having a
brother is having a sibling. Notice, however, that being a U.S. citizen is not a
sufficient condition for being President, and having a sibling is not a sufficient
condition for having a brother. Likewise, being born in the U.S. is not a
necessary condition for being a U.S. citizen (people can become “naturalized
citizens”), and being decapitated is not a necessary condition for dying (one can
die without being decapitated).
Exercise 13: Translate the following English sentences into symbolic logic
sentences using the constants indicated. Make sure you write out what
the atomic propositions are. In some cases this will be straightforward,
but not in every case. Remember: atomic propositions never contain any
truth functional connectives—and that includes negation! Note: although
many of these sentences can be translated using only the horseshoe,
others require truth functional connectives other than the horseshoe.
1. The Tigers will win only if the Indians lose their star pitcher. (T, I)
2. Tom will pass the class provided that he does all the homework. (P, H)
3. The car will run only if it has gas. (R, G)
4. The fact that you are asking me about your grade implies that you
care about your grade. (A, C)
5. Although Frog will swim without a bathing suit, Toad will swim only if
he is wearing a bathing suit. (F, T, B)
6. If Obama isn’t a U.S. citizen, then I’m a monkey’s uncle. (O, M)
7. If Toad wears his bathing suit, he doesn’t want Frog to see him in it.
(T, F)
8. If Tom doesn’t pass the exam, then he is either stupid or lazy. (P, S, L)
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2.8 “Unless”
If we use the constant “R” to stand for the atomic proposition, “the Reds will
win” and “S” to stand for the atomic proposition, “the Reds’ starting pitcher is
injured,” how would we translate this sentence using truth functional
connectives? Think about what the sentence is saying (think carefully). Is the
sentence asserting that the Reds will win? No; it is only saying that
The Reds will win as long as their starting pitcher isn’t injured.
“As long as” denotes a conditional statement. In particular, what follows the “as
long as” phrase is a sufficient condition, and as we have seen, a sufficient
condition is always the antecedent of a conditional. But notice that the sufficient
condition also contains a negation. Thus, the correct translation of this sentence
is:
~S ⊃ R
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Chapter 2: Formal methods of evaluating arguments
One simple trick you can use to translate sentences which use the term “unless”
is just substitute the phrase “if it’s not the case that” for the “unless.” But
another trick is just to substitute an “or” for the “unless.” Although it may
sound strange in English, a disjunction will always capture the truth functional
meaning of “unless.” Thus, we could also correctly translate the sentence like
this:
SvR
In the next section we will show how we can prove that these two sentences are
equivalent using a truth table.
As we saw in the last section, two different symbolic sentences can translate the
same English sentence. In the last section I claimed that “~S ⊃ R” and “S v R”
are equivalent. More precisely, they are equivalent ways of capturing the truth-
functional relationship between propositions. Two propositions are materially
equivalent if and only if they have the same truth value for every assignment of
truth values to the atomic propositions. That is, they have the same truth values
on every row of a truth table. The truth table below demonstrates that “~S ⊃ R”
and “S v R” are materially equivalent.
R S ~S ⊃ R SvR
T T F T T
T F T T T
F T F T T
F F T F F
If you look at the truth values under the main operators of each sentence, you
can see that their truth values are identical on every row. That means the two
statements are materially equivalent and can be used interchangeably, as far as
propositional logic goes.
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~p ⋅ ~q
~(p v q)
We can prove these two statements are materially equivalent with a truth table
(below).
p q ~p ⋅ ~q ~(p v q)
T T F F F F T
T F F F T F T
F T T F F F T
F F T T T T F
Again, as you can see from the truth table, the truth values under the main
operators of each sentence are identical on every row (i.e., for every assignment
of truth values to the atomic propositions).
p q p≡q
T T T
T F F
F T F
F F T
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Some common ways of expressing the biconditional in English are with the
phrases “if and only if” and “just in case.” If you have been paying close
attention (or do from now on out) you will see me use the phrase “if and only if”
often. It is most commonly used when one is giving a definition, such as the
definition of validity and also in defining the “material equivalence” in this very
section. It makes sense that the biconditional would be used in this way since
when we define something we are laying down an equivalent way of saying it.
1. A ⊃ B and ~A v B
2. ~(A ⋅ B) and ~A v ~B
3. A ⊃ B and ~B ⊃ ~A
4. A v ~B and B ⊃ A
5. B ⊃ A and A ⊃ B
6. ~(A ⊃ B) and A ⋅ ~B
7. A v B and ~A ⋅ ~B
8. A v (B ⋅ C) and (A v B) ⋅ (A v C)
9. (A v B) ⋅ C and A v (B ⋅ C)
10. ~(A v B) and ~A v B
Can you think of a statement that could never be false? How about a statement
that could never be true? It is harder than you think, unless you know how to
utilize the truth functional operators to construct a tautology or a contradiction.
A tautology is a statement that is true in virtue of its form. Thus, we don’t even
have to know what the statement means to know that it is true. In contrast, a
contradiction is a statement that is false in virtue of its form. Finally, a
contingent statement is a statement whose truth depends on the way the world
actually is. Thus, it is a statement that could be either true or false—it just
depends on what the facts actually are. In contrast, there is an important sense
in which the truth of a tautology or the falsity of a contradiction doesn’t depend
on how the world is. As philosophers would say, tautologies are true in every
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p v ~p
p ⋅ ~p
The following two truth tables are examples of tautologies and contradictions,
respectively.
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A B (A ⊃ B) v A
T T T T
T F F T
F T T T
F F T T
A B (A v B) ⋅ (~A ⋅ ~B)
T T T F F F F
T F T F F F T
F T T F T F F
F F F F T F T
Notice that in the second truth table, I had to do quite a lot of work before I
could figure out what the truth values of the main operator were. I had to first
determine the left conjunct (A v B) and then the right conjunct (~A ⋅ ~B), but in
order to figure out the truth values of the right conjunct (which is itself a
conjunct), I had to determine the negations of A and B. Constructing truth
tables can sometimes be a chore, but once you understand what you are doing
(and why), it certainly isn’t very difficult.
1. A ⊃ (A ⋅ B)
2. (A ⋅ B) ⊃ (~A ⊃ ~B)
3. (A ⋅ ~A) ⊃ B
4. (A ⊃ A) ⊃ (B ⋅ ~B)
5. (A ⋅ B) ⊃ (A v B)
6. (A v B) ⊃ (A ⋅ B)
7. (~A ⊃ ~B) ⊃ (~B ⊃ ~A)
8. (A ⊃ B) ⊃ (~B ⊃ ~A)
9. (B v ~B) ⊃ A
10. (A v B) v ~A
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Although truth tables are our only formal method of deciding whether an
argument is valid or invalid in propositional logic, there is another formal
method of proving that an argument is valid: the method of proof. Although
you cannot construct a proof to show that an argument is invalid, you can
construct proofs to show that an argument is valid. The reason proofs are
helpful, is that they allow us to show that certain arguments are valid much more
efficiently than do truth tables. For example, consider the following argument:
1. (R v S) ⊃ (T ⊃ K)
2. ~K
3. R v S /∴ ~T
(Note: in this section I will be writing the conclusion of the argument to the right
of the last premise—in this case premise 3. As before, the conclusion we are
trying to derive is denoted by the “therefore” sign, “∴”.) We could attempt to
prove this argument is valid with a truth table, but the truth table would be 16
rows long because there are four different atomic propositions that occur in this
argument, R, S, T, and K. If there were 5 or 6 different atomic propositions, the
truth table would be 32 or 64 lines long! However, as we will soon see, we
could also prove this argument is valid with only two additional lines. That
seems a much more efficient way of establishing that this argument is valid. We
will do this a little later—after we have introduced the 8 valid forms of inference
that you will need in order to do proofs. Each line of the proof will be justified
by citing one of these rules, with the last line of the proof being the conclusion
that we are trying to ultimately establish. I will introduce the 8 valid forms of
inference in groups, starting with the rules that utilize the horseshoe and
negation.
The first of the 8 forms of inference is “modus ponens” which is Latin for “way
that affirms.” Modus ponens has the following form:
1. p ⊃ q
2. p
3. ∴ q
What this form says, in words, is that if we have asserted a conditional statement
(p ⊃ q) and we have also asserted the antecedent of that conditional statement
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(p), then we are entitled to infer the consequent of that conditional statement
(q). For example, if I asserted the conditional, “if it is raining, then the ground is
wet” and I also asserted “it is raining” (the antecedent of that conditional) then I
(or anyone else, for that matter) am entitled to assert the consequent of the
conditional, “the ground is wet.”
As with any valid forms of inference in this section, we can prove that modus
ponens is valid by constructing a truth table. As you see from the truth table
below, this argument form passes the truth table test of validity (since there is no
row of the truth table on which the premises are all true and yet the conclusion
is false).
p q p⊃q p q
T T T T T
T F F T F
F T T F T
F F T F F
Thus, any argument that has this same form is valid. For example, the following
argument also has this same form (modus ponens):
1. (A ⋅ B) ⊃ C
2. (A ⋅ B)
3. ∴ C
In this argument we can assert C according to the rule, modus ponens. This is
so even though the antecedent of the conditional is itself complex (i.e., it is a
conjunction). That doesn’t matter. The first premise is still a conditional
statement (since the horseshoe is the main operator) and the second premise is
the antecedent of that conditional statement. The rule modus ponens says that
if we have that much, we are entitled to infer the consequent of the conditional.
We can actually use modus ponens in the first argument of this section:
1. (R v S) ⊃ (T ⊃ K)
2. ~K
3. R v S /∴ ~T
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What I have done here is I have written the valid form of inference (or rule) that
justifies the line I am deriving, as well as the lines to which that rule applies, to
the right of the new line of the proof that I am deriving. Here I have derived “T
⊃ K” from lines 1 and 3 of the argument by modus ponens. Notice that line 1 is
a conditional statement and line 3 is the antecedent of that conditional
statement. This proof isn’t finished yet, since we have not yet derived the
conclusion we are trying to derive, namely, “~T.” We need a different rule to
derive that, which we will introduce next.
The next form of inference is called “modus tollens,” which is Latin for “the way
that denies.” Modus tollens has the following form:
1. p ⊃ q
2. ~q
3. ∴ ~p
What this form says, in words, is that if we have asserted a conditional statement
(p ⊃ q) and we have also asserted the negated consequent of that conditional
(~q), then we are entitled to infer the negated antecedent of that conditional
statement (~p). For example, if I asserted the conditional, “if it is raining, then
the ground is wet” and I also asserted “the ground is not wet” (the negated
consequent of that conditional) then I am entitled to assert the negated
antecedent of the conditional, “it is not raining.” It is important to see that any
argument that has this same form is a valid argument. For example, the
following argument is also an argument with this same form:
1. C ⊃ (E v F)
2. ~(E v F)
3. ∴ ~C
In this argument we can assert ~C according to the rule, modus tollens. This is
so even though the consequent of the conditional is itself complex (i.e., it is a
disjunction). That doesn’t matter. The first premise is still a conditional
statement (since the horseshoe is the main operator) and the second premise is
the negated consequent of that conditional statement. The rule modus tollens
says that if we have that much, we are entitled to infer the negated antecedent
of the conditional.
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1. (R v S) ⊃ (T ⊃ K)
2. ~K
3. RvS /∴ ~T
4. T⊃K Modus ponens, lines 1, 3
5. ~T Modus tollens, lines 2, 4
Notice that the last line of the proof is the conclusion that we are supposed to
derive and that each statement that I have derived (i.e., lines 4 and 5) has a rule
to the right. That rule cited is the rule that justifies the statement that is being
derived and the lines cited are the previous lines of the proof where we can see
that the rule applies. This is what is called a proof. A proof is a series of
statements, starting with the premises and ending with the conclusion, where
each additional statement after the premises is derived from some previous
line(s) of the proof using one of the valid forms of inference. We will practice
this some more in the exercise at the end of this section.
1. p ⊃ q
2. q ⊃ r
3. ∴ p ⊃ r
As you can see, the conclusion of this argument links p and r together in a
conditional statement. We could continue adding conditionals such as “r ⊃ s”
and “s ⊃ t” and the inferences would be just as valid. And if we lined them all
up as I have below, you can see why ancient philosophers referred to this valid
argument form as a “chain argument”:
p⊃q
q⊃r
r⊃s
s⊃t
∴ p⊃t
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1. (A v B) ⊃ ~D
2. ~D ⊃ C
3. ∴ (A v B) ⊃ C
Notice that the consequent of the first premise and the antecedent of the
second premise are exactly the same term, “~D”. That is what allows us to
“link” the antecedent of the first premise and the consequent of the second
premise together in a “chain” to infer the conclusion. Being able to recognize
the forms of these inferences is an important skill that you will have to become
proficient at in order to do proofs.
The next four forms of inference we will introduce utilize conjunction, disjunction
and negation in different ways. We will start with the rule called
“simplification,” which has the following form:
1. p ⋅ q
2. ∴ p
What this rule says, in words, is that if we have asserted a conjunction then we
are entitled to infer either one of the conjuncts. This is the rule that I introduced
in the first section of this chapter. It is a pretty “obvious” rule—so obvious, in
fact, that we might even wonder why we have to state it. However, every form
of inference that we will introduce in this section should be obvious—that is the
point of calling them basic forms of inference. They are some of the simplest
forms of inference, whose validity should be transparently obvious. The idea of
a proof is that although the inference being made in the argument is not
obvious, we can break that inference down in steps, each of which is obvious.
Thus, the obvious inferences ultimately justify the non-obvious inference being
made in the argument. Those obvious inferences thus function as rules that we
use to justify each step of the proof. Simplification is a prime example of one of
the more obvious rules.
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As before, it is important to realize that any inference that has the same form as
simplification is a valid inference. For example,
1. (A v B) ⋅ ~(C ⋅ D)
2. ∴ (A v B)
is a valid inference because it has the same form as simplification. That is, line 1
is a conjunction (since the dot is the main operator of the sentence) and line 2 is
inferring one of the conjuncts of that conjunction in line 1. (Just think of the “A v
B” as the “p” and the “~(C ⋅ D)” as the “q”.)
The next rule we will introduce is called “conjunction” and is like the reverse of
simplification. (Don’t confuse the rule called conjunction with the type of
complex proposition called a conjunction.) Conjunction has the following form:
1. p
2. q
3. ∴ p ⋅ q
What this rule says, in words, is that if you have asserted two different
propositions, then you are entitled to assert the conjunction of those two
propositions. As before, it is important to realize that any inference that has the
same form as conjunction is a valid inference. For example,
1. A ⊃ B
2. C v D
3. ∴ (A ⊃ B) ⋅ (C v D)
is a valid inference because it has the same form as conjunction. We are simply
conjoining two propositions together; it doesn’t matter whether those
propositions are atomic or complex. In this case, of course, the propositions we
are conjoining together are complex, but as long as those propositions have
already been asserted as premises in the argument (or derived by some other
valid form of inference), we can conjoin them together into a conjunction.
1. p v q
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2. ~p
3. ∴ q
In words, this rule states that if we have asserted a disjunction and we have
asserted the negation of one of the disjuncts, then we are entitled to assert the
other disjunct. Once you think about it, this inference should be pretty obvious.
If we are taking for granted the truth of the premises—that either p or q is true;
and that p is not true—then is has to follow that q is true in order for the original
disjunction to be true. (Remember that we must assume the premises are true
when evaluating whether an argument is valid.) If I assert that it is true that
either Bob or Linda stole the diamond, and I assert that Bob did not steal the
diamond, then it has to follow that Linda did. That is a disjunctive syllogism. As
before, any argument that has this same form is a valid argument. For example,
1. ~A v (B ⋅ C)
2. ~~A
3. ∴ B ⋅ C
is a valid inference because it has the same form as disjunctive syllogism. The
first premise is a disjunction (since the wedge is the main operator), the second
premise is simply the negation of the left disjunct, “~A”, and the conclusion is
the right disjunct of the original disjunction. It may help you to see the form of
the argument if you treat “~A” as the p and “B ⋅ C” as the q. Also notice that
the second premise contains a double negation. Your English teacher may tell
you never to use double negatives, but as far as logic is concerned, there is
absolutely nothing wrong with a double negation. In this case, our left disjunct
in premise 1 is itself a negation, while premise 2 is simply a negation of that left
disjunct.
The next rule we’ll introduce is called “addition.” It is not quite as “obvious” a
rule as the ones we’ve introduced above. However, once you understand the
conditions under which a disjunction is true, then it should be obvious why this
form of inference is valid. Addition has the following form:
1. p
2. ∴ p v q
What this rule says, in words, is that that if we have asserted some proposition,
p, then we are entitled to assert the disjunction of that proposition p and any
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As before, is it important to realize that any argument that has this same form, is
a valid argument. For example,
1. A v B
2. ∴ (A v B) v (~C v D)
is a valid inference because it has the same form as addition. The first premise
asserts a statement (which in this case is complex—a disjunction) and the
conclusion is a disjunction of that statement and some other statement. In this
case, that other statement is itself complex (a disjunction). But an argument or
inference can have the same form, regardless of whether the components of
those sentences are atomic or complex. That is the important lesson that I have
been trying to drill in in this section.
The final of our 8 valid forms of inference is called “constructive dilemma” and
is the most complicated of them all. It may be most helpful to introduce it using
an example. Suppose I reasoned thus:
The killer is either in the attic or the basement. If the killer is in the attic
then he is above me. If the killer is in the basement then his is below me.
Therefore, the killer is either _________________ or _________________.
Can you fill in the blanks with the phrases that would make this argument valid?
I’m guessing that you can. It should be pretty obvious. The conclusion of the
argument is the following:
3
A better answer is that we need this rule in order to make this set of rules that I am presenting
a sound a complete set of rules. That is, without it there would be arguments that are valid but
that we aren’t able to show are valid using this set of rules. In more advanced areas of logic,
such as metalogic, logicians attempt to prove things about a particular system of logic, such as
proving that the system is sound and complete.
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That this argument is valid should be obvious (can you imagine a scenario where
all the premises are true and yet the conclusion is false?). What might not be as
obvious is the form that this argument has. However, you should be able to
identify that form if you utilize the tools that you have learned so far. The first
premise is a disjunction. The second premise is a conditional statement whose
antecedent is the left disjunct of the disjunction in the first premise. And the
third premise is a conditional statement whose antecedent is the right disjunct
of the disjunction in the first premise. The conclusion is the disjunction of the
consequents of the conditionals in premises 2 and 3. Here is this form of
inference using symbols:
1. pvq
2. p⊃r
3. q⊃s
4. ∴ rvs
We have now introduced each of the 8 forms of inference. In the next section I
will walk you through some basic proofs that utilize these 8 rules.
Exercise 16: Fill in the blanks with the valid form of inference that is
being used and the lines the inference follows from. Note: the conclusion
is written to the right of the last premise, following the “/∴“ symbols.
Example 1:
1. M ⊃ ~N
2. M
3. H⊃N /∴ ~H
4. ~N Modus ponens, 1, 2
5. ~H Modus tollens, 3, 4
Example 2:
1. A v B
2. C ⊃ D
3. A ⊃ C
4. ~D /∴ B
5. A ⊃ D Hypothetical syllogism, 3, 2
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6. ~A Modus tollens, 5, 4
7. B Disjunctive syllogism, 1, 6
#1 4. D⊃E /∴ E v B
1. A ⋅ C /∴ (A v E) ⋅ (C v D) 5. C ⊃ E _________________
2. A _________________ 6. C v A _________________
3. C _________________ 7. E v B _________________
4. A v E _________________
5. C v D _________________ #6
6. (A v E) ⋅ (C v D) ______________ 1. (A v M) ⊃ R
2. (L ⊃ R) ⋅ ~R
#2 3. ~(C ⋅ D) v (A v M) /∴ ~(C ⋅ D)
1. A ⊃ (B ⊃ D) 4. ~R _______________
2. ~D 5. ~(A v M) _______________
3. DvA /∴ ~B 6. ~(C ⋅ D) _______________
4. A _________________
5. B ⊃ D _________________ #7
6. ~B _________________ 1. (H ⋅ K) ⊃ L
2. ~R ⋅ K
#3 3. K ⊃ (H v R) /∴ L
1. A ⊃ ~B 4. K _________________
2. AvC 5. H v R _________________
3. ~~B ⋅ D /∴ C 6. ~R _________________
4. ~~B _________________ 7. H _________________
5. ~A _________________ 8. H ⋅ K _________________
6. C _________________ 9. L _________________
#4 #8
1. A⊃B 1. C ⊃ B
2. A ⋅ ~D 2. ~D ⋅ ~B
3. B⊃C /∴ C ⋅ ~D 3. (A ⊃ (B ⊃ C)) v D
4. A _________________ 4. A v C /∴ B ⊃ C
5. A ⊃ C _________________ 5. ~D _________________
6. C _________________ 6. A ⊃ (B ⊃ C) _____________
7. ~D _________________ 7. ~B _________________
8. C ⋅ ~D _________________ 8. ~C __________________
9. A __________________
#5 10. B ⊃ C __________________
1. C 11. (B ⊃ C) v B __________________
2. A ⊃ B
3. C ⊃ D
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You can think of constructing proofs as a game. The goal of the game is to
derive the conclusion from the given premises using only the 8 valid rules of
inference that we have introduced. Not every proof requires you to use every
rule, of course. But you may use any of the rules—as along as your use of the
rule is correct. Like most games, people can be better or worse at the “game”
of constructing proofs. Better players will be able to a) make fewer mistakes, b)
construct the proofs more quickly, and c) construct the proofs more efficiently.
In order to construct proofs, it is imperative that you internalize the 8 valid forms
of inference introduced in the previous section. You will be citing these forms of
inference as rules that will justify each new line of your proof that you add. By
“internalize” I mean that you have memorized them so well that you can see
those forms manifest in various sentences almost without even thinking about it.
If you internalize the rules in this way, constructing proofs will be a pleasant
diversion, rather than a frustrating activity. In addition to internalizing the 8 valid
forms of inference, there are a couple of different strategies that can help when
you’re stuck and can’t figure out what to do next. The first is the strategy of
working backwards. When we work backwards in a proof, we ask ourselves
what rule we can use to derive the sentence(s) we need to derive. Here is an
example:
1. R ⋅ S
2. T /∴ (T v L) ⋅ (R ⋅ S)
The conclusion, which is to the right of the second premise and follows the “/∴”
symbol, is a conjunction (since the dot is the main operator). If we are trying to
“work backwards,” the relevant question to ask is: What rule can we use to
derive a conjunction? If you know the rules, you should know the answer to that
question. There is only one rule that allows us to derive (infer) a sentence that is
a conjunction. That rule is called “conjunction.” The form of the rule
conjunction says that in order to derive a conjunction, we need to have each
conjunct on a separate line. So, what are the two conjuncts that we would need
in order to derive the conjunction that is the conclusion (i.e., “(T v L) ⋅ (R ⋅ S)”).
We would need both “T v L” on a line and “R ⋅ S” on a separate line. But look
at premise 1—we already have “R ⋅ S” on its own line! So the only other thing
we need to derive is the sentence “T v L”. Once we have that on a separate
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line, then we can use the rule conjunction to conjoin those two sentences to get
the conclusion! So the next question we have to ask is: How can I derive the
sentence “T v L”? Again, if we are working backwards, the relevant question to
ask here is: What rule allows me to derive a disjunction? There are only two:
constructive dilemma and addition. However, we know that we won’t be using
constructive dilemma since none of the premises are conditional statements,
and constructive dilemma requires conditional statements as premises. That
leaves addition. Addition allows us to disjoin any statement we like to an
existing statement. Since we have “T” as the second premise, the rule addition
allows us to disjoin “L” to that statement. The first new line of the proof should
thus look like this:
3. T v L Addition 2
What I have done is number a new line of the proof (continuing the numbering
from the premises) and then have written the rule that justifies that new line as
well as the line(s) from which that line was derived via that rule. In this case,
since addition is a rule that allows you to derive a sentence directly from just one
line, I have cited only one line. The next step of the proof should be clear since
we have already talked through it above. All we have to do now is go directly to
the conclusion, since the conclusion is a conjunction and we now have (on
separate lines of the proof) each conjunct. Thus, the final line of this (quite
simple) proof should look like this:
4. (T v L) ⋅ (R ⋅ S) Conjunction 1, 3
Again, all I’ve done is the write the new line of the proof (continuing the
numbering from the previous line) and then have written the rule that justifies
that new line as well as the line(s) from which that line was derived via that rule.
In this case, the rule conjunction requires that we cite two lines (i.e., each
conjunct that we are conjoining). So, I have to find the lines that contained “T v
L” and “R ⋅ S” and cite those lines. It does not matter the order in which you
cite the lines as along as you have cited the correct lines (e.g., I could have
equally well have written, “Conjunction 3, 1” as the justification). Thus the
complete proof should look like this:
1. R ⋅ S
2. T /∴ (T v L) ⋅ (R ⋅ S)
3. T v L Addition 2
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4. (T v L) ⋅ (R ⋅ S) Conjunction 1, 3
That’s it. That is all there is to constructing a proof. The last line of the proof is
the conclusion to be derived: check. Each line of the proof follows by the rule
and the line(s) cited: check. Since both of those requirements check out, our
proof is complete and correct.
I have just walked you through a simple proof using the strategy of working
backwards. This strategy works well as long as the conclusion we are trying to
derive is complex—that is, if it contains truth functional connectives. However,
sometimes our conclusion will simply be an atomic statement. In that case, we
will not as easily be able to utilize the strategy of working backwards. But there
is another strategy that we can utilize: the strategy of working forward. To
utilize the strategy of working forward, we simply ask ourselves what rules we
can apply to the existing premises to derive something, even if it isn’t the
conclusion we are ultimately trying to derive. As a part of this strategy, we
should typically break apart a conjunction whenever we have one as a premise
of our argument. Doing this can help to see where to go next. (If you’ve ever
played Scrabble, then you can think of this as rearranging your Scrabble tiles in
order to see what words you can build.) Here is an example of a proof where we
should utilize the strategy of working forward:
1. A ⋅ B
2. B ⊃ C /∴ C
Notice that since the conclusion is atomic, we cannot utilize the strategy of
working backwards. Instead, we should try working forward. As part of this
strategy, we should break apart conjunctions by using the rule “simplification.”
That will be the first step of our proof:
1. A⋅B
2. B⊃C /∴ C
3. A Simplification 1
4. B Simplification 1
The first two lines of the proof is just breaking down the conjunction in line 1,
where line 3 is just the left conjunct and line 4 is just the right conjunct. Both
lines 3 and 4 follow by the same rule and the same line, in this case. The next
question we ask when utilizing the strategy of working forward is: what lines of
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the proof we can apply some rule to in order to derive something or other?
Look at the conditional on line 2. We haven’t used that yet. So what rule can
we apply to that line? You should be thinking of the rules that utilize conditional
statements (modus ponens, modus tollens, and hypothetical syllogism). We can
rule out hypothetical syllogism since here we have only one conditional and the
rule hypothetical syllogism requires that we have two. If you look at line 4 (that
we have just derived) you should see that it is the antecedent of the conditional
statement on line 2. And you should know that that means we can apply the
rule, modus ponens. So our next step is to do that:
1. A⋅B
2. B⊃C /∴ C
3. A Simplification 1
4. B Simplification 1
5. C Modus ponens 2, 4
But now also notice that the line that we have just derived is in fact the
conclusion of the argument. So our proof is finished.
Before the close of this section, let’s work through a bit longer proof.
Remember: any proof, long or short, is the same process and utilizes the same
strategy. It is just a matter a keeping track of where you are in the proof and
what you’re ultimately trying to derive. So here is a bit more complex proof:
1. (~A v B) ⊃ L
2. ~B
3. A⊃B
4. L ⊃ (~R v D)
5. ~D ⋅ (R v F) /∴ (L v G) ⋅ ~R
6. ~D Simplification 5
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7. R v F Simplification 5
Look at lines 2 and 6: they are both negated atomic propositions. Another part
of the strategy of working forward is to utilize either atomic or negated atomic
sentences. We should look for how we can utilize modus tollens or disjunctive
syllogism by plugging these negated atomic sentences into other lines of the
proof. Look at lines 2 and 3. You should see a modus tollens there. That will
be our next step:
8. ~A Modus tollens 2, 3
The next step of this proof can be a bit tricky. There are a couple different ways
we could go. One would be to utilize the rule “addition.” Can you see how we
might helpfully utilize this rule using either line 6 or 8? If not, I’ll give you a hint:
what if we were to use addition on line 8 to derive “~A v B”? Can you see how
we could then plug that into line 1? In fact, “~A v B” is the antecedent of the
conditional in line 1, so we could then use modus ponens to derive the
consequent. Thus, let’s try starting with the addition on line 8:
9. ~A v B Addition 8
Next, we’ll utilize line 9 and line 1 with modus ponens to derive the next line:
Notice at this point that what we have derived on line 10 is “L” and what we
earlier said we needed as one of the conjuncts was “L v G”. You should
recognize that we have a rule that will allow us to infer directly from “L” to “L v
G”. That rule is addition (again). That will be the next line of the proof:
11. L v G Addition 10
At this point, our strategy should be to try to derive the other conjunct, “~R”.
Notice that “~R” is contained within the sentence on line 4, but it is embedded.
How can we “get it free”? Start by noticing that the ~R is a part of a disjunction,
which is itself a consequent of a conditional statement. Also notice that we have
already derived the antecedent of that conditional statement, which means that
we can use modus ponens to derive the consequent:
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The final step is simply to conjoin lines 11 and 13 to get the conclusion:
1. (~A v B) ⊃ L
2. ~B
3. A ⊃ B
4. L ⊃ (~R v D)
5. ~D ⋅ (R v F) /∴ (L v G) ⋅ ~R
6. ~D Simplification 5
7. R v F Simplification 5
8. ~A Modus tollens 2, 3
9. ~A v B Addition 8
10. L Modus ponens 1, 9
11. L v G Addition 10
12. ~R v D Modus ponens 4, 10
13. ~R Disjunctive syllogism
14. (L v G) ⋅ ~R Conjunction 11, 13
Constructing proofs is a skill that takes practice. The following exercises will
give you some practice with constructing proofs.
Exercise 17: Construct proofs for the following valid arguments. The first
fifteen proofs can be complete in three or less additional lines. The next
five proofs will be a bit longer. It is important to note that there is always
more than one way to construct a proof. If your proof differs from the
answer key, that doesn’t mean it is wrong.
#1 2. (A v C) ⊃ D /∴ A ⋅ D
1. A ⋅ B
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#2 2. ~A ⋅ C /∴ ~B
1. A
2. B /∴ (A v C) ⋅ B #12
1. (D v E) ⊃ (F ⋅ G)
#3 2. D /∴ F
1. D ⊃ E
2. D ⋅ F /∴ E #13
1. T ⊃ U
#4 2. V v ~U
1. J ⊃ K 3. ~V ⋅ ~W /∴ ~T
2. J /∴ K v L
#14
#5 1. (A v B) ⊃ ~C
1. A v B 2. C v D
2. ~A ⋅ ~C /∴ B 3. A /∴ D
#6 #15
1. A ⊃ B 1. L v (M ⊃ N)
2. ~B ⋅ ~C /∴ ~A 2. ~L ⊃ (N ⊃ O)
3. ~L /∴ M ⊃ O
#7
1. D ⊃ E #16
2. (E ⊃ F) ⋅ (F⊃ D) /∴D ⊃ F 1. A ⊃ B
2. A v (C ⋅ D)
#8 3. ~B ⋅ ~E /∴ C
1. (T ⊃ U) ⋅ (T ⊃ V)
2. T /∴ U v V #17
1. (F ⊃ G) ⋅ (H ⊃ I)
#9 2. J ⊃ K
1. (E ⋅ F) v (G ⊃ H) 3. (F v J) ⋅ (H v L) /∴ G v K
2. I ⊃ G
3. ~(E ⋅ F) /∴ I ⊃ H #18
1. (E v F) ⊃ (G ⋅ H)
2. (G v H) ⊃ I
#10 3. E /∴ I
1. M⊃N
2. O⊃P #19
3. N⊃P 1. (N v O) ⊃ P
4. (N ⊃ P) ⊃ (M v O) /∴N v P 2. (P v Q) ⊃ R
3. QvN
#11 4. ~Q /∴ R
1. A v (B ⊃ A)
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#20 4. ~K /∴ M
1. J ⊃ K
2. K v L
3. (L ⋅ ~J) ⊃ (M ⋅ ~J)
So far in this chapter we have learned a formal method for determining whether
a certain class of arguments (i.e., those that utilize only truth functional
operators) are valid or invalid. That method is the truth table test of validity.
We have also learned a formal method for proving arguments are valid or invalid
(the method of proof). The other important skill we have learned in this chapter
so far is translating sentences into propositional logic. Thus, there are three
different skills that you should know how to do:
It is important to reiterate that truth tables are the only formal method that allow
us to determine whether an argument is valid or invalid; proofs can only show
that an argument is valid, but not that it is invalid. You might think that you can
use proofs to show that an argument is invalid—for example, if you are unable
to construct a proof for an argument, that means that the argument is invalid.
However, this doesn’t follow. There could be many reasons why you are unable
to construct a proof, including that you just aren’t skilled enough to construct
proofs. But the fact that you aren’t skilled enough to find a proof for an
argument wouldn’t mean that the argument is invalid, it would just mean that
you weren’t skilled enough to show that it is valid! So we cannot use one’s
inability to construct a proof for an argument to establish that the argument is
invalid. Again, only the truth table test of validity can establish that an argument
is invalid.
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logic using constants and the truth functional connectives, we don’t need to
know what the constants mean in order to know whether the argument is valid
or invalid. We simply have to fill out the truth table in the mechanical way we
have learned and then apply the truth table test of validity (which is also a
mechanical procedure). Thus, once an argument has been translated into
propositional logic, determining whether an argument passes the truth table test
of validity is something a computer could easily do. The translation from English
to symbolic format is not as easy for a computer to do because successfully
doing so depends on understanding the nuances of English. Although today
there are computer programs that are pretty good at doing this, it has taken
many years to get there. In contrast, any simple computer program from half a
century ago could easily construct and evaluate a truth table using the truth
table test of validity because this doesn’t take any understanding—it is simply a
mechanical procedure. There are many different programs, many of which are
readily available on the web, that allow you to construct and evaluate truth
tables.
If we translate “toves are slithy” at “T” and “borogoves are mimsy” as “B” then
the form of this argument is clearly modus tollens, which is one of the 8 valid
forms of inference:
1. T ⊃ B
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2. ~B
3. ∴ ~T
We can thus see that this argument is valid even though we have no idea what
“toves” or “borogoves” are or what “slithy” and “mimsy” mean. Thus,
propositional logic, which includes the truth table test of validity, is a kind of
formal logic, whereas the informal test of validity is not. There are other kinds of
formal logic besides propositional logic. In the next section I will introduce
another kind of formal logic: categorical logic.
If we were to apply the informal test of validity (from chapter 1) to this argument,
we would see that the argument is valid because it is not possible to imagine a
scenario in which the premises are true and yet the conclusion is false.
However, look at what happens if we try to translate it using propositional logic.
Since “all humans are mortal” is atomic, (i.e., it does not contain any truth
functional operators) we can translate it using the constant “H.” The second
premise, “all mortal things die,” is also atomic, so we can translate it using the
constant, “M.” Finally, the conclusion, is yet another atomic statement, “All
humans die,” which we can translate “D.” But then the form of our argument is
just this:
1. H
2. M
3. ∴ D
The problem is that this argument is not valid, which we can clearly see by
constructing a truth table. Since there are three different atomic components,
our truth table will be 8 rows. (In the following truth table, since the reference
columns would just be identical to the premise and conclusion columns, I just
collapsed the two in order to make the truth table less redundant.)
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H M D
T T T
T T F
T F T
T F F
F T T
F T F
F F T
F F F
Notice the second row of the truth table (which I have bolded). The premises
are both true on that row and yet the conclusion is false. That means that this
argument does not pass the truth table test of validity and so is invalid. But
clearly this argument is valid. If it is true that all humans are mortal and that all
mortal things die, then it must be true that all humans die. What this argument
reveals is one of the limitations of propositional logic. There are some
arguments that are intuitively valid (such as this one) but that cannot be shown
to be valid using the methods of propositional logic. This shows that we need
other kinds of formal logic to be able to capture a wider range of logically valid
inferences. Categorical logic allows us to supplement propositional logic with a
formal method that will handle arguments like this that propositional logic is
unable to handle.
Categorical logic is the logic that deals with the logical relationship between
categorical statements. A categorical statement is simply a statement about a
category or type of thing. For example, the first premise of the above argument
is a statement about the categories of humans and things that are mortal. The
second premise is a statement about the categories of things that are mortal
and things that die. Finally, the conclusion is a statement about humans and
things that die. Although you may think that this argument as a similar form as a
hypothetical syllogism, it is distinct from a hypothetical syllogism because the
premises are not composed of two different atomic propositions. Rather, each
premise contains only one atomic proposition.
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for categories of things in the world, rather than for atomic propositions. Thus,
we can represent the statement:
as
All H are M
where “H” stands for the category of “humans” and “M” stands for the
category, “things that are mortal.” Notice that the categories are nouns or noun
phrases. Thus, instead of saying that the category is “mortal” I said the
category is “things that are mortal.” It is important to recognize the difference
between how the capital letters are being used in categorical logic and how
they were used in propositional logic. In categorical logic, the capital letters
stand for noun phrases that denote categories of things in the world—for
example, “cars” or “things that are man-made” or “mammals” or “things that
are red.”
In categorical logic, we will use what are called Venn diagrams to represent the
logical relationships between the different kinds of categorical statements. A
Venn diagram is simply a way of graphically representing the logical relationship
between two different categorical statements. Below is a Venn diagram that
represents the statement, “all humans are mortal.”
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Here is how to understand this Venn. There are two circles that represent the
two categories, “humans” and “things that are mortal.” These two categories
are overlapping so that the intersection of those two categories (i.e. the place
where the two circles overlap) represents things that are both human and
mortal. Any shaded portions of the Venn diagram (by “shaded” I will mean
“blacked out”) represent that there is nothing in that area of the category. So
the above Venn says that there is nothing in the category “humans” that is not
also in the category “things that are mortal.” The above Venn also allows that
there are things that are in the category “things that are mortal” but that aren’t
in the category “humans” (which is as it should be since, of course, dogs are
mortal and yet not human). So the reason the category “things that are mortal”
is left unshaded is that in saying “all humans are mortal” I leave open the
possibility that there are things that are not human and yet mortal.
As noted above, the statement, “all humans are mortal,” has a particular form:
All H are M.
This is one of the four categorical forms. The way we will represent these
categorical forms generally are with an “S” (which stands for “subject term”) and
a “P” (which stands for “predicate term”). Thus, the categorical statement, “all
humans are mortal,” has the following categorical form:
All S are P
The way we interpret statements of this form are as follows: everything in the
category S is also in the category P. This statement form is what we call a
“universal affirmative,” since it is a universal statement that does not contain a
negation. There are three other categorical statement forms that you will have
to become familiar with in order to do categorical logic. Here they are (with the
name of the type of statement in parentheses to the right:
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Here are three examples of statements that have these three forms
(respectively):
Notice that although these three statements don’t have exactly the same form
as the statement forms above, they can be translated into those same forms. All
we have to do is figure out the noun phrase that describes each category that
the statement is referring to. Let’s start with “no reptiles give live birth.” This
categorical statement refers to two different categories: the category of
“reptiles” and the category of “things that give live birth.” Notice, again, that I
added “things that…” to the predicate of the sentence (“give live birth”)
because “give live birth” is not a description of a category. Rather, the way of
describing the category is with the noun phrase, “things that give live birth.”
Using these two category descriptions, we can translate this sentence to have
the same form as its categorical form. All we have to do is substitute in the
name of the subject category (i.e., the “S” term) and the description of the
predicate category (i.e., the “P” term). Doing that will yield the following
sentence:
Although this sentence sounds strange in English, it has the same form as the
categorical form, no S are P, and this translation allows us to clearly see that it
does and thus to see what the two categories are. Here is what the Venn
diagram for this statement looks like:
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This Venn diagram represents that there is nothing in the intersection of the two
categories, “reptiles” and “things that give live birth.” If you think about it, this
is exactly what our original statement was saying: there isn’t anything that is
both a reptile and gives live birth.
Let’s look at the next statement, “some birds are taller than President Obama.”
This is a statement not about all birds, but about some birds. What are the two
categories? One category is clearly “birds.” The other category is “things that
are taller than President Obama.” That may sound like a strange category, but it
is perfectly legitimate category. It includes things like adult ostriches, large
grizzly bears standing on their hind legs, giraffes, the Flatiron Building, a school
bus, etc. Here is how we’d translate this sentence using our two categories:
Some birds are things that are taller than President Obama.
Again, although this sentence sounds strange in English, it has the same form as
the categorical form, some S are P, and it allows us to clearly see what the two
categories are. Below is the Venn diagram for this statement:
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By convention, an asterisk on the Venn diagram means that there is at least one
thing in that category. By putting the asterisk in the intersection of the two
categories, we are saying that there is at least one thing that is a bird and is
taller than President Obama, which is exactly what our original sentence was
saying.
Finally, let’s consider the statement, “some birds don’t fly.” How would we
translate this sentence to have the “some S are not P” form? The first step is to
get the descriptions of the two categories using either nouns or noun phrases.
The “S” term is easy; it is just “birds” again. But we have to be a bit more
careful with the “P” term, since its predicate contains a negation. We do not
want any of our categories to contain a negation. Rather, the negation is
contained in the form (i.e., the “not”). The category cannot be simply “fly” or
even “flies” since neither of these are a category of thing. We have to use our
trick of turning the predicate into a noun phrase, i.e., “things that fly.” Given
these two category descriptions, we can then translate the sentence to have the
categorical form, some S are not P:
Again, although the English sounds clunky here, it has the same form as the
categorical form, some S are not P, and it allows us to clearly see what the two
categories are. Below is the Venn diagram for this statement:
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By convention, an asterisk on the Venn diagram means that there is at least one
thing in that category. By putting the asterisk inside the “birds” category, but
outside the “things that fly” category, we are representing that at least one
thing that is a bird isn’t a thing that flies. This is exactly what our original
sentence was saying.
This is a categorical statement, but which of the four categorical forms does it
have? The first step is to ask what two categories are being referred to in this
sentence. Here are the two categories: “things that love me” and “things that
are my mother.” Notice that the category couldn’t just be “my mother” since
that isn’t a category; it’s a particular thing. Again, this sounds strange, but it is
important to remember that we are describing categories of things. The next
question is: what is this sentence saying is the relationship between these two
categories? Hint: it has to be one of the four categorical forms (since any
categorical statement can be translated into one of these four forms). The
sentence is saying that the only things that love me are things that are my
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mother. The categorical form of the statement is the “all S are P” form. Thus,
the sentence, translated into the correct categorical form would be:
We will end this section with one last example. Consider the following
categorical statement:
Which of the four categorical forms does this statement have? Although the
article “the,” which often denotes particulars, may lead one to think that this is a
particular affirmative form (some S are P), it is actually a universal affirmative
form (all S are P). This English sentence has the sense of “baboons are fearsome
beasts” rather than of “that (particular) baboon is a fearsome beast.” English is
strange, which is what makes translation one of the trickiest parts of logic. So,
the two categories are: “baboons” and “fearsome beasts.” Notice that since
“fearsome beasts” is already a noun phrase, we don’t have to add “things that
are…” to it. Using the two category descriptions, the translation into the “all S
are P” categorical form is thus:
In this section we have learned what categorical statement are, how to translate
categorical statements into one of the four categorical forms, and how to
construct Venn diagrams for each of the four categorical forms. The following
exercises will give you some practice with the translation part; in subsequent
sections we will learn how to use Venn diagrams as a formal method of
evaluating a certain class of arguments.
Exercise 18: Translate each of the following sentences into one of the
four categorical forms (universal affirmative, universal negative, particular
affirmative, particular negative). Make sure that the descriptions of the
two categories are nouns or noun phrases (rather than adjectives or
verbs).
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In the last section, we introduced the four categorical forms. Those forms are
below.
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If we construct a Venn diagram for the premise and another Venn diagram for
the conclusion, we will see that the Venn diagrams are identical to each other.
That is, the information that is represented in the Venn for the premise, is exactly
the same information represented in the Venn for the conclusion. This argument
passes the Venn test of validity because the conclusion Venn contains no
additional information that is not already contained in the premise Venn. Thus,
this argument is valid. Let’s now turn to an example of an invalid argument.
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Here are the Venns for the premise and the conclusion, respectively:
In this case, the Venns are clearly not the same. More importantly, we can see
that the conclusion Venn (on the right) contains additional information that is not
already contained in the premise Venn. In particular, the conclusion Venn allows
that a) there could be things in the “car” category that aren’t in the “vehicle”
category and b) that there cannot be anything in the “vehicle” category that
isn’t also in the “car” category. That is not information that is contained in the
premise Venn, which says that a) there isn’t anything in the category “car” that
isn’t also in the category “vehicle” and b) that there could be things in the
category “vehicle” that aren’t in the category “car.” Thus, this argument does
not pass the Venn test of validity since there is information contained in the
conclusion Venn that is not already contained in the premise Venn. Thus, this
argument is invalid.
The Venn test of validity is a formal method, because we can apply it even if we
only know the form of the categorical statements, but don’t know what the
categories referred to in the statements represent. For example, we can simply
use “S” and “P” for the categories—and we clearly don’t know what these
represent. For example:
1. All S are P
2. No P are S
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The conclusion (on the right) contains information that is not contained in the
premise (on the left). In particular, the conclusion Venn explicitly rules out that
there is anything that is both in the category “S” and in the category “P” while
the premise Venn allows that this is the case (but does not require it). Thus, we
can say that this argument fails the Venn test of validity and thus is invalid. We
know this even though we have no idea what the categories “S” and “P” are.
This is the mark of a formal method of evaluation.
1. All S are P
2. Therefore, some S are P
Is this inference valid or invalid? As it turns out, this is an issue on which there
has been much philosophical debate. On the one hand, it seems that many
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times when we make a universal statement, such as “all dogs are mammals,” we
imply that there are dogs—i.e., that dogs exist. Thus, if we assert that all dogs
are mammals, that implies that some dogs are mammals (just as if I say that
everyone at the party was drunk, this implies that at least someone at the party
was drunk). In general, it may seem that “all” implies “some” (since some is
encompassed by all). This reasoning would support the idea that the above
inference is valid: universal statements imply certain particular statements. Thus,
statements of the form “all S are P” would imply that statements of the form
“some S are P.” This is what is called “existential commitment.”
In contrast to the reasoning just laid out, modern logicians reject existential
commitment; they do not take statements of the form “all S are P” to imply that
there exists anything in the “S” category. Why would they think this? One way
of understanding why universal statements are interpreted in this way in modern
logic is by considering laws such as the following:
All bodies that are not acted on by any force are at rest.
All passenger cars that can travel 770 mph are supersonic.
The “S” terms in the above categorical statements are “trespassers,” “bodies
that are not acted on by any force,” and “passenger cars that can travel 770
mph.” Now ask yourself: do these statements commit us to the existence of
either trespassers or bodies not acted on by any force? No, they don’t. Just
because we assert the rule that all trespassers will be fined, we do not
necessarily commit ourselves to the claim that there are trespassers. Rather,
what we are saying is anything that is a trespasser will be fined. But this can be
true, even if there are no trespassers! Likewise, when Isaac Newton asserted
that all bodies that are not acted on by any force remain at rest, he was not
committing himself to the existence of “bodies not acted on by any force.”
Rather, he was saying that anything that is a body not acted on by any force will
remain in motion. But this can be true, even if there are no bodies not acted on
by any force! (And there aren’t any such bodies, since even things that are
stationary like your house or your car parked in the driveway are still acted on by
forces such as gravity and friction.) Finally, in asserting that all passenger cars
that can travel 770 mph are supersonic, we are not committing ourselves to the
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existence of any such car. Rather, we are only saying that were there any such
car, it would be supersonic (i.e., it would travel faster than the speed of sound).
For various reasons (that we will not discuss here), modern logic treats a
universal categorical statement as a kind of conditional statement. Thus, a
statement like,
All passenger cars that can travel 770 mph are supersonic
is interpreted as follows:
For any x, if x is a passenger car that can travel 770 mph then x is
supersonic.
But since conditional statements do not assert either the antecedent or the
consequent, the universal statement is not asserting the existence of passenger
cars that can travel 770 mph. Rather, it is just saying that if there were
passenger cars that could travel that fast, then those things would be
supersonic.
We will follow modern logic in denying existential commitment. That is, we will
not interpret universal affirmative statements of the form “All S are P” as
implying particular affirmative statements of the form “some S are P.” Likewise,
we will not interpret universal negative statements of the form “no S are P” as
implying particular negative statements of the form “some S are not P.” Thus,
when constructing Venn diagrams, you can always rely on the fact that if there is
no particular represented in the premise Venn (i.e., there is no asterisk), then if
the conclusion Venn represents a particular (i.e., there is an asterisk), the
argument will be invalid. This is so since no universal statement logically implies
the existence of any particular. Conversely, if the premise Venn does represent
a particular statement (i.e., it contains an asterisk), then if the conclusion doesn’t
contain particular statement (i.e., doesn’t contain an asterisk), the argument will
be invalid.
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Thus, any categorical syllogism’s premises and conclusion will be some mixture
of these different types of statement. The argument I gave at the beginning of
section 2.13 was a categorical syllogism. Here, again, is that argument:
As we can see now that we have learned the four categorical forms, each one of
the statements in this syllogism is a “universal affirmative” statement of the
form, “all S are P.” Let’s first translate each statement of this argument to have
the “all S are P” form:
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We need a three category Venn for the premises since the two premises refer to
three different categories. The way you should construct the Venn is with the
circle that represents the “S” category of the conclusion (i.e., the category
“humans”) on left, the circle that represents the “P” category of the conclusion
(i.e., the category “things that die”) on the right, and the remaining category
(“things that are mortal”) in the middle, as I have done above. Constructing
your three category Venn in this way will allow you to easily determine whether
the argument is valid.
The next thing we must do is represent the information from the first two
premises in our three category Venn. We’ll start with the first premise, which
says “all humans are things that are mortal.” That means that we must shade
out anything that is in the “human” category, but that isn’t in the “things that
are mortal” category, like this:
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The next thing we have to do is fill in the information for the second premise, all
things that are mortal are things that die. That means that there isn’t anything
that is in the category “things that are mortal” but that isn’t in the “things that
die” category. So we must shade out all of the parts of the “things that are
mortal” category the lie outside the “things that die” category, like this:
The next thing we have to do is construct a two category Venn for the
conclusion and then compare the information represented by the three category
Venn for the premises to the two category Venn for the conclusion.
The conclusion represents the information that there is nothing in the “humans”
category that isn’t also in the “things that die” category. It also allows that there
are things that die, but that aren’t humans. The premise Venn also includes this
same information, since every part of the “humans” category that is outside the
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“things that die” category is shaded out. Thus, this argument passes the Venn
test of validity and is thus valid since there is no information represented in the
conclusion Venn that is not also represented in the premise Venn. Notice that it
doesn’t matter that the premise Venn contains more information than the
conclusion Venn. That is to be expected, since the premise Venn is representing
a whole other category that the conclusion Venn isn’t. This is perfectly
allowable. What isn’t allowable (and thus would make an argument fail the Venn
test of validity) is if the conclusion Venn contained information that wasn’t
already contained in the premise Venn. However, since this argument does not
do that, it is valid.
The first step is to identify the three categories referred to in this categorical
syllogism. They are:
Pediatricians
Doctors
Things that like children
The next step is to fill out the three category Venn for the premises and the two
category Venn for the conclusion.
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This argument does not pass the Venn test of validity because there is
information contained in the conclusion Venn that is not contained in the
premise Venn. In particular, the conclusion says that there is nothing in the
“doctors” category that is outside the “things that like children category.”
However, the premises do not represent that information, since the section of
the category “doctors” that lies outside of the intersection of the category
“things that like children” is unshaded, thus representing that there can be
things there.
Mammals
Bears
Two-legged creatures
As always, we will put the “S” term of the conclusion on the left of our three
category Venn, the “P” term on the right, and the remaining term in the middle,
as follows:
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Now we need to represent the first premise, which means we need to put an
asterisk in the intersection of the “mammals” and “bears” categories. However,
here we have a choice to make. Since the intersection of the “bears” and
“mammals” categories contains a section that is outside the “two-legged
creatures” category and a section that is inside the “two-legged creatures”
category, we must choose between representing the particular as part of the
“two-legged creatures” category or not.
But neither of these can be right, since the first premise says nothing at all about
whether the thing that is both a bear and a mammal is two-legged! Thus, in
order to accurately represent the information contained in this premise, we must
adopt a new convention. That convention says that when we encounter a
situation where we must represent a particular on our three category Venn, but
the premise says nothing about a particular category, then we must put the
asterisk on the line of that category as I have done below. When we do this, it
will represent that the particular is neither inside the category or outside the
category.
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We must do this same thing for the second premise, since we encounter the
same problem there. Thus, when putting the asterisk in the intersection of the
“two-legged creatures” and “mammals” categories, we cannot put the asterisk
either inside or outside the “bears” category. Instead, we must put the asterisk
on the line of the “bears” category. Thus, using this convention, we can
represent the premise Venn and conclusion Venn as follows:
Keeping in mind the convention we have just introduced, we can see that this
argument fails the Venn test of validity and is thus invalid. The reason is that the
conclusion Venn clearly represents an individual in the intersection of the “two-
legged creatures” and “bears” categories, whereas the premise Venn contains
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no such information. Thus, the conclusion Venn contains information that is not
contained in the premise Venn, which means the argument is invalid.
We will close this section with one last example that will illustrate an important
strategy. The strategy is that we should always map universal statements before
mapping particular statements. Here is a categorical syllogism that illustrates
this point. This time I am going to switch to just using the capital letters S, P,
and M to represent the categories. Recall that we can do this because the Venn
test of validity is a formal evaluation method where we don’t have to actually
understand what the categories represent in the world in order to determine
whether the argument is valid.
1. Some S are M
2. All M are P
3. ∴ Some S are P
If we think about mapping the first premise on our three category Venn, it seems
that we will have to utilize the convention we just introduced, since the first
premise is a particular categorical statement that mentions only the categories S
and M and nothing about the category P:
However, as it turns out, we don’t have to use this convention because when we
map premise 2, which is a universal statement, this clears up where the asterisk
has to go:
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We can see that once we’ve mapped the universal statement onto the premise
Venn (on the left), there is only one section where the asterisk can go that is in
the intersection of S and M. The reason is that once we have mapped the “all M
are P” premise, and have thus shaded out any portion of the M category that is
outside the P category, we know that that asterisk cannot belong inside the M
category, given that it has to be inside the P category. When we apply the Venn
test of validity to the above argument, we can see that it is valid since the
conclusion Venn does not contain any information that isn’t already contained in
the premise Venn. The conclusion simply says that there is some thing that is
both S and P, and that information is already represented in our premise Venn.
Thus, the argument is valid. The point of strategy here is that we should always
map our universal statements onto our three category Venns before mapping
our particular statements. The reason is that the universal can determine how
we map our particular statements (but not vice versa).
Exercise 21: Use the Venn test of validity to determine whether the
following syllogisms are valid or invalid.
1. All M is P
All M is S 3. All M is P
∴ All S is P Some M is S
∴ Some S is P
2. All P is M
All M is S 4. All P is M
∴ All S is P Some M is S
∴ Some S is P
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13. No P is M
5. All P is M Some M is not S
Some S is M ∴ Some S is not P
∴ Some S is P
14. No P is M
6. All P is M No M is S
Some S is not M ∴ No S is P
∴ Some S is not P
15. No P is M
7. All M is P All M is S
Some S is not M ∴ No S is P
∴ Some S is not P
16. No P is M
8. All M is P All S is M
Some M is not S ∴ No S is P
∴ Some S is not P
17. All P is M
9. No M is P No S is M
Some S is M ∴ No S is P
∴ Some S is not P
18. All M is P
10. No P is M No S is M
Some S is M ∴ No S is P
∴ Some S is not P
19. Some M is P
11. No P is M Some M is not S
Some S is not M ∴ Some S is not P
∴ Some S is not P
20. Some P is M
12. No M is P Some S is not M
Some S is not M ∴ Some S is P
∴ Some S is not P
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Without knowing anything else about Tweets, it is a good bet that Tweets flies.
However, if we were to add that Tweets is 6 ft. tall and can run 30 mph, then it is
no longer a good bet that Tweets can fly (since in this case Tweets is likely an
ostrich and therefore can’t fly). The second premise, “most healthy, normally
functioning birds fly,” is a statistical generalization. Statistical generalizations
are generalizations arrived at by empirical observations of certain regularities.
Statistical generalizations can be either universal or partial. Universal
generalizations assert that all members (i.e., 100%) of a certain class have a
certain feature, whereas partial generalizations assert that most or some
percentage of members of a class have a certain feature. For example, the
claim that “67.5% of all prisoners released from prison are rearrested within
three years” is a partial generalization that is much more precise than simply
saying that “most prisoners released from prison are rearrested within three
years.” In contrast, the claim that “all prisoners released from prison are
rearrested within three years” is a universal generalization. As we can see from
these examples, deductive arguments typically use universal statistical
generalizations whereas inductive arguments typically use partial statistical
generalizations. Since statistical generalizations are often crucial premises in
both deductive and inductive arguments, being able to evaluate when a
statistical generalization is good or bad is crucial for being able to evaluate
arguments. What we are doing in evaluating statistical generalizations is
determining whether the premise in our argument is true (or at least well-
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This is an inductive argument because even if the premise is true, the conclusion
could still be false (for example, an opponent of candidate X could
systematically kill or intimidate those voters who intend to vote for candidate X
so that very few of them will actually vote). Furthermore, it is clear that the
argument is intended to be inductive because the conclusion contains the word
“probably,” which clearly indicates that an inductive, rather than deductive,
inference is intended. Remember that in evaluating arguments we want to know
about the strength of the inference from the premises to the conclusion, but we
also want to know whether the premise is true! We can assess whether or not a
statistical generalization is true by considering whether the statistical
generalization meets certain conditions. There are two conditions that any
statistical generalization must meet in order for the generalization to be deemed
“good.”
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population I was trying to generalize about (i.e., the total number of cars and
trucks that drove down my street in a day). The “adequate sample size”
condition and the “non-biased sample” condition are ways of making sure that a
sample is representative. In the rest of this section, we will explain each of these
conditions in turn.
The non-biased sample condition may not be met even when the adequate
sample size condition is met. For example, suppose that I count all the cars on
my street for a three hour period from 11-2 pm during a weekday. Let’s assume
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that counting for three hours straight give us an adequate sample size.
However, suppose that during those hours (lunch hours) there is a much higher
proportion of trucks to cars, since (let’s suppose) many work trucks are coming
to and from worksites during those lunch hours. If that were the case, then my
sample, although large enough, would not be representative because it would
be biased. In particular, the number of trucks to cars in the sample would be
higher than in the overall population, which would make the sample
unrepresentative of the population (and hence biased).
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method will not produce a representative sample because elderly voters are
much less likely to use cell phones and text messaging and so the poll will leave
out the responses of these elderly voters (who, we’ve assumed make up a large
segment of the population). Thus, the sample will be biased and
unrepresentative of the target population. As a result, any attempt to generalize
to the general population would be extremely ill-advised.
Before ending this section, we should consider one other source of bias, which is
a bias in the polling questionnaire itself (what statisticians call the “instrument”).
Suppose that a poll is trying to determine how much a population favors organic
food products. We can imagine the questionnaire containing a choice like the
following:
Because of the phrasing of the options, it seems clear that many people will
choose option “b.” Although the two options do accurately describe the
difference between organic and non-organic products, option “b” sounds much
more desirable than option “a.” The phrasing of the options is biased insofar as
“a” is a stand-in for “organic” and “b” is stand-in for “non-organic.” Even
people who favor organic products may be more inclined to choose option “b”
here. Thus, the poll would not be representative because the responses would
be skewed by the biased phrasing of the options. Here is another example with
the same point:
Again, because option “b” sounds so bad and “a” sounds more attractive,
those responding to a poll with this question might be inclined to choose “a”
even if they don’t really support gun rights. This is another example of how bias
can creep into a statistical generalization through a biased way of asking a
question.
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4. Tom counts and categorizes birds that land in the tree in his backyard
every day from 5:00-6:00 am, from 11:00-12:00 pm, and from 5:00-
6:00 pm. He counts mostly Mourning Doves and generalizes, “most
birds that land in my tree during the 24-hour day are Mourning
Doves.”
5. Tom counts and categorizes birds that land in the tree in his backyard
every evening from 10:00-11:00 pm. He counts mostly owls and
generalizes, “most birds that land in my tree throughout the 24-hour
day are owls.”
6. Tom counts and categorizes birds that land in the tree in his backyard
every evening from 10:00-11:00 pm and from 2:00-3:00 am. He
counts mostly owls and generalizes, “most birds that land in my tree
throughout the night are owls.”
7. A poll administered to 10,000 registered voters who were home-
owners showed that 90% supported a policy to slash Medicaid
funding and decrease property taxes. Therefore, 90% of voters
support a policy to slash Medicaid funding.
8. A telephone poll administered by a computer randomly generating
numbers to call, found that 68% of Americans in the sample of 2000
were in favor of legalizing recreational marijuana use. Thus, almost
70% of Americans favor legalizing recreation marijuana use.
9. A randomized telephone poll in the United States asked respondents
whether they supported a) a policy that allows killing innocent children
in the womb or b) a policy that saves the lives of innocent children in
the womb. The results showed that 69% of respondents choose
option “b” over option “a.” The generalization was made that “most
Americans favor a policy that disallows abortion.”
10. Steve’s first rock and roll concert was an Ani Difranco concert, in which
most of the concert-goers were women with feminist political slogans
written on their t-shirts. Steve makes the generalization that “most
rock and roll concert-goers are women who are feminists.” He then
applies this generalization to the next concert he attends (Tom Petty)
and is greatly surprised by what he finds.
11. A high school principal conducts a survey of how satisfied students are
with his high school by asking students in detention to fill out a
satisfaction survey. Generalizing from that sample, he infers that 79%
of students are dissatisfied with their high school experience. He is
surprised and saddened by the result.
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12. After having attended numerous Pistons home games over 20 years,
Alice cannot remember a time when she didn’t see ticket scalpers
selling tickets outside the stadium. She generalizes that there are
always scalpers at every Pistons home game.
13. After having attended numerous Pistons home games over 20 years,
Alice cannot remember a time when she didn’t see ticket scalpers
selling tickets outside the stadium. She generalizes that there are
ticket scalpers at every NBA game.
14. After having attended numerous Pistons home games over 20 years,
Alice cannot remember a time when she didn’t see ticket scalpers
selling tickets outside the stadium. She generalizes that there are
ticket scalpers at every sporting event.
15. Bob once ordered a hamburger from Burger King and got violently ill
shortly after he ate it. From now on, he never eats at Burger King
because he fears he will get food poisoning.
3.2 Inference to the best explanation and the seven explanatory virtues
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responsible for both things) and this kind of thing is (unfortunately) not
uncommon—it happens to other people at other times and places. The
baseball-dog scenario is not as plausible because it doesn’t happen in contexts
like this one (i.e., in a parking garage) nearly as often and it is not as simple (i.e.,
we need to posit two different events that are unconnected to each other—stray
baseball, stray dog—rather than just one—the thief). Inference to the best
explanation is a form of inductive argument whose premises are a set of
observed facts, a hypothesis that explains those observed facts, and a
comparison of competing explanations, and whose conclusion is that the
hypothesis is true. The example we’ve just been discussing is an inference to
the best explanation. Here is its form:
1. Observed facts: Your car window is broken and your iPod is gone.
2. Explanation: The hypothesis that a thief broke the window and stole
your iPod provides a reasonable explanation of the observed facts.
3. Comparison: No other hypothesis provides as reasonable an
explanation.
4. Conclusion: Therefore, a thief broke your car window and stole your
iPod.
Notice that this is an inductive argument because the premises could all be true
and yet the conclusion false. Just because something is reasonable, doesn’t
mean it is true. After all, sometimes things happen in the world that defy our
reason. So perhaps the baseball-dog hypothesis was actually true. In that case,
the premises of the argument would still be true (after all, the thief hypothesis is
still more reasonable than the baseball-dog hypothesis) and yet the conclusion
would be false. But the fact that the argument is not a deductive argument isn’t
a defect of the argument, because inference to the best explanation arguments
are not intended to be deductive arguments, but inductive arguments. As we
saw in chapter 1, inductive arguments can be strong even if the premises don’t
entail the conclusion. That isn’t a defect of an inductive argument, it is simply a
definition of what an inductive argument is!
As we’ve seen, in order to make a strong inference to the best explanation, the
favored explanation must be the best (or the most reasonable). But what makes
an explanation reasonable? There are certain conditions that any good
explanation must meet. The more of these conditions are met, the better the
explanation. The first, and perhaps most obvious condition, is that the
hypothesis proposed must actually explain all the observed facts. For example,
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if, in order to explain the facts that your car window was broken and your iPod
was missing, someone were to say offer the hypothesis that a rock thrown up
from a lawnmower broke the window of your car, then this hypothesis wouldn’t
account for all the facts because it wouldn’t explain the disappearance of your
iPod. It would lack the explanatory virtue of explaining all the observed facts.
The baseball-dog hypothesis would explain all the observed facts, but it would
lack certain other explanatory virtues, such as “power” and “simplicity.” In the
remainder of this section, I will list the seven explanatory virtues and then I will
discuss each one in turn. The seven explanatory virtues are:
Suppose that when confronted with the observed facts of my car window being
broken and my iPod missing, my colleague Jeff hypothesizes that my colleague,
Paul Jurczak did it. However, given that I am friends with Paul, that Paul could
easily buy an iPod if he wanted one, and that I know Paul to be the kind of
person who has probably never stolen anything in his life (much less broken a
car window), this explanation would raise many more questions than it answers.
Why would Paul want to steal my iPod? Why would he break my car window to
do so? Etc. This explanation raises as many questions as it answers and thus it
lacks the explanatory virtue of “depth.”
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cannot be confirmed because we cannot specify any evidence that would show
it was false, so we can’t try to look for such evidence (which is what a rigorous
scientific methodology requires).
The explanatory virtue of “simplicity” tells us that all other things being equal,
the simplest explanation is the better explanation. More precisely, an
explanation that posits fewer entities or processes in order to explain the
observed facts is better than an explanation that posits more entities and
processes to explain that same set of observed facts. Here is an example of an
explanation that would lack the virtue of simplicity. Suppose that all three of our
cars in our driveway were broken into one night and that the next morning the
passenger’s side rear windows of each car were broken out. If I were to
hypothesize that three separate, unrelated thieves at three different times of the
night broke into each of the cars, then this would be an explanation that lacks
the virtue of simplicity. The far simpler explanation is that it was one thief (or
one related group of thieves) that broke into the three cars at roughly the same
time. In the domain of science, upholding simplicity is often a matter of not
positing new entities or laws when we can explain the observed facts in terms of
existing entities and laws. My earlier example of the sock gnome stealing the
socks vs. our dog Violet taking the socks is a good example to illustrate this.
Sock gnomes would be a new kind of entity that we don’t have any independent
reason to think exists, but our dog Violet clearly already exists and since the
observed facts can be explained by Violet’s actions rather than that of a sock
gnome, the Violet explanation possesses the explanatory virtue of simplicity,
whereas the sock gnome explanation lacks the explanatory virtue of simplicity.
However, sometimes science requires that we posit new kinds of entities or
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processes, as when Copernicus and Galileo suggested that the sun, rather than
the earth, was at the center of the “solar system” in order to explain certain
astronomical observations. In physics new entities are often posited in order to
explain the observations that physicists make. For example, the elementary
particle dubbed “the Higgs boson” was hypothesized by Peter Higgs (and
others) in 1964 and was confirmed in 2012. Much earlier, in 1897, J.J.
Thompson and his collaborators, drawing on the work of earlier German
physicists, discovered the electron—one of the first elementary particles to be
discovered. So there is nothing wrong with positing new laws or entities—that is
how science progresses. Simplicity doesn’t say that one should never posit new
entities; that would be absurd. Rather, it tells us that if the observed facts can
be explained without having to posit new entities, then that explanation is
preferable to an explanation that does posit new entities (all other things being
equal). Of course, sometimes the observations cannot be explained without
having to change the way we understand that world. This is when it is legitimate
to posit new entities or scientific laws.
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It should be stated that some of the examples I have given could illustrate more
than one explanatory virtue. For example, the example of the invisible sock
gnome hypothesis could illustrate either lack of falsifiability or lack of simplicity.
In identifying which explanatory virtues a particular explanation may lack, what is
important is that you give the correct reasoning for why the explanation lacks
that particular virtue. For example, if you say that the explanation isn’t
falsifiable, then you need to make sure you give the right explanation of why it
isn’t falsifiable (i.e., that there is no evidence that could ever show that the
hypothesis is false). In contrast, if the explanation lacks simplicity, you’d have to
say that there is another explanation that can equally explain all the observed
facts but that posits fewer entities or processes.
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6. Elise has the uncanny feeling that although her family members look
exactly the same, something just isn’t right about them. She
hypothesizes that her family members have been replaced with
imposters who look and act exactly like her real family members and
that no one can prove that this didn’t happen.
7. John thinks that since something cannot come from nothing and since
we know there was a Big Bang, an all-powerful but invisible and
undetectable being must have been the cause of the Big Bang.
8. Erin feels that she is being followed. Every time she looks over her
shoulder, she sees someone duck behind an object to avoid being
seen. She hypothesizes that it must be her 5th grade teacher, Mr.
Sanchez.
9. While walking through the forest at night, Claudia hears some rustling
in the bushes. It is clear to her that it isn’t just the wind, because she
can hear sticks cracking on the ground. She hypothesizes that it must
be an escaped zoo animal.
10. While driving on the freeway, Bill sees the flashing lights of a cop car
in his rear view mirror. He hypothesizes that the cops must have
finally found out about the library book that he never returned when
he was in fifth grade and are coming to get him.
11. While driving on the freeway, Bill sees the flashing lights of a cop car
in his rear view mirror. He hypothesizes that the cops are going to
pull someone over for speeding.
12. While driving on the freeway, Bill sees the flashing lights of a cop car
in his rear view mirror. He hypothesizes that the cops are going to
pull someone over for going 13.74 mph over the speed limit.
13. Stacy cannot figure out why the rat poison she is using is not killing
the rats in her apartment. She hypothesizes that the rats must be a
new breed of rats that are resistant to any kind of poison and that
evolved in the environment of her apartment.
14. Stacy cannot figure out why the rat poison she is using is not killing
the rats in her apartment. She hypothesizes that the rats must be a
new breed of rats that are immortal and that evolved in the
environment of her apartment.
15. Bob is fed up with his life. He intends to kill himself so he gets his
gun, puts bullets into it and pull the trigger. Miraculously, he is not
killed. Bob hypothesizes that he must be immortal.
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constructed with the same quality parts and quality assembly as the other cars
I’d owned (and that had been reliable for me). What this illustrates is that better
arguments from analogy will invoke more relevant similarities between the
things being compared in the analogy. This is a key condition for any good
argument from analogy: the similar characteristics between the two things cited
in the premises must be relevant to the characteristic cited in the conclusion.
1
This argument comes (with interpretive liberties on my part) from Peter Singer’s, “The Singer
Solution to World Poverty” published in the NY Times Magazine, September 5, 1999.
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life in just six years.2 Given these facts, and comparing these two scenarios
(Bob’s and your own), the argument from analogy proceeds like this:
1. Bob chose to have a luxury item for himself rather than to save the life
of a child.
2. “We” regularly choose having luxury items rather than saving the life
of a child.
3. What Bob did was morally wrong.
4. Therefore, what we are doing is morally wrong as well.
The two things being compared here are Bob’s situation and our own. The
argument then proceeds by claiming that since we judge what Bob did to be
morally wrong, and since our situation is analogous to Bob’s in relevant respects
(i.e., choosing to have luxury items for ourselves rather than saving the lives of
dying children), then our actions of purchasing luxury items for ourselves must
be morally wrong for the same reason.
One way of arguing against the conclusion of this argument is by trying to argue
that there are relevant disanalogies between Bob’s situation and our own. For
example, one might claim that in Bob’s situation, there was something much
more immediate he could do to save the child’s life right then and there. In
contrast, our own situation is not one in which a child that is physically proximate
to us is in imminent danger of death, where there is something we can
immediately do about it. One might argue that this disanalogy is enough to
show that the two situations are not analogous and that, therefore, the
conclusion does not follow. Whether or not this response to the argument is
adequate, we can see that the way of objecting to an argument from analogy is
by trying to show that there are relevant differences between the two things
being compared in the analogy. For example, to return to my car example,
even if the new car was a Subaru and was made under the same conditions as all
of my other Subarus, if I purchased the current Subaru used, whereas all the
other Subarus had been purchased new, then that could be a relevant difference
that would weaken the conclusion that this Subaru will be reliable.
So we’ve seen that an argument from analogy is strong only if the following two
conditions are met:
2
http://www.givewell.org/giving101/Your-dollar-goes-further-overseas
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Arguments from analogy that meet these two conditions will tend to be stronger
inductive arguments.
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10. If health insurance companies pay for heart surgery and brain surgery,
which can both increase an individual’s happiness, then they should
also pay for cosmetic surgery, which can also increase an individual’s
happiness.
11. A knife is an eating utensil that can cut things. A spoon is also an
eating utensil. So a spoon can probably cut things as well.
12. Any artificial, complex object like a watch or a telescope has been
designed by some intelligent human designer. But naturally occurring
objects like eyes and brains are also very complex objects. Therefore,
complex naturally occurring objects must have been designed by
some intelligent non-human designer.
13. The world record holding runner, Kenenisa Bekele ran 100 miles per
week and twice a week did workouts comprised of ten mile repeats on
the track in the weeks leading up to his 10,000 meter world record. I
have run 100 miles per week and have been doing ten mile repeats
twice a week. Therefore, the next race I will run will probably be a
world record.
14. I feel pain when someone hits me in the face with a hockey puck. We
are both human beings, so you also probably feel pain when you are
hit in the face with a hockey puck.
15. The color I experience when I see something as “green” has a
particular quality (that is difficult to describe). You and I are both
human beings, so the color you experience when you see something
green probably has the exact same quality. (That is, what you and I
experience when we see something green is the exact same
experiential color.)
When I strike a match, it will produce a flame. It is natural to take the striking of
the match as the cause that produces the effect of a flame. But what if the
matchbook is wet? Or what if I happen to be in a vacuum in which there is no
oxygen (such as in outer space)? If either of those things is the case, then the
striking of the match will not produce a flame. So it isn’t simply the striking of
the match that produces the flame, but a combination of the striking of the
match together with a number of other conditions that must be in place in order
for the striking of the match to create a flame. Which of those conditions we call
the “cause” depends in part on the context. Suppose that I’m in outer space
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striking a match (suppose I’m wearing a space suit that supplies me with oxygen
but that I’m striking the match in space, where there is no oxygen). I
continuously strike it but no flame appears (of course). But then someone (also
in a space suit) brings out a can of compressed oxygen that they spray on the
match while I strike it. All of a sudden a flame is produced. In this context, it
looks like it is the spraying of oxygen that causes flame, not the striking of the
match. Just as in the case of the striking of the match, any cause is more
complex than just a simple event that produces some other event. Rather, there
are always multiple conditions that must be in place for any cause to occur.
These conditions are called background conditions. That said, we often take
for granted the background conditions in normal contexts and just refer to one
particular event as the cause. Thus, we call the striking of the match the cause
of the flame. We don’t go on to specify all the other conditions that conspired
to create the flame (such as the presence of oxygen and the absence of water).
But this is more for convenience than correctness. For just about any cause,
there are a number of conditions that must be in place in order for the effect to
occur. These are called necessary conditions (recall the discussion of necessary
and sufficient conditions from chapter 2, section 2.7). For example, a necessary
condition of the match lighting is that there is oxygen present. A necessary
condition of a car running is that there is gas in the tank. We can use necessary
conditions to diagnose what has gone wrong in cases of malfunction. That is,
we can consider each condition in turn in order to determine what caused the
malfunction. For example, if the match doesn’t light, we can check to see
whether the matches are wet. If we find that the matches are wet then we can
explain the lack of the flame by saying something like, “dropping the matches in
the water caused the matches not to light.” In contrast, a sufficient condition is
one which, if present, will always bring about the effect. For example, a person
being fed through an operating wood chipper is sufficient for causing that
person’s death (as was the fate of Steve Buscemi’s character in the movie Fargo).
Because the natural world functions in accordance with natural laws (such as the
laws of physics), causes can be generalized. For example, any object near the
surface of the earth will fall towards the earth at 9.8 m/s2 unless impeded by
some contrary force (such as the propulsion of a rocket). This generalization
applies to apples, rocks, people, wood chippers and every other object. Such
causal generalizations are often parts of explanations. For example, we can
explain why the airplane crashed to the ground by citing the causal
generalization that all unsupported objects fall to the ground and by noting that
the airplane had lost any method of propelling itself because the engines had
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For example:
For any human, if that human has been fed through an operating wood
chipper, then that human is dead.
For any engine, if that engine has no fuel, then that engine will
not operate.
For any object near the surface of the earth, if that object is unsupported
and not impeded by some contrary force, then that object will fall
towards the earth at 9.8 m/s2.
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Day 1 ~A B C D S
Day 2 A ~B C D ~S
Day 3 A B ~C D ~S
Day 4 A B C ~D S
Day 5 A B ~C D ~S
Day 6 A ~B C D ~S
How can we use this information to determine what might be causing Charlie to
have seizures? The first thing we’d want to know is what feature is present every
time he has a seizure. This would be a necessary (but not sufficient) condition.
And that can tell us something important about the cause. The necessary
condition test says that any candidate feature (here A, B, C, or D) that is absent
when the target feature (S) is present is eliminated as a possible necessary
condition of S.3 In the table above, A is absent when S is present, so A can’t be a
necessary condition (i.e., day 1). D is also absent when S is present (day 4) so D
can’t be a necessary condition either. In contrast, B is never absent when S is
present—that is every time S is present, B is also present. That means B is a
necessary condition, based on the data that we have gathered so far. The same
applies to C since it is never absent when S is present. Notice that there are
times when both B and C are absent, but on those days the target feature (S) is
absent as well, so it doesn’t matter.
The next thing we’d want to know is which feature is such that every time it is
present, Charlie has a seizure. The test that is relevant to determining this is
called the sufficient condition test. The sufficient condition test says that any
candidate that is present when the target feature (S) is absent is eliminated as a
possible sufficient condition of S. In the table above, we can see that no one
candidate feature is a sufficient condition for causing the seizures since for each
candidate (A, B, C, D) there is a case (i.e. day) where it is present but that no
seizure occurred. Although no one feature is sufficient for causing the seizures
(according to the data we have gathered so far), it is still possible that certain
features are jointly sufficient. Two candidate features are jointly sufficient for a
target feature if and only if there is no case in which both candidates are present
3
This discussion draws heavily on chapter 10, pp. 220-224 of Sinnott-Armstrong and Fogelin’s
Understanding Arguments, 9th edition (Cengage Learning).
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and yet the target is absent. Applying this test, we can see that B and C are
jointly sufficient for the target feature since any time both are present, the target
feature is always present. Thus, from the data we have gathered so far, we can
say that the likely cause of Charlie’s seizures are when we both give him a bath
and then follow that bath up with a flea treatment. Every time those two things
occur, he has a seizure (sufficient condition); and every time he has a seizure,
those two things occur (necessary condition). Thus, the data gathered so far
supports the following causal conditional:
Any time Charlie is given a shampoo bath and a flea treatment, he has a
seizure.
Although in the above case, the necessary and sufficient conditions were the
same, this needn’t always be the case. Sometimes sufficient conditions are not
necessary conditions. For example, being fed through a wood chipper is a
sufficient condition for death, but it certainly isn’t necessary! (Lot’s of people die
without being fed through a wood chipper, so it can’t be a necessary condition
of dying.) In any case, determining necessary and sufficient conditions is a key
part of determining a cause.
When analyzing data to find a cause it is important that we rigorously test each
candidate. Here is an example to illustrate rigorous testing. Suppose that on
every day we collected data about Charlie he ate human food but that on none
of the days was he given a bath and shampoo, as the table below indicates.
Day 1 A ~B C D ~S
Day 2 A ~B C D ~S
Day 3 A ~B ~C D ~S
Day 4 A ~B C ~D S
Day 5 A ~B ~C D ~S
Day 6 A ~B C D S
Given this data, A trivially passes the necessary condition test since it is always
present (thus, there can never be a case where A is absent when S is present).
However, in order to rigorously test A as a necessary condition, we have to look
for cases in which A is not present and then see if our target condition S is
present. We have rigorously tested A as a necessary condition only if we have
collected data in which A was not present. Otherwise, we don’t really know
whether A is a necessary condition. Similarly, B trivially passes the sufficient
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condition test since it is never present (thus, there can never be a case where B
is present but S is absent). However, in order to rigorously test B as a sufficient
condition, we have to look for cases in which B is present and then see if our
target condition S is absent. We have rigorously tested B as a sufficient
condition only if we have collected data in which B is present. Otherwise, we
don’t really know whether B is a sufficient condition or not.
In rigorous testing, we are actively looking for (or trying to create) situations in
which a candidate feature fails one of the tests. That is why when rigorously
testing a candidate for the necessary condition test, we must seek out cases in
which the candidate is not present, whereas when rigorously testing a candidate
for the sufficient condition test, we must seek out cases in which the candidate is
present. In the example above, A is not rigorously tested as a necessary
condition and B is not rigorously tested as a sufficient condition. If we are
interested in finding a cause, we should always rigorously test each candidate.
This means that we should always have a mix of different situations where the
candidates and targets are sometimes present and sometimes absent.
The necessary and sufficient conditions tests can be applied when features of
the environment are wholly present or wholly absent. However, in situations
where features of the environment are always present in some degree, these
tests will not work (since there will never be cases where the features are absent
and so rigorous testing cannot be applied). For example, suppose we are trying
to figure out whether CO2 is a contributing cause to higher global temperatures.
In this case, we can’t very well look for cases in which CO2 is present but high
global temperatures aren’t (sufficient condition test), since CO2 and high
temperatures are always present to some degree. Nor can we look for cases in
which CO2 is absent when high global temperatures are present (necessary
condition test), since, again, CO2 and high global temperatures are always
present to some degree. Rather, we must use a different method, the method
that J.S. Mill called the method of concomitant variation. In concomitant
variation we look for how things vary vis-à-vis each other. For example, if we see
that as CO2 levels rise, global temperatures also rise, then this is evidence that
CO2 and higher temperatures are positively correlated. When two things are
positively correlated, as one increases, the other also increases at a similar rate
(or as one decreases, the other decreases at a similar rate). In contrast, when
two things are negatively correlated, as one increases, the other decreases at
similar rate (or vice versa). For example, if as a police department increased the
number of police officers on the street, the number of crimes reported
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decreases, then number of police on the street and number of crimes reported
would be negatively correlated. In each of these examples, we may think we
can directly infer the cause from the correlation—the rising CO2 levels are
causing the rising global temperatures and the increasing number of police on
the street is causing the crime rate to drop. However, we cannot directly infer
causation from correlation. Correlation is not causation. If A and B are
positively correlated, then there are four distinct possibilities regarding what the
cause is:
1. A is the cause of B
2. B is the cause of A
3. Some third thing, C, is the cause of both A and B increasing
4. The correlation is accidental
In order to infer what causes what in a correlation, we must rely on our general
background knowledge (i.e., things we know to be true about the world), our
scientific knowledge, and possibly further scientific testing. For example, in the
global warming case, there is no scientific theory that explains how rising global
temperatures could cause rising levels of CO2 but there is a scientific theory that
enables us to understand how rising levels of CO2 could increase average global
temperatures. This knowledge makes it plausible to infer that the rising CO2
levels are causing the rising average global temperatures. In the police/crime
case, drawing on our background knowledge we can easily come up with an
inference to the best explanation argument for why increased police presence
on the streets would lower the crime rate—the more police on the street, the
harder it is for criminals to get away with crimes because there are fewer places
where those crimes could take place without the criminal being caught. Since
criminals don’t want to risk getting caught when they commit a crime, seeing
more police around will make them less likely to commit a crime. In contrast,
there is no good explanation for why decreased crime would cause there to be
more police on the street. In fact, it would seem to be just the opposite: if the
crime rate is low, the city should cut back, or at least remain stable, on the
number of police officers and put those resources somewhere else. This makes
it plausible to infer that it is the increased police officers on the street that is
causing the decrease in crime.
Sometimes two things can be correlated without either one causing the other.
Rather, some third thing is causing them both. For example, suppose that Bob
discovers a correlation between waking up with all his clothes on and waking up
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with a headache. Bob might try to infer that sleeping with all his clothes on
causes headaches, but there is probably a better explanation than that. It is
more likely that Bob’s drinking too much the night before caused him to pass
out in his bed with all his clothes on, as well as his headache. In this scenario,
Bob’s inebriation is the common cause of both his headache and his clothes
being on in bed.
And the number of Mexican lemons imported to the U.S. correlates with the
number of traffic fatalities5:
4
http://tylervigen.com/spurious-correlations
5
Stephen R. Johnson, The Trouble with QSAR (or How I Learned To Stop Worrying and Embrace
Fallacy). J. Chem. Inf. Model., 2008, 48 (1), pp. 25–26.
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Our discussion of causes has shown that we cannot say that just because A
precedes B or is correlated with B, that A caused B. To claim that since A
precedes or correlates with B, A must therefore be the cause of B is to commit
what is called the false cause fallacy. The false cause fallacy is sometimes
called the “post hoc” fallacy. “Post hoc” is short for the Latin phrase, “post hoc
ergo propter hoc,” which means “after this therefore because of this.” As we’ve
seen, false cause fallacies occur any time someone assumes that two events that
are correlated must be in a causal relationship, or that since one event precedes
another, it must cause the other. To avoid the false cause fallacy, one must look
more carefully into the relationship between A and B to determine whether
there is a true cause or just a common cause or accidental correlation. Common
causes and accidental correlations are more common than one might think.
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condition test relative to the target (G). In addition, note whether there
are any candidates that aren’t rigorously tested as either necessary or
sufficient conditions.
1.
Case 1 A B ~C D ~G
Case 2 ~A B C D G
Case 3 A ~B C D G
2.
Case 1 A B C D G
Case 2 ~A B ~C D ~G
Case 3 A ~B C ~D G
3.
Case 1 A B C D G
Case 2 ~A B C D G
Case 3 A ~B C D G
4.
Case 1 A B C D ~G
Case 2 ~A B C D G
Case 3 A ~B C ~D G
5.
Case 1 A B ~C D ~G
Case 2 ~A B C D G
Case 3 A ~B ~C ~D ~G
6.
Case 1 A B C D ~G
Case 2 ~A B C ~D ~G
Case 3 A ~B ~C D G
7.
Case 1 A B ~C D G
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Case 2 ~A ~B C D ~G
Case 3 A ~B C ~D ~G
8.
Case 1 A B ~C D ~G
Case 2 ~A ~B ~C D ~G
Case 3 A ~B ~C ~D ~G
9.
Case 1 A B C D G
Case 2 ~A ~B C D G
Case 3 A ~B ~C D ~G
10.
Case 1 ~A B ~C D ~G
Case 2 ~A B C D G
Case 3 ~A ~B ~C D G
Exercise 26: For each of the following correlations, use your background
knowledge to determine whether A causes B, B causes A, a common
cause C is the cause of both A and B, or the correlations is accidental.
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3.5 Probability
As we have seen, a strong inductive argument is one in which the truth of the
premises makes the conclusion highly probable. The distinction between strong
inductive arguments and valid (deductive) arguments is that whereas the
premises of strong inductive arguments make their conclusions highly probable,
the premises of valid arguments make their conclusions certain. We can think of
probability as how likely it is that something is (or will be) true, given a particular
body of evidence. Using numbers between 0 and 1, we can express
probabilities numerically. For example, if I have a full deck of cards and pick one
at random, what is the probability that the card I pick is a queen? Since there
are 52 cards in the deck, and only four of them are queens, the probability of
picking a queen is 4/52, or .077. That is, I have about a 7.7% chance of picking
a queen at random. In comparison, my chances of picking any “face” card
would be much higher. There are three face cards in each suit and four different
suits, which means there are 12 face cards total. So, 12/52 = .23 or 23%. In any
case, the important thing here is that probabilities can be expressed numerically.
In using a numerical scheme to represent probabilities, we take 0 to represent
an impossible event (such as a contradiction) and 1 to represent an event that is
certain (such as a tautology).
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We can think of the rules of probability in terms of some of the truth functional
operators, introduced in chapter 2: the probability of conjunctions, the
probability of negations, and the probability of disjunctions. The probability of
conjunctions is the probability that two, independent events will both occur. For
example, what is the probability that you randomly draw a queen and then (after
returning it to the pile and reshuffling the deck) you draw another queen? Since
we are asking what is the probability that these two events both occur, this is a
matter of calculating the probability of a joint occurrence. In the following, “a”
and “b” will refer to independent events, and the locution “P(a)” stands for “the
probability of a.” Here is how we calculate the probability of conjunctions:
So, to apply this to my example of drawing two queens, we have to multiply the
probability of drawing one queen, “P(a)” by the probability of drawing yet
another queen, “P(b).” Since we have already calculated the probability of
drawing a queen at .077, the math is quite simple:
That is, there a less than 1% chance (.59% to be precise) of drawing two queens
in this scenario. So, obviously, you’d not be wise to place a bet on that
happening! Let’s try another example where we have to calculate the
probability of a conjunction. Suppose I want to know what the probability that
both my father and mother will die of brain cancer. (Macabre, I know.) I’d have
to know the probability of dying of brain cancer, which is about 5/100,000. That
is, 5 out of every 100,000 people die of brain cancer. That is a very small
number: .00005. But the chance of both of them dying of brain cancer is going
to be an even smaller number:
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That is almost 1 in a billion chance. So not very likely. Let’s consider a final
example with more manageable numbers. Suppose I wanted to know the
probability of rolling a 12 when rolling two, six-sided dice. Since the only way to
roll a 12 is when I roll a 6 on each die, I can compute the probability of rolling a
6 and then the independent probability of rolling another 6 on the other die.
The probability of rolling a six on 1 die is just 1/6 = .166. Thus,
Thus, you have a 2.8% chance of rolling a 12. We could have also calculated
this using fractions instead of decimals:
P(not-a) = 1 – P(a)
1 – .028 = .972
Thus, I have 97.2% chance of not rolling a 12. So it is highly likely that I won’t
(thank goodness).
Here’s another example. What are the chances that my daughter doesn’t get
into Harvard? Since the acceptance rate at Harvard is about 6% (or .06), I simply
subtract that from 1, which yields .94, or 94%. So my daughter has a 94%
chance of not getting into Harvard.
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woman over 50 (16%) than if you are a man over 50 (4%). So if you want
accurate data concerning probability, you have to take into account all the
relevant factors. In the case of osteoporosis, that means knowing whether you
are a woman or a man and are over or under 50. The same kind of point applies
to my example of getting into Harvard. Here’s an anecdote that will illustrate
the point. Some years ago, I agreed to be a part of an interviewing process for
candidates for the “presidential scholarship” at the college at which I was
teaching at the time. The interviewees were high school students and we could
have calculated the probability that any one of them would win the scholarship
simply by noting the number of scholarships available and the number of
applicants for them. But after having interviewed the candidates I was given to
interview, it was very clear to me that one of them easily outshined all the rest.
Thus, given the new information I had, it would have been silly for me to assign
the same, generic probability to this student winning the award. This student
was extremely well-spoken, well-put-together, and answered even my hardest
questions (with which other candidates struggled) with an ease and confidence
that stunned me. On top of all of that, she was a Hispanic woman, which I knew
would only help her in the process (since colleges value diversity in their student
population). I recommended her highly for the scholarship, but I also knew that
she would end up at a much better institution (and probably with one of their
most competitive scholarships). Some time later, I was wondering where she did
end up going to college, so I did a quick search on her name and, sure enough,
she was a freshman at Harvard. No surprise to me. The point of the story is that
although we could have said that this woman’s chances of not getting into
Harvard are about 94%, this would neglect all the other things about her which
in fact drastically increase her chances of getting into Harvard (and thus
drastically decrease her chances of not getting in). So our assessments of
probability are only as good as the information we use to assess them. If we
were omniscient (i.e., all-knowing), then arguably we could know every detail
and would be able to predict with 100% accuracy any event. Since we aren’t,
we have to rely on the best information we do have and use that information to
determine the chances that an event will occur.
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Sometimes events are not independent. For example, suppose you wanted to
know the probability of drawing 5 clubs from the deck (which in poker is called a
“flush”). This time you are holding on to the cards after you draw them rather
than replacing them back into the deck. The probability of drawing the first club
is simply 13/52 (or ¼). However, each of the remaining four draws will be
affected by the previous draws. If one were to successfully draw all clubs then
after the first draw, there would be only 51 cards left, 12 of which were clubs;
after the second draw, there would be only 50 cards left, 11 of which were clubs,
and so on, like this:
As you can see, we’ve had to determine the probability of a conjunction, since
we want card 1 and card 2 and card 3 etc. to all be clubs. That is a conjunction
of different events. As you can also see, the probability of drawing such a hand
is extremely low—about .0005 or .05%. A flush is indeed a rare hand.
But suppose we wanted to know, not the chances of drawing a flush in a specific
suit, but just the chances of drawing a flush in any suit. In that case, we’d have
to calculate the probability of a disjunction of drawing either a flush in clubs or a
flush in spades or a flush in diamonds or a flush in hearts. Recall that in order to
calculate a disjunction we must add together the probabilities:
So the probability of drawing a flush in any suit is still only about .2% or one fifth
of one percent—i.e., very low.
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.5 + .5 + .5 + .5 + .5 + .5 = 3 (or 300%)
However, this cannot be right, because the probability of any event is between 1
and 0 (including 0 and 1 for events that are impossible and absolutely certain).
However, this way of calculating the probability leaves us with an event that is
three times more than certain. And nothing is more than 100% certain—100%
certainty is the limit. So something is wrong with the calculation. Another way
of seeing that something must be wrong with the calculation is that it isn’t
impossible that I flip 6 tails in a row (and thus no heads). Since that is a real
possibility (however improbable), it cannot be 100% certain that I flip at least
one head. Here is the way to think about this problem. What is the probability
that I flip all tails? That is simply the probability of the conjunction of 6 events,
each of which has the probability of .5 (or 50%):
Then we simply use the rule for calculating the probability of a negation, since
we want to know the chances that we don’t flip 6 tails in a row (i.e., we flip at
least one head):
1 – .015 = .985
So the probability of flipping at least one head in 6 flips of the coin is 98.5%. (It
would be exactly the same probability of flipping at least one tails in 6 flips.)
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3. What is the probability of rolling a five on your first throw and another
five on the second throw of that die?
4. If you roll two dice at one time, what are the chances of rolling two
twos?
5. If you roll two dice at one time, what are the chances of rolling at least
one two?
6. If you roll two dice at once, what are the chances that at most one of
the dice will come up a two?
7. If you roll two dice at once, what are the chances that the total of the
dice adds up to 8?
8. If you roll two dice at once, what are the chances that there will be no
fours?
9. If you roll two dice at once, what are the chances of rolling double
fives?
10. If you roll two dice at once, what are the chances of rolling doubles (of
any number)?
In this and the remaining sections of this chapter, we will consider some formal
fallacies of probability. These fallacies are easy to spot once you see them, but
they can be difficult to detect because of the way our minds mislead us—
analogous to the way our minds can be misled when watching a magic trick. In
addition to introducing the fallacies, I will suggest some psychological
explanations for why these fallacies are so common, despite how easy they are
to see once we’ve spotted them.
Linda is 31 years old, single, outspoken, and very bright. She majored in
philosophy. As a student, she was deeply concerned with issues of
discrimination and social justice, and also participated in anti-nuclear
demonstrations.
6
The following famous example comes from Tversky, A. and Kahneman, D. (1983). Extension
versus intuitive reasoning: The conjunction fallacy in probability judgment. Psychological Review,
90(4), 293–315.
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If you are like most people who answer this question, you will answer “b.” But
that cannot be correct because it violates the basic rules of probability. In
particular, notice that option b contains option a (i.e., Linda is a bank teller). But
option b also contains more information—that Linda is also active in the feminist
movement. The problem is that a conjunction can never be more probable than
either one of its conjuncts. Suppose we say it is very probable that Linda a bank
teller (how boring, given the description of Linda which makes her sound
interesting!). Let’s set the probability low, say .4. Then what is the probability of
her being active in the feminist movement? Let’s set that high, say .9. However,
the probability that she is both a bank teller and active in the feminist movement
must be computed as the probability of a conjunction, like this:
.4 × .9 = .36
So given these probability assignments (which I’ve just made up but seem fairly
plausible), the probability of Linda being both a bank teller and active in the
feminist movement is .36. But .36 is a lower probability than .4, which was the
probability that she is bank teller. So option b cannot be more probable than
option a. Notice that even if we say it is absolutely certain that Linda is active in
the feminist movement (i.e., we set the probability of her being active in the
feminist movement at 1), option b is still only equal to the probability of option
a, since (.4)(1) = .4.
In this case, it is clear which of the options is more probable. Clearly a is more
probable since it requires less to be true. Option a would be true even if option
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b is true. But option a could also be true even if option b were false (i.e., Mark
could have brown hair or red hair, etc.).
Thus there are cases where we can easily avoid committing the conjunction
fallacy. So what is the difference between this case and the Linda case? The
Nobel Prize-winning psychologist, Daniel Kahneman (and his long-time
collaborator, Amos Tversky), has for many years suggested a psychological
explanation for this difference. The explanation is complex, but I can give you
the gist of it quite simply. Kahneman suggests that our minds are wired to find
patterns and many of these patterns we find are based on what he calls
“representativeness.” In the Linda case, the idea of Linda being active in the
feminist movement fits better with the description of Linda as a philosophy
major, as being active in social justice movements, and, perhaps, as being
single. We build up a picture of Linda and then we try to match the descriptions
to her. “Bank teller” doesn’t really match anything in the description of Linda.
That is, the description of Linda is not representative of a bank teller. However,
for many people, it is representative of a feminist. Thus, our minds more or less
automatically see the match between representativeness of the description of
Linda and option b, which mentions she is a feminist. Kahneman thinks that in
cases like these, our minds substitute a question of representativeness for the
question of probability, thus answering the probability question incorrectly.7 We
are distracted from the probability question by seeking representativeness,
which our minds more automatically look for and think about than probability.
For Kahneman, the psychological explanation is needed to explain why even
trained mathematicians and those who deal regularly with probability still
commit the conjunction fallacy. The psychological explanation that our brains
are wired to look for representativeness, and that we unwittingly substitute the
question of representativeness for the question of probability, explains why even
experts make these kinds of mistakes.
Consider the following scenario. You go in for some testing for some health
problems you’ve been having and after a number of tests, you test positive for
colon cancer. What are the chances that you really do have colon cancer? Let’s
7
Kahneman gives this explanation numerous places, including, most exhaustively (and for a
general audience) in his 2011 book, Thinking Fast and Slow. New York, NY: Farrar, Straus and
Giroux.
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suppose that the test is not perfect, but it is 95% accurate. That is, in the case of
those who really do have colon cancer, the test will detect the cancer 95% of the
time (and thus miss it 5% of the time). (The test will also misdiagnose those who
don’t actually have colon cancer 5% of the time.) Many people would be
inclined to say that, given the test and its accuracy, there is a 95% chance that
you have colon cancer. However, if you are like most people and are inclined to
answer this way, you are wrong. In fact, you have committed the fallacy of
ignoring the base rate (i.e., the base rate fallacy).
The base rate in this example is the rate of those who have colon cancer in a
population. There is very small percentage of the population that actually has
colon cancer (let’s suppose it is .005 or .5%), so the probability that you have it
must take into account the very low probability that you are one of the few that
have it. That is, prior to the test (and not taking into account any other details
about you), there was a very low probability that you have it—that is, a half of
one percent chance (.5%). Yes, the test is 95% accurate, but given the very low
prior probability that you have colon cancer, we cannot simply now say that
there is a 95% chance that you have it. Rather, we must temper that figure with
the very low base rate. The general point is this: when a condition (x) is very
rare, then even if a highly accurate test identifies condition (x) as being present,
we should still suspect that condition (x) is not present. In the above scenario,
the prior probability (i.e., before the test) that you have colon cancer is really,
really low. And that means that even after the test we should suspect that the
probability is still fairly low. That’s the logic of the matter and we can
understand that conceptually without actually even getting into the math.
But since we are given numbers to work with, we can actually use math to figure
the actual probability that you have colon cancer. Here is how we do it. Let’s
suppose that our population is 100,000 people. The base rate tells us that .5%
of the population has colon cancer. That means that of the 100,000 people only
500 of them have colon cancer. If we were to apply the 95% accurate test to
500 people, the test would correctly diagnose 475 of them. That is, the test
would deliver 475 correct identifications. These are called true positives.
However, the test will also mistakenly tell us that some of the people who don’t
have colon cancer actually do have it. When this happens, it is called a false
positive. Our base rate tells us that most of our population (99,500) do not
have colon cancer and the 95% accurate test will misdiagnose 5% of those has
having colon cancer. This comes out to 4975 false positives!
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So what are the chances that you are true positive rather than a false positive? It
is simply the number of true positives (475) divided by the total number of
positive identifications that the test would make. This latter number includes
those the test would misidentify (4975) as well as the number it would accurately
identify (475)—thus the total number the test would identify as having colon
cancer would be 5450. So the probability that you have it, given the positive
test = 475/5450 = .087 or 8.7%. So the probability that you have cancer, given
the evidence of the positive test is 8.7%. Thus, contrary to our initial reasoning
that there was a 95% chance that you have colon cancer, the chance is only a
tenth of that—it is less than 10%! In thinking that the probability that you have
cancer is closer to 95% you would be ignoring the extremely low probability of
having the disease in the first place (i.e., the low base rate). Neglecting to
account for low base rates in determining the probability of some event is the
signature of any base rate fallacy.
The general lesson here is that the number of false positives will be quite high
(even when the identification method is fairly accurate) as long as the base rate
of the phenomenon we’re looking for is very low. And if the number of false
positives is high, then this will significantly lower the probability that the
identification method has correctly identified the phenomenon in question.
From the above example we can see that the general method for determining
probabilities when base rates are in play is the following.
!"#$ &'()!)*$(
!"#$ &'()!)*$( + ,-.($ &'()!)*$(
Before closing this section, let’s look at a couple more examples of a base rate
fallacy. Suppose that the government has developed a machine that is able to
detect terrorist intent with an accuracy of 90%. During a joint meeting of
congress, a highly trustworthy source says that there is a terrorist in the building.
(Let’s suppose, for the sake of simplifying this example, that there is in fact a
terrorist in the building.) In order to determine who the terrorist is, the building
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security seals all the exits, rounds up all 3000 people in the building and uses
the machine to test each person. The first 30 people pass without triggering a
positive identification from the machine, but on the very next person, the
machine triggers a positive identification of terrorist intent. The question is:
what are the chances that the person who set off the machine really is a
terrorist?8 Consider the following three possibilities: a) 90%, b) 10%, or c) .3%.
If you answered 90%, then you committed the base rate fallacy again. The
actually answer is “c”—less than 1%! Here’s why. The base rate is the
likelihood that any given individual is a terrorist and this is exceedingly low since
there is only one terrorist in the building and there are 3000 people in the
building. That means the probability of any one person being a terrorist, before
any results of the test, is exceedingly low: 1/3000. Since the test is 90%
accurate, that means that out of the 2999 non-terrorists, it will misidentify 10% of
them as terrorists = ~300 false positives. Assuming the machine doesn’t
misidentify the one actual terrorist, the machine will identify a total of 301
individuals as those “possessing terrorist intent.” The probability that any one
of them actually possesses terrorist intent is 1/301 = .3%. So the probability is
drastically lower than 90%. It’s not even close. This is another good illustration
of how far off probabilities can be when the base rate is ignored.
At this point, having been sensitized to the base rate fallacy, you should suspect
that the probability is nowhere near as high as the accuracy of Bob’s eyewitness
skills. Here’s the math. Suppose our population is 1000 people: 995 non-
robbers and 5 robbers (based on the above base rate of robbers in the
population). Of 995 non-robbers, Bob will misidentify 9.95 as robbers (false
positives) and accurately identify 4.95 as robbers for a totally of 14.9 robber-
identifications. So the chances that Nancy really is a robber, given Bob’s
eyewitness evidence is:
8
This example is taken (with certain alterations) from:
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/magazine/8153539.stm
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= 4.95/14.9 = 33%. Thus, it is more likely that Nancy is not the robber.
Suppose a study showed that of the 3,141 counties of the United States, the
incidence of kidney cancer was lowest in those counties which are mostly rural,
sparsely populated, and located in traditionally Republican states. In fact, this is
true.9 What accounts for this interesting finding? Most people would be
tempted to look for a causal explanation—to look for features of the rural
environment that account for the lower incidence of cancer. However, they
would be wrong (in this case) to do so. It is easy to see why once we consider
the counties that have the highest incidence of kidney cancer: they are counties
that are mostly rural, sparsely populated, and located in traditionally Republican
states! So whatever it was you thought might account for the lower cancer rates
in rural counties can’t be the right explanation, since these counties also have
the highest rates of cancer. It is important to understand that it isn’t the same
counties that have the highest and lowest rates—for example, county X doesn’t
have both a high and a low cancer rate (relative to other U.S. counties). That
would be a contradiction (and so can’t possibly be true). Rather, what is the
case is that counties that have the highest kidney cancer rates are “mostly rural,
sparsely populated, and located in traditionally Republican states” but also
counties that have the lowest kidney cancer rates are “mostly rural, sparsely
populated, and located in traditionally Republican states.” How could this be?
Before giving you the explanation, I’ll give you a simpler example and see if you
can figure it out from that example.
Suppose that a jar contains equal amounts of red and white marbles.
Jack and Jill are taking turns drawing marbles from the jar. However, they
draw marbles at different rates. Jill draws 10 marbles at a time while Jack
draws 3 marbles at a time. Who is more likely to draw either all red or all
white marbles more often: Jack or Jill?10
9
This example taken from Kahneman (2011), op. cit., p. 109.
10
This example is also taken (with minor modifications) from Kahneman (2011), p. 110.
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The answer here should be obvious: Jack is more likely to draw marbles of all
the same color more often, since Jack is only drawing 3 marbles at a time. Since
Jill is drawing 10 marbles at a time, it will be less likely that her draws will yield
marbles of all the same color. This is simply a fact of sampling and is related to
the sampling errors discussed in section 3.1. A sample that is too small will tend
not to be representative of the population. In the marbles case, if we view
Jack’s draws as samples, then his samples will be far less representative of the
ratio of marbles in the jar. Jill, on the other hand, will tend to get far more
representative samples. Since Jill is drawing a larger number of marbles, it is
less likely that her samples would be drastically off in the way Jack’s would be.
The general point to be taken from this example is that smaller samples tend to
the extremes—both in terms of overrepresenting some feature (e.g., red
marbles) and in underrepresenting that same feature.
Can you see how this might apply to the case of kidney cancer rates in rural,
sparsely populated counties? There is a national kidney cancer rate which is an
average of all the kidney cancer rates of the 3,141 counties in the U.S. Imagine
ranking each county in terms of the cancer rates from highest to lowest. The
finding is that there is a relatively larger proportion of the sparsely populated
counties at the top of this list, but also a relatively larger proportion of the
sparsely populated counties at the bottom of the list. But why would it be that
the more sparsely populated counties would be overrepresented at both ends
of the list? The reason is that these counties have smaller populations, so they
will tend to have more extreme results (of either the higher or lower rates). Just
as Jack is more likely to get either all white marbles or all red marbles (an
extreme result), the less populated counties will tend to have cancer rates that
are at the extreme, relative to the national average. And this is a purely
statistical fact; it has nothing to do with features of those environments causing
the cancer rate to be higher or lower. Just as Jack’s extreme draws have
nothing to do with the way he is drawing (but are simply the result of statistical,
mathematical facts), the extremes of the smaller counties have nothing to do
with features of those counties, but only with the fact that they are smaller and
so will tend to have more extreme results (i.e., cancer rates that are either higher
or lower than the national average).
The first take home lesson here is that smaller groups will tend to be less
representative than larger groups (thus, smaller groups will tend to inhabit the
extremely of a spectrum). We can call this the law of small numbers. The
second take home message is that our brains are wired to look for causal
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We will end this section with a somewhat humorous and incredible example of a
small numbers bias that, presumably, wasted billions of dollars. This example,
too, comes from Kahneman, who in turn heard the anecdote from some of his
colleagues who are statisticians.11 Some time ago, the Gates foundation (which
is the charitable foundation of Microsoft founder, Bill Gates) donated 1.7 billion
to research a curious finding: smaller schools tend to be more successful than
larger schools. That is, if you consider a rank ordering of the most successful
schools, the smaller schools will tend to be overrepresented near the top (i.e.,
there is a higher proportion of them near the top of the list compared to the
proportion of larger schools at the top of the list). This is the finding that the
Gates Foundation invested 1.7 billion dollars to help understand. In order to do
so, they created smaller schools, sometimes splitting larger schools in half.
However, none of this was necessary. Had the Gates Foundation (or those
advising them) looked that the characteristics of the worst schools, they would
have found that those schools also tended to be smaller! The “finding” is
merely a result of the law of small numbers: smaller groups tend towards the
extremes (on both ends of a spectrum) more so than larger groups. In this case,
the fact that smaller schools tend to be both more successful and less successful
is explained in the same way as we explain why Jack tends to get either all red
or all white marbles more often than Jill.
Humans are prone to see causes even when no such cause is present. For
example, if I have just committed some wrong and then immediately after the
thunder cracks, I may think that my wrong action caused the lightning (e.g.,
because the gods were angry with me). The term “snake oil” refers to a product
that promises certain (e.g., health) benefits but is actually fraudulent and has no
benefits whatsoever. For example, consider a product that is supposed to help
you recover from a common cold. You take the medicine and then within a few
11
Kahneman (2011), pp. 117-118.
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days, you are all better! No cold! It must have been the medicine. Or maybe
you just regressed to the mean. Regression to the mean describes the
tendency of things to go back to normal or to return to something close to the
relevant statistical average. In the case of a cold, when you have a cold, you are
outside of the average in terms of health. But you will naturally return to the
state of health, with or without the “medicine.” If anyone were to try to
convince you to buy such a medicine, you shouldn’t. Because the fact that you
got better from your cold more likely has to do with the fact that you will
naturally regress to the mean (return to normal) than it has to do with the special
medicine.
Another example. Suppose you live in Lansing and it has been over 100
degrees for two weeks straight. Someone says that if you pay tribute and do a
special dance to Baal, the temperature will drop. Suppose you do this and the
temperature does drop. Was it Baal or just regression to the mean? Probably
regression to the mean, unless we have some special reason for thinking it is
Baal. The point is, extreme situations tend to regress towards less extreme,
more average situations. Since it is very rare for it to ever be over 100 degrees
in Lansing, the fact that the temperature drops is to be expected, regardless of
one’s prayers to Baal.
Suppose that a professional golfer has been on a hot streak. She has been
winning every tournament she enters by ten strokes—she’s beating the
competition like they were middle school golfers. She is just playing so much
better than them. Then something happens. The golfer all of a sudden starts
playing like average. What explains her fall from greatness? The sports
commentators speculate: could it be that she switched her caddy, or that it is
warmer now than is was when she was on her streak, or perhaps it was fame that
went to her head once she had started winning all those tournaments? Chances
are, none of these are the right explanation because no such explanation is
needed. Most likely she just regressed to the mean and is now playing like
everyone else—still like a pro, just not like a golfer who is out of this world
good. Even those who are skilled can get lucky (or unlucky) and when they do,
we should expect that eventually that luck will end and they will regress to the
mean.
As these examples illustrate, one commits the regression to the mean fallacy
when one tries to give a causal explanation of a phenomenon that is merely
statistical or probabilistic in nature. The best way to rule out that something is
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The gambler’s fallacy occurs when one thinks that independent, random events
can be influenced by each other. For example, suppose I have a fair coin and I
have just flipped 4 heads in a row. Erik, on the other hand, has a fair coin that he
has flipped 4 times and gotten tails. We are each taking bets that the next coin
flipped is heads. Who should you bet flips the head? If you are inclined to say
that you should place the bet with Erik since he has been flipping all tails and
since the coin is fair, the flips must even out soon, then you have committed the
gambler’s fallacy. The fact is, each flip is independent of the next, so the fact
that I have just flipped 4 heads in a row does not increase or decrease my
chances of flipping a head. Likewise for Erik. It is true that as long as the coin is
fair, then over a large number of flips we should expect that the proportion of
heads to tails will be about 50/50. But there is no reason to expect that a
particular flip will be more likely to be one or the other. Since the coin is fair,
each flip has the same probability of being heads and the same probability of
being tails—50%.
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Chapter 4: Informal fallacies
A fallacy is simply a mistake in reasoning. Some fallacies are formal and some
are informal. In chapter 2, we saw that we could define validity formally and
thus could determine whether an argument was valid or invalid without even
having to know or understand what the argument was about. We saw that we
could define certain valid rules of inference, such as modus ponens and modus
tollens. These inference patterns are valid in virtue of their form, not their
content. That is, any argument that has the same form as modus ponens or
modus tollens will automatically be valid. A formal fallacy is simply an argument
whose form is invalid. Thus, any argument that has that form will automatically
be invalid, regardless of the meaning of the sentences. Two formal fallacies that
are similar to, but should never be confused with, modus ponens and modus
tollens are denying the antecedent and affirming the consequent. Here are
the forms of those invalid inferences:
Any argument that has either of these forms is an invalid argument. For
example:
1. D ⊃ C
2. ~D
3. ∴ ~C
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As you can see, this argument has the form of the fallacy, denying the
antecedent. Thus, we know that this argument is invalid even if we don’t know
what “Kant” or “deontologist” or “non-consequentialist” means. (“Kant” was a
famous German philosopher from the early 1800s, whereas “deontology” and
“non-consequentialist” are terms that come from ethical theory.) It is mark of a
formal fallacy that we can identify it even if we don’t really understand the
meanings of the sentences in the argument. Recall our Jabberwocky argument
from chapter 2. Here’s an argument which uses silly, made-up words from Lewis
Carrol’s “Jabberwocky.” See if you can determine whether the argument’s form
is valid or invalid:
You should be able to see that this argument has the form of affirming the
consequent:
1. B ⊃ S
2. S
3. ∴ B
As such, we know that the argument is invalid, even though we haven’t got a
clue what “toves” are or what “slithy” or “brillig” means. The point is that we
can identify formal fallacies without having to know what they mean.
Each member on the gymnastics team weighs less than 110 lbs.
Therefore, the whole gymnastics team weighs less than 110 lbs.
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This arguments commits the composition fallacy. In the composition fallacy one
argues that since each part of the whole has a certain feature, it follows that the
whole has that same feature. However, you cannot generally identify any
argument that moves from statements about parts to statements about wholes
as committing the composition fallacy because whether or not there is a fallacy
depends on what feature we are attributing to the parts and wholes. Here is an
example of an argument that moves from claims about the parts possessing a
feature to a claim about the whole possessing that same feature, but doesn’t
commit the composition fallacy:
Every part of the car is made of plastic. Therefore, the whole car is made
of plastic.
This conclusion does follow from the premises; there is no fallacy here. The
difference between this argument and the preceding argument (about the
gymnastics team) isn’t their form. In fact both arguments have the same form:
Every part of X has the feature f. Therefore, the whole X has the feature f.
And yet one of the arguments is clearly fallacious, while the other isn’t. The
difference between the two arguments is not their form, but their content. That
is, the difference is what feature is being attributed to the parts and wholes.
Some features (like weighing a certain amount) are such that if they belong to
each part, then it does not follow that they belong to the whole. Other features
(such as being made of plastic) are such that if they belong to each part, it
follows that they belong to the whole.
Every member of the team has been to Paris. Therefore the team has
been to Paris.
The conclusion of this argument does not follow. Just because each member of
the team has been to Paris, it doesn’t follow that the whole team has been to
Paris, since it may not have been the case that each individual was there at the
same time and was there in their capacity as a member of the team. Thus, even
though it is plausible to say that the team is composed of every member of the
team, it doesn’t follow that since every member of the team has been to Paris,
the whole team has been to Paris. Contrast that example with this one:
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Every member of the team was on the plane. Therefore, the whole team
was on the plane.
This argument, in contrast to the last one, contains no fallacy. It is true that if
every member is on the plane then the whole team is on the plane. And yet
these two arguments have almost exactly the same form. The only difference is
that the first argument is talking about the property, having been to Paris,
whereas the second argument is talking about the property, being on the plane.
The only reason we are able to identify the first argument as committing the
composition fallacy and the second argument as not committing a fallacy is that
we understand the relationship between the concepts involved. In the first case,
we understand that it is possible that every member could have been to Paris
without the team ever having been; in the second case we understand that as
long as every member of the team is on the plane, it has to be true that the
whole team is on the plane. The take home point here is that in order to identify
whether an argument has committed the composition fallacy, one must
understand the concepts involved in the argument. This is the mark of an
informal fallacy: we have to rely on our understanding of the meanings of the
words or concepts involved, rather than simply being able to identify the fallacy
from its form.
The division fallacy is like the composition fallacy and they are easy to confuse.
The difference is that the division fallacy argues that since the whole has some
feature, each part must also have that feature. The composition fallacy, as we
have just seen, goes in the opposite direction: since each part has some feature,
the whole must have that same feature. Here is an example of a division fallacy:
The house costs 1 million dollars. Therefore, each part of the house costs
1 million dollars.
This is clearly a fallacy. Just because the whole house costs 1 million dollars, it
doesn’t follow that each part of the house costs 1 million dollars. However, here
is an argument that has the same form, but that doesn’t commit the division
fallacy:
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The whole team died in the plane crash. Therefore, each individual on
the team died in the plane crash.
In this example, since we seem to be referring to one plane crash in which all the
members of the team died (“the” plane crash), it follows that if the whole team
died in the crash, then every individual on the team died in the crash. So this
argument does not commit the division fallacy. In contrast, the following
argument has exactly the same form, but does commit the division fallacy:
The team played its worst game ever tonight. Therefore, each individual
on the team played their worst game ever tonight.
It can be true that the whole team played its worst game ever even if it is true
that no individual on the team played their worst game ever. Thus, this
argument does commit the fallacy of division even though it has the same form
as the previous argument, which doesn’t commit the fallacy of division. This
shows (again) that in order to identify informal fallacies (like composition and
division), we must rely on our understanding of the concepts involved in the
argument. Some concepts (like “team” and “dying in a plane crash”) are such
that if they apply to the whole, they also apply to all the parts. Other concepts
(like “team” and “worst game played”) are such that they can apply to the
whole even if they do not apply to all the parts.
The premise indicator, “because” denotes the premise and (derivatively) the
conclusion of this argument. In standard form, the argument is this:
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You should notice something peculiar about this argument: the premise is
essentially the same claim as the conclusion. The only difference is that the
premise spells out what capital punishment means (the state putting criminals to
death) whereas the conclusion just refers to capital punishment by name, and
the premise uses terms like “legitimate” and “appropriate” whereas the
conclusion uses the related term, “justified.” But these differences don’t add up
to any real differences in meaning. Thus, the premise is essentially saying the
same thing as the conclusion. This is a problem: we want our premise to
provide a reason for accepting the conclusion. But if the premise is the same
claim as the conclusion, then it can’t possibly provide a reason for accepting the
conclusion! Begging the question occurs when one (either explicitly or
implicitly) assumes the truth of the conclusion in one or more of the premises.
Begging the question is thus a kind of circular reasoning.
One interesting feature of this fallacy is that formally there is nothing wrong with
arguments of this form. Here is what I mean. Consider an argument that
explicitly commits the fallacy of begging the question. For example,
Now, apply any method of assessing validity to this argument and you will see
that it is valid by any method. If we use the informal test (by trying to imagine
that the premises are true while the conclusion is false), then the argument
passes the test, since any time the premise is true, the conclusion will have to be
true as well (since it is the exact same statement). Likewise, the argument is
valid by our formal test of validity, truth tables. But while this argument is
technically valid, it is still a really bad argument. Why? Because the point of
giving an argument in the first place is to provide some reason for thinking the
conclusion is true for those who don’t already accept the conclusion. But if one
doesn’t already accept the conclusion, then simply restating the conclusion in a
different way isn’t going to convince them. Rather, a good argument will
provide some reason for accepting the conclusion that is sufficiently
independent of that conclusion itself. Begging the question utterly fails to do
this and this is why it counts as an informal fallacy. What is interesting about
begging the question is that there is absolutely nothing wrong with the
argument formally.
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Whether or not an argument begs the question is not always an easy matter to
sort out. As with all informal fallacies, detecting it requires a careful
understanding of the meaning of the statements involved in the argument. Here
is an example of an argument where it is not as clear whether there is a fallacy of
begging the question:
One might think that there is a kind of circularity (or begging the question)
involved in this argument since the argument appears to assume the truth of
Christianity in justifying the claim that Christianity is true. But whether or not this
argument really does beg the question is something on which there is much
debate within the sub-field of philosophy called epistemology (“study of
knowledge”). The philosopher Alvin Plantinga argues persuasively that the
argument does not beg the question, but being able to assess that argument
takes patient years of study in the field of epistemology (not to mention a careful
engagement with Plantinga’s work). As this example illustrates, the issue of
whether an argument begs the question requires us to draw on our general
knowledge of the world. This is the mark of an informal, rather than formal,
fallacy.
Raising taxes on the wealthy will either hurt the economy or it will help it.
But it won’t help the economy. Therefore, it will hurt the economy.
1. Either raising taxes on the wealthy will hurt the economy or it will help
it.
2. Raising taxes on the wealthy won’t help the economy.
3. Therefore, raising taxes on the wealthy will hurt the economy.
1
This is a much simplified version of the view defended by Christian philosophers such as Alvin
Plantinga. Plantinga defends (something like) this claim in: Plantinga, A. 2000. Warranted
Christian Belief. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press.
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AvB
~A
∴ B
However, since the first premise presents two options as if they were the only
two options, when in fact they aren’t, the first premise is false and the argument
fails. Notice that the form of the argument is perfectly good—the argument is
valid. The problem is that this argument isn’t sound because the first premise of
the argument commits the false dichotomy fallacy. False dichotomies are
commonly encountered in the context of a disjunctive syllogism or constructive
dilemma (see chapter 2).
In a speech made on April 5, 2004, President Bush made the following remarks
about the causes of the Iraq war:
Saddam Hussein once again defied the demands of the world. And so I
had a choice: Do I take the word of a madman, do I trust a person who
had used weapons of mass destruction on his own people, plus people in
the neighborhood, or do I take the steps necessary to defend the
country? Given that choice, I will defend America every time.
Either I trust the word of a madman or I defend America (by going to war
against Saddam Hussein’s regime).
The problem is that these aren’t the only options. Other options include
ongoing diplomacy and economic sanctions. Thus, even if it true that Bush
shouldn’t have trusted the word of Hussein, it doesn’t follow that the only other
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As with all the previous informal fallacies we’ve considered, the false dichotomy
fallacy requires an understanding of the concepts involved. Thus, we have to
use our understanding of world in order to assess whether a false dichotomy
fallacy is being committed or not.
4.1.5 Equivocation
This is a silly argument, but it illustrates the fallacy of equivocation. The problem
is that the word “headache” is used equivocally—that is, in two different senses.
In the first premise, “headache” is used figuratively, whereas in the second
premise “headache” is used literally. The argument is only successful if the
meaning of “headache” is the same in both premises. But it isn’t and this is
what makes this argument an instance of the fallacy of equivocation.
Taking a logic class helps you learn how to argue. But there is already
too much hostility in the world today, and the fewer arguments the better.
Therefore, you shouldn’t take a logic class.
In this example, the word “argue” and “argument” are used equivocally.
Hopefully, at this point in the text, you recognize the difference. (If not, go back
and reread section 1.1.)
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The term “law” is used equivocally here. In the first premise it is used to refer to
societal laws, such as criminal law; in the second premise it is used to refer to
laws of nature. Although we use the term “law” to apply to both cases, they are
importantly different. Societal laws, such as the criminal law of a society, are
enforced by people and there are punishments for breaking the laws. Natural
laws, such as laws of physics, cannot be broken and thus there are no
punishments for breaking them. (Does it make sense to scold the electron for
not doing what the law says it will do?)
For example, two grains of sand is not a heap, thus (by the second claim) neither
is three grains of sand. But since three grains of sand is not a heap then (by the
second claim again) neither is four grains of sand. You can probably see where
this is going. By continuing to add one grain of sand over and over, I will
eventually end up with something that is clearly a heap of sand, but that won’t
be counted as a heap of sand if we accept both claims 1 and 2 above.
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Philosophers continue to argue and debate about how to resolve the sorites
paradox, but the point for us is just to illustrate the concept of vagueness. The
concept “heap” is a vague concept in this example. But so are so many other
concepts, such a color concepts (red, yellow, green, etc.), moral concepts (right,
wrong, good, bad), and just about any other concept you can think of. The one
domain that seems to be unaffected by vagueness is mathematical and logical
concepts. There are two fallacies related to vagueness: the causal slippery slope
and the conceptual slippery slope. We’ll cover the conceptual slippery slope
first since it relates most closely to the concept of vagueness I’ve explained
above.
It may be true that there is no essential difference between 499 grains of sand
and 500 grains of sand. But even if that is so, it doesn’t follow that there is no
difference between 1 grain of sand and 5 billion grains of sand. In general, just
because we cannot draw a distinction between A and B, and we cannot draw a
distinction between B and C, it doesn’t mean we cannot draw a distinction
between A and C. Here is an example of a conceptual slippery slope fallacy.
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between the colors—a continuous spectrum. Even if it is true that for any two
adjacent hues on the color wheel, we cannot distinguish between the two, it
doesn’t follow from this that there is no distinction to be drawn between any two
portions of the color wheel, because then we’d be committed to saying that
there is no distinguishable difference between purple and yellow! The example
of the color spectrum illustrates the general point that just because the
boundaries between very similar things on a spectrum are vague, it doesn’t
follow that there are no differences between any two things on that spectrum.
People are found not guilty by reason of insanity when they cannot avoid
breaking the law. But people who are brought up in certain deprived
social circumstances are not much more able than the legally insane to
avoid breaking the law. So we should not find such individuals guilty any
more than those who are legally insane.
Whether there is conceptual slippery slope fallacy here depends on what you
think about a host of other things, including individual responsibility, free will,
the psychological and social effects of deprived social circumstances such as
poverty, lack of opportunity, abuse, etc. Some people may think that there are
big differences between those who are legally insane and those who grow up in
deprived social circumstances. Others may not think the differences are so
great. The issues here are subtle, sensitive, and complex, which is why it is
difficult to determine whether there is any fallacy here or not. If the differences
between those who are insane and those who are the product of deprived social
circumstances turn out to be like the differences between one shade of yellow
and an adjacent shade of yellow, then there is no fallacy here. But if the
differences turn out to be analogous to those between yellow and green (i.e.,
with many distinguishable stages of difference between) then there would
indeed be a conceptual slippery slope fallacy here. The difficulty of
distinguishing instances of the conceptual slippery slope fallacy, and the fact
that distinguishing it requires us to draw on our knowledge about the world,
shows that the conceptual slippery slope fallacy is an informal fallacy.
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The causal slippery slope fallacy is committed when one event is said to lead to
some other (usually disastrous) event via a chain of intermediary events. If you
have ever seen Direct TV’s “get rid of cable” commercials, you will know exactly
what I’m talking about. (If you don’t know what I’m talking about you should
Google it right now and find out. They’re quite funny.) Here is an example of a
causal slippery slope fallacy (it is adapted from one of the Direct TV
commercials):
If you use cable, your cable will probably go on the fritz. If your cable is
on the fritz, you will probably get frustrated. When you get frustrated you
will probably hit the table. When you hit the table, your young daughter
will probably imitate you. When your daughter imitates you, she will
probably get thrown out of school. When she gets thrown out of school,
she will probably meet undesirables. When she meets undesirables, she
will probably marry undesirables. When she marries undesirables, you
will probably have a grandson with a dog collar. Therefore, if you use
cable, you will probably have a grandson with a dog collar.
This example is silly and absurd, yes. But it illustrates the causal slippery slope
fallacy. Slippery slope fallacies are always made up of a series of conjunctions of
probabilistic conditional statements that link the first event to the last event. A
causal slippery slope fallacy is committed when one assumes that just because
each individual conditional statement is probable, the conditional that links the
first event to the last event is also probable. Even if we grant that each “link” in
the chain is individually probable, it doesn’t follow that the whole chain (or the
conditional that links the first event to the last event) is probable. Suppose, for
the sake of the argument, we assign probabilities to each “link” or conditional
statement, like this. (I have italicized the consequents of the conditionals and
assigned high conditional probabilities to them. The high probability is for the
sake of the argument; I don’t actually think these things are as probable as I’ve
assumed here.)
If you use cable, then your cable will probably go on the fritz (.9)
If your cable is on the fritz, then you will probably get angry (.9)
If you get angry, then you will probably hit the table (.9)
If you hit the table, your daughter will probably imitate you (.8)
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If your daughter imitates you, she will probably be kicked out of school
(.8)
If she is kicked out of school, she will probably meet undesirables (.9)
If she meets undesirables, she will probably marry undesirables (.8)
If she marries undesirables, you will probably have a grandson with a dog
collar (.8)
However, even if we grant the probabilities of each link in the chain is high (80-
90% probable), the conclusion doesn’t even reach a probability higher than
chance. Recall that in order to figure the probability of a conjunction, we must
multiply the probability of each conjunct:
That means the probability of the conclusion (i.e., that if you use cable, you will
have a grandson with a dog collar) is only 27%, despite the fact that each
conditional has a relatively high probability! The causal slippery slope fallacy is
actually a formal probabilistic fallacy and so could have been discussed in
chapter 3 with the other formal probabilistic fallacies. What makes it a formal
rather than informal fallacy is that we can identify it without even having to know
what the sentences of the argument mean. I could just have easily written out a
nonsense argument comprised of series of probabilistic conditional statements.
But I would still have been able to identify the causal slippery slope fallacy
because I would have seen that there was a series of probabilistic conditional
statements leading to a claim that the conclusion of the series was also probable.
That is enough to tell me that there is a causal slippery slope fallacy, even if I
don’t really understand the meanings of the conditional statements.
It is helpful to contrast the causal slippery slope fallacy with the valid form of
inference, hypothetical syllogism. Recall that a hypothetical syllogism has the
following kind of form:
A⊃B
B⊃C
C⊃D
D⊃E
∴ A⊃E
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The only difference between this and the causal slippery slope fallacy is that
whereas in the hypothetical syllogism, the link between each component is
certain, in a causal slippery slope fallacy, the link between each event is
probabilistic. It is the fact that each link is probabilistic that accounts for the
fallacy. One way of putting this is point is that probability is not transitive. Just
because A makes B probable and B makes C probable and C makes X probable,
it doesn’t follow that A makes X probable. In contrast, when the links are certain
rather than probable, then if A always leads to B and B always leads to C and C
always leads to X, then it has to be the case that A always leads to X.
What all fallacies of relevance have in common is that they make an argument or
response to an argument that is irrelevant to that argument. Fallacies of
relevance can be psychologically compelling, but it is important to distinguish
between rhetorical techniques that are psychologically compelling, on the one
hand, and rationally compelling arguments, on the other. What makes
something a fallacy is that it fails to be rationally compelling, once we have
carefully considered it. That said, arguments that fail to be rationally compelling
may still be psychologically or emotionally compelling. The first fallacy of
relevance that we will consider, the ad hominem fallacy, is an excellent example
of a fallacy that can be psychologically compelling.
4.3.1 Ad hominem
“Ad hominem” is a Latin phrase that can be translated into English as the phrase,
“against the man.” In an ad hominem fallacy, instead of responding to (or
attacking) the argument a person has made, one attacks the person him or
herself. In short, one attacks the person making the argument rather than the
argument itself. Here is an anecdote that reveals an ad hominem fallacy (and
that has actually occurred in my ethics class before).
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who could save the lives of these children if they are funded by
individuals from wealthy countries like our own. Since there are things
that we all regularly buy that we don’t need (e.g., Starbuck’s lattes, beer,
movie tickets, or extra clothes or shoes we don’t really need), if we
continue to purchase those things rather than using that money to save
the lives of children, then we are essentially contributing to the deaths of
those children if we choose to continue to live our lifestyle of buying
things we don’t need, rather than donating the money to a charity that
will save lives of children in need. In response to Singer’s argument, one
student in the class asked: “Does Peter Singer give his money to charity?
Does he do what he says we are all morally required to do?”
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Suppose that my opponent has argued for a position, call it position A, and in
response to his argument, I give a rationally compelling argument against
position B, which is related to position A, but is much less plausible (and thus
much easier to refute). What I have just done is attacked a straw man—a
position that “looks like” the target position, but is actually not that position.
When one attacks a straw man, one commits the straw man fallacy. The straw
man fallacy misrepresents one’s opponent’s argument and is thus a kind of
irrelevance. Here is an example.
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Two candidates for political office in Colorado, Tom and Fred, are having
an exchange in a debate in which Tom has laid out his plan for putting
more money into health care and education and Fred has laid out his plan
which includes earmarking more state money for building more prisons
which will create more jobs and, thus, strengthen Colorado’s economy.
Fred responds to Tom’s argument that we need to increase funding to
health care and education as follows: “I am surprised, Tom, that you are
willing to put our state’s economic future at risk by sinking money into
these programs that do not help to create jobs. You see, folks, Tom’s
plan will risk sending our economy into a tailspin, risking harm to
thousands of Coloradans. On the other hand, my plan supports a healthy
and strong Colorado and would never bet our state’s economic security
on idealistic notions that simply don’t work when the rubber meets the
road.”
Fred has committed the straw man fallacy. Just because Tom wants to increase
funding to health care and education does not mean he does not want to help
the economy. Furthermore, increasing funding to health care and education
does not entail that fewer jobs will be created. Fred has attacked a position that
is not the position that Tom holds, but is in fact a much less plausible, easier to
refute position. However, it would be silly for any political candidate to run on a
platform that included “harming the economy.” Presumably no political
candidate would run on such a platform. Nonetheless, this exact kind of straw
man is ubiquitous in political discourse in our country.
Nancy has just argued that we should provide middle schoolers with sex
education classes, including how to use contraceptives so that they can
practice safe sex should they end up in the situation where they are
having sex. Fran responds: “proponents of sex education try to
encourage our children to a sex-with-no-strings-attached mentality, which
is harmful to our children and to our society.”
Fran has committed the straw man (or straw woman) fallacy by misrepresenting
Nancy’s position. Nancy’s position is not that we should encourage children to
have sex, but that we should make sure that they are fully informed about sex so
that if they do have sex, they go into it at least a little less blindly and are able to
make better decisions regarding sex.
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4.3.3 Tu quoque
“Tu quoque” is a Latin phrase that can be translated into English as “you too”
or “you, also.” The tu quoque fallacy is a way of avoiding answering a criticism
by bringing up a criticism of your opponent rather than answer the criticism. For
example, suppose that two political candidates, A and B, are discussing their
policies and A brings up a criticism of B’s policy. In response, B brings up her
own criticism of A’s policy rather than respond to A’s criticism of her policy. B
has here committed the tu quoque fallacy. The fallacy is best understood as a
way of avoiding having to answer a tough criticism that one may not have a
good answer to. This kind of thing happens all the time in political discourse.
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Tu quoque, as I have presented it, is fallacious when the criticism one raises is
simply in order to avoid having to answer a difficult objection to one’s argument
or view. However, there are circumstances in which a tu quoque kind of
response is not fallacious. If the criticism that A brings toward B is a criticism
that equally applies not only to A’s position but to any position, then B is right to
point this fact out. For example, suppose that A criticizes B for taking money
from special interest groups. In this case, B would be totally right (and there
would be no tu quoque fallacy committed) to respond that not only does A take
money from special interest groups, but every political candidate running for
office does. That is just a fact of life in American politics today. So A really has
no criticism at all to B since everyone does what B is doing and it is in many
ways unavoidable. Thus, B could (and should) respond with a “you too” rebuttal
and in this case that rebuttal is not a tu quoque fallacy.
The genetic fallacy occurs when one argues (or, more commonly, implies) that
the origin of something (e.g., a theory, idea, policy, etc.) is a reason for rejecting
(or accepting) it. For example, suppose that Jack is arguing that we should
allow physician assisted suicide and Jill responds that that idea first was used in
Nazi Germany. Jill has just committed a genetic fallacy because she is implying
that because the idea is associated with Nazi Germany, there must be
something wrong with the idea itself. What she should have done instead is
explain what, exactly, is wrong with the idea rather than simply assuming that
there must be something wrong with it since it has a negative origin. The origin
of an idea has nothing inherently to do with its truth or plausibility. Suppose
that Hitler constructed a mathematical proof in his early adulthood (he didn’t,
but just suppose). The validity of that mathematical proof stands on its own; the
fact that Hitler was a horrible person has nothing to do with whether the proof is
good. Likewise with any other idea: ideas must be assessed on their own merits
and the origin of an idea is neither a merit nor demerit of the idea.
Although genetic fallacies are most often committed when one associates an
idea with a negative origin, it can also go the other way: one can imply that
because the idea has a positive origin, the idea must be true or more plausible.
For example, suppose that Jill argues that the Golden Rule is a good way to live
one’s life because the Golden Rule originated with Jesus in the Sermon on the
Mount (it didn’t, actually, even though Jesus does state a version of the Golden
Rule). Jill has committed the genetic fallacy in assuming that the (presumed)
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fact that Jesus is the origin of the Golden Rule has anything to do with whether
the Golden Rule is a good idea.
I’ll end with an example from William James’s seminal work, The Varieties of
Religious Experience. In that book (originally a set of lectures), James considers
the idea that if religious experiences could be explained in terms of neurological
causes, then the legitimacy of the religious experience is undermined. James,
being a materialist who thinks that all mental states are physical states—
ultimately a matter of complex brain chemistry, says that the fact that any
religious experience has a physical cause does not undermine that veracity of
that experience. Although he doesn’t use the term explicitly, James claims that
the claim that the physical origin of some experience undermines the veracity of
that experience is a genetic fallacy. Origin is irrelevant for assessing the veracity
of an experience, James thinks. In fact, he thinks that religious dogmatists who
take the origin of the Bible to be the word of God are making exactly the same
mistake as those who think that a physical explanation of a religious experience
would undermine its veracity. We must assess ideas for their merits, James
thinks, not their origins.
The appeal to consequences fallacy is like the reverse of the genetic fallacy:
whereas the genetic fallacy consists in the mistake of trying to assess the truth or
reasonableness of an idea based on the origin of the idea, the appeal to
consequences fallacy consists in the mistake of trying to assess the truth or
reasonableness of an idea based on the (typically negative) consequences of
accepting that idea. For example, suppose that the results of a study revealed
that there are IQ differences between different races (this is a fictitious example,
there is no such study that I know of). In debating the results of this study, one
researcher claims that if we were to accept these results, it would lead to
increased racism in our society, which is not tolerable. Therefore, these results
must not be right since if they were accepted, it would lead to increased racism.
The researcher who responded in this way has committed the appeal to
consequences fallacy. Again, we must assess the study on its own merits. If
there is something wrong with the study, some flaw in its design, for example,
then that would be a relevant criticism of the study. However, the fact that the
results of the study, if widely circulated, would have a negative effect on society
is not a reason for rejecting these results as false. The consequences of some
idea (good or bad) are irrelevant to the truth or reasonableness of that idea.
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Answers to exercises
Exercise 1
1. Statement 8. Statement
2. Statement 9. Statement
3. Not a statement (question) 10. Statement
4. Statement 11. Not a statement (question)
5. Not a statement (command) 12. Not a statement (exclamation)
6. Not a statement 13. Not a statement (command)
(command/request) 14. Statement
7. Statement 15. Statement
Exercise 2
1. Argument. Conclusion: The woman in the hat is not a witch.
2. Not an argument
3. Argument. Conclusion: Albert won’t be willing to help me wash the
dishes.
4. Not an argument
5. Not an argument
6. Not an argument
7. Not an argument
8. Argument. Conclusion: Obesity has become a problem in the U.S.
9. Not an argument
10. Argument. Conclusion: Albert isn’t a fireman.
11. Argument. Conclusion: Charlie and Violet don’t sweat.
12. Argument (explanation). Conclusion: I forgot to lock the door.
13. Not an argument
14. Argument (explanation). Conclusion: Apple stole some of Samsung’s
patents.
15. Argument. Conclusion: No one who gets frostbite while on K2 will ever
survive.
Exercise 3
1. Explanation. Conclusion: Wanda rode the bus today.
2. Explanation. Conclusion: Wanda has not picked up her car from the shop.
3. Argument. Conclusion: Bob rode the bus to work today.
4. Argument. Conclusion: It can’t be snowing right now.
5. Explanation. Conclusion: Some people with schizophrenia hear voices in
their head.
6. Argument. Conclusion: Fracking should be allowed.
7. Argument. Conclusion: Wanda did not ride the bus today.
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Answers to exercises
8. Argument. Conclusion: The Tigers will not win their game against the
Pirates.
9. Argument. Conclusion: No one living in Pompeii could have escaped
before the lava from Mt. Vesuvius hit.
10. Explanation: When a person moves to Cincinnati, their allergies worsen.
Exercise 4
1.
1. There is nothing wrong with consensual sexual and economic relations
between adults.
2. There is no difference between a man paying directly for sex and a man
taking a woman on a blind date, paying for it, and then having sex with
her.
3. Therefore, there is nothing wrong with prostitution. (from 1, 2
independently)
2.
1. Multiple surveys done with prostitutes show that a high percentage of
them report having been sexually abused as children.
2. Therefore, prostitution involves women who were typically abused as
children. (from 1)
3. Therefore, prostitution is wrong. (from 2)
3.
1. There was warm water in the cabin’s tea kettle.
2. There was wood still smoldering in the fireplace.
3. Therefore, someone was in this cabin recently. (from 1-2)
4. Tim has been with me the whole time.
5. Therefore, the person in the cabin couldn’t have been Tim. (from 3-4)
6. Therefore, there is someone else in these woods. (from 6)
4.
1. Marla Runyan ran in the Sydney 2000 Olympics when she was blind.
2. Therefore, it is possible to be blind and yet run in the Olympics. (from1)
5.
1. The bridge was out.
2. Therefore, the train had to take a longer, alternate route. (from 1)
3. Therefore, the train was late. (from 2)
6.
1. Iran has threatened to destroy Israel multiple times.
2. If Iran had a nuclear missile, it could destroy Israel.
3. Therefore, if Iran had a nuclear missile, Israel is not safe. (from 1-2)
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Answers to exercises
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Answers to exercises
Exercise 6 (Note: there is more than one possible correct answer to some of
these.)
1. Anyone who rides horses is a cowboy.
2. Driving over the speed limit is wrong.
3. It is raining.
4. Olaf is an elf.
5. Any time a person has a choice of who to take to homecoming, they will
take the person they like the most.
6. I have looked at the watch in frequent intervals—much more often than
every 12 hours.
7. Only those who have drank too much fall out of apartment windows.
8. Mark is on Earth and is unassisted by any devices that help him overcome
the Earth’s gravity.
9. Any nation in which there is a large discrepancy between net worths of
different races is a racist nation.
10. The water is at sea level.
11. First missing premise: We should not allows policies that have the
potential of taking innocent lives, unless there is a very good reason to do
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Answers to exercises
Exercise 7
1. Discounting 5. Discounting 9. Discounting
2. Assuring 6. Guarding 10. Assuring
3. Discounting 7. Assuring
4. Assuring 8. Discounting
Exercise 8
1. Not truth functional.
2. Truth functional: Tom is a fireman. Tom is a father.
3. Not truth functional.
4. Not truth functional.
5. Truth functional: Cameron Dias has had several relationships. Cameron
Dias has never married.
6. Not truth functional.
7. Not truth functional.
8. Not truth functional.
9. Truth functional: Jack is a cowboy. Jill is a cowboy.
10. Truth functional: Josiah is Amish. Josiah is a drug dealer.
11. Truth functional: The Tigers are the best baseball team in the state. The
Tigers are not as good as the Yankees.
12. Truth functional: Bob went to the beach to enjoy some rest. Bob went to
the beach to enjoy some relaxation.
13. Truth functional: Lauren isn’t the fastest runner on the team. Lauren is
fast enough to have made it to the national championship.
14. Truth functional: The ring is beautiful. The ring is expensive.
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Answers to exercises
15. Truth functional: It is sad that many Americans to not know where their
next meal will come from. It is true that many Americans do not know
where their next meal will come from.
Exercise 9
1. B v T 5. ~G 9. ~B
2. ~S 6. ~M v ~T 10. ~A
3. ~B 7. ~T
4. A v B 8. C⋅D
Exercise 10
1. (~A ⋅ ~S) ⋅ M (The main operator is the second dot—in this case it
doesn’t actually matter which dot since the sentence has the same
meaning whichever of the conjuncts you treat as the main operator.)
2. ~S ⋅ ~H (The main operator is the conjunction.)
3. P ⋅ ~N (The main operator is the conjunction.)
4. (~S ⋅ ~F) ⋅ A (The main operator is the second dot—in this case it
doesn’t actually matter which dot since the sentence has the same
meaning whichever of the conjuncts you treat as the main operator.)
5. ~C ⋅ (F ⋅ B) (The main operator is the first dot—in this case it doesn’t
actually matter which dot since the sentence has the same meaning
whichever of the conjuncts you treat as the main operator.)
6. (T ⋅ ~S) ⋅ L (The main operator is the second dot—in this case it doesn’t
actually matter which dot since the sentence has the same meaning
whichever of the conjuncts you treat as the main operator.)
7. E ⋅ W (There is only one truth functional operator, the conjunction. So
that is by default the main operator!)
8. (T v L) ⋅ ~S (The main operator is the conjunction.)
9. (B v F) ⋅ ~(P v D) (The main operator is the conjunction.)
10. (A ⋅ J) ⋅ E (The main operator is the second dot—in this case it doesn’t
actually matter which dot since the sentence has the same meaning
whichever of the conjuncts you treat as the main operator.)
11. (A ⋅ J) v (C ⋅ M) (The wedge is the main operator.)
12. S ⋅ ~H (The main operator is the conjunction.)
Exercise 11
1.
a. P = Coral is a plant; A = Coral is an animal
b. ~(P ⋅ A)
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Answers to exercises
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Answers to exercises
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Answers to exercises
Exercise 12
1. Invalid
2. Valid
3. Invalid
4. Valid
A B C (A v B) ⋅ (A v C) ~A BvC
T T T T T T F T
T T F T T T F T
T F T T T T F T
T F F T T T F F
F T T T T T T T
F T F T F F T T
F F T F F T T T
F F F F F F T F
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Answers to exercises
5. Invalid
R T S R ⋅ (T v S) T ~S
T T T T T T F
T T F T T T T
T F T T T F F
T F F F F F T
F T T F T T F
F T F F T T T
F F T F T F F
F F F F F F T
6. Invalid
7. Valid
8. Valid
A B ~(A v B) ~A v ~B
T T F T F F F
T F F T F T T
F T F T T T F
F F T F T T T
9. Valid
D R S (R v S) ⋅ ~D ~R S ⋅ ~D
T T T T F F F F
T T F T F F F F
T F T T F F T F
T F F F F F T F
F T T T T T F T
F T F T T T F F
F F T T T T T T
F F F F F T F F
Exercise 13
1. T ⊃ I (T = The Tigers will win; I = The Indians will lose their star pitcher)
2. H ⊃ P (P = Tom will pass the class; H = Tom does all of his homework)
3. R ⊃ G (R = The car will run; G = The car has gas)
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Answers to exercises
Exercise 14
1. Equivalent 6. Equivalent
2. Equivalent 7. Not equivalent
3. Equivalent 8. Equivalent
4. Equivalent 9. Not equivalent
5. Not equivalent 10. Not equivalent
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Answers to exercises
Exercise 15
1. Contingent
A B A ⊃ (A ⋅ B)
T T T T
T F F F
F T T F
F F T F
2. Tautology
A B (A ⋅ B) ⊃ (~A ⊃ ~B)
T T T T T
T F F T T
F T F T F
F F F T T
3. Tautology
A B (A ⋅ ~A) ⊃ B
T T F T T
T F F T F
F T F T T
F F F T F
4. Contradiction
A B (A ⊃ A) ⊃ (B ⋅ ~B)
T T T F F
T F T F F
F T T F F
F F T F F
5. Tautology
A B (A ⋅ B) ⊃ (A v B)
T T T T T
T F F T T
F T F T T
F F F T F
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Answers to exercises
6. Contingent
A B (A v B) ⊃ (A ⋅ B)
T T T T T
T F T F F
F T T F F
F F F T F
7. Contingent
A B (~A ⊃ ~B) ⊃ (~B ⊃ ~A)
T T T T T
T F T F F
F T F T T
F F T T T
8. Tautology
A B (A ⊃ B) ⊃ (~B ⊃ ~A)
T T T T T
T F F T F
F T T T T
F F T T T
9. Contingent
A B (B v ~B) ⊃ A
T T T T
T F T T
F T T F
F F T F
10. Tautology
A B (A v B) v ~A
T T T T F
T F T T F
F T T T T
F F F T T
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Answers to exercises
Exercise 16
1. Addition 1
Simplification 1 Constructive dilemma 2, 5,
Simplification 1 6
Addition 2 6.
Addition 3 Simplification 2
Conjunction 4, 5 Modus tollens 1, 4
2. Disjunctive syllogism 3, 5
Disjunctive syllogism 2, 3 7.
Modus ponens 1, 4 Simplification 2
Modus tollens 2, 5 Modus ponens 3, 4
3. Simplification 2
Simplification 3 Disjunctive syllogism 5, 6
Modus tollens 1, 4 Conjunction 4, 7
Disjunctive syllogism 2, 5 Modus ponens 1, 8
4. 8.
Simplification 2 Simplification 2
Hypothetical syllogism 1, 3 Disjunctive syllogism 3, 5
Modus ponens 4, 5 Simplification 2
Simplification 2 Modus tollens 1, 7
Conjunction 6, 7 Disjunctive syllogism 4, 8
5. Modus ponens 6, 9
Hypothetical syllogism 3, 4 Addition 10
Exercise 17
1.
1. A ⋅ B
2. (A v C) ⊃ D /∴ A ⋅ D
3. A Simplification 1
4. A v C Addition 3
5. D Modus ponens 2, 4
6. A ⋅ D Conjunction 3, 5
2.
1. A
2. B /∴ (A v C) ⋅ B
3. AvC Addition 1
4. (A v C) ⋅ B Conjunction 2, 3
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Answers to exercises
3.
1. D⊃E
2. D⋅F /∴ E
3. D Simplification 2
4. E Modus ponens 1, 3
4.
1. J⊃K
2. J /∴ K v L
3. K Modus ponens 1, 2
4. KvL Addition 3
5.
1. AvB
2. ~A ⋅ ~C /∴ B
3. ~A Simplification 2
4. B Disjunctive syllogism 1, 3
6.
1. A⊃B
2. ~B ⋅ ~C /∴ ~A
3. ~B Simplification 2
4. ~A Modus tollens, 1, 3
7.
1. D⊃E
2. (E ⊃ F) ⋅ (F⊃ D) /∴ D ⊃ F
3. E⊃F Simplification 2
4. D⊃F Hypothetical syllogism 1, 3
8.
1. (T ⊃ U) ⋅ (T ⊃ V)
2. T /∴ U v V
3. TvU Addition 2
4. UvV Constructive dilemma 1, 2, 3
9.
1. (E ⋅ F) v (G ⊃ H)
2. I ⊃ G
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Answers to exercises
3. ~(E ⋅ F) /∴ I ⊃ H
4. G ⊃ H Disjunctive syllogism 1, 3
5. I ⊃ H Hypothetical syllogism 2, 4
10.
1. M⊃N
2. O⊃P
3. N⊃P
4. (N ⊃ P) ⊃ (M v O) /∴N v P
5. MvO Modus ponens 3, 4
6. NvP Constructive dilemma 1, 2, 5
11.
1. A v (B ⊃ A)
2. ~A ⋅ C /∴ ~B
3. ~A Simplification 2
4. B⊃A Disjunctive syllogism 1, 3
5. ~B Modus tollens 3, 4
12.
1. (D v E) ⊃ (F ⋅ G)
2. D /∴ F
3. DvE Addition 2
4. F⋅G Modus ponens 1, 3
5. F Simplification 4
13.
1. T⊃U
2. V v ~U
3. ~V ⋅ ~W /∴ ~T
4. ~V Simplification 3
5. ~U Disjunctive syllogism 2, 4
6. ~T Modus tollens 1, 5
14.
1. (A v B) ⊃ ~C
2. CvD
3. A /∴ D
4. AvB Addition 3
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Answers to exercises
5. ~C Modus ponens 1, 4
6. D Disjunctive syllogism 2, 5
15.
1. L v (M ⊃ N)
2. ~L ⊃ (N ⊃ O)
3. ~L /∴ M⊃O
4. N⊃O Modus ponens 2, 3
5. M⊃N Disjunctive syllogism 1, 3
6. M⊃O Hypothetical syllogism 4, 5
16.
1. A⊃B
2. A v (C ⋅ D)
3. ~B ⋅ ~E /∴ C
4. ~B Simplification 3
5. ~A Modus tollens 1, 4
6. C⋅D Disjunctive syllogism 2, 5
7. C Simplification 6
17.
1. (F ⊃ G) ⋅ (H ⊃ I)
2. J⊃K
3. (F v J) ⋅ (H v L) /∴ G v K
4. F⊃G Simplification 1
5. FvJ Simplification 3
6. GvK Constructive dilemma 2, 4, 5
18.
1. (E v F) ⊃ (G ⋅ H)
2. (G v H) ⊃ I
3. E /∴ I
4. EvF Addition 3
5. G⋅H Modus ponens 1, 4
6. G Simplification 5
7. GvH Addition 6
8. I Modus ponens 2, 7
19.
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Answers to exercises
1. (N v O) ⊃ P
2. (P v Q) ⊃ R
3. QvN
4. ~Q /∴ R
5. N Disjunctive syllogism 3, 4
6. N v O Addition 5
7. P Modus ponens 1, 6
8. P v Q Addition 7
9. R Modus ponens 2, 8
20.
1. J⊃K
2. KvL
3. (L ⋅ ~J) ⊃ (M ⋅ ~J)
4. ~K /∴ M
5. L Disjunctive syllogism 2, 4
6. ~J Modus tollens 1, 4
7. L ⋅ ~J Conjunction 5, 6
8. M ⋅ ~J Modus ponens 3, 7
9. M Simplification 8
Exercise 18
1. All real men are things that wear pink.
2. No dinosaurs are birds.
3. All birds are things that evolved from dinosaurs.
4. Some mammals are not predators. [Already in “Some S are not P”
categorical form.]
5. Some predators are not mammals. [Already in “Some S are not P”
categorical form.]
6. Some things that wander are not things that are lost.
7. No presidents are women.
8. No boxers are rich people.
9. No things that are sleeping are things that are conscious.
10. No things that are conscious are things that are sleeping.
11. All things that end well are things that are well. [Note that this is in a
different order than the sentence states. However, if you think about the
meaning of the cliché, it should be clear that this is the correct order.
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Answers to exercises
Exercise 19
1. Invalid 5. Valid
2. Valid 6. Invalid
3. Invalid 7. Invalid
4. Invalid 8. Invalid
Exercise 20
1. Invalid
2. Invalid
3. Invalid
4. Invalid
Exercise 21
1. Invalid 4. Invalid 7. Invalid
2. Invalid 5. Invalid 8. Invalid
3. Valid 6. Valid 9. Valid
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Answers to exercises
Exercise 22
1. Hasty generalization (you can’t infer something general from just one case
here—the sample size is way too small). There is also a sampling bias
present: even if many others people from Silverton, CO drove pickups, it
doesn’t follow that people generally do. There is a high percentage of
trucks in Silverton because the rough roads there almost require trucks.
2. Biased sample: even if he has an adequate sample size, Tom needs to
sample from different times during the morning to be sure that he has a
representative sample. If morning doves are disproportionately
represented during the early morning hours, then his sample will be
biased.
3. Even more clearly than the previous example, this one is a biased sample:
even if he has an adequate sample size, Tom needs to sample from
different times of the day. It is likely that morning doves will be
disproportionately represented in the morning, since they are more likely
to be out in the morning than other kinds of birds.
4. This example corrects the problems of the previous two: Tom has
sampled from different times during the day. As long as he has taken
these samples on multiple different days (preferably in different seasons
too), then his sample is representative and his generalization is good.
5. Biased sample. Same problem, mutatis mutandis, as #3.
6. This seems to be a good generalization, assuming that he keeps up this
regimen on multiple days. The difference, of course, is that instead of
making his generalization cover the whole day, his generalization is only
about the birds that land in his tree during the night.
7. Biased sample. Of course the home owners will be likely to support a
policy that slashes property taxes. Most likely, those on Medicaid
(governmental health care support for the elderly) will not be
homeowners but will be in nursing home facilities. If the poll had been
administered to Medicaid recipients (who are less likely to own homes),
the results would likely have been different.
8. This seems a good generalization. Telephone polls are a good way of
getting a random sample, and the sample size is large enough if a good
random sampling technique is used.
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Answers to exercises
9. Sampling bias because of the biased way the question is asked: “killing
innocent children” uses strong, evaluative language and may influence
how people answer, making them more likely to choose option b over
option a (who wants to say they support “killing innocent children”?).
10. Steve’s problem is that he has gotten a biased sample. Ani Difranco
concert-goers are not representative of concert-goers tout court. Since
Ani Difranco is very political (and from a feminist perspective), we should
expect to see a much higher proportion of such speech at an Ani Difranco
concert. In contrast, Tom Petty is about a apolitical as any musician.
11. Biased sample. We should expect students in detention to be less
satisfied, on average, than students generally. Thus, since the principal’s
survey was only administered to students in detention, the rate of
dissatisfaction will be much higher, which will make the sample
unrepresentative and the generalization bad.
12. This seems to be a good generalization. Her generalization only covers
“all Pistons games” (rather than all NBA games or all professional sports
games, more generally) and she has attended many games over many
years. Thus the sample seems to be both representative (i.e., non-biased)
and large enough.
13. Unlike the last example, Alice’s generalization now applies to all NBA
games, but still uses only her experience at Pistons games. But unless we
are given some reason for thinking that Pistons games are representative
of all NBA games, we should not assume that Pistons games are
representative of all NBA games. Thus, the sample is probably biased
(although we do not know for sure that it is, we cannot assume it isn’t
without further investigation).
14. Even more than the last example, this one is biased sample. Unless we
have a good reason for thinking that Pistons games are representative of
all professional sporting events, we cannot assume that they are.
15. Although we can understand Bob’s fear, this is clearly a hasty
generalization since he is generalization from only one case at one Burger
King to all Burger Kings, all the time.
Exercise 23 (Note: for many of these, there is more than one correct answer.
The important thing to do is to give the correctly explanation for why the
explanation lacks the virtue you have chosen.)
1. This could be any number of them, including: depth (why would the
aliens have kidnapped him and then returned him to his home?), power
(this explanation cannot be used in a range of different circumstances—a
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Answers to exercises
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Answers to exercises
9. Again, this explanation lacks modesty. Why not just say that it is “an
animal” rather than “an escaped zoo animal.” Unless she has some
evidence relevant to the escaped zoo animal hypothesis, she should just
leave it at the more general “animal” hypothesis. Furthermore, the
explanation may be said to lack power, as well. Since most such noises
are made by creatures in the wild, not escaped zoo animals, the
“creatures in the wild” explanation is more powerful, since it is used to
explain a much wider range of similar observations (i.e., hearing rustling
in the bushes and sticks cracking on the ground while in the woods).
10. Simplicity. The simpler explanation is that Bill was speeding, not that
they had tracked his overdue library book. It also lacks power since most
of the time when people are pulled over on the highway it is for speeding,
not unreturned library books.
11. This is a good explanation and seems to lack no explanatory virtue.
12. This explanation clearly lacks modesty. Why say that someone was
going precisely 13.74 mph over the speed limit rather than saying that
they were going over the speed limit (without specifying how far)? That
specificity is not justified by the observed facts.
13. Conservativeness. We have no good reason for positing some whole
new breed of rats—especially if the claim is that they evolved in her
apartment only. This would violate what we know about how evolution
works (i.e., we probably need a much larger population for this to happen
than the population of rats that are contained in only her apartment).
Furthermore, the explanation lacks power since a better explanation that
applied to a wider range of circumstances is simply that the rats were not
taking the bait.
14. Even more clearly than #13, this one lacks conservativeness. There are
no known cases of anything being immortal and this idea violates our
understanding of the basic laws of nature. Nothing is immortal.
15. Again, this explanation lacks conservativeness (i.e., it violates our
understanding of nature which says that nothing is immortal). A better
explanation is that the bullets Bob put in his gun were blanks (cf. the
movie, Crash).
Exercise 24
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Answers to exercises
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Answers to exercises
12. Whether this famous argument for the existence of God is strong or weak
is a matter of some debate. One reason for saying it is a weak argument
is that there is a disanalogy between artificial objects and natural objects,
since complex natural objects may evolve without being designed by an
intelligent designer, whereas no artificial objects (yet) can evolve on their
own.
13. Weak. Running the same number of miles as an elite runner is not a
relevant similarity for determining how fast one will run a race. The
relevant dissimilarity here is that although Bekele runs his mile repeats at
close to 4:00 flat, I can only run mine at 5:30. So it is the pace at which
one runs, rather than the number of miles one runs, that is the better
predictor of how fast one can run a race.
14. Strong. The fact that we are both humans is relevant to determining
whether someone will feel pain. Humans all have similar physiology,
which is why we should expect that if x causes one person physical pain,
then x will also cause anyone else a similar pain. (However, this argument
also raises a famous problem in philosophy of mind called “the problem
of other minds.” The issue is whether or not we can ever know that
people have mental states, such as pain, like my own. Even if you exhibit
pain behavior in similar instances in which I experience pain, how do I
know that you are actually feeling what I am feeling—that you are having
the experience of pain, rather than simply exhibiting pain behavior
without have the mental experience of it? Many philosophers have
argued that we cannot overcome this problem and must admit that we
cannot know whether people other than ourselves actually have mental
states like ours.)
15. Again, the common sense answer would be that this is a strong
argument based on a strong analogy. Since you and I are both human
and share similar perceptual systems, we should expect that we will
perceive the world very similarly (even if not exactly the same). (However,
we can raise the same “problem of other minds” problem here as I did in
#14 above. Suppose we both point at the grass and say that it is green.
However, how do I know that your experience of green is like my
experience of green? Maybe your experience of green is more like my
experience of red and vice versa.)
Exercise 25
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Answers to exercises
Exercise 26
1. Accidental
2. B causes A. Perhaps when we are away from home, Charlie gets less
exercise, hence putting on more weight. In that case B is (indirectly)
causing A, since our being away from home results in Charlie getting less
exercise, which results in him gaining more weight.
3. Common cause. The common cause is simply the factors that make
plants grow, such a sunlight, water, and good soil. In this case, A and B
are not causing each other, but there is something else (i.e., growth
factors of plants) that is causing each one, independently to grow.
4. A causes B. The more bombing, the more stress for the president. And
the more stress for the president, the more of his hairs fall out.
5. B causes A. Arguably, the average number of fires per year will influence
the number of fire engines needed. Fewer fires would require fewer
engines (in which case they’d likely retire some); more fires would require
more engines (in which case they’d likely acquire some).
6. Common cause: agrarian societies will have more mules and will also
probably pay professors less, since higher education is not as important in
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Answers to exercises
Exercise 27
1. 1/6 6. 35/36
2. 5/6 7. 1 – (5/6 x 5/6) = 11/36
3. 1/36 8. 1 – 11/36 = 25/36
4. 1/36 9. 1/36
5. 1 – (5/6 x 5/6) = 11/36 10. 6/36
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Glossary/Index
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Glossary/Index
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