pdf version of the entry

Supervenience
http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2014/entries/supervenience/ Supervenience
from the Spring 2014 Edition of the First published Mon Jul 25, 2005; substantive revision Wed Nov 2, 2011

Stanford Encyclopedia A set of properties A supervenes upon another set B just in case no two
things can differ with respect to A-properties without also differing with
of Philosophy respect to their B-properties. In slogan form, “there cannot be an A-
difference without a B-difference”.

As we shall see, this slogan can be cashed out in many different ways. But
to illustrate the basic idea, imagine that there is a perfect forger. Her
copies of paintings not only fool the art dealers, but are in fact exact
Edward N. Zalta Uri Nodelman Colin Allen R. Lanier Anderson duplicates of the originals down to the precise placement of every
Principal Editor Senior Editor Associate Editor Faculty Sponsor
molecule of pigment—indeed, down to every microphysical detail.
Editorial Board
Suppose that she produces such a copy of El Greco's A View of Toledo. It
http://plato.stanford.edu/board.html
is of course different from the original in various respects—it is a forgery,
Library of Congress Catalog Data it was not painted by El Greco, it is worth quite a bit less at Sotheby's, and
ISSN: 1095-5054
so forth. But the forgery is also exactly like the original in other respects. It
Notice: This PDF version was distributed by request to mem- is the same shape, size, and weight. The surface of the canvas contains the
bers of the Friends of the SEP Society and by courtesy to SEP same arrangements of colors and shapes—a blue rectangle here, a green
content contributors. It is solely for their fair use. Unauthorized swirl there. Indeed, it looks just the same, at least to a single viewer under
distribution is prohibited. To learn how to join the Friends of the identical lighting conditions and so forth. Perhaps it is even just as
SEP Society and obtain authorized PDF versions of SEP entries, beautiful as the original, though that is more controversial.
please visit https://leibniz.stanford.edu/friends/ .
The properties that the forgery is guaranteed to share with the original are
Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy those that supervene upon its microphysical properties. Two paintings that
Copyright c 2011 by the publisher
The Metaphysics Research Lab are microphysically just alike are guaranteed to be just alike in the
Center for the Study of Language and Information arrangement of colors and shapes on their canvases. That is, you cannot
Stanford University, Stanford, CA 94305
change the arrangement of colors and shapes on a painting's canvas
Supervenience without changing its microphysical properties. This is just to say that the
Copyright c 2014 by the authors
Brian McLaughlin and Karen Bennett arrangement of colors and shapes supervenes on its microphysical
All rights reserved.
properties.
Copyright policy: https://leibniz.stanford.edu/friends/info/copyright/

1
 Supervenience Brian McLaughlin and Karen Bennett

Supervenience is a central notion in analytic philosophy. It has been 4.4 Similarity Based Supervenience
invoked in almost every corner of the field. For example, it has been 4.5 Multiple Domain Supervenience
claimed that aesthetic, moral, and mental properties supervene upon 5. Applications
physical properties. It has also been claimed that modal truths supervene 5.1 An Argumentative Strategy
on non-modal ones, and that general truths supervene on particular truths. 5.2 Internalism/Externalism
Further, supervenience has been used to distinguish various kinds of 5.3 Haecceitism
internalism and externalism, and to test claims of reducibility and 5.4 Characterizing Physicalism
conceptual analysis. 5.5 Coincident Entities and the “Grounding Problem”
Appendix: List of Definitions
1. Introduction Bibliography
2. History Academic Tools
2.1 ‘Supervenience’ as a Philosophical Term of Art Other Internet Resources
2.2 Origin of the Term Related Entries
3. Supervenience and Other Relations
3.1 The Modal Force of the Supervenience Relation
3.2 Supervenience and Entailment 1. Introduction
3.3 Supervenience and Reduction
3.4 Supervenience and Ontological Innocence The core idea of supervenience is captured by the slogan, “there cannot be
3.5 Supervenience and Dependence an A-difference without a B-difference.” It is important to notice the word
3.6 Supervenience and Realization ‘cannot’. Supervenience claims do not merely say that it just so happens
3.7 Supervenience and Explanation that there is no A-difference without a B-difference; they say that there
3.8 Tallying Up cannot be one. A-properties supervene on B-properties if and only if a
4. Varieties of Supervenience difference in A-properties requires a difference in B-properties—or,
4.1 Weak and Strong Individual Supervenience equivalently, if and only if exact similarity with respect to B-properties
4.2 Regional Supervenience guarantees exact similarity with respect to A-properties. Supervenience
4.3 Global Supervenience claims thus have modal force. The kind of modal force can vary; different
4.3.1 Strong Individual Supervenience and Global supervenience claims might attribute different kinds of necessity to the
Supervenience connection between B-properties and A-properties (see Section 3.1.) Even
4.3.2 Different Versions of Global Supervenience when the modality is fixed, however, there are a number of distinct claims
4.3.3 Equivalences for an Extrinsic Base that might be expressed by the slogan. A good deal of philosophical work
4.3.4 Equivalencies for Intrinsic Properties has gone into distinguishing these forms of supervenience, and into
4.3.5 Individual and Global Supervenience Redux examining their pairwise logical relations.

2 Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy Spring 2014 Edition 3

 Supervenience Brian McLaughlin and Karen Bennett

We will begin with a few brief historical remarks (Section 2), and then ‘supervenience’ is irrelevant to the philosophical use of the term. The
turn to some general questions about supervenience, such as whether it is philosophical use of ‘supervenience’ is strictly proprietary, and so in no
explanatory and whether it is guarantees entailment (Section 3). We will way beholden to its vernacular use(s). In this way, ‘supervene’ is different
then explore the various versions of supervenience in some detail (Section from terms like ‘cause,’ ‘freedom,’ or ‘justice’. ‘Supervene’ receives its
4). The technical work is interesting in its own right, but it is obviously sense by stipulation, and the notion so defined is to be judged by its
made more interesting by the fact that the different varieties of philosophical fruits (McLaughlin 1995).
supervenience may be useful for different philosophical purposes. Thus,
although most of this entry will be concerned with supervenience itself 2.2 Origin of the Term
rather than its applications, we will end with a discussion of some of the
What, then, is the origin of the philosophical use of the term? It is not
substantive philosophical issues to which supervenience is relevant
clear. Some have speculated that it originates with the British
(Section 5).
Emergentists of the early part of the twentieth century. This is because the
Readers primarily interested only in an overview of the relations between British Emergentist Lloyd Morgan (1923) used the term ‘supervene’ to
the main varieties of supervenience should skip to Section 4. The technical characterize a relation that emergent properties bear to their base
definitions are also collated in an Appendix. properties, and his use became fairly widespread in the literature on
emergence. However, Morgan used ‘supervene’ in essentially its
2. History vernacular sense, rather than in its current philosophical sense. He held
that emergent properties are distinct from, and additional to, their base
2.1 ‘Supervenience’ as a Philosophical Term of Art properties, and arise unpredictably from them. It was this use, not the
current philosophical use, that became fairly widespread in the literature
‘Supervenience’ and its cognates are technical terms. This is not news; on emergence (see Van Cleve 1990; and McLaughlin 1992 and 1997b).
‘supervene’ is rarely used outside the philosophy room these days. But it
occasionally is, and when it is, it typically has a different meaning. It is It is also frequently claimed that the term ‘supervene’ was first used in its
typically used to mean “coming or occurring as something additional, contemporary philosophical sense by R.M. Hare, who used it to
extraneous, or unexpected” (Webster's New International Dictionary, 3rd characterize a relationship between moral properties and natural properties
edition). This is the sense at issue in the following passages from the (1952, 145). Unlike Morgan, Hare used the term in essentially the current
Oxford English Dictionary: “upon a sudden supervened the death of the philosophical sense, but he claims that he was not the first to do so. He
king (1674–48)” and “The king was bruised by the pommel of his saddle; claims that the term was so used in Oxford in the 1940s, though he does
fever supervened, and the injury proved fatal (1867)” (cited in Kim 1990, not recall by whom, or in what context (Hare 1984).
2–3). It is also the sense at issue in W.V.O. Quine's autobiographical
remark about his adolescence: “necking, as it was called, supervened in It is important to be clear, however, that whether or not Hare was the first
the fullness of time as necking will” (1985, 43). However, this use of to use the term ‘supervene’ in the philosophical sense, he was by no means

4 Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy Spring 2014 Edition 5

 Supervenience Brian McLaughlin and Karen Bennett

the first to assert a supervenience thesis. For example, while G. E. Moore In Section 4, we will lay out those varieties, and note their pairwise logical
did not use the term ‘supervene’, he asserted: “one of the most important relations. For now, though, we will stick to the core idea of supervenience
facts about qualitative difference…[is that] two things cannot differ in —namely, that there cannot be an A-difference without a B-difference. A
quality without differing in intrinsic nature” (1922, 263). And there are number of general points of philosophical interest can be made just by
many other historical examples of such explicit statements of working with that simple and easy idea.
supervenience theses. Moreover, though we are not going to argue the
point here, it seems no exaggeration to say that virtually every major 3.1 The Modal Force of the Supervenience Relation
figure in the history of western philosophy has been at least implicitly
In order to sort out how supervenience connects up to other relations—like
committed to some supervenience thesis or other (or to the denial of one).
entailment, reduction, ontological dependence, and explanation—we need
But regardless of how long the notion of supervenience has been around, to discuss the fact that supervenience can hold with varying degrees of
or who first used the term ‘supervenience’ in its philosophical sense, it is modal force. That is, the ‘cannot’ in “there cannot be an A-difference
indisputable that Donald Davidson played a key role in bringing the idea without a B-difference” comes in different strengths. For example, it can
to center stage. He introduced the term ‘supervenience’ into contemporary mean “cannot as a matter of logic,” or it can mean “cannot consistently
philosophy of mind in the following passage: with the laws of nature“.

[M]ental characteristics are in some sense dependent, or This raises some controversial issues. For the purposes of this essay, we
supervenient, on physical characteristics. Such supervenience make the following three assumptions. First, we assume that metaphysical
might be taken to mean that there cannot be two events alike in all necessity is just as strong as logical necessity. There are, to be sure,
physical respects but differing in some mental respect, or that an metaphysically necessary truths that are not logical truths, such as the truth
object cannot alter in some mental respect without altering in some that water = H20. But metaphysical necessity is just as strong as logical
physical respect (1970, 214). necessity in that the space of metaphysical possibility is exactly the same
as the space of logically possibility: the logically possible worlds = the
After Davidson's appeal to supervenience, Terence Horgan (1982, 1984), metaphysically possible worlds (see, e.g., McLaughlin 1995; Chalmers
Jaegwon Kim (1984, 1987, 1988, 1990, 1993), David Lewis (1983), and 1996; and Jackson 1998). This is not entirely uncontroversial, but little we
others began to examine the notion of supervenience itself, and to explore have to say turns on it. Second, and more importantly in what follows, we
its usefulness for a wide variety of philosophical purposes. The literature assume that at least certain properties that figure in laws of nature do not
has since mushroomed. play their nomic roles essentially, so that it is logically or metaphysically
possible for those properties not to figure in the laws in question. This is
3. Supervenience and Other Relations also controversial, but we will not defend it here. (See Shoemaker 1980,
Swoyer 1982, and Ellis 2001 for the opposing view.) Finally, we will
Philosophers have distinguished many different varieties of supervenience. assume that whatever is metaphysically necessary is nomologically

6 Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy Spring 2014 Edition 7

 Supervenience Brian McLaughlin and Karen Bennett

necessary, but not conversely. (One can hold that there are nomologically there be what philosophers call a ‘zombie’? Because it is widely agreed
necessary truths that are not metaphysically necessary, even if one holds that the mental nomologically supervenes on the physical, it is widely
that all nomic properties play their nomic roles essentially; see Fine 2002.) agreed that zombies are nomologically impossible—that their existence
would violate psychophysical laws. But some philosophers (e.g., Chalmers
Some supervenience relations are metaphysically (or logically) necessary. 1996) think that zombies are metaphysically possible. This remains a
The property being a haircut or a halibut supervenes with metaphysical matter of lively dispute, and resolving it requires addressing some hard
necessity on the two base properties being a haircut and being a halibut: questions about the relationship between conceivability and metaphysical
two things cannot differ with respect to being a haircut or a halibut possibility. Suffice it to note that the dispute is precisely over the modal
without differing either with respect to being a haircut or else with respect force of the ‘cannot’ in “there cannot be a mental difference without a
to being a halibut. Also, the surface areas of perfect spheres supervene physical difference.” (For discussions of the relationship between
with metaphysical necessity on their volumes (and vice versa) (Lombard conceivability and metaphysical possibility see, e.g., the essays in Gendler
1986). Some supervenience relations are metaphysically contingent. and Hawthorne 2002. For a discussion of physicalism, see Section 5.4 and
Consider the Wiedemann-Franz Law, which entails that the electrical the separate entry on physicalism.)
conductivity of a metal co-varies with its thermal conductivity. This law
thus entails that electrical conductivity and thermal conductivity mutually 3.2 Supervenience and Entailment
supervene on each other. But on the assumption that the law is
metaphysically contingent, the supervenience relation is too. It is only Is supervenience a form of entailment? The two relations are logically
nomologically necessary that there cannot be a difference in one sort of similar in certain ways. The entailment relation is reflexive, transitive, and
conductivity without a difference in the other sort. non-symmetric, and so is supervenience. Supervenience is reflexive: for
any set of properties A, there cannot be an A-difference without an A-
So, supervenience relations can hold with either metaphysical or difference (see, e.g., Kim 1984). It is also transitive: if A-properties
nomological necessity, and perhaps even with some other kind of supervene on B-properties, and B-properties supervene on C-properties,
necessity. The fact that supervenience comes in different modal strengths then A-properties supervene on C-properties. However, supervenience is
is important. Sometimes there is widespread agreement that a certain neither symmetric nor asymmetric; it is non-symmetric. Sometimes it
supervenience relation holds, but dispute over what its modal force is. One holds symmetrically. Every reflexive case of supervenience is trivially a
important example is the supervenience of the mental on the physical. Just symmetric case; consider also the case of the volume and surface area of
about everyone, even a Cartesian dualist, believes some version of this perfect spheres mentioned in Section 3.1. And sometimes it holds
supervenience claim. But there is vigorous disagreement about whether asymmetrically. For example, while the mental may supervene on the
the supervenience relation holds with metaphysical or merely nomological physical, the physical does not supervene on the mental. There can be
necessity. Ask yourself—could there be an individual that has no physical differences without mental differences. One uncontroversial way
conscious experience at all, despite being physically indiscernible from an to see this is to note that radically physically different things—a washing
individual that is conscious (Kirk 1994; Chalmers 1996)? That is, could machine and a paper bag, say—can be mentally just alike in virtue of

8 Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy Spring 2014 Edition 9

 Supervenience Brian McLaughlin and Karen Bennett

lacking mental properties altogether. Thus supervenience, like entailment, being F does not entail being not-F (McLaughlin 1995, 1997a). Second,
is reflexive, transitive, and non-symmetric. consider a case in which the property set B contains only the property P
and the property Q, and property set A is the unit set of the conjunctive
Nonetheless, that B-properties entail A-properties is neither necessary nor property P&Q. That is, A = {P&Q}, and B = {P, Q}. A supervenes with
sufficient for A-properties to supervene on B-properties. (The notion of metaphysical necessity on B. But there is no property in B that entails the
property entailment in play is this: property P entails property Q just in A-property.
case it is metaphysically necessary that anything that possesses P also
possesses Q.) To see that such entailments do not suffice for Now, there might be special sets of properties for which the supervenience
supervenience, consider the properties being a brother and being a sibling. of A on B guarantees that there are B-properties that entail the A-properties
Possessing the former entails possessing the latter; every brother is a —namely, property sets that are closed under the Boolean operations of
sibling. But being a sibling does not supervene on being a brother. Two complementation, infinitary conjunction, infinitary disjunction (see Kim
people can differ with respect to being a sibling despite being exactly alike 1984), and operations involving quantification. Closing {F} and {~F}
with respect to being a brother. To see this, suppose that Sarah has a sister under these operations will result in the same set, namely {F, ~F, F & ~F,
and Jack is an only child. Thus Sarah is a sibling and Jack is not, though F v ~F…}. In both cases just above, then, the closure of B under these
neither is a brother. So the B-properties can entail the A-properties, even operations in fact contains a property that entails the A-property.
though A does not supervene on B.
Discussions of supervenience often appeal to property sets that are closed
To see that supervenience does not suffice for entailment, recall that under such operations. But this is not a trivial assumption, for two reasons.
supervenience can hold with only nomological necessity. In such cases, First, it is controversial whether complementation, conjunction, and
there is no entailment; thermal conductivity properties do not entail disjunction are legitimate property-forming operations. Whether they are
electrical conductivity properties, for example. largely depends upon what properties are taken to be. If properties are just
the semantic values of predicates, then there are negative, conjunctive, and
But what about supervenience with metaphysical or logical necessity? disjunctive properties, because negative, conjunctive, and disjunctive
Even that does not in general guarantee that there are B-properties that predicates can have semantic values. But if properties are universals there
entail the A-properties. At best, the logical supervenience of A on B means may not be any such properties (Armstrong 1978, 1989). And if properties
that how something is B-wise entails how it is A-wise. But it does not are ways a thing might be, then property sets cannot be closed under
follow that every A-property is entailed by a B-property, or even that some Boolean operations. That would entail that for any property F, being F and
A-property is entailed by a B-property. Consider two examples. First, on ~F is also a property. However, that is not a way anything might be.
the assumption that there are negative properties, every property F will Second, even if it is assumed that the property-forming operations are
supervene with logical necessity on its complement not-F. After all, two legitimate, the fact is that we are quite often interested in property sets that
things cannot differ with respect to whether they are F without differing are not closed under them. Consider negation. Even assuming that there
with respect to whether they are not-F, and conversely. But obviously are negative properties, the fact is that we do not standardly count cats as

10 Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy Spring 2014 Edition 11

 Supervenience Brian McLaughlin and Karen Bennett

having geological properties because they are neither ignaceous, obvious for those who think that reduction requires property identity,
sedimentary, nor metamorphic. And it seems strange to say that Descartes because supervenience is reflexive. But on any reasonable view of
was committed to mental substances having physical properties simply reduction, if some set of A-properties reduces to a set of B-properties,
because he thought they are not spatially extended. Since not every there cannot be an A-difference without a B-difference. This is true both of
property set is closed under every property-forming operation, ontological reductions and what might be called “conceptual
supervenience is not in general sufficient for entailment. (For further reductions”—i.e., conceptual analyses.
discussion of supervenience and various property-forming operations, see
Van Cleve 1990; Oddie and Tichy 1990; Bacon 1990, 1995; Glanzberg The more interesting issue is whether supervenience suffices for reduction
2001; Bader forthcoming.) (see Kim 1984, 1990). This depends upon what reduction is taken to
require. If it is taken to require property identity or entailment, then, as we
One particularly interesting case of entailment failure arises when the have just seen (Section 3.2), even supervenience with logical necessity is
property sets are not closed under quantification. This opens room for not sufficient for reduction. Further, if reduction requires that certain
cases in which the supervening set A contains properties formed by epistemic conditions be met, then, once again, supervenience with logical
quantification, like being such that every F is a G, and the subvening set B necessity is not sufficient for reduction. That A supervenes on B as a
does not. If B does not include such properties, there are no properties in B matter of logical necessity need not be knowable a priori.
that entail them. As Bertrand Russell noted many years ago, “you cannot
ever arrive at a general fact by [deductive] inference from particular facts, 3.4. Supervenience and Ontological Innocence
however numerous” (Russell 1918, 235; quoted in Bricker 2005). But
The issues about entailment and reduction are related to a question about
general properties, nevertheless, logically supervene on particular ones: no
whether supervenience with metaphysical necessity is ontologically
two possible worlds can differ in what general facts hold without differing
innocent—whether the A-properties are anything “over and above” the B-
in what particular facts hold (see Skyrms 1981, Lewis 1992, and Bricker
properties.
2005). Thus, general facts logically supervene on particular facts, even
though the latter do not entail the former. Some think that supervenience is indeed ontologically innocent in this
sense. After all, if the A-properties supervene with metaphysical necessity
The upshot is that the logical supervenience of property set A on property
on the B-properties, then they come along automatically given the B-
set B will only guarantee that each A-property is entailed by some B-
properties. To borrow Kripke's metaphor (1972, 153-154), once God fixes
property if A and B are closed under both infinitary Boolean operations
the B-properties, she is all done; she does not need to do anything further
and property-forming operations involving quantification.
to get the A-properties going. Indeed, she cannot block them. Given the
3.3 Supervenience and Reduction distribution of B-properties, there is no further question about which A-
properties are instantiated. So, it is claimed, the latter are nothing over and
Everyone agrees that reduction requires supervenience. This is particularly above the former. However, other people vigorously resist this idea. How

12 Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy Spring 2014 Edition 13

 Supervenience Brian McLaughlin and Karen Bennett

can the A-properties not count as a further ontological commitment, if So, on the one hand, there is what might be called the “supervenience
they are numerically distinct from the B-properties? intuition”. The nonreductive physicalist thinks that the metaphysically
necessary supervenience of the mental on the physical means that mental
This dispute is central to various issues in metaphysics and the philosophy properties are nothing over and above physical ones, and the believer in
of mind. For example, nonreductive physicalists often say that mental unrestricted mereological composition thinks that the metaphysically
properties are distinct from but nonetheless “nothing over and above” necessary supervenience of fusions on their parts means that fusions are
physical ones. Their reductivist opponents, however, clearly think that this nothing over and above those parts. On the other hand, there is what might
is illegitimate. This can be seen in the charge that nonreductive be called the “distinctness intuition”—if mental properties and
physicalists face the exclusion problem—that they are unable to account mereological fusions are distinct from physical properties and
for the causal efficacy of the mental without claiming that all of its effects mereological atoms, respectively, then surely they count as something
are “double-caused.” (See the entry on mental causation.) over and above them.
Another example concerns composition. Some people—those who believe This can be made to look as though it is just a terminological issue about
in “unrestricted mereological composition”—think that any two or more how to best use phrases like “nothing over and above” and “ontological
things whatsoever compose a larger thing. They typically claim that while innocence”. But there are very real issues here. The central difference
the (single) fusion is not identical to its (many) parts (the exception is between the two sides is that one emphasizes the fact that the two kinds of
Baxter 1988), it does supervene on them, and is thus “nothing over and properties or entities are numerically distinct, and the other emphasizes the
above” those parts. So, for example, there is a mereological fusion of your fact that there is nonetheless a close nonidentity relation between them.
left elbow, Tony Blair, and the Mississippi River, and it is distinct from, And what matters in any given case is i) just which particular nonidentity
but nothing over and above, those three parts. Lewis, speaking of a fusion relation holds, and ii) whether the fact that that relation holds is enough to
of a trout and a turkey, says that “it is neither fish nor fowl, but it is defuse whatever problem is on the table.
nothing else: it is part fish and part fowl” (1991, 80) and that “mereology
is innocent” (87). However, opponents of unrestricted mereological In the mereological fusion case, the issue is really just whether fusions
composition are unsurprisingly unconvinced: “what does ‘nothing over exist at all. Those who believe in unrestricted mereological composition
and above’ mean? This slippery phrase has had a lot of employment in think that the existence of the atoms entails the existence of the fusions,
philosophy, but what it means is never explained by its employers” (van and their opponents do not. The debate here is not so much about whether
Inwagen 1994, 210). Indeed, the thought that composition is not in the the fusions are anything “over and above” their parts—or would be if they
least ontologically innocent has led some to claim that there aren't any existed—but rather about whether the principle of unrestricted
composite objects (or that living organisms are the only composite objects; mereological composition is true.
see van Inwagen 1990, Merricks 2001, Dorr and Rosen 2002, and the
entry on mereology). In the nonreductive physicalism case, the issue is about whether all
nonidentity relations are on a par as far as the exclusion argument is

14 Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy Spring 2014 Edition 15

 Supervenience Brian McLaughlin and Karen Bennett

concerned. Nonreductive physicalists think that mental properties perhaps nothing short of numerical identity will do.
supervene with metaphysical necessity upon physical properties (whether
they are also entailed by physical properties depends upon what property- 3.5 Supervenience and Dependence
forming operations the set of physical properties is taken to be closed
Often, when someone asserts that A supervenes on B, she also wants to say
under; see Section 3.2). The interesting question is not whether this
that A-properties ontologically depend upon B-properties—regardless of
enables them to truly say that mental properties are “nothing over and
whether or not they are entailed by the B-properties, or count as a further
above” physical ones, but rather whether it enables them to solve the
ontological commitment. However, even this goes beyond the minimum
exclusion problem. (For views that more or less say that it does, see Yablo
required for supervenience. Supervenience is not a relation of ontological
1987, Shoemaker 2001, Bennett 2003, Melnyk 2003). Note that this issue
priority; the supervenience of A on B does not guarantee that B-properties
also arises in the case of mereological fusions; Merricks (2001) uses a
are ontologically prior to A-properties.
version of the exclusion problem to argue against the existence of
nonliving composites. One way to see this is to note that ontological priority is irreflexive and
asymmetrical: nothing can be ontologically prior to itself, or be
One more example, which is similar to the fusion case. We have just seen
ontologically prior to something that is also ontologically prior to it (see
that general truths supervene with metaphysical necessity on particular
van Cleve 1999). But as we have seen, supervenience is reflexive and not
truths, but are not entailed by them (Section 3.2). This led Russell to say
asymmetrical (see Section 3.2).
that “you must admit general facts as distinct from and over and above
particular facts” (1918, 236). It would be a mistake to focus too much on A second way to see that supervenience is not an ontological priority
Russell's claim that general facts are “over and above” particular facts; he relation is to see that A-properties can supervene on B-properties, even
clearly just means that they are numerically distinct from particular facts. when it is not the case that something has its A-properties in virtue of
The interesting issue is rather whether Russell is right that we must admit having its B-properties. A supervenience claim does not automatically
general facts into our ontology at all. (See Bricker 2005 for an argument to entail an “in virtue of” claim (McLaughlin 1995). As noted above, for any
the contrary.) property F, being F supervenes on being ~F: two things cannot differ with
respect to being F without differing with respect to being ~F. But, of
All told, there may not be a straightforward answer to the question of
course, it is not the case that something is F in virtue of being ~F!
whether supervenience with metaphysical necessity is ontologically
innocent. Whether it is depends upon whether it is a tight enough relation Third, notice that properties everything has necessarily and ones that
to do the work required to solve whatever concern is in play, and that will nothing can possibly have supervene, with the same sort of necessity, on
obviously depend upon what that concern is. So whether metaphysically any property whatsoever. (The fact that the necessary and the impossible
necessary supervenience is “ontologically innocent” may well depend supervene on anything and everything arguably poses a problem for
upon the case. In one case, metaphysically necessary supervenience might attempts to use supervenience to define physicalism. See Section 5.4.) The
do the job, in another case entailment might be required, and in another property being self-identical supervenes on the property being an antique;

16 Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy Spring 2014 Edition 17

 Supervenience Brian McLaughlin and Karen Bennett

the property being both a kangaroo and not a kangaroo supervenes upon property will realize pain just in case it has the kinds of causes and effects
the property being dusty. The reason is simple enough. No two things can that comprise the pain-role. (According to analytical functionalism, the
differ with respect to either necessary or impossible properties, period; pain-role is the causal role that folk psychology associates with pain;
thus no two things can differ with respect to such properties without also according to psychofunctionalism, it is the causal role that scientific
differing with respect to B-properties, for any property set B. Nothing can psychology associates with pain.) If more than one property plays the G-
be both a kangaroo and not a kangaroo, so no two things can differ with role, then G is multiply realizable. (See the entry on multiple realizability.)
respect to that property, and thus no two things can differ with respect to
that property without also differing with respect to being dusty, or being Sydney Shoemaker (2007, chapter 2) defines a related notion of property
purple, or being a steam engine, etc. But it is not the case that being both a realization, which he calls the ‘subset view of realization’. He says that “as
kangaroo and not a kangaroo is ontologically dependent upon being dusty. a first approximation, property P has property Q as a realizer just in case
(1) the forward-looking causal features of property P are a subset of the
For yet another reason for denying that the supervenience of A-properties forward-looking causal features of property Q, and (2) the backward-
on B-properties entails that things have their A-properties in virtue of looking causal features of P have as a subset the backward-looking
having their B-properties, see the discussion of certain forms of global features of Q” (2007, 12). Once again, if P has more than one realizer,
supervenience in Section 4.3.5. then P is multiply realizable.

3.6 Supervenience and Realization Neither of these property realization relations is the supervenience
relation. A property can supervene on other properties even when it is not
Like ‘supervenience’, ‘realization’ is a philosophical term of art. Its the kind of property that has a causal role associated with it, as is the case
definitions are stipulative and thus can only be judged by their theoretical with pure mathematical properties, for instance. Nor is property
usefulness. supervenience required for property realization in either of the above
senses. Suppose that F is multiply realizable in that it can be realized by G
Realization is primarily taken to be a relationship between properties,
or realized by H, and that something can be H without being G. Then,
though derivative notions of property instance realization and state of
despite the fact that G realizes F, two things can differ with respect to F
affairs realization have been defined. We will focus on property
without differing with respect to G in that they both lack G, and so F fails
realization. There is more than one use of the term ‘property realization’ in
to supervene on G. Of course, F may belong to a family of properties A,
literature. Perhaps the leading use is the one found in the literature on the
and G and H to a family of properties B, such that A-properties supervene
functionalist theory of mind. (See, e.g., Block 1980; Melnyk 2003, 2006).
on B-properties even though F does not supervene on G in particular.
On the functional view of realization, one property F realizes another G
just in case F occupies (or fills or plays) the causal role associated with G, There are other, less well-entrenched notions of realization in the literature
‘the G-role’—that is, just in case instances of F have the kinds of causes (e.g., Gillett 2002; Shoemaker 2007, chapter 3). These are not the
and kinds of effects that comprise the G-role. Thus, for instance, a neural supervenience relation either, though it would take us too far afield to

18 Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy Spring 2014 Edition 19

 Supervenience Brian McLaughlin and Karen Bennett

spell this out in detail. to rest content with a supervenience thesis if we do not see what would
explain why it is true. If it is claimed, for instance, that moral properties
3.7 Supervenience and Explanation supervene on non-moral properties, we expect there to be an explanation
of why this is so. Appeals to unexplainable supervenience theses can thus
Supervenience claims, by themselves, do nothing more than state that
seem to be mystery mongering.
certain patterns of property (or fact) variation hold. They are silent about
why those patterns hold, and about the precise nature of the dependency 3.8 Tallying Up
involved (see Kim 1993, 167; 1998, 9–15; Blackburn 1984, 186; Schiffer
1987, 153–154; and McGinn 1993, 57). But few supervenience theses are Supervenience gives us less than some philosophers have thought. Even
plausibly brute, that is, unexplainable. It is natural to look further, and to logically or metaphysically necessary supervenience is compatible with
try to explain why A-properties supervene on B-properties. When such there being no B-properties that entail any A-properties. Supervenience is
supervenience is explainable, there is ‘superdupervenience’ (a term coined not itself explanatory, and does not guarantee that the A-properties either
by William Lycan; see also Schiffer 1987; Horgan 1993; and Wilson reduce to or ontologically depend upon the B-properties. It might provide
1999). a way to capture the thought that A-properties or facts are not a further
ontological commitment over and above the B-properties or facts, but this
Sometimes it is easy to see what explains a supervenience thesis. Consider is controversial. At heart, all a supervenience claim says is that A-
the examples of trivial supervenience relations from Section 3.5. It is properties covary with B-properties. Nevertheless, as we shall see in
obvious why there cannot be an A-difference without a B-difference if A is Section 5, supervenience has a variety of philosophical uses.
a set of necessary or impossible properties—namely, because there cannot
be an A-difference at all. The supervenience relation is explained by the 4. Varieties of Supervenience
necessity or impossibility of the supervening properties. It is also obvious
why A-properties supervene on A-properties. Of course, property identity The slogan “There cannot be an A-difference without a B-difference” is
claims are sometimes not a priori knowable; consider, for example, the applied both to particular individuals and to entire possible worlds. In the
fact that the property being water is identical with the property being H20. former case, the slogan expresses the idea that two individuals cannot
Still the fact that being water is identical with being H20 explains why differ in A-respects without also differing in B-respects. This sort of claim
there cannot be a difference with respect to being water without a is an individual supervenience claim. In the latter case, the slogan
difference with respect to being H20. And supervenience with only expresses the idea that two possible worlds cannot differ with respect to
nomological necessity can be explained by appeal to laws of nature. It is in their world-wide pattern of distribution of A-properties without also
virtue of the Wiedemann-Franz Law that electrical conductivity differing with respect to their world-wide pattern of distribution of B-
supervenes with nomological necessity on thermal conductivity. properties. That sort of claim is a global supervenience claim. Both
individual and global supervenience claims come in a variety of modal
Because we expect supervenience theses to be explainable, it is hard for us
strengths. In this section, we will distinguish various forms of both

20 Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy Spring 2014 Edition 21

 Supervenience Brian McLaughlin and Karen Bennett

individual and global supervenience, and examine some logical supervenience theses, but the latter do not in general entail the former. It is
relationships among them. important to note, however, that when A is restricted to intrinsic
properties, strong and weak supervenience are arguably equivalent; see
4.1 Weak and Strong Individual Supervenience Section 4.3.4.

Kim (1984, 1987) distinguished two different kinds of individual Occasionally philosophers appeal to weak supervenience rather than
supervenience, weak and strong. They are defined by means of strong supervenience. Hare, for example, said that his claim that value
quantification over possible worlds, as follows: properties supervene on other properties was intended to be an appeal only
to weak supervenience (1984, 4). And Davidson similarly claimed that his
A-properties weakly supervene on B-properties if and only if for
appeal to supervenience was intended to be an appeal only to weak
any possible world w and any individuals x and y in w, if x and y
supervenience (1985, 1993, esp. 4n4). (He said this in response to Kim
are B-indiscernible in w, then they are A-indiscernible in w.
(1984), who argued that Davidson cannot appeal to strong supervenience
A-properties strongly supervene on B-properties if and only if for on pain of commitment to strict psychophysical laws, which are
any possible worlds w1 and w2 and any individuals x in w1 and y in incompatible with Davidson's well-known thesis of the anomalism of the
w2, if x in w1 is B-indiscernible from y in w2, then x in w1 is A- mental, according to which there are no strict psychophysical laws. See
indiscernible from y in w2. (Kim 1987.) the entry on anomalous monism.)

x and y are A-indiscernible if and only if they are exactly alike with respect But appealing to weak supervenience while denying strong generates a
to every A-property; similarly for B-indiscernibility. (Here times are certain explanatory burden. You will recall that we always want an
omitted, but of course objects may be A-indiscernible at one time, but not explanation of why a supervenience relation holds (see Section 3.7). Thus
at another.) The possible worlds quantified over might include all someone who asserts a weak supervenience thesis but denies the
metaphysically possible worlds, or only nomologically possible worlds corresponding strong supervenience thesis must provide an explanation of
(etc.), depending upon what degree of modal force is intended. why the weak supervenience thesis is true that does not entail that the
relevant strong supervenience thesis is true as well. And that can look
As the names indicate, strong individual supervenience is stronger than mysterious: if there can be things in different worlds that are A-discernible
weak individual supervenience. (We shall hereafter follow established but not B-discernible, why can't there be two such things within a single
usage and drop the word ‘individual’ unless clarity requires it.) Weak world? If everything within each world that is B-indiscernible is A-
supervenience says that there is no possible world that contains individuals indiscernible, how can different worlds enforce different B→A property
that are B-indiscernible but A-discernible. Strong supervenience entails pairings? (See Blackburn on the need to explain the “ban on mixed
that there are no possible individuals that are B-indiscernible but A- worlds,” 1973, 1985, and especially 1984, 184.)
discernible, whether they are in the same world or different worlds. When
the range of worlds is the same, strong supervenience theses entail weak Sometimes there is an explanation of why weak supervenience holds

22 Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy Spring 2014 Edition 23

 Supervenience Brian McLaughlin and Karen Bennett

despite the fact that strong supervenience does not. If, within a world, two requires explanation, and 3) that projectivists can do this better than moral
individuals assert exactly the same propositions, then they are exactly realists (1973, 1985.) We are content to note that some such answer is
alike vis-à-vis having asserted a true proposition: the one asserted at least required from anyone who holds a weak supervenience thesis without the
one true proposition if and only if the other did. The reason is that a corresponding strong supervenience thesis.
proposition will have a unique truth-value relative to a world. The
following weak supervenience thesis thus holds: for any world w, and any One final matter concerning the notions of weak and strong supervenience
individuals x and y in w, if x and y are indiscernible with respect to what remains to be discussed. This is that they are sometimes formulated
propositions they have asserted, then they are indiscernible with respect to differently, by means of modal operators rather than quantification over
having asserted a true proposition. Contingent propositions, however, are possible worlds:
true in some worlds and false in others. It is thus possible for two
A weakly supervenesm on B if and only if necessarily, if anything x
individuals in different worlds to assert exactly the same propositions, and
has some property F in A, then there is at least one property G in B
yet differ with respect to having asserted a true proposition. The one might
such that x has G, and everything that has G has F, i.e., iff
assert many true propositions, while the other fails to assert any true
proposition. It follows that the following strong supervenience thesis is □∀x∀F∈A[Fx → ∃G∈B(Gx & ∀y(Gy → Fy))]
false: for any worlds w1 and w2, any individuals x in w1 and y in w2, if x in
w1 is indiscernible from y in w2, with respect to what propositions they A strongly supervenesm on B if and only if necessarily, if anything
have asserted, then x in w1 is indiscernible from y in w2 with respect to x has some property F in A, then there is at least one property G in
having asserted a true proposition. B such x has G, and necessarily everything that has G has F, i.e.,
iff
In contrast, it is by no means clear why mental properties would weakly
supervene on physical properties without strongly supervening on them; □∀x∀F∈A[Fx → ∃G∈B(Gx & □∀y(Gy → Fy))]
and the analogous question arises for moral properties and nonmoral
(Kim 1984)
properties. Davidson and Hare owe us an explanation of why mental and
moral properties weakly supervene, respectively, on physical and Notice that strong superveniencem is formulated just like weak
nonmoral ones—and it must be an explanation that does not entail that superveniencem, except that it contains one more necessity operator.
strong supervenience holds as well. Simon Blackburn's well-known
argument against moral realism basically constitutes an attempt to answer Kim initially maintained that the modal operator versions are equivalent to
this question for Hare. Though Blackburn speaks of ‘supervenience’ and the above possible world definitions of weak and strong supervenience
‘necessitation’ rather than weak and strong supervenience, his argument respectively (see esp. 1987, 79–82). But they are not; they are stronger. On
against moral realism rests on exactly the demand for explanation that we certain assumptions (e.g. that modal operators are to be understood as
have been exploring. He claims, 1) that moral properties weakly supervene quantifiers over worlds), the modal operator versions of strong and weak
on nonmoral properties, but do not strongly supervene on them, 2) that this supervenience respectively entail the possible world versions; but not vice

24 Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy Spring 2014 Edition 25

 Supervenience Brian McLaughlin and Karen Bennett

versa (McLaughlin 1995). 4.2 Regional Supervenience

The reasoning here is basically the same as that given in Section 3.2 above Terence Horgan (1982) has proposed a version of supervenience in terms
for why supervenience does not guarantee entailment. Both weakm and of individual regions of space-times, rather than in terms of objects. A
strongm supervenience say i) that it is necessary that everything that has an weak and a strong version of Horgan's “regional supervenience” can be
A-property has some B-property or other, and ii) that that B-property formulated as follows:
entails the A-property. But neither i) nor ii) follows from the possible
world versions of either weak or strong supervenience—unless B is A-properties weakly regionally supervene on B-properties if and
assumed to be closed under the Boolean operations of complementation, only if for any possible world w and any space-time regions r1 and
infinitary conjunction, infinitary disjunction, and property-forming r2 in w, if r1 and r2 are B-duplicates in w, then they are A-
operations involving quantification (McLaughlin 1995). Without that duplicates in w.
assumption, the possible worlds versions allow things with A-properties to
A-properties strongly regionally supervene on B-properties if and
lack B-properties altogether, and a fortiori to lack any B-property that
only if for any possible worlds w1 and w2 and any space-time
entails their A-properties. Of course, possible worlds supervenience
regions r1 in w1 and space-time region r2 in w2, if r1 in w1 is a B-
requires that each pair of B-less intraworld (weak) or interworld (strong)
duplicate of r2 in w2, then r1 in w1 is an A-duplicate of r2 in w2.
individuals must have the same A-properties, but the possible world
versions allow B-less individuals to have A-properties. The modal operator Regional supervenience is a form of individual supervenience that takes
versions do not. the individuals to be regions of space-time. Nonetheless, it is worth
separate mention because Horgan (1982) has argued that it has some of the
It should therefore come as no surprise that the cases that served as
attractive features of global supervenience.
counterexamples to the claim that supervenience is a form of entailment
also serve as counterexamples to the equivalence of the possible worlds 4.3 Global Supervenience
and modal operator formulations of supervenience. Being F strongly
supervenes on being not-F, but fails to even weakly supervenem on it. {P Often, claims of the form ‘there cannot be an A-difference without a B-
& Q} strongly supervenes on {P, Q}, but fails to even weakly supervenem difference’ are not made about individuals, nor about nonmaximal space-
on it. The possible world versions of weak and strong supervenience are time regions, but rather about entire possible worlds. This is global
weaker than the corresponding modal operator versions. The latter go supervenience, typically formulated as follows:
beyond the basic idea that there cannot be an A-difference without a B-
difference. Again, though, the modal operator versions are equivalent to A-properties globally supervene on B-properties if and only if for
the possible worlds versions if the base set B is closed under Boolean any worlds w1 and w2, if w1 and w2 have exactly the same world-
operations, and operations involving quantification. wide pattern of distribution of B-properties, then they have exactly
the same world-wide pattern of distribution of A-properties.

26 Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy Spring 2014 Edition 27

 Supervenience Brian McLaughlin and Karen Bennett

The notion of a global supervenience thesis has been employed for a supervenience. In this section, we describe the initial stages of this debate,
number of philosophical purposes. Notably, it has been used to which took place when the going notion of global supervenience was that
characterize physicalism (see Section 5.4), and to capture David Lewis' outlined just above. In Section 4.3.2, we explain how that notion has been
Humean supervenience thesis: “all there is to the world is a vast mosaic of replaced by a family of more precise notions, and explore how it affects
local matters of particular factÉ all else supervenes on that” (1986a, ix-x). the question of whether global supervenience entails strong individual
supervenience. (Most of the reminder of this section paraphrases
Global supervenience is often claimed to serve purposes that neither McLaughlin 1995, 55–56.)
strong nor weak individual supervenience will serve. First, it is sometimes
claimed that global supervenience naturally handles relational properties The debate began when Kim purported to show that “global supervenience
like being an original Van Gogh or being a dollar bill. As we shall see, is nothing but strong supervenience” (1984, 168). In response, Brad Petrie
however, strong or weak supervenience can handle relational properties (1987) argued that global supervenience does not entail strong
too. Second, global supervenience naturally handles the supervenience of supervenience. His strategy was to try to provide a counterexample to a
factors other than properties or relations. On a Humean view of laws of strong supervenience thesis that is not a counterexample to the
nature, for instance, laws of nature are general facts that supervene on corresponding global supervenience thesis. Here is his case. Let set A =
particular facts. But that can be captured by individual property {S} and that B = {P}. Consider two worlds w1 and w2 that are as follows:
supervenience, even if only in a baroque way. A third potential difference world w1 contains exactly two objects, x and y. And world w2 contains
between global and individual supervenience is that the former, but not the exactly two objects, x* and y*. The following purports to be a complete
latter, is compatible with the supervening and subvening properties being depiction of the contents of those worlds:
possessed by different individuals (see Haugeland 1982). Thus, for
example, global supervenience is useful if there can be distinct but spatio- W1 W2
temporally coincident objects—it leaves room to say that the properties of
Px Px*
a clay statue supervene upon the properties of the distinct lump of clay
that constitutes it (see Section 5.5). Sx ~Sx*
Py ~Py*
What the difference between individual and global supervenience really
comes to will be discussed throughout the rest of this section. ~Sy ~Sy*

4.3.1 Strong Individual Supervenience and Global Supervenience The existence of w1 and w2 is incompatible with the thesis that A strongly
individually supervenes on B because x in w1 is B-indiscernible but A-
It is clear that strong individual supervenience entails global discernible from x* in w2. But the existence of these worlds is not itself a
supervenience (see Kim 1984). The question that has attracted attention is counterexample to the global supervenience of A on B. Since w1 and w2 do
the converse—whether global supervenience entails strong individual not have the same global pattern of distribution of B-properties, it seems

28 Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy Spring 2014 Edition 29

 Supervenience Brian McLaughlin and Karen Bennett

not to matter that the worlds do not have the same global pattern of an object y is isolated in a world “if and only if that world contains only (i)
distribution of A-properties. Thus Petrie claimed that “since global y, (ii) y's parts, and (iii) objects whose existence is entail by any of the
supervenience is, and strong supervenience is not, consistent with this objects mentioned in (i) and (ii)” (1992, 838–9). Crucially, isolated
example, the two concepts of supervenience are not equivalent” (1987, duplicates share the intrinsic properties of the things with which they are
121). duplicates. (Two caveats. First, this is not intended to be a definition of
‘intrinsic’. For some attempts to do so, see e.g., Lewis 1983a, Langton and
In response, Kim conceded that global supervenience fails to entail strong Lewis 1998, and a variety of articles in Philosophy and Phenomenological
supervenience (1987, 318), and went on to claim that Petrie's example also Research 63). Second, notice that the principle does not say that each
shows that global supervenience fails to entail weak. Notice that w1 alone thing can itself exist in isolation; it simply says that each thing has a
violates the weak supervenience of A on B, but also fails to be a duplicate that does. It consequently does not entail that nothing has any
counterexample to the global supervenience of A on B. Kim thus essential extrinsic properties.)
concluded that global supervenience fails to entail weak or strong
individual supervenience. Paull and Sider's isolation principle does the job. Consider again the
worlds w1 and w2 that Petrie described. Petrie purported to describe the
Paull and Sider pointed out that these argument strategies are no good worlds in full. Thus, P and S are presumably supposed to be intrinsic
(1992). The problem is that one cannot simply point to two worlds that do properties. It follows from the isolation principle that there is a world w3
not themselves falsify a global supervenience thesis, and then claim that that contains an isolated duplicate of x—call it “z”—and a world w4 that
the case is compatible with that thesis. Those two worlds might entail the contains an isolated duplicate of x*—call it “z*.” As Paull and Sider note,
existence of other worlds that are not compatible with the global these worlds will be as follows:
supervenience thesis. A global supervenience thesis is a claim about all
worlds, not just two. The upshot is that although a global supervenience W3 W4
thesis fails to entail either a weak or strong supervenience thesis in virtue
of logical form, it might nevertheless be the case that plausible Pz Pz*
metaphysical principles entail that whenever the former holds, so does the Sz ~Sz*
latter.
Unlike w1 and w2, w3 and w4 constitute a counterexample to the global
Paull and Sider appeal to a plausible principle to show that the existence
supervenience of A-properties on B-properties. They have the same pattern
of Petrie's w1 and w2 entail the existence of a pair of worlds that
of distribution of B-properties, but different patterns of distribution of A-
constitutes a counterexample to the global supervenience of A-properties
properties. So, Paull and Sider claim that Petrie failed to show that global
on B-properties (1992, 838). The basic idea is that for any object in any
supervenience does not entail strong supervenience.
possible world, there is another world containing an “isolated duplicate”
of it. Intuitively, the duplicate exists all alone in its world; more precisely, But Paull and Sider went on to provide a new argument for that claim.

30 Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy Spring 2014 Edition 31

 Supervenience Brian McLaughlin and Karen Bennett

They appealed to a set B containing just two properties, P and Q, and a set to the strong supervenience of A on B after all. That, however, does not
A containing only one property, M. An object has M just in case it has P, follow. It would follow only if a and c thereby counted as B-discernible,
and some other object is Q. That is to say, Mx =df Px & ∃yQy. This and they do not. Paull and Sider stipulate that B contains only P and Q.
definition guarantees that A globally supervenes on B. They then described Thus, a and c are B-indiscernible, despite the fact that a has P# and c does
the following two worlds: not.

W W* But Klagge was clearly right that Paull and Sider's example involves a
supervenient set A that contains an extrinsic property and a subvenient set
Ma ~Mc B that contains only intrinsic properties, and he was right that this is
Pa Pc important. It invites the question whether global supervenience might
entail strong supervenience when A and B are sets of intrinsic properties.
~Mb And it invites the question whether global supervenience might entail
Qb strong supervenience when A and B both include extrinsic properties of
certain sorts. Indeed, in response to Paull and Sider, Kim suggests that
This pair of worlds shows that A does not strongly supervene on B. And “equivalence seems to fail, through the failure of implication from global
the principle of isolation cannot be applied to generate a counterexample to strong supervenience, only when extrinsic properties are present in the
to global supervenience. An isolated duplicate of a would be both A- and supervenient set but disallowed from the subvenient base” (1993, 170; see
B-indiscernible from c (an isolated duplicate of a would not have M). also McLaughlin 1997a, 215). We will return to these questions in the next
Consequently, Paull and Sider concluded that global and strong several sections. Answering them requires getting clearer about global
supervenience are not equivalent. (1992, 841). supervenience; to this we now turn.

Klagge (1995) objected to this line of argument. He pointed out that Paull 4.3.2 Different Versions of Global Supervenience
and Sider include an extrinsic property M in the supervenient set A, but
only intrinsic properties P and Q in the subvenient or base set B. And, he Until now, we have been relying mainly on a notion of global
claimed, if we allow that there are the sorts of property-forming operations supervenience that is defined in terms of what amounts to a notion of A/B-
required to construct extrinsic property M, then Paull and Sider have not indiscernibility of worlds:
exhaustively characterized worlds w and w*. For, given those property-
forming operations, it is plausible that there will, for instance, be a A-properties globally supervene on B-properties if and only if for
property P# that can be defined as follows: P# =df Px & ∃y(y≠x). any worlds w1 and w2, if w1 and w2 have exactly the same world-
(Basically, a thing is P# just in case something else is P.) a in w and c in wide pattern of distribution of B-properties, then they have exactly
w* differ on this property; a has P# while c does not. That is right. But the same world-wide pattern of distribution of A-properties.
Klagge took that to show that w and w* do not provide a counterexample

32 Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy Spring 2014 Edition 33

 Supervenience Brian McLaughlin and Karen Bennett

But what is meant by a ‘world-wide pattern of distribution’ of A- or B- A-properties intermediately globally supervene on B-properties if
properties? The notion is best cashed out by appeal to the notion of there and only if for any worlds w1 and w2, if there is a B-preserving
being a certain kind of isomorphism or mapping between worlds. For any isomorphism between w1 and w2, then at least one isomorphism
property set f, define the notion of an f-preserving isomorphism as follows: between them is both A-and-B-preserving.

An isomorphism I between the inhabitants of worlds w1 and w2 Indeed, any number of versions of global supervenience can be
preserves f-properties if and only if for any x in w1, x has a f- formulated, simply by specifying exactly how many A-and-B-preserving
property P in w1 just in case the image of x under I (the individual isomorphisms there must be between worlds between which there is a B-
to which I maps x) has P in w2. preserving isomorphism. Such versions all count as forms of intermediate
global supervenience, however, and will be ignored in what follows.
This purposely avoids appeal to any special relationship that the mapped Notice too that it is not always clear which version is intended when
individuals may bear to each other (such, e.g., occupying corresponding someone appeals to the notion of global supervenience. Shagrir (2002) and
locations in their respective worlds). This is to remain as neutral as Bennett (2004a) suggest that there is some reason to think that people
possible on such issues, and because any features used to pick out the often intend intermediate; Leuenberger (2009) argues that none of the
mapped things would automatically then globally supervene on any precisified versions really captures the original concept. Shagrir now
properties whatever (see McLaughlin 1995, 1997a). argues that strong does the most “justice to the notion of global
supervenience” (forthcoming).
Given this notion, various different forms of global supervenience emerge.
Stalnaker 1996, McLaughlin 1996, 1997a, and Sider 1999 all distinguish It is easy to see that strong global supervenience entails intermediate
between a weak and a strong notion of global supervenience, as follows: global supervenience, which in turn entails weak global supervenience. If
every B-preserving isomorphism between two worlds must itself be A-
A-properties weakly globally supervene on B-properties iff for any
preserving, then if there are any B-preserving isomorphisms between two
worlds w1 and w2, if there is a B-preserving isomorphism between
worlds at all, at least one of them must be A-preserving. So, strong global
w1 and w2, then there is an A-preserving isomorphism between
supervenience entails intermediate. And if at least one of any existing B-
them.
preserving isomorphisms between two worlds must itself be A-preserving,
A-properties strongly globally supervene on B-properties iff for then it obviously follows that if there is a B-preserving isomorphism
any worlds w1 and w2, every B-preserving isomorphism between between two worlds, there must also be an A-preserving one. Thus,
w1 and w2 is an A-preserving isomorphism between them. intermediate global supervenience entails weak global supervenience.

Shagrir (2002) and Bennett (2004a) have both formulated an intermediate It is also easy to see that strong individual supervenience entails strong
version: global supervenience. Suppose that A-properties fail to strongly globally
supervene on B-properties. That means that there are two worlds w1 and

34 Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy Spring 2014 Edition 35

 Supervenience Brian McLaughlin and Karen Bennett

w2 between which there is a B-preserving isomorphism that fails to be A- complicated, and we thus refer to the reader to the original literature.
preserving. So, for some x in w1, the image of x under I in w2—call it y—
has all and only the same B-properties as x in w1, but differs from x in w1 4.3.3 Equivalences for an Extrinsic Base
in at least one of its A-properties. But that is just to say that x in w1 is B-
indiscernible yet A-discernible from y in w2. It follows that B-properties Strong global supervenience entails strong individual supervenience as
fail to strongly supervene on A-properties. Thus, strong individual long as the base set B is taken to be closed under complementation,
supervenience entails strong global supervenience, and thereby also entails infinitary conjunction, infinitary disjunction, and property-forming
intermediate and weak global supervenience as well. operations involving quantification and identity. Kim anticipates this
equivalence (1993, 170), and Robert Stalnaker provides the proof (1996,
But strong global supervenience fails to entail strong individual 238). It should also be noted that John Bacon argues that if sets of
supervenience, at least when A and B are any nonempty sets of properties. properties A and B are closed under the operations mentioned above and
Showing this only requires tiny modifications to Paull and Sider's also an operation he calls “resplicing,” then weak and strong individual
argument that the notion of global supervenience spelled out just in terms supervenience both hold or fail to hold together (1986). For B to be closed
of world-wide patterns of distribution of properties fails to entail strong under resplicing is for it to be the case that for any property P such that its
individual supervenience (4.3.1), and so we will not state the argument extension Pw in a world w is the extension of some property in B, P is a
here. (See Shagrir 2002, 188.) Once again, the key to the argument is a member of B.
case in which the supervening set contains extrinsic properties, and the
subvening set does not. We have already noted that it is controversial whether such property-
forming operations are legitimate, and, even if they are, we are often
Let us now see what is the case when the supervening and subvening interested in property sets that are not closed under them. See Section 3.2.
property sets are brought into line with each other. Recall the earlier Still, so long as the property-forming operations are legitimate, then even
hypothesis that global and strong individual are equivalent when Paull- if B itself is not closed under them, there will always be a larger set B+
Sider style cases are blocked (see Section 4.3.1). So, then, does strong which is. That is good enough to entail that for every strong global
global entail strong individual when the supervening set contains only supervenience thesis there is a logically equivalent strong individual
intrinsic properties? When the subvening set contains both intrinsic supervenience thesis. Indeed, if all of these property-forming operations
properties and all of the extrinsic properties that can be generated from (including Bacon's resplicing) are legitimate, then there are property sets
them? with respect to which weak individual supervenience, strong individual
supervenience, and strong global supervenience are all equivalent.
The answer to both questions is “yes.” And it turns out that related
argumentative strategies can also be reapplied back to the case of weak But since there has been considerable dispute over the legitimacy of the
and strong individual supervenience. We outline these strategies in the various alleged property-forming operations, the issues remain unresolved.
next two sections. However, some of the proofs themselves are

36 Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy Spring 2014 Edition 37

 Supervenience Brian McLaughlin and Karen Bennett

4.3.4 Equivalencies for Intrinsic Properties witness the violation of a strong supervenience claim have intrinsic-
duplicates within a single world. If the supervening properties are
If we bring the property sets into line by restricting both the supervening intrinsic, those duplicates will violate weak supervenience as well.
and subvening sets to intrinsic properties—however exactly the notion of
an intrinsic property is to be captured (see e.g. Langton and Lewis 1998) If all of these results are right, then weak individual supervenience, strong
—we get even clearer results. Many varieties of supervenience turn out to individual supervenience, weak global supervenience, intermediate global
be equivalent for intrinsic properties. supervenience, and strong global supervenience are all equivalent in the
special case when A and B are sets of intrinsic properties.
Both Shagrir (2002) and Bennett (2004a) argue that strong individual
supervenience is equivalent to strong global supervenience when A and B 4.3.5 Individual and Global Supervenience Redux
are sets of intrinsic properties. Bennett also argues that in such a case even
weak global supervenience entails strong individual supervenience. The In 4.3.3, we saw that weak and strong individual supervenience are
argument relies upon Paull and Sider's isolation principle, explained in equivalent to strong global supervenience in the special case in which the
Section 4.3.1 above; the basic idea is to show that any counterexamples to base set B is closed under certain property forming operations. And in
strong individual supervenience can be “isolated” to generate 4.3.4, we saw that weak and strong individual supervenience, and weak,
counterexamples to weak global supervenience—i.e., pairs of worlds intermediate, and strong global supervenience are all equivalent in the
between which there is a B-preserving isomorphism but no A-preserving special case in which A and B are sets of intrinsic properties. The upshot is
one. that strong global and strong individual supervenience come apart “only
when extrinsic properties are present in the supervenient set but
Here, again, we can also obtain related results about individual disallowed from the subvenient base,” as Kim and others predicted (4.3.1).
supervenience. Mark Moyer (2008) argues that weak and strong individual See Shagrir 2009 for discussion of the case of relations.
supervenience are equivalent in the special case of intrinsic properties. He
appeals to a recombination principle similar to Paull and Sider's principle However, weak and intermediate global supervenience are not equivalent
of isolation, but with a twist. The intuitive idea is that any two things in to strong individual supervenience even when extrinsic properties are let
any two worlds can be isolated from their surroundings and then put into a into the base—more precisely, when the base is closed under the relevant
world with each other. More formally: property-forming operations. So, perhaps they have distinctive
philosophical work to do, work that cannot be done by strong individual
Recombination Principle. For any worlds w1 and w2, any supervenience. For example, Sider (1999) appeals to weak global
individual x in w1 and any individual y in w2, there is a world w3 supervenience to handle cases of spatio-temporal coincidence, though he
that contains individuals xʹ′ and yʹ′ such that xʹ′ in w3 is an intrinsic- retracts this in his (2008). See Section 5.5.
duplicate of x in w1 and yʹ′ in w3 is an intrinsic-duplicate of y in w2.
But it is controversial whether these forms of supervenience are strong
If this principle is right, then any cross-world pair of individuals that

38 Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy Spring 2014 Edition 39

 Supervenience Brian McLaughlin and Karen Bennett

enough to be philosophically useful. As both Shagrir (2002) and Bennett supervenience. But in some cases we might be interested in a notion
(2004a) have pointed out, only strong global supervenience guarantees according to which things that are very much alike in B-respects must also
that the world-wide distribution of B-properties determines the world-wide be very much alike in A-respects. This is similarity-based supervenience
distribution of A-properties. Both weak and intermediate global allow (Kim 1987). (The remainder of this section closely paraphrases
what is called ‘intraworld variation’—both allow B-indiscernible McLaughlin 1995).
individuals in a world to have different A-properties. (Contrast weak
individual supervenience, which allows crossworld variation, but does ban Weak and strong versions of similarity-based supervenience can be
“mixed worlds.”) Indeed, weak global supervenience allows the A- defined in the expected fashion:
preserving and B-preserving isomorphisms to be utterly independent of
A weakly supervenessim on B if and only if for any world w, and
each other. Suppose some property being griffic merely weakly globally
for any x and y in w, if x and y are not largely different with respect
supervenes on the physical. Then although a world physically just like this
to B-properties, then they are not largely different with respect to
one has to contain the same number of griffic things as this world, it does
A-properties.
not matter which things they are. In this world it might be the Eiffel Tower
and the Queen Mother; in the physical duplicate it might be a tea towel A strongly supervenessim on B if and only if for any worlds w1 and
and the Grand Canyon. w2, and for any x in w1 and y in w2, if x in w1 is not largely
different from y in w2 with respect to B-properties, then x in w1 is
In any case, those who assert a weak or intermediate global supervenience
not largely different from y in w2 with respect to A-properties.
thesis while denying the corresponding strong global supervenience thesis
need to provide an explanation of why weak or intermediate global These are versions of individual supervenience; global versions can also
supervenience holds that does not entail that strong global supervenience be formulated. Strong implies weak, but not conversely, except for the
holds. (Recall the discussion of weak and strong individual supervenience special case of intrinsic properties. (The latter can be shown by slight
in 4.1). That is, they need to explain what enforces the links between A- modification of Moyer's argument mentioned in Section 4.3.4.)
and B-preserving isomorphisms that are required by weak and
intermediate global, without also enforcing the claim that every B- Similarity-based supervenience is logically independent of
preserving isomorphism itself be A-preserving. indiscernibility-based supervenience: neither implies the other. Similarity-
based supervenience fails to imply indiscernibility-based supervenience. It
At present, these issues remain open, and the status of weak and may be that there can be A-differences without B-differences, but that
intermediate global supervenience is controversial. there cannot be large A-differences without large B-differences. And
indiscernibility-based supervenience likewise fails to imply similarity-
4.4 Similarity Based Supervenience based supervenience. The reason is that there may be small B-differences
that are critical points for big A-differences. When that happens,
This essay has thus far focused on varieties of indiscernibility-based
similarity-based supervenience will fail, even though indiscernibility-

40 Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy Spring 2014 Edition 41

 Supervenience Brian McLaughlin and Karen Bennett

based supervenience may hold. For example, it might well be the case that related. We can define the following notions:
small physical differences can be accompanied by large mental and moral
differences. Similarly, a small physical difference like a misplaced brush (A, D1) weakly multiple domain supervenes on (B, D2) relative to R
stroke might have a large effect on the aesthetic value of a painting. just in case necessarily for any x and y in D1, if R|x and R|y are B-
Suffice it to note that it remains an open question whether there are any indiscernible, then x and y are A-indiscernible.
interesting philosophical uses of similarity-based supervenience.
(A, D1) strongly multiple domain supervenes on (B, D2) relative to
relation R just in case for any x and y in D1 and any worlds w1 and
4.5 Multiple Domain Supervenience
w2, if R|x in w1 is B-indiscernible from R|y in w2, x in w1 is A-
Thus far this essay has focused primarily on single domain supervenience indiscernible from y in w2. (Kim 1998)
(the exceptions are the discussions of weak and intermediate global
When R is identity, these are equivalent, respectively, to single domain
supervenience). A form of supervenience counts as single domain when
weak and single domain strong individual supervenience. It is because R
and only when the A- and B-properties are possessed by the very same
might be a relation other than identity, for example material constitution,
individuals—when the way something is in A-respects is a function of the
that the definitions have the potential for added utility. Here again, slight
way it is in B-respects. Both weak and strong individual supervenience are
modification of Moyer's argument (Section 4.3.4) can be used to show that
clear cases of single domain supervenience. But in some cases, what we
weak and strong multiple domain supervenience are equivalent when the
want to say is that there cannot be an A-difference in certain things
supervening set is intrinsic.
without a B-difference in certain other things—distinct things to which the
former things are related in a certain way. When and if this is the case, Coincidence-friendly supervenience is another kind of multiple-domain
there is multiple domain supervenience. supervenience (proposed by Dean Zimmerman 1995, 88)). It can be
formulated as follows (see Bennett 2004, 520):
One place such a notion seems useful is in discussions of coincidence and
material constitution. Those who think that a clay statue is distinct from Coincidence-Friendly Supervenience : For all x and y, and all
the lump of clay that make it up will claim that certain properties of the worlds w1 and w2, if x in w1 is B-indiscernible from y in w2, then
statue must supervene on properties of the lump of clay that constitutes it. for each thing x* in w1 to which x is R-related, there is something
For example, there could not be two statues that are discernible in shape y* in w2 that is R-related to y and that is A-indiscernible from x*.
without the statues being constituted by lumps of clay discernible in shape.
For further discussion, see Section 5.5. That is a strong version, but a weak version can be formulated as follows:

Kim (1988) has formulated a weak and strong version of multiple domain Weak Coincidence-Friendly Supervenience: For any world w and
supervenience. Let D1 and D2 be non-empty domains of individuals, R be any x and y in w, if x in w is B-indiscernible from y in w, then for
a relation between D1 and D2, and R|x be the subset of D2 to which x is R- each thing x* to which x is R-related in w, there is something y*

42 Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy Spring 2014 Edition 43

 Supervenience Brian McLaughlin and Karen Bennett

that y is R-related in w and x* is A-indiscernible from y*. FIST.

Here again, when R is identity, these forms of supervenience are Here are a few well-known arguments by appeal to a FIST. Suppose
equivalent, respectively, to weak and strong individual supervenience. someone claims that there are neurophysiological properties, perhaps yet
And here again, the weak and strong versions are equivalent when A is a to be discovered, to which intentional properties like believing that P
set of only intrinsic properties. reduce. This claim implies that intentional properties supervene on
neurophysiological properties. The Twin Earth thought experiments given
Weak and strong coincident-friendly supervenience count as kinds of by Tyler Burge (1979) and Hilary Putnam (1976) are (putative)
multiple-domain supervenience, but they differ from Kim's weak and counterexamples to that supervenience claim; they are cases of
strong multiple domain supervenience in at least one important respect. neurophysiologically indiscernible people whose thoughts have different
The final quantifier in the definitions of coincident-friendly supervenience contents.
is existential, rather than universal as it is in Kim's weak and strong
multiple domain supervenience. As a result, Kim's multiple domain Another argument by appeal to a FIST is Chalmers' appeal to the
supervenience says that if a and b are B-indiscernible, each thing R-related (putative) metaphysical possibility of zombies (see Section 3.1 and
to a must be A-indiscernible from everything R-related to b. Coincidence- Section 5.4). This is intended to show that phenomenal properties do not
friendly supervenience says only that each thing R-related to a must be A- metaphysically supervene on, and thus do not reduce to, physical
indiscernible from something R-related to b. This matters if R is B- properties. This line of argument is available even though physicalists
indiscernibility, as it plausibly is in the case of spatio-temporal have not yet proposed any such reduction. If it succeeds, then the project
coincidence—the main philosophical application of multiple-domain of reducing phenomenal properties to physical properties is doomed to
supervenience. failure.

5. Applications Consider a third example, from epistemology. A simple causal theory of

perceptual knowledge says that a subject's perceptual knowledge that P
5.1 An Argumentative Strategy can be analyzed in terms of P's bearing the right kind of causal relation to
the subject's belief that P. To test this claim, we need not await proposals
Recall that everyone agrees that the reduction of A to B implies the as to what the kind of causal relation in question is. For this project of
supervenience of A on B (Section 3.3). This gives rise to one central use of conceptual analysis can succeed only if two believers that P cannot differ
supervenience. Arguing against a supervenience thesis that must be true if with respect to perceptually knowing that P without differing with respect
some program of reduction or conceptual analysis is to succeed is a to how P is causally connected to their belief that P. Alvin Goldman's fake
common way of arguing that the program cannot succeed. McLaughlin barn country case (1976) yields a (putative) counterexample to this
(1984, 1995) calls this style of argumentation ‘argument by appeal to a supervenience claim.
false implied supervenience thesis’—or, for short, argument by appeal to a

44 Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy Spring 2014 Edition 45

 Supervenience Brian McLaughlin and Karen Bennett

Of course, it is controversial whether any of these arguments succeed, those above is that here there is no real dispute about whether the
because it is controversial whether the alleged counterexamples to the supervenience thesis holds or not; it is widely agreed that there are two
supervenience claims are really possible. But in all three cases, the style of kinds of relations.
argument is the same—argument by appeal to a FIST. (See McLaughlin
1984, 1995.) 5.3 Haecceitism

5.2 Internalism/Externalism Haecceitism is the view that identity properties, like being Kofi Annan or
being that particular table, do not supervene on qualitative properties. On
Distinctions between internalism and externalism arise in many areas in this view, every two numerically distinct things differ haecceitistically, but
philosophy—philosophy of mind, philosophy of language, epistemology, no other difference follows. Questions about whether there could be
and ethics. All of these distinctions can be characterized by means of qualitatively indiscernible but numerically distinct things becomes
supervenience theses. For example, an internalist about mental content important in modal metaphysics.
accepts, and an externalist denies, that what a mental state is about
supervenes upon neurophysiological properties, or “what's in the head.” The issue here is an instance of something more general. Supervenience
The dispute is about whether two thinkers can differ in the contents of plays a useful role in answering questions about the identity and
their mental states without also differing in some neurophysical respect. individuation conditions for things belonging to some kind. As Davidson
Similarly, an internalist about epistemic justification accepts, and an pointed out, there is a prima facie puzzle (1980, ch. 5) about how to
externalist denies, that whether a belief is justified supervenes upon the address such questions. The answer to the question “When are two events
mental properties of the believer. The dispute is about whether two identical?” is trivial—“Never.” And the answer to the question “When is
believers can differ in whether their beliefs are justified without also an event identical with itself?” is likewise trivial—“Always.” But surely
differing in some mental respect. And an internalist about moral there is a substantive question lurking here. Davidson himself opted to get
motivation accepts, and an externalist denies, that moral motivation around this worry by means of semantic ascent. But an alternative is to
supervenes upon moral judgment. The dispute is about whether two move to what David Lewis calls ‘a nonduplication principle’ (see Bennett
(rational) people can differ in how they are motivated to act without also 1988). Instead of asking when two events are identical, we can ask a fill in
differing in their judgments about which of those actions they ought to the blank question: ‘no two events can be just alike with respect to
perform. ______’? Davidson would fill in the blank with ‘their causes and effects’.
Kim would fill in the blank with ‘their subject, time, and constitutive
Relatedly, supervenience can also be used to capture the traditional property’ (1976); others fill in the blank in other ways.
distinction between internal and external relations. As Lewis has noted
(1986b, 62), an internal relation (such as being taller than) supervenes on What matters here is just that nonduplication principles are supervenience
the intrinsic natures of its relata. An extrinsic relation (such as being 3 theses. They are supervenience theses that take the supervening set A to be
kilometers from ) does not. The main difference between this case and the identity facts for particular entities of whatever kind is in question.

46 Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy Spring 2014 Edition 47

 Supervenience Brian McLaughlin and Karen Bennett

There cannot be a difference in whether an event has a property like being much more mental property swapping. It would allow a world physically
event e without a difference in its causes and effects (Davidson) or in its indiscernible from this one, in which precisely the same mental properties
subject, constitutive property, and time (Kim). Note that any view that are instantiated as are instantiated here, but in which they are differently
accepts a nonduplication principle for some sort of entity is ipso facto anti- distributed among the inhabitants—a world in which Paris Hilton, Colin
haecceitist. Both Davidson and Kim are anti-haecceitists about events. Powell, and the Pope all exchange mental lives, for example (see 4.3.5).

5.4 Characterizing Physicalism Yet physicalists need not maintain that everything strongly globally
supervenes upon the physical. Many physicalists want to allow that the
While there is no consensus about exactly how the doctrine of physicalism existence of things like ghosts and Cartesian souls is logically compatible
should be formulated, some philosophers have tried to formulate it as a with the physical facts of our world. They think that there actually aren't
global supervenience thesis. This raises several issues. any such things, not that there could not be any, or even that there
logically could not be any given the physical facts of our world. They thus
It is widely acknowledged that it would be too weak to formulate
allow that two worlds could be physical duplicates, but nonetheless differ
physicalism as the claim that as a matter of mere nomological necessity,
mentally—two worlds that are physically just alike, but only one of which
everything globally supervenes on the physical. Dualists can accept that
contains a community of disembodied spirits. (Note that because the
thesis, because dualists can maintain that there are fundamental
worlds are physical duplicates, those spirits either exert no causal
psychophysical laws (McLaughlin 1992, Chalmers 1996). While dualists
influence on the physical at all, or else only exert redundant,
think that zombies are metaphysically possible, they need not hold that
“overdeterministic” causal influence on the physical.)
zombies are nomologically possible (recall Section 3.1). Physicalists, of
course, do not think that zombies are possible at all. Capturing Various philosophers have offered various ways of defining physicalism
physicalism therefore requires a supervenience thesis that holds with full- to allow for this sort of logical possibility, while continuing to rely upon
blown metaphysical necessity. global supervenience. David Lewis took physicalism to be the claim that

Another question that arises is whether the global supervenience thesis Among worlds where no natural properties alien to our world are
should be a weak global supervenience thesis, an intermediate global instantiated, no two differ without differing physically; any two
supervenience thesis, or a strong global supervenience thesis (see Section such worlds that are exactly alike physically are duplicates (Lewis
4.3.2). But notice that an intermediate global supervenience thesis would 1983b, 364).
allow a world physically indiscernible from this one, in which precisely
the same mental properties are instantiated as are instantiated here, but in Jackson offers the following:
which the physically indiscernible individuals (if any) swap mental lives.
Any world which is a minimal physical duplicate of our world is a
And that seems to be something that physicalism should not allow. A
duplicate simpliciter (Jackson, 1998, 12).
weak global supervenience characterization of physicalism would allow

48 Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy Spring 2014 Edition 49

 Supervenience Brian McLaughlin and Karen Bennett

where a minimal physical duplicate is what results from duplicating all the It is fairly widely held that more than one object can occupy the same
physical facts and “stopping right there.” And David Chalmers says that spatio-temporal location. Such objects are said to be spatio-temporally
physicalism is true in a world w just in case every positive fact that obtains coincident. The classic example is a statue, Goliath, and the lump of clay
in w also obtains in any world physically indiscernible from w (1996, 39– that constitutes it, Lumpl (see Gibbard 1975). On one version of the story,
40). Each of these three definitions allows for a world in which the same Lumpl sits around on a shelf for a few days before the sculptor shapes it
physical facts obtain as obtain here in our world, but in which some extra into Goliath on a Thursday morning. It looks like Lumpl existed on the
non-physical facts obtain as well. previous Wednesday and that Goliath did not, and consequently looks like
Leibniz's Law entails that they are distinct objects. On another version of
Unfortunately, none of these three definitions seems to succeed in stating a the story, Lumpl and Goliath are created and destroyed at precisely the
sufficient condition for physicalism. For one thing, they are all compatible same moment. Here the two do not have different temporal properties, but
with the existence of a necessarily existing God (recall 3.5). But they do have different modal ones—Lumpl would still exist if we
physicalism is surely incompatible with the existence of any God (see squashed it into a ball, but Goliath would not. Again, Leibniz's Law
Jackson 1998, 22–23 for an attempt to avoid this objection. See Witmer apparently entails that they are distinct. (See Rea 1997a for many
1999 and Hawthorne 2002 for other counterexamples to these definitions.) interesting papers on this issue.)
Moreover, even if the definitions were counter-example free, it might well
be thought that physicalism requires superdupervenience, that is to say, The main objection to the view that Goliath and Lumpl are distinct is what
that physicalism should explain why the relevant global supervenience can be called ‘the grounding problem’. How can Lumpl and Goliath differ
theses holds (see 3.7, and Horgan 1993; Melnyk 2003; Wilson 2005). in their modal properties, given that they are alike in every other way?
What grounds their difference in persistence conditions? In virtue of what
Perhaps no strong global supervenience thesis will state a sufficient do they have the persistence conditions they do?
condition for physicalism. Nonetheless, progress has been made if there is
some global supervenience thesis that all physicalists must accept and that The grounding problem is sometimes characterized in terms of
virtually all non-physicalists would reject. Physicalism would then be supervenience failure. Lumpl and Goliath differ in their persistence
testable by opening it to would-be arguments by appeal to FISTS, such as conditions without differing in their physical or categorical properties (see
the zombie argument mentioned above. Moreover, it would be a Yablo 1987 for a discussion of categoricity). And it is true that many
substantive condition of adequacy on any formulation of physicalism that forms of supervenience fail: weak and strong individual supervenience
it entail the global supervenience thesis. Indeed, all three global and strong global supervenience all fail. But there are forms of
supervenience theses stated above—Jackson's, Lewis', and Chalmers'— supervenience that can hold. Both weak and intermediate global
seem to serve these purposes. Thus, even if they do not capture the supervenience hold, as does (as the name suggests) coincidence-friendly
doctrine of physicalism, they do enough to earn their keep. supervenience, and possibly other versions of multiple-domain
supervenience (c.f. Zimmerman 1995, Rea 1997b, Sider 1999, Baker
5.5 Coincident Entities and the “Grounding Problem” 2000). All of these forms hold on the plausible assumption that any two

50 Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy Spring 2014 Edition 51

 Supervenience Brian McLaughlin and Karen Bennett

regions physically/categorically just like this one will contain an object –––, 1992. “Supervenience, Emergence, and Reduction,” in Beckermann
with Goliath's persistence conditions, and an object with Lumpl's et.al., 94–118.
persistence conditions. Bennett, J., 1988. Events and Their Names, Indianapolis: Hackett
Publishing Company.
But the crucial question is not whether any form of supervenience holds, Bennett, K., 2003. “Why the Exclusion Problem Seems Intractable, and
but rather whether those that hold constitute a satisfactory answer to the How, Just Maybe, to Tract It,” Noûs, 37(3): 471–497.
grounding problem. For a defense of the positive answer, see Sider 1999; –––, 2004a. “Global Supervenience and Dependence,” Philosophy and
for a defense of the negative answer, see Bennett 2004b. For a new take, Phenomenological Research, 68: 510–529.
see Sider 2008. –––, 2004b. “Spatio-temporal Coincidence and the Grounding Problem,”
Philosophical Studies, 118: 339–371.
Bibliography Blackburn, S., 1973. “Moral Realism,” reprinted (1993) in Essays in
Quasi-Realism, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Armstrong, D.M., 1978. A Theory of Universals, Vol.2 of Universals and
–––, 1984. Spreading the Word, Oxford: Clarendon.
Scientific Realism, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
–––, 1985. “Supervenience Revisited,” reprinted (1993) in Essays in
–––, 1989. Universals: An Opinionated Introduction, Boulder, CO:
Quasi-Realism. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Westview Press.
Block, Ned (ed.), 1980. Readings in the Philosophy of Psychology
Bacon, J., 1986. “Supervenience, Necessary Coextension, and
(Volume 1). Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Reducibility,” Philosophical Studies 49: 163–76.
–––, 1980. “What is Functionalism?” in Block 1980 (ed.), 171–184.
–––, 1990. “Van Cleve Versus Closure,” Philosophical Studies 8: 239–
Bricker, P., 2005. “The Relation Between General and Particular:
242.
Entailment vs. Supervenience,” in D. Zimmerman (ed.), Oxford
–––, 1993. “Weak Supervenience Supervenes,” in Savellos, E. and Yalcin,
Studies in Metaphysics (Volume II), Oxford: Oxford University
U., eds., 101–109.
Press.
Bader, Ralf, forthcoming. “Supervenience and Infinitary Property-
Broad, C.D., 1925. The Mind and Its Place in Nature, London: Routledge
Forming Operations,” Philosophical Studies.
and Kegan Paul.
Baker, L., 2000. Persons and Bodies: A Constitution View, New York:
Burge, T. 1979. “Individualism and the Mental,” Midwest Studies in
Cambridge University Press.
Philosophy, 4: 73–121.
Baldwin, T., 2003. The Cambridge History of Philosophy 1870–1945,
Causey, R.I., 1977. Unity of Science, Dordrecht: Reidel.
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Chalmers, D., 1996. The Conscious Mind, New York: Oxford University
Baxter, D., 1988. “Many-One Identity,” Philosophical Papers 17: 193–
Press.
216.
Davidson, D., 1969. “The Individuation of Events,” reprinted in Davidson
Beckermann, A, Flohr, H. and Kim, J. (eds.), 1992. Emergence or
(ed.), 1980, 163–180.
Reduction? Berlin: Walter de Gruyter.

52 Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy Spring 2014 Edition 53

 Supervenience Brian McLaughlin and Karen Bennett

–––, 1970. “Mental Events,” reprinted in Davidson (ed.) 1980, 207–225. Hellman, G. and Thompson, F., 1975. “Physicalism, Ontology,
–––, 1985. “Replies to Essays X-XII,” in B. Vermazzen and M. B. Determination, and Reduction,” The Journal of Philosophy, 72: 551–
Hintikka (eds.) 1985. 64.
–––, 1993. “Thinking Causes,” in J. Heil and A. Mele (eds.), Mental Horgan, T., 1982. “Supervenience and Microphysics,” Pacific
Causation, Oxford: Clarendon, 3–17. Philosophical Quarterly, 63: 29–43.
Davidson, D. (ed.), 1980. Essays on Actions and Events, Oxford: –––, 1993. “From Supervenience to Superdupervenience: Meeting the
Clarendon Press. Demands of a Material World,” Mind, 102: 555–86.
Dorr, C. and Rosen, G., 2002. “Composition as a Fiction,” in R. M. Gale Jackson, F., 1998. From Metaphysics to Ethics, Oxford: Oxford University
(ed.), Blackwell Guide to Metaphysics, Oxford: Blackwell. Press.
Ellis, B., 2001. Scientific Essentialism, Cambridge: Cambridge University Kim, J., 1976. “Events as Property Exemplifications,” reprinted in Kim
Press. 1993, 33–52.
Fine, K., 2002. “Varieties of Necessity,” in T. Gendler and J. Hawthorne –––, 1984. “Concepts of Supervenience,” reprinted in Kim 1993, 53–78.
(eds.) 2002, 253–281. –––, 1987. “'Strong’ and ‘Global’ Supervenience Revisited,” reprinted in
Gendler, T.S. and Hawthorne, J. (eds.), 2002. Conceivability and Kim 1993, 79–91.
Possibility, Oxford: Oxford University Press. –––, 1988. “Supervenience for Multiple Domains,” reprinted in Kim 1993,
Gibbard, A., 1975. “Contingent Identity,” Journal of Philosophical Logic, 109–130.
4: 187–221. –––, 1990. “Supervenience as a Philosophical Concept,” reprinted in Kim
Gillett, Carl, 2002. “The dimensions of realization: A critique of the 1993, 131–160.
Standard view,” Analysis, 62: 316–323. ––– (ed.), 1993. Supervenience and Mind: Selected Philosophical Essays,
Glanzberg, M., 2001. “Supervenience and Infinitary Logic,” Noûs, 25: Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
419–39. –––, 1993. “Postscripts on Supervenience,” in Kim 1993, 161–171.
Goldman, A., 1976. “Discrimination and Perceptual Knowledge,” Journal –––, 1998. “The Mind-Body Problem After Fifty Years,” in O’ Hear, ed.,
of Philosophy, 18: 771–91. 3–21.
Hare, R.M., 1952. The Language of Morals, Oxford: Oxford University Kirk, R., 1994. Raw Feeling: A Philosophical Account of the Essence of
Press. Consciousness, Oxford: Clarendon Press.
–––, 1984, “Supervenience,” Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume, Klagge, J., 1995. “Supervenience: Model Theory or Metaphysics?,” in
58: 1–16. Savellos and Yalcin, eds., 60–72.
Haugeland, J., 1982. “Weak Supervenience,” American Philosophical Kripke, S., 1972. Naming and Necessity, Cambridge, MA: Harvard
Quarterly, 19: 93–101. University Press.
Hawthorne, J., 2002. “Blocking Definitions of Materialism,” Langton, R. and Lewis, D.K., 1998. “Defining ‘Intrinsic’,” Philosophy
Philosophical Studies, 110: 103–113. and Phenomenological Research, 58: 333–45.

54 Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy Spring 2014 Edition 55

 Supervenience Brian McLaughlin and Karen Bennett

Leuenberger, Stephan, 2009. “What is Global Supervenience?,” Synthese, Behavioral Sciences, Elsevier, 1142–1147.
170: 115–129. –––, 2003. “Vitalism and Emergence,” in T. Baldwin (ed.), 631–39.
Lewis, D.K., 1983a. “Extrinsic Properties,” Philosophical Studies, 44: Melnyk, A., 2003. A Physicalist Manifesto: Thoroughly Modern
197–200. Materialism, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
–––, 1983b. “New Work for a Theory of Universals,” Australasian –––, 2006. “Realization and the formulation of physicalism,”
Journal of Philosophy, 61: 343–77. Philosophical Studies, 131: 127–155.
–––, 1986a. Philosophical Papers Volume II, Oxford: Oxford University Merricks, T., 2001. Objects and Persons, Oxford: Clarendon.
Press. Moore, G.E., 1922. Philosophical Studies, London: Routledge.
–––, 1986b. The Plurality of Worlds, Oxford: Oxford University Press. –––, 1942, “A Reply to My Critics,” in Schilpp, ed., 1942, 660–667.
–––, 1991. Parts of Classes, Oxford: Blackwell. Morgan, L., 1923. Emergent Evolution, London: Williams & Norgate.
Lombard, L., 1986. Events: A Metaphysical Study, London: Routledge. Moyer, M., 2008. “Weak and Global Supervenience are Strong,”
Marsh, R. C., 1992. Logic and Knowledge, London: Routledge. Philosophical Studies, 138: 125–150.
McGinn, C., 1993. Problems in Philosophy: the Limits of Inquiry, Oddie, G. and Tichy, P., 1990. “Resplicing Properties in the
Cambridge: Basil Blackwell. Supervenience Base,” Philosophical Studies, 58: 259–69.
McLaughlin, B.P., 1984. “Perception, Causation, and Supervenience,” O'Hear, A. (ed.), 1998. Current Issues in Philosophy of Mind, Cambridge:
Midwest Studies in Philosophy, 9: 569–92. Cambridge University Press.
–––, 1984. “Event Supervenience and Supervenient Causation,” Southern Paull, C.P. and Sider, T.R., 1992. “In Defense of Global Supervenience,”
Journal of Philosophy: Supplementary Volume on the Spindel Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 32: 830–45.
Conference on Supervenience, 22: 71–91. Post, J., 1987. The Faces of Existence, Ithaca: Cornell University Press.
–––, 1992. “The Rise and Fall of British Emergentism,” in Beckermann, Putnam, H., 1975. “The Meaning of ‘Meaning’,” in Minnesota Studies in
et.al., eds., 49–93. the Philosophy of Science, 7: 215–271.
–––, 1995. “Varieties of Supervenience,” in E. Savellos, and U. Yalcin, ––– (ed.), 1975. Mind, Language and Reality, Cambridge, UK: Cambridge
eds., 16–59. University Press.
–––, 1996. “Supervenience,” in Borchert, ed., Encyclopedia of Philosophy Quine, W.V.O., 1985. The Time of My Life: An Autobiography,
Supplement, Macmillan, 558–560. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press.
–––, 1997a. “Supervenience, Vagueness, and Determination,” Rea, M. (ed.), 1997a. Material Constitution, Oxford: Rowman &
Philosophical Perspectives, 11: 209–230. Littlefield.
–––, 1997b. “Emergence and Supervenience,” Intellectica, 25: 25–43. –––, 1997b. “Supervenience and Colocation,” American Philosophical
–––, 1999a. “Emergence,” in R. A. Wilson, and F. C. Keil, eds., Quarterly, 34: 367–375.
Encyclopedia of Cognitive Sciences, 267–69. Russell, B., 1918. The Philosophy of Logical Atomism, Reprinted in R.C.
–––, 2001. “Supervenience,” in Smith, ed., Encyclopedia of the Social and Marsh, ed., 177–281.

56 Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy Spring 2014 Edition 57

 Supervenience Brian McLaughlin and Karen Bennett

Schilpp, P.A. (ed.), 1942. The Philosophy of G.E.Moore, Chicago and Determination,” Southern Journal of Philosophy: Supplement to
Evanston, Illinois. Spindel Conference, 22: 137–42.
Savellos, E. and Yalcin, U. (eds.), 1995. Supervenience: New Essays, Van Cleve, J., 1990. “Emergence vs. Pansychism: Mind Dust or Magic?,”
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Philosophical Perspectives, vol.4: 215–226.
Schiffer, S., 1987. Remnants of Meaning, Cambridge, MA: MIT/Bradford. –––, 1990. “Supervenience and Closure,” Philosophical Studies, 58: 225–
Shagrir, O., 2002. “Global Supervenience, Coincident Entities and Anti- 238.
individualism,” Philosophical Studies, 109: 171-196. van Inwagen, P. (ed.), 1980. Time and Cause, Dordrecht: D. Reidel.
–––, 2009. “Strong Global Supervenience is Valuable,” Erkenntnis, 71: –––, 1990. Material Beings, Ithaca: Cornell University Press.
417–423. –––, 1994. “Composition as Identity,” Philosophical Perspectives, 8: 207–
–––, forthcoming, “Concepts of Supervenience Revisited.” 220.
Shoemaker, S., 1979. “Identity, Properties, and Causality,” Midwest Vermazzen B. and Hintikka M.B. (eds.), 1985. Essays on Davidson:
Studies in Philosophy, 4: 321–324. Actions and Events, Oxford: Clarendon Press.
–––, 1980, “Causality and Properties,” in P. van Inwagen (ed.) 1980, 109– Wilson, J., 1999. “How Superduper Does a Physicalist Supervenience
35. Need To Be?” Philosophical Quarterly, 49: 33–52.
–––, 2007. Physical Realization., Oxford: Oxford University Press. –––, 2005. “Supervenience-Based Characterizations of Physicalism,”
Sider, T.R., 1999. “Global Supervenience and Identity Across Times and Noûs, 39: 426–459.
Worlds,” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 59: 913–37. Witmer, D. Gene, 1999. “Supervenience Physicalism and the Problem of
–––, 2008. “Yet Another Paper on the Supervenience Argument Against Extras,” Southern Journal of Philosophy, 37: 315–331.
Coincident Entities,” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, Yablo, S., 1987. “Identity, Essence, and Indiscernibility,” The Journal of
77: 613–624. Philosophy, 84: 293–314.
Skyrms, B., 1981. “Tractarian Nominalism,” Philosophical Studies, 40: –––, 1992. “Mental Causation,” The Philosophical Review, 101: 245–280.
199–206. Zimmerman, D., 1995. “Theories of Masses and Problems of
Sosa, E. (ed.), 1991. Knowledge in Perspective, Cambridge, UK: Constitution,” Philosophical Review, 104: 53–110.
Cambridge University Press.
Stalnaker, R., 1996. “Varieties of Supervenience,” Philosophical Other Internet Resources
Perspectives, 10: 221–41.
Stanton, W., 1983. “Supervenience and Psychological Law in Anomalous Supervenience in Metaphysics, Philosophy Compass, by Stephan
Monism,” Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, 64: 70–80. Leuenberger (University of Glasgow).
Swoyer, C., 1982. “The Nature of Natural Laws,” Australasian Journal of
Philosophy, 60: 203–223. Related Entries
Teller, P., 1984. “A Poor Man's Guide to Supervenience and
anomalous monism | dependence, ontological | emergent properties | logic:

58 Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy Spring 2014 Edition 59

 Supervenience Brian McLaughlin and Karen Bennett

modal | material constitution | mental causation | mereology | multiple Modal Operator Formulation: A strongly supervenes on B iff
realizability | physicalism | possible worlds | properties necessarily, if anything x has some property F in A, then there
is at least one property G in B such x has G, and necessarily
Supplement to Supervenience everything that has G has F.

Appendix: List of Definitions □∀x∀F∈A[Fx → ∃G∈B(Gx & □∀y(Gy→Fy))]

For ease of reference, the technical definitions discussed in earlier sections Regional Supervenience
are collected in this section. ‘A’ and ‘B’ should be understood as variables Weak: A weak-regionally supervenes on B iff for any possible world
ranging over non-empty sets of properties (though the quantification is w and any space-time regions r1 and r2 in w, if r1 and r2 are exactly
typically implicit). alike in every intrinsic B-respect in w, then they are exactly alike in
every intrinsic A-respect in w.
Individual Supervenience
Strong: A strong-regionally supervenes on B iff for any possible
Weak Individual Supervenience worlds w1 and w2 and any space-time regions r1 in w1 and spacetime
Possible-Worlds Formulation: A weakly supervenes on B iff region r2 in w2, if r1 in w1 is exactly like r2 in w2 in every intrinsic B-
for any possible world w and any individuals x and y in w, if x respect, then r1 in w1 is exactly like r2 in w2 in every intrinsic A-
and y are B-indiscernible in w, then they are A-indiscernible in respect.
w.
Similarity-Based Supervenience
Modal Operator Formulation: A weakly supervenes on B iff Weak Similarity-Based: A weakly supervenes on B iff for any world
necessarily, if anything x has some property F in A, then there w, and for any x and y in w, if x and y are not largely different with
is at least one property G in B such that x has G, and respect to B-properties, then they are not largely different with
everything that has G has F. respect to A-properties.

□∀x∀F∈A[Fx → ∃G∈B(Gx & ∀y(Gy→Fy))] Strong Similarity-Based: A strongly supervenes on B iff for any
worlds w1 and w2, and for any x in w1 and y in w2, if x in w1 is not
Strong Individual Supervenience largely different from y in w2 with respect to B-properties, then x in
Possible-Worlds Formulation: A strongly supervenes on B iff w1 is not largely different from y in w2 with respect to A-properties.
for any possible worlds w1 and w2 and any individuals x in w1
and y in w2, if x in w1 is B-indiscernible from y in w2, then x in Global Supervenience
w1 is A-indiscernible from y in w2. Generic Global: A globally supervenes on B iff for any worlds w1
and w2, if w1 and w2 have exactly the same world-wide pattern of

60 Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy Spring 2014 Edition 61

 Supervenience Brian McLaughlin and Karen Bennett

distribution of B-properties, then they have exactly the same world- w1 to which x is R-related, there is something y* in w2 to which y is
wide pattern of distribution of A-properties. R-related, and which is A-indiscernible from x*.

Weak Global: A weakly globally supervenes on B iff for any worlds Return to main entry
w1 and w2, if there is a B-preserving isomorphism between w1 and w2,
then there is an A-preserving isomorphism between them. Copyright © 2014 by the authors
Brian McLaughlin and Karen Bennett
Intermediate Global: A intermediately globally supervenes on B iff
for any worlds w1 and w2, if there is a B-preserving isomorphism
between w1 and w2, then there is an A-and-B-preserving isomorphism
between w1 and w2.

Strong Global: A strongly globally supervenes on B iff for any

worlds w1 and w2, every B-preserving isomorphism between w1 and
w2 is an A-preserving isomorphism between them.

Multiple Domain Supervenience

Weak Multiple Domain: A weakly supervenes on B relative to
relation R just in for any world w and any x and y in w, if R|x in w is
B-indiscernible from R|y in w, then x and y are A-indiscernible in w.

Strong Multiple Domain: A strongly supervenes on B relative to

relation R just in case for any worlds w1 and w2, any x in w1 and y in
w2, if R|x in w1 is B-indiscernible from R|y in w2, x in w1 is A-
indiscernible from y in w2.

Weak Coincident-Friendly: For any world w and any x and y in w,

if x in w is B-indiscernible from y in w, then for each thing x* in w to
which x is R-related, there is something y* in w to which y is R-
related, and which is A-indiscernible from x*.

Strong Coincident-Friendly: For all x and y, and all worlds w1 and

w2, if x in w1 is B-indiscernible from y in w2, then for each thing x* in

62 Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy Spring 2014 Edition 63