ISO-IEC-IEEE-15026-4 - Systems and Software Engineering - Systems and Software Assurance - Part 4 Assurance in The Life Cycle
ISO-IEC-IEEE-15026-4 - Systems and Software Engineering - Systems and Software Assurance - Part 4 Assurance in The Life Cycle
ISO-IEC-IEEE-15026-4 - Systems and Software Engineering - Systems and Software Assurance - Part 4 Assurance in The Life Cycle
Sponsored by the
Software & Systems Engineering Standards Committee
IEEE
3 Park Avenue IEEE Std 15026-4™-2013
New York, NY 10016-5997
USA
Authorized licensed use limited to: City College of New York. Downloaded on May 11,2017 at 21:57:31 UTC from IEEE Xplore. Restrictions apply.
Authorized licensed use limited to: City College of New York. Downloaded on May 11,2017 at 21:57:31 UTC from IEEE Xplore. Restrictions apply.
IEEE Std 15026-4™-2013
Sponsor
Authorized licensed use limited to: City College of New York. Downloaded on May 11,2017 at 21:57:31 UTC from IEEE Xplore. Restrictions apply.
Abstract: Guidance and recommendations for conducting selected processes, activities, and
tasks for systems and software products requiring assurance claims for properties selected for
special attention (called critical properties) are given in this adoption of ISO/IEC 15026-4:2012.
IEEE Std 15026-4™-2013 specifies a property-independent list of processes, activities and tasks
to achieve the claim and show the achievement of the claim. IEEE Std 15026-4-2013 establishes
the processes, activities, tasks, guidance, and recommendations in the context of a defined life
cycle model and set of life cycle processes for system and/or software life cycle management.
IEEE is a registered trademark in the U.S. Patent & Trademark Office, owned by The Institute of Electrical and Electronics
Engineers, Incorporated.
Authorized licensed use limited to: City College of New York. Downloaded on May 11,2017 at 21:57:31 UTC from IEEE Xplore. Restrictions apply.
Notice and Disclaimer of Liability Concerning the Use of IEEE Documents: IEEE Standards documents are developed
within the IEEE Societies and the Standards Coordinating Committees of the IEEE Standards Association (IEEE-SA)
Standards Board. IEEE develops its standards through a consensus development process, approved by the American National
Standards Institute, which brings together volunteers representing varied viewpoints and interests to achieve the final product.
Volunteers are not necessarily members of the Institute and serve without compensation. While IEEE administers the process
and establishes rules to promote fairness in the consensus development process, IEEE does not independently evaluate, test, or
verify the accuracy of any of the information or the soundness of any judgments contained in its standards.
Use of an IEEE Standard is wholly voluntary. IEEE disclaims liability for any personal injury, property or other damage, of
any nature whatsoever, whether special, indirect, consequential, or compensatory, directly or indirectly resulting from the
publication, use of, or reliance upon any IEEE Standard document.
IEEE does not warrant or represent the accuracy or content of the material contained in its standards, and expressly disclaims
any express or implied warranty, including any implied warranty of merchantability or fitness for a specific purpose, or that
the use of the material contained in its standards is free from patent infringement. IEEE Standards documents are supplied "AS
IS."
The existence of an IEEE Standard does not imply that there are no other ways to produce, test, measure, purchase, market, or
provide other goods and services related to the scope of the IEEE standard. Furthermore, the viewpoint expressed at the time a
standard is approved and issued is subject to change brought about through developments in the state of the art and comments
received from users of the standard. Every IEEE standard is subjected to review at least every ten years. When a document is
more than ten years old and has not undergone a revision process, it is reasonable to conclude that its contents, although still of
some value, do not wholly reflect the present state of the art. Users are cautioned to check to determine that they have the
latest edition of any IEEE standard.
In publishing and making its standards available, IEEE is not suggesting or rendering professional or other services for, or on
behalf of, any person or entity. Nor is IEEE undertaking to perform any duty owed by any other person or entity to another.
Any person utilizing any IEEE Standards document, should rely upon his or her own independent judgment in the exercise of
reasonable care in any given circumstances or, as appropriate, seek the advice of a competent professional in determining the
appropriateness of a given IEEE standard.
Translations: The IEEE consensus development process involves the review of documents in English only. In the event that
an IEEE standard is translated, only the English version published by IEEE should be considered the approved IEEE standard.
Official Statements: A statement, written or oral, that is not processed in accordance with the IEEE-SA Standards Board
Operations Manual shall not be considered the official position of IEEE or any of its committees and shall not be considered to
be, nor be relied upon as, a formal position of IEEE. At lectures, symposia, seminars, or educational courses, an individual
presenting information on IEEE standards shall make it clear that his or her views should be considered the personal views of
that individual rather than the formal position of IEEE.
Comments on Standards: Comments for revision of IEEE Standards documents are welcome from any interested party,
regardless of membership affiliation with IEEE. However, IEEE does not provide consulting information or advice pertaining
to IEEE Standards documents. Suggestions for changes in documents should be in the form of a proposed change of text,
together with appropriate supporting comments. Since IEEE standards represent a consensus of concerned interests, it is
important to ensure that any responses to comments and questions also receive the concurrence of a balance of interests. For
this reason, IEEE and the members of its societies and Standards Coordinating Committees are not able to provide an instant
response to comments or questions except in those cases where the matter has previously been addressed. Any person who
would like to participate in evaluating comments or revisions to an IEEE standard is welcome to join the relevant IEEE
working group at http://standards.ieee.org/develop/wg/.
Photocopies: Authorization to photocopy portions of any individual standard for internal or personal use is granted by The
Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers, Inc., provided that the appropriate fee is paid to Copyright Clearance Center.
To arrange for payment of licensing fee, please contact Copyright Clearance Center, Customer Service, 222 Rosewood Drive,
Danvers, MA 01923 USA; +1 978 750 8400. Permission to photocopy portions of any individual standard for educational
classroom use can also be obtained through the Copyright Clearance Center.
Authorized licensed use limited to: City College of New York. Downloaded on May 11,2017 at 21:57:31 UTC from IEEE Xplore. Restrictions apply.
Notice to users
Copyrights
This document is copyrighted by the IEEE. It is made available for a wide variety of both public and
private uses. These include both use, by reference, in laws and regulations, and use in private self-
regulation, standardization, and the promotion of engineering practices and methods. By making this
document available for use and adoption by public authorities and private users, the IEEE does not waive
any rights in copyright to this document.
Errata
Errata, if any, for this and all other standards can be accessed at the following URL:
http://standards.ieee.org/findstds/errata/index.html. Users are encouraged to check this URL for errata
periodically.
iv
Copyright © 2013 IEEE. All rights reserved.
Authorized licensed use limited to: City College of New York. Downloaded on May 11,2017 at 21:57:31 UTC from IEEE Xplore. Restrictions apply.
Patents
Attention is called to the possibility that implementation of this standard may require use of subject matter
covered by patent rights. By publication of this standard, no position is taken by the IEEE with respect to
the existence or validity of any patent rights in connection therewith. If a patent holder or patent applicant
has filed a statement of assurance via an Accepted Letter of Assurance, then the statement is listed on the
IEEE-SA Website at http://standards.ieee.org/about/sasb/patcom/patents.html. Letters of Assurance may
indicate whether the Submitter is willing or unwilling to grant licenses under patent rights without
compensation or under reasonable rates, with reasonable terms and conditions that are demonstrably free of
any unfair discrimination to applicants desiring to obtain such licenses.
Essential Patent Claims may exist for which a Letter of Assurance has not been received. The IEEE is not
responsible for identifying Essential Patent Claims for which a license may be required, for conducting
inquiries into the legal validity or scope of Patents Claims, or determining whether any licensing terms or
conditions provided in connection with submission of a Letter of Assurance, if any, or in any licensing
agreements are reasonable or non-discriminatory. Users of this standard are expressly advised that
determination of the validity of any patent rights, and the risk of infringement of such rights, is entirely
their own responsibility. Further information may be obtained from the IEEE Standards Association.
Participants
At the time this IEEE standard was completed, the Life Cycle Processes Working Group had the following
membership:
The following members of the individual balloting committee voted on this standard. Balloters may have
voted for approval, disapproval, or abstention.
v
Copyright © 2013 IEEE. All rights reserved.
Authorized licensed use limited to: City College of New York. Downloaded on May 11,2017 at 21:57:31 UTC from IEEE Xplore. Restrictions apply.
When the IEEE-SA Standards Board approved this standard on 23 August 2013, it had the following
membership:
*Member Emeritus
Also included are the following nonvoting IEEE-SA Standards Board liaisons:
Patrick Gibbons
IEEE Standards Program Manager, Document Development
Malia Zaman
IEEE Standards Program Manager, Technical Program Development
vi
Copyright © 2013 IEEE. All rights reserved.
Authorized licensed use limited to: City College of New York. Downloaded on May 11,2017 at 21:57:31 UTC from IEEE Xplore. Restrictions apply.
Introduction
This introduction is not part of IEEE Std 15026-4™-2013, IEEE Standard Adoption of ISO/IEC 15026-4, Systems and
Software Engineering—Systems and Software Assurance—Part 4: Assurance in the Life Cycle.
The IEEE Software and Systems Engineering Standards Committee (S2ESC) has undertaken a long-term
program to harmonize its standards with those of ISO/IEC JTC 1/SC 7, the international standards
committee for software and systems engineering. In areas of overlap, one organization sometimes adopts
the relevant standard from the other organization, or the two organizations cooperate to produce a single
joint standard. In this case, S2ESC has chosen to adopt a relevant document from SC 7.
This IEEE standard is an adoption of ISO/IEC 15026-4:2012. References to some ISO/IEC standards
should be considered as references to the identical IEEE standard:
Errata
The following editorial corrections are made in the adopted document:
Page 5, 7.2.2: Add a closing parenthesis before the period appearing in the fourth line.
Page 6, 7.3.1: Change the column headings of the table to read “Activities from 15288” and “Activities
from 12207”.
Page 15, 7.9.1: Change “form” to “from” in the left-hand column heading.
vii
Copyright © 2013 IEEE. All rights reserved.
Authorized licensed use limited to: City College of New York. Downloaded on May 11,2017 at 21:57:31 UTC from IEEE Xplore. Restrictions apply.
Contents of IEEE Std 15026-4-2013
ISO/IEC 15026-4:2012………………………………………………………………………………………1
viii
Copyright © 2013 IEEE. All rights reserved.
Authorized licensed use limited to: City College of New York. Downloaded on May 11,2017 at 21:57:31 UTC from IEEE Xplore. Restrictions apply.
IEEE Standard Adoption of ISO/IEC
15026-4—Systems and Software
Engineering—Systems and Software
Assurance—Part 4: Assurance in the
Life Cycle
IMPORTANT NOTICE: IEEE Standards documents are not intended to ensure safety, health, or
environmental protection, or ensure against interference with or from other devices or networks.
Implementers of IEEE Standards documents are responsible for determining and complying with all
appropriate safety, security, environmental, health, and interference protection practices and all
applicable laws and regulations.
This IEEE document is made available for use subject to important notices and legal disclaimers.
These notices and disclaimers appear in all publications containing this document and may
be found under the heading “Important Notice” or “Important Notices and Disclaimers
Concerning IEEE Documents.” They can also be obtained on request from IEEE or viewed at
http://standards.ieee.org/IPR/disclaimers.html.
1
Copyright © 2013 IEEE. All rights reserved.
Authorized licensed use limited to: City College of New York. Downloaded on May 11,2017 at 21:57:31 UTC from IEEE Xplore. Restrictions apply.
INTERNATIONAL ISO/IEC
STANDARD 15026-4
First edition
2012-10-01
Reference number
ISO/IEC 15026-4:2012(E)
© ISO/IEC 2012
Authorized licensed use limited to: City College of New York. Downloaded on May 11,2017 at 21:57:31 UTC from IEEE Xplore. Restrictions apply.
ISO/IEC 15026-4:2012(E)
Authorized licensed use limited to: City College of New York. Downloaded on May 11,2017 at 21:57:31 UTC from IEEE Xplore. Restrictions apply.
ISO/IEC 15026-4:2012(E)
Contents Page
Foreword ............................................................................................................................................................. v
Introduction ........................................................................................................................................................ vi
1 Scope ...................................................................................................................................................... 1
2 Conformance ......................................................................................................................................... 1
3 Normative references ............................................................................................................................ 1
4 Terms and definitions ........................................................................................................................... 2
5 Key concepts for and use of this part of ISO/IEC 15026 ................................................................... 2
5.1 Life cycle approach ............................................................................................................................... 2
5.2 Assurance claims .................................................................................................................................. 2
5.3 Using this part of ISO/IEC 15026.......................................................................................................... 3
5.3.1 Use for an agreement ............................................................................................................................ 3
5.3.2 Use for regulation .................................................................................................................................. 3
5.3.3 Use for development ............................................................................................................................. 3
6 Process view purposes and required outcomes ............................................................................... 3
6.1 Systems assurance process view ....................................................................................................... 3
6.1.1 Purpose .................................................................................................................................................. 4
6.1.2 Required outcomes ............................................................................................................................... 4
6.2 Software assurance process view ....................................................................................................... 4
6.2.1 Purpose .................................................................................................................................................. 4
6.2.2 Required outcomes ............................................................................................................................... 4
7 Assurance guidance and recommendations for selected processes ............................................. 4
7.1 Introduction ............................................................................................................................................ 4
7.2 Acquisition process .............................................................................................................................. 5
7.2.1 Relevant activities and tasks ............................................................................................................... 5
7.2.2 Assurance guidance and recommendations ...................................................................................... 5
7.3 Supply process ...................................................................................................................................... 6
7.3.1 Relevant activities and tasks ............................................................................................................... 6
7.3.2 Assurance guidance and recommendations ...................................................................................... 6
7.4 Project planning process ..................................................................................................................... 7
7.4.1 Relevant activities and tasks ............................................................................................................... 7
7.4.2 Assurance guidance and recommendations ...................................................................................... 7
7.5 Decision Management process ............................................................................................................ 8
7.5.1 Relevant activities and tasks ............................................................................................................... 9
7.5.2 Assurance guidance and recommendations ...................................................................................... 9
7.6 Risk Management process ................................................................................................................... 9
7.6.1 Relevant activities and tasks ............................................................................................................. 10
7.6.2 Assurance guidance and recommendations .................................................................................... 11
7.7 Configuration management process ................................................................................................. 11
7.7.1 Relevant activities and tasks ............................................................................................................. 11
7.7.2 Assurance guidance and recommendations .................................................................................... 12
7.8 Information Management process ..................................................................................................... 13
7.8.1 Relevant activities and tasks ............................................................................................................. 13
7.8.2 Assurance guidance and recommendations .................................................................................... 13
7.9 Stakeholder Requirements Definition process ................................................................................ 14
7.9.1 Relevant activities and tasks ............................................................................................................. 15
7.9.2 Assurance guidance and recommendations .................................................................................... 15
7.10 Requirements Analysis process ........................................................................................................ 17
7.10.1 Relevant activities and tasks ............................................................................................................. 18
7.10.2 Assurance guidance and recommendations .................................................................................... 19
Authorized licensed use limited to: City College of New York. Downloaded on May 11,2017 at 21:57:31 UTC from IEEE Xplore. Restrictions apply.
ISO/IEC 15026-4:2012(E)
Foreword
ISO (the International Organization for Standardization) and IEC (the International Electrotechnical
Commission) form the specialized system for worldwide standardization. National bodies that are members of
ISO or IEC participate in the development of International Standards through technical committees
established by the respective organization to deal with particular fields of technical activity. ISO and IEC
technical committees collaborate in fields of mutual interest. Other international organizations, governmental
and non-governmental, in liaison with ISO and IEC, also take part in the work. In the field of information
technology, ISO and IEC have established a joint technical committee, ISO/IEC JTC 1.
International Standards are drafted in accordance with the rules given in the ISO/IEC Directives, Part 2.
The main task of the joint technical committee is to prepare International Standards. Draft International
Standards adopted by the joint technical committee are circulated to national bodies for voting. Publication as
an International Standard requires approval by at least 75 % of the national bodies casting a vote.
Attention is drawn to the possibility that some of the elements of this document may be the subject of patent
rights. ISO shall not be held responsible for identifying any or all such patent rights.
ISO/IEC 15026-4 was prepared by Joint Technical Committee ISO/TC JTC 1, Information technology,
Subcommittee SC 7, Software and systems engineering.
ISO/IEC 15026 consists of the following parts, under the general title Systems and software engineering —
Systems and software assurance:
Introduction
In its entirety, ISO/IEC 15026 consists of multiple parts:
a) ISO/IEC TR 15026-1, System and software engineering — Systems and software assurance — Part 1:
Concepts and vocabulary
b) ISO/IEC 15026-2, System and software engineering — Systems and software assurance — Part 2:
Assurance case
c) ISO/IEC 15026-3, System and software engineering — Systems and software assurance — Part 3:
System integrity levels
d) ISO/IEC 15026-4, System and software engineering — Systems and software assurance — Part 4:
Assurance in the life cycle
Many specialized standards and guidelines address specific application areas and topics related to assurance
and use different concepts and terminology when addressing common themes. ISO/IEC TR 15026-1 provides
terminology and concepts used in all parts of ISO/IEC 15026.
ISO/IEC 15026-2 provides minimum requirements for the structure and contents of assurance cases that treat
claims regarding properties of a system or software product selected for special treatment. The results of
performing the life cycle activities and tasks referenced in this part of ISO/IEC 15026 can be recorded in the
form of the assurance case described in ISO/IEC 15026-2.
ISO/IEC 15026-3 addresses the assignment of integrity levels for selected elements of a system. Where
ISO/IEC 15026-2 is applicable, it can bring useful structure, aid, and direction to defining claims and showing
their achievement through the use of integrity levels and accompanying integrity level requirements.
ISO/IEC 15026-2, ISO/IEC 15026-3 and ISO/IEC 15026-4 all use the concepts and vocabulary defined in
ISO/IEC TR 15026-1; however, any part can be applied independently of the others and the use of one does
not require the use of any others.
Authorized licensed use limited to: City College of New York. Downloaded on May 11,2017 at 21:57:31 UTC from IEEE Xplore. Restrictions apply.
INTERNATIONAL STANDARD ISO/IEC 15026-4:2012(E)
1 Scope
This part of ISO/IEC 15026 gives guidance and recommendations for conducting selected processes,
activities and tasks for systems and software products requiring assurance claims for properties selected for
special attention, called critical properties. This part of ISO/IEC 15026 specifies a property-independent list of
processes, activities and tasks to achieve the claim and show the achievement of the claim. This part of
ISO/IEC 15026 establishes the processes, activities, tasks, guidance and recommendations in the context of a
defined life cycle model and set of life cycle processes for system and/or software life cycle management.
NOTE The stakeholders determine which of the system or software properties are selected for special attention and
require assurance claims. This part of ISO/IEC 15026 uses the term “critical” to distinguish those properties from other
requirements.
2 Conformance
Conformance may be claimed to this part of ISO/IEC 15026 with respect to the systems assurance process
view and/or the software assurance process view. Thus, conformance to this part of ISO/IEC 15026 can be
achieved in either or both of the following ways:
a) Demonstrating that the required outcomes of the systems assurance process view (6.1.2) have been
achieved, in addition to conforming to the Agreement, Project, and Technical processes of
ISO/IEC 15288.
b) Demonstrating that the required outcomes of the software assurance process view (6.2.2) have been
achieved, in addition to conforming to the Agreement, Project, Technical, and Software Specific
processes of ISO/IEC 12207:2008.
A claim of conformance is relevant only to specific claims regarding designated systems or software.
Conformance to ISO/IEC 15026 Part 2 can assist in achieving the outcomes required by the two process
views in this part of ISO/IEC 15026.
NOTE Parties to an agreement may choose to incorporate selected portions of this part of the International Standard
into the terms of the agreement. However, compliance with the agreement does not justify a claim of conformance to this
part of the International Standard. A claim of conformance can only be justified as explained above.
3 Normative references
The following referenced documents are indispensable for the application of this document. For dated
references, only the edition cited applies. For undated references, the latest edition of the referenced
documents (including any amendments) applies.
ISO/IEC TR 15026-1, Systems and software engineering — Systems and software assurance — Part 1:
Concepts and vocabulary
This part requires activities and tasks in the context of complete sets of life cycle processes that comprise life
cycle models for projects. The two sets of life cycle processes are provided in:
ISO/IEC 15288:2008, Systems and software engineering — System life cycle processes
ISO/IEC 12207:2008, Systems and software engineering — Software life cycle processes
The assurance guidance and recommendations referenced in this part of ISO/IEC 15026 are to be understood
in terms of their being in the context of the processes, activities and tasks of ISO/IEC 15288 and
ISO/IEC 12207.
It is presumed that the user of this International Standard is using a defined life cycle model and set of life
cycle processes for system and/or software life cycle management. Across the life cycle, the systems and
software process views in Clause 6 use the guidance and recommendations in Clause 7 for the performance
of specific processes, activities, and tasks in order to achieve and show the achievement of assurance claims.
Since all processes of ISO/IEC 15288 and ISO/IEC 12207 are applied iteratively and recursively in the life
cycle, the guidance and recommendations for assurance are also applied iteratively and recursively. In that
way, the achievement of assurance can be checked during each iteration or recursion.
NOTE See ISO/IEC TR 24748-1 for more information about life cycle models and the iteration and recursion of
processes.
When system or software product requirements call for assurance of one or more critical properties of the
system or software product, the overall claims for assurance regarding these properties' values are referred to
in ISO/IEC 15026 as assurance claims. Commonly, such critical properties are in areas where substantial risk
or consequences are involved such as reliability and maintainability, safety, security, or human factors.
Achieving assurance claims normally includes all the considerations involved in achieving stringent
requirements. A requirement is defined in ISO/IEC 29148 as “statement which translates or expresses a need
and its associated constraints and conditions” and a claim is defined in ISO/IEC TR 15026-1 as “statement of
something to be true including associated conditions and limitations.” This part of ISO/IEC 15026 considers
requirements to be statements of values for variables and claims to be statements of requirements to be true.
While assurance claims can be derived from a number of sources, they are normally motivated by potential
real-world adverse consequences related to the intended uses of the system and justified as deriving from
system or software requirements. Each assurance claim is fully and unambiguously specified including:
1) Values for the variables of the critical property required for its achievement.
Authorized licensed use limited to: City College of New York. Downloaded on May 11,2017 at 21:57:31 UTC from IEEE Xplore. Restrictions apply.
ISO/IEC 15026-4:2012(E)
4) The set of versions or instances of the system or software product covered by the claims.
c) “Justification for assurance claims” — that is, the justification for selecting and specifying these particular
assurance claims.
d) “Body of information showing achievement of assurance claims” or more succinctly as the “information
showing [or assuring] the achievement of assurance claims”.
This last item includes the evidence, the rationale or argument showing how the evidence supports the claims,
and any assumptions underlying this rationale. Normally, this rationale has multiple levels of derived claims
internal to it, e.g., claims about system elements at each level of decomposition that need to be true in order
for the assurance claims about the system or software product to be true. The body of information also
includes information on the validity, integrity, relevance, and significance of the evidence.
The rationale often includes several different kinds of arguments, e.g., arguments based on design rationale,
use of defensive design techniques, verification and validation results, performance of similar systems or
products, conformance to standards, or field data. These are combined to achieve an overall conclusion and
an estimate of the remaining uncertainty regarding the achievement of the assurance claims.
The body of information composing and organizing these three items is an element (or elements) of the
system or software product and, as such, is maintained and updated throughout the system life cycle, to
include development as well as maintenance. As a system element, all the processes, activities, and tasks
regarding a system element apply to it, such as configuration management, verification, and validation.
This part of ISO/IEC 15026 can be used for an agreement between an acquirer and supplier, for regulation
purposes, or for assessment of internal development processes to improve achieving and showing the
achievement of assurance claims for the system or software product. Its use is, however, not limited to these
three purposes.
This part of ISO/IEC 15026 can be used for an agreement between an acquirer and a supplier concerning
achieving and showing the achievement of an assurance claim about the value of variables for a critical
property of the system or software product being acquired. The acquirer and supplier relationship can occur at
different levels of the supply chain (prime-supplier, internal to one organization, etc.).
NOTE An agreement may range in formality from a written contract to a verbal understanding.
An authoritative body can use this part of ISO/IEC 15026 for regulation for assuring some critical property of a
system or software product. The need for such regulation can arise to assure or certify a critical property of a
system or software product, to clarify their assurance in the condition of trade, or to do some other action.
This part of ISO/IEC 15026 can be used for an internal assessment by a developer in improving its processes
for achieving and showing the achievement of assurance claims for critical properties of systems and software
products it develops.
The following clauses define the purpose and required outcomes of the systems assurance process view.
6.1.1 Purpose
The purpose of the Systems Assurance Process View is to achieve the assurance claims regarding the
system properties selected for special attention and to provide a body of information showing the achievement
of those claims. The Systems Assurance Process View covers the system of interest including any constituent
software.
The following outcomes shall result from the successful implementation of the Systems Assurance Process
View:
b) Assurance claims, their justification, and the body of information showing the achievement of the
assurance claims for the critical properties are established as an element of the system.
c) A strategy for achieving these assurance claims and showing their achievement is defined.
The following clauses define the purpose and required outcomes of the software assurance process view.
6.2.1 Purpose
The purpose of the Software Assurance Process View is to achieve the assurance claims regarding the
software properties selected for special attention and to provide a body of information showing the
achievement of those claims.
The following outcomes shall result from the successful implementation of the Software Assurance Process
View:
a) A subset of requirements for achievement of the critical properties for application of this process view is
defined.
b) Assurance claims, their justification, and the body of information showing achievement of the assurance
claims for the critical properties are established as an element of the system.
c) A strategy for achieving these assurance claims and showing their achievement is defined.
7.1 Introduction
Clause 7 cites the activities and tasks from the Agreement, Project, and Technical categories of processes in
ISO/IEC 15288:2008 and in ISO/IEC 12207:2008 that require extension or special interpretation when a
defined level of assurance is to be demonstrated. The numbers of those activities and tasks correspond to the
numbers in the parent standards (ISO/IEC 15288 and ISO/IEC 12207). Assurance-claim-related guidance and
recommendations are provided for performing these activities and tasks to achieve the outcomes of the
process views. This guidance and recommendations assume and depend upon the full application of
ISO/IEC 15288 and ISO/IEC 12207 as indicated in Clause 3. The processes and activities not cited in this
clause are considered adequate as defined in ISO/IEC 15288:2008 and ISO/IEC 12207:2008 to achieve the
claims for the critical properties.
Authorized licensed use limited to: City College of New York. Downloaded on May 11,2017 at 21:57:31 UTC from IEEE Xplore. Restrictions apply.
ISO/IEC 15026-4:2012(E)
The Acquisition Process (ISO/IEC 15288:2008, 6.1.1 and ISO/IEC 12207:2008 6.1.1) obtains a product or
service in accordance with the acquirer's requirements. When the acquisition is for a system element, this
process should ensure that all requirements for achieving or showing the achievement of any assurance claim
associated with that system element is passed to the supplier through the agreement.
1) Negotiate an agreement with 6.1.1.3.4.2 The acquirer shall then prepare and negotiate an
the supplier. agreement with the supplier that addresses the acquisition
requirements, including the cost and schedule, of the software
d) Monitor the agreement. product or service to be delivered. The contract shall address
proprietary, usage, ownership, warranty and licensing rights
1) Assess the execution of the associated with the reusable off-the-shelf software products.
agreement.
6.1.1.3.5 Agreement monitoring.
2) Provide data needed by the
supplier and resolve issues in a 6.1.1.3.5.1 The acquirer shall monitor the supplier's activities in
timely manner. accordance with the Software Review Process and the
Software Audit Process. The acquirer should supplement the
monitoring with the Software Verification Process and the
Software Validation Process as needed.
The project should ensure that the agreement considers the variables and their values of the critical properties
for the system element being acquired. The agreement should include integrity requirements (i.e., guarding
against counterfeit parts, tampering, system elements with vulnerabilities, and revealing of confidential
information including information about vulnerabilities to ensure that what is received is what is expected. The
project should derive the claims for the system element being acquired from the system’s assurance claims
and incorporate them into the request for the supply of the system element. In addition, the project should
incorporate the following considerations into the negotiations and the agreement with the supplier:
a) Confidence that the appropriate controls regarding dependability (e.g., trustworthiness) of their personnel
and those of their associated organizations are effectively implemented.
b) Confidence that the supplier guards against counterfeit parts, tampering, and other threats to system or
product integrity as well as against revealing confidential information.
c) Confidence that the system element transferred, received, and, to the extent practicable, installed and
operated, is the one intended.
d) Confidence that the product development environment has appropriate resources in place to protect the
integrity of the product and its critical properties during development.
e) Confidence that the system or software development life cycle model chosen by the supplier is
appropriate to the nature of any assurance claims to be achieved.
f) Confidence that the appropriate controls regarding implementation of dependability and safety
requirements and the achievement of system dependability and safety integrity requirements are
effectively implemented.
g) Confidence that the development lifecycle is conducted using well documented, repeatable processes
that are monitored in accordance with a quality management plan appropriate to the nature of the claims
to be achieved.
The project should revisit the approaches to showing achievement of claims when considering an acquisition
from a supplier when the supplier relationship changes (i.e. new, acquired by another entity, merged with
another entity) or if the acquirer’s requirements change to ensure that the supplier does not deny required
information, enable a new threat, or undermine the safeguards already in place to protect the system.
The project should submit a request for proposal (RFP) that can be correctly understood by the supplier and
other stakeholders and establish a procedure for resolving problems, which may even expand to a change in
the agreement in the case of extensive problem resolution. Upon a change of agreement, the project should
ensure that the stakeholder requirements defined in the Stakeholder Requirements Definition process are the
starting point of the change. The project should consider a multi-stage agreement when appropriate.
NOTE Refer to ISO/IEC 12207:2008 Annex F.3 of for a description of the Contract change management process.
The Supply Process (ISO/IEC 15288:2008, 6.1.2 and ISO/IEC 12207:2008 6.1.2) provides an acquirer with a
product or service that meets agreed requirements. When a system element is being supplied, this process
should ensure that all requirements for achieving or showing the achievement of any assurance claim
associated with that system element are passed to the acquirer.
1) Negotiate an agreement with the 6.1.2.3.4.8 The supplier shall monitor and control the
acquirer. progress and the quality of the software products or
services of the project throughout the contracted life cycle.
d) Execute the agreement. This shall be an ongoing, iterative task, which shall
provide for:
1) Execute the agreement according to
the Supplier’s established project plans a) Monitoring progress of technical performance, costs,
and in accordance with the agreement. and schedules and reporting of project status.
The project should ensure that the agreement considers the feasibility of the variables and their values of the
critical properties for the system element being supplied, from the technical and resources aspects. The
agreement should include integrity requirements to ensure that what is supplied is what is expected. The
project should provide the evidence and argument for the claims for the system element derived from the
system’s assurance claims. In addition, the project should incorporate the following considerations into the
negotiations and the agreement with the acquirer, in order to achieve assurance which offsets the resource
available to the project:
a) Confidence that there is a means to fulfil major requirements in a practical manner from technical and
other aspects.
b) Consideration of a multistage agreement, in the case that the precise cost estimation is difficult to
achieve.
Authorized licensed use limited to: City College of New York. Downloaded on May 11,2017 at 21:57:31 UTC from IEEE Xplore. Restrictions apply.
ISO/IEC 15026-4:2012(E)
The Project Planning Process (ISO/IEC 15288:2008, 6.3.1 and ISO/IEC 12207:2008, 6.3.1) produces and
communicates effective and workable project plans. For assurance, project plans include adequate resources
to achieve the assurance claims and show the achievement of the claims.
NOTE The assurance claims and showing achievement of those claims can be captured in an assurance case with
the structure and format as in Part 2 of ISO/IEC 15026.
1) Identify the project objectives and 6.3.1.3.1.1 The manager shall establish the
constraints. requirements of the project to be undertaken.
3) Define and maintain a life cycle model that is 6.3.1.3.2 Project planning.
comprised of stages using the defined life cycle
models of the organization. 6.3.1.3.2.1 The manager shall prepare the
plans for execution of the project. The plans
b) Plan the project resources. associated with the execution of the project shall
contain descriptions of the associated activities
1) Define and maintain a project schedule and tasks and identification of the software
based on project objectives and work estimates. products that will be provided. These plans shall
include, but are not limited to, the following:
2) Define project achievement criteria for the
life cycle stage decision gates, delivery dates a) Schedules for the timely completion of tasks.
and major dependencies on external inputs or
b) Estimation of effort.
outputs.
c) Adequate resources needed to execute the
3) Define the project costs and plan a budget. tasks.
d) Allocation of tasks.
4) Establish the structure of authorities and
responsibilities for project work. e) Assignment of responsibilities.
f) Quantification of risks associated with the
5) Define the infrastructure and services tasks or the process itself.
required by the project.
g) Quality assurance measures to be employed
6) Plan the acquisition of materials, goods and throughout the project.
enabling system services supplied from outside h) Costs associated with the process
the project execution.
c) Plan the project technical and quality i) Provision of environment and infrastructure.
management. j) Definition and maintenance of a life cycle
model that is comprised of stages using the
1) Generate and communicate a plan for defined life cycle models for projects of the
technical management and execution of the organization.
project, including reviews.
The project should include assurance objectives for the critical properties in the project objectives. These
assurance objectives should include constraints and reflect the laws, regulations, and standards for project
compliance to achieve those objectives, ensuring that activities and tasks for obtaining necessary licenses or
certifications is included in the planning. For example, for a critical property such as safety, obtaining required
safety certifications should be reflected in project planning.
NOTE Assurance objectives are based on the defined critical properties by identifying the dangers and adverse
consequences including harm, threats, and hazards that are to be managed or affected by the system and by considering
the tolerable values of the variables for those critical properties and maximum acceptable uncertainties.
These objectives should be communicated to as many stakeholders in the project as possible, including top
management, customers and suppliers.
The development method, environment and tools should be determined according to the requirements of the
system.
NOTE Each of the development methodologies, such as process oriented, data oriented and object oriented methods,
has its own suitability to different applications. The development method should be chosen according to an analysis of the
work flow and information processed by the system.
The project should ensure that personnel have sufficient skills and authority to adequately cover all the
requirements related to the critical properties and to address achieving and showing the achievement of the
claims for those critical properties.
The project plan should include planning to achieve assurance claims and to show that project progress is
consistent with the claims being met in a timely manner, including planning to deal with the potential effects
from vulnerabilities and weaknesses that can affect claims. The project should clarify the tasks and
responsibility with respect to the claims.
The project should plan for independent reporting regarding assurance claims including responsibilities for
claims-related reporting and issues management; document these issues and reports; and determine how
reporting and information dissemination will be coordinated throughout the organization (including customers
and suppliers as needed).
The project should incorporate decision points and milestones to manage cost, schedule, and performance
risks associated with uncertain, ambiguous and emerging requirements that contribute to achieving the claim.
These decision points should be at the relevant points in the project so that important decisions and
requirements from stakeholders are not postponed, regardless of their complexity.
The project should determine the ancillary actions required for showing the achievement of claims for critical
properties, besides software and system development, and calculate the cost, timescales and resources
necessary for their completion. The goal for these ancillary actions should be given quantitatively whenever
possible. Quantitative estimation is necessary for achievement evaluation in the Operation Process. The
achievement evaluation should be continued throughout the period of applicability of the relevant assurance
claim (e.g., safety monitoring equipment within the nuclear industry).
The project should evaluate the use of off-the-shelf and bespoke products as system elements according to
the project needs. In the evaluation, the project should consider how using off-the-shelf system elements may
affect achieving the claims and showing the achievement of the claims for the critical properties because of
the risk that may be caused by black-boxing the functionality performed by those system elements. Where
customisation is required, particular attention should be given to ensuring that assurance claims are not
invalidated.
The Decision Management Process (ISO/IEC 15288:2008, 6.3.3 and ISO/IEC 12207:2008 6.3.3) selects the
most beneficial course of project action where alternatives exist. For assurance the Decision Management
Process activities need to ensure that the consequences of achieving the claim and showing the achievement
of the claim for the critical property are considered whenever a decision is made.
Authorized licensed use limited to: City College of New York. Downloaded on May 11,2017 at 21:57:31 UTC from IEEE Xplore. Restrictions apply.
ISO/IEC 15026-4:2012(E)
1) Define a decision management strategy. 6.3.3.3.1.1 The project shall define a decision-
making strategy.
2) Identify the circumstances and need for a
decision. 6.3.3.3.1.2 The project shall involve relevant
parties in the decision-making in order to draw on
3) Involve relevant parties in the decision-making experience and knowledge.
in order to draw on experience and knowledge.
6.3.3.3.1.3 The project shall identify the
b) Analyze the decision information. circumstances and need for a decision.
The project should include assurance-claims-related decisions as a category of decision types in the decision
management strategy. The decision management strategy should ensure that any effects on achieving and
showing the achievement of assurance claims are included in the evaluation of consequences and associated
risks of alternative actions in any decisions affecting policies, procedures, plans, personnel, environment,
products, services, and critical supporting infrastructure. Once a decision relevant to claims has been made,
its effect should be reflected in the approaches to showing their achievement. Decision criteria for trade-offs
and other decisions should protect the assurance of the critical property and should involve the stakeholders
of that critical property.
The Risk Management Process (ISO/IEC 15288:2008, 6.3.4 and ISO/IEC 12207:2008 6.3.4) identifies,
analyzes, treats and monitors the risks continuously and can be applied to risks related to the acquisition,
supply, development, maintenance, operation or disposal of a system. The activities and tasks of the risk
management process are a key part of the approach to showing achievement of claims.
NOTE Although the first sentence above is taken from 15288, the Part of ISO/IEC 15026 added “supply” due to the
assurance risks inherent in the supply of a system.
Authorized licensed use limited to: City College of New York. Downloaded on May 11,2017 at 21:57:31 UTC from IEEE Xplore. Restrictions apply.
ISO/IEC 15026-4:2012(E)
Managing assurance-related risks should be thoroughly integrated throughout the risk management process
in priority setting, decision making, establishing and maintaining the risk profile, and risk treatment. The
information justifying the selection and specification of the assurance claims, the body of information showing
achievement of the claims, and the required limitations on uncertainty can be used as a framework for
organizing and addressing systems assurance risks. This information should contain the relevant
assumptions, data, judgments, and calculations needed to underpin risk analysis and allow risk estimates to
be reviewed, reconstructed, and audited.
Throughout the system life cycle, emphasis should be given to causal factors and conditions for their
occurrence, warning signs and indications of emerging risks, and the consequences of risks. In addition,
careful attention should be given to difficulties in achieving needed evidence, in ensuring prompt reporting and
assessment of reports, and in maintenance of complete records. Practices to analyze and mitigate adverse
effects on assurance should be developed and used when suppliers of off-the-shelf or bespoke products
make changes to these products without providing detailed information about those changes.
Risks and sources of risks attributable to security vulnerabilities and weaknesses, threats, hazards, faults,
human error and changes to the system or its environment should be identified throughout the system life
cycle. The project should assume the existence of intelligent and malicious adversaries in establishing and
maintaining its risk profile because of the crucial nature of the risks involved. When estimating the probability
of occurrence and consequences of each identified risk, the project should consider the complete chain of
effects that an intelligent adversary could cause. A risk of subversion exists during any of the system life cycle
processes including the risk management process itself.
The possibilities of failing to achieve the assurance claims and failing to acceptably show this achievement
should be realistically considered, including the risks of having to redo parts of the system. The project should
evaluate the potential for not being able to achieve the necessary systems assurance in a timely manner,
resulting in a risk to the system certification or accreditation or resulting in the system not being used as
intended. Contingency action in the event that assurance claims cannot be achieved in a timely manner
should be identified, planned, and approved by the relevant stakeholders.
The Configuration Management Process (ISO/IEC 15288, 6.3.5, and ISO/IEC 12207, 6.3.5) establishes and
maintains the integrity of all identified artefacts of a project or process and makes them available to concerned
parties. For assurance, two relationships exist: (1) Effective configuration management of the system
elements is evidence in the information showing achievement of assurance claims; (2) the information
showing achievement of the assurance claims itself is under configuration management.
The configuration management strategy should be developed to determine how to get relevant information
from the configuration management process into the information assuring claims, including during
maintenance, and to provide protection of configuration item data and meta-data, both in repositories and
under modification.
The project should identify planned assurance-claim-related information and periodically combined it into an
identified configuration to constitute an organized version of the information assuring claims. Review and audit
of configuration management procedures and activities should be done to prevent accidental or unauthorized
modifications of controlled products and to recommend corrective and preventive actions relating to assurance
claims.
The project should ensure consistency of the integrity and security of the structure and information contained
in the information assuring claims with the approach to showing achievement of claims. Required assurance
information should be identified and periodically combined in an identified configuration to constitute an
organized version of the information assuring claims. Access and distribution control, storage, and protection
should be maintained throughout the product or service life cycle.
The project should tailor configuration management to facilitate the achieving and assuring of claims. At a
minimum:
a) Employing rigor and protective measures commensurate with the criticality of the system, data, mission,
and the assuring of claims and are flexible enough to enable addressing a wide variety of threats.
b) Adjusting granularity within the configuration management process to support the approach to showing
achievement of claims.
The project should establish and maintain required confidentiality, integrity, availability, authentication,
accountability (including non-repudiation), and auditability of information assuring claims, including
incorporating the following strategies and techniques for configuration management processes and supporting
tools:
a) Strong per user authentication. If passwords are used for authentication, they should always be encrypted
for transmission over a network, and never stored as plain text anywhere.
b) Repositories hardened against attack. For example, on the platform supporting the centralized repository,
limit the number of other services being run to reduce the risk that these other services could expose the
repository to attack. Restrict and monitor network access for the CM system.
e) Records and measurements regarding access and updates to the data, to determine if there is
unexpected or unusual activity (e.g., activity with unusual times, locations, systems, or people; individuals
updating an unusually large number of configuration items, etc.).
f) Physical protection of configuration management systems (e.g., by locking them up) and controlled
access to the system.
h) Controlled entry points for those needing access to the configuration management data.
The project should assess the risks arising from the use of the configuration management process including
risks from human error, including maliciousness, unless documented justification is provided for doing
otherwise.
Authorized licensed use limited to: City College of New York. Downloaded on May 11,2017 at 21:57:31 UTC from IEEE Xplore. Restrictions apply.
ISO/IEC 15026-4:2012(E)
NOTE Additional guidance for these configuration management practices is available in ISO/IEC 27002, Information
technology Security techniques Code of practice for information security management, and ISO 10007:2003, Quality
management systems Guidelines for configuration management.
The Information Management Process (ISO/IEC 15288, 6.3.6, and ISO/IEC 12207, 6.3.6) provides relevant,
timely, valid and, if required, confidential information to designated parties during and, as appropriate, after the
system life cycle. For assurance, this process provides the information about the achievement of assurance
claims to the relevant stakeholders and provides for delivery of the body of information showing achievement
of assurance claims to relevant stakeholders, including regulatory or approval authorities.
1) Define the items of information that will be 6.3.6.3.1.1 The project shall define the items of
managed during the system life cycle and, information that will be managed during the
according to organizational policy, agreements, system life cycle and, according to
or legislation, maintained for a defined period organizational policy or legislation, maintained
beyond. for a defined period beyond.
The project should plan for and establish a documented body of information providing grounds for confidence
in the assurance claims consisting of assumptions, arguments, structured evidence, and relationships among
these that show how the claims will be or have been satisfied.
NOTE Part 2 of this International Standard provides a structure for this information in the form of an assurance case
if an assurance case is required by the stakeholders interested in the assurance of a particular critical property.
EXAMPLE When such claims are made for the critical properties of “safety” or “security” of the system, the body of
information should provide an argument covering the full required scope for the safety or security. The arguments and
supporting evidence should be built, collected, and maintained throughout the life cycle and are typically derived from
multiple sources.
The project should also collect, organize, and analyze the following additional relevant information related to
assuring claims:
a) Existing information and evidence including relevant information from prior versions and similar systems
and their similar sets of information including any arguments and justification for using it to mitigate risks
and generate for both successes and failures.
b) Information concerning the validity and integrity of the information assuring claims.
c) Information and reports related to failure, human errors, faults, weaknesses, and incidents related to
assuring claims.
The project should manage and control information related to assuring claims to preserve its integrity and
validity. This includes protecting information related to assuring claims, including protection from malicious
actions; limiting access to sensitive information, including threat and hazard information, and maintaining the
required confidentiality; and responding to incidents involving the information assuring claims.
Whenever a change is made in the information related to assuring claims, the part of the agreement that is
relevant to the change and the relationship between the change and the relevant part of the agreement should
be clarified.
The project should provide reports that summarize this set of information, changes to it, and its quality and
completion status at planned intervals and as necessary for effective oversight and management. This
includes establishing reporting channels that provide visibility to relevant information needed by stakeholders
in decision making. Such information includes what the system is expected to do in typical usage
circumstances in order for users to identify when the system does something unexpected because this may
indicate a potential breach of compliance with restrictions. The user should know how to report or act upon
non-routine or emergent conditions and any breaches of compliance with restrictions so users do not
compromise compliance with restrictions.
The written documents that affect stakeholder agreements should be managed so that any discrepancy with a
stakeholders’ interpretation is minimised. Such documents include, but are not limited to, the request for
proposals (RFPs) by the acquirer and the proposal by the project.
The Stakeholder Requirements Definition Process (ISO/IEC 15288:2008, 6.4.1 and ISO/IEC 12207:2008
6.4.1) defines the requirements for a system that can provide the services needed by users and other
stakeholders in a defined environment. It identifies stakeholders, or stakeholder classes, involved with the
system throughout its life cycle, and their needs, expectations, and desires. It analyzes and transforms these
into a common set of stakeholder requirements. As a subset of these requirements, critical properties for
which a high degree of confidence is required for their achievement are identified and documented.
Authorized licensed use limited to: City College of New York. Downloaded on May 11,2017 at 21:57:31 UTC from IEEE Xplore. Restrictions apply.
ISO/IEC 15026-4:2012(E)
1) Analyze the complete set of elicited 6.4.1.3.3.1 The project shall analyze the
requirements. complete set of elicited requirements.
A set of critical properties should be determined by analysis of the complete set of requirements collected
from the stakeholders. As stakeholders define their requirements, some will emerge as requiring high
confidence in their achievement because they are associated with important consequences, risks, regulations
or other mandates (e.g., anti-tamper, security), relating to properties of the system. Requirements requiring
high confidence can be used to identify the critical properties of the system or software product. The project
should aid in this selection from the technical point of view, such as by identifying additional risks,
consequences and related uncertainties, and compliance requirements.
As part of selecting critical properties, the project should define preliminary requirements for showing
achievement of these properties, paying particular attention to tradeoffs related to stakeholder tolerance for
risks. Stakeholders need to identify their tolerance for failure, degradation, and compromise or loss, e.g.,
degraded modes of operation. The project also should identify any cultural, social, and organizational context
of a system that might affect achievement or showing the achievement of a particular property. This activity is
aided by using experience and records regarding previous versions or similar systems and operational
environments as well as known intentions or predictions regarding the use of the system in its environment.
The project should prioritize properties in order to select which ones are the most critical for providing
assurance claims. The selected critical properties with the justification and rationale for their selection should
be documented and become part of the traceability to that particular stakeholder need and maintained for later
investigation when necessary. This documentation and maintenance of the rationale is done as a part of
maintaining stakeholder requirements traceability to the sources of stakeholder need. The selected critical
properties are used for the top-level assurance claims.
During the analysis of the stakeholder requirements, the fact that each stakeholder has their own
circumstance and set of values should be taken into account.
NOTE The project should work across the set of technology-knowledgeable stakeholders to determine the feasibility
of requirements across the lifecycle. The full lifecycle should be considered to determine the requirements feasibility and
avoid modifications that drive undesirable changes in costs, schedule and/or performance later in the lifecycle when more
technical detail about the system is known.
The project should strive to eliminate indeterminate items in the set of elicited stakeholder requirements. Both
functional and nonfunctional requirements should be examined and defined, reflecting the information about
peak amounts of work, monthly accountant deadlines, and practical experience of development and operation.
Doing so should minimise the technically oriented risks so as to enable more precise estimation of the human
resources, deadlines and cost for the system life cycle. Should the indeterminate items remain or technically
oriented risks be unavoidable, the project should make them explicit and manage them in the risk
management process in as early a stage of the life cycle as possible.
NOTE 1 Refer to ISO/IEC 29148:2011, Requirements Engineering, to understand and include all the types of
requirements and operational concepts.
NOTE 2 The acquirer should define and mange requirements based on the type of life cycle for the project in order to
enable the project to estimate cost and start development, and the project should estimate cost early based on the final
requirements in order to enable the acquirer to judge the investment. These actions may not be their first inclinations
because of anticipation of hidden risks.
The stakeholder requirements should be kept as simple as possible because complicated requirements tend
to result in a complicated system with high cost for development and operation and may make the critical
property more difficult to assure.
The project should ensure that decisions necessary in the later stages of the life cycle are based on the
stakeholder requirements defined in this process.
The project should ensure the involvement of all relevant stakeholders (e.g., those stakeholders familiar with
the business need for the critical property and knowledge of the critical property) in requirements definition to
keep the introduction of additional stakeholder requirements to a minimum in later stages of the life cycle.
NOTE Collaboration is essential in defining the purpose of the system or software product (e.g. new business
enabled by the new system or software). The project personnel have the system or software development technology
knowledge but no detailed image of the use of the system or software, while the acquirers, customers, or users
understand what the use of the system or software would be without the technical skill to build it.
The project should try to minimize both the number of work items that are necessary but not listed in the
stakeholder requirements and any duplication of work items in the stakeholder requirements. These actions
help minimize the risk of misunderstanding between stakeholders.
The project should provide support to stakeholders as required. Some stakeholders may not have a technical
background and may need technical assistance in defining stakeholder requirements or in negotiation to
resolve conflicting stakeholder requirements. Explicit interpretation of the stakeholder’s requirements and the
technical application of those requirements may be necessary to ensure a common understanding among
both technical and non-technical stakeholders.
The stakeholders should agree that they all share the duty of requirements definition, in the sense that they
need to provide their requirements in a proper manner. The system analyst may have the responsibility for
eliciting the requirements, but then the other stakeholders have the duty to act cooperatively with the analyst.
The project should ensure that the approach to achieving and showing the achievement of the assurance
claims of the chosen critical properties of the system or software product is reconciled in the context of the
business or concept of operations to be conducted with the system or software product.
In the case of updating an existing system, the analyst conducting the stakeholder requirements definition
process should be cautious about the phrase “the same as the present system” in stakeholder requirements.
When such requirements arise, the analyst should thoroughly examine whether the current use of the system
or the current values of the system variables will in fact be kept unmodified in the updated system. Special
attention should be given to the critical properties and the claims for those properties in the current system
when a system is updated.
Authorized licensed use limited to: City College of New York. Downloaded on May 11,2017 at 21:57:31 UTC from IEEE Xplore. Restrictions apply.
ISO/IEC 15026-4:2012(E)
Although essential requirements are defined and confirmed under this process, Stakeholder Requirements
Definition, they are subject to change as a result of resolving conflicts between requirements of different
stakeholders and limitations from the system considerations when conducting the activities of the next process,
Requirements Analysis. The activities and tasks of these two processes are, therefore, conducted iteratively.
Due to cost, schedule, and other constraints or changes in stakeholder needs, requirements will evolve. As
agreements on changes in requirements are made, impacts on the ability to achieve agreements related to
the critical properties should also be addressed, although an agreement should be respected and should not
be changed too easily, even if no legal or financial action results.
NOTE 1 Refer to ISO/IEC 29148:2011, Requirements engineering, Clause 5, for more discussion of the iterative nature
of these activities and tasks.
NOTE 2 A process for conducting a change of agreement is included in ISO/IEC 12207:2008, Annex F.3, Contract
Change Management Process.
The Requirements Analysis Process (ISO/IEC 15288:2008, 6.4.2) and the System Requirements Analysis
process (ISO/IEC 12207:2008 6.4.2) transforms the stakeholder, requirement-driven view of desired services
into a technical view of a required product that could deliver those services. The Software Requirements
Analysis process (ISO/IEC 12207, 7.1.2) establishes the requirements of the software elements of the system.
The main assurance-claim-related purpose of requirements analysis is to derive a set of assurance claims
from critical properties. Requirements Analysis takes the selected critical properties from the Stakeholder
Requirements Definition process and assigns variables for evaluating the property and values to those
variables for measuring the property. The assurance claim is then a statement about the value of the variables
for that property.
NOTE In Part 1, a claim is defined to be a “statement of something to be true including associated conditions and
limitations.” Here, the “something” is the “value of the variables for the property.”
Authorized licensed use limited to: City College of New York. Downloaded on May 11,2017 at 21:57:31 UTC from IEEE Xplore. Restrictions apply.
ISO/IEC 15026-4:2012(E)
System requirements definition is conducted to define the values for the variables for the critical properties
chosen out of the collected stakeholder requirements in the Stakeholder Requirements Definition process.
The functional boundary of the system related to the critical properties, the functions related to the critical
properties, and the implementation constraints related to the critical properties should be explicitly specified.
Among the measures defined, those measures related to the values of the variables of the critical properties
should be explicitly specified, and system requirements related to the critical properties should be explicitly
specified in terms of values for variables pertaining to those critical properties. Moreover, the priority among
the system requirements related to the critical properties should be defined and the traceability maintained to
the stakeholder requirements.
EXAMPLE If functional safety is chosen as the critical property, the part of system requirements required to be
specified in this process view would be “safety lifecycle requirements,” as described in IEC 61508-1.
The constraints for the system environment required to achieve and show achievement of claims are identified
by performing analysis of risks or consequences. This analysis is facilitated by capturing the following
information for each claim:
a) Allowable risks associated with the system not achieving this claim.
Before completing requirements analysis, the project should review the system requirements related to the
critical properties to determine whether they are consistent with stakeholder requirements and whether they
have adequately captured those critical properties whose violation has severe consequences and in whose
achievement stakeholders require high confidence. The ultimate set of claims to be achieved and shown to be
achieved can then be selected and validated. The project should document the selected set of assurance
claims and their relationships to stakeholder and system requirements that justify them.
The project should provide a framework to validate that the requirements define a system that does what it is
intended to do and nothing else in its transition, operational, and disposal environments.
The system requirements must be unambiguous and well examined; an unexamined ambiguous set of
requirements tends to result in cost increase, schedule slippage, and lower quality of the system.
For the systems assurance process view, the Verification Process (ISO/IEC 15288:2008, 6.4.6) confirms that
the specified design requirements are fulfilled by the system. This process provides the information required to
effect the remedial actions that correct non-conformances in the realized system or the processes that act on
it. The Software Verification Process (ISO/IEC 12207:2008, 7.2.4) confirms that each software work product
and/or service of a process or project properly reflects the specified requirements. For assurance, the project
should make a verification plan that is consistent with the strategy for achieving and showing the achievement
of the assurance claims.
1) Define the strategy for verifying the system 7.2.4.3.1.1 A determination shall be made if the
entities throughout the life cycle.) project warrants a verification effort and the
degree of organizational independence of that
2) Define a verification plan based on system effort needed. The project requirements shall be
requirements. analyzed for criticality. Criticality may be gauged
in terms of:
3) Potential constraints on design decisions are
identified and communicated. a) The potential of an undetected error in a
system or software requirement for causing
NOTE This includes practical limitations of accuracy, death or personal injury, mission failure, or
uncertainty, repeatability that are imposed by the financial or catastrophic equipment loss or
verification enabling systems, the associated damage;
measurement methods, the need for system integration,
and the availability, accessibility and interconnection with b) The maturity of and risks associated with the
enabling systems. software technology to be used;
The project should conduct verification planning to be consistent with assurance-claim-related plans including
the planned approach to showing achievement of the claims for the critical properties. This includes identifying
verification and measurement criteria used in the approach to showing achievement of claims and establishing
criteria for how assurance-claim-related problems should be resolved and reflected in the body of information
assuring claims. Once values for assurance-related uncertainties are established, the verification plans,
activities, and decisions should ensure meeting these uncertainty requirements. For example, the project
should consider the contribution of tool reliability to the uncertainty of achieving the result.
The Operation Process (ISO/IEC 15288, 6.4.9) uses the system in order to deliver its services. The Software
Operation process (ISO/IEC 12207, 6.4.9) operates the software product in its intended environment and
provides support to the customers of the software product. For assurance, plans for this process should
consider achievement of the critical properties throughout the life of the system.
Authorized licensed use limited to: City College of New York. Downloaded on May 11,2017 at 21:57:31 UTC from IEEE Xplore. Restrictions apply.
ISO/IEC 15026-4:2012(E)
6.4.9.3 a) Prepare for operation. 6.4.9.3.1 Preparation for operation. This activity
consists of the following tasks:
1) Prepare a strategy for operation.
6.4.9.3.1.1 The operator shall develop a plan and
set operational standards for performing the
activities and tasks of this process. The plan shall be
documented and executed.
The project should plan that the operation of the system conforms to operational restrictions and is consistent
with the assumptions from the approach to showing achievement of the assurance claims. The plan should
ensure that violations of these restrictions are reported, recorded, and resolved and contain training
information on how to establish and maintain compliance with assurance-claim-related restrictions. The plan
should include how to modify the approach to showing achievement of claims and the related body of
information to reflect changes in operational conditions not encompassed in the claims.
The plan should provide for assessment of the effects of changes in the system or its operational environment
on the assurance-claim-related usability of the system and on the validity of the assumptions necessary for
showing achievement of the claims. The plan should provide for regular audits of operation records to verify
that there is no evidence that the system or the achievement and showing achievement of claims have been
unknowingly subverted. The plan should ensure that adequate measures exist to prevent loss of sensitive
information or harm if the control of the system is lost or transferred.
The project should establish reporting systems and procedures for investigation and disposition of assurance-
claims-related incidents such as attempted violations and violations of claims, product vulnerabilities or
weakness that might contribute to violations; and new sources of danger potentially resulting in claim violation
/throughout the life of the system. Appropriate safeguards should be put in place for required confidentiality
when communicating the plan and reporting the incidents.
The Maintenance process (ISO/IEC 15288, 6.4.10) sustains the capability of the system to provide a service.
The Software Maintenance process (ISO/IEC 12207, 6.4.10) provides cost-effective support to a delivered
software product. For assurance, plans for this process should consider achievement of the critical properties
throughout the life of the system.
The project should ensure that the maintenance plan provides for evaluating the effect on assurance-claim-
related information of changes made to the system or system elements during system maintenance. The plan
should include resources for updating the approach to showing the achievement of claims and the related
body of information as required, including new evidence. The plan should include provision for the controlled
update and release of assurance=claim=related artefacts. The plan should include assessment of the effects
of changes in the system or its operational environment on the assurance-claim-related usability of the
system. This assessment should include ongoing measurement of the critical properties when maintenance
changes are made.
NOTE 1 All proposed product changes should undergo claims-related effects analyses. Approved changes that have
an effect on achieving and showing achievement of claims should be returned to the appropriate phase of the life cycle
and all subsequent phases repeated for the changes. Information with claims-related implications should be disseminated
widely and should be clear, concise, and easy to read. Information can be disseminated by means of formal reports to
management and by safety newsletters, bulletins, and training for all staff.
NOTE 2 The maintenance plan should include provisions to ensure the critical properties of the systems are not
compromised throughout the lifecycle as a result of replacement, retired, or disposed parts or components of the system.
The plan should have provisions for informing the risk management strategy of claim-related risk information
and guidance related to modifications, workarounds, and other maintenance-related risks. A risk assessment
or claim-related effects analysis of these changes should be performed in order to ensure that the
achievement of claims, the approach to showing the achievement of claims and the related body of
information can be maintained.
NOTE All proposed product changes, including changes to non-assurance-claims-related requirements, design, and
components, should undergo assurance-claims-related impact analyses.
Authorized licensed use limited to: City College of New York. Downloaded on May 11,2017 at 21:57:31 UTC from IEEE Xplore. Restrictions apply.
ISO/IEC 15026-4:2012(E)
Bibliography
For additional guidance in assurance-related fields, the users of this part of ISO/IEC 15026 are encouraged to
consult the extensive bibliography in ISO/IEC TR 15026-1. The bibliography here focuses on process
standards.
[1] ISO/IEC 90003:2004, Software engineering — Guidelines for the application of ISO 9001:2000 to
computer software
[2] ISO/IEC 15026-2:2011, System and software engineering — System and software assurance — Part 2:
Assurance case
[3] Software and Systems Engineering Vocabulary (sevocab). Available at: www.computer.org/sevocab/
[4] ISO/IEC 15289:2011, System and software engineering — Content of life cycle information products
(documentation)
[5] ISO/IEC 15504-1:2004, Information Technology — Process Assessment— Par 1: Concepts and
vocabulary
[12] ISO/IEC 16085:2006, Systems and software engineering ʊ Life cycle processes ʊ Risk management
[13] ISO/IEC 16326:2009, System and Software engineering — Life cycle Processes ʊ Project
management
[14] ISO/IEC 21827:2008, Information technology ʊ Systems Security Engineering ʊ Capability Maturity
Model (SSE-CMM®)
[15] ISO/IEC TR 24748-1:2010, Systems and software engineering — Life cycle management — Part 1:
Guide for life cycle management
[16] ISO/IEC TR 24748-2:2011, Systems and software engineering — Life cycle management — Part 2:
Guide for the application of ISO/IEC 15288 (System life cycle processes)
[17] ISO/IEC TR 24748-3:2011, Systems and software engineering — Life cycle management — Part 3:
Guide for the application of ISO/IEC 12207 (Software life cycle processes)
[18] ISO/IEC 25000:2005, Software engineering ʊ Software product Quality Requirements and Evaluation
(SQuaRE) ʊ Guide to SQuaRE
[19] ISO/IEC 25010:2011, Systems and software engineering ʊ Systems and software Quality
Requirements and Evaluation (SQuaRE) ʊ System and software quality models
[20] ISO/IEC 25012:2008, Software Engineering ʊ Software product Quality Requirements and Evaluation
(SQuaRE) ʊ Data Quality Model
[21] ISO/IEC 25020:2007, Software engineering ʊ Software product Quality Requirements and Evaluation
(SQuaRE) ʊ Measurement reference model and guide
[22] ISO/IEC 25030:2007, Software engineering ʊ Software product Quality Requirements and Evaluation
(SQuaRE) ʊ Quality requirements
[23] ISO/IEC 25040:2011, Systems and software engineering ʊ Systems and software Quality
Requirements and Evaluation (SQuaRE) ʊ Evaluation process
[24] ISO/IEC 25051:200, Software engineering ʊ Software product Quality Requirements and Evaluation
(SQuaRE) ʊ Requirements for quality of Commercial Off-The-Shelf (COTS) software product and
instructions for testing
[26] ISO/IEC 27002:2005, Information technology ʊ Security techniques ʊ Code of practice for information
security management
Authorized licensed use limited to: City College of New York. Downloaded on May 11,2017 at 21:57:31 UTC from IEEE Xplore. Restrictions apply.
Authorized licensed use limited to: City College of New York. Downloaded on May 11,2017 at 21:57:31 UTC from IEEE Xplore. Restrictions apply.
ISO/IEC 15026-4:2012(E)
ICS 35.080
Price based on 24 pages
Authorized licensed use limited to: City College of New York. Downloaded on May 11,2017 at 21:57:31 UTC from IEEE Xplore. Restrictions apply.