Freedom as an Ideal Author(s): Raymond Geuss and Martin Hollis Source: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Supplementary Volumes,

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FREEDOMAS AN IDEAL RaymondGeuss and MartinHollis I-Raymond Geuss

saiahBerlin's discussion of the two concepts of liberty1provides a convenientstartingplace for the topic I wish to discuss, namely the role conceptions of freedom play in structuringour human aspirations. Berlin assumes that 'freedom' can be significantly ascribed either to human individuals or to groups, and he also distinguisheswhat he calls 'negativeconceptions'of freedomfrom 'positive conceptions'. An entity (whether human individual or group) is free 'in a negative sense' to the extent to which there are no (external)impedimentsor obstacles to the action of that entity domain);an entity (whethera humanindividual (in some particular or a group) is free 'in a positive sense' to the extent to which that entity is its own master,i.e. to the extentto which it rulesor governs itself. One might think that these two distinctions (between individual and group freedom on the one hand and positive and negative freedomon the other)cut acrosseach otherso thatactually Berlin's accountrecognizes four kinds of freedom: a) negative freedom of an individual:if my hands are untied, I am to that extent freerthanI was; b) positive freedom of an individual:a Roman slave who was emancipatedbecame free 'in a positive sense'; c) negative freedomof a group:a certainnomadicgroupmight not be free to move in a certain direction because of frontier (Hadrian'sWall, for instance); arrangements d) positive freedomof a group:if a colony successfully revolts areaandestablishesitself as a separate againstthe metropolitan it may sometimesbe saidto have attaineda kind politicalentity, of (positive) freedom it lacked before the revolt.
1 'Introduction'and 'Two Conceptsof Liberty'in Four Essays on Liberty,IsaiahBerlin, Oxford:OxfordUniversity Press, 1969.

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As if this were not complicatedenough, Berlin also claims that the positive conceptionof freedom (by which he seems to mean in this case the positive freedomof a humanindividual)is ambiguous. Sometimes 'freedom' (of the individual in the positive sense) means 'autonomy'or abilityto give oneself the rule or principleof one's own behaviour,but sometimes (positive) 'freedom' means 'self-realization'i.e. thatthe individual's 'true'or 'real' self comes to expression in action. Actually neither of these two senses of '(positive) freedom' seems the same as the sense in which the emancipatedRoman slave has become free. An emancipatedslave is a person who has been assigned a certainlegal status:his or her actions are now recognized in a certain way, and certain kinds of action, such as appearingin court in one's own cause, are now possible that were not before. None of this implies that the former slave is now 'autonomous'i.e. actuallycapableof regulatinghis or her own behaviouror has attained'self-realization' (in any of the more emphatic senses in which that term was used in the 19th century). The discussion can be clarified,I think,by introducinga further distinctionwhich Berlindoesn't use. To returnfor a moment to the positive sense of freedomfora group,a colony thatattainsindependareamay be said to have gained a kind of ence from a metropolitan positive freedom,butit does notfollow fromsuchindependencethat the former colony will be internallyself-governing (by whatever standardsone uses to determinethis). I would like to say that the colony thatbecomes independentattains (positive) freedom 'in an outward-lookingsense'; '(positive) freedom in an inward-looking sense' then refers to political and social arrangements which nowadays will probablyinclude the existence of a parliamentary systemof governmentwithregularelections, etc.2One can make an
2 I would like to be able to give a clearer and more abstractaccount of the distinction between inward-lookingand outward-lookingsenses of freedom, but can't. I hope the examples at least make my generalintentionsclear. 'The positive freedom of a group in an inward-lookingsense' doesn't yet designate a single well-defined concept, but rather a family of slightly differentconceptions. Different more or less distinct concepts will ariseby addingfurtherspecificationsof what it means for a groupto be 'self-governing'. I discuss some of these issues in more detail in my 'Auffassungender Freiheit' (forthcoming in Zeitschriftfiirphilosophische Forschung) and 'Freiheitim Liberalismusund bei Marx'(forthcomingin Ethischeundpolitische Freiheit ed. JulianNida-Riimelinand WilhelmVossenkuhl).

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analogous distinction in the case of the positive freedom of an individual:the legal freedom of the emancipatedformer slave is sense andit is an extremely positive freedomin an outward-looking historical step when this notion of 'being one's own important master' is extended and internalized, giving rise to notions of (positive) freedom as self-control,autonomy,self-realization,etc., that is, to various conceptions of freedom in an inward-looking sense. Berlin's own final position on freedom is not completely clear. He obviously thinksthatthe concept of freedomhas sufferedfrom a kind of 'inflation' during the past several hundredyears in the sense that people have tried to build more and more of the componentsof a fully good and satisfactoryhumanlife into the concept of freedomitself. In any case Berlinis clearly extremelyconcerned to counter this 'inflation' of the concept of freedom as much as possible.3 Thus he wishes to distinguish as sharply as possible betweenwhatbelongs to the contentof the conceptof freedomitself and what properly belongs only to the conditions under which freedom can effectively be utilized.4In fact Berlin at times comes close to suggestingthatpositive freedomitself in any of its various forms is not really a proper concept of freedom but a bloated amalgam, incorporatingcomponents of the concept of freedom with variousother inflationaryelements derived from conceptions of happiness,rationality,etc. Only, he suggests, the austerenotion of individualnegative freedom is the real unvarnishedthing itself: certainlyit is individualnegative freedom which should be given strictpriorityin philosophicaldiscussion. for The reason it is so important Berlin to claim thatthe concept of individual negative freedom is in some sense the most basic concept of freedom5is that he believes there is a kind of elective affinity between positive conceptions of freedom and the legitimationof a certainkind of totalitarian oppression.6Only the positive
3 Cf. Four Essays on Liberty,pp. xxxviii ff., liii ff. 4 Cf. Four Essays on Libertypp. xlix, liii ff. Accepting this distinctionwould exclude from discussion views thattake power to be an essential componentof freedom. 'Freedomis an opportunityfor action' (Four Essays p. xlii) not a power to act or 'action itself'. 5 Cf. Four Essays p. lvi. 6 Berlin sometimes denies that he is asserting any special (in particularany logical) connection between positive conceptions of freedom and totalitarianism,(cf. Four

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conception of freedom, Berlin thinks, gives rise to what has been called 'Rousseau's paradox' that is the thesis that under certain circumstancesone could force people to be free.7To believe that undercertain circumstancespeople could be forced to be free is, however, to lack the conceptualresourcesto resist certainforms of totalitarianism. To put what I take to be Berlin's argumentin a series of steps: 1. To be negatively free means simply to be in a state in which one has unobstructed opportunities for action, but to be positively free means actuallyto live and act in a certainway. 2. If freedom is a way of life, someone else might know better than I do what constitutesthat way of life. 3. Anyone who knew (better than I did myself) in what my positive freedom would consist could legitimately force me to adopt that way of life and in so doing would be forcing me to be free. There are any number of difficulties with this argument.8 Obviously nothing at all like it could hold good for all positive conceptionsof freedom,for instancea conceptionthatsaw freedom as residing in individualautonomy,because on such a conception it would be an integralpartof the free way of life thatthe individual living it has chosen that life ratherthan being forced to adopt it.9 At the moment, however, I would like to consider the thirdstep in the argument.It is, of course, not truethatif I know what would be good for you--even if I know what would be supremelygood for
Essays, pp. xliii-xlix, 132), but this seems to me to be somewhat disingenuous. If the connectionbetween positive conceptionsof freedomand totalitarianism really merely is historical and contingent, it is hardto see what systematic point Berlin's discussion is supposed to have, beyond remindingus that 'freedom' is used in a variety of different senses, not all of them compatiblewith each other. 7 J.-J. Rousseau Du contrat social (1762) Book I, Ch. VII; cf. Q. Skinner 'The Idea of Negative Liberty' in Philosophy in History ed. R. Rorty, J. Schneewind, Q. Skinner, Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress, 1984. 8 Note for instance that it would be a mistake to assume that freedomin a positive sense mustbe an exercise concept,just becauseit is not a mere opportunity concept. 'Freedom' (in a positive sense) might designate the possession of a faculty or capacity which may or may not be exercised. 9 Note that I could also force you to be negatively free by removing various obstacles to your action. Whereasbefore you had no choice but to stay seated(since you were tied to the chair), when I untie you you are forced to have the freedom of remaining seated or standingup. No one thinksthere is anythingconceptually odd about cases like this.

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you-this gives me a warrant coerceyou, especiallynot if the to goodin question one whichhasvalueonlyif you choseit freely, is so thatin usingcoercionI destroy it. Thesituation changesimmediately, course,if one addsto the of threepointslistedabovea fourth: 4. There a socialagency(forinstance, State) is The whois really me (or:who is 'therealme') andthusall of whoseactionsare reallymineso thatnoneof its actionsagainst can even in me principle countas coercion. Actually onehas4 onedoesn'tneed3 aboveto drawsomestrong if and unpleasant conclusions.This suggeststhat Berlinhas misdiagnosed errorwhich gives rise to an inabilityto resistthe the temptations totalitarianism. culprit somethesisaboutthe of The is relation betweenindividual socialagency-somethinglike 4 and above or like what Berlin calls the 'organicist' conceptionof society andnotthepositiveconception freedom. of 10 It is striking Berlin'swholediscussion freedom structthat of is uredby his interest the limitsof permissible in socialcoercion.ll Freedom himis fromtheverystart police-concept. possible for a The justification coercivesocial regulation humanactionis not, of of however, onlycontextin whichtheconcept freedom the of playsa role.Another contextis thatin whichindividuals decidehow they will lead ffieirown lives. Whatever importance negative the of conceptions freedomin the discussionof systems of public of coercion, areof littleuse in helpingindividuals they structure their aspirations.l2 Since one is not necessarilygoing to be using conceptions freedom legitimize of to systems coercion, isn'tat of it all obviousthatconceptual abstemiousness thecorrect is course.It doesn't followfromffiiseither onecan'ttakeseriously that Berlin's
10 Note that ThomasHobbes has a relentlessly negative conception of freedom, but given his theory aboutthe constructionof social agency, the Leviathan,he arrivesat strongly totalitarianconclusions. Note also that both Hegel and Marx specifically reject the 'organicist'conceptionof society if by that is meantthe view thathumanindividualsare no more than accidents of the social substanceor organs of a social whole. Cf. G.W.F. Hegel Grundliniender Philosophie des Rechts, Frankfurt/M: Suhrkamp,1970, 260 261 plus 'Zusatze',273 ('Zusatz'). Cf. also KarlMarx,Grundrisse, Berlin:Dietz, 1974 pp. 375ff, esp. p. 384. 11 Berlin, Four Essays p. 121. 12 As Nietzsche writes,freedom as absence of constraintsis perhapsa reasonableaspiration for slaves, but not for others. Cf. Fr. Nietzsche, Jenseits von Gut und Bose 260.

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concern about excessive inflation of the concept of freedom; 'freedom'needn'tnecessarilycompletelylose its profileandbecome from the vague general notion of 'a completely indistinguishable humanlife'. satisfactory If 'freedom' is not the same as 'happiness' it is not the same as 'morality' either.13So if one wants to make progress in the right freedom as an ethical ideal one has to direction in understanding threadone's way throughthe minefield, some of the salientfeatures of which I have just sketched. That is, one wants a conception of freedom which is a developmentof somethingrooted in everyday usage and practice which can serve to give clarity and focus to individualhumanaspirationsbut which is neithera police-concept nor so inflated as to be indistinguishablefrom the concept of the indeterminatesum of all human satisfactions, nor so thoroughly moralized that it is an analytic truth that anyone acting freely is acting morally. There are, I think, a number of different paths through this mine-field. I would like to mentionfour: 1) freedom as autonomy; 2) conceptions of freedom centred aroundpower; 3) freedom as authenticityof desire; 4) freedom as self-realization. I will first make some very cursory remarksabout the first two, then some commentson authenticityand self-realization. The full concept of autonomycan be thoughtof as being comprisedof two components;I will be said to be 'autonomous'if I 1. have or exercise the capacity to set myself my own goals, give myself principlesof action etc. 2. have or exercise a capacity for self-control, i.e. am able to refrain from acting on impulses I may experience if I know them to be incompatible with goals I have set myself or principlesI have adopted. This conception of freedom as autonomy has a long and distinguished history althoughI would suggest that by itself it may seem slightly etiolatedto those with a certainkind of modem sensibility. To use the standardexample, the slave in chains may well be 'autonomous'in the above sense, but we would perhapshesitate to
13 Despite the efforts of Kant and his followers to assimilate freedom and morality.

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call such a slave fully free. One mightthinkthatone could deal with this considerationby claiming thatthe ideal of individualfreedom comprisesboth full autonomyand maximalnegative freedom. If one reflects on the intuition that lies behind the negative conceptionof freedom, one might come to think that it was something like this: I am the freer the more possible courses of action stand open to me, thus any obstacle which closes off a course of action as a possibility for me is a restrictionof my freedom. If this is the rightway to thinkaboutfreedom,then the centralthing is the extentof the spectrumof possible courses of action thatstandopen to me at any given time. How manypossible courses of action stand open to me, however, will depend on any number of factors; in many cases it will depend as much on how much power (of what kind) I have as on the existence or non-existence of obstacles. 'Obstacles' lose their salience in the discussion of freedom; there is in principleno reason why increaseof my power might not lead to as great an increase in my freedom as the removal of obstacles would. This is the tack Marx takes when he cites the 'Dictionnaire de l'academie' to the effect that 'libert6'is most commonly used in the sense of 'puissance'.14 Stalwartproponentsof negative libertycan try to resist this line of argument appealto a certainmoralintuitionmany of us have by and which one finds expressed with great clarity in Rousseau's Emile, namely that we react differentlyto differentways in which our wishes can be frustrated.If our desires are frustratedbecause we lack the power to attainwhat we want or are preventedby some naturalobstacle our reactionwill usually lack the qualityof resentment and indignationit may well have if we are hinderedby an obstaclecreatedby anotherhumanagent (especially if this obstacle was createdspecifically to thwartus). Berlin, and those who take a similarpositionto his on the priorityof negative libertyarguefrom this Rousseauistintuitionthatonly obstacles which are the results count as of humanaction (or even, of 'deliberateinterference')15 of obstaclesormy own lack of power restrictions my liberty;natural do not.16
14 MEW 3.287 i.e. Marx-Engels Werke (Berlin:Dietz, 1983) vol. 3, p. 287. 15 Berlin, Four Essays p. 122. 16 Partof my intentionis to try to breakthe hold on our imaginationsexercised by an image

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It seems plausible that a conception of freedom which held it to consist in autonomy plus power, could satisfy the conditions I outlined above. It could have a clear conceptual profile and be distinguishablefrom otherideals and it needn't be construedin an inherently moralizing way-I may well autonomously decide to use my powers in ways thatdo not satisfy reasonablestandardsof 'morality'. One might still, however, think that a conception of freedom which took it to consist in autonomyplus power left somethingout. It has often been taken to be part of our intuitive conception of freedom that I can be called fully free only if I am doing what I really want. 'What I really want to do' here refers not to some externallyspecifiablecourse of action,but to the kind of desire that gives rise to the actionI perform.In this sense I am doing something I really want to do if my action is motivated by a desire that is mine. I'm free then, in this sense, if I am genuinely or authentically on a genuine or authenticdesire. acting Anotherway in which the same point is often put is to say thatI am free only if acting on a desire with which I 'identify'. The most powerfulcontemporary analysis of what it means to 'identify'with a desire is the one given by HarryFrankfurt his classic paper in 'Freedomof the Will & the Concept of a Person'.17This analysis and desires startsfroma distinction betweenfirst-order second-order (and correspondingly first-order and second-order volitions). I identifywith a given desire,roughlyspeaking,when I will thatdesire to be the one which moves me to action.Thus if I have a (first-order) desireto have a glass of wine, I will be actingfreely in actingon that desire thatthatdesire for a glass desireif I also have a second-order of wine be theone whichmotivatesme to action;sucha second-order volitionandmeansthatI have identifiedwith desireis a second-order desire.If, on the otherhand,I have a first-order the given first-order
Berlin (and some of his followers) tend to project,the image of a contrastbetween sober, responsible, more or less value-neutralnegative conceptions of freedom and inflated, highly moralizingpositive conceptions.(Cf. esp. FlathmanThePhilosophy & Politics of Freedom (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1987) pp. 50ff.) If the Rousseauist intuitiondid turnout to be partof the motivationof those who cling most tenaciously to a purely negative conception of freedom, this would be grist for my mill. 17 Harry Frankfurt,The Importance of What We Care About (Cambridge: Cambridge UniversityPress, 1988) pp. Ilff.

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desire to drinka glass of wine and a second-ordervolition thatthat desirenot move me to action,then the desire to drinkthe first-order wine is notone I haveidentifiedwith,notone authentically mine,and on it will not be actingfully freely. acting introducesa qualification In a somewhatlateressay18Frankfurt to his account.If I have a second-orderdesire not to be moved to action by a particularfirst-orderdesire, I have not identified with the first-orderdesire in question, but it doesn't necessarily follow from the fact thatI endorsea given first-orderdesire as motive for action that I have thereby identifiedwith that first-orderdesire in any very significantsense. It may well be the case, for instance,that I have unresolvedconflicts among my higher-orderdesires. After with (proleptic)regret muchbackingandforthingI mayreluctantly, and many reservationsfinally settle for the moment on a secondfirst-orderdesire be the one that order volition that one particular constitutes my will. In so deciding (and then acting) I don't fully identify with the first-orderdesire-all things considered, under I these andthese conditions,unfortunately, endorseit for actionthis time aroundwithoutany commitmentor clear expectationthatnext time aroundI will not decide differently.This is the issue Frankfurt It calls 'wholeheartedness'. is obviously extremelydifficult to give kind of full and clear account of what it means to identify any wholeheartedly with a desire, but Frankfurtis surely right to emphasizethatone componentof such an analysisis a commitment the agent makes vis-a-vis the future;I grantthe desire in question a continuingrecognized place within the self.19 Reflection on wholeheartedness, identification, authenticity gave rise in the nineteenthcenturyto two contrastingideals. The first of these is one which sees freedom to consist precisely in the absenceof identificationor wholeheartedness. The free spirit is bound by no fixed beliefs or commitmentsand standsrelatedto desires in a way that is similarto that in which the ancient sceptic and standsto beliefs. Desires, both first-order higher-order desires,
in The Importanceof WhatWe 18 'Identificationand Wholeheartedness' HarryFrankfurt, CareAbout pp.159ff. in 19 Cf. H. Frankfurt 'Identificationand Wholeheartedness' The Importanceof WhatWe CareAbout(Cambridge,1988) esp. pp. 168ff. 'Freedomof the Will and the Concept of a Person'deals with traditional problemsof the mechanismof autonomy;'Identification & Wholeheartedness' deals with what came to be called 'authenticity'.

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arethereto be actedon in the given context,not to be the objects of identification. Genuinely free anddeep people are those who love masksandaredeftat changing them.20 As Hegel pointedout, though,in his criticismof Friedrich Schlegel2l apparent multiplicity possibilities the rich of opento the freespiritseemsto be purchased thepriceof animpoverishment at of theself whichis reduced thesingle,emptyinfinitely to repeated movement rejecting of identification. The other,diametrically opposedideal,is one whichsees freedomto consistin identifying oneselfwholeheartedly a unitary, with structured of desireswhichconstitute coreof a moreor less set the enduring self.22 Onlythen,so thisline of argument runs,canthere evenbe a self whichmight saidto be freeorunfreein actingone be way rather thananother, namelyactingfreelyif actingon a desire withwhichit identifies, otherwise actingfreely.23 not It would,though,I think,be a mistaketo thinkthatone could understand freedom the senseat issue heremerely as actionon in a set of desireswithwhichI can wholeheartedly identify.Evenif the projectof the 'free spirit'in its moreextremeversionsisn't completely coherent, proponents this idealdid havesomethe of thingin mindthatonecan'tsimplydismiss: therecanbe a kindof naive,immediate, unreflective and wholeheartedness whichwe are not necessarily inclinedto see specifically a formof freedom. as Hegel's idea thatbothreflection (whichgives rise to the idealof the free spirit)andidentification (whichgives rise to the idealof wholeheartedness) internal'moments'of freedom(correctly are understood), seemsplausible, by itselfleavesonewithout but much clarity about howexactly twowillberelated full-blown the in cases of freedom.
20 This ideal is expressed with greatbrillianceat variousplaces in Nietzsche's work, (e.g. Jenseits von Gut und Bose 40, 284, 289). 21 G.W.F.Hegel, Grundliniender Philosophie des Rechts (Suhrkamp,1970) 140. 22 Oddly enough one finds extremeexpressionsof both of the two ideals in Nietzsche. (For an instance of something like this ideal of 'wholeheartedness'cf. Gotzendammerung 'Sprucheund Pfeile' 44). Partof the difficulty in understanding Nietzsche is a difficulty in knowing how to take this fact. Hegel has a complex theory of the way in which both of these ideals are (so he claims) rooted in aspects of the structureof the will and how they can be reconciled in a life lived in a fully rationalstate. Cf. Hegel Grundlinienzur Philosophie des Rechts 5-7, 139-157. 23 Kantdoesn't use the languageof 'identification'but one might think of him as claiming thatone should identify wholeheartedlyonly with the desire to act consistently.

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Self-realization views of freedom shift the focus from the internalworldof desireto the worldof action.Therearetwo slightly different versions of a self-realizationapproachto freedom. The first, which one can find perhapsmost explicitly in Humboldt,24 sees humanbeings not so much as creatureswho have desires with which they identify or fail to identify, but as bearersof powers and capacities which they can exercise and develop. I'm free on this view to the extent to which I am engaged in a course of action in which I am exercising my powers andcapacitiesin such a way that these powers and capacitiesare also at the same time being further developed.It is by exercisingmy capacityto play the pianothatthat capacityis further developed,andto the extentto which the exercise of this capacityis at the sametime the developmentof thatcapacity, the course of action is free. In 19th century capitalist industrial labour, workers performed simplified and highly repetitious motions for long periods of time; part of the reason why for Marx such labourwas a form of unfreeactivity was that such simplified androutinizedactivitywas the exercise of certainhumancapacities on the partof the individualworker which was not appropriately connected with the development of any powers or capacities.25 Playing the piano an hour a day makes one progressively a better player but turninga screw in a certainposition for an hour a day won't afterthe first day make one a bettermechanic. Oftenthose who wish thus to understand freedomas the exercise and developmentof humanpowers and capacities hold thata fully free action will be one that is an integral part of an all-sided or universaldevelopmentof humanpowersandcapacities.26 Since the developmentof some humanpowersandcapacitiesis incompatible with the developmentof others,the coherenceof the more extreme forms of this view has rightly been questioned.27 There is also a difference at least of emphasis perhaps between this selfslight
24 W. von Humboldt, Oberdie Grenzender Wirksamkeit Staates (originally 1793; the des most convenient modem edition is Reclam, 1967). 25 MEW Erg. 1.454ff. Marx-Engels Werke (Dietz, Berlin) Erginzungsband1, pp. 454ff. 26 MEW 3.74, 206, 237, 245 etc. 27 Cf. G.A. Cohen 'ReconsideringHistorical Materialism'(in Nomos XXVII, 1983) pp. 226ff. Obviously there are a numberof different specific views possible here: That freedomconsists in exercise and developmentof all of my powers and capacities,of any that are uniqueto me, of those thatare in some sense characteristicof me, etc.

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realizationview and the view I mentionedearlierwhich identified freedom with power. The earlierview focuses on my ability to get what I want as the centralpartof freedom (and power is what lets me get whatI want).Inthe self-realization views theemphasisseems to of rather be on the transformation my self which developmentof my powers and capacities brings about; by developing and exercising my capacities and powers I become a literally more realized self and thus, the proponentsof this argumentclaim, freer in my acting.28 The othervariantof a self-realizationview emphasizes thatI am free only if I am acting in such a way as to be able to recognize (or perhapsrecognize and affirm) myself in the action. Unfortunately it is tremendouslydifficult to give any kind of coherentreadingof what 'recognizing myself in my action' means which isn't either muchtoo weak-'recognizing myself' meansjust having a certain feeling of familiarity or subjective belief, but one doesn't necessarily want to define freedom directly in terms of a mere subjective feeling-or really very strong indeed-if one, for of instance, has a specific theoryof the structure the self and holds thatfree action is action in which I can see thatparticular structure I of the self to be instantiated. suspectthatmost of whatis intuitively appealingaboutthis versionof the self-realizationview can actually be accommodated ajudiciousextensionof notionsof authenticity by of desire or perhapsof the notionsof authenticity plus development and exercise of my powers and capacities. Autonomy,power, authenticityof desire, exercise and development of my powers and capacities all seem eminently reasonable all objectsof humanaspiration; seem reasonablyclearlydefinedand none of these seems to have an inherentbias in favour of morality. I may autonomouslyset myself perfectlyimmoralgoals, authentically identifywith desiresthatwill move me to egregiously antisocial behaviour,andthe developmentand exercise of my capacities may be grossly incompatiblewith the continuedexistence of minimally humaneconditionsof life for largenumbersof otherpeople. Finally none seems to be inherently a police concept. (Together with
28 Note that the word 'power' in the phrase 'developmentand exercise of my powers and capacities' may not mean precisely the same thing as 'power' meant in the earlier discussion.

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negativefreedom)they seem to me to designateperfectlylegitimate dimensionsalong which the discussion of freedomcan proceed. Earlier (footnote 16 above) I spoke of a certain image Isaiah Berlin's discussion insinuated: That 'negative freedom' was a sober, morally neutralconcept, whereas positive straightforward, of freedom arose out of an attemptto build highly conceptions controversialbiases in the directionof one or anothermoral view into the very natureof freedom itself. What 'moral neutrality'might mean here isn't perhaps completely clear (nor why that shouldbe a desideratum).I take it to be one of the greatmeritsof BernardWilliams' work to have pointed out that 'ethics' has traditionally meant two distinct things: a) the to say something aboutwhat the 'good life' for me would attempt be, and b) the attemptto say somethinggeneral abouthow people shouldregulatetheirbehaviourtowardone another.'Ethics'widely construedrefers equivocally to either task, narrowlyconstruedto the first; 'morality'tends to be used to referto the second. Western philosophy begins with the attemptto show the close connection betweenplausibleanswersto thetwo questions:the only way for me to live a trulyhappylife (it is claimed) is to do so in the context of acting towardothersin morallywell-regulatedways.29 if 'Negative freedom', I wantto claim, gets its attractiveness one is looking for a police-concept, that is a concept to regulate the enforcement of morality.This doesn't mean one can't extract a concept of 'negativefreedom'fromthe contextof moralenquiryin which it is embedded;of course one can, but outside this particular moralcontextthe concept seems ad hoc and pointless. It would be neatly symmetricalif I could now claim that the positive conceptionof freedom (or at any rate some of the various positive conceptions)has the propertyof 'moralneutrality'falsely assigned to negative freedom, but I can't. This result should be undisturbing because one's whole interest in the concept of 'freedom' arises from ethicalconcerns(very broadlyconstrued)so are it isn't obviousthatall formsof moralneutrality even desiderata. The positive conceptions of freedom I have mentioned describe
29 Cf. Bernard Williams, Ethics & the Limitsof Philosophy (London:Fontana,1985). For the persistenceof this formof thinkingin GermanIdealismcf. AndreasWildt,Autonomie (Klett-Cotta,1982). undAnerkennung

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100 I-RAYMOND GEUSS

individualaspirational ideals, but do so in such a way as to leave it an open question whetherit is always good for each individual to attain his or her ideals (to become more free in one or another way) andalso an open questionwhetheror not (or to what particular extent) it would be a good thing for a society to be organizedso as to allow its members maximal freedom in one or another of the positive senses.30

30 My thanksto Prof. MartinHollis for his extremely helpful comments on this paper.

FREEDOMAS AN IDEAL RaymondGeuss and MartinHollis II-Martin Hollis

FREEDOM IN GOOD SPIRITS Freedom' The GeussGallery Ideals mounting 'Spirit people who Exhibition.The main section will be devoted to

of

is

of

personifythe idea (or ideal); andtherewill be sections for Enemies of Freedom,and for Free and Unfree Societies. The selectors are off to a good startwith a huge bust of Socratesfor the main section and a scowling portraitof JosephStalin for the rogues gallery.But they are already having trouble with Genghis Khan and Martin Luther. By the test of whether these individuals displayed 'autonomy, power, authenticity of desire and the exercise and developmentof [their]powers andcapacities'(p. 98), the formeris in and the latter probablyout. That is disconcerting;but then, by thattest, Stalin may have had the edge on Socrates. The debate has driven the selectors back to their general brief, which is not proving altogetherhelpful. It instructsthem to apply a conception which is 'a development of something rooted in everyday usage and practice, which can serve to give clarity and focus to individual human aspirations but which is neither a police-concept nor so inflated as to be indistinguishablefrom the sum of all humansatisfactions,nor so conceptof the indeterminate moralizedthatit was an analytictruththatanyone acting thoroughly freely was acting morally.'(p. 92) Each clause strikesa chord;but they are unsure whetherthe clauses sum coherently.Yet the intellectual distinction of Raymond Geuss's absorbing, inconclusive paper,with its mixtureof scholarlynotes and inviting queries,bids them to thinktheirway through. I share their admirationand am all for working up a positive conception of freedom connected with human aspirations, But, since the papertrailsfar morethoughtsthancan be pursuedand the Joint Session thrives on a spot of discord, I shall arguethat it fails

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in its aim unless Geuss is willing to makehis ideal of freedommore ethical and less individualthanenvisaged. To stakeout the ground, I shall distinguish 'thin' and 'thick' versions of both negative and positive freedom, and then turn awkward about the treatmentof and autonomy,power, authenticity self-realisation.But the crux, as I see it, is bettersuited to collaborationthanpolemics. It is what to say about internal impediments to freedom, given an inherited discourse moulded chiefly in debate about externalimpediments, commonly biased towards individualism and deeply ambivalent aboutobjectivityin ethics. I Isaiah Berlin's mesmeric 'Two Concepts of Liberty' defined negative freedom as an absence of (human) interferencewith my activityand then tracedpositive freedom to 'the wish on the partof the individualto be his own master'. I agree that this strategyhas thedrawbacks which Geusspointsout. As Berlinhimself remarked, he employed two concepts which may seem 'at no great distance from one another'. Consequently he injected a bias towards individualism,and left it unclearwhy and hence whetherfreedom to be one's own masteris always 'positive'. Leavingthe individualism for later, let us start with differences between and within negative and positive conceptions. Despite a risk of begged questions, I propose marking off negative from positive by the test of whetherthe freedomsdeemed crucialarea functionof whatI wantor a functionof whatit is proper for me to want.This leaves it open for the momentwhether'proper' is a moraltermor has some otherconnotation,and whetherwhat it denotes is finally internal, perhaps peculiar, to me or involves externally set goals and aspirationsessentially-open, in short, aboutthe wish to be one's own master.But it lets us distinguishat the extremes between Mill's 'fool satisfied' and Cranmer's obedient Christian.The former is perfectly free, if satisfaction is everything; the latter submits to a God whose service is perfect positive freedom. I am negativelyfree in so far as I can do what I want. Withinthe negative range, there are 'thin' and 'thick' versions, whose differfor ence is fairlystraightforward externalimpediments.The thinnest versions recognise only formal prohibitions and some wilful

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obstructions.By this test any Americancitizen is free to become President,since thereis no legal obstacle to it. But, since the sense in which a poor black woman has a free passage to the Oval Office is as nothingto the sense in which she has not, there are positions still in the negative range which identify lack of resources and perhapslack of abilities as relevantimpedimentsto freedom. The range is governed by what is deemed relevantto whetherI that can do whatI want, with a firm presumption obstructionsmust be humanandremovable.I am neitherfree nor unfreeto jump over the moon;butwhatof the impedimentsto my winninga Nobel prize for physics? Several criteriahave been proposed,all impreciseand some more disputedthan others. Broadly, the lack of an ability or resource which nature has given no one and which technology cannot at present supply is never deemed a relevant impediment. Argumentoccurs only where nature,technology or social organisation have granted some people a power denied to others. An element of human responsibility is necessary, but not always sufficient. For instance, blindness does not restrict freedom in a kingdom of the blind but may or may not do so in a society where it deprivessome people of opportunities open to othersand where cureor compensationis possible. 'Responsibility'startsas a merely causal termbut soon takes on a moraltone. The moral element in the choice of what counts is strikingand perhapsunexpected.Itoperatesmostclearlyin politicalphilosophy. Libertarians quick to resist the idea that lack of resources or are abilities limits my freedom, and will countenanceit only where I have suffereda personalinjustice.I remainfree to buy a car, even thoughI do not have the priceof a bicycle, unless, for instance,you have stolen my savings: if my poverty is due to natureor to social is where no one in particular at fault, my freedom is arrangements On the otherhand,liberalswho agreewith J.S.Mill that unimpaired. 'the only liberty which deserves the name is that of pursuingour own good in our own way' are notably readierto discuss the disof tribution resourcesandabilities.But then they hold beliefs about social justice-for instance that there is such a thing-which scandaliselibertarians. They also connect freedom with the cultivationof one's faculties-a matterto returnto in a moment. On anotheroccasion we might linger on distinctions between natural impediments and those created by human beings, and,

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within the human category, between those due to someone in and particular those arisingfrom the working of social institutions at large. We might also ponderthe place of abilities in a theory of justice, seeing that they owe something to nature, something to society, and something to people's own efforts. But that would divert us too far into discussing Berlin's distinction between the concept of freedomand the conditionsof freedomand whetherthis distinctionvaries with the concept of freedom proposed.It would also take us furtherinto political philosophy than Geuss's paper warrants.So let us simply note that even the libertarianview is clearly influenced by considerationsof moral responsibility.This that usefully helps to correctany presumption negativeconceptions of freedomdiffer from positive by being wholly unmoralised. To generalise the point, between wanting and getting lie innumerable hazards,only some of which countas relevantimpediments. Since hazardswhich are unlikelyto materialiseor to be very effective are not deemed relevant,we might be inclined to say that freedom depends on absence of any foreseeable and effective hazards. no theorytakesthis line. All testforrelevanceby asking But who createdthe hazardor could remove it or both; and then, since theoriesof freedomof actionarenormative,asking who, if anyone, shouldremove it. If it turnsout thatno one is at fault or has any duty to smooth the way, the hazardis not counted as an impediment.To this extent even negativeconceptionsare moralised. But, despite the intrusionof ethics, they can remainconsistently negative, so long as they refuse to specify what it is properfor a free agentto want.Ethicalquestionsare to be confinedto the choice of means for pursuingour own good in our own way and to what counts as an unwarranted impedimentthereto.The crux is whether this can be done or whetherthe relevance of hazardsmust finally be related to particular,no doubt proper, ends. Offhand, thin negative conceptions can avoid a link by specifying only formal constraintsimposed by otherhuman prohibitionsand unwarranted in particular circumstances.But thick negative conceptions beings are more precarious,partlybecause views about relevantpatterns are of resourcesandotherfeaturesof social organisation not neutral ends and partly because their advocates are prone to among ambitiousthoughtsaboutabilities.

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Talk of abilities, and hence of internalimpediments,clouds the distinction between negative and positive. To see why, recall Hobbes's accountof freedomin Leviathan,where externalimpedimentsaretheonly touchstone.He opens Chapter XXI by remarking: or the of Liberty, freedom, signifieth, properly, absence opposition; by opposition, meanexternal I impediments motion; to andthen arguesthat,contraryto common belief, I do freely what I rationally do from fear and indeed from necessity. Internal influences on my will (describedin ChapterVI as 'the last appetite in deliberating')do not count, since freedom is to be measured solely by whethermy will can succeed.Does this imply thatrational persons adapt their desires to their circumstances, thus neatly closing any gap between whatthey want and what they get? Would we do well to become Stoics or, with less trouble,couch potatoes? If Hobbes does not drawthis conclusion, it is, I think,only because he takes humannatureto be incapableof sitting still: Continual successin obtaining thosethingswhicha manfromtime to timedesireth, is to say,continual that is prospering, thatmencall I meanthefelicityof thislife.Forthere no suchthing is FELICITY; as perpetual of tranquillity mind,while we live here;becauselife itselfis butmotion, canneverbe without and desire...(Chapter VI) Without this restlessness, we would indeed do well to keep our desires modest, and, even grantingit, the smaller our aspirations, It the less our frustration. is hardto see how a negative conception can say otherwise. This finds no favour with J.S. Mill and others, whose idea of liberty includes a centralmessage about Individuality,along with advice on cultivatingthe higherpleasuresand generallyimproving our faculties. The theme is plain in Mill, Kant and Rousseau, to name only three. It links freedom with self-mastery, and hence is 'positive' by Berlin's test, and goes on to connect autarchy or autonomy to particularcapacities, whose cultivation is possible, desirable and freedom-enhancing.Thus Rousseau commends the 'remarkablechange in man' producedby entering the civil state because inter alia: hisfaculties so stimulated developed, ideasso extended, are and his his feelingsso ennobled, his wholesoul so uplifted, and that,did notthe abusesof thisnewcondition oftendegrade belowthat him

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II-MARTIN HOLLIS whichhe left,he wouldbe bound blessthehappy to moment which it of and tookhimfrom forever,and,instead a stupid unimaginative animal,madehim an intelligentbeing and a man. (The Social
Contract1.8)

Rousseau's conception of freedom is plainly positive. But why exactly? The chapterends by claiming that man in the civil state also acquires whichalonemakeshimtrulymaster himself;for of moralliberty, is while obedienceto a law the mereimpulseof appetite slavery, is whichwe prescribe ourselves liberty. to Yes, but where exactly was the border between negative and positive crossed? Was it when, like Mill, he declareda view about which capacities are worth cultivating?Was it in introducingthe to idea of 'moralliberty'as accompaniment the 'civil liberty' which the social contractgives us in exchange for our 'naturalliberty'? Or was it perhapsin the deliberatechoice of the first person plural to define liberty as obedience to a law which we prescribe to ourselves? The borderbetween thicknegative and thin positive seems clear at first.The idea behindthick negative is to specify what is needed in practiceif, individuallyor collectively, we are to be effectively able to pursue our own good in our own way; and to specify it withoutpreemptingthe form of our own good. For the individual, thereare some famous 'freedomsfrom' (e.g. hungerand fear), and 'freedoms of' (e.g. speech and religion), which sound noncommittal.Also there are what are fashionablycalled transferable skills, or skills requiredfor a High QualityLife, whateverform that life might take. On the collective front,therearepre-conditionsfor self-government-a citizens' army to protect the realm is a traditionalexample-which seem not to restrictthe ends which a free society might choose to pursue; and a similar line could be skills which a free society needs its citizens takenfor transferable to have for the common good, whatever form the common good might take. On second thoughts,it is not so easy,even thoughsome resources and abilities can serve many purposes and, in general, add more options than they restrict.Resources are resources only relative to costs. Clothes are not purposes,andtheirprovisionhas opportunity

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a resource for determined nudists and the cloth diverted from making them umbrellas is wasted. The same goes for abilities. Masteryof the Cornishlanguageis not enabling,if Cornishhas died out leaving no other speakers or significant texts behind, and especially if it means no time to learn Japanese or swordswallowing. 'Individuality',in short,is not neutralamongends and aspirations.Liberals, at any rate, have a committal view of which abilities enhance freedom and so merit public sponsorship, one boundup with a view of 'ourown good'. In Mill, it is linked with a convictionthata properlycultivatedhumanbeing 'comes, as though instinctively,to be conscious of himself as a being who of course pays regardto others'(Utilitarianism,ch. 3, italics in original),and shows itself in a runningcontrastbetween the mechanical and the organic: Human nature nota machine be builtaftera model,andset to is to dotheworkprescribed it,buta tree,whichrequires growand for to to itselfon all sides,according thetendency the inward of develop forces which make it a living thing. (On Liberty,ch. 3, 'Of Individuality') Trees,it soon emerges,needtherightsoil as muchas machinesneed productionlines, andMill firmlyprescribessuitabledung andtilth. Resources are resourcesrelativeto favouredabilities, and policies of public provision are to be decided accordingly. The categoryof 'thicknegative'is thus precariousand shades so readilyinto 'thin positive' thatit threatensto destabilise.Yet, since not even thin negative conceptionsare morallyinnocent,it may not be fatal to put moralrestrictionson the laws which, as free beings, we may prescribeto ourselves. 'Socratesdissatisfied'is still as far from Cranmer's obedient Christian as from a 'fool satisfied'. Geuss's aim, in surveying the four candidates for a positive conception-autonomy, power, authenticity of desire and selfrealisation-is, I take it, to pick the thinnest positive, or perhaps thickestnegative,candidatewhich fits his bill. Althoughall four are in the positive range by Berlin's test, Geuss has queries about the test and may be hoping for a position between the border checkpoints. Can he please tell us more about his criterion of relevancefor innerimpediments?

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Meanwhile, we can see why the selectors for the 'Spirit of Freedom' Exhibitionare perplexed.Here again is their brief, this time with comments. * a development ofsomethingrootedin everydayusage andpractice, Yes, but thereare many roughideas of freedomrootedin everyday usageandpractice.Theiradvocatesareoftenunclearwherefreedom stopsand otherideas, like thatof a good life, begin. The clearerthey manageto be, the plainerit is thatideas so rootedcan conflict. This first clause is only a growled warning not to roam without good reason. * which can serve to give clarity and focus to individual human aspirations Or of Noble aspirations? aretheaspirations serialkillersto be equally well served?Thereis an old hope thatclarityand focus lead people to sociable aims. But Geuss'sfinal page seems to rejectthis hope. * but which is neithera police-concept... AlthoughGeuss's focus is inforo interno,wherepolicing is secondary, we cannot altogether avoid thinking about policing conflict between the aspirationsof differentpeople. * nor so inflatedas to be indistinguishable from the concept of the sum of all humansatisfactions,... indeterminate Another growl-presumably a modest inflation is acceptable, in thatsome humansatisfactionsmay prove integralto freedom as an ethical ideal. * nor so thoroughlymoralized that it was an analytic truth that anyone actingfreely was acting morally. Shortof this, however, a bit of moralisingis unavoidable. II Geuss's own readingof the brief leads him to opt for authenticity, strengthenedby mention of powers and capacities, as the most suggestive clue. Althoughleaving much to furtherdiscussion, he is definite that none of his 'eminently reasonableobjects of human

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aspiration' displays 'an inherentbias in favourof morality'(p. 98). can autonomouslychoose 'perfectly immoral goals'; authentic I desires 'canmove me to egregiouslyantisocialbehaviour';exercise of my capacities may be a disaster for 'large numbers of other people' (p. 98). This reading deeply disturbsthe selectors for the FreedomExhibitionas it threatens populatethe mainsection with to Ubermenschen to exclude the meek altogether.So let me try to and subvertit. Althoughteasingly ambiguousbetween thick negative and thin positive, Geuss's ideal is clearly located in the individual, rather than collective, range. As a Geussian free being, I choose and do what is, in some sense, right-for-me.In what sense? Well, not one 'so thoroughlymoralizedthat it was an analytic truththat anyone actingfreely was actingmorally'.Whatis right-for-meneed not be rightfor anyoneelse or in general.Is the idea to suit my desires and choices to my particularindividual human nature? No, Geuss makes room for self-creation, even if he also holds out for an element of self-recognition. On the one hand, to quote Sartre in Existentialism Humanism,'in life a manpaintshis own portrait and ... and thereis nothingbut the portrait'"; the otherhand, not all on the self-portraits which I can come to paint are equally me. Very well, suppose I am fascinated by serial killers and feel a mixture of envy and bloodlust, lightly spiced with moral repugnance, as I savourtheir exploits. What tells me whethermy socioAt or pathictendenciesareauthentic inauthentic? presentI am a mite aboutspendingmy evenings witha sniper'srifle, picking squeamish off motoristsfromabridgeon the motorway, some citizens of Los as are apparentlywont to do. But I could learn to be less Angeles and squeamishand come to adaptmy character desires in whatever ways were needed to give me a coherent antisocial personality. Come to think of it, do I even need to? Coherence is not the only curefor dissonance:anotheris to insulatethe disjunctures from one In anotherandlive in sealed compartments. short,Geuss leaves the possibilities so open that anything goes; or, if not, then the constraintsat work have an undisclosed source.
1 Jean-PaulSartreExistentialismand Humanism(London:Methuen, 1973), p. 42.

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If the source is neithera pre-socialhumannaturenor something 'thoroughly moralised', how about heading off authentic sociopathsby construing'individualhumanaspirations'so as at least to Yet point 'aspirations'onwardandupward? thatwouldbe arbitrary, while my aspirationsremain firmly peculiarto me. Guess' title is 'Freedomas an Ideal'. His brief, however, refers to 'freedom as an ethical ideal' andI do not see how aspirationsso wholly individual are to come out ethical. 'Ethical' requires actes which are less gratuitesthanhe countenances.So, I suggest, aspirationswill have to be somewhatmoralised,enoughto takeus definitelyinto the thin positive range. My 'individual human aspirations' need to be chosen from some kind of moral catalogue, vetted for inclusion, even if lightly and in pluralistspirit,by whetherthey pass muster as ethical. At this point an ambiguityemerges. 'Ethical' gestures both to local ethos orpracticesandto whatis trulyright,good andbeautiful. Is it enough to shift focus from individualto collective, or must we also shift from subjectiveto objective?Recast the centralquestion as one about collective humanaspirations.Is it remedy enough to say thatI, as a free being, cannotset myself perfectlyimmoralgoals or give way to egregiously antisocialbehaviouror make my neighbours' lives a misery, while leaving it open that we might? What are the selectors to make of that? They are yet more perplexed.The Third Reich developed clear and focused aspirations,together with the capacities to execute them,and,by thetestof Geuss'sfinalpage, soundslike a free society in the collective sense. To avoid drawing this unappealing conclusion amid the mass graves of the victims, he could try denying thatthereis a collective sense of freedom after all, apartfrom any derivable as a sum or reconciliation of individual freedoms. Alternatively,however, he might prefer to restore some familiar safeguards,which he seems to have strippedaway. As soon as we enter the collective range, we face Rousseau's question:how can a manbe forced to conformto wills not his own? Thereseem at firstto be only two answers.One is to invoke external (andeternal?)moralprinciplesto guide what may be demandedof a citizen. This answer used to make sense, when human life belonged in a morally-charged, perhapsdivinely ordered,cosmos forreligionsandtheoriesof natural andmay still serve justice which

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retainpre-modernconvictions. But it will not satisfy anyone who agrees with Wilhelm Dilthey that 'Life means nothing outside itself. Thereis nothingin it which points to a meaning beyond it'.2 The challenge is then to find Reason scope for objectivity without needingto appealto meaningsexternalto humanlife. Kantiansand Utilitariansare not the only ones to take it up. But, for purposesof the 'Spiritof Freedom'exhibition,this sounds like whistling in the dark.Yet the other obvious answeris to declare that whateverthe sovereign says goes; and that apparentlyleaves the victims with nothing to complain about. Rousseau's question sounds as tendentiousas Berlin claims. Rousseauhimself has a thirdline,however.Implicitin the original convention,which has to be unanimous,is a set of constraintson the process for arrivingat sovereign decisions. These constraintsstart with rules for the conduct of decision-making(priorinformation, open discussion,no caucusing,no factions andso forth)and extend to such mattersas a reasonablyequal distributionof wealth and power.Whenthese conditionsaresatisfied,whateveremergesis the GeneralWill. The case is well put and leads Rousseau to infer that those forced to conform to wills not theirown are being 'forced to be free'. Is Berlin right to be outraged?Well, since the constraints ensure a General Will, if at all, only while there is no trace of and measureof corruption, corruption since thereis no independent we may well think Rousseau's line too dangerousto risk, whether well reasonedor not. But that leaves furtheralternatives.Rousseau sets no limit to what the GeneralWill may demandof its members,who thus have particularwills, moral discretion and a private sphere only on sufferanceand subjectto collective revision of the boundary.That leaves scope for a position which lies within the collective range by deeming us citizens with duties before we are individuals with rights, and is thinly positive, in that, althoughit involves a theory of the socially just society, it defines a private sphere immutably. This is familiarterritoryto anyone strugglingto defend liberalism from post-moderns,pre-moderns,libertariansand totalitarians.It
2 Wilhelm Dilthey Gesammelte Werke, B. Groethuysen,vol. vii (Stuttgart;Teubner ed. Verlag, 1926), p. 224.

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is currently where ethical socialists are waxing lyrical about individual liberty and alarmed conservatives are going back to civics. Althoughit is farfromclear whethersucha positionis finally tenable, I suggest thatthis is where we need to look. Geuss closes off this territory.He does so at the end, partly by suggesting thata positive conception of freedom with no 'inherent bias in favour of morality' need not be moralisedat all, and partly by suggesting that autonomy,authenticityand capacities suited to a free being can be deemed 'reasonable objects of human aspiration'and 'reasonablyclearlydefined' withoutthinkingabout conflicts and the good of others. The upshot is an individualist conception of freedom which seems to me doubly vulnerable.If, as arguedearlier, not even thin negative conceptions are morally neutral,and if thick negative conceptions, in their concern for the distributionof resources and cultivation of abilities, are further needs to be reopened. moralised,the territory My own view is thata standon resourcesand abilities blocks in enough of the propersort of free life to be definitely positive and involves ideas of the common good which can only be collective. As evidence, I cite the progressiveerosion of the liberal firebreak between the right and the good. The conditions of freedom are a public good in a sense strongerthan that of being desired by all, and they include resolving conflicts of aspirationin ways which serve the publicgood. If, as free beings, we need to be citizens with duties before we are individualswith rights, then these conditions are integralto the concept and individualismfalls. So can Geuss please give the selectors some strongerguidance? The exhibition is intendedto lure couch potatoes from the couch and woo them to aspire to an individualitywhich of course pays regardto others.The ideal for thejob would be a conception which is positive in its rejectionof instrumental rationalityand collective in its antidote to self-glorifying individualism, yet not so thickly collective that it snuffs out the self. Although the selectors grant that, when contrastedwith Geuss's final flourish, this is all a bit bourgeoisandconventional,they refuseto go beyondgood andevil. Can we not find them a properway to put the exercise of duties before the enjoyment of rights and yet leave freedom in good spirits?