Technical articles

Safeguarding Robots and Robot Cells

Protect personnel working directly with or around robots.
Robots offer a means to simplify and improve efficiency with a process and can complete tasks that
pose too great of a hazard to be handled by human operators. This, however, does not remove all
hazards from a machine or process, yet it creates new unique hazards which must be guarded to
protect personnel while working directly or around the robot.

Relevant standards for robots

As with any industrial piece of equipment,

the first steps to safeguarding a robot or Relevant robot standards:
robot cell is understanding the relevant
safety standards associated with robots. USA
• ANSI/RIA15.06 - Industrial Robots And Robot Systems -
This allows safety requirements to be aligned Safety Requirements
with the hazard identification process of your
risk assessment. Being able to understand • ANSI/RIA15.08 - Industrial Mobile Robots - Safety
what typical hazards exist as described Requirements: Requirements For The Industrial Mobile
within harmonized standards such as ISO Robot
10218 (robots and robotic devices — Safety
requirements for industrial robots) will • RIA TR R15.306 - Task-Based Risk Assessment Methodology
provide guidance on recognizing gaps and
deficiencies related to the safety of new and • RIA TR R15.406 - Safeguarding
existing robot applications.
• RIA TR R15.506-2014 - Applicability of ANSI/RIA R15.06 For
One important concept to take away from Existing Industrial Robot Applications
such standards is that hazards (the potential
source of harm) and risks (the degree of • RIA TR R15.606-2016 - Technical Report - Industrial Robots
potential exposure and consequence of the And Robot Systems - Safety Requirements - Collaborative
hazard) are not reserved for the robot itself, Robots
but also for the surrounding areas such
as the end-of-arm tooling, material being Canada
processed, and the auxiliary equipment used • CAN/CSA-Z434-14 - Industrial Robots And Robot Systems
in conjunction with the robot application
(conveyers, lifts, etc.). ISO 10218 being International
harmonized means that that these • ISO10218 - Robots and robotic devices - Safety requirements
fundamental baselines for robot safety are for industrial robots
shared globally as seen with ANSI/RIA 15.06
and CSA Z434 • ISO/TS15066 - Robots and robotic devices - Collaborative
robots
Understanding robot functionality and limitations

Aside from understanding the safety requirements, it Spacial mapping

is important to understand the robot functionality and Another crutial element to define is the space criteria,
limitations. which is the three-dimensional area through which the
robot can move. It is broken down into three sectors:
Risk Assessment
A thorough risk assessment should be performed on the • Maximum space is the actual reach the robot is
application, based on the standards. The risk assessment cable of, including the end or arm tooling.
should focus on the robot application as a whole as well as
the individual specific tasks associated when interacting • Restricted space is an area within the maximum
with the robot. space, restricted by limiting devices that establish
limits which will not be exceeded be the robot, such
For example, reasonably foreseeable hazards and risks as limits created by hard stops or programming.
should be evaluated on the materials being handled,
the type of end-effector being used and its operating • Operating space is the area that the robot has been
speeds. This same approach is needed when looking at programmed to work in.
tasks such as teaching, setup, maintenance and even
troubleshooting. Where the hazards associated with the It is important to understand the robot’s space criteria,
robot as a whole can affect all personnel, the task-based especially if soft stops (predefined program limits) or
hazards are associated with specific personnel such as hard stops (physical end-stop to restrict moment) are
operators, technicians, and maintenance, performing a not in use. It may be helpful to create a space mapping,
specific task. designating the maximum, restricted, and operating
spaces, like in figure 1.

SIDE VIEW

Operating
space

Restricted
space

Maximum space

TOP VIEW

Operating
Workers inspect the end tooling of a industrial robot Restricted space
space

Stop time analysis

If the plan is to use non-separating guarding, then the robot
application should have stop time analysis performed.
It is important to know how quickly the robot will cease
hazardous movement once a stop signal is sent. This is
particularly important information needed to calculate Maximum space
the appropriate placement of non-separating guards. Restricted
space
Since these type of devices do not prevent personnel from
entering the hazardous area, they must detect personnel
and bring the system to a safe state before the hazard can
be reached.
Figure 1: Side and top view of robot arm space mapping
Typical methods of safeguarding robots

The risk assessment, stop time analysis, and spacial

mapping will help determine what types of safeguards
should be used and where they should be placed in relation
to the robot.

Physical barrier
The most common means to protect personnel walking
or working near the robot and robot cells is by using hard
guards such as fencing. As with any safeguarding measure,
certain considerations and requirements must be observed
for the safety solution to be effective.
When implementing physical barrier to safeguard
against robot hazards, it is important to understand the
programmed robot operating space and the potential reach
due to a failure of the robot safety controls. Again, the
terms reasonably foreseeable must be considered during
this evaluation. If proper safety controls are not in place to
adequately reduce the chances of the robot from entering
a restricted space, physical guarding that can withstand
the impact of the robot to prevent it from entering the
restricted space may be needed.
Other attributes of the physical barrier to consider is the
viewing capability. Operators may need to see the robot
function to confirm a process, or to teach the robot a new
function or perhaps maintenance require visual access for
troubleshooting. The easier it is for personnel to see past
the physical barrier the less likely the chance of bypassing
Top: safety fencing provides a good view of the robot cell
the guarding is. Bottom: A robot cell with a opaque barrier.

Placement of physical barrier

In this example the physical barrier guard has been placed around the Here the phsyical barrier has been placed outside the maximum
operating space only. It does not consider the potential reach of the space, restricting access to the hazardous area.
robot to extend within the restricted or maximum space in the event
of a failure with the robot safety controls. Workers would be exposed
to the hazards of the robot and potential hazards within the robot cell,
if the robot were to break through the barrier.
Non-Separating guarding Controls
Safety light curtains, safety pressure mats, and safety laser Many of today’s robot controllers allow for an easy
scanners are safety protective devices that can detect the integration of safety systems which may be required. This
presesnce of personnel approaching or within the robot includes a safety rated two-channel redundant input for
cell. They are considered “non-separating” since they do an emergency stop function (used for an E-stop) and a
not provide a physical barrier. separate safety rated two two-channel redundant input for
an interlock safety function (used for a laser scanner).
Typically these presence sensing devices are implemented
as a secondary measure, used to ensure personnel are not Additional considerations relating to the robot functions
within the robot cell prior to re-initiation. Additionally, non- and limitations is the potential for full body access. In
separating guarding may also be used to allow material to other words, is there a possibility to access a robot cell
enter or leave the robot cell while preventing personnel and possibly be trapped by the closing of a guard? Robotic
from entering and reaching hazardous parts or conditions. safety standards such as ANSI/RIA 15.06 require an
This can be achieved by utilizing safety functions such as emergency egress bypass of locks on access doors. This
muting, most commonly seen with conveyor applications. must allow personnel to escape from within the robot cell
regardless of the lock condition of the safety interlock.
They can be used as a primary safety function, such as a
virtual cell created by light curtains and deflecting mirrors.
There are special considerations to this application -
since these devices must detect personnel and bring the
system to a safe state before the hazard can be reached,
they may need an additional detection distance beyond
the “maximum area”. Proper placement of these devices
requires a safety distance calculation which takes factors
into account such as the type of device being used, the
manner in which is mounted, the approach speed of the
body (or limbs) and the total stopping time of the system
(from the stop time analysis). ISO 13855 is a safety
standard which provides guidance on conducting a safe
minimum distance calculation.
This door lock has an emergency release handle inside the robot cell.

Restart controls should be positioned so that operators can

see that entire hazardous area is clear. If personnel could
be present but unseen in the hazardous area, then a double
reset function should be introduced. This would require
actuation of a pushbutton within the hidden hazard area,
acknowledgement of egress (guard closure or light curtain
interruption) and then actuation of a second pushbutton
outside, all within a limited timed period.

Many applications become ineligible because the

calculated minimum safe distance for placing these
devices is impractical. Traditional industrial robotics
applications which consist of large payloads and high
speeds generally have longer stoppage time and may need Animation of a double reset. The second pushbutton is mounted
outside the cell. The process includes interupting the light curtain.
a greater distance than is feasable.
Safety Considerations for Collaborative Robots

A collaborative robot differs from an industrial robot in

the sense that the collaborative robot is designed to be
inherently safe. This is primarily because human contact
with a collaborative robot is both allowed and expected if
both are working within the same operating space.

However, an inherently safe-by-design collaborative robot

does not mean that a collaborative robot application itself
is safe. The harmonized safety standard ISO/TS15066
(robots and robotic devices — collaborative robots)
provides guidance on establishing a safe collaborative
robot application.

As with any industrial machine, a risk assessment should

be performed. The focus should be on the cobot application
as a whole including the environment, scope of work
defined for the robot and human operator, and material
being handled.

ISO/TS15066 states that a collaborative operation may include one or more of these safeguarding techniques:

Safety-rated monitored stop Speed and separation monitoring

A safety-rated monitored stop will bring the collaborative The speed and separation monitoring function allows
robot to safe condition, allowing personnel to access a person to be in the collaborative space while robot
restricted and unauthorized operating spaces. motion is running as long as there is a separation of
However, if the collaborative robot were to experience a defined protective distance from coming in contact
an unexpected movement or condition while the with the robot.
monitored stop is enabled, an emergency stop function
would be initiated. Power and force limiting
Lastly, applying Power and Force Limiting is used if
Hand guiding the robot system may come into direct contact either
Hand guiding allows an operator to utilize a hand- intentionally or accidentally with a person. Limiting
operated controller, or even hand moving the robot the power and force to a safe level reduces the risk
directly, to initiate motion commands commonly seen factors. Safe levels are determined by the body
during a collaborative teaching process. area(s) expected to be in contact with the robot which
have predefined thresholds to follow called out by
harmonized collaborative safety standards.

Author
Devin Murray Schmersal USA
tec.nicum Services Manager, Schmersal USA 15 Skyline Drive, Hawthorne NY 10532
FS Eng (TÜV Rheinland ID-No. 4274/11 Machinery) www.schmersalusa.com
[email protected] © 2023, Schmersal

Schmersal Group