Melammu

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Powerful Women in the Ancient World

Powerful
Women in the
Ancient World

Perception and
(Self )Presentation

Proceedings of the 8th Melammu Workshop,

Kassel, 30 January – 1 February 2019

www.zaphon.de Edited by Kerstin Droß-Krüpe

and Sebastian Fink
Zaphon

MWM-4-Cover.indd 1 21.06.2021 20:57:46

Powerful Women in the Ancient World

Perception and (Self)Presentation

Proceedings of the 8th Melammu Workshop,

Kassel, 30 January – 1 February 2019

Edited by
Kerstin Droß-Krüpe and Sebastian Fink
Melammu Workshops and Monographs

Volume 4

Edited by
Sebastian Fink and Robert Rollinger

Scientific Board
Alberto Bernabé (Madrid)
Josine Blok (Utrecht)
Rémy Boucharlat (Lyon)
Eckart Frahm (New Haven)
Mait Kõiv (Tartu)
Ingo Kottsieper (Göttingen)
Daniele Morandi Bonacossi (Udine)
Sabine Müller (Marburg)
Simonetta Ponchia (Verona)
Kurt Raaflaub (Providence)
Thomas Schneider (Vancouver)
Rahim Shayegan (Los Angeles)
Shigeo Yamada (Tsukuba)
Powerful Women in the Ancient World

Perception and (Self)Presentation

Proceedings of the 8th Melammu Workshop,

Kassel, 30 January – 1 February 2019

Edited by
Kerstin Droß-Krüpe and Sebastian Fink

Zaphon
Münster
2021
The Melammu Logo was drawn by Rita Berg from a Greco-Persian style seal found
on the north-eastern shore of the Black Sea (Dominique Collon, First Impressions:
Cylinder Seals in the Ancient Near East (London: British Museum Publications
1987), no. 432).

Illustration on the cover: Morton Dürr / Lars Horneman: Zenobia. København 2016,
p. 43, by courtesy of the authors.

Powerful Women in the Ancient World. Perception and (Self)Presentation.

Proceedings of the 8th Melammu Workshop, Kassel, 30 January – 1 February 2019
Edited by Kerstin Droß-Krüpe and Sebastian Fink
Melammu Workshops and Monographs 4

© 2021 Zaphon, Enkingweg 36, Münster (www.zaphon.de)

All rights reserved.

Printed in Germany. Printed on acid-free paper.

ISBN 978-3-96327-138-0 (Buch)

ISBN 978-3-96327-139-7 (E-Book)

ISSN 2698-8224
 Table of Contents

Preface and Acknowledgements

Kerstin Droß-Krüpe / Sebastian Fink ...................................................................9

Powerful Women in the Ancient World in the Light of the Sources

Innana and En-ḫedu-ana: Mutual Empowerment and the Myth INNANA
CONQUERS UR
Annette Zgoll .......................................................................................................13
The Many Lives of Enheduana: Identity, Authorship, and the “World’s
First Poet”
Gina Konstantopoulos ........................................................................................57
Šamḫat: Deconstructing Temple Prostitution One Woman at a Time
Nicole Brisch ......................................................................................................77
Hatshepsut: The Feminine Horus and Daughter of Amun on the Throne
of Atum
David A. Warburton ............................................................................................91
Bathsheba and Beyond: Harem Politics in the Ancient Near East
Lloyd Llewellyn-Jones ......................................................................................145
The Agency of Female Prophets in the Bible: Independent or Instrumental?
Prophetic or Political?
Martti Nissinen .................................................................................................161
Women at the Heart of the Tribal System in the Book of Genesis
Stéphanie Anthonioz .........................................................................................185
Between a Queen and an Ordinary Woman: On Laodice and the
Representation of Women in Cuneiform Sources in the Hellenistic Period
Paola Corò........................................................................................................201
Antigone: Political Power and Resonance
Claudia Horst ...................................................................................................211
Mighty, but quiet? Elpinice between Conflicting Priorities
in Interpretations and Sources
Florian Krüpe ...................................................................................................227
On a Dynastic Mission: Olympias and Kleopatra, Agents of their House
Sabine Müller....................................................................................................241
6 Table of Contents

(Re)Taking Halikarnassos: Ada, Alexander the Great and Karian Queenship

Timothy Howe ...................................................................................................259
Amanishakheto: A Meroitic Ruling Queen of the Late 1st Cent. BC /
Early 1st Cent. AD
Josefine Kuckertz ..............................................................................................287
Cornelia: A Powerful Woman
Kordula Schnegg...............................................................................................323
Domum servavit, lanam fecit: Livia and the Rewriting of the Female Model
in the Augustan Age
Francesca Rohr Vio ..........................................................................................349
Iulia maior on the Move: exemplum licentiae and euergetis
Christiane Kunst ...............................................................................................361
Der Tod Messalinas. Folge sexueller Libertinage oder Machtkalkül?
Helmuth Schneider............................................................................................379
Feminine, influential and different? The Presentation of Julia Domna
Brigitte Truschnegg ..........................................................................................413
Zenobia of Palmyra: A Female Roman Ruler in Times of Crisis
Udo Hartmann ..................................................................................................433
“Earthly yoke”? The Estate of Valeria Melania
Ireneusz Milewski..............................................................................................453
Shirin in Context: Female Agency and the Wives of the Sasanian King
Khosrow Parviz
Ewan Short / Eve MacDonald...........................................................................475

Powerful Women in the Ancient World in Modern Thought

Cleopatra as a Strong Woman in Modern Times: A Less Negative Episode
in a Disfigured Tradition?
François de Callataÿ ........................................................................................499
Rome Herself: Female Characters in Günther Birkenfeld’s Augustus Novels
(1934–1984)
Martin Lindner..................................................................................................519
Depicting the Palmyrene Queen Zenobia: From Baroque “femmes fortes”
to Modern Comic Books
Anja Wieber ......................................................................................................541
 Table of Contents 7

Bios ...................................................................................................................567

Index.................................................................................................................573
Names ..........................................................................................................573
Places ...........................................................................................................583
 (Re)Taking Halikarnassos
Ada, Alexander the Great and Karian Queenship

Timothy Howe*

“[Alexander] next entered Caria, where he was welcomed by Ada, Idrieus’

widow and sister of the former dynast and satrap Mausolus. She had been
dispossessed of her authority by her brother Pixodarus; she adopted Alex-
ander as her son and put her fortress Alinda into his hands. But Alexander
was held up by Halicarnassus, where Memnon himself commanded the
garrison; with him were Orontopates, satrap of Cara, Pixodarus’ successor,
and some Macedonian exiles.” (Tarn, 1948: 19–20)
So W.W. Tarn summarises Ada’s role in Alexander the Great’s campaign, giving
the Hekatomnid ruler these few sentences in his history of Alexander. Even the
Roman authors Arrian and Strabo devote more space to her.1 And yet, 20th and
21st century scholars have largely followed in Tarn’s wake, neglecting Ada’s role
as a military commander, ruler and person in her own right to focus on Alexander
and his political needs.2 Even those who attempt to center Ada in the analysis,
such as Matthew Sears (2014) nonetheless perpetuate the reductionist view that
Ada was a political tool for Macedonian propaganda.3 In what follows, I seek a

* I would like to thank the editors for inviting me to contribute to this project. Their advice
and assistance was invaluable. Also deserving of thanks are Frances Pownall, Hugh
Bowden, Daniel Ogden, Waldemar Heckel and Pat Wheatley, whose comments on drafts
and deep insight greatly improved the argument.
1
Arr. Anab. 1.23.6–8; Strabo 14.1.17.
2
In his 2019 military and religious biography of Alexander, Fred Naiden echoes Tarn’s
judgement: “Unable to vanquish Memnon, Alexander gained a victory of a sort over Pix-
odarus, who had refused to become his father-in-law. Passing through Pixodarus’s king-
dom of Caria, Alexander gave it to his sister Ada, who had ruled the country before but
lost it to her brother. Using an odd turn of phrase, he said that Ada was like a mother to
him. Ada, in turn adopted him as her son. That way he could inherit the throne of Caria
once she died” [emphasis added] Naiden, 2019: 56. For Naiden, Ada is reduced to a dy-
nastic tool that serves both to legitimate Alexander’s inheritance of Karia and to satisfy
Alexander’s personal revenge against Pixodaros. Both reasons dehumanize Ada and only
the first is supported by the sources. That revenge over Pixodaros motivated Alexander in
any way is pure speculation and best put aside.
3
Sears’ conclusion that Karian Ada was a “symbol of Greekness” for Alexander’s propa-
ganda undermines his goal to reconsider Ada on her own terms. Yet this is well in keeping
with the communis opinio, which sees Alexander’s enagement with Ada in decidedly Al-
exander-centred terms, as locally orientated propaganda invented to gain the support of
the Karians. Consequently, Wilcken, 1967: 93; Bosworth, 1988: 230; Ruzicka, 1992: 140–
260 Timothy Howe

different approach. By analysing Ada as a Karian queen and evaluating her mili-
tary power and socio-political context, I hope to show that the military threat and
advantage Ada offered the invading Macedonians as holder of the fortresses that
could threaten passage up the Maiandros Valley4 – the most convenient land-route
from Miletos through Central Asia Minor to Mesopotamia – had more effect on
Alexander’s choices to ally with Ada and assist her in retaking Halikarnassos than
any possible propaganda value (Hellenic or otherwise) the Karian queen may have
offered. Even though Alexander had turned away from the Aegean coast after
Miletos, Ada’s need to retake Halikarnassos from her rebellious brother Pixodaros
“convinced” him to change his plans. Ada courted Alexander, not the other way
round. The fact that the seige of Halikarnassos did not result in a speedy victory
for Alexander, has resulted in a dearth of both acient and modern scholarly atten-
tion. Indeed, the ancient sources were more than ready to move on to Alexander’s
more “successful” military endeavours.

Karian queenship: Ada the Hekatomnid

Ada, daughter of Hekatomnos, was part of an unusual and short-lived dynasty of
siblings who ruled Karia from 377/6 to 331 BCE.5 The family’s ancestral power-
base was the lowland city of Mylasa and the sourrounding mountain fortresses
and sanctuaries of the Latmos Range, such as Alinda, Labraunda and Sinuri (see
map, Figure 1).6 Under the patriarch Hekatomnos, the family was elevated to
regional authority some time after 395, when the Persian Great King Artaxerxes
II recognized him as satrap of Karia.7 After Hekatomnos’ death in 377/6, the eld-
est son Maussollos and the eldest daughter Artemisia married and co-ruled. While
the Greek literary sources treat Maussollos as the controlling partner in this sib-
ling marriage, dedications from Karia show that the Karians understood the cou-
ple as joint monarchs.8 During their reign, Maussollos and Artemisia centred the

141; Carney, 2003: 248–289; Worthington, 2004: 62; Cartledge, 2004: 142; Heckel, 2006:
3; 2008: 51–52; Müller, 2019: 95 see the alliance with Ada as the first example of Alex-
ander’s wider policy of appealing to local populations by honouring local traditions and
leaders. Despite focusing on the power and role of Karian women, Carney, 2005: 70 has
surprisingly little to say about Ada and Alexander and follows the trend of yoking their
political and military alliance to Alexander’s propagandistic and military needs and de-
sires.
4
For Ada’s control over the Maiandros see Karlsson, 1994: 141–153; Bockisch / Ruggen-
dorfer / Zabrana, 2013: 130.
5
For the debate over the date of Hekatomnos’ death see Hornblower, 1982: 38–40;
Ruzicka, 1992: 92.
6
See Hornblower, 1982: 34–51 for an overview of the dynasty and 294–331 for the Hek-
atomnid building programme. See Carstens, 2006; 2009: 88–100, 107–120 for the role of
Mylasa and the sanctuaries of Labraunda and Sinuri.
7
Hornblower, 1982: 36; Ruzicka, 1992: 16–21.
8
Labraunda 3.2, no. 40; Staatsvertäge 260; I. Erythrai 8 = SIG 168 = Tod GHI 2:155.
 (Re)Taking Halikarnassos 261

satrapy in the Greek orbit, relocating the capital from Mylasa to the important port
city of Halikarnassos and engaging in a programme of panhellenism.9 At the same
time, the couple also began to transform the sanctuary of Labraunda into an inter-
national religious centre that welcomed both Greek and Persian audiences, work
which continued under their sibling successors, Ada and Idrieus.10

Figure 1: Map of the central Karia and the Maiandros River Valley.
Created by author.

Hornblower, 1982: 40, 358–363; Carney, 2005: 66 for the nature of this “joint” rule. While
modern scholars readily acknowledge the reality suggested by the epigraphic evidence,
Hellenic gender norms about male primacy still dominate the conversation. The studies of
Hornblower, 1982 and Ruzicka, 1992 are prime examples. See discussion below.
9
Diod. 15.90.3. Hornblower, 1982: 78–105; Ruzicka, 1992: 33–36.
10
Carstens, 2009, 100: “I believe that Labraunda was the key sanctuary for the Hekatom-
nids, where they staged and used the rural site as an extended palace, suited for proces-
sions, audiences, banquets in a magnificent setting. I further suggest that the meetings of
the Karian federations were transferred from the lowland Mylasa to Labraunda during the
Hekatomnid period. Or at least, that when the leader, the King of the Karians needed to be
consulted he was often to be found in Labraunda under the protection of an ancient deity,
in the midst of well-staged ideology.” Williamson, 2013b: 145–146: “The many dining
facilities are indeed one of the most remarkable aspects of Labraunda, particularly the
Andrones, the splendid banqueting halls built by Maussollos and his brother Idrieus which
integrated both Greek and Achaemenid architectural influences, no doubt intended to im-
press guests of state through super-prestigious, ritual banqueting.” For further discussion
of the role of Labraunda in Hekatomnid royal identity, see Carstens, 2009: 88–100; 2013;
Konuk, 2013: 110–112; Williamson, 2013a; 2014, 90–96. For Achaemenid engagement
with Labraunda see Carstens, 2011.
262 Timothy Howe

What is particularly unusual about the Hekatonid dynasty is not that brother
married sister – though Greek and Roman authors did find such sibling unions
distateful11 – but rather that the Hekatomnid women, Artemisia and Ada ruled
alone after the death of their brother-husbands.12 Unlike other brother-sister dyn-
asties of the ancient Mediterrean world, the Hekatomnid women did not remarry
a surviving brother (or other close male relative), but chose to rule alone.13 The
fact that neither the Karian people, nor the Persian Great Kings objected to this
arrangement indicates the legitimate power and authority Artemisia and Ada
wielded in the region.14 As a result, we should see the Karian queenship practised
by Ada as a legitimate and integral institution in its own right and not downplay
its power as mere “symbolism”, as has been commonly done when studying the
interactions between Ada and Alexander the Great.15
In 351 BCE, after the death of their older sister Artemisia, Ada and her brother-
husband Idrieus inherited Karia.16 Like Artemisia and Maussollos, the new Hek-
atomnid rulers invested in the international sanctuaries of Labraunda and Sinuri.17
They also strengthened the military defenses along the eastern approaches to the
satrapy: fortifications at Labraunda, Alinda and Alabanda were extended, as Ada
and Idreus focused on controlling access to and from the strategic Maidandros
Valley via the Sacred Way of Labraunda – a fortified highway stretching from
Mylasa to Alinda.18 Ada and Idrieus also continued Artemisia and Maussollos’

11
E.g. Ath. 621a. See Hornblower, 1982: 358–363 for further discussion.
12
No children were produced by the brother-sister pairs, either with siblings or with other
partners. Thus, apart from Pixodaros who did not have a unmarried sister to wed, the Hek-
atomnids had no heirs. Pixodaros married a Persian Cappadocian woman, Aphneis, with
whom he had a daughter, also named Ada. Strabo 14.2.17. Ruzicka, 1992: 126.
13
E.g. Kleopatra VII of Egypt married two of her younger brothers, Ptolemy XIII and
Ptolemy XIV, respectively. Lucan, Pharsalia, 110–113; 430–455. [Caes.] BA 33.
14
Carney, 2005: 76; Ruzicka, 1992: 100–102. While we have no formal records of Arta-
xerxes II naming Artemisia satrap, I find Ruzicka’s point (1992: 101) compelling that “so
long as the Persian treasury regularly received the tribute owed by the Hekatomnids, mat-
ters of title may have been of little concern to Artaxerxes.” Demosthenes 15.11–12 cer-
tainly seems to have accepted her sole rule as he railed against her in 351, predicting what
she would do if Athens interfered and attempted to replace the Rhodian oligarchy with a
democracy.
15
E.g. Sears, 2014.
16
Diod. 6.69.2, 45.7; Strabo 14.2.17; Arr. Anab. 1.23.7; Harpocration, s.v. “Idrieus.”
17
Two Sinuri inscriptions show Ada and Idrieus making joint decrees, one a decree of
syngeneia for an individual (2 Sinuri 1, no. 73; Robert, 1945: 94–98) and the other a grant
of tax exemption (3 Sinuri 1, no. 75. Robert, 1945: 98). The two siblings are also depicted
on a private dedicatory relief from the temple of Athena Alea in Tegea, which has often
been taken as a sign of their panhellenism. The fact that Zeus Labraunda is also portrayed
with them here underscores the pivotal role the sancuary continued to have under Ada and
Idrieus. See Waywell, 1993 for analysis of the relief and its wider context.
18
Road: Strabo 14.2.23; Roos, 2006: 18; Hild, 2014: 26, n. 74, 40; Konecny / Ruggen-
 (Re)Taking Halikarnassos 263

engagement with the Greek communities of both Asia Minor and the Greek main-
land. Indeed, so successful was the Karian couple’s patronage that Miletos dedi-
cated honourific statues of Ada and Idrieus at Delphi.19 These military and socio-
political investments along the Labraundan Sacred Way and at Miletos, show that
Ada and Idreus, just like Artemisia and Maussollos, saw both opportunities for
expansion as well as threats to their power coming from Ionia and Persia along
the Maiandros Valley.20 This policy, however, was not unusual. Like many elites
in 4th century Asia Minor, the Hekatomnids attempted to tread a middle path be-
tween both Greece and Persia.21
In 344, after the death of Idrieus, Ada became sole ruler of Karia, just as her
sister Artemisia had done on the death of the eldest Hekatomnid, Maussollos.22
During her period of sole rule, Ada continued the defensive works in central Karia
begun during her joint rule with Idrieus. In their study of the fortifications at
Alinda, Konecny / Ruggendorfer (2014: 742), suggest that the main circuit wall
of the city was begun during this period, though it was likely completed after 340
BCE, after Pixodaros had driven Ada from Halikarnassos and she made Alinda
her capital-in-exile. Ada also continued to patronise the important Ionian city of
Miletos. Indeed, it is possible that the Milesian dedication at Delphi, mentioned
above, could date to this period of Ada’s sole rule.23 In addition, the colossal head
of Ada (Figure 2), found in the sanctuary of Athena Polias at Priene and now in
the British Museum, might also date to Ada’s sole rule, though it is more likely it

dorfer, 2014: 709. Fortifications: Karlsson / Henry / Bild, 2008: 111–116, 129 offer a de-
tailed analysis of the fortifications and 32 ancient fountain houses along the course of the
Sacred Way from Labraunda to Mylasa, as well as the large fortress above the acropolis
and the 5 watchtowers along the road, most of which have a view towards the acropolis.
Konecny / Ruggendorfer, 2014: 714–742, analyse the Way going towards Alinda, which
possessed similar fortifications built under the Hekatomnids. As Williamson, 2013a: 6,
notes “there is a second monumental gateway to Labraunda from the east, which led from
Alinda and Alabanda to the north via a road that was also at least partly paved …
Labraunda was thus a connecting station in this road.”
19
Tod GHI 2.161B. This was signed by one Satyros, whom Hornblower, 1982: 241–242;
275 suggests was likely Satyros son of Isotimos from Paros. A private individual also
dedicated the relief of the couple to Athena Alea in Tegea discussed above, Tod GHI
2.162B; see Waywell, 1993.
20
Karlsson, 1994: 141–153; Bockisch / Ruggendorfer / Zabrana, 2013: 130. See Ruzicka,
1992: 67–75 for Maussollos’ campaigns in Ionia and efforts to expand Karian influence
among the Greek cities of the region. In 362/1 Maussollos revolted from Persia: Diod.
15.90.3; Xen. Ages. 2.27; Ruzicka, 1992: 76–89.
21
See, e.g. Hyland, 2017.
22
Arr. Anab. 1.23.7; Strabo 14.2.17; Diod 16.45.7; 69.2.
23
See Hornblower, 1982: 241–242, for a discussion of the issues surrounding the dating
of this dedication.
264 Timothy Howe

comes from the period after Alexander’s arrival.24 Like her sibling predecessors,
Ada maintained and even strengthened her resources in the Maiandros River ba-
sin.

Figure 2. Colossal head of Ara from the sanctuary of

Athena Polias at Priene. © Trustees of the British
Museum. Reproduced with permission.

Yet Ada was also a loyal Persian satrap. In 341, when Philip II of Macedon
besieged Perinthos on the Sea of Marmara, the Great King of Persia, Artaxerxes
III Ochos, ordered all of his Asian coastal satraps to help the Perinthos resist.
Alongside her colleagues Ada did so.25 A few months later, when Philip sur-

24
Hornblower, 1982: 329–330; Carter, 1983: 264–266; 271–276; Prag / Neave, 2010.
25
Diod. 16.75.1–2. Hornblower, 1982: 48–49 and Ruzicka, 1992: 127–128 argue that Pix-
odaros and not Ada sent this aid, but I find it unlikely that Pixodaros, who struck a decid-
edly anti-Persian tone in his coinage of 340, would be in a position to do the Great King’s
bidding. Pixodaros only courted the Great King after his alliance with Philip II fell
through. See discussion below.
 (Re)Taking Halikarnassos 265

rounded Byzantion, Karian-controlled Kos and Rhodes also sent assistance.26 It

is in this context that we should see the Great King lack of interference with Ada’s
position in Karia. As with Artemisia’s sole role, there was no internal Karian nor
external Persian push for Ada to marry or in any way share power with male fam-
ily members, though given his later actions, it seems that the remaining Hekatom-
nid brother, Pixodaros, did not like this state of affairs. And yet, Pixodaros bided
his time: Ada ruled for four years before Pixodaros rose against her.27
When rebellion came, Pixodaros’ “usurpation” was decidedly unspectacular.
Unlike the previous Hekatomnids, Pixodaros was unable to control the heartland
of Karia – he did not dedicate at the important dynastic cult centres of Labraunda
and Sinuri, a clear indication that beyond the hellenised metropole of Halikarnas-
sos, Pixodaros’ control over Karia (and the Karians) was limited. As a result, from
340–336 BCE, Karia was divided between the two siblings – Ada holding the
native Karian Hekatomnid sites and Pixodaros the hellenised Halikarnassian coast
– with neither decisively in control of the kingdom. This stalemate, and the lack
of progress on Pixodaros’ part to gain the native Karian interior, may explain why
the Great King did not confirm Pixodaros’ usurpation of the Karian throne in 340.
Artaxerxes III Ochos may have been waiting for a clear winner to emerge in the
Karian civil war. For the moment, Persia seemed to support Ada, at least tacitly.28
Since the Great King seemed unwilling to interfere in Karia, and Pixodaros
could not unseat Ada from the fortified highlands, the usurper had to find new
allies and carve out an independent powerbase outside of Karia. With Persian help
not forthcoming, the Greek communities were the obvious choice. Indeed, the
coinage Pixodaros issued in his first year suggest that anti-Persian elements across
the Aegean in mainland Greece were on his wishlist. Among the first coins Pixo-
daros issued from Halikarnassos were 1/8 daric gold coins with Zeus Osogillis of
Mylasa on the obverse and Zeus Labrys and Pixodaros’ name in Greek on the
reverse. The Karian symbolism of the two Zeuses makes it clear that his Heka-
tomnid roots and native Karians were an important audience, but the unusal
choice of metal suggests that Pixodaros was courting anti-Persian allies as well a
local Karians. Only the Great King coined gold in this manner.29 It was unprece-
dented for any leader in Asia Minor, Hekatomnid or otherwise, to mint in gold,
especially on the Pesian daric standard. And yet, Pixodaros did so, using Karian
cultic symbols from the heyday of Karian power under Maussollos. Pixodaros
chose to put his name on gold coins reserved exclusively for the Great King, most
likely to demonstrate to the Greek world (and any Karians who might be inter-

26
Diod. 16.77.2.
27
Arr. Anab. 1.23.7–8; Strabo 14.2.17; Diod. 16.74.2.
28
This has puzzled ancient and modern authors alike (see n. 22, above). Hornblower, 1982:
49 and Ruzicka, 1992: 123–125, for example, insist that Pixodaros was the “real” satrap
of Karia, not Ada.
29
Konuk, 2013: 110 urges caution against reading too much into these unique coins.
266 Timothy Howe

ested) his anti-Persian credentials. One does wonder if Philip II of Macedon was
part of Pixodaros’ target audience, for Philip II was the only other ruler to coin in
gold at the time and Philip was also decidely anti-Persian, as he had demonstrated
recently at Perinthos and Byzantium.30
Pixodaros also issued tetradrachms with Didymaean Apollo on the obverse in
an exact emulation of contemporary Milesian coins, likely in an attempt to com-
plete with Ada for Miletos’ attention. On the reverse we see Zeus Labrys (the god
of Labraunda) or just the axe of Labraunda and Pixodaros’ name in Greek. And
while these tetradrachms were similar to Ada and Idrieus’ coins, they were struck
in weight standards (full Chian) not in use since the early reign of Maussollos and
Karia’s period of autonomy from Persia. With these tetradrachms, Pixodaros is
attempting to usurp not only Ada’s queendom but also her control over the Hek-
atomnid family legacy. Significantly, some of the new coins were overstruck
coins of Idrieus and Ada.31 By linking the glorious (and, at times Hellenising)
Karian past under Maussollos with contemporary Miletos, and issuing gold coins
on the Persian standard in what can only be understood as defiance of the Great
King, Pixodaros seemed intent on broadcasting a message that he was not just
usurping power from Ada but also from Persia itself.32
While the use of symbols from Labraunda intentionally reference Pixodaros’
struggle with Ada over the Hekatomnid legacy, they may have also communicated
a deeper panhellenic and anti-Persian message. Herodotos, in his narrative of the
revolt of the Ionian poleis against Persia (499–494 BCE), recounts the leadership
provided by a Karian general, one Pixodaros son of Maussollos (Hdt 5.118). In
497, this Pixodaros fought Persian forces in the Maiandros Valley and then re-
treated to Labraunda, and finally Pedasa, where the Karians crushed the Persian
army. Herodotos’ narrative (5.119–121) leaves no question of Karian loyalty to
the Greek cause:
μετὰ δὲ παρεόντων καὶ διαβάντων τὸν Μαίανδρον τῶν Περσέων, ἐνθαῦτα
ἐπὶ τῷ Μαρσύῃ ποταμῷ συνέβαλόν τε τοῖσι Πέρσῃσι οἱ Κᾶρες καὶ μάχην
ἐμαχέσαντο ἰσχυρὴν καὶ ἐπὶ χρόνον πολλόν, τέλος δὲ ἑσσώθησαν διὰ
πλῆθος. Περσέων μὲν δὴ ἔπεσον ἄνδρες ἐς δισχιλίους, Καρῶν δὲ ἐς
μυρίους. [119.2] ἐνθεῦτεν δὲ οἱ διαφυγόντες αὐτῶν κατειλήθησαν ἐς
Λάβραυνδα ἐς Διὸς στρατίου ἱρόν, μέγα τε καὶ ἅγιον ἄλσος πλατανίστων.
μοῦνοι δὲ τῶν ἡμεῖς ἴδμεν Κᾶρες εἰσὶ οἳ Διὶ στρατίῳ θυσίας ἀνάγουσι.
κατειληθέντες δὲ ὦν οὗτοι ἐνθαῦτα ἐβουλεύοντο περὶ σωτηρίης, ὁκότερα

30
Carstens, 2009: 124–126 argues that Hekatomid symbolism and propaganda had an im-
portant influence on Philip II’s dynastic self-fashioning.
31
Konuk, 2013: 110.
32
Such Maussollos-style coins might also recall the times when Karia had allied with the
Greeks against Persia. See Ruzicka, 1992: 67–75 for Maussollos’ campaigns in Ionia and
efforts to expand Karian influence among the Greek cities of the region. In 362/1
Maussollos revolted from Persia: Diod. 15.90.3; Xen. Ages. 2.27; Ruzicka, 1992: 76–89.
 (Re)Taking Halikarnassos 267

ἢ παραδόντες σφέας αὐτοὺς Πέρσῃσι ἢ ἐκλιπόντες τὸ παράπαν τὴν Ἀσίην

ἄμεινον πρήξουσι. [120] βουλευομένοισι δέ σφι ταῦτα παραγίνονται
βοηθέοντες Μιλήσιοί τε καὶ οἱ τούτων σύμμαχοι: ἐνθαῦτα δὲ τὰ μὲν
πρότερον οἱ Κᾶρες ἐβουλεύοντο μετῆκαν, οἳ δὲ αὖτις πολεμέειν ἐξ ἀρχῆς
ἀρτέοντο. καὶ ἐπιοῦσί τε τοῖσι Πέρσῃσι συμβάλλουσι καὶ μαχεσάμενοι ἐπὶ
πλέον ἢ πρότερον ἑσσώθησαν: πεσόντων δὲ τῶν πάντων πολλῶν μάλιστα
Μιλήσιοι ἐπλήγησαν. [121] μετὰ δὲ τοῦτο τὸ τρῶμα ἀνέλαβόν τε καὶ
ἀνεμαχέσαντο οἱ Κᾶρες: πυθόμενοι γὰρ ὡς στρατεύεσθαι ὁρμέαται οἱ
Πέρσαι ἐπὶ τὰς πόλις σφέων, ἐλόχησαν τὴν ἐν Πηδάσῳ ὁδόν, ἐς τὴν
ἐμπεσόντες οἱ Πέρσαι νυκτὸς διεφθάρησαν καὶ αὐτοὶ καὶ οἱ στρατηγοὶ
αὐτῶν Δαυρίσης καὶ Ἀμόργης καὶ Σισιμάκης: σὺν δέ σφι ἀπέθανε καὶ
Μύρσος ὁ Γύγεω. τοῦ δὲ λόχου τούτου ἡγεμὼν ἦν Ἡρακλείδης
Ἰβανώλλιος ἀνὴρ Μυλασσεύς.
“Presently, when the Persians had come and had crossed the Maiandros,
they and the Karians fought by the river Marsyas. The Karians fought hard
and for a long time, but in the end they were out-numbered. Two thousand
Persians fell and ten thousand Karians. [119.2] Those of them who escaped
were driven into a large grove of sacred plane-trees in the precinct of Zeus
of the Armies at Labraunda – the Karians are the only people whom we
know who offer sacrifices to Zeus by this name. When they had been
driven there, they deliberated about best way to save themselves: was it
better for them to surrender to the Persians or to depart from Asia. [120]
While they were deliberating, the Milesians and their allies came to their
aid. At this point the Karians abandoned their former plans, and prepared
to wage war all over again. They met the Persian attack and suffered a
heavier defeat in the battle than the first. Many men fell, but the Milesians
were hardest hit. [121] But the Karians rallied and fought again after this
disaster, because they had learned that the Persians were marching against
their cities. They prepared to ambush the Persians along the road at
Pedasa.33 The Persians fell into their trap by night and perished, the men
and their generals, Daurises, Amorges and Sisimakes. Myrsus, son of
Gyges also perished. The leader of this ambush was Heraklides of Mylasas,
son of Ibanollis.”
Although the Karians initially suffered a great loss to the Persian army at
Labraunda, they chose to redouble their efforts. In a way, Labraunda serves as a
turning point in the Karian-Greek alliance and resistance of Persian “slavery,” as

33
There is considerable debate over whether the correct reading here is Pedasa near Hali-
karnassos or Pidasa farther north on the edge of Milesian territory. Hornblower, 2013:
304–305, after reviewing the various claims, argues for Pidasa. Since Pixdodaros would
be engaging the wider rhetoric of the campaign, such disagreement over place does not
affect the present argument.
268 Timothy Howe

articulated by Herodotos. Thus, Labraunda and the symbols of Zeus Labrys would
resonate well with the resistance-to-Persia political discourses of the the latter part
of the 4th century. As John Maricola 2007 has noted, the Persian Wars of the 490s
and 80s, and Herodotos’ account of them, figured largely in the political posturing
of the Greek cities of the 340s.
Although signposting a revolt from Persia seems to be a huge risk, I suspect
that Pixodaros’ choice was infomed by his lack of progress in winning over the
native Karians and the Persian King. Ada was firmly entrenched in the interior
and Karia essentially had two rulers. The Great King was doing nothing to resolve
the situation one way or the other. It is worth noting that Great King Artaxerxes
III Ochos, who came to power in 358, had expressed no disapproval of the sole
rule of Artemisia from 353–351, the accession of Ada and Idrieus in 351, and the
sole rule of Ada in 344. Consequently, from Ochos’ perspective, Ada seems to
have been the legitmate ruler and Pixodaros the “pretender”. It would be wrong
to argue from a Greco-Roman gender-normative perspective that the Karians and
Persians preferred a male on the Karian throne. It is significant that Arrian, Anab.
1.23.7, has to remind his audience not to misunderstand the realities of Karian
Queenship: “νενομισμένον ἐν τῇ Ἀσίᾳ ἔτι ἀπὸ Σεμιράμεως καὶ γυναῖκας ἄρχειν
ἀνδρῶν / it had been accepted in Asia from Semiramis forward that women should
actually rule men.” Viewed in this light, Ruzicka’s assertion (1992: 124–125),
that Ochos would “prefer a male Hekatomnid” on the satrapal throne is not only
culturally inaccurate but even runs counter to previous Achaemenid policy in Ka-
ria. Likewise, his assertion that Ochos’ general Mentor would “naturally” support
Pixodaros against Ada is also flawed. So far as we know, Mentor did not, in fact,
intervene in the Karian civil war at this time and speculation about what he “may
have preferred” is best put aside. In the end, Persian policy is clear: Pixodaros
received no Persian assistance from 341–336. Ochos seems to have been content
with the status quo, with Ada and Pixodaros keeping each other busy so that nei-
ther could be a threat to wider Persian interests in the region.
But the Greeks and native Karians were not Pixodaros’ only potential allies.
As with his coinage, Pixodaros turned to elder brother Maussollos for inspiration:
the neighbouring Lykians had been an integral part of Maussollos’ realm but since
his death had moved out of Halikarnassos’ sphere of influence.34 From 340–337,
Pixodaros had extended his influence along the southern Karian coast into
Lykia.35 This action attracted Ochos’ attention. In 337, in a famous trilingual in-
scription (Aramaic, Lykian and Greek) from Xanthos, Pixodaros asserts his con-
trol over both Karia and Lykia. The Aramaic text – which likely retains the closest
fidelity to an original edict from the Great King – calls Pixodaros “Satrap of Ka-
ria” and asserts that he shall adjudicate Lykian matters on behalf of the Great

34
Hornblower, 1982: 120–123; Ruzicka, 1992: 84–86, 124–125.
35
Ruzicka, 1992: 124–126.
 (Re)Taking Halikarnassos 269

King.36 Ochos’ role in this is decidedly unclear – he certainly did not make any
move to counter Pixodaros’ assertion but neither did he give Pixodaros any sup-
port. Ochos did not assist Pixodaros militarily against Ada. In reality, then, Pixo-
daros was in little better position with regards to his sister in 337 than he had been
when he took power in 340. While the Great King made no move to counter his
power in Lykia, or his use of the title Satrap of Karia, Pixdaros nonetheless ruled
over a rump satrapy and received no Persian aid. For this reason, Pixodaros con-
tinued to seek help elsewhere. Or, perhaps more accurately, Pixodaros did not
abandon his efforts to secure allies from across the Aegean. Enter the Macedoni-
ans.
In 336, Pixodaros approached Philip II of Macedon, father of Alexander the
Great, with a proposal of alliance.37 From Pixodaros’ perspective, Philip was a
good choice. Over the past few years the Macedonian monarch had attempted to
insert himself into the political dramas of Asia Minor and to cultivate local rebel-
lions against Persia.38 But unfortunately for Pixodaros, the Macedonian alliance
came to nothing due to internal Macedonian factionalism. Yet, all was not lost.
Political change had also come to Persia: Ochos had been assassinated by the eu-
nuch Bagoas and a new king, Darius III had come to the throne.39 As a newly
crowned monarch, Darius III needed all of the allies he could find in order to
consolidate control over an empire in chaos. While the details are murky at best,
we can trace a noticeable shift in Pixodaros’ fortunes in 336/5 that mirror the
needs of the new Great King: after the negotiations with Philip fail, Pixodaros has
his daughter Ada marry a Persian noble named Orontobates. On Pixodaros’ death
a little over a year later, Darius confirmed Orontobates as satrap of Karia, the first
non-Karian to hold that position.40 I think it likely that Orontobates served as the
intermediary between Darius III and his father-in-law Pixodaros, or perhaps even
as a guarantor of Pixodaros’ good behaviour – Strabo’s statement (14.2.17) that
Orontobates was Karia’s co-ruler together with Pixodaros indicates a complicated
power relationship existed between the two men. In any event, the non-traditional
appointment of a Persian more than any other act signals Darius III’s position
regarding Ada. The new Great King would not allow Ada to rule any part of Karia.
Her time of controlling the interior of Karia was coming to an end.

36
Fouilles de Xanthos 6. For a translation and commentary on the text see Briant, 2002:
707–709. For the debate over dating see the summary of the main positions and references
collected by Briant, 2002: 1011–1012.
37
Plut. Alex. 10.1–5 is clear that Pixodaros is the instigator of the negotiations. See Heckel
/ Howe / Müller, 2017: 100–105. Cf. Ruzicka, 2010: 6–7, who presents the proposed union
between Philip III Arrhidaeus and Ada II as a project conceived by Philip II, not Pixodaros.
38
Ath. 6, 256e; Diod.16.52.1–4; Arist. Oec. 1351a 33–37; Dem. 10.31–34; Strabo 13.1.57.
39
Briant, 2002: 769–780.
40
Plut. Alex. 10.5; Arr. Anab. 1.23.8; Strabo 14.2.17.
270 Timothy Howe

But Ada had prepared for this eventuality. While Pixodaros was attempting to
assert his control over Karia and cosy up to the Great King, Ada had stepped up
the fortification work at Alinda and Alabanda and attempted to consolidate her
authority over the interior of Karia.41 The fact that Darius III did not send rein-
forcements from Lydia or Greater Phrygia along the Maiandros Valley, even
though he had confirmed the Persian Orontobates as Karian satrap and sent ships
to Halikarnassos, hints at Ada’s power in the interior and control over the land
routes from the other Persian satrapies in Asia Minor.
In addition to fortifying her strongholds, Ada continued to affirm her alle-
giance to her Karian subjects by connecting directly with the Karian culture and
language. We can see this most clearly in a proxeny decree from Kaunos hon-
ouring two Athenians, that De Martinis (2015: 227–230) convincingly dates to
Ada’s period of “exile” or soon thereafater. The primary language of the decree
is Karian, and though there is some text in Greek, it is unclear whether it was a
full translation or gloss, like the Greek in the trilingual decree from Xanthos
discussed above. As De Martinis (2015: 226–227) notes,
“the apparent contradiction inherent in the use of Carian as a source of
identity by a member of the Hecatomnid dynasty, which has long used the
Greek as official language, could be explained by the Ada’s need to em-
phasize her Carian origin compared to that of Persian Orontobates, member
of the Hecatomnid dynasty as a result of the marriage bond with Ada II,
Pixodarus’ daughter.”
That Ada chose to commemorate international honourands (Athenians!) in the
local language seems to undercut Sears’ argument the Ada’s value to Alexander
lay in her being a known symbol of Greekness.42
Regardless, 335/4 was a pivotal year for Ada. The new Great King, Darius III
had confirmed the Persian Orontobates as satrap of Karia, a shift in Persian policy
and a clear signal that Ada’s control over the Karian interior was threatened. As
Orontobates welcomed Memnon and the Persian fleet, Ada’s position became in-
creasingly dire. But the summer of 334 also brought a new player to the politics

41
Konecny / Ruggendorfer, 2014: 709.
42
Müller, 2019: 95–96 summarises the issue well: “Matthew Sears möchte in Alexanders
Verbindung zu Ada ein Versatzstück panhellenischer Propaganda erkennen: Als Vertrete-
rin der Hekatomniden, die griechische Künstler und Kultur stark gefördert hatten, sei sie
‘a nice emblem of Greek liberation’ gewesen. Es ist aber fraglich, ob es ausreichte, Mäze-
naten griechischer Künstler in der Familie zu haben, um als panhellenisches Symbol zu
gelten. Auch die Perserkönige hatten griechische Künstler beschäftigt. Zudem war Adas
Vater Mausolos den Athenern noch in schlechter Erinnerung, weil er 357–355 den Abfall
von Rhodos, Kos und Chios vom Zweiten Seebund unterstützt hatte. Ada selbst war mit
den Stationen Geschwisterehe und weiblicher Regentschaft im Lebenslauf – in griechi-
schen Augen ‘barbarische’ (Un)Sitten – alles andere als eine (pan)hellenische Vorzeige-
vertreterin.”
 (Re)Taking Halikarnassos 271

of Asia Minor: Alexander’s victory over Darius’ satraps at the Granikos River in
May of 334 sent ripples throughout the region. Greeks and non-Greeks alike
flocked to the young Macedonian king.43 This only increased after his successful
siege of Miletos a few months later. In August of 334, Alexander seemed Ada’s
best possible ally against Darius III, Orontobates and his wife Ada, the daughter
of Pixodaros. In addition, since Memnon had quartered his fleet at Halikarnassos
after the fall of Miletos, Alexander was Ada’s last best chance to retake her capi-
tal. Accordingly, Ada could not let Alexander continue up the Maiandros River
towards Greater Phrygia and the Great Road to Susa. She had to convince him to
assist her or she would lose her queendom. And so she set out to meet the con-
quering hero as he marched to the Greek city of Tralles.

Alexander and the Greek fleet

Before we can begin to understand what took place between Ada and Alexander
near Tralles on the Maiandros in August of 334 BCE, we must first consider
Alexander’s strategic position and immediate goals – in particular, his dismissal
of the panhellenic fleet after his victory over the Persian forces at Miletos. The
opinio communis, articulated by Arrian (Anab. 1.20.1) and accepted by recent
commentators,44 holds that Alexander dismissed his fleet as part of a larger plan
to capture Halikarnassos and the Persian naval bases by land. Unfortunately, this
“grand strategy” argument is problematic for three reasons. First, it relies on an
ancient a priori assumption that Alexander always planned to take out the Persian
fleet after Miletos as the first stage in his multi-pronged strategy to conquer Per-
sia.45 Second, it overlooks the fact that after Miletos, Alexander was marching
inland along the Maiandros River to the satrapy of Greater Phrygia and thus mov-
ing away from the land routes to Halikarnassos, the headquarters of the Persian
fleet after Miletos.46 After their meeting in August 334, Alexander had to back-

43
Arr. Anab. 1.17.10, 18.2; Diod. 17.24.1; Tod, GHI 2.192. See Capdetrey, 2012: 230–
231 for a discussion of the impact of Alexander’s victory at Granikos among Greek and
non-Greek inhabitants of western Asia Minor.
44
See Schachermeyr, 1973: 182; Bosworth, 1980: 141–142; Romane, 1994: 69; Murray,
2008: 42–43, for analyses of Alexander’s strategy regarding his fleet.
45
Alexander paid so little attention to the Persian navy that it nearly recaptured the Aegean.
Curt. 3.1.19–20; Arr. Anab. 2.2.3. As Bosworth, 1988: 47 observes, this was a tactical
blunder. Clearly, Alexander’s focus was elsewhere.
46
Bosworth, 1980: 143, argues, contra Stark, 1958b: 104–106, that Alexander took the
coastal road because he could not have gone to Alinda – Ada met him as he marched into
Karia. At the time Bosworth was writing little archaeological work had been published on
the heavily fortified Sacred Way from Alinda to Mylasa and the coastal plain. Conse-
quently, Bosworth was not aware of how much more advantageous to Alexander and Ada
the inland route would be over the coastal route. Moreover, since Ada did not control the
coastal regions from Halikarnassos to Miletos at this time (see above), it is unlikely that
she would have been able to meet Alexander other than near the Maiandros River and its
272 Timothy Howe

track to assist Ada in taking Halikarnassos (see map, Figure 3). Third, other than
Arrian’s opinion on what he claims Alexander “thought,” we have no direct evi-
dence of any grand strategy to take the Persian ports by land. Further, Alexander
did not follow this “attack naval bases by land” plan other than during the two
rather unique sieges of Halikarnassos and Tyre, one an initial failure, the other an
epic success.47 For example, although he marched through the territory of Karia’s
neighbours Lykia and Pamphylia after failing to take Halikarnassos, Alexander
did not garrison any port cities in these strategic regions or destroy any naval
infrastructure – despite the fact that the Perisan fleet was still active in the Ae-
gean.48 Alexander’s actions in Asia Minor after Miletos show that the Persian
navy was not a concern for him until the siege of Tyre.

Figure 3: Map of Alexander’s route to Halikarnassos. Created by author.

At this point, it is worthwhile examining the narrative context in which Arrian

(Anab. 1.20.1, 23.7–8) reports his understanding of Alexander’s “grand strategy”:
Ἀλέξανδρος δὲ καταλῦσαι ἔγνω τὸ ναυτικὸν χρημάτων τε ἐν τῷ τότε
ἀπορίᾳ καὶ ἅμα οὐκ ἀξιόμαχον ὁρῶν τὸ αὑτοῦ ναυτικὸν τῷ Περσικῷ,
οὔκουν ἐθέλων οὐδὲ μέρει τινὶ τῆς στρατιᾶς κινδυνεύειν. ἄλλως τε ἐπενόει,
κατέχων ἤδη τῷ πεζῷ τὴν Ἀσίαν, ὅτι οὔτε ναυτικοῦ ἔτι δέοιτο, τάς τε
παραλίους πόλεις λαβὼν καταλύσει τὸ Περσῶν ναυτικόν, οὔτε ὁπόθεν τὰς
ὑπηρεσίας συμπληρώσουσιν οὔτε ὅποι τῆς Ἀσίας προσέξουσιν ἔχοντας.

junction with the Marsyas River near Tralles.

47
Tyre fell to Alexander for reasons having little to do with any grand strategy for taking
out the Persian fleet: Curt 4.2.17; Arr. Anab. 2.17.3–4. Cf. Murray, 2008: 43–44.
48
Arr. Anab. 2.2.3–5. Bosworth, 1980: 183–184; Bosworth 1988: 52–53.
 (Re)Taking Halikarnassos 273

καὶ τὸν ἀετὸν ταύτῃ συνέβαλλεν, ὅτι ἐσήμηνεν αὐτῷ ἐκ τῆς γῆς κρατήσειν
τῶν νεῶν…[here follows an out of sequence discursus on the seige of Hal-
ikarnassos and aftermath] (23.8) Ἄδα δὲ Ἄλινδα μόνον κατεῖχε, χωρίον τῆς
Καρίας ἐν τοῖς ὀχυρώτατον, καὶ ἐσβαλόντι Ἀλεξάνδρῳ ἐς Καρίαν ἀπήντα,
τά τε Ἄλινδα ἐνδιδοῦσα καὶ παῖδά οἱ τιθεμένη Ἀλέξανδρον. καὶ
Ἀλέξανδρος τά τε Ἄλινδα αὐτῇ ἐπέτρεψε καὶ τὸ ὄνομα τοῦ παιδὸς οὐκ
ἀπηξίωσε, καὶ ἐπειδὴ Ἁλικαρνασσόν τε ἐξεῖλε καὶ τῆς ἄλλης Καρίας
ἐπεκράτησεν, αὐτῇ ἄρχειν ἁπάσης ἔδωκε.
“Alexander now decided to disband his navy, because he lacked the neces-
sary resources at that time and also perceived that the fleet could not face
an action with the Persian navy. For these reasons he was unwilling to risk
disaster with even part of his forces. Further, he reckoned that because he
now controlled Asia with his land troops, he no longer needed the navy.
He thought that by capturing the cities on the coast he would break up the
Persian fleet, since they would have nowhere to make up their crews from,
and no place in Asia where they could find safe harbour. This was what he
took the omen of the eagle to mean: he was not to overcome the ships from
dry land… [here follows an out of sequence discursus on the seige of Hal-
ikarnassos and its aftermath] (23.8) At this time Ada held only Alinda, the
strongest fortress in Karia. When Alexander approached Karia she went to
meet him, surrendering Alinda and adopting Alexander as her son. Alex-
ander gave Alinda to her charge, and did not reject the title of son. After he
had taken Halikarnassos and become master of the rest of Karia, he decided
she should rule over everything.”
Notice that Arrian breaks up the chronology of events in order to foreground the
seige of Halikarnassos and thereby demonstrate that Alexander’s interpretation of
the eagle omen was correct.49 As Hugh Bowden (2017) has argued, Arrian regu-
larly deploys omens and signs to create narrative space in which to offer com-
mentary on Alexander’s thoughts, motives and actions. In this way, omens serve
to inject divine authority into Arrian’s interpretations. 50 Investing in Arrian’s post
hoc, propter hoc argument, which seems to be grounded in Alexander’s rather

49
Bosworth, 1980: 142 believes that the omen is Arrian’s own invention.
50
That Arrian needed a divine explanation to give authority to Alexander’s actions is borne
out by the fact that he knows Alexander made the wrong choice. The Macedonian king
failed to take Halikarnassos in 334 and the Macedonians only captured the city later, after
the Persian navy had dissolved as an effective force upon Memnon’s death: Arr. Anab.
2.1–5; Diod. 17.29.1–2; Romane, 1994; Murray, 2008. Indeed, the Battle of Issos rather
than the siege of Halikarnassos, was the turning point for the Persian navy. Darius’ defeat
at Issos, and his subsequent retreat to Mesopotamia and de facto abandonment of the Med-
iterranean encouraged the Persian naval allies on Cyprus and in Phoenicia to come over to
Alexander, so Murray 2008 convincingly argues.
274 Timothy Howe

unique actions at Tyre (not Halikarnassos) is of little use. As Romane noted in his
study of seiges of Miletos and Halikarnassos (1994: 69), neither Diodoros nor
Arrian knew precisely why Alexander disbanded his fleet and attacked
Halikarnassos by land. Indeed, Arrian’s inclusion and interpretation of the eagle
omen give cover to the fact that the author was himself confused by Alexander’s
actions – hence, Alexander is guided by divine will. If we take the pre-Tyre
campaign as a whole, Alexander’s actions demonstrate that he focused very little
direct attention on the Persian navy and was more invested in land battles against
Persian land forces.51 So, perhaps we can leave aside Arrian’s explanation that
Alexander chose to conquer a naval force by land – an argument that would appeal
more to a Roman audience raised on Livy’s and Polybius’ descriptions of Rome’s
wars with Carthage52 – and see what other reasons the sources offer for
Alexander’s dismissal of the fleet and enagement in the Karian civil war on Ada’s
behalf.
Arrian (Anab. 1.20.1, 23.5–6) also speculates that Alexander could no longer
afford to keep both his fleet and his land army.53 While Plutarch (Alex. 15.2–3)
had raised the issue of funds when discussing Alexander’s invasion, this is the
first we see of money troubles in Arrian. Although lack of funds serves as a tidy
explanation for the dismissal of the fleet, it does not wash.54 Alexander was
clearly not broke in summer of 334: Arrian knows that after the victory at the
Granikos River Alexander had seized the satrapal capital of Sardis and its sizable
treasury (Anab. 1.17.2). The Macedonians had also taken Miletos and presumably
had access to any precious metals and military supplies accumulated there, by
right of conquest. To put it simply: Arrian knows that Alexander is not in the same
financial position after Miletos as he was before Granikos. I find it telling that our
sources do not raise this “lack of funds” issue again, even though Alexander takes
in no revenue after Miletos and only has expenses until his victory at Issos a year
later, when he captures the treasure Darius abandoned on the battlefield. So, I
think it is safe to say that we can view reports about a lack of funds with healthy
skepticism. Arrian (and/or his sources) does not fully understand why Alexander
did not keep his fleet. And, since we cannot rely on Arrian, our “best source for
military matters”, we need find another explanation for why Alexander turned
around and besieged Halikarnassos.

51
So Bosworth, 1980: 142, “Macedonian operations in Lycia were mostly inland, not di-
rected against the coast”.
52
The famous passage from Polyb. 1.20.5–21.1 comes to mind here.
53
Diod. 17.22.5 reports the same information about expense, suggesting that this claim
about resources driving Alexander’s strategy originated from earlier sources and not Ar-
rian or Diodoros themselves.
54
Tarn, 1948: 18; Wilcken, 1967: 93, accept this explanation.
 (Re)Taking Halikarnassos 275

Ada and Alexander

It is useful to remind ourselves that Alexander in 334 BCE was not yet a world
conqueror – we cannot see him as “Alexander the Great” and argue backwards
post hoc, propter hoc, to determine his grand strategy. We must look at what Al-
exander has achieved thusfar in his 2-year reign and see events as evolving in
response to the situation on the ground. So far, Alexander has won two military
engagements against Persian forces, the last of which (the seige of Miletos) was
rather difficult. Moreover, Alexander is new to Asia Minor and does not have a
wealth of personal experience traversing through Persian territory to guide him.
As a result, he would look to the actions of his predecessors Kyros the Younger
and Agesilaos of Sparta, as reported in the works of Xenophon.55 In particular,
Agesilaos’ panhellenic “New Trojan War” to free the Greeks would have reso-
nated with Alexander’s propaganda, at least so far as his stop at Troy and his
rhetoric after Granikos of freeing the Greeks from the Barbarians was involved.56
Alexander, or his advisors, such as the official campaign historian Kallisthenes,
would not have overlooked Xenophon’s eyewitness accounts, since these narra-
tives provided rich detail about local politics, supply routes and military tactics.
Significantly, both Kyros’ and Agesilaos’ invasions were land campaigns that
set off from Miletos and fought decisive land battles rather than naval engage-
ments. Recognizing Persian superiority on the sea, both Kyros and Agesilaos
planned inland sorties via the Maiandros River Valley, far from Persia’s port cities
and naval bases. Indeed, like Alexander in 334, Kyros had also besieged Miletos
in 401 in order to neutralize the Greeks loyal to the Great King who might hinder
his passage up the Maiandros.57 Also like Alexander in 334, Agesilaos attacked
the borders of Karia in 395, an act which freed passage up the Maiandros.58 Along
the march, Agesilaos was approached by a local leader, Spithridates, who invited
him into Paphlagonia in order to wrest this area from the control of a rival who
supported the Great King. Agesilaos eagerly undertook the journey because, as
Xenophon put it “πάλαι τούτου ἐπιθυμῶν, τοῦ ἀφιστάναι τι ἔθνος ἀπὸ βασιλέως
/ he had long desired to win some nation away from the Persian King” (Xen. Hell.
4.1.2). With Spithridates’ help, Agesilaos set out to take the satrapy and main
miltary route to Persia. Xenophon describes Agesilaos’ wider strategy thusly:

55
Bosworth, 1988: 50 argues that Alexander decided to emulate Kyros only after failing
to take Halikarnassos, but this need not be the case. See Hyland, 2017: 122–147 for anal-
ysis of Kyros’ and Agesilaos’ campaigns.
56
Troy: Arr. Anab. 1.11.6–12.2. Freeing the Greeks: Arr. Anab.1.17.10, 18.2; Diod.
17.24.1; Tod, GHI II, 192; Capdetry, 2012: 230–231. See Prandi, 1985: 77–79, 82–93;
Borgeaud, 2010; Bowden, 2018; Howe forthcoming, for a discussion of Alexander’s use
of Homer, Herodotos and Xenophon’s discussion of wars in Asia to inform his strategy
and propaganda as seen in Kallisthenes’ official history.
57
Xen. Anab. 1.1.11.
58
Plut. Ages. 9.3; Xen. Ages. 1.29; Plut. Ages. 10.1–2.
276 Timothy Howe

παρεσκευάζετο γὰρ πορευσόμενος ὡς δύναιτο ἀνωτάτω, νομίζων ὁπόσα

ὄπισθεν ποιήσαιτο ἔθνη πάντα ἀποστερήσειν βασιλέως.
“For he was preparing to march as far as he could into the interior, thinking
that he would detach from the King all the nations which he could put in
his rear” (Xen. Hell. 4.1.41).
Such a plan mirrors Alexander’s actions after Granikos – detach Greek and non-
Greek allies from the Great King along the march to the interior of Asia Minor.59
After Miletos, Alexander had two choices – backtrack to Sardis, through ter-
ritory that was loyal to him and take the Royal Road east to Greater Phrygia, Cap-
padocia and the Cilican Gates to Syria, or follow the more direct route from Mi-
letos along the Maiandros River to the Royal Road in Greater Phrygia. He chose
the Maiandros River.60 Along the way, near Tralles, he met Ada and decided to
aid her in taking Halikarnassos. Diodoros 17.24.2 and Strabo 14.2.17 are clear
that taking Halikarnassos was Ada’s idea, and was not part of any grand strategy
on Alexander’s part.61 Ada “ἱκετεύει τὸν Ἀλέξανδρον καὶ πείθει κατάγειν αὐτὴν
εἰς τὴν ἀφαιρεθεῖσαν βασιλείαν / entreated Alexander and persuaded him to re-

59
Capdetry, 2012: 230–231.
60
Although Arrian does not comment on Alexander’s actions between Miletos and meet-
ing Ada, the language he used makes it clear that Alexander was marching up the Ma-
iandros: Ada met up with Alexander at the moment when he was entering Karia –
ἐσβαλόντι Ἀλεξάνδρῳ ἐς Καρίαν ἀπήντα. Diodoros’ statement (17.24.1) that Greek cities
came over to Alexander after Miletos as he marched to Persia suggests that Alexander
planned to access the Persian heartland via the Maiandros Valley, which was filled with
important Greek cities like Magnesia and Tralles. More to the point, Alexander’s policy
of freedom and democracy to the cities of the Maiandros Valley would echo Agesilaos’
policy in the region and fit what he had done along the Ionian coast. Moreover, the largest
city in the middle Maiandros Valley, Tralles, had sent congratulatory messages to Alex-
ander after Granikos, but he had yet to visit the place. Arrian’s narrative of this phase of
the campaign, outside of the important seiges of Miletos and Halikarnassos is compressed
and chronologically jumbled. As a result, the discussion of Alexander’s relationship with
Tralles is related in 1.18, when ambassadors from the Maiandros cities visit the Macedo-
nian king at Ephessos.
61
Alexander’s plan seems to have been to continue quickly up the Maiandros without any
entanglements. Thus, he had left his siege engines behind at Tralles. After the siege of
Halikarnassos Arrian Anab. 1.23.6 tells us that Alexander brought his siege engines back
to Tralles (ἀπαγαγεῖν); Bosworth, 1980: 151. Diod. 17.22.5 confirms that Alexander had
to move his siege engines from far away at a great expense. Tralles would fit this context.
Although Diodorus (17.24.1) has Alexander transfer the engines from Miletos to Halikar-
nassos by sea, before meeting with Ada, this seems unlikely, for they were not in place
when Alexander arrived to invest the city. As Murray (2008: n. 64) observed in his analysis
of the siege, the main reason Alexander failed to take the Myndos Gate is because his
engines were delayed in transport.
 (Re)Taking Halikarnassos 277

store her to the kingdom of which she had been deprived” (Strabo 14.2.7).62
What did Ada say to Alexander at that meeting that convinced him to join her
in retaking Halikarnassos? How did Ada change Alexander’s strategy? The result
is clear: the Macedonian king broke off the march to Persia and backtracked to
Halikarnassos without the advantage of the fleet, which had just show itself very
effective against the Persian naval forces at Miletos. As noted above, this decision
has thrown both ancient and modern commentators into confusion, and as Brian
Bosworth noted in his commentary on Arrian (1980: 142), none of the arguments
advanced by ancient and modern authors offer satisfactory explanations for Alex-
ander actions. 63 Indeed, if we continue to think about Halikarnassos as the in-
tended target, then Alexander’s march east up the Maiandros Valley makes little
sense. But if we shift our perspective, and see Halikarnassos not as Alexander’s
target but Ada’s, then we change the conversation. Diodoros and Strabo inform
us that Ada convinced Alexander to restore her to the Karian throne. I think we
should see Ada in a similar position to Spithridates of Phaphlagonia in 396 BCE,
when Agesilaos was traversing this same route along the Maeander – Ada was
either an ally or an obstacle.64
The logistics of moving an army up the Maeander River Valley offer context
for understanding Ada as an actor in this historical drama rather than simply a
symbol. Once Alexander passed Tralles, he would have a problem: Ada held the
impregnable, granite-walled fortresses of Alabanda and Alinda that had the po-
tential to threaten access along the middle Maiandros Valley. Although Ada was
in a precarious position with regards to Orontobates and Halikarnassos and points
south-west, she was nonetheless in a very strong position with respect to Alexan-
der and points north-east. If Alexander had to invest Alabanda, the fortress closest
to the Maiandros road, and fight Ada, it would have set back his advance into
Persia. And yet, if he alligned with Ada, her control over the fortified Sacred Way
would give Alexander a “back-door” into Halikarnassos.65 What had previously

62
Diod 17.24.2: ἐντυχούσης δ’ αὐτῆς περὶ τῆς προγονικῆς δυναστείας καὶ δεηθείσης
βοηθῆσαι ταύτην “she presented a petition to recover the position of her ancestors and
requested his assistance.”
63
Sears’ main claim (2014: 212) that Alexander “embraced Ada because she consciously
and concertedly affected Greekness” is intriguing but inadequate to explain Alexander’s
military strategy. Greek symbolism does not explain why Alexander left the Greek city of
Tralles (and others along the Maiandros Valley) and marched into the heartland of non-
Greek Karia.
64
Strabo 14.2.17 has Ada fight alongside Alexander at the seige of Halikarnassos, sug-
gesting that her military skills and resources were understood by the literary tradition as
significant. Jeppesen, 1986: 92–93 takes this to mean that Ada faced off against her neice
of the same name. Cf. Carney, 2005: 70, n. 45.
65
Orontobates and Memnon did not see him coming, perhaps further evidence that Alex-
ander’s choice to take Halikarnassos was ad hoc and not part of any grand strategy. Stark,
1958a; 1958b: 104–106; 1958c: 341, argues that the Sacred Way was too narrow and likely
278 Timothy Howe

seemed unwise – taking Halikarnassos when Orontobates and Memnon controlled

both the sea and the land – was becoming plausible. More to the point, Ada had
leverage over Alexander: she could delay his eastward progress and bleed his
resources by forcing a siege at Alabanda. And so the two came to a mutually
beneficial arrangement – Alexander would turn aside and join Ada in retaking
Halikarnassos.
Apart from military inducements, Ada may also have offered Alexander an
opportunity to deepen his connections to what would later be a major interest of
his – his “other father”, Zeus.66 As Munn 2008 has shown, Alexander leveraged
local Zeus connections a few months later in 333, when he wrapped himself in a
Macedonian-sourced mythos of Midas and Asian kinghip at Gordion. Ada pre-
sented Alexander with a similar opportunity – connection with a Zeus Ninuendos
/ Zeus Labrys and his son Adonis.67 By presenting Alexander as the New Adonis,
the son of a local Zeus (with herself as the New Mother Goddess), Ada could
weave Alexander into native Karian mythologies for their mutual benefit. That
such a relationship was on offer is suggested by a heretofore troublesome passage
form Plutarch’s Moralia (180a):
τῆς δὲ τῶν Καρῶν βασιλίσσης Ἄδας ὄψα καὶ πέμματα παρεσκευασμένα
περιττῶς διὰ δημιουργῶν καὶ μαγείρων φιλοτιμουμένης ἀεὶ πέμπειν πρὸς
αὐτόν, ἔφη κρείττονας ἔχειν αὐτὸς ὀψοποιούς, πρὸς μὲν ἄριστον τὴν
νυκτοπορίαν πρὸς δὲ δεῖπνον τὴν ὀλιγαριστίαν.

to be snow-covered in Autumn for it to be an effective route for Alexander’s army. She

concludes that Alexander must have taken the route south of Alabanda to the coast and
then approached Halikarnassos from the sea. All reconstructions of Alexander’s route have
followed Stark’s thesis. But in the 50 years since she wrote, archaeological work in the
region has changed our view of the Sacred Way, see above, n. 18. The Sacred Way was
Alexander’s best choice because it avoided any coastal regions where Memnon’s fleet
could compromise his route. Moreover, the Sacred Way is at no higher elevation than the
pass to the coast via Alabanda and no more likely to be snow-covered.
66
See Howe, 2013 for a discussion of how Alexander invested in a mythos as a son of
Zeus.
67
Carstens, 2009: 24–26 notes that there is a long tradition in Karia of worshipping the
Anatolian storm god and his consort Innana, the mother goddess. Brody 2001: 102 argues
that by the Roman dictator Sulla’s time Zeus Labrys was associated with Aphrodite in her
guise as Anatolian mother goddess with Adonis as lover and/or son. See Yildrim 2004 for
an analysis of the carved reliefs at Aphrodisias and the local traditions that link Adonis,
Zeus and Aphrodite in Karia. See Chaniotis, 2010: 239–240, who traces the linkages
between Ninos, husband of Semiramis and father of Adonis, and Zeus among the local
traditions and epigraphic record of Karia. Unfortunately, the local traditions that informed
these linkages are lost to time, leaving only a hint of the rich mythology available to Ada
and Alexander.
 (Re)Taking Halikarnassos 279

“Ada, queen of the Carians, made it a point of honor to be always sending

to him fancy dishes and sweetmeats prepared in unusual ways by the hands
of artists and chefs, but he said he had better fancy cooks – his night
marches for his breakfast, and for his dinner his frugal breakfast.”
While Carney 2005: 70, n. 45 dismisses the ancedote as “dubious” I don’t think
we should be too quick to do so. Theokritos’ Idyll 15.112–118, attests that Adonis
worship at the time centred round specially prepared sweet dishes.68 While Car-
ney is correct that Plutarch uses this anecdote to show Alexander’s simple tastes
and rejection of luxury, it is important to note that he also underscores the fact
that Ada regulary (ἀεὶ) sent them to the Macedonian commander. If Alexander
did not eat such sweet food then Ada would cease sending it, if the purpose was
to please or nurish her new “son”. But the addition of ἀεὶ, continual repetive ac-
tion, suggests that a ritutal purpose was the intent here. The sweet cakes and other
delicaies should be seen as dedications to Alexander as the New Adonis rather
than as “food”.
The timing of these gifts to Alexander is significant because Ada had been
building up the local Adonis cult for several years. Archaeological survey shows
that Ada had constructed a new temenos to Adonis and the Mother Goddess (as
Aphrodite) at Alinda.69 Stephanus of Byzantium, likely following the famous 3rd
Century BCE Karian historian Apollonios of Aphrodisias, confirms this, noting
that there was a famous shrine to Adonis and Aphrodite constructed at Alinda.70
The Hekatomnid rulers had a long history of deploying cult, ritual and space to
articulate their identity as native Karian rulers. The ritual of sweet foods, and
Ada’s adoption of Alexander as her “son”, hint that local Karian ritual and power
networks informed their interactions.71 Unfortunately, the complex web of
symbolic relationships that Ada and Alexander may have built around these cults
are now lost to us, though the “adoption” suggests something more than legitimis-

68
See Reed, 2000: 322, 331.
69
See Bockisch / Ruggendorfer / Zabrana, 2013: 133–134, 141–158 for analysis and ref-
erences.
70
Stephanus s.v. Αλεξάνδρεια ι. Stephanus seems to know a great deal about Karian ge-
ography and history and regularly quotes Apollonios. For example, in BNJ 740 F 6a, he
cites Apollonios as a source for Alabanda being the “happiest home to the Karians”. For
the relationship between Stephanus and Apollonios see Paradiso, 2010. That Alexander
participated in this politicisation can be confirmed by the fact that Alinda was renamed
Alexandria, the first of many cities to bear that name; see Cohen, 1995: 244–246 for Alinda
as the first of Alexandrias.
71
In this context I think we should reconsider Abramenko’s innovative hypothesis that
Ada (and not Olympias) informed Alexander about Alexander of Lynkestis’ plot against
him. Carney, 2005: 70 dismisses it out of hand. But Ada had become an important part of
Alexander’s Asian network. She had connections in Asia that Olympias, back in Greece
did not.
280 Timothy Howe

ing Alexander’s inheritance of Karia is at play.

As with Midas and Gordion, Macedonian royal tradition itself may have of-
fered an opening for the family union between Alexander and Ada. Herodotos
reports in 8.136 that the nephew of Alexander I, one Amyntas after his maternal
grandfather Amyntas I, was given Alabanda, a πόλις μεγάλη “great city” in Phry-
gia to live in. Unfortunately, the manuscript tradition as we have it reports that
this Alabanda was located in Phyrgia, not Karia – Herodotos also knows of the
Alabanda in Karia (7.95.1) – and since Herodotos was a native Halikarnassian, he
should be in a position to know the cities of Karia.72 Thus, much ink has been spilt
to over the location of the Alabanda of 8.136, though with little result.73 Since we
have no way to resolve the “Alabanda Question”, I think it is best to focus on Ada
and Alexander’s reception of Herodotos’ text, rather than the potential errors in

72
As Bowrie, 2007: 224 notes, Hdt. 8.136 is the only attestation for a Phrygian Alabanda.
73
Badian, 1994: 115–116 posits that two cities named Alabanda existed at the same time,
and that the Phrygian one was given to the younger Amyntas as a consolation prize, after
the loss of Macedonia from Persian control in aftermath of 5th century Persian Wars. Ba-
dian concludes that this “lesser” Alabanda was so unimportant that it received no further
notice in the literary record. Since Badian’s argument does not take into account Herodo-
tos’ statement that Phrygian Alabanda was a πόλις μεγάλη, it is best put aside. The other
solutions to the “Alabanda Question” are in a different category altogether and involve
emendations to Herodotos’ text. Stein, 1875: ap. Hdt 8.136, for example, proposed that
Ἀλάβανδα was a copy-error for Ἀλάβαστρα. But since there is no Alabastra attested in
Asia Minor most editors of Diodoros have perferred to retain Ἀλάβανδα, though Stein’s
argument does persist; e.g. Vasilev, 2015: 112–113. More recently. Hornblower, 1982:
218, n. 2, pointed out that although Alabanda cannot be correct since it contradicts what
Herodotos, a native of Karia tells us in Hdt. 5.95, a word like Alabanda must be intended
and was subsequently garbled by a copyist. Hornblower proposes Blaunda / Blauda /
Blaundos on the Phrygian-Lydian border, based on Diod. 13.104.6. And there the issue
might rest but for the material evidence from Blaundos. A. Filges performed field surveys
at Blaundos in 1999, 2000 and 2002 but was unable to find evidence of a Classical city;
Filges, 2006: 321–350; Can, 2017. Likewise, in 2018 and 2019, B. Can, the current leader
of the Blaundos Excavation Project, excavated the city centre and found no Classical ma-
terial. Thus, depite extensive survey and two seasons of excavation, no physical evidence
has been found of a city (μεγάλη or otherwise) dating to the late 400s BCE – the period
when Herodotos is writing and the period to which Diodoros is referring (B. Can, personal
communication). While the archaeological record has cast doubt on Hornblower’s inno-
vative philological solution, a closer examination of Diodoros offers a potential way for-
ward. Diodoros calles Blaundos a fort (φρούριον), not a polis; see commentary in Nielsen,
2002: 55, esp. n. 50. And so it possible that a small late 5th century fort may lie hidden
among Hellenistic and Roman Blaundos. But syncretising Herodotos’ πόλις μεγάλη and
Diodoros’ φρούριον still require a great leap of faith. In the end, because a comprehensive
solution has not been reached, I think it best to work with Herodotos’ text as we have it
and focus on Alexander’s reception of an Argead presence at “an” Alabanda in Asia Mi-
nor. Thus, for Alexander, a familial connection could be made, via Alabanda, between
Ada and the Argeads, thereby legitimising his “adoption” by Ada.
 (Re)Taking Halikarnassos 281

the manuscript or the “accuracy” of that text in the modern historical sense. From
the fragments that survive of Kallisthenes’ official history of Alexander’s cam-
paign, it is clear that Herodotos’ Historia was certainly well known at Alexander’s
court.74 Seen in this light, then, the fact that a branch of the Argead royal house
could be connected to a prosperous city in Asia Minor, named Alabanda, would
have great diplomatic use. A putative family connection between Alexander and
Ada could do much to legitimate their alliance, especially when Alexander III,
named descendant of Alexander I, found himself face-to-face with the current
ruler of Alabanda. What better justification for alliance that uniting two estranged
“branches” of the Argead family?

Conclusions
Ada ruled over a strategically important queendom. She had to the support of her
fellow Karians as well as that of Persian and Macedonian monarchs. Like her
Hekatomnid predecessors, she used all the tools at her disposal – military, politi-
cal and religious – to keep control over her realm. But unlike many Persian satraps
in Asia Minor, including members of her own family, she stayed loyal to her over-
lords, so long as they stayed loyal to her. And yet, she is one of the most over-
looked rulers of the ancient world, largely because she crossed Alexander the
Great’s path and was overshadowed by him. As Alexander’s story grew, Ada’s
strategic needs become overwhelmed by his, her story elided by his. And so in the
Alexander historiography, taking Halikarnassos becomes not Ada’s plan but Al-
exanders, a link in the Great Man’s grand strategy to take out Persian seapower
by land. Though Ada’s role has not been completely erased, it is decidedly dimin-
ished. This paper has attempted to challenge such orthodoxy and bring Ada out
of the shadows as a military leader and politician in her own right. Retaking Hal-
ikarnassos was Ada’s plan, not Alexander’s. She met him as he marched up the
Maiandros and convinced him to change plans in favour of a mutually beneficial
alliance. Interestingly, many of the legitimising tools that Ada used to retain her
control of Karia and attract allies, such as family mythologies, ruler cults and
brother-sister marriage Alexander’s successors would make famous. As we con-
tinue to refine Ada’s story and centre analysis on her and her tools of empire, it is
worth revisiting the origins of Hellenistic kingship and looking to Karia as well
as to Pharaonic Egypt and Achaemenid Persia.

74
Prandi, 1985: 77–79, 82–93.
282 Timothy Howe

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