Indian Penal Code PDF
Indian Penal Code PDF
Indian Penal Code PDF
Chapter I Introduction
What is Crime ? Explain the difference between Crime and Tort?
Introduction: The criminal law consists of rules for regulating human conduct
promulgated by State and are uniformly applicable to all persons and is
enforced by punishment.
The Concept of Crime:
Perception of crime has undergone a radical change over the years, Generally
speaking, crime is a human conduct which the society generally abhors or
disapproves. But in the modern sense of the term, whatever is prohibited by the
penal law in force is deemed as a crime, the consequence which is punishment.
IPC is a comprehensive code intended to cover substantive aspects of Criminal
law. It is not procedural law like Cr.P.C. This code was drafted in 1860 on the
recommendations of first law commission of India established in 1834, under the
Charter Act of 1833 under the Chairmanship of Lord Babington Macualay.
Commenced in January 1862.
The IPC of 1860 , is sub divided into 23 Chapters and 511 Sections.
Definitions of crime:
The word ‘Crime is derived from Greek expression ‘Krimos’ which means social
order and it is applied ‘to those acts that go against social order and are
worthy of serious condemnation.’
Crime has been defined by various writers, but no definition tells us everything
about a crime. In fact, the very definition of crime depends on the values of a
given society. The Code itself does not define crime .
Salmond, defines crime as: “a crime is an act deemed by law to be harmful to
Society in general, even though its immediate victim is an individual”.
According to Bentham, offences are whatever the legislature has prohibited
for good or for bad reasons. If the question relates to a theoretical research
for the discovery of the best possible laws according to the principles of utility,
we give the name of offence to every act which we think ought to be
prohibited by reasons of some evil which it produces or tends to produce.
Sir William Blackstone in his “Commentaries on the Laws of England” has
defined crime in two ways: as (i) “an act committed or omitted in violation of a
Public law either forbidding or commanding it.” (ii) “A crime is a violation of the
public rights and duties due to the whole community, considered, as a
community in its social aggregate capacity”.
Sir James Stephen, while modifying the Blackstone’s definition, states, “A crime is
a violation of a right, considered in reference to the evil tendency of such
violation as regards the community at large”.
In T. K . Gopal v. State of Karnataka, SCC, 2000, the Supreme Court attempted a
definition for crime Thus; “an act that subjects the doer to legal punishment”. It
may also be defined as commission of an act as specifically forbidden by law; it
may be an offence against morality or social order.
In Indradeo mahto v. State of W.B1973, SCC, the Supreme Court has said that
the real test to differentiate crime from civil wrong is the degree and extent of
the disturbance an act causes to the normal balanced peaceful tempo of civil Life
of a community.
In Harpreet Kaurv. State of Maharashtra, SC 1972, the SC opined that, Crime is a
revolt against the whole society and an attack on the civilization of the day.
Order, is the basis need of any organized civilized society and any attempt to
disturb that order affects the society and the community.
We find that it is very difficult to get a definition of crime suitable to all countries
for all the time. The following are, according to Jerome Hall, interrelated and
overlapping differential of crime.
1. There must be some external consequences or ‘harm’ to social interests.
2. The harm must be ‘prohibited’ by penal laws.
3. There must be ‘conduct’ that is intentional or reckless action o inaction that
brings prohibited harm.
4. There must be ‘mens rea’ or’ criminal intent’.
5. There must be concurrence of ‘,mens rea’ and conduct.
6. There must be a ‘casual relation between the legally prohibited harm and the
voluntary misconduct.
7. There must be legally prescribed ‘punishment’ or threat of punishment.
Nature of Crime:
Law prescribes certain standards of conduct to be observed by people in
society . These standards have the approval of the society in general. Any
deviation from the standards of behavior fixed by the society is punished.
Therefore, such conduct which does not accord with the prescribed standard is
loosely known as crime.
A crime contains two elements, they are:
(i) mala-in-se, and
(ii) ‘mala prohibita’
Some of the traditional crimes like murder, theft and rape etc., are known as
‘mala-in se’, while various other crimes, in which there is no element of
immorality in the traditional sense are known as ‘mala-prohibita’ for example
traffic violations and fines.
Crimes are not static, they are relative. Crimes differ from country to country
and time to time. For example adultery was mala-prohibita in India all these
years but now it is decriminalized. Whereas in England it is not prohibited at all.
Polygamy is prohibited among Hindus by the Hindu marriage Act, 1955, but there
is no such law of Mohammedans. They can marry 4 women at a time.
there is vast difference between crime , sin, social wrongs and moral wrongs.
The reason is that a crime is forbidden by law. There is also a prescribed
procedure and machinery to punish the persons who commit crime, whereas
there is no mechanism to punish anyone in the case of the sin, social or moral
wrongs.
Sin is concerned with religion. Therefore if any person commits a sin, it is aid
that he will be punished by God himself. What is ‘sin’ is dictated by the particular
religion to which he belongs. Likewise, social and moral wrongs are wrongs only
in the eyes of moral codes, or in social rules, but they are not recognized wrongs
in the eyes of law.
Distinction between Crime and Torts (Civil wrongs)
There are certain acts which are not approved by most of the people in a
civilized society, because they have a tendency to reduce the sum total of
human happiness to conserve which is the ultimate aim of all laws. Such acts
are known as wrongs for example forgery, cheating , stealing and homicide etc.
The evil tendencies of these acts differ in degree. Some of them are
considered serious enough so as to attract the notice of the laws, others are
only disapproved by the society. The latter are known as moral wrongs and are
created by the laws of the community or the laws of religion. The reaction of
thein former is grave enough and is expressed either by asking the wrong-doer
to pay damages to the person injured or awards punishment. Cases, where the
wrong-doer is ordered to indemnify the person injured are known as civil
wrongs and where he awarded punishment are known as Crimes.
Both crimes and Torts directly affect the community. They overlap each other
and many crimes include tort within them.
Tort is a civil wrong which is a breach of some duty between citizens
defined by the general law, which creates a civil cause of action.
Every tortious act does not amount to a crime, nor does every crime include a
tort. Thus, mistaken or innocent trespass to one’s land or private nuisance is
a tortious act, but is not a crime as there is no element of danger to the
public interest.
Both Crime and tort resemble each other in two respects, namely
(i) Tort and crime are violation of right in rem;
(ii) They are fixed by law irrespective of the consent of the parties, unlike
contract.
Some of them are only torts and not crimes, for example: Conversion, nervous
shock, private nuisance, malicious prosecution, tortious conspiracy, slander of
goods etc.
Few examples of crimes which are not treated as torts: they are forgery,
perjury, culpable homicide, rape, etc.
Some examples for both crimes and torts: Assault, battery(criminal force),
deceit, defamation, negligence, false imprisonment, trespass etc.
16. Criminal law is the oldest law. Civil law is the latest subject.
Distinction between Crime and Breach of Contract
Crime Breach of Contract
1. The injured party cannot sue for But, in case of breach of contract,
damages. The injury to the victim the injured party has right only for
is deemed as an injury to the liquidated damages. That is, pre-
society. It is the violation of settled or actual damages.
public right. Hence the State
prosecutes the accused. The
burden of proof lies upon the
State. If the wrongful act is
proved, the accused is put in
imprisonment or imposed fine or
both . It is credited into the state’s
account. While, the object of law on the
2. The object of the criminal law is to breach of contract is to protect the
protect the peace of the society. rights of the parties in a contract.
Crime Breach of Contract
3. Mens rea , is an important factor Where-as, in breach of contract , the
in imposing Criminal liability upon motive is not an essential factor. The
the wrong-doer. defaulting party has to pay the pre-
settled and actual damages.
4. A wrongful act is an infringement But, in a breach of contract is an
of ‘right in rem’. The wrong doer infringement of a ’right in personam’,
has a ‘duty in rem’, that is he that is a right available only against
should not do harm or injury to some determinate person or body
any person. It is a statutory duty. and for which the community at
large has no concern.
It is constructive liability.
6. It is joint liability.
7. Only offence committed in
furtherance of common Members of unlawful assembly
are not only labile to the acts
intention is punishable. done in prosecution of common
intention to be done with
unlawful object, but its
consequence offences.
Chapter: Punishments
Question: Explain types of punishments to which offenders are liable
under IPC with special reference to death sentence.
The object of punishment is to protect society from mischievous and
undesirable elements by deterring potential offenders, by preventing
the actual offender from committing further offence and by reforming
and turning them into law-abiding citizens. It is also asserted that
respect for law grows largely out of opposition to those who violate
the law. The object of punishments has been very well summarised by
Manu, the Great Hindu law-giver in the following words:
Punishments governs all mankind; considers the punishment(danda)
as the perfection of justice.
The protection of society and security of person's life, liberty and
property is an essential function of the state. This could be achieved
through instrumentality of criminal law by imposing appropriate
sentence and stamping out criminal proclivity (tendency.)
Section 53 to 75 of IPC, enumerates various kinds of punishments to which
offenders are liable under the Penal Code. This section is not exhaustive in
so far as the kinds of punishments are concerned because some other
punishments may be imposed under some local and special law.
In State of Punjab v. Mann Singh, 1983, It was held that it was the duty of
the Court in every case to award a proper sentence having regard to the
nature of the offence, the manner in which it was committed and to all the
attendant circumstances.
While passing sentence the Court has to consider the totality of factors
bearing on the offence and the offender and award a punishment which
will promote effectively the punitive objective of the law deterrence and
rehabilitation. Sentencing is always a matter of judicial discretion subject
to any mandatory minimum prescribed by law.
Prof. H.L.A. Hart, defines punishment in terms of the following five elements
(i) It must involve pain or other consequences normally considered
unpleasant.
(ii) It must be for an offence against legal rules.
(iii) It must be for an actual or supposed offender for his offence.
(iv) It must be intentionally administered by human being other than
offender.
(v) It must be imposed and administered by an authority constituted by a
legal system against which the offence is committed purpose and function.
The nature of punishment can be drawn with reference to the following
characteristics.
(1) Punishments is a privation(evil, pain, disvalue).
(2) Punishments is coercive.
(3) Punishments is inflicted in the name of the State; it is authorised.
(4) Punishment presupposes rules, their violations and a more or less formal
determination of that , expressed in a judgment.
(5) Punishment is inflicted upon an offender who has committed a harm and
this presupposed a set of values by reference to which both the harm and
punishment are ethically significant.
(6) The extent or the type of punishment is in some defended way related to
the commission of a harm.
Theories of Punishments: there are five types of theories of pinishment they
are:
1. Deterrent theory: According to this theory, the object of punishment is
not only to prevent the wrong doer from doing a wrong a second time,
but also to make him an example to others who have criminal tendencies.
Salmond considered deterrent aspects of criminal justice to be the most
important for control of crime.
That is to say, the chief aim of the law of crime is to make the evil-doer
an example and a warning to all that are like-minded. The commission of
every offence should be made a bad bargain.
2. Preventive theory: Another object of punishment is prevention or
disablement. Offenders are disabled from repeating the crime by awarding
punishments, such as death, exile or forfeiture of an office, by putting the
criminal in jail, he is prevented from committing another crime.
The preventive theory concentrates o the prisoner and seeks to prevent
hi from offending again in the future. The death penalty and exile serve
the same purpose of disabling the offender.
3. Retributive theory: In primitive society punishment was mainly retributive .
The person wronged was allowed to have revenge against the wrongdoer.
The principle of “an eye for an eye”, “a tooth for a tooth”, “ a nail for nail”,
was the basis of criminal administration.
Retributive punishments gratifies the instinct or retaliation , which exists
not merely in the individual wronged, but also in society at large. In
modern times the idea of private revenge has been forsaken and the State
has come forward to effect revenge in place of the private individual.
4. Reformative Theory: According to the reformative theory, the object of
punishment is the reformation of criminals. It is maintained that
punishment tends to reform criminals and that it accomplishes this by
instilling in them a fear of repetition of the punishment a conviction tht
crime does not pay, or by braking habits that the criminals have formed,
especially if the penalty is a long period of imprisonment, which gives the
prisoner no opportunity for improvement. Even if an offender commits a
crime under certain circumstances, he does not cease to be a human being.
The circumstances under which he committed the crime may not occur
again. The object of the punishment should be to reform the offender.
In other words the purpose of this theory is, the essence of punishment is to
reform the character of the wrong doer by making him do what is right and not
to do what is wrong. The legitimate object of punishment is to reform, educate
and discipline the criminal . In this theory Crime is treated as disease which
needs to be cured and not to be punished.
4. Expiatory Theory: this theory is also known as theory of penance.
According to this theory, punishment is necessary for the purification of the
offender. It is a kind of expiation or penance for the misdeed of a person .
In modern times expiation theory is accepted in a modified form and is
considered by some to be a part of the retributive theory. According to Salmond,
“to suffer punishment is to pay a debt due to the law that has been violated”.
One more theory added in the modern times are:
Multiple Approach Theory: In fact, a perfect system of criminal justice could
never be based on any single theory of justice. It would have to be a combination
of all. Every theory has its own merits and every effort should be made to extract
the good points of each and integrate it so that best of all could be achieved.
Kinds of punishments Liable under the provisions of the Indian Penal Code. 1860:
According to Section 53 of the Indian Penal Code , the punishments to which
offender are liable under the provisions of the Code are:
1. Death(Capital Punishment).
2. Imprisonment for life.
3. Imprisonment, which is of two descriptions , namely:
(i) Rigorous.
ii) Simple.
4. Forfeiture of Property.
5. Fine.
1. Death sentence or capital punishment: Death sentence is the most serious
kinds of punishment. Some countries abolished it. It is awarded in India in
certain exceptional cases. To name a few:
(i) waging or attempting to wage war or abetting the waging of war against the
government of India-section 121.
(ii) Abetment of mutiny actual committed - Section 132.
(iii) Giving , fabricating false evidence upon which an innocent person suffers death
– Section 194.
(iv) Murder Section – 302
(v) Abetment of suicide of a child, an insane or intoxicated person Section-305
(vi) Attempt to murder by a person under sentence of imprisonment for life, if
hurt is caused. Section: Section 307.
(i) Punishment for cause death or resulting in persistent vegetative
state of victim : Section 376A.
(ii) Punishments for repeat offenders.
(iii) Dacoity accompanied with murder: Section 396.
The law confers on the Judge wide discretionary power in the
matter of passing a sentence. However, under section 303 of the IPC,
the Judge has no such discretionary power, since Section 303
prescribes capital sentence compulsorily in case of a life imprisonment
convict, who is found guilty of committing murder, while undergoing
the sentence of imprisonment for life. But , Section 303 ,was struck
down as unconstitutional by the Supreme Court in Muthu v. State of
Punjab, AIR 1983.
While death penalty is supported by one section of society , but the other
totally disapprove the idea of capital punishment, may be the reason perhaps ,
recent trends in public sentiments against capital punishment represent the
broader realisation that correction is more important to society than
punishment.
In Rajendra Prasad v. State of UP., 1979, the Supreme Court has observed that
capital sentence may be awarded where survival of the society is in danger.
Death penalty may be awarded in case of planned motivation persons guilty of
adulteration etc., hardened murderer beyond rehabilitation or where officer of
law are killed by designers of murder. Further special reasons stated by the
court in awarding death penalty must relate to criminal as well and not to
crime alone.
In Jagmohan Singh vs. State of Uttar Pradesh AIR, 1973, the five judge bench
of the Supreme Court, by a unanimous verdict, upheld the constitutional
validity of death penalty held that capital punishment was not violate of
Articles 14, 19 and 21.
In this case the validity of death sentence was challenged on the ground that it
was violate of Articles 19 and 21 because it did not provide any procedure. It
was contended that the procedure prescribed under Cr. P.C. was confined only to
findings of guilt and not awarding death sentence. The Supreme Court held that
the choice of death sentence is done in accordance with the procedure
established by law. It was observed that the judge makes the choice between
capital sentence or imprisonment of life on the basis of circumstances and facts
and nature of crime brought on record during trial.
Further, The Supreme Court in Machhi Singh vs. State of Punjab, AIR 1983, laid
down the broad outlines of the circumstances when death sentence should be
imposed. Justice Thakkar speaking for the Court held that five categories of
cases may be regarded as rarest of rare cases deserving extreme penalty. They
are:
1. Manner of Commission of murder – When the murder is committed in an
extremely brutal manner so as to arouse intense and extreme indignation in
the community, for instance, when the house of the victim is set a flame to
roast him alive, when the body is cut to pieces or the victim is subjected to
inhuman torture.
2. Motive – When the murder is committed for a motive which evinces
depravity and meanness, example., a hired assassin, a cold blooded murder to
inherit property, or gain control over property of a ward, or a murder
committed for betrayal of the motherland.
3. Anti-social or socially abhorrent nature of the crime – where a scheduled
caste or minority community person is murdered in circumstances which
arouse: social wrath; or bride burning for dowry, or for remarriage.
4. Magnitude of the Crime – Crimes of enormous proportion, like multiple
murders of a family or persons of a particular caste, community or locality.
5. Personality of victim of murder.
In a very renowned case Bachan Singh v. State of punjab, 1980, the Supreme
Court while upholding the validity of the death penalty expressed the opinion
That a real and abiding concern for the dignity of human life postulates resistance
to taking a life through laws instrumentality. That ought not to be done save in the
rarest of rare cases, , when the alternative option is unquestionably foreclosed.
The aggravating circumstances which justify the award of death penalty have
been summed up as follows:
(a) If the murder has been committed after previous planning and involves
extreme brutality; or
(b) If the murder involves exceptional depravity; or
( c) If the murder is of a member of any of the armed forces of the Union or of a
member of any police force or of any public servant and was committed –
(i) while such member or public servant was on duty; or
(ii) in consequence of anything done or attempted to be done by such member
or public servant in the lawful discharge of his duty as such member or public
servant as the case may be, or has ceased to be such member or public servant.
(d) If the murder is of a person who acted in the lawful discharge of his duty
under section 43 of Cr. P.C, 1973, or who had rendered an assistance to a
magistrate or a police officer demanding his aid or requesting his assistance
under Section 37 and 129 of the Code.
2. Imprisonment for life: the sentence of imprisonment for life is provided in
about fifty offences under the IPC . To name a few, waging war, Conspiracy,
Collection of arms , with the intention of waging war against the Government of
India, Sedition Abetment of mutiny, Perjury in a capital crime. Murder , Culpable
homicide, Abetment of suicide by a minor or insane person, Attempt to murder
with hurt, Trade in slaves, rape, Gang Rape, Murder in docoity, Criminal breach of
trust by public servant, banker merchant agent etc, Grievous Hurt committed in
house breaking, Counterfeiting device or mark for forgery , Manufacturing seal
with intent to commit forgery, etc.,
In ordinary connotation imprisonment for life means imprisonment for
whole of the remaining period of the convicted person’s natural life. But in
practice, it is not so. However, the life convict is not entitled to automatic
release on completion of fourteen years imprisonment unless the government
passes an order remitting the balance of his sentence. Section 55 of the IPC
empowers the appropriate government to commute the period of life
imprisonment.
The Court in Swamy Sharaddananda alias Murli Manohar Mishra v. State of
Karnataka, AIR , 2008, made it explicitly clear that a convict punished with life
imprisonment meant imprisonment till his last breath. The Court, however,
noted that once the judgment passing life imprisonment is pronounced , the
matter passes into the hands of the executive and is governed by different
provisions of law and there is no guarantee that at the sentence awarded to
the convict by the Court after considerable deliberation would be carried out in
actually the remissions granted by the executive to a life convict virtually
reduce the sentence to not more than 14 years which obviously frustrates the
cause of justice. The Court in this case directed that the accused shall not be
released from prison till the rest of his life.
The Supreme Court in Mohd. Munna V. Union of India, AIR, 2005,
reiterated that in the absence of an order or remission formally passed by the
appropriate Government, there is no provision in IPC or Cr.P.C under which a
sentence of life imprisonment could be treated as for a term of 14 years or 20
years and a life convict cannot claim remission as a matter of right.
3. Imprisonment: Imprisonment is defined as the deprivation of the liberty of
another without his consent. Imprisonment is no other thing but the restraint
of a man’s liberty, whether it be in the open field, or in the stocks or cage or in
the street or in the man’s own house, in all these places the party so restrained
is said to be a prisoner so long as he has no liberty freely to go at all times to all
places at his will.
Imprisonment is of following types:
(a) Rigorous Imprisonment: In the case of rigorous imprisonment, the offender
is put to hard labour such a grinding corn, digging earth, drawing water, cutting
fire-wood, etc., according to 57 of IPC, the maximum rigorous imprisonment
that can be awarded for an offence is fourteen years. According to section
57, the lowest term actually named for a given offence is twenty-four
hours. The minimum is unlimited. To name a few, the following offences
mentioned in the IPC are punishable also rigorous imprisonment.
(i) Personating a public c servant –Section 170.
(ii) Punishment for bribery –Section 171-E.
(iii) Punishment of false evidence.
(iv) Causing miscarriage ; Section 312.
(v) Giving false information respect to an offence committed: Section –
203, etc.
(c) Simple Imprisonment: In case of simple imprisonment , the offender is
confined to jail and is not put to any kind of work. The following are the
few examples for offences punishable with simple imprisonment only:
(i) Pubic servant unlawfully engaging in trade.
(i) A person absconding to avoid service of summons.
(ii) Intentional omission to produce a document to a public servant by a person
legally bound to produce such document.
(iii) Refusing to take oath or refusing to anger to a public servant authorised to
question, etc.,
(iv) Intentional insult or interruption to a public servant sitting in any stage of a
judicial proceeding .
(v) Continuation of nuisance after injunction to discontinue.
(vi) Wrongful restraint .
(vii)Defamation, etc,.
As per Section 60 of the IPC, in every case in which an offender is punishable
with imprisonment, which may be either description , it shall be competent to
the court to direct in the sentence that such imprisonment shall be wholly
rigorous, or that such imprisonment shall be wholly simple , or that any part of
such imprisonment shall be rigorous and the rest simple.
Commutation for death sentence or sentences: According IPC, in every case in
which sentence of death or any sentence shall have been passed, the appropriate
government may, without the consent of the offender , commute the punishment
for any other punishment provided by the Court.
Solitary Confinement: (for short notes): According to section 73 of IPC, solitary
confinement is isolation of he prisoner from human intercourse and society. The
sentence of solitary confinement is a mode of undergoing the sentence of
rigorous imprisonment. It is not a substantive sentence by itself. It causes a
feeling of oppression due to the gregarious instincts of man. Prolonged isolation of
the prisoner from human communion becomes intolerable and often leads to
mental derangement. When not unduly prolonged, it gives him time to reflect
upon the utility of society which has acts were calculated to destroy.
The sentence of solitary confinement is reserved for hardened criminals and as
punishment for atrocity or brutality. Solitary confinement may be ordered even in
a case tried summarily provide the offender is sentenced to rigorous
imprisonment.
The following are some restrictions in imposing solitary confinement:
(i) Solitary confinement should not exceed three months of the whole term of
imprisonment;
(ii) It cannot be awarded where imprisonment is not part of the substantive
sentence;
(iii) It cannot be awarded where imprisonment is in lieu of fine;
(iv) It cannot be awarded for the whole term of imprisonment;
False evidence. Section 191 -197, 208-212: Offences relating to coins and
Government Stamps: Sections 230 to 240 & 263A; Public Nuisance &
Private Nuisance: Offences relating to religion: Section 295 -298
Introduction :
As a general principal of law, man is presumed to know the nature and
consequences of his act and is, therefor ,held responsible for it. However,
there are certain exceptions to this general rule, wherein a person may be
excused of crim. In some cases, a person may be entirely excused from
criminal responsibility by virtue of being head of a sovereign State or being a
representative of such a State , or of the United Nations Organisations and so
on.
Others may be excused from the consequences of punishment by reason of
the absence of the requisite mens rea necessary for the commission of
particular offence. This is based on the well-known maxim, actus non facit
reum nisi mens sit rea, that is, the act itself does not make a man guilty
unless his intention are so, such cases have been discussed elaborately under
Section 76 to 106. these are called ‘Exceptions’. These exceptions not only
limited to the offences under the Penal Code, but it extends to the offences
under the special or local laws as well.
There are 31 sections under general exceptions , wherein for acts committed,
there is no punishment, as such acts are either excused or justified which may
be grouped into eight heads.
(i) Mistake of fact and mistake of law (Section 76 and 79)
(ii) Privileged Acts and Judicial Acts)(Section 77 and 78)
(iii) Accidental Acts (Section 80)
(iv) Necessity(Section 81)
(v) Incapability to commit a crime(Section 82 to 86)
(vi) Acts done with consent (Section 87-90); or without consent(Section 92)
(vii) Triviality (Section 9)and
(viii)Private defence (Section 96 -106).
The exceptions provide in the chapter may be grouped into two categories,
namely:
(i) Excusable exceptions , and
(ii) Justifiable exceptions.
I. Mistake of Fact and Mistake of Law
Questions : 1. Explain the defence of ‘mistake of fact’ in the Indian
context.
2. Write a short notes on Mistake of Law and Mistake of fact.
A mistake means a factual error. An opinion, judgement, or a belief which is
erroneous by reference to the real facts . It can divided into two types:
1. Mistake of fact and
2. Mistake of Law:
The essential conditions of criminal responsibility are :
(a) Free will;
(b) Intelligence to distinguish between good and evil;
( c) knowledge of facts upon which the good and evil of an act may depend;
The distinction between good and evil necessarily depends on the knowledge of
facts. It is because of this that ignorance or mistake of such fact as is necessary to
distinguish between right and wrong , is admitted as a good ground of exemption
from criminal liability. But in order to be excuse the ignorance or mistake of fact
should not be the result of carelessness or negligence.
Mistake of Fact: According to Section 76, Acts done by a person bound or by
mistake of fact believing himself bound, by law: “Nothing is an offence which is
done by a person who is, or who by reason of a mistake of fact and not by reason
of a mistake of law in good faith believes himself to be bound by law to do it”.
Meaning of Mistake : Ignorantia facti excusat, ignorantia legis neminem excusat,
is a well known maxim of criminal law. It means ignorance of fact is an excuse,
ignorance of law is no excuse. In means a factual error. “All error consists in
taking for real what is mere appearance.
Thus under IPC, both mistake of fact and ignorance of fact are treated alike and
they are accepted as defence against criminal liability.
Mistake of fact to be an excuse must be mistake in respect of a material fact, a fact
essential to constitute a particular offence it is only such ignorance that negatives
the mens rea necessary to constitute the offence and as pointed by Baron Parke
Accepted by Huda, “the guilt of the accused must depend on circumstances as
they appear to him. “Mistake according to Russel may be admitted as a defence
provided:
(1) That the state of things believed to exist would, it true, have justified the act
done;
(2) That the mistake must be reasonable;
(3) That the mistake must relate to fact and not to law.
One who sets up mistake as his defence must establish the existence or the
probability of the existence of that attitude of his mind which he asserts to have
been at the time of commission of crime. In other words , what accused pleads
to have misled him, would have misled as ‘reasonable man’. That is, what
accused believed, must be bonafide and in good faith.
The Essentials of mistake is contained in Section 76 to 79 of the Indian Penal
Code. They are:
(i) An act done by a person who is bound by law in doing that or
(ii) An act done by a person who believes himself to be bound by law in doing
that;
(iii) The belief must be by reasons for a mistake of fact and not by reason of a
mistake of law, that is., mistake must relate to fact and not to law;
(iv) The belief must be a bona fide belief in goods faith, that is., he must believe in
good faith
If the above conditions are fulfilled a, a mistake may successfully be pleaded in
defence to any prosecution for any offence.
There are two exceptions to the maxim ‘ignorantia facti doth excuse’
1. No one is allowed to lead ignorance of fact, when responsible inquiry would
have elicited the true facts. For example, when a person marries on an honest
belief that his previous marriage has been dissolved by a decree of divorce ,
whereas the decree of divorce has not been granted, he will be guilty of
bigamy. Here mistake will not save the accused because the second marriage.
2. Mistake of fact is not accepted as a plea at all, when the act is penalised by a
Selling of adulterated foodstuffs has been made an offence under he
Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954. In case of any prosecution, it shall
be no defence that the vendor was ignorant of the nature, substance or
quality of the food sold by him.
Illustration for mistake of fact:
1. A , a soldier fires on a mob by the order of his superior officer in conformity
with the commands of the law. A has committed no offence.
2. A, an officer of a Court of Justice, being ordered by that court to arrest, Y,
and after due enquiry, believing Z to be Y, arrests Z. A has committed no
offence.
Case Laws:
R v. Prince 1975: In this case, the accused was charged of unlawfully taking an
unmarried girl under the age of 16 years out of possession and against the will
of father . It was found tht the accused bona fide and reasonably believed the
girl to be older than 16 years. The accused’s mistaken belief about the age of
the girl was held not o be a good defence to an indictment for abduction ,
because he intended to do and did a wrongful or immoral act and not an
innocent act. Section 55 of the offence against the Persons’ Act 1857, which
made the offence of abduction and intended to penalise the abduction without
proof of any guilty intention on the apart of the wrong-doer.
In R v. Tolson, 1889, the accused was convicted of bigamy . She believed in
good faith and on reasonable grounds that her husband died. It was held that a
bona fide belief on reasonable grounds in he death of the husband at the time
of the second marriage afforded a good defence to the charge of bigamy.
In Sheras v. Dr. Rutzen, 1895, a statute prohibited a licensed dealer of liquor
from supplying liquor to a police constable while on duty and the dealer
supplied liquor to a constable on a bona fide belief that he was off duty. He
was held to have committed no offence.
Mistake is a defence, because when an act is done by reason of mistake of fact,
mens rea necessary to constitute the crime is absent or is negative.
In Rex v. Levett, 1688, the defendant was awakened in the night by strange noises in his
house, thinking he was attacking a burglar , he ran his sword through a cabinet, where
the intruder was hiding and killed a friend of his servant present by the latter’s
invitation. It was held not to be manslaughter. “for he did it ignorantly without
intention of hurt to the deceased”.
In Gopalia Kallaiya , 1923, a police officer arrested the complainant under a warrant
believing in good faith that he was the person to arrested. The complainant brought an
action for wrongful confinement. It was held that the police officer was not guilty
because he was protected by this section.
Section 76 deals with two classes of cases wherein a person is excused from criminal
liability on the ground of mistake of fact:
1. Obedience to order of Superior Officer: the subordinates need not blindly obey the
order of their superiors. The maxim ‘respondent superior’ has no application to such a
case. However, the plea of obedience to an illegal orders can be taken into
consideration, only in mitigation of punishment. But cannot be ed as a complete
defence.
Where a constables fires upon a lawful assembly under the orders of his superior, he
shall be liable and cannot claim benefit of this section, because no one is obliged to
obey illegal order of he superior. If the order of the superior is justified and is, therefore
lawful no further question can arise as to whether the subordinate servants who
acted in obedience to that order, believed or did not believe that order to lawful.
Such an inquiry becomes necessary only, when the order of the superior officer
which is pleaded as a defence is found not to be conformity with the commands
of the law. In such an eventuality no occasion arises for applying provisions of
section 76.
2. Belief in good faith or reasonableness of the error: An actual mistake of fact is
not sufficient. The apprehension of danger must be bona fide and
reasonable. Thus it is not every mistake that furnishes a defence, mistake
must be reasonable and must have been made in good faith and there must
be evidence to prove that. The Expression “good faith” is interpreted with
reference to section 52 of the IPC.
II Mistake of Law: Mistake of law means mistake as to the existence or
otherwise of any law on particular subject as well as mistake as to what law is.
The words “by reason of mistake of fact and not be reason of mistake of law”
under Section 76 of the IPC, denotes the paraphrasing of the latin maxim
“ignorantia facti excusat ignorant juris non excusat”, which means ‘ignorance of
fact excuses, ignorance of law does not excuse’. This maxim is widely accepted
in most parts of the world. Section 76 of IPC is an incorporation that rule in
our law. This rule seems to be based on anther rule of evidence that “ every
man is presumed to know the law”. ‘Ignorantia corumquoe scire tenetur non
excusat”, which means, ‘that ignorance of those things which one is bound to
know does not excuse’. If ignorance of the law were a defence, it would be
open to an accused charged of a crime to allege that, he was not aware of the
law on the point and it would be quite impossible for the prosecution to prove
that the accused was cognizant of the law in question. The result would be
the acquittal of accused persons in all the cases, rendering the administration
of justice to fail.
Another important justification for not allowing a mistake of law as defence
apparently is that the operation of a provision of the law is intended to be
independent of its being known to everybody. If this were not so, great
difficulty would be experienced in the enforcement of the law and would lead
to injustice.
Section 76 and Section 79 of the Code have expressly excluded mistake of law
from the purview of the exception. The maxim is applied in a strict sense.
however, since no minimum punishment is provided in the Code, as a general rule the
courts have passed considerably lenient sentence, when a non negligent inviable
mistake of law has occurred.
It is also important here to note the following points:
Ignorance of Law by Foreigners: the Maxim ignorantia juris non excusat in its
application to criminal offences admits no exception. Even a foreigner is not
exempted who cannot reasonably be supposed to know the law.
The plea of act of State: It will be available to persons carrying out an act of State in
the following cases:
(1) If the defendant had authority to act on behalf of the State in the matter, and
(2) If in so acting, he was professing to act as a matter of policy, outside the law and
not as a matter of right within the law.
(3) Distinction between mistake of fact and mistake of law:
Distinction between mistake of fact and mistake of law can be well illustrated by he
following example:
(1) A , a police officer, who has the right to arrest a person committing a cognizable
offence, if he arrest B, mistakenly thinking tht he has committed murder, when in
fact he killed a dacoit in self defence. A is not liable for
committing the offence of wrongful confinement, his mistake being one of fact.
On the other hand, if the police officer arrests a person for committing an
assault, which he wrongfully considers a cognizable offence, whereas it is not
cognizable in which he cannot arrest a person he is liable for wrongful
confinement, his mistake being one of law for which he cannot be excused.
II. Hence to conclude, the following persons are immune from Criminal Liability:
the following person are immune from criminal liability. They are:
1. Act of judge, when acting judicially: According to Section 77, “nothing is an
offence which is done by a judge when acting judicially in the exercise of any
person which is , or which in good faith, he believes to be, given to be, given
to him by law”.
This section provides protection to a Judge while acting judicially. It
affords protection toa Judge in those cases in which he proceeds irregularly in the
exercise of a power given to him by law and also in cases where he in good faith
exceeds his jurisdiction and has no lawful powers. The exception under this
section is in respect of a criminal proceeding only.
2. Act done pursuant to the Judgment or order of Court: According to Section 78
Of the Code, “Nothing which is done in pursuance of, or which is warranted by
the Judgement or order of a Court of Justice, if done whilst such judgment or
order remains in force, is an offence, notwithstanding the Court may have had
no jurisdiction to pass such judgment or order, provided the person doing the
act in good faith believes that the Court had such jurisdiction.
3. Acts done by a person justified or by mistake of fact believing himself
justified by law: According to section 79 , “Nothing is an offence which is
done by any person who is justified by law, or who by reason of a mistake
of fact and not by reason of a mistake of a law, in good faith, believes
himself to be justified by law, in doing it.
Illustration: A sees Z commit what appears to A to be a murder. A, in the
exercise, to the best of his judgment exerted in good faith , of the power which
the law gives to all persons of apprehending murderers in the fact, seizes Z, in
order to bring Z before the proper authorities. A has committed no offence,
though it may turn out that Z was acting in self defence.
Ingredients of this Section 79:
(1) An act done by a person under a mistake of fact.
(2) Mistake must relate to fact and not to law.
(3) Mistake must be committed in good faith.
(4) The person doing the act is either justified by law or believes himself to be
justified by law in dong an act.
Distinction between Section 76 and Section 79: Section 76 deals with cases
where by reason of mistake of a fact the person under a mistake considers
himself bound by law to act in a particular way, although on the true state of
facts his act is an offence.
Section 79, on the other hand, deals with cases where by reason of a
mistake of fact the persons under such mistake considers himself simply justified
by law act in a particular way.
The words used in Section 76 is bound by law and in Section 79 is justified by
law, that is under section 76 there is legal compulsion and under Section 79,
there is a legal justification.
Question: Write a short notes on “Accidents”.
III. Accidents: Sections 80 of IPC, talks about Accident in doing a lawful act-
“Nothing is an offence which is done by accident or misfortune and without any
criminal intention or knowledge in the doing of a lawful act in a lawful manner
by lawful means and with proper care and caution”.
Ingredients: ingredients of Section 80 are:
(1) The act must be an accident or misfortune;
(2) The act must not be done with any criminal intention or knowledge;
(3) The accident must be the outcome of a lawful act done in lawful manner by
lawful means;
(4) The act must have been done with proper care and causation;
Illustration:
A is at work with a hatchet , the head flies off and kills a man who is standing
by. Here, if there was no want of proper caution on the part of A ,his act is
excusable and not an offence.
Meaning: section 80 of the IPC , is based on the principle that no act is per se
criminal unless the actor did it with criminal intent. To constitute a crime,
intent and the act of the wrong doer must concur. Accidents does not mean
a happening by chance, but such happening must be unintentional and
unexpected. It means an undersigned happening out of the ordinary
courses which not man of ordinary prudent could anticipate or provide
against.
Stephen, author of Digest of Criminal law, observes that, “ An effect is said to
be accident when the act by which it is caused is not done with intention of
causing it and when its occurrence as a consequence of such act is not so
probable that a person of ordinary prudence ought under the circumstances
in which it done to take reasonable precaution against it”.
Hence, an injury is said to be caused accidentally when it is neither wilfully
not negligently caused. Stephen also gives illustrations to support the point:
(1) A, a workman throws snow from a roof giving proper warning. A
passenger is killed. Such a death is accidental.
2. A turns B a trespasser, out of his house, using no more force than is
necessary for the purpose. B resists but without striking A they fall in
struggle and B is killed. Death is accidental.
3. A takes up a gun, not knowing whether it is loaded or no points it in sport at
B and pulls the trigger. B is shot dead. Such a death is not accidental. If A
had reason to believe that the gun was not loaded, the death would have
been accidental although he had not used every possible precaution to
ascertain whether gun was loaded or not.
Lawful act done in lawful manner by lawful means: In Jageshwar v. Emperor
AIR, 1924, the accused was beating a person with his fists, when the latter’s wife
with a two months child on her shoulder interfered, the accused hit the woman
but the blow struck the child on his head. The baby died from the effects of the
blow. It was held that although the child was hit by accident, the accused, was
not doing a lawful act in a lawful manner by lawful means and therefore the
defence under section 80, IPC could not be availed of by him.
In Sukdev Singh v. Delhi State (Government of NCT of Delhi), AIR, 2003.
In the present case the factual position shows that the accused who was
posted as Personal Security Officer, deliberately used the gun ,of course
during the scuffle and the accused appellant did not say that the bullet
went off in the process of struggle and snatching, but the accused
specifically told that as the diseased tried to snatch the pistol, he fired at
him. Hence it was not a case of accident and therefore he would not be
entitled to get the benefit of accident under Section 80, IPC.
In Bhupendrasinh A Chaudasama v. State of Gujarath, AIR, 1998, the
Supreme Court observed that the accused did not disclose to any
prosecution witness that he was unable to identify his immediate superior
and he thought him to be a miscreant and fired to protect valve tower. The
right of private defence was far from contemplation of accused when he
opened fire at the deceased, hence accused is not entitled even to
restricted right to private defence under section 104 IPC.
The defence contributive negligence is no defence to a charge in criminal
law. In one of the cases it was held that, if a motor driver caused death by
His own omission or negligence, the fact that the deceased was also negligent and
contributed to the accident does not afford a defence to the driver.
In State of Orissa v. Khora Ghasi, 1978, A caused death of D by shooting arrow under
the bonafide belief that he was shooting that arrow at a bear which had entered
into his field and was destroying, his maize crop. Death was held to be the
consequence of accident.
The Supreme Court in Shankar Bhadolkar v. State if Maharashtra, AIR 2004, declined
to allow the protection of Section 80 that is, defence of accident , to the accused
who picked up a gun, unlocked it and loaded it with cartridges and shot it from a
close range at one of the invitees for dinner at his place, causing death. The Court
held that the accused failed to exercise due care and caution and therefore, he was
not entitled to the benefit of defence under Section 80 of IPC.
Problem: 1. A is carried off by a tiger. B fires at the tiger knowing that the short
may kill A. A is killed. Has B committed any offence?
2. A is at work with a hatchet, the head flies off and kills man who is standing by.
Decide the liability of A.
Question: Write a Short Notes on “Necessity”
IV. Section 81: Act likely to cause harm, but done without criminal intent and to
prevent other Harm: “Nothing is an offence merely by reason of its being done with
the knowledge that it is likely to cause harm, if it be done without an criminal intention
to cause harm, and in good faith for the purpose of preventing or avoiding other harm
to person or property”.
Ingredients: The Indian Law of defence of necessity as contained in section 81 IPC may
be analysed as follows:
1. The act constituting the offence is known by the wrong-doer to be likely to cause
harm, but it is done without any criminal intention to cause harm;
2. The act must have been done in good faith
3. The act must have also been done for the purpose of preventing or avoiding other
harm;
4. The harm aimed to be prevented or avoided may relate to person or property.
It is a question of fact in such a case whether harm to be prevented or avoided was of
such a nature and so imminent as to justify or excuse the risk of doing the act with the
knowledge that was likely to cause harm.
Section 81 of the Code grants immunity to man from criminal charge with
respect to acts committed under compelling circumstances forced by
necessity.
An act which would otherwise be a crime may in some cases be excused
if the person accused can show that it was done only in order to avoid
consequences which could not other wise be avoided, and which, if they
had followed, would have inflicted upon him or upon other whom he was
bound to protect, inevitable and irreparable evil. Section 81 excuses the
doing of an evil so that good may result. It permits the infliction of a
lesser evil in order to prevent greater evil . It is intended to give legislative
sanction to the principle that where on a sudden and extreme emergency,
one or other of the two evils is inevitable, it is lawful so to direct events
that the smaller only shall occur.
Illustrations:
(a) A, the captains of a steam vessel, suddenly and without any fault or
negligence on his part, finds himself in such a position that, before he can
stop his vessel, he must inevitably run down a boat B, with twenty or
Thirty passengers on board, unless he changes the course of his vessel and
that, by changing his course he must incur risk or running down a boat C
with only two passengers on board, which he may possibly clear. here., if A
alter his course without any intention to run down the boat C and in good
faith for the purpose of avoiding the danger to the passengers in the boat B,
he is not guilty of an offence, though he may run down the Boat C by doing
an act which he knew was likely to cause that effect, if it be found as a matter
of fact that the danger which he intended to avoid was such as to excuse him
in incurring the risk of running down the boat C.
(b) A, in a great fire, pulls down houses in order to prevent the conflagration
from spreading. He does this with the intention in good faith of saving
human life or property. Here, if it be found that the harm to be prevented
was of such a nature and so imminent as to excuse A’s act, A is not guilty
of the offence.
Whenever necessity forces a man to do an illegal act, he will be justified
because no man can be guilty of a crime without the will and intention of the
mind thus the law of necessity dispenses with things which otherwise are not
lawful to be done.
To avail the defence of this section, following points have to be proved:
1. Without any Criminal intention: In order to avail of the defence under this
section it is necessary tht the criminal act is done without any evil intention.
Intentional wrong-doing can in no circumstances be justified. He will not
responsible for the harmful consequences of his act, provided the act was
done in good faith to avoid or prevent some other harm to person or
property. For example: A sees a tiger attacking B and he feels sure that the
tiger will be on him in a minute, A shoots the tiger fully knowing that B and
tiger are so close tht he might kill B and not the tiger. Here if A kills B, he
would be guilty of no offence because he had no intention to kill B. A
intended to kill the tiger to save B.
2. Act done to prevent harm to person or property: the main principle on
which this section is based is that, causing of lesser evil may be justified to
prevent greater evil either to person or property .
Cases where necessity may be pleaded as defence:
(i) Self-defence, and prevention of violence
(ii) Prevention of harm to the accused at the expense of an innocent
person;
(iii) Choice of evils affecting person other than the accused: An
illustration of the case falling under this category arise when a doctor
has a choice in killing of the child and killing of the other delivering
the child. If the doctor acting in good faith to save the other kills the
child he would be justified under this section.
However, as discussed below necessity does not justify:
(a) Indiscriminate throwing of passengers overboard to save the sinking
vessel: In US v. Holmes, 1872, Holmes was a member of the crew,
who under the order of the master, there overboard 16 male
passengers. Homes was charged with manslaughter(culpable
homicide) but not with murder, as the act was illegal because the
sailors who were not necessary for navigation ought to have been
scarified before the passengers.
(b) And choice of these sailors should have been determined by lot as
there was sufficient time to do so.
In Queen v. Dudley and Stephens (1884), it is called the well-known Mignoets’
case. It was held tht the shipwrecked sailors who killed the cabin boy for food
were guilty of murder, notwithstanding the finding of the jury that if the men
had not fed upon the body of he boy, they probably would not have survived to
be rescued and that the boy, being in a much weaker condition , was likely to
have died before them.
the Court said that the deliberate killing of man howsoever great the
temptation might be killing cannot be justified by necessity.
The Court on the question of conservation of a man’s own life in extreme cases
of hardships laid down the following principle;
1. self-preservation is not an absolute necessity.
2. No man has a right to take other’s life to preserve his own life, unless it is in
self defence, i.e., private defence (Section 96 to 106, IPC).
3. There is no necessity that justified private homicide , that is, to conserve
one’s life, as distinguished from public necessity or even necessity when it is
Section 82 of IPC, discusses an act of a child under seven years of age: According
to this section , “Nothing is an offence which is done by a child under seven years
of age”.
Infancy is a defect of the understanding and infants under the age of discretion
ought not be punished by any criminal prosecution whatsoever. They are under
natural disability of distinguishing between good and evil.
Section 83 of IPC, discusses an act of a child above seven and under twelve of
years of age of immature understanding: “Nothing is an offence which is done by
done by a child above seven years of age and under twelve, who has not attained
sufficient maturity of understanding to judge of the nature and consequences of
his conduct on tht occasion.
Ingredients: the following ae ingredients of Section 83:
(i) An act done by a child above 7 years but under 12 years of age.
(ii) The child must not have attained sufficient maturity of understanding to judge
of the nature and consequences his conduct.
Marsh v. Loader: in this case a child below 7 years was charged for stealing
a piece of wood from the defendant’s premises. Held he was protected
under the defence of Infancy and was discharged.
In India a child between 7 to 12 is presumed to be Doli capax, that is
capable of understanding, and the burden of proof lies on the defendant to
prove that , incapable of committing crimes that is Doli incapax.
In Mussamat Alimona case, the accused was aged 10 years old and she was
held for committing murder of her husband 19 years old. She slept near her
mother in law , whereas the husband slept near his brother. On the day of
the murder, the mother in law woke her for household duties and after some
time, the accused ran away from the house and the husband was wounded
on the neck. She was held to be Doli capax, as she possessed sufficient
degree of criminal intent.
Unsoudness of mind
Question: 1. Who are legally abnormal persons? Discuss M’Nagnten answers.
2. Explain the nature and extent of unsoundness of mind required to exempt a person
from criminal liability with reference to leading cases.
4. Write a Short notes on ‘Unsoundness of mind.
V. The next exception is : Section 84 of the act discusses on Act of a person of
unsound mind- “Nothing is an offence which is done by a person who, at the
time of doing it, by reason of unsoundness of mind , is incapable of knowing
the nature of the act, or that he is doing what is either wrong or contrary to
law”.
Ingredients: the following are the ingredients of Section 84:
1. Act must be done by a person of unsound mind:
2. Such person must be incapable of the act, or
(i) the nature of the act, or
(ii) that the act was contrary to law, or
(iii) that the act was wrong.
3. Such incapacity must be by reason of unsoundness of mind of the offender.
4. The incapacity of the nature stated above in point 2 must exist at the time
of doing of the act constituting the offence.
Every man is presumed to be sane and to posses sufficient degree of reason to
be responsible for his crimes, until contrary be proved to the satisfaction of the
jury or the Court.
In order to hold a person legally responsible for a crime, a criminal intent is
necessary and therefore capacity of the wrong-doer to form a criminal intent is
a relevant consideration in determining the criminal liability of that person. A
person may lack sufficient mental capacity to form a criminal intent , because of
immaturity of age or because of some defect of the mental faculty. When such
defect is caused by some disease of mind, a person is said to be insane.
Therefore, those who are under a natural disability of distinguishing between
good and evil, as infants under the age of discretion, idiots and lunatics, are not
punishable by any criminal prosecution whatsoever.
The courts before were unable to distinguish properly right from wrong , though
they had not yet definitely formulated this test in very clear term until the
M’Naughten case decided in 1843.
The principle of insanity as a defence was laid down by the House of Lords in the
historic M’Naughten’s case. The accused, Daniel N’Naughten suffered from a
delusion that Sir Robert Peel, the then Prime Minister of Britain had Injured him
and in order to take revenge, he mistook Edward Drummond, the Secretary to the
Prime Minister , for Sir Robert Peel and shot him dead. When charged of murder,
the accused took the defence of insanity. The medical evidence testified that he
was under a morbid delusion which carried him away beyond the powers of his
self-control. The jury found him “not guilty by reason of insanity”. However, his
acquittal was vehemently critised by public which led to a debate in the House of
Lords on this subject. The outcome of the debate was that certain principles were
enunciated by the House of Lords, which were known as the M’Naughten Rules.
They are as follows:
1. Every persons supposed to be sane and to possess sufficient decree of reason
to be responsible for his crimes, until the contrary is proved.
(2) In order to establish the defence of insanity, it must be clearly proved that at
the time of committing the crime, the person was so insane as not to know the
nature and quality of the act he was dong, or if he did know it, he did not know
what he was doing was wrong.
(3) The test of wrongfulness of the act is in the power to distinguish between
right and wrong, not in the abstract or in general, but in regard to the particular
act committed.
The Courts in India have inevitably followed the above Rule in the interpretation
of Section 84 of the IPC.
The criminal law recognises only legal insanity as a defence under Section 84,
IPC and not all kinds of medical insanities. Legal insanity is one which
completely impairs the cognitive faculty of the mind, to such an extent that a
person is incapable of knowing the nature of his act or what he is dong is wrong.
Persons of unsound mind:
There are four kinds of persons who may be said to be not of sound mind (non compos
mentis):
1. An idiot;
2. A lunatic or a madman;
3. One made non compos by illness; and
4. One who is drunk.
1. Idiot: A person who is of non-sane memory from his birth by a perpetual infirmity,
without lucid internals is said to be an idiot. Idiot is also one who cannot count twenty
or tell the days of the week or who does not know his father or other or the like.
2. Lunatic: A lunatic is a person who is afflicted by mental disorder only at certain
periods. If the person who is permanently mad without any interval is sais as
natural insanity. A person who behaves in a stupid way doing crazy and often
dangerous things Lunacy and madness are said to be acquired insanity and idiocy
as natural insanity.
3. Non Compos Mentis: A person made non compos mentis due to regular illness is
exempted from liability, in case of such acts which committed while under the
influence of mental disorder.
in other words, if the accused is suffering from disease of mind at the time of
commission of offence, and unable to know the consequences of his act. he is
entitled to the exemption of sections 84.
4. Insanity brought on by drunkenness: Drunkenness is no excuse but
delirioum tremens caused by caused by drinking , form of drunkenness , if it
produces such a degree of madness, even for a time, as to render a person
incapable of distinguishing, right from wrong, afforded a ground of excuse from
criminal responsibility.
Unsoundness of mind is some disease of the brain or the nervous system.
Insanity includes, lunacy, mental derangement , mental disorder, madness and
so on. Section 84 does not embrace all types of insanity known to medical
science but only such varieties as render a person incapable of knowing the
nature of the act he was doing or that even if he know it, he did not know it
with either wrong or contrary to law. The expression unsoundness of mind as
used in this section is wide enough to include all varieties of want of capacity
whether temporary or permanent, natural or supervening, whether it arises
from disease or exists from the time of birth. There are numerous degrees of
insanity. In order to be an excuse insanity must reach that degree which is
described in the section. It does not matter whether the insanity arose
from disease of the brain or from the persistent indulgence in intoxicating
drugs or liquor.
At the time of doing it: Insanity must be proved to exist at the time of
committing the act constituting the offence complained of. A plea of insanity
at the time of trial will not help the accused.
Legal Insanity: In Someswar Bora v. State of Assam, 1981, the accused left
the place of murder immediately after committing murder and remembered
clearly, in a confession given on the very next day, what he did. It was held
that, the accused was not entitled to protection of section 84, as it could not
be said that he did not know either the nature and quality of the act or
that he did not know that what he did was wrong. The fact that he had
some sort of abnormality and mental imbalance was immaterial .
Hence in order to get the protection of section 84, the accused has to
establish the existence of what is known as legal insanity, a disease of the
mind as not to know the nature and gravity of the act he was doing or if he
did know it that he did not know he was doing what was wrong.
In Re, Balagopal 1981, the accused appellant committed murders of his wife
and his son by cutting them with a knife for no apparent reason whatsoever.
The mother-in-law of the accused testified that the accused was living very
amicably with his wife and his behaviour was very friendly and there was
nothing abnormal in it. There was no suggestion that the murders were
committed by the accused on account of any motive. The Doctor was of
the definite opinion that the accused would not have been in a position to
understand whether he has committed any particular act, which was wrong
or contrary to law. Hence he was exempted.
Proof if Insanity: Where in a murder case, it is alleged that the accused was
suffering from insanity, the insanity or unsoundness of mind must be
proved. Mere absence of motive is not enough. The crucial point of time at
which it should be proved is the time when the crime is actually committed
and the burden of proving this is on the accused.
The Gauhati High Court in Someswar v. State of Assam, 1981, held that in
order to seek protection under section 84, it must be established that, “the
accused, at the time of committing the offence, was labouring under such
defect of reason from disease of mind as not know the nature and quality of
the act he was doing, or that he did not know what he was doing was wrong.
The term unsoundness of mind or insanity denotes a state of mind in which
the accused is incapable of knowing the nature of his act and that what he is
doing is wrong or contrary to law
Ram Lal v. State of Rajasthan, 1977, is an important case on the point. In this
case Ram Lal lacked motive in killing the 8 years old boy and the doctor’s report
showed that he was a case of epilepsy with retarded mental faulty so as to put
him in he category of severe sub normality. There was no evidence that at the
time of murder the accused as acting in a state of hallucination or under
influence of epileptic insanity. On the contrary his running away to his village
after the occurrence showed that he was conscious of the fact which was
enough to defeat the plea of insanity.
To sum up, the following principles are to be kept in mind in applying this
section:
1. Every type of insanity is not legal insanity; the cognitive faculty must be
destroyed as to render one incapable of knowing the nature of his act or that
what he is doing is wrong or contrary to law;
2. The court shall presume the absence of such insanity;
3. The burden of proof of legal insanity is on the accused, though it is not as
heavy as the prosecution;
4. The court must consider whether the accused suffered from legal insanity at
the time when the offence was committed;
5. In reaching such a conclusion, the circumstances which preceded, attended or
followed the crime are relevant consideration; and
6. The prosecution in discharging its burden of the plea of legal insanity has
merely to prove the basic fact and rely upon the normal presumption of the law
that everyone knows the law and the natural consequences of his act.
VI. The next exception is, Section 85 : Act of a person incapable of judgement
by reason of intoxication caused against his will: According to Section 85 ,
“Nothing is an offence which is done by a person who, at the time of doing it, is
by reason of intoxication, incapable of knowing the nature of the act, or that he
is doing what is either wrong, or contrary to law: provided that the thing which
intoxicated to him was administered to him without his knowledge or against his
will”.
Essentials to establish the defence of intoxication under Section 85 of IPC.
1. At the time of doing the act, the person must be incapable of knowing ,due to
intoxication.
2. The nature of his act, or
3. That he was doing an act which was either wrong or contrary to law; and
4. That the thing which intoxicated him was administered to him against his will
or without his knowledge.
The early common law made no concession because of intoxication. The
earliest case in England wherein the court approved the death sentence for a
homicide committed in extreme intoxication is Reninger v. Fogossa, 1551. the
rigorous law prevailed upto the early nineteenth century, but it was gradually
relaxed in later judicial decisions during this century. However involuntary
drunkenness may be pleaded as an excuse but no voluntary drunkenness.
The general rule in England appear to be that merely to show that a man’s mind
was so affected by drink that he more readily gave way to a violent passion is no
defence. To this general rule, there are two exceptions:
(a) Habitual drinking may occasionally lead to such permanent change in the
brain tissues as to be accounted for insanity, such as delirium tremens and
alcoholic dementia. Where the intellect of a person has been permanently
impaired by vicious habits, the reasons for excluding the plea of incapacity are no
longer applicable.
(b) Involuntary drunkenness is a defence: this exception may be justified for the
reason that the plea of involuntary drunkenness is not open to the same abuse as
one of voluntary drunkenness a Beard , 1920nd the offence is not so likely
repeated.
The Director Public Prosecution v. Beard, 1920, is the leading case on the point.
In this case a girl of thirteen years while going to market passed through the gate
of a mill, where the accused Beard was the watchman on duty. The accused
attempted to commit rape. The girl struggled, therefore, accused place his hand
over her mounth and pressed his thumb on her throat in a bit to prevent her
from screaming. In this endeavour he unintentionally killed her. The Court of
Criminal Appeal found him guilty of manslaughter , but the House of Lords
respired the conviction for murder. The following principles were laid down:
(i) Where a specific intent is an essential element in the offence: evidence of a
state of drunkenness rendering the accused incapable of forming such an intent
should be taken into consideration in order to determining whether he had
in fact formed the intent necessary o constitute the particular crime.
(ii) Insanity, whether produced by drunkenness or otherwise, is a defence to
the crime charged: the insane person cannot be convicted of a crime. The law
takes note of the cause of insanity. If actual insanity in fact supervenes, as he
result of alcoholic excess, it furnishes as complete an answer to a criminal
charge as insanity induced by any other cause. If a man by drunkenness
brings on a state of disease which causes such a degree of madness , then he
would not be criminally responsible.
(iii) That event of drunkenness which renders the accused incapable of
forming the specific intent essential to constitute the crime should be taken
into consideration with the other facts proved in order to determine whether
or not he had this intent.
(iv) That evidence of drunkenness falling short of proved incapacity in the
accused to form the intent necessary to constitute the crime and merely
establishing that his mind was affected by drink so that he more readily gave
way to some violent passion, does not rebut the presumption that a man
intent the natural consequences of his acts.
The SC in the case of Bablu alias Mubarak Hussain v. State of Rajasthan , 2007,
held that in a gruesome murder case of wife and his three minor daughter and a
male child by the accused in 2005, the accused came out of his house at 5 a.m
and started shouting tht he had killed five bastards. there is no reason to accept
the defence that these murders were committed by reason of accused being in a
state of intoxication. The Court held tht these murders were pre-meditated, well
planned and gruesome in nature and therefore, the accused deserved no
sympathy and the case clearly fell in the category of ‘rarest of rare’ case.
Question: Write a short note on Volenti non fit injuria or act done by consent’.
Act not intended and not known to likely to cause death or grievous hurt, which
is done by consent: According to Section 87, “Nothing which is not intended to
cause death or grievous hurt and which is not known by the doer to be likely to
cause death or grievous hurt, is an offence by reason of any harm which it may
cause or be intended by the doer to cause to ay person, above eighteen years of
age who has given consent, whether express or implied to suffer that harm; or
by reason of any harm which it may be known by the doer to be likely to cause
to any such person who has consented to take the risk of that harm.
Ingredients of Section 87: the main principle underlying section 87 is that,
consent never justifies death or grievous hurt. Under this section any harm
other than death or grievous hurt, even though intended or known by the
doer to be likely to be caused will not be an offence under the following
conditions:
(1) If act is done neither with the intention of causing death or grievous hurt
not the knowledge that it is likely to cause death or grievous hurt.
(2) Harm is caused to any person with his consent.
(3) Persons giving consent is above 18 years of age
(4) Consent given may be express or implied.
The defence of consent is based on two propositions :
(1) That every person is the best judge of his own interest;
(2) That no man will consent to what he thinks hurtful to himself: every man
may give away his property, therefore, if a person takes another’s
property with his consent, he commits no offence. For example, a man
Illustration: A and Z agree to fence with each other for amusement . This
agreement implies the consent of each to suffer any harm which in the course of
such fencing, may be caused without foul play; and if A, while playing fairly, hurts Z,
A commits no offence.
All offences against property are offences against alienable right and if done with
the consent of the owner, is a complete defence both to civil and criminal actions.
This right upto a certain stage is an alienable right, but beyond that stage it is
inalienable and no amount of consent can condone the person who infringes that
right.
Hence , consent is a good defence to all offences against property and to all
offences against human body which do not involve the causing of death or grievous
hurt.
A man gave away his property, therefore, if a person takes another’s property with
his consent, he commits no offence. However, this section does not permit a man
to consent to anything intended, or known to be likely to cause his own death or
grievous hurt. The authors of the Code said, if Z chooses to sell his teeth to a
dentist, and permits the dentist to pull them out, the dentist ought not to be
punished for injuring Z’s person.
Sections 87, 88 and 89 of the IPC deal with the law of consent.
Where an act is in itself unlawful, consent can never be allowed as defence.
However, there are some exceptions to the rule . This section ordinarily
provides protection to certain games like fencing , boxing, single sticks, football
and the like. The reason why injuries suffered in the course of any of these
games are distinguished from those where death results in consequence of an
intent to do a slight injury is tht in games bodily harm is not the motive or
intention of either party. A prize fight is illegal.
Question: Explain the acts done in good faith.
I Act not intended to cause death, done by consent in good faith for person’s
benefit: According to Section 88, “Nothing, which is not intended to cause
death, is an offence by reason of any harm which it may cause, or be intended
by the doer to cause, or be known by the doer to be likely to cause, to any
person for whose benefit it is done in good faith, and who has given consent,
whether express or implied, to suffer that harm or to take the risk of that harm.
Ingredients: This section provides that the doer of an act will not be liable even
though he causes the harm resulting in death intentionally or knowing that the
act is harmful if:
(1) The act done is for the benefit of the person who suffers injury,
(2) Such act is done with the consent of the person to suffer tht harm or to take
the risk of that harm,
(3) Consent may be express or implied,
(4) Act is done in good faith,
(5) Act is done without intention to cause death though it might have been done
with the intention of causing such harm as may result in death.
Illustration: A, a surgeon, knowing that a particular operation is likely to cause
the death of Z, who suffers under a painful complaint, but not intending to cause
Z’s death, and intending, in good faith Z’s benefit, performs that operation on Z
with Z’s consent. A has committed no offence.
the rule is that consent can never justify an intentional causing of death.
Under this section wrong-doer is protected even though he has done the act
with the intention of causing harm including grievous hurt but not death. The
defence is available because the act is done in good faith and for the benefit of
the victim.
Cases: A school teacher who administers in good faith moderate and reasonable
corporal punishment to pupils to enforce discipline in the school is protected by
this section and will not be guilty of an offence punishable under 323 of the
Code.
This section mandates that he who deals with the life or health of another person
must use competent skill and sufficient attention if the patient dies for want of
either, the persons is guilty of manslaughter.
In Dr. Suresh Gupta V. NCT Delhi, 2004, the surgeon(accused) performed plastic
surgery of the patient in order to remove deformity of nose. During the
operation the patient died. The accused was charged of an offence under section
304A of IPC. He pleaded defence under Section 80 and 88 of IPC. Exonerating
the accused of the charges against him, the Supreme Court held the surgeon not
liable for every accident or death caused during operation, unless there has been
II Act done in good faith for benefit of child or insane person , by or by consent of
guardian: According to Section 89, “Nothing which is done in good faith for the
benefit of a person under twelve years of age, or of unsound mind, by or by consent
either express or implied, of the guardian or other person having lawful charge of
that person, is an offence by reason of any harm which it may cause or be intended
by the doer to cause or be known to by the doer to be likely to cause to that person
Provided :
1. That this exception shall not extend to the intentional causing of death, or to the
attempting to cause death:
2. That this exception shall not extend to the doing of anything which the person
doing it knows to be likely to cause death, for any purpose other than the
preventing of death or grievous hurt, or the causing of any grievous disease or
infirmity:
3. That this exception shall not extend to the voluntary causing of grievous hurt, or
to the attempting to cause grievous hurt, unless it be for the purpose of
preventing death or grievous hurt, or the curing of any grievous disease or
infirmity:
4. That this exception shall not extend to the abetment of any offence, to the
committing of which offence it would not extend.
Illustration: A, in good faith, for his child’s benefit without his child’s consent, has
his child cut for the stone by a surgeon , knowing it to be likely that the operation
will cause the child’s death but not intending to cause the child’s death. A is within
this exception, in as must as his object was the cure of the child.
Ingredients: In order that a person may avail the defence under this section 89, the
following conditions must be fulfilled:
1. Act must be done for the benefit of a person who is either a minor under 12
years of age or a person of unsound mind;
2. Act must be done in good faith;
3. Act must be done by the guardian or by the consent of the guardian or other
person having lawful charge of that person;
4. The consent may either be expressed or implied.
5. If the above conditions are fulfilled, the act shall not amount to an offence.
The next exception is:
Consent known to be given under fear or misconception: According to
Section 90, “A consent, is not such a consent as is intended by any section
of this Code, if the consent is given by a person under fear of injury, or
under a misconception of fact, an if the person doing the act knows, or has
reason to believe, that the consent was given in consequence of such fear or
misconception; or
Consent of insane person: If the consent is given by a person who, from
unsoundness of mind, or intoxication, is unable to understand the nature
and consequence's of that to which he gives his consent: or
Consent of child- Unless the contrary appears from the context, if the
consent is given by a person who is under twelve years of age.
This section does not define consent but describes what is not consent. The
misconception of fact used in this section refers to misconception regarding
the true nature of the act or regarding the effect or consequences of the
acts.
In the following cases consent is not free consent under this section:
(1) Consent given by a person under fear of injury’
(2) Consent given under misconception of fact.
(3) Consent given by a child under 12 years of age.
(4) Consent give by a person of unsound mind.
(5) Consent given by an intoxicated person.
III Acts done in good faith for benefit of a person without consent: According
to Section 92: “Nothing is an offence by reason of any harm which it may cause
to a person for whose benefit it is done in good faith, even without that
person's consent, if the circumstances are such that it is impossible for that
person to signify consent, or if that person is incapable of giving consent, and
has no guardian or other person in lawful charge of him from whom it is
possible to obtain consent in time for the thing to be done with benefit: but
1. That this exception shall not extend to the intentional causing of death, or
the attempting to cause death;
That this exception shall not extend to the doing of anything which the
person doing it knows to be likely to cause death, for any purpose other than
the preventing of death or grievous hurt, or the curing of any grievous
disease or infirmity;
3. That this exception shall not extend to the voluntary causing of hurt, or to
the attempting to cause hurt, for any purpose other than the preventing
of death or hurt;
4. That this exception shall not extend to the abetment of any offence, to the
committing of which offence it would not extend.
Illustration: Z is carried off by a tiger. A fires at the tiger knowing it to be likely
that the shot may kill Z, but not intending to kill Z, and in good faith intending
Z’s benefit. AS’s bullet gives Z a mortal wound. A has committed no offence.
The next exception is :
IV Communication made in good faith: According to Section 93: “No
communication made in good faith is an offence by reason of any harm to the
person to whom it is made, if it is made for the benefit of that person”.
Illustration: a, a surgeon in good faith, communicates to a patient that in his
opinion that he cannot live. The patient dies in consequence of the shock. A has
committed no offence, though he know it to be likely that the communication
might cause the patient's death.
In order that protection may be claimed under this section the
communication should have been made:
(1) In good faith, and
(2) For the benefit of the person to whom it is made.
The next exception is: Act to which a person is compelled by threats: According
to section 94, “except murder, and offences against the State punishable with
death, nothing is an offence which is done by a person who is compelled to do it
by threats, which, at the time of doing it, reasonably cause the apprehension that
instant death to that person will otherwise be the consequence:
Provided the person doing the act did not, of his own accord, or from a
reasonable apprehension of harm to himself short of instant death, place himself
in the situation by which he became subject to such constraint.
Explanation 1- A person who, of his own accord, or by reason of a threat of
being beaten, joins a gang of dacoits, knowing their character, is not entitled to
the benefit of this exception, on the ground of his having been compelled by his
associates to do anything that is an offence by law.
Explanation 2- A person seized by a gang of dacoits, and forced, by threat of
instant death, to do a thing which is an offence by law; for example, a smith
compelled to take is tools and to force the door of a house for the dacoits to
enter and plunder it, is entitled to the benefit of tis exception.
Dr. H.S. Gour has suggested that in order to justify an act under section 94,
three points must be proved, namely:
1. That the person did not voluntarily expose himself to the constraint;
2. That the fear which prompted his action was the fear of instant death;
3. That the act itself was done at a time when he was left with no option but to
do it or die.
Cases: Except murder and offences punishable with death, compulsion is an
Fear must be present at the time of doing the act.
In Devji Govendji, it was held that, “ a policeman is no more justified in
torturing a man to death simply because he had been ordered to do so by his
superior than a robber can justify his act on the plea that he had to obey his
fellow confederates. Therefore, the principle followed in Indian cases is that
“no man from a fear of consequences to himself short of apprehension of
immediate death arising from threat of injury has a right to make himself a
party to committing mischief on mankind.
The next exception is: Act causing slight harm(trifles): according to section
95, “Nothing is an offence by reason that it causes, or that it is intended to
cause , or that it is known to be likely to cause ,any harm, if that harm is so
slight that no person of ordinary sense and temper would complain of such
harm.
This section is based on the principle contained in the maxim “de minimis
non curat lex”, which means tht the law takes no account of trifles.
Whether an act which amounts to an offence is trivial would depend upon
the nature of the injury , the position of the parties, the knowledge with
which the act is done.
The following acts are covered by this section:
(1) Where a person takes pods almost valueless from a tree standing on
Government waste land.
(2) Where the accused committed theft of a cheque of no value.
(3) Where the plaintiff complained of the harm caused to his reputation by
the imputation that he was travelling with a wrong ticket.
The following acts are not trivial in nature:
(1) Where a blow was given across the chest with an umbrella by a dismissed
policeman to a District Superintendent of Police because his application
to reconsider his case was rejected.
(2) Where a respectable man is taken by the ear.
(3) Where an Advocate while cross-examining a witness used filthy words,
Exhibiting disrespect or indignity towards the other of the witness.
Case: In one of the cases, the accused had stored for sale mustard oil of a
quality slightly inferior to the purity standard fixed b the rules. It was urged that
the variation was only slight and the appellant should be given the benefit of
Section 95. the plea was rejected and the conviction was confirmed.
Right of Private Defence
Questions: 1. When the “right of private defence” of the body extends to
causing death?
2. Explain the provisions relating to Private defence of property?
3. What are the circumstances under which the right of private defence may be
exercised?
Introduction: Section 96 to 106 of the Indian Penal Code speak about the right
of private defence of person and property as defence against criminal liability.
Self help is the basic rule of criminal law. The right of private defence is
absolutely necessary for the protection of one’s life liberty and property.
According to these provisions, a man can use necessary force against an assailant
or a wrong-doer for the purpose of protecting his own body and property and
also another man’s body and property, when immediate aid or help from the
State is not readily available. In doing so, he is not liable for any harm done to
the wrong doer by his acts.
“Things done in private Defence: According to section 96, “Nothing is an
offence which is done in the exercise of the right of Private Defence”.
This Section provides that the act done in the exercise of right of private
defence would not amount to an offence. The expression ‘self defence’ has
been elaborately explained in the next section , that is section 97 of IPC. Various
aspects and the extend to which the right of private defence may be used have
been incorporated under sections 96 to 106. in reaching a conclusion whether
an accused has been justified in use of his right of private defence, the Courts
must take into consideration the situation as a whole, namely the injuries
received by the accused, the imminence of threat to his safety, the injuries
caused by him and the circumstances, particularly whether he had the time to
seek assistance from the public authorities in the situation of the case.
Generally, the onus that he acted in exercise of his right to private defence lies
on he accused himself, but there may be cases when the accused though acting
under the right does not raise this plea before the Court or pleads some other
defence, in such a situation, the Court may suo moto allow this defence to the
accused if it thinks it necessary in the interest of justice.
This view finds support in the Supreme Court’s decision handed down in
Subramani v. State of Tamil Nadu, 2005, wherein the Court observed that the
plea of private defence need not always be taken by the accused, and even if
this plea is not raised by the defence, the court can itself consider it, if the
Circumstances of the case so warrant. However, in this particular case, the right
of private defence was not accepted by the Court.
The Supreme Court in Bhan Singh v. State of Punjab, 1995, held that a person
who comes fully prepared for a fight or a quarrel and attacks the unarmed
victim, will not be entitled to the benefit of private defence.
In Sekar alias Shekheran v. State of Tamil Nadu, AIR 2002, there was a quarrel
between the accused and the deceased which was not premeditated. While
quarrelling the accused suddenly attacked the deceased who fell on the ground
and succumbed to injuries as the accused still continued to hit him on his neck.
Disallowing the plea of private defence, the Court convicted the accused for the
offence under section 304, Part I of the IPC.
In Krishna and others v. State of UP, 2007, the accused was indebted to the
deceased and the latter was persistently asking for the repayment of debt.
There was exchange of abuses between the two on this issue. When the
deceased was going to police station along with his brother to lodge a FIR, the
accused with lathis and knife causing him serious injuries which caused his
death. The Court held the accused guilty of the offence of assault and refused
to accept his plea of private defence.
The Court in this case, reiterated that in order to decide whether the right of
private defence should be allowed to the accused or not, the Court would take
into consideration the following facts:
(i) Injuries caused to the accused;
(ii)Imminence of danger to the accused;
(iii)
The injuries caused by the accused to the person injured; and
(iv)Whether there was sufficient time for recourse to public authorities instead
of using force for self protection.
Section 97: Right of private defence of the body and of property- Every person
has a right, subject to the restrictions contained in Section 99 to defend-
1. His own body, and the body of any other person, against any offence
affecting the human body;
2. The property, whether movable or immovable, of himself or of any other
person, against any act which is an offence falling under the definition of
theft, robbery, mischief or criminal trespass, or which is an attempt to
commit theft, robbery, mischief or criminal trespass.
3. This Section provides that every person has a right to defence the person
and property of his own and also of any other person. The right to defend
property is very limited in the sense that it extends to only 4 offences, namely
theft, robbery, mischief and criminal trespass and attempt thereof.
The exercise of right of private defence relating to person under Section 97 is
justified only where the offence is actually committed and not merely on the
possibility of the occurrence of the offence. As provided under the section 99
of IPC, the exercise of the right of private defence under Section 97 is subject
to following limitations:
(1) The aggressor’s act should constitute an offence relating to human body
under the IPC;
(2) The person using this right must have apprehension of injury to his body or
body of some other person;
(3) The person exercising this right should not himself be an aggressor; and
(4) The right of private defence is right to defend and not right to take revenge.
Defence of Body: Where a person is about to shoot a person, the targeted
person may fire the gun in his own self defence and it will be no offence.
The Supreme Court held in Sonelal v. State, 1981, held that right of private
defence begins when there is reasonable apprehension about injury to
Human body. Mere intimidation will not constitute a valid ground for the
exercise of the right of private defence. The person exercising this right should
not himself be an aggressor.
The Supreme Court in State of UP v. Niyami, 1987, held that right of private
defence extends not only for self, but also for defending the body or property of
others. The English Law however does not extend this defence to protection of
strangers.
Defence of Property: the exercise of right of private defence is not limited to the
protection of human body but also extends to the protection of one’s property
and property of others.
The right of private defence of property cannot be exercised against a
person who entered the premises lawfully, under the authority of law. Thus in
Kanwar Singh v. Delhi Administration, AIR 1965, a raiding party under the
authority of the Delhi Municipal Corporation Act, seized the stray cattle
belonging to the accused and the accused resisted the seizures by use of force
and inflicting injuries on the raiding party, it was held that the right of private
defence cannot be available to the accused and he was convicted for the
offence of assault.
Exceeding the right of Private Defence: Where the accused has used force
which was excessive in the circumstances of the case, he cannot avail of the
right of private defence.
In the case of Kishore Shambhunath Mishra v. State of Maharastra, AIR, 1989,
two notorious criminals of the locality armed with lethal weapons entered a
flat and forced the occupants to part with money, an act which is an offence of
extortion under section 388 of IPC. The occupants of the flat resisted the
invaders both of whom were killed in the fight. It was difficult to say as to who
actually hit the deceased which caused their death. The Court held all the
occupants in those circumstances were entitled to the right of private defence
and therefore none of them could be convicted for an offence under Section
302 read with section 34 IPC.
Section 98: Right of private defence against the act of a person of unsound
mind, etc., “
When an act, which would otherwise be a certain offence is not that
offence, by reason of the youth, the want of maturity of understanding, the
unsoundness of mind or the intoxication of the person doing that act, or by
reason for any misconception on the part of that person, every person has
the same right of private defence against that act which he would have if the
act were that offence.
Illustrations: 1. Z, under the influence of madness attempts to kill A, Z is
guilty of no offence. But A has the same right of private defence within he
would have if Z were sane.
2. A enters by night a house which he is legally entitled to enter. Z, in good
faith taking A for a House-breaker, attacks A. Here Z, by attacking A under
this misconception, commits no offence. But A has the same right of private
defence against Z, which he would have if Z were not acting under that
misconception.
Acts against which there is no right of private defence:
The clauses one to four, under the Section 99, lays done the limitations within
which the right of private defence can be exercised. In other words, it explains
the conditions under which the right of private defence will not be available.
They are as follows:
(1). Right of private defence does not exist against public servant acting in good
faith: There is no right of private defence against an act which does not
reasonably cause the apprehension of death or of grievous hurt, if done, or
attempted to be done, by a public servant acting in good faith under colour of his
office, though that act may not be strictly justifiable by law.
For instance, where a police officer in good faith arrests a person, then the
person so arrested will not have any right of private defence against the police
officer. But if the police officer exceeds his authority and makes illegal arrest, then
the arrestee shall have the right of private defence against such police officer.
(2). Acts done under the direction of Public Servant: There is no right of private
defence against a person who has acted under the direction of a public servant.
But there is an exception to this rule. Where a person not knowing that the act
is being done under the directions of a public servant, exercises right of private
defence against the doer of the act, he shall be entitled to defence under this
section. Thus, where a police officer attempted to execute a warrant which was
issued illegally, it was held that the accused were justified in resisting the
execution of that warrant.
(3). Where there is time to have recourse to protection of public authorities:
the principle underlying this provision is that no one can be allowed to take law
in his own hands when he can seek the assistance of public authorities for
redressal of his problem. However, where the assistance of public authorities
cannot be procured and the situation warrants immediate action on the part of
the defender, he can retaliate, to keep away the attack without waiting for such
help.
while deciding on availability of the right of private defence under this clause of
Section 99, the Court will take into consideration the following two aspects:
(i)The nature and gravity of the danger apprehended; and
(ii) Did the accused have time to seek recourse to public authorities for
assistance, instead of making use of the right of private defence himself.
(4) The harm or injury caused should not be more than necessary keeping in
view the circumstances of the case: This Clause (4) of this Section further
stipulates that right of private defence in no case should exceed to the causing of
more harm that is necessary for the purpose of defence. Where the accused
continued assault on the deceased after he had fallen on the ground and became
helpless, it was held that there was no need to assault him further therefore, the
accused had exceeded the limits of right of private defence and therefore , lost
that right.
Questions: 1. When the “right of private defence” of the body extends to causing
death?
Section 100 discusses, when the right of private defence of the body extend to
causing death: the right of private defence of the body extends, under the
restrictions mentioned in the last proceeding section to the voluntary causing of
death or of any other harm to the assailant, In this offence which occasions the
exercise of the right be of any of the description hereinafter enumerated, namely
1. Such an assault as may reasonably cause the apprehension that death will
otherwise be the consequence of such assault:
2. Such an assault as may reasonably cause the apprehension that grievous
hurt will otherwise be the consequences of such assault:
3. An assault with the intention of committing rape:
4. An assault with the intention of gratifying unnatural lust:
5. An assault with the intention of kidnapping or abducting:
6. An assault with the intention of wrongfully confining a person, under
circumstances which may reasonably cause him to apprehend that he will
be unable to have recourse to the public authorities for his release.
7. An act of throwing or administering acid or an attempt to throw or
administer acid which may reasonably cause the apprehension that
grievous hurt will otherwise be the consequence of such act.(this seventh
new clause was added by Criminal Law Amendment Act of 2013).
Condition to invoke section 100:
1. The person exercising the right of private defence must not do any act to
invite the encounter;
2. There must be an actual peril to life or great bodily harm or injury, either
real or apparent to create an honest belief that only by causing death of the
aggressor such peril could be avoided.
3. There must not be any safety or any means of escape by retreat; and
4. There must not been a necessity for taking the life.
This section contemplates that there may be certain situations wherein a
person may not have any alternative except causing death of the aggressor in
exercise of his right of private defence of body. The section enumerates such
situations, wherein a person may use his right of private defence to the extend
of causing death of the assailant in the exercise of his right of private defence
are where there is reasonable and imminent danger or fear of assailant’s act
result in the following:
1. Reasonable apprehension of death or grievous hurt: Clauses first and second
of this Section provides that the right of private defence of body extends to
causing death, when an assault reasonably causes the apprehension that it
might result in death or grievous hurt if not retaliated promptly. Such
apprehension must be real and reasonable and not imaginary or based on
surmises. Mere reasonable apprehension is sufficient to justify exercise of
the right of private defence by the accused.
In State of UP. V. Zalim, AIR, 1996, there was a verbal altercation between the
deceased and the accused and the deceased took off the shoe of his left leg and
hurled at the accused. On this, the accused felt badly insulted and therefore,
dragged the deceased in the middle of the road and stabbed his causing his
death. Held, hurling of shoes could not cause reasonable apprehension of
imminent danger the mind of a person and therefore, the accused was not
justified in stabing the deceased in the exercise of his right of private defence.
The defence therefore fails.
2. Assault with intention to commit rape or unnatural offence: Clauses third and
fourth of Section 100, stipulates the right of private defence of body
extends to causing death in cases of assault with intention of committing rape or
gratifying unnatural lust. The offences of rape and unnatural lust are defined in
IPC under Sections 376 and 377 respectively.
The Supreme Court in Deo Narayan v. State of UP, 1973, held tht when a vital part
of the body such as head is hit by a blunt weapon, it crates a reasonable
apprehension of grievous hurt or even death in the mind of the defence.
Therefore, use of spear by him may be justified under right of his private defence
and it cannot be said tht the force in those circumstances was excessive than need
to stop the oppression.
The case of Gurriya Buchha v. State of Gujarath, AIR, 1962, relates to exercise of
right of private defence under Section 100 in order to protect a person from being
a victim of the unnatural sexual lust of the deceased. In this case, the deceased
assaulted a boy and caused him injuries in order to satisfy his sexual lust. Seeing
this, the accused attacked the deceased who fell down and even after that the
accused continued beating him with the result the deceased dies, Held , the
apprehension of unnatural act by the deceased had come to an end the moment
he fell on the ground, therefore the grievous hurts caused by the accused to the
defendant after his falling down were not justified in exercise of the right of
private defence under section 100. the defence was this disallowed.
3. Assault with intention of kidnapping or abducting: according to Clause fifth of
this section: When there is an assault which is an offence against human body
and that assault is with the intention of abduction as defined in Section 362, IPC,
the right of private defence will be available to the accused when caused injuries
or even death to oppose the act of abduction.
In Vishwanath v. State of UP, AIR, 1960, the husband went to his in laws house to
bring back his wife who had left him and was residing with her parents. His father-in-
law, refused to send his daughter, hence her husband forcibly dragged her out of the
house to take her with him. This infuriated brother-in-law of the deceased husband
stabbed him to death. In defence, the brother of the girl pleaded protection under
clause fifth of section 100 as the act was done to prevent his sister from being
forcibly abducted by her husband. Accepting his defence, the Court acquitted the
accused.
4. Assault with the Intention of Wrongful Confinement: Clause sixth of Section 100
stipulates that the right of private defence of body may extend to causing death when
there is an assault with the intention of causing wrongful confinement(Section 304 of
IPC) of a person. But the person asserting this defence must have a reasonable
Apprehension that the person so confined did not have recourse to public
authorities for his or her relief.
According to Section 101, that in case of an offence of any other description
enumerated in the section 100, the right of private defence will not extend to
causing of death of the assailant, but accused in defence can cause any other
harm expect death in such a case.
According to Section 102, talks about Commencement and continuance of the
right of private defence of the body: the right of private defence of the body
commences as soon as a reasonable apprehension of danger to the body arises
from an attempt or threat to commit the offence though the offence may not
have bee committed and it continues as long as such apprehension of danger to
body continues. (also write here Section 103, When the right of private defence
of property extends to causing death, which is dealt in the next question )
Question: Explain the provisions relating to Private defence of property?
Section 97: Right of private defence of the body and of property- Every person
has a right, subject to the restrictions contained in Section 99 to defend:
1. His own body, and the body of any other person, against any offence affecting
the human body;
2. The property, whether movable or immovable, of himself or of any other
person, against any act which is an offence falling under the definition of theft,
robbery, mischief or criminal trespass, or which is an attempt to commit theft,
robbery, mischief or criminal trespass.
3. This Section provides that every person has a right to defence the person and
property of his own and also of any other person. The right to defend property
is very limited in the sense that it extends to only four offences, namely theft,
robbery, mischief and criminal trespass and attempt thereof.
The exercise of right of private defence relating to person under Section 97 is
justified only where the offence is actually committed and not merely on the
possibility of the occurrence of the offence.
Limitations: As provided under the section 99 of IPC, the exercise of the right of
private defence under Section 97 is subject to following limitations:
(1) The aggressor’s act should constitute an offence relating to human body
under the IPC;
(2) The person using this right must have apprehension of injury to his body or
property of some other person;
(3) The person exercising this right should not himself be an aggressor; and
(4) The right of private defence is right to defend and not right to take revenge.
Defence of Property: the exercise of right of private defence is not limited to the
protection of human body but also extends to the protection of one’s property
and property of others. Every person has a right to defend the property of
himself or of any other person. A rightful owner is entitled to turn out physically
trespasser or one trying to infringe upon his rights. A person exercising this right
should however, not use more force, that is, he has to use reasonable force to
defend his possession from a trespass.
Where a trespasser enters upon the land of another, the person in
whom the right of possession is vested while the trespasser is the process of
acquiring possession may turn the trespasser out of the land by force and if
in doing so he inflicts such injuries on the trespasser as are warranted by the
situation, he commits no offence.
The right of private defence of property cannot be exercised against a person
who entered the premises lawfully, under the authority of law. Thus in Kanwar
Singh v. Delhi Administration, AIR 1965, a raiding party under the authority of
the Delhi Municipal Corporation Act, seized the stray cattle belonging to the
accused and the accused resisted the seizures by use of force and inflicting
injuries on the raiding party, it was held that the right of private defence cannot
be available to the accused and he was convicted for the offence of assault.
Exceeding the right of Private Defence: Where the accused has used force which
was excessive in the circumstances of the case, he cannot avail of the right of
private defence.
In the case of Kishore Shambhunath Mishra v. State of Maharastra, AIR, 1989,
two notorious criminals of the locality armed with lethal weapons, entered
a flat and forced the occupants to part with money, an act which is an offence
of extortion under section 388 of IPC. The occupants of the flat resisted the
invaders both of whom were killed in the fight. It was difficult to say as to who
actually hit the deceased which caused their death. The Court held all the
occupants in those circumstances were entitled to the right of private defence
and therefore none of them could be convicted for an offence under Section
302 read with section 34 IPC.
When the right of private defence of property extends to causing death:
According to Section 103: the right of private defence of property extends,
under the restrictions mentioned in Section 99, to the voluntary causing of
death or of any other harm to the wrong-doer, if the offence, the committing of
which, or the attempting to commit which, occasions, the exercise of the right ,
be an offence of any of the description hereinafter enumerated, namely:
1. Robbery;
2. House-breaking by night;
3. Mischief by fire committed on any building., tent or vessel, which building,
tent or vessel is used as a human dwelling or as a place for the custody of
property;
4. Theft, mischief or house-trespass under such circumstances as may
reasonably cause apprehension that death or grievous hurt will be the
consequence, if such right of private defence is not exercised.
In Puddhan v. State of Tami Nadu, AIR, 2000, there was a dispute over drainage
of water between the deceased and father of the accused and they had gone to
the extent of assaulting each other. In the mean time, the father called his
son(the accused in the case) for help, whereas the mother of the deceased who
intervened was pushed by the accused and she fell down. Thereafter, the
accused went home and brought a knife by which he caused eight injuries to
the accused who later died. The accused pleaded the defence of protection of
property. However, the SC disallowed the defence. The Court altered his
conviction under section 302 to one of Section 304, Part I and the appeal was
dismissed.
When such right extends to causing any harm other than death: Section 104 of
IPC: If the offence, the committing of which or the attempting to commit which
occasions the exercise of the right of private defence, be theft, mischief, or
criminal trespass, not on any of the descriptions enumerated in Section 103, that
right does not extend to the voluntary causing of death, but does extend, subject
to the restrictions mention in section 99, to the voluntary causing to the wrong-
doer of any harm other than death.
In A.R. Yelve v. State of Maharashtra, 1996, The SC ruled that the right of private
defence under section 103 or Section 104 is not available in cases where the
accused does not have right, title, interest or possession over the disputed land.
Commencement and Continuance of the right of private defence of property:
According to Section 105:
1. The right of private defence of property against theft continues till the
offender has effected his retreat with the property or till the assistance of the
public authorities is obtained, or the property has been recovered.
2. The right of private defence of property against robbery continues as long as
the offender causes or attempts to cause to any person death or hurt or wrongful
Restraint or as long as the fear of instant death or if instant hurt or of instant
personal restraint continues.
The right of private defence of property against criminal trespass or mischief
continues as long as the offender continues in the commission of criminal
trespass or mischief.
The right of private defence of property against house-breaking by night
continues as long as the house-trespass and house-breaking continues.
Topic : Abetment
Questions: 1. Explain the provisions relating to abetment of offence.
2. Who is an ‘abettor’? what is abetment of a thing?
3. Define Abetment.
4. A instigated B to murder C. B is pursuance of the instigation stabs C. C
recovers from the wound . What is the liability of ‘A’?
Introduction: The provisions relating to abetment as an offence are contained in
sections 107 to 120 of the Code. Where a crime involves joint-criminals tht is
more than one criminal under the principles of joint liability, the English law
places them into four categories: (Which we have already discussed in Unit I)
(1) Principal in the first degree, that is one who commits the crime or gets the
same committed by an innocent agent;
(2) Principal in the second degree, that is, one is present at the scene and aids and
assist in the commission of crime.
(3) Accessory before the fact; that is, one who though absent from the scene of
crime, counsels, procures or commands another to commit the crime; and
(4) Accessory after the fact, this, one who knowing well that the perpetrators has
committed a crime, harbours and assists him to escape punishment.
Though Indian Law of abetment does not recognise such categories, it
does make a distinction between the main perpetrator of the crime and those
who help or assist him in commission of crime as also those who harbour or
provide shelter to them.
Abetment of a thing: Section 107, describes what is a abetment of a thing: A
person Abets the doing of a thing who –
first- Instigates any person to do that thing: or
Secondly- Engages with one or more other persons or persons in any
conspiracy for the doing of that thing, If an act or illegal omission takes place in
pursuance of that conspiracy, and in order to the doing of that thing: or in
pursuance of that conspiracy.
Thirdly- Intentionally aids, by any act or illegal omission, the doing of that thing.
Explanation 1: A person who, by wilful misrepresentation or by wilful
concealment of a material fact which he is bound to disclose, voluntarily causes
or procures, or attempts to cause or procure, a thing to be done, is said to
instigate the doing of that thing.
Illustration: A public officer, is authorised by a warrant from a Court of Justice to
apprehend Z. B, knowing that fact and also that C is not Z, wilfully represents to
A, that C is Z, and thereby intentionally causes A to apprehend C. Here B abets
by instigation the apprehension of C.
Explanation 2- Whoever, either prior to or at the time of the commission of an
act, does anything in order to facilitate the commission of that act, and there
by facilitates the commission thereof, is said to aid the doing of that act.
When several persons take part in the commission of an offence, each one of
them may contribute in a manner and degree different from the others to the
commission of it. The offence may be committed by the hands of one person
at the instigation of another person, while some others may only be present for
offering help at the time of commission of it, and still others may help the
principal culprit in procuring the tool. It is necessary, therefore, to determine
their degree of culpability.
Under the English law distinction is made between Principals who may be of
the first or second degree ad the accessories before and after the fact. Principal
in the first degree is one who commits or actually takes part in the commission
of a crime. Principal in the second degree is one who aids or abets the actual
commission of a crime. Whoever directly or indirectly incites, counsels,
procures, encourages or commands any person to commit a felony is accessory
before the fact if the felony is committed in consequence thereof. Such a
person if present at the time of commission of a crime is called Principal in the
second degree. Whoever, knowing tht a felony has been committed by another
person, receives comforts or assists him in order to enable him to escape from
punishment is known as accessory after the fact. This distinction in English Law
has its relevance only in cases of felony but not in treason or misdemeanours.
Illustration- A instigates B to murder M. C encourages B by saying ‘maro maro’
and D puts a lathi into his hand. B thereby kills M. E knowing tht B had killed M,
harbours him in order to enable him to escape from arrest. Here B is the person
who commits the offence and is therefore Principal in the first degree. D aids B
by putting lathi into his hand and is therefore Principal in the second degree. A
and C are accessories before the fact for they instigate and encourage B to kill
M. E is the accessory after the fact for he assist him in escaping from
punishment.
Under Indian Law, the IPC makes a broad distinction between principals and
abettors but does not recognise the accessory after the fact, except that
harbouring of offender has been made a substantive offence in some cases.
Under Indian Penal Code, abetment is constituted in the following ways:
(1) By instigating a person to commit an offence; or
(2) By engaging in a conspiracy to commit an offence; or
(3) By intentionally aiding a person to commit an offence.
Abetment is an offence, only if the act abetted would itself be an offence
punishable under the Indian Penal Code or under any other law for the time being
in force. The SC held in Gangula Mohan Reddy v. State of Andhra Pradesh, 2010,
that abetment involves mental process of instigating or intentionally aiding person
to do certain thing. Some positive act by accused is essential to constitute
abetment.
(1) By instigating a person to commit an offence; Instigation means the act of
inciting another to do a wrongful act. One may abet the commission of an
offence by counselling, suggesting, encouraging, procuring or commanding
another to do an act. In order to constitute abetment by instigation, some
active proceeding towards the perpetration of the crime is necessary.
Mere acquiescence, silent assent or verbal permission would not constitute
instigation. For instance, A tells B that he intends to murder C. B says do as you
like. A kills C. B cannot be said to have instigated A to murder C, because
instigation means some active suggestion or support to stimulation to the
commission of the act.
(2) By engaging in a conspiracy to commit an offence; Abetment by conspiracy
consists when two or more persons engage in a conspiracy for the doing of a
thing and an act or illegal omission takes place in pursuance of the
conspiracy and in order to the doing of that thing. Thus in order that
abetment by conspiracy may be constituted, three things are necessary:
(a) A conspiracy between two or more persons;
(b) Such an act or illegal omission must also take place in order to the doing of
the thing conspired.
Conspiracy means an agreement between two or more persons:
(a) To do an illegal act, or
(b) To do an act which is not illegal but by illegal means.
(3) Abetment by intentionally aiding a person to commit an offence: A person
abets the doing of a thing who intentionally aids, by any act or illegal omission,
the doing of that thing. Mere intention to facilitate, even coupled with an act
calculated to facilitate, is not sufficient to constitute abetment, unless the act
which it is intended to facilitate, actually takes place and is facilitated thereby.
For instance, if a servant keeps open the gate of his master’s house , so that
thieves may enter, and thieves do not come, he cannot be held to have abetted
the commission of theft. But if such a person, after having opened the door or
before it, informs possible thieves that he is going to keep the door open, then
he encourages by his conduct to commit theft and is guilty of abetment by
instigation; or if prior to the opening of the gate he had entered into an
agreement with the thieves to keep the door open he would be guilty of
abetment by conspiracy.
Mere presence at the commission of an offence does not amount to intentional
aid, unless it was intended to have that effect.
In Hardhan Chakravarthy v. Union of India, 1990, the main offender was
convicted along with one abettor and eight other abettors were acquitted
of the charges of theft of some military material. Therefore, the main
offender was acquitted by the High Court and thus the only abettor who
was left, appealed to the Supreme Court against his sole conviction. The
Supreme court held that since all the abettors along with the main
offenders had been acquitted the single abettor also deserved to be
acquitted.
Question: Who is an ‘abettor’?
Section 108 defines who is a Abettor. A Abettor is a person abets an offence,
who abets either the commission of an offence, or the commission of an act
which would be an offence, if committed by a person capable by law of
committing an offence, with the same intention or knowledge as that of the
abettor.
Explanation 1- The abetment of the illegal omission of an act may amount to
an offence although the abettor may not himself be bound to do that act.
Explanation 2- To constitute the offence of abetment, it is not necessary that
the act abetted should be committed, or that the effect requisite to constitute
the offence should be caused.
Illustration: (a) A instigates B to murder C, B refuses to do so. A is guilty of
abetting B to commit murder.
A instigates B to murder D. B in pursuance of the instigation stabs D. D
recovers from the wound. A is guilty of instigating B to commit murder. (this is
the answer for the problem asked in the KSLU)
Explanation 3 - It is not necessary that the person abetted should be capable by
law of committing an offence, or that he should have the same guilty intention or
knowledge as that of the abettor, or any guilty intention or knowledge.
Illustration: A, with A guilty intention, abets a child or a lunatic to commit an act
which would be an offence, if committed by a person capable by law of
committing an offence, and having the same intention as A. Here A, whether
the act be committed or not, is guilty of abetting an offence.
Explanation 4 – The abetment of an offence being an offence, the abetment of
such an abetment is also an offence.
Illustration: A instigates B to instigate C to murder Z, B accordingly instigates C to
murder Z, and C commits that offence in consequence of B’s instigation. B is
liable to be punished for his offence with the punishment for murder and as A
instigated B to commit the offence, A is also liable to the same punishment.
Explanation 5 – It is not necessary to the commission of the offence of abetment
by conspiracy that the abettor should concert the offence with the person who
commits it. It is sufficient if he engages in the conspiracy in pursuance of which
the offence is committed.
Illustration: A, concerts with B a plan for poisoning Z. It is agreed that A shall
administer the poison. B them explains the plan to C mentioning that a third
person is to administer the poison, but without mentioning A’s name. C agrees
to procure the poison, and procures and delivers it to B, for the purpose of its
being used in the manner explained. A administers the poison, Z dies in
consequence . Here, though A and C have not conspired together, yet C has
been engaged in the conspiracy in pursuance of which Z has been murdered. C
has, therefore, committed the offence defined in this section and is liable to the
punishment for murder.
In case of offence of abetment, active complicity, on the part of the abettor,
prior of actual commission of the offence is necessary. The Abettor must
substantially assist the principal culprit towards the commission of the offence.
To repeat again, Para (1) of section 108 defines Abettor. Abettor means:
(a) One who abets the commission of an offence, or
(b) One who abets the commission of an act which would be an offence if
committed by a person not suffering from any physical or mental incapacity.
( what amount to Abetment is already explained in section 107).
Section 108-A: Abetment in India of offence outside India:
A person abets an offence within the meaning of this Code, who is India, abets the
commission of any act without and beyond India, which would constitute an
offence if committed in India.
Section 109: this section provided for the same punishment to the abettor as
that which may be inflicted on the principal offender provided that-
(a) The act abated is committed in consequence of the abetment ; and
(b) No express provision is made in the Code for the punishment of such an
abetment.
This section only lays down that if separate punishment has not been provided by
the code for an abetment, then it would be punishable with the punishment
provided for the original offence.
The explanation makes it clear that the abetment may be of any one of the three
kinds that is, instigation, aiding or conspiracy.
In the case of Sahib Lal Rit Lal v. Emperor, 1883, a widowed woman sat on the
funeral pyre to commit sati by burning herself alive along with the dead body of
her deceased husband. She asked the accused to set the fire on but as soon as
the flames started coming-out from the pyre, she got frightened and started
running away but the accused compelled her to come back and commit sati, but
she did not oblige. The Court held that the woman was guilty of attempt to
commit suicide under section 309, IPC but along with her the accused was also
held guilty of abetment of murder under Section 109, IPC.
Topic: Criminal Conspiracy
Questions: 1. What is criminal conspiracy? How does it differ from abetment?
2. Write short notes on Criminal conspiracy.
Section 120-A, defines Criminal Conspiracy as “When two or more person agree to do, or
cause to be done-
(1) An illegal act, or
(2) An act which is not illegal but done by illegal means, such an agreement is designated a
criminal conspiracy:”
Provided that no agreement except an agreement to commit an offence shall amount to a
criminal conspiracy, unless some act besides the agreement is done by one or more parties to
such agreement in pursuance thereof.
Explanation – It is immaterial whether the illegal act is the ultimate object of such agreement,
or is merely incidental to that object.
Ingredient of the Section 120-A – The offence of criminal conspiracy as defined in
Section 120-A must have the following ingredients:-
(i) There must be an agreement between two or more persons between
themselves; and
(ii) The agreement must be to do or cause to be done:
(a) an illegal act; or
(b) a legal act by illegal means.
The proviso to section 121-A, further amplifies that in case of conspiracy to
commit an offence, mere existence of an agreement is sufficient to impose penal
liability without the requirement of some overt act having been done in
furtherance of the conspiracy. But where there is conspiracy to do a legal act by
illegal means, there must be an overt act committed by one or more parties to
the agreement. In other words, in the latter case existence of both, agreement
as well as an overt act is essential to constitute the offence of conspiracy.
Criminal conspiracy is a continuing offence and it continues till the conspirators
do not rescind or frustrate it voluntarily or compelled by the circumstances.
The Supreme Court summarises the broad essentials of the offence of
criminal conspiracy in Devender Pal Singh v. State(NCT Delhi), as follows:
(a) There should be an object or purpose to be accomplished;
(b) There should be a plan embodying means to accomplish that object;
(c) An agreement or understanding between two or more person's to
combine and accomplish that object or purpose by mutual cooperation;
and
(d) An overt act in pursuance of the agreement where the conspiracy is to do
for doing a legal act by illegal means.
Essentials of Criminal Conspiracy
1. There must be two or more persons: In order to constitute an offence of
criminal conspiracy, there must be an agreement between two or more
persons to do an illegal act or to do a legal act by illegal means
In Faguan Kant Nath v. State of Assam, AIR, 1959, a Major of the Army was tried
for committing theft by conspiring with nine other army personnel who were
co-accused in the case. Eight out of these nine were acquitted by the Trial Court
and the remaining one was acquitted by the High Court on appeal. The Major
appealed to the Supreme Court on the ground that he alone could not conspire
with himself. Accepting the plea of the Major(Appellant) the Court ordered his
acquittal.
2. Agreement between two persons is the essence of the offence of Criminal
Conspiracy: An agreement among the combination of persons to do an illegal
act or to a legal act by illegal means is the essence of the criminal conspiracy.
Mere combination of two or more persons does not make a case of criminal
conspiracy unless they have agreed to do an illegal act or legal act by illegal
means . However, the law does not require that each and every person
should have knowledge of all the details of offence which is going to be
committed by conspiring together.
3. The agreement should be to commit an illegal act or an act which is legal by
illegal means: An ‘illegal act’ as defined in section 43, IPC means an act which
is prohibited under the law or which creates a basis for civil action.
The Supreme Court in State of Madhya Pradesh v. S.B. Johari, SCC, 2000, once
again reiterated that in most case involving charge of criminal conspiracy, it is
only from the circumstantial evidence that an inference of conspiracy has to be
drawn.
4. The act must have been done in furtherance of agreement: As stipulated in
the explanation appended to Section 120-A, this section equally applies to
other acts committed by conspiracy besides the commission of an offence
by criminal conspiracy.
5. Inference of Conspiracy: there may be cases when direct evidence is not
available about the offence, but the facts and circumstances by themselves
may be sufficient to draw an inference about the existence of criminal
conspiracy.
In Saju v. State of Kerala, 2001, the Court held that evidence in case of
conspiracy is generally based on inference deduced from acts or illegal
omissions of the accused persons done in furtherance of their common
intention, there must be evidence to show that there existed a common design
to act.;
Punishment of Criminal conspiracy: According to Section 120-B:
This section provides punishment for the offence of criminal conspiracy. As
provided in the preceding Section 120-A criminal conspiracy may be of two kinds,
namely,
(1) Conspiracy for committing serious offences which are punishable with death,
imprisonment for life or rigorous imprisonment for a term of 2 years or more;
and
(2) Conspiracy to commit other than the serious offence and act which is legal but
done by illegal means.
In the former case, no overt act is deemed necessary and mere
agreement if proved would be sufficient to constitute the offence of criminal
conspiracy, but in the latter case an overt act must have been done.
Distinction between Criminal Conspiracy(Section 120-A) and Abetment(Section
107)
In view of the fact that conspiracy is an offence by itself under Section 120-A and
one of the form of abetment of an offence under Section 107, it is necessary to
bring out distinction between the two. It is as follows
Criminal Conspiracy(Section 120-A) Abetment (Section 107)
1. Criminal Conspiracy is a substantive Whereas under the second clause of
offence under Section 120-A of IPC. Section 107, conspiracy is a form of
abetment for doing an act or illegal
2. In case of Criminal conspiracy under omission.
Section 120-A, there has to be an
agreement between two or more
persons to do or cause to be done an Whereas in case of Section 107 it is
illegal act or a legal act when not ‘engagement’. The person who abets is
illegal by illegal means. Therefore, the called the Abettor.
basis of liability under Section 120-A
is agreement.
(1) Waging War: Any person taking part in organised armed attack on the
constitutional authorities and the object of attack being subversion of
Government and the establishment of another in its place, would be guilty of
the offence of waging war. This offence may be committed by citizens or
foreigners.
In Maganlal Radhkrishan V. Emperor, AIR, 1946, the following characteristics
of the offence were pointed out:
(1) No specific number of persons is necessary to constitute this offence.
(2) the number of persons concerned and the manner in which they are
equipped is immaterial;
(3) The true criterion is “Quo Animo”, did the gathering assemble ?
(4) The object of the gathering must be to attain by force and violence an
object of a general public nature thereby striking directly against the
King’s authority.
(5) There is no distinction between principal and accessory and everyone
who takes part in the unlawful act incurs the same guilt.
2. Abets the Waging of War: Abetment of waging war is made a special
offence. It is not essential that as a result of the abetment the war should
in fact be waged.
In Mohd. Arif v. State(NCT Delhi), 2011, the trial court had awarded death
sentence to appellant Mohd. Arif alias Ashraff, for the offence under Section 121
of IPC for waging war against the Government of India. Similarly, he was
sentenced to death for the offence under section 120-B, read with Section 302
IPC for committing murder of Army Naik Ashok Kumar, Uma Shankar and
Abdullah thakur inside the Red fort on December 22, 2000. the High Court
concurred with the finding of the trial Court and confirmed the death sentence
as there were no mitigating circumstances justifying lesser punishment.
Section 121-A, deals with two kinds of conspiracies:
(1) Conspiring within or without India to commit any of the offences punishable
by Section 212.
(2) Conspiring to overawe by means of criminal force, or the show of criminal
force against Central Government or any State Government
Such offences shall be punished with imprisonment for life, or with imprisonment
of either description which may extend to ten years, and shall also be liable to
fine.
The expression conspiring to overawe government by means of criminal force
or the show of criminal force was interpreted by the Kerala High Court, in the
case, Arbind v. State 1993, the Court observed that the word “overawe”
means something more than the mere creation of apprehension, alarm or
fear. It connotes the creation of a situation in which the government feels
itself compelled to choose between yielding to force or exposing itself for
members of the public to very serious danger.
Collecting arms, etc., with intention of waging war against the Government of
India: According to Section 122: Whoever collects men, arms or ammunition
or otherwise prepares to wage war with the intention of either waging or
being prepared to wage war against the Government of India, shall be
punished with imprisonment for life or imprisonment of either description for
a term not exceeding ten years, and shall also be liable to fine.
Section 123: Concealing with intent to facilitate design to wage war: the
following are the essentials of this section:
(1) The existence of a design to wage war against the Government of India
(2) Such a design must be within the knowledge of the accused;
(3) The accused must have concealed that design; and
(4) The concealment must have been intended to facilitate the design to
wage war.
This section makes the concealment of design to wage war against the
Government of India by any act or omission, so that, such concealment may
facilitate the waging of such war, an offence.
Section 124, makes it an offence, an assault or attempt to commit assault or
wrongful restraint or attempt or use of criminal force of show of criminal
force committed against the President of India or the Governor of a State,
Question: What is sedition and explain the ingredients.
Sedition: According to Section 124-A of IPC, “ whoever by words, either spoke or
written, or by signs or by visible representation or otherwise brings or attempts to
bring into hatred or contempt, or excites or attempts to excite disaffection towards
the government established by law in India, shall be punished with imprisonment or
life, to which fine may be added, or with imprisonment which may extent to three
years, to which fine may be added, or with fine.
Explanation 1 – The expressions “dissatisfaction” includes disloyalty and all feelings o
enmity’
Explanation 2 – Comments expressing disapprobation of the measures of the
Government with a view to obtain their alteration by lawful means without exciting
or attempting to excite hatred, contempt or direction, do not constitute an offence
under this section.
Explanation 3- Comments expressing disapprobation of the administrative or the
action of the government without exciting or attempting to excite hatred, contempt or
dissatisfaction, do not constitute an offence under this section.
Ingredients: the following are the two essentials of Sedition:
(1) Bringing or attempting to bring into hatred or contempt or exciting or
attempting to excite dissatisfaction towards the Government of India.
(2) (2) such act or attempt may be done(i) by words, either spoken or
written, or (ii) signs, or (iii) by visible representation.
In Queen v. Jogendra Chandra Bose, CJ Petheram explained
‘dissatisfaction’ to means as a feeling contrary to affection; In other words
dislike or hatred. Disapprobation means simply disapproval. If a person uses
either spoken or written words calculated to create in the minds of the person
to whom they are addressed a disposition not to obey the lawful authority of
the government , or to subvert or resist the authority, If and when the
occasion should arise and if he does so with the intention of creating such
disposition, among his hearers or reader, they will be guilty under the Section.
In Queen v. Balgangadhar Tilak, Strachey J, agreed with the above ruling,
holding that a man must not made or try to make others feel enmity of any
kind towards the Government. Amount and intensity or disaffection is
absolutely immaterial except perhaps in dealing with the question of
punishment.
After coming into force of the Constitution the validity of this section was
considered by the Supreme Court in Ramesh Thapart, AIR 1962 and Brij
Bhusam’s cases. As a result of these two decisions Constitution First
Amendment Act was passed in 1951. There after in Kedar Nath Singh's, case,
AIR, 1962, the validity of this section was again questioned on the ground of
the provisions of this section being in violation of freedom of speech and
expression. The plea was negatived by the Court and the section was held to
be constitutional. The explanation to the section makes it clear that criticism of
public measures or comment on Government action, however strongly worded,
within reasonable limits and consistent with the fundamental right of freedom
of speech and expression is not affected. It is only when the words have the
pernicious tendency or intention of creating public disorder or disturbance of
law and order that the provisions of the section are attracted.
Elements:
1. Exciting dissatisfaction: To Constitute an offence under this section it is not
necessary that one should excite or attempt to excite mutiny or rebellion or
any kind of actual disturbance, it would be sufficient that one tries to excite
feeling or hatred or contempt towards the government.
In Navarag Singh v. Stata o Punjab, 1986, The Propaganda Secretary of the
Gurudwaras in course of his speech gave very high figures of causalities
following Army action in Punjab. He was charged with sedition under Section
124-A of IPC. The High Court of Punjab held that even though the accused had
not directed or incited anyone to commit violence but the tendency of his
Speech was to bring the Government into contempt and here was every
likelihood violence and public disorder erupting as a result of the speech.
2. Attempt: A person may be charged not only with exciting but also with
attempting to excite and both successful and unsuccessful attempts to excite
disaffection were placed on the same footing. So even if a person had only
tried to excite the feeling he could be convicted.
3. Government established by law in India: the expression “Government
established by law in India” includes the executive power in action and does
not mean merely the constitutional framework. It includes the State
Government as well as the Central Government .
4. Various Forms of Excitement: Disaffection may be excited in a number of
ways. Writing of any kind, poem, drama, story, novel or essays may be used
for the purpose of exciting disaffection. But seditious writing, if it remains in
the hands of the author or unpublished does not constitute offence because
publication of some kind is necessary.
5. Liability of Editor’s, etc: the editor of a paper will be liable for unsigned
seditious letters appearing in the newspaper. Where extracts of foreign
newspapers are published as a new item, it may attract the provisions of
this section if such writings are seditious libels.
6. Dramatic Performance: Any dramatic performance likely to excite feelings
of disaffection to the Government may be prohibited by the Government
and persons taking part in any such performance may be punished.
Offences against public tranquillity
Topic Unlawful Assembly
It is constructive liability.
6. It is joint liability.
7. Only offence committed in
furtherance of common Members of unlawful assembly
are not only labile to the acts
intention is punishable. done in prosecution of common
intention to be done with
unlawful object, but its
consequence offences.
Topic: Rioting and Affray
Question: Distinguish ‘rioting from ‘affray’.
Section 146, defines what is Rioting under IPC as: “Whenever force or violence
is used by an unlawful assembly , or by any member thereof, in prosecution of
the common object of such assembly, every member of such assembly is guilty
of the offence of rioting.
A riot is simply an unlawful assembly, in a particular state of activity, that activity
being accompanied by the use of force or violence. It is only the use of the force
that distinguished rioting from an unlawful assembly. The word ‘riot’ is a term of
art and to popular belief a riot may involve no noise or disturbance of the
neighbours though there must be some force or violence.
Ingredients: the following are the ingredients of the offence of rioting:
1. The accused persons must be five or more in number and form an unlawful
assembly;
2. The accused must be animated by a common object;
3. The force or violence must be used by the unlawful assembly or any
member therefore in prosecution of the common object.
Force is defined in section 349 of IPC and it has been used here in that sense. It
is restricted to force used against persons only. Even slightest use of force by
any member of an unlawful assembly, if proved to be unlawful, constitutes
rioting. But force must have been used in prosecution of the common object of
the assembly.
In a Sudden quarrel, if the number of persons assembled for any lawful
purpose suddenly quarrel without any previous intention or design they would
not be liable for rioting.
Difference between riot and unlawful assembly: if the parties assemble in a
tumultuous manner and actually execute their purpose with violence, it is a
riot, but if they merely meet upon a purpose which, if executed would make
them rioters and, having done nothing, they separate without carrying their
purpose into effect, it is an unlawful assembly. It is only the use of force that
distinguishes rioting from an unlawful assembly.
Punishment for rioting: According to Section 147, Whoever is guilty of rioting,
shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may
extend to two years or with fine or with both and according to section 148,
whoever is guilty of rioting being armed with a deadly weapon or with anything
which, used as a weapon of offence, is likely to cause death, shall be punished
with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to three
years, or with fine, or with both.
Cases: 1. In Rahunath Rai case, 1892, several Hindus acting in concert, forcibly
removed an ox and two cows from the possession of a Mohammedan, not for
the purpose of causing ‘wrongful gain’ to themselves or ‘wrongful loss’ to the
owner of the cattle, but for the purpose of preventing the killing of the cows.
They were held guilty of rioting.
2. The Supreme Court in Budhwa v. State, 1990, upheld the conviction of four
accused out of a total of fifteen on the ground that there was sufficient evidence
against them regarding active participation in the crime in pursuance of the
common object of unlawful assembly, of which they were members, therefore,
they were rightly convicted of the offence under Section 146 of IPC.
Topic: Affray
Section 159 defines what is Affray, “When two or more persons, by fighting in a
public place disturb the public peace, they are said to “commit an affray”.
The word ‘affray’ is derived from the French word ‘affraier’ which means to
terrify. In law it means a public offence to the terror of the people. The gist of
the offence lies in the terror it is likely to cause to the public. According to
Blackstone, a fighting between two or more persons in a public place to the terror
of His Majesty's subjects is affray in English law.
Ingredients: the following are the ingredients of this offence:
(i) Two or more persons must fight;
(ii) They must fight in a public place;
(iii) By their fighting they must disturb the public peace.
(iv) Some fight at public place is necessary to constitute the offence. Mere
exchange of abusive, threatening or hot words, however violent, without
exchange of blows does not amount to fight. The fighting means a quarrel
accompanied by use of a little force. And also cases in which when member of
one party beat the members of another party and the latter do no retaliate,
there is no fighting and therefore, no affray.
In order to constitute the offence of an affray, there must not only be fighting
in a public place but such fighting must also cause the disturbance of public
peace.
In the case of, Jagannath Sah,1930, two brothers were quarrelling and abusing
each other in a public road in a town and a large crown gathered and the traffic
was jammed but no actual fight took place. It was held that no affray was
committed in absence of actual fighting.
The punishment for Affray is prescribed in section 160 of IPC, is only a term of
imprisonment up to one month or a meagre fine of Rs 100 or with both.
Distinction between Affray and Assault: the two are different in the following
ways:
Distinction between Common Intention and Common Object
Common Intention(Section 34) Common object (Section 149)
1. The number of offenders must be 1. The number of offenders is five
more than one that is, two or or more.
more.
2. It does not create specific and 2. It creates a specific and
substantive offence, but only substantive offence, punishment
states a rule of evidence. can be imposed solely
Punishment cannot be imposed depending upon Section149.
solely upon Section 34.
3. The object under Section 149
3. The intention under Section 34 must be one of the objects
may be of any intention . mentioned under Section 141.
4. Prior meeting of minds is 4. Prior meeting of minds is not
necessary. necessary.
Common Intention Common Object
5. It requires that all the accused Mere membership of unlawful
must meet together before assembly at the time of
actual attack participated by commitment of crime is
all takes place. sufficient.
It is constructive liability.
6. It is joint liability.
7. Only offence committed in
furtherance of common Members of unlawful assembly
are not only labile to the acts
intention is punishable. done in prosecution of common
intention to be done with
unlawful object, but its
consequence offences.
Offence relating by or Relating to Public Servants
Question: 1. Explain the provisions of Indian Penal Code, relating to the
offences by or relating to a public servant.
Section 166 to 171 deals with offence relating by or relating to Public Servants,
they are
1. According to Section 166, A public servant who wilfully disobeys a law with
the intention of cause injury to any person shall be punishable under this
Section. However, mere disobedience of any departmental rules or regulations
will not be punishable under this section as they do not have the force of law.
The expression ‘Public servant’ used in this section has the same meaning as
defined in Section 21 of the IPC.
The offence under this section is non-cognizable, bailable and non-
compoundable and is triable by Magistrate of the First Class. The disobedience
of an injunction order of a Court is not covered within the ambit of this section,
because it is a case of contempt of court for which contempt proceeding is the
proper forum. Under this section he shall be punishable with simple
imprisonment for a term which may extend to one year, or with fine, or with
both.
Illustration: A, being an officer directed by law to take property in execution, in
order to satisfy a decree pronounced in Z’s favour by a Court of Justice,
knowingly disobeys that direction of law, with the knowledge that he is likely
thereby to cause injury to Z. A has committed the offence defined in this
section.
2. Section 166-A, Public servant disobeying direction under law, whoever being a
public servant according to clause (a) of Section 166-A: a public servant who
knowingly disobeys any direction of law which prohibits him from requiring the
attendance at any place of any person for the purpose of investigation into an
offence or other matter shall be punished.
And according Clause (b) provides that when a public servant knowingly disobeys
to the prejudice of any person any other direction of the law regulating the
manner in which he shall conduct such investigation shall also be punishable.
According to clause ( c) of section 166-A, as amended by the Criminal Law
(Amendment) Act, 2013, makes refusal to register an FIR as a cognizable and
bailable offence where the information reveals the commission of any of the of
the following offences under the Indian Penal Code:
1. Voluntary causing grievous hurt by use of acid.
2. Voluntarily throwing or attempting to throw acid.
3. Assault or use of criminal force to woman with intent to outrage her modestly.
4. Assault or use of criminal force to woman with intent to disrobe her,
5. Trafficking of persons.
6. Exploitation of trafficked child.
7. Rape
8. Person committing an offence of rape and inflicting injury which causes death or
causes the woman to be in a persistent vegetative state.
9. Sexual intercourse by husband upon his wife during separation.
10. Sexual intercourse by a person in authority.
11. Gang-rape.
12. Repeat offenders.
13. Uttering any words or making any gesture intended to insult the modesty of a
woman etc,..
The supreme court observed that insertion of Section 166-A was in the light of
recent unfortunate occurrences of offences on against women.
4. The newly added Section 166-B, of the Indian penal Code deals with
punishment for non-treatment of a victim: It punishes any person in charge of a
hospital whether the hospital is a public or private and whether it is run by
Central or State government.
5. Section 167, deals with Public Servant framing an incorrect record or writing
with intent to cause injury: Whoever, being a public servant, frames incorrect
document with the intent to cause injury will be punishable under this section.
In Krishna Govind Patel v. State of Maharashtra, AIR, 1973, the accused a forest
official made entries showing underestimation and under-valuation in records
with respect of the number of trees actually fell and included even the trees
which were illegally fell, with knowledge that it is going to cause huge wrongful
loss to the Government, the Supreme Court upheld his conviction under
Section 167.
6. Public Servant unlawfully engaging in trade: Section 168: this section aims at
prohibiting the public servants from indulging in any trade or business during
their service tenure, so that they may not misuse their position for obtaining
unfair benefits or advantages. The word ‘trade’ in narrowest sense means
“exchange of goods for goods or for money with the object of making profit” and
in its widest sense means “any business with a view to earn profit”.
7. Public Servant unlawfully buying or bidding for property: Section 168: This
section is mere extension of the preceding section which prohibits a public
servant from purchasing or bidding for property which he legally is bound not to
purchase in his own name or in the name of another jointly.
The sections 166 to 169 imposes criminal liability on a public servant if he does
certain prohibited acts specified these sections.
8. Personating a Public Servant: Section 170: According to this Section, a person
who does not hold a public office , but falsely pretends and personates any other
person holding such office and does or attempts to do any act under colour of
such office shall be punishable under this section.
9. Wearing garb or carrying token used by a pubic servant with fraudulent intent:
Section 171: according to this section, any person who wears garb or caries
token used by a public servant with fraudulent intent is punishable under this
section. The knowledge, of the person that he is personating as pubic servant
who he is actually not, is the essential ingredient of the offence under this
section and it should be with the intention that he should be believed to be
belonging to that category of public servant whose garb he wearing or whose
token he is carrying.
Topic: Offences relating to Elections
Question: Write a note on election offences.
Section 171 to 171 –I, defines the offences relating to Elections:
Section 171-A defines who is a Candidate and what is a Electoral right.
Candidate means a person who has been nominated as a candidate at any
election. It includes a person who holds himself out as a prospective candidate in
the election, provides he is subsequently nominated as a candidate at such
election. And Election right means the right of a person to stand or not to stand
as a candidate in an election or to withdraw from such election or to vote or
refrain from voting at an election.
Offences relating to Elections:
1. Section 171 –B: Bribery: It means the taking or giving of a gratification as a
motive or a reward to any person weather to induce him to stand , or not stand,
or to withdraw from being a candidate or to vote or to refrain from voting at an
election To know whether a particular act is a bribery or not, it should be seen
whether the gratification satisfies his personal motive and is of some value to
him.
2. Section 171-C: Undue influence of elections: This section defines undue
influence at elections. It means voluntary interference or attempted
interference with the right of any person to stand, or not stand as, or withdraw
from being, a candidate, or to vote or refrain from voting, commits the offence
of undue influence.
3. Sections 171-D to 171-I, makes the following as offences under IPC:
(a) Personation at elections: in this section, any person who attempts to vote in
another person’s name or in a fictitious name, or one who attempts to vote
twice or one who abets with a corrupt motive, will be guilty of personation.
(b) Punishment for Bribery: If any person commits the offence of bribery, then
he will be punished with imprisonment up to one year or fine of both. If
the bribery is in the form of food, drink , entertainment, then it is punishable
with fine only other wise the offence is non-cognizable, bailable and non-
compoundable , triable by first class magistrate.
(c) False statement in connection with an election: this section punishes false
statement of fact in relation to the personal character or conduct of a
candidate.
(d) Failure to keep election accounts: Failure to keep accounts of election
expenses is punishable under this Section. If such accounts are required to be
kept by any law or rule having the force of law.
III Giving False Information: According to Section 203, any person knowing or
having reasons to believe that an offence has been committed, gives any
information regarding that offence which he knows or believes to be false, shall
be punished with imprisonment for two years or fine or both.
Essentials:
1. An offence must have bee committed.
2. The accused should know or believe that such offence has been committed.
3. The accused must have given information regarding the offence.
4. The information must be false.
5. At the time of giving information he should know that it was false.
Sections, 230 to 240 & 263A; deal with Counterfeiting coins and Government
Stamps: in this regards the important points are:
I Counterfeiting Coin: According to Section 231, Whoever counterfeits or
knowingly performs any part of the process of counterfeiting coin, shall be
punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to
seven years, and shall also be liable to fine.
Explanation: A person commits this offence who intending to practice deception,
or knowing it to be likely that deception will thereby be practised, causes a
genuine coin to appear like a different coin.
The offence under this section is cognizable, non bailable and non-compoundable.
Coins are defined by Section 230 , means, Coins is metal used for the
time being as money and stamped and issued by the authority of some State or
Sovereign Power in order to be so used.
The following are also offences under this chapter.
1. Possession of instrument or material for the purpose of using the same for
counterfeiting coin.
2. Abetting in India the counterfeiting out of India of coin.
3. Import or export of counterfeit coin.
4. Delivery of coins, possessed with knowledge that it is counterfeit.
5. Delivery of Indian coin, possessed with knowledge that it is counterfeit.
6. Delivery of coin as genuine which when first possessed the deliverer did not
know to be counterfeit.
7. Possession of counterfeit coin by person who knew it to be counterfeit
when he became possessed thereof.
8. Possession of Indian coin by person who knew it to be counterfeit when he
became possessed thereof, and so on.
II Hurt(Sections 319-338,IPC).
III Wrongful Restraint and Wrongful confinement (Sections 399-348, IPC).
IV Criminal Force and Assault (Section 349-354, 354A, 354B, 354C, 354D, 355
to 358).
V. Kidnapping, Abduction, Slavery and forced labour(sections 359 to 374, IPC).
(i) Kidnapping and Abduction (Sections 359 to 363A, 364, 364A to 369).
(ii) Trafficking of persons 370 exploitation of a trafficked person (section
370A).
(iii) Habitual dealing in slave(Sections 371).
(iv) selling or buying a minor for prostitution, etc,(Section 372 to 373, IPC).
(v) Unlawful Compulsory labour(section 374, IPC).
VI Sexual Offences(sections 375 -377, IPC).
(i) Rape (sections, 375, 376,376A, 376B,376C, 376D and 376E, IPC).
(ii) Unnatural offences (sections 377, IPC).
Topic : Culpable Homicide(section 299)
Questions: 1. Explain the ingredient of the offence of culpable homicide with
illustrations.
2. State the circumstances when culpable homicide does not amount to murder?
Introduction : Homicide is the killing of a human being by a human being. Homicide
may be either:
1. Lawful Homicide, and
2. Unlawful Homicide.
1. Lawful Homicide is further divided into:
(i) Justifiable Homicide: Examples (a) Mistake of fact(Section 76 and
(b) Judicial Act(Section 77)
(ii) Excusable Homicide: Examples (a) Accident(section 80)
(b) Acts of the Child below 7 yrs(Section 82)
2. Unlawful Homicide is further divided under IPC into :
(i) Murder(Section: 300)
(ii) Culpable homicide not amounting to murder; and
(iii) Causing death by negligence(section 304A); and
(iv) Suicide (sections 305 and 306)
Culpable Homicide
Section 299 defines what is Culpable Homicide: ‘Whoever causes death by doing
an act with the intention of causing death, or with the intention of causing such
bodily injury as is likely to cause death, or with the knowledge, that he is likely
by such act to cause death, commits the offence of culpable homicide.
Explanation 1 –a person who causes bodily injury to another who is labouring
under a disorder, disease or bodily infirmity and thereby accelerates the death
of that other, shall be deemed to have caused his death.
Explanation 2- Where death is caused by bodily injury, the person who causes
such bodily injury shall be deemed to have caused the death, although by
resorting to proper remedies and skilful treatment the death might have been
prevented .
Explanation 3 - the causing of the death of child in the mother’s womb is not
homicide. But it may amount to culpable homicide to cause the death of a living
child, if any part of that child has been brought forth, though the child may mot have
breathed or been completely born.
Illustrations: (a) A lays sticks and turf over a pit, with the intention of causing death
or with the knowledge, that death is likely to be thereby caused Z, believing the
ground to be firm, treads on it, falls in and is killed. A has committed the offence of
culpable homicide.
(b) A knows Z to be behind a bush. B does not know it. A, intending to cause, or
knowing it to be likely to cause Z’s death, induces b to fire at the bush. B fires
and kills Z. Here B may be guilty of no offence, but A has committed the offence
of culpable homicide.
(c) A, by shooting at a fowl with intent to kill and steal it , kills B, who is behind a
bush; a not knowing that he was there. Here, although A was doing an unlawful
act, he was not guilty of culpable homicide, as he did not intend to kill B, or to
cause death by doing an act that he knew was likely to cause death.
Ingredients: the following are the essentials of culpable homicide:
1. Causing of death of a human being.
2. Such death must have been caused by doing an act.
3. The act must have been done;
(i) with the intention of causing death, or
(ii) with the intention of causing such bodily injury as to likely to cause
death; or
(iii) with the knowledge that the doer is likely by such act, to cause death.
‘Homicide’ literally means killing of a human being by a human being. The first
kind of unlawful homicide is known as culpable homicide under section 299,
IPC. The word ‘culpable’ denotes blameworthiness or criminal in nature.
Culpable homicide is of two types:
(1) Culpable homicide amounting to murder, or
(2) Culpable homicide not amounting to murder
A murder is merely a particular form of culpable homicide. It is said that every
murder is culpable homicide but every culpable homicide is not murder. Thus
murder is only a specie of culpable homicide which is the genus.
When the accused caused death of a person, the court while finding him guilty
of an act of voluntarily causing hurt, must consider the provisions of section 299
read with Section 304 of IPC. It is important from the jurisprudential point of
view because when an act or omission of the accused causes the death of any
person, he or she is either guilty of culpable homicide or guilty of non-culpable
homicide. It is for the Court to determine on the evidence available, whether, if
it is culpable homicide, amount to murder as explained in section 300 of IPC or
not amounting to murder as explained in Section 304, IPC. If culpable homicide
cannot be proved, then it would fall in the category of non-culpable homicide.
The explanation appended to Section 299 describe three situations when
presence or absence of certain factors in causing death are treated as
committing the offence of culpable homicide.
1. Whoever causes death: Death means death of human being. It does not
include the death of an unborn child, such child in the mother’s womb.
But in view of explanation 3 it may amount to culpable homicide to cause
death of a living child, if any part of the child has been brought forth, though
the child may not have breathed or been completely born.
2. By doing an Act or omission: Whether an act or omission would be
covered by the definition of culpable homicide is to be decided on the basis
of the fact that, if the act done or the omission by the accused has caused
the death of another person and whether death is the direct result of such
act or omission. Death may be caused in any number of ways; such as by
poisoning, starving, striking, drowning , or communicating some shocking
news. Etc, it includes illegal omission also. For instance, where a jailor
voluntarily cause death of a prisoner by omitting to supply him food, or a
nurse voluntarily causes death of a child entrusted to her care by omitting to
take it out of a tub of water into which it has fallen. The jailor or nurse shall
be guilty of murder. But if the jailer omits to give food to a beggar, and if the
beggar dies. Here jailor commits no offence because here beggar has no
other claim on Jailer , than that of humanity.
Death caused by effect of words: Death may also be caused by effect of words
such as by making some communicate to another which caused excitement
which results in death although it would be difficult to prove it the person,
who spoke the words, anticipated from them an affect which except under very
peculiar circumstances.
For example: A with the intention or knowledge aforesaid, relates exciting or
agitating new to B who is in a critical stage of a dangerous illness; B dies in
consequence. A will be liable of culpable homicide. Similarly, A with the
intention or knowledge aforesaid, gives B his choice whether B will kill himself,
or suffer lingering torture; B kills himself by taking poison. A would be liable for
culpable homicide.
3(i) Intention to cause death: Intention means the expectation of the
consequence in question. When a man is charged with doing an act, of which
the reasonable consequences may be highly injurious, the intention is an
inference of law resulting from the doing of the act. Intention is inferred from
the acts of the accused and the circumstances of the case. Thus a deliberate
firing by a loaded gun at one leads to inference that the intention was to cause
death.
The existence of intention is not to be inferred unless death follows as a natural
and probable consequences from the act. For instance, where death is caused
By a blow, which would not cause the death of a healthy person because the
person whose death is caused suffered from a disease, it would not be fair to
infer intention or knowledge. This is so because in such a case the consequence
is not natural or probable consequence of the act done and therefore, it can be
said that in the case the accused never contemplated the result. Here some
extrinsic evidence would be necessary to how the real intent or knowledge in
such a case, to illustrate, the offender was aware of the disease and the blow
was given on the diseased. An intention also includes foresight of certainty.
Intention of causing death is not the intention of causing the death of any
particular person. It can be any person. For illustration : A had the intention or
knowledge of causing somebody’s death , though not of a particular person,
who treads over the turf believing the ground to be firm.
3. (ii) with the intention of causing such bodily injury as is likely to cause death:
The intention of the offender may not be to cause death, it would be sufficient
if he intended to cause such bodily injury which was likely to cause death. The
connection between the ‘act’ and the death caused by the act must be direct
and distinct; and though not immediate it must not be too remote.
The expression of causing such bodily injury as is likely to cause death’
merely means an intention to cause a particular injury, which injury is, or turn
out to be, one likely to cause death. It is not the death itself which is intended,
nor the effect of injury. It is not necessary that the consequence of the injury,
are foreseen, it would be sufficient that there is an intention to cause injury,
which injury is likely to cause death.
In Naga Po Nyein, AIR, 1933, the accused gave one blow to B with a long
wooden handle on the thinner part of the head . He was liable not for murder
but for culpable homicide as the weapon could not be said to be a formidable
one and the intention to kill could not be presumed.
3(iii) With the knowledge that he is likely by such act to cause death:
Knowledge is a strong word and imports a certainty and not merely a
probability. Here knowledge refers to the personal knowledge of the person
who dies the act. If A, B, and C attack M with lathis, the blows being directed
at the head of M, they must be fixed with the knowledge that they were likely
to cause death.
In Mansel Pleydall, 1926, the accused kicked the abdomen of B with such a
violence as to cause fracture of two ribs and rupture of the spleen which was
normal. B dies. It was held that the accused know that the abdomen is a most
delicate and vulnerable part of the human body and should, therefore, be
presumed to have kicked with the knowledge that by so kicking he was likely to
cause death.
In Vineet Kumar Chauhan v. State of UP, 2008, accused and victim were
neighbours. The incident in question preceded by altercation between accused
and family member of victim. Accused returned to his house in a huff, took
revolver of his father and fired indiscriminately towards victims house, victim
while trying to close door of his house was hit by the bullet which proved fatal.
It was held tht accused at best can be said to have knowledge that use of
revolver was likely to cause death and hence he is liable to be convicted under
Section 299 clause (iii) and not under Section 300, IPC.
Sometimes even gross negligence may amount knowledge: If a person acts
negligently or without exercising due care and caution, he will be presumed to
have knowledge of the consequences arising from his act.
In Ganesh Dooley, 1879, a snake charmer exhibited in public a venomous snake,
whose fangs he knew had not been extracted, and to show his own skill, but
without any intention to cause harm to anyone, placed the snake on the head of
one of the spectators. The spectator in trying to push off the snake was bitten,
and died in consequence . The snake charmer was held guilty of culpable
homicide not amounting to murder.
4. Death caused without intention or knowledge: the offence of culpable
homicide presupposes an intention, or knowledge of likelihood of causing
death. In the absence of such intention or knowledge, the offence
committed may be grievous hurt, or simple hurt. In those cases where death
is attributed to any injury which the offender did not know would endanger
life or would be likely to cause death and which in normal conditions would
not be so, notwithstanding, death being caused, the offence will not be
culpable homicide but grievous or simple hurt. Every such case would
depend upon the existence of abnormal conditions unknown to the offender.
A person who voluntarily inflicts such injury as was likely to endanger life
must always, except in the most extraordinary and exceptional circumstances, be
deemed to know that he is likely to cause death. If the victim is killed, ordinarily, the
the offence is culpable homicide. Unless the lack of intention or the
knowledge aforesaid is proved. Once it is proved that the act was deliberate
act and was not the result of accident or rashness or negligence, his offence
would be culpable homicide.
Explanation 1: According to explanation 1, to section 299, a person who caused
bodily injury to another who is labouring under disordered disease or bodily
infirmity, and thereby accelerates the death of that other, shall be deemed to
have caused his death. But one of the elements of culpable homicide as
contained in section 299 must be present. That is, if the bodily injury so
inflicted was not with such intention or knowledge as required in section
299,then the offence is not culpable homicide.
Explanation 2: According to this explanation a plea that death could have been
prevented by resorting to proper remedies and skilful treatment is not allowed
to be raised to defeat a prosecution because it may not always be within the
reach of a wounded man. Therefore, if death results from an injury voluntarily
caused, the person who causes that injury is deemed to have caused death,
although the life of the victim might have been saved if proper medical
treatment have been given, and even if medical treatment was given but not
the proper treatment, provided that the treatment was given in good faith by a
competent physician or surgeon.
Explanation 3: this explanation provides tht causing of death of a child in the
mother’s womb is not homicide . But it would be homicide to cause the death of
living child, if any part of that child has been brought forth , though the child may
not have breathed or been completely born. Thus complete birth is not a
requisite.
In Abani K .Debath v. State of Tripura, 2006(SC), there was a quarrel between two
persons and the deceased who intervened to save one of them, was hit by a fatal
blow given by one of the accused persons. He died after seven day of the
incident and the medical evidence showed that fatal blow was the cause of his
death. He was held guilty of offence under Section 299(3) and punished under
Section 304, Part II of IPC.
In a landmark case of Public Prosecutor v. Mushunooru Suryanarayana Moorty,
1942, the Court held that death caused of person other than intended is covered
under section 299 as culpable homicide. In the instant case, the accused, with
the intention of killing A, on whose life he had taken out considerable insurance
without latter’s knowledge, in order to get insurance amount, gave A some
sweets mixed with dangerous poison. ‘A’ ate some of the sweets and threw
the rest away which were picked up by two children who dies because of
eating those poisonous sweets. It was held tht the accused was liable for
killing those two children though he had intended to kill A and not those
children. He was convicted for culpable homicide under Sec
The Supreme Court in Richpal Singh Meena v. Ghosh, 2014, has suggested a
five-step enquiry in deciding whether the accused causing death of person
should be guilty of culpable homicide under Section 299 or should be guilty of
murder under Section 300. Whether the act or omission of accused causing
death, is culpable homicide or not, can be determined by applying the five
step test as follows:
(1) Is there homicide?
(2) If yes, it is culpable or not culpable homicide?
(3) Is it a culpable homicide amounting to murder(i.e., Section 300, IPC) or
culpable homicide not amounting to murder under section 304, IPC?
(4) If it is not culpable homicide, then a case under Section 304-A of IPC?
(5) If it is not possible to identify the person who has committed the
homicide, the provisions of Section 72, IPC may be invoked. Such cases
generally arise if the investigation is defective or if he evidence is
insufficient.
Topic: Murder(Section 300)
Questions 1. Define Murder. Distinguish between culpable homicide and
murder
2. State the circumstances when culpable homicide amounts to murder?
Section 300 defines what is Murder under IPC: Except in the cases hereinafter
excepted, culpable homicide is murder, if the act by which the death is caused
is done with the intention of causing death, or
Secondly: If it is done with the intention of causing such bodily injury as the
offender knows to be likely to cause the death of the person to whom the
harm is caused, or
Thirdly: If it is done with the intention of causing bodily injury to any person
and the bodily injury intended to be inflicted is sufficient in the ordinary course
of nature to cause death, or
Fourthly: If the person committing the act knows that it is so imminently
dangerous that it must, in all probability, cause death or such bodily injury as
is likely to cause death, and commits such act without any excuse for
incurring the risk of causing death or such injury as aforesaid.
Illustrations: (a) a shoots Z with the intention of killing him. Z dies in
consequence, A commits murder.
(b) A, knowing that Z is labouring under such a disease that a blow is likely to
cause his death, strikes him with the intention of causing bodily injury. Z
dies in consequence of the blow. A is guilty of murder, although the blow
might not have been sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause
the death of a person in a sound state of health. But if A, not knowing
tht Z is labouring under any disease, gives him such a blow as would not
in the ordinary course of nature kill a person in a sound state of health,
here A, although he may intend to cause bodily injury, is not guilty of
murder, if he did not intend to cause death, or such body injury as in the
ordinary course of nature would cause death.
(c) A intentionally gives Z a sword cut, or club-wound sufficient to cause
The death of a man in the ordinary course of nature, Z dies in consequence.
Here, A is guilty of murder, although he may not have intended to cause Z’s
death.
(d) A without any excuse fires a loaded gun, into a crowd of persons and kills one
of them. A is guilty of murder, although he may not have had a premeditated
design to kill any particular individual.
Exception 1: When culpable homicide is not murder: Culpable homicide is not
murder if the offender, whilst deprived of the power of self-control by grave and
sudden provocation, causes the death of the person who gave the provocation
or causes the death of any other person by mistake.
The above exception is subject to the following provisos:
First: That the provocation is not sought or voluntarily provoked by the offender
as an excuse for killing or doing harm to any person.
Secondly: That the provocation is not given by anything done in obedience to
the law, or by a public servant in the lawful exercise of the powers of such public
servant.
Thirdly: That the provocation is not given by anything done in the lawful
exercise of the right of private defence.
Explanation: Whether the provocation was grave and sudden enough to prevent
the offence from amounting to murder is a question of fact.
Illustrations:
(a) A, under the influence of passion excited by a provocation given by Z,
intentionally kills Y, Z’s child. This is murder, in as much as the provocation
was not given by the child, and the death of the child was not caused by
accident or misfortune in doing an act caused by the provocation.
(b) Y gives grave and sudden provocation to A, A on this provocation, fires a
pistol at Y, neither intending nor knowing himself to be likely to kill Z, who is
near him, but out of sight. A kills Z. Here A has not committed murder, but
merely culpable homicide.
(c) A is lawfully arrested by Z, a bailiff. A is excited to sudden and violent
passion by the arrest and kills Z. This is murder, in as much as the
provocation was given by a thing done by a public servant in the exercise of
the right of private defence.
(d) A appears as a witness before Z, a Magistrate. Z says that he does not believe an
words of A’s deposition, and that A has perjured himself. A is moved to sudden
passion by these words, and kills Z. This is murder.
(e) A attempts to pull Z’s nose. Z, in the exercise of the right of private defence, lays
hold of A to prevent him from doing so. A is moved to sudden and violent
passion in consequence, and kills Z. This is murder, in as much as the
provocation was give by a thing done in the exercise of the right of private
defence.
(f) Z strikes B, B is by this provocation excited to violent rage. A, a by-stander
intending to take advantage of B’s rage, and to cause him to kill Z, puts a knife
into B’s hand for the purpose. B kills Z with the knife. Here B may have committed
only culpable homicide, but A is guilty of murder.
Exceptions 2: Culpable Homicide is not murder if the offender, in the exercise in
good faith of the right of private defence of person or property , exceeds the power
given to him by law and causes the death of the person against whom he exercising
such right to defence without premeditation, and without any intention of doing
more harm than is necessary for the purpose of such defence.
Illustration: Z, attempts to horsewhip A, not in such a manner as to cause
grievous hurt to A. A draws out a pistol. Z persists in the assault. A believing
in good faith that he can by no other means prevent himself from being
horsewhipped, shoots Z dead. A has not committed murder, but only culpable
homicide.
Exception 3: Culpable homicide is not murder, if the offender, being a public
servant or aiding a public servant acting for the advancement of public justice,
exceeds the powers given to him by law, and causes death by doing an act
which he, in good faith, believes to be lawful and necessary for the due
discharge of his duty as such pubic servant and without ill-will towards the
person whose death is caused.
Exception 4: Culpable homicide is not murder if it is committed without
premeditation in a sudden fight in the heat of passion upon a sudden quarrel
and without the offender having take undue advantage or acted in a cruel or
unusual manner.
Explanation - It is immaterial in such case which party offers the provocation or
commits the first assault.
Exception 5: Culpable homicide is not murder when the person whose death is
caused, being above the age of eighteen years, suffers death or taken the risk of
death with his own consent.
Illustration: A, by instigation, voluntarily causes Z, a person under eighteen
years of age to commit suicide. Here on account of Z’s youth, he was incapable
of giving consent to his own death, therefore A has abetted death.
This section 300, defines ‘Murder’ which is an offence punishable under
section 302 IPC. Murder includes culpable homicide, but a culpable homicide
may or may not amount to murder. As stated earlier, every murder includes
culpable homicide but the converse is not true and every culpable homicide is
not murder under n Section 300, IPC.
A case of culpable homicide is murder, if it falls within any one of the four
clauses of Section 300. in order to ensure justice in murder trial court should
go by evidence produced before it. It should remain dissociated from heat
generated outside court room either through news media or through flutter in
public opinion.
What will constitute an offence of Murder?
The question whether an offence falls in the category of murder or not depends
upon the following three considerations, namely:-
1. Does the act of the accused amount to culpable homicide as defined in
Section 299? If yes, then;
2. Does it also come within any one the categories of culpable homicide as
provided in the first four conditions described in Section 300of IPC? If yes; and
3. Then if the aforesaid act is not covered in any of the five exceptions laid
down in section 300, it will constitute on offence of murder.
Essentials or Ingredients of the offence of Murder: The essential ingredients of
the offence of murder under Section 300, IPC are as follows:
1. There was intention to cause death(Clause (1) of Section 300): According to
this clause any act by which the death is caused is done with the intention of
causing death, will constitute an offence of murder. The word ‘act’ also includes
omission as well. Thus where a person deliberately neglected to provide his child
proper food and subsistence although repeatedly warned of the consequences
And the child dies, it was held to be a case of murder .
In Venkaku v. State. 1956, the accused seeing the deceased sleeping in his
cottage, locked the door from outside so that he could not seek any help from
outside and set the cottage on fire. Held, that there was no doubt that the
intention of the accused was to kill the deceased and therefore, he was guilty of
murder and not the offence of culpable homicide as held by Supreme Court.
Similarly, in Pyra Sing v. State of Punjab, 1980, the accused persons inflicted
as many as twenty-four serious injuries on the deceased and cut his body into
several pieces, they were therefore, held guilty of murder.
2. Intentional causing bodily injury with knowledge that it will cause death
(Clause (2) of Section 300): According to this clause, if a person voluntarily
causes bodily injury, with the knowledge that such bodily injury will cause
death of the person injured, then it will be culpable homicide amounting to
murder. Thus the two requisites for the applicability of this clause are:
(1) there must be an intention to cause bodily injury or harm, and
(2) There must be ‘knowledge’ that death is likely to result of such bodily injury.
The ‘ knowledge’ that death will be the likely consequence of such intended
bodily injury is ‘subjective knowledge’ as opposed to the ‘objective knowledge’
which is required under clause (3) of Section 300. the words ‘likely’ and
‘knowledge’ used in clause (2) of section 300 carry with them an element of
certainty or definiteness and not mere possibility of death.
In Sudarshan Kumar v. State, 1974, the accused threw acid on the deceased
Mayavati as a result of which she died due to acid burn. In her dying declaration,
the deceased stated that the accused had threatened her that he would kill her, if
she does not marry him. Medical evidence showed that the injury and burns
caused to the deceased were of a serious nature which in ordinary course of
nature were sufficient to cause death. The Supreme Court, convicted the
accused for intention to murder.
3. Intentional causing in injury sufficient in ordinary course to cause death:
Clause(3) of section 300: As stated earlier, whether the accused had the intention
of causing bodily injury sufficient to cause death has to be decided objectively
and not subjectively as in the preceding clause (2) of Section 300. the probability
of death being caused due to intentional injury in ordinary course of nature
constitutes the essence of clause (3) of section 300.
The Supreme Court in Virsa Singh v. State of Punjab, 1958, held that for
convicting an accused under Clause (3) of Section 300, the prosecution has to
prove the following:
(1) That bodily injury was caused;
(2) That the injury was caused intentionally (this is to be established objectively);
(3) That the said injury was intentional that is, it was neither accidental nor
unintentional; and
(4) That the injury was sufficient to cause death in the ordinary course of nature.
In Rajwani Singh v. State, 1966, the accused covered the mouth of the deceased
with adhesive plaster, tied a handkerchief over the plaster, plugged the nostrils
with cotton wool soaked with chloroform, tied the hands and legs with rope and
dubbed him in a shallow drain with his own shirt put under his head as a pillow,
the accused was held guilty of murder under Clause (3) of section 300.
4. Knowledge that act is so imminently dangerous as to cause death: Clause (4)
of section 300: the main ingredients of the offence under this clause is:
(1) the act of the accused must be imminently dangerous .
(2) The accused must have knowledge that it is so imminently dangerous;
(3) That in all probability it will cause death or such bodily injury as is likely to
cause death; and
(4) Such imminently dangerous act should have been done without any reason
or justification for taking the risk of such injury.
In State of MP v. Ram Prasad, 1968, the accused poured kerosene oil upon the
clothes of his wife and set fire to those cloths. As he had no cause for incurring
that risk, he committed an act so imminently dangerous that it was in all
probability , likely to cause death or to result in an injury that was likely to
cause death.
Acquittal of person accused of offence under Section 300 on benefit of doubt:
A person accused of murder under Section 300 cannot be convicted for the
offence until his guilt is proved beyond any doubt and there is no sufficient
evidence to show that the accused has caused the murder or the injuries to
the deceased person resulting in his death.
The distinction between culpable homicide and murder has been brought out
by Melvill J. in R v. Govida 1876, wherein the accused about 18 years of age
kicked his wife aged 15 years and gave her few blows on her body as a result of
which she fell down on the ground. Then he put one knee on her chest and
struck her few blows by fist on her face causing extravasation of blood in brain
resulting in her death. The trial Court convicted the accused for murder. There
was difference of opinion amongst the two judges of the High Court of
Bombay, whether it was an offence of murder or culpable homicide, hence the
case was referred to third Judge of the High Court of Bombay, whether it was
an offence of murder or culpable homicide.
The third Judge, Melvill J, held the accused guilty of offence of culpable
homicide under section 299(2) and sentenced him under section 304, Part I on
the ground that the death was caused with the knowledge on the part of
accused that to cause such bodily injury was likely to result in death. The
learned Judge ruled out the application of clause (1) or (3) of section 300,
because the facts and circumstances of the case neither showed intention of
the accused to cause death of his wife nor bodily injury inflicted was sufficient
in the ordinary course of nature to cause death.
The distinction between culpable homicide and murder has been brought out
by Melvill J. in R v. Govida 1876, wherein the accused about 18 years of age
kicked his wife aged 15 years and gave her few blows on her body as a result of
which she fell down on the ground. Then he put one knee on her chest and
struck her few blows by fist on her face causing extravasation of blood in brain
resulting in her death. The trial Court convicted the accused for murder. There
was difference of opinion amongst the two judges of the High Court of
Bombay, whether it was an offence of murder or culpable homicide, hence the
case was referred to third Judge of the High Court of Bombay, whether it was
an offence of murder or culpable homicide.
The third Judge, Melvill J, held the accused guilty of offence of culpable
homicide under section 299(2) and sentenced him under section 304, Part I on
the ground that the death was caused with the knowledge on the part of
accused that to cause such bodily injury was likely to result in death. The
learned Judge ruled out the application of clause (1) or (3) of section 300,
because the facts and circumstances of the case neither showed intention of
the accused to cause death of his wife nor bodily injury inflicted was sufficient
in the ordinary course of nature to cause death.
The distinction between culpable homicide and murder has been brought out
by Melvill J. in R v. Govida 1876, wherein the accused about 18 years of age
kicked his wife aged 15 years and gave her few blows on her body as a result of
which she fell down on the ground. Then he put one knee on her chest and
struck her few blows by fist on her face causing extravasation of blood in brain
resulting in her death. The trial Court convicted the accused for murder. There
was difference of opinion amongst the two judges of the High Court of
Bombay, whether it was an offence of murder or culpable homicide, hence the
case was referred to third Judge of the High Court of Bombay, whether it was
an offence of murder or culpable homicide.
The third Judge, Melvill J, held the accused guilty of offence of culpable
homicide under section 299(2) and sentenced him under section 304, Part I on
the ground that the death was caused with the knowledge on the part of
accused that to cause such bodily injury was likely to result in death. The
learned Judge ruled out the application of clause (1) or (3) of section 300,
because the facts and circumstances of the case neither showed intention of
the accused to cause death of his wife nor bodily injury inflicted was sufficient
in the ordinary course of nature to cause death.
All murders are culpable homicide but not vice-versa. For the purpose of fixing
punishment, proportionate to the gravity of the generic offence, the Indian
Penal Code practically recognises three degrees of culpable homicide.
• The first is ‘Murder’. Which is the gravest form of culpable homicide which is
defined by section 300.
• The second may be termed as “culpable homicide of the Second degree”.
This is punishable under the first part of Section 304.
• Then there is “culpable homicide of the third degree”. This is the lowest type
of culpable homicide, from the point of view punishment and is punishable
under the second part of section 304 of Indian Penal Code.
In the case Augustine saldanha v. State of Karnataka, 2003, the Supreme
Court explained the distinction between murder and culpable homicide not
amounting to murder with the help of following table.
Culpable Homicide (Section 299) Murder (section 300)
1. It has no special characteristics of 1. It has special characteristics of
murder. It is genus. murder. It is specie.
2. It is called the culpable homicide 2. It is the gravest form of culpable
of first degree of intention. homicide – Culpable homicide of the
second degree.
3. Subject to certain cxception culpable
3. A person commits culpable homicide is murder, if the act by
homicide if the act by which the which the death is caused is done:
death is caused is done:
(a) With the intention of causing death.
(a) With the intention of causing or
death; or (b) with intention of causing such bodily
(b) With the intention of causing such injury as the offender knows to be
bodily injury as is likely to cause likely to cause the death of the
death; or person to whom the harm is caused,
or
Culpable Homicide (Section 299) Murder (Section 300)
Knowledge Knowledge
(c) with the knowledge that the act is (c) with the knowledge that the act is
likely to cause death. so imminently dangerous that it
must in all probability, cause
death, or such bodily injury as is
likely to cause death, and commits
(5) (a) The punishment for culpable such act without any excuse for
homicide is imprisonment for life
or imprisonment up to ten years incurring the risk of causing death
and fine, if the offence committed or such bodily injury as is
is under clause (1) and (2) of mentioned above.
section 299.
(b) If the offence committed is (5) The punishment for murder is
under clause (3) of Section 299, the
punishment is up to ten years of fine death sentence or imprisonment for
or both. life and fine.
When Culpable Homicide is not Murder (five Exceptions to section 300)
There are five exceptions appended to Section 300 which provided that
culpable homicide will not amount to murder, If the offence is committed under
any of the circumstances stated below, namely:
(1) Grave and sudden provocation;
(2) Private defence;
(3) Acts of public servants;
(4) Sudden fight; and
(5) Consent of the person killed.
Exception 1. Grave and Sudden Provocation: There may be a situation when an
offender on account of grave and sudden provocation is deprived of his power
of self-control and causes death of a person. Exception is itself subject to three
exceptions as follows:
(a) Whether a reasonable man, belonging to the same class of society as the
accused, placed in similar situation in which the accused was placed, would be
So provoked as to lose his self-control.
(b) Gestures may also, under certain circumstances, cause grave and sudden
provocation to an accused, so as to bring the act within the First Exception
to Section 300;
(c) The mental background created by the previous act of the victim may be
taken into consideration in ascertaining whether the subsequent act caused
grave and sudden provocation for committing the offence; and
(d) The fatal blow should be the instantaneous reaction of the provocation
caused and not after the passion had cooled down by interval of time or
other wise allowing scope for premeditation etc.
(e) In Nirmala Subba Rao v. State of Andhra Pradesh, 2007, the wife of the
accused left him and started living with her paramour. When she refused to
come back and live with the accused, the accused picked up a weapon from
carpenter’s tools and killed her. The Supreme Court declined to grant the
benefit of Exception 1 of Section 300 to the accused on the ground that he
had sufficient time interval to react and therefore it is not a case of grave
and sudden provocation, he was held guilty of murder.
When Culpable Homicide is not Murder (five Exceptions to section 300)
There are five exceptions appended to Section 300 which provided that culpable
homicide will not amount to murder, If the offence is committed under any of the
circumstances stated below, namely:
(1) Grave and sudden provocation;
(2) Private defence;
(3) Acts of public servants;
(4) Sudden fight; and
(5) Consent of the person killed.
Question: ‘A’ under he influence of passion excited by provocation given by ‘B’
intentionally kills ‘C’ who is ‘B’s child. What is the offence committed by ‘A’ ?
Exception 1. Grave and Sudden Provocation: There may be a situation when an
offender on account of grave and sudden provocation is deprived of his power of self-
control and causes death of a person. Exception is itself subject to three exceptions
as follows:
(a) Whether a reasonable man, belonging to the same class of society as the accused,
placed in similar situation in which the accused was placed, would be
Exception 2. Exceeding the right of private defence: Right of private defence is
recognised as a valid ground from exemption from criminal liability and this
defence is available against property and person and may even extend to causing
death in certain situations. Where a person genuinely exercises his right of
private defence within the limits prescribed by law, he commits no offence.
However, if he exceeds this right and commits murder so some person , he will be
allowed the benefit of exception 2 to Section 300 and will be held guilty of a
lesser offence of culpable homicide not amounting to murder and not for
murder. But exceeding such exercise of private defence should not be pre-
meditated and intentional for the applicability of the exception. Whether the
exceeding of right of private defence was premeditated or not and intentional or
unintentional would depend upon the facts and circumstances of the case.
In Bhagwan Swarup v. State of MP, 1992, the accused opened fire to rescue his
father who was being beaten by lathis blows. The short hit the person who was
wielding the lathi, resulting into his death. The Court held that the act of the
accused was justified in view of the fact and circumstances of the case and
allowing him the protection of Exception 2 of Section 300, he was convicted
under Section 304 instead of Section 302(murder).
Exception 3, Act of Public Servant: This exception extends benefit to a public
servant who exceeds his lawful power in discharge of his duties and thereby
causes death of a person. The ingredients of this exception are as follows:
(1) The offence must have been committed by a pubic servant or a person
aiding him;
(2) The alleged act must have been committed by public servant in the
discharge of his lawful duties;
(3) He should have exceeded the limits of powers given to him by law;
(4) The act should have been done in good faith;
(5) The public servant should have believed that his act was lawful and
necessary for the discharge of his duties; and
(6) He should not have borne any ill-will or malice towards the person whose
death occurred due to the act of public servant.
In Dakhi Singh v. State of UP, 1955, a police constable was taking a suspected
thief by train after arresting him. But the thief escaped from the running train.
The constable chased him and when he was not in a position to apprehend
him, he fired at him, but in the process the bullet hit the railway fireman who
was killed. The court held the case fell under exception 3 to Section 300 and
the accused constable was held guilty of culpable homicide not amounting to
murder and not for murder.
Exception 4, Sudden Fight: According to Exception 4 to Section 300, where
there is sudden fight between two persons or parties and the offender loses
his power of reasoning due to heat of passion, and cause death, he shall be
guilty of culpable homicide not amounting to murder, instead of murder. The
expression ‘sudden fight’ implies mutual provocation and aggravation.
The Supreme Court in Jaipal v. State of Haryana, 2000, reiterated that in order
to invoke exception 4 of Section 300 IPC, the defence has to prove that
culpable homicide is committed:
(i) Without premeditation in a sudden fight;
(ii) In the heat of passion in sudden quarrel; and
(iii) Without offender having taken any undue advantage or having acted in a cruel or
unusual manner.
(iv) nor acted in a cruel and unusual manner.
In Muthu v. State of Tamil Nadu, 2008, the deceased threw waste into the accused’s
shop and both started fighting on this issue. The enraged accused picked up a knife
lying there and thrust in the chest of the deceased causing his death due to serious
injury. The trial Court convicted the accused under Section 302(murder) and
sentenced him to life imprisonment, which was affirmed by the High Court. But in
appeal, the Supreme Court held that it was not the case of premeditated and
intentional murder and the case is covered under Exception 4 to Section 300 because
the accused did the act in a fit of anger when he lost self-control. The accused was
therefore, convicted for five years under section 304, Part II, out of which the
sentence which the accused has already undergone was to be deducted.
Exception 5, Death caused by consent: where death was caused, with the consent of
the deceased who was above 18 years of age ad such consent was free and voluntary,
the person causing such death shall not be guilty of murder but it will be a case of
culpable homicide not amounting to murder under exception 5 to Section 300 of IPC.
In the case of Dashrath Paswan v. State of Bihar, 1958, the accused, who was studying
in Xth class failed in the examination thrice in succession. He was so upset and
frustrated by these failures that he decided to put an end to his life. he informed his
wife, an educated girl of 19 years of age about his intention to commit suicide. The
wife thereupon requested him to kill her first and then kill himself. Accordingly, the
accused killed his wife, but was arrested before he could end his own life. The Court,
invoked Exception 5 to Section 300 and convicted the accused under Section 304,
Part I for culpable homicide not amounting to murder and not for the offence of
murder undersection 300.
the burden of proving that the accused is entitled to the benefit of exceptions is
on the accused though according to the general principle the burden of proving the
guilt of the accused beyond doubt lies on the prosecution.
Now lets discuss a famous case which differentiates between murder and
culpable homicide is ans which is a landmark case in the criminal history of India, K.M.
Nanavati v. State of Maharashtra, This landmark judgement of India received
unprecedented media attention as it involved Kawas Manekshaw Nanavati, a Naval
Commander who was tried for committing the murder of his wife’s lover, Mr. Prem
Ahuja.
Initially, Nanavati was declared not guilty, but later the verdict was dismissed by the
Bombay High Court and the case was tried under a bench trial.
This case was the last case to be heard as a jury trial in India because as the result of
this case, the government abolished the jury trials in India.
Kevas Manekshaw Nanavati, an Indian Naval Officer shifted to Bombay in March 1959
with his family and got to meet Prem Bhagwandas Ahuja, a businessman in
Bombay. While he was out of Bombay for his duty, Sylvia, his wife, developed an illicit
relationship with Prem Ahuja. He was then confronted with the confession of his wife
when she opened with her relationship with Ahuja. Further, in the heat of his agony,
he went to his ship to procure a loaded revolver and drove himself to Prem Ahuja’s
office. On not finding him at his workplace, he then drove to his residence. After an
altercation, at his residence, two shots went off accidently and hit Ahuja. Jury voted in
favour of the accused. The case was referred to hon’ble High Court under Section 307
of The Code of Criminal Procedure. The Division Bench of the High Court went on to
declare the accused guilty under Section 302 of IPC. An appeal was finally decided by
the Supreme Court.
Whether Nanavati shot Ahuja in “the heat of the moment” or whether it was a
premeditated murder?
JUDGEMENT-
It was held by the court that the conduct of the accused clearly showed that the
murder committed by him was a deliberate one and the facts of the case do not
attract the provision of Exception I of section 300 of IPC as the accused by
adducing evidence failed to bring the case under General Exception of IPC.
Therefore, as a result, the court convicted Nanavati under section 302 of IPC and
sentenced him of Imprisonment for Life.
The SC upheld the decision of the High court on the following grounds:
1. As per the defence case, the accused was thinking of the future of his wife
and a child which indicates that he had not only regained his senses but also
was planning for the future.
2. The time lapse between the confession and murder was sufficient to regain
his self-control.
3. The mere fact that before the shooting the accused abused the deceased and
the abuse provoked an equally abusive reply could not conceivably be a
provocation for the murder.
Section 301: Culpable Homicide by causing death of person other than person
whose death was intended: If a person , by doing anything which he intends or
knows to be likely to cause death, commits culpable homicide by causing the
death of any person, whose death he neither intends not knows himself to be
likely to cause, the culpable homicide committed by the offender is of the
description of which it would have been if he had caused the death of the
person whose death he intended or knew himself to be likely to cause.
That is to say, a wilful doing of a prohibited act will render a person liable
and it would be no defence for him to say that he never intended to cause
death of the person killed and that the said person was killed by mistake.
In Abdul Ise Suleman v. State of Gujarat, 1995, the accused persons had an
altercation with the complainant. They started firing at the fleeing
complainants in a commercial locality. The first shot injured an innocent person
while the second shot caused the death of ten years old son of the complainant.
The Supreme Court held the death of the child to be intentional and upheld the
conviction of the accused under Section 300, read with Section 301 and
declined to accept it as a case falling under Section 304-A of IPC.
Section 302: Punishment for murder: Whoever commits murder shall be
punished with death, or imprisonment for life, and shall also be liable to fine.
This section provides punishment for murder . Life imprisonment is the rule
and death penalty is an exception in an offence of murder. Section 354 (b) of the
Criminal Procedure Code, 1973, requires that special reasons should be recorded
while awarding death penalty.
Where from the accused’s conduct it appears that he is genuinely dependent of
the circumstances unerringly point to the guilt of the accused and they are
consistent with the guilt . In a conviction for murder if direct evidence is
satisfactory and reliable the same cannot be rejected on hypothecal medical
evidence.
In Earabadrappa v. State of Karnataka, 1983, the accused appellant who was a
servant of the deceased, strangulated her to death and after her death, eloped
with her ornaments, silk sarees and case money kept in the almirah. The offence
was committed in the dead of the night when everybody in the house were
asleep. On these facts it was held by the High Court to be a pre planned ad cold
blooded murder for greed. The Supreme Court held itself be bound by the
decision in Bachan Singh v. State of Punjab, 1980 in which the Court was moved
by compassionate sentiments of human feelings and had ruled tht the sentence
of death should not be passed except in the rarest of the rare cases. But it
came to the conclusion that this case does not fulfil the test laid down in
Bachan Singh’s case, therefore, the death sentence was reduced to life
imprisonment. While deciding the case of Machi Sing and others v. State of
Punjab, 1983, the Supreme Court has laid down a five-point formula based on
which death penalty may be awarded. The factors which the Court was
expected to take into consideration for this purpose awarding death penalty for
rarest of rare cases, may be briefly stated as follows:
1. The manner in which the offence of murder was committed. If it was
committed with extreme brutality such as burning the victim alive or cutting
body into pieces, it would be a fit case to be considered as rarest of rare
case.
2. When the motive reveals depravity and meanness of the murderer for
Example, crime being committed for material gain.
3. When the murder is socially abhorrent such a bride burring or killing of a
Harijan.
4. When the magnitude of the offence is enormous as in case of multiple
murders.
5. When the victim is an innocent child, a helpless woman, or a reputed figure,
that is the case of a political murder.
The Supreme Court in Ankush Maruti Shinde and others v. State of
Maharashtra, 2009, upheld the death sentence of the six accused persons and
held that the case was clearly of the rarest of rare cases. In this case, the
accused persons were found involved in robbery, rape and murder of five
members of a family. They dragged a minor girl in an open field and gang-raped
her and then she was done to death. The deceased were not known to the
accused and there was no animosity. The murders were not only cruel, brutal
but also diabolic which collectively shocked the conscience of community. The
High Court of Bombay altered the death sentence of the accused
imprisonment for life.
On appeal by the State, against the alteration of death sentence of
the accused to that of imprisonment for life by the High Court , the
Supreme Court allowed the State’s appeal and held that this being a
case which could be said to be rarest of rare case, all the six accused
deserved to be punished with the sentence of death. The order of the
High court was therefore, liable to be quashed.
Section 303: Punishment for murder by life convict: Whoever, being
under sentence of imprisonment for life, commits murder, shall be
punished with death.
304: Punishment for culpable homicide not amounting to murder:
Whoever commits culpable homicide not amounting to murder:
Whoever commits culpable homicide not amounting to murder shall be
punished with Imprisonment for life, or imprisonment of either description
for a term which may extend to ten years, and shall also be liable to fine, if the
act by which the death is caused is done with the intention of causing death or
of causing such bodily injury as is likely to cause death; or with imprisonment
of either description for a term which may extend to ten years, or with fine, or
with both, if the act is done with the knowledge that it is likely to cause death,
but without any intention to cause death, or to cause such bodily injury as is
likely to cause death.
This section provides punishment for culpable homicide not amounting
to murder. The section comprises two parts which are generally referred to as
Part I and Part II and provides two kinds of punishments applicable to two
different circumstances:
(i) Where the act by which death is caused is done intentionally or causing
such bodily injury as is likely to cause death, it is punishable under Part I
with sentence of imprisonment for life or of either description for a term
up to 10 years of fine. This part corresponds to clause (a) and (b) of section
299 and applies to cases of causing death under any of the exceptions to
Section 300.
(ii) On the other hand, Part II of Section 304, applies to offences where the act
is done with the knowledge that it is likely to cause death but without any
intention to cause death or such bodily injury as is likely to cause death.
This Part corresponds to Clause (c) of section 299. whether the
accused had the knowledge that his act was likely to cause death or bodily
injury which is likely to cause death, is a question of fact depending on the
situation and circumstances of each case. The maximum punishment is 7 years.
In Laxman v. State pf MP, 2006, the accused shot arrows at the deceased from
a distance with the result that one arrow pierced the deceased’s chest causing
his death. The supreme court altered the conviction of the accused from
murder to culpable homicide not amounting to murder and sentenced his under
Section 304, Part I.
In MT. Nambiar v. State of Kerala, 1997, where the accused(appellant) gave a
blow with a pair of scissors on the chest of the deceased, it was held that he did
that such an injury on the vital part of the body of deceased was likely to cause
his death. He was, therefore, convicted under Section 304, Part II, instead of
section 302, IPC.
In Shanmugam alias kulandaivelu v. State of Tamil Nadu, 2003, the accused
inflicted bodily injuries on the deceased which were of such nature that they
were likely to cause death. The Court held that there can be no doubt that the
accused intended to cause and did cause the injuries which caused the death
of the deceased and therefore, they were rightly 304, part I of the Indian
Penal Code.
In Gouri Shankar Sharma v. State of UP., 1990, the accused who was a police
officer was charged with the offence of causing death of a person by torturing
him while he was in police custody. He was convicted under Section 304, Part
II and sentences to seven years imprisonment which was held to be justified
by the Supreme court.
Rash and Negligent Acts
Section 304-A: Causing death by negligence - Whoever causes the death of any
person by doing any rash or negligent act not amounting to culpable homicide,
shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which
may extend to two years, or with fine, or with both.
For the application of this section, it is necessary that death is caused by doing a
rash or negligent act and such act must not amount to culpable homicide. Thus
this section shall apply where there is neither any intention to cause death not
knowledge that the act would in all probability cause death. To impose
criminal liability under this section it is necessary that the death should have
been the direct result of a rash or negligent act of the accused, and that act
must be the proximate and efficient cause without the intervention of another’s
negligence.
Culpable negligence is acting without the consciousness that the illegal and
mischievous effect will follow, but in circumstances which show that the actor
has not exercised the caution required of him. For example , where a chemist
gives expired date medicines to a patient and the patient dies, the chemist
would be liable for causing death by negligence because he has failed to
exercise due caution to ascertain whether the medicine that he was giving was
expired date or not.
Rash and negligent act: A rash and negligent act is an act done not intentionally
or designedly. A rash act is primarily an over-hasty act, and is thus opposed to
a deliberate act, but it also includes an act which, though it may be said to be
deliberate is yet done without due deliberation and caution. Negligence is the
breach of a duty caused by omission to do something which a reasonable man
guided by those considerations which ordinarily regulate the conduct of human
affairs, would do or he doing of something which a prudent and reasonable
man would not do.
Rashness and negligence are not the same things. Mere negligence cannot be
construed to mean rashness. Negligence is the genus of which rashness is a
species. In order that rashness or negligence may be criminal it must be of such
a degree as to amount to taking hazard knowing that the hazard was of a such a
degree that injury was most likely to be caused thereby. The criminality lies in
running the risk or doing such an act with recklessness and indifferent to the
consequences.
It was held in Jacob Mathew v. State of Punjab, 2005, that the word has not
been used in section 304-A of IPC, yet it is settled that in criminal law,
negligence or recklessness, to be so held, must be such a high degree as to be
gross. The expression “rash or negligent act” as occurring in section 304-A of
the IPC has to be read as qualified by the word “grossly”.
Death due to deceased’s own negligence does not invoke Section 304-A.
Distinction between Section 304-A and section 304, Part II
It must be stated tht distinction between causing death by rash and negligent
act as understood in section 304-A of IPC and culpable homicide not amounting
to murder under section 304, Part II is very thin. The former is an act of
omission while in the latter, there is knowledge of the consequences attributed
though unintended.
In film-actor Salman Khan’s case in 2015, since the FIR stated that the actor was
drunk and driving at 10 km per hour from Juhu to his house Bandra in Mumbai,
the trial Court held him guilty of offence under Section 304,Part II holding that
he had knowledge that bakery workers slept on pavement outside the bakery on
Hill Road, near his house, coupled with the knowledge that driving drunk in fast
speed late in the night could result in car crash . He was convicted under
Section 304, Part II and sentenced to five years imprisonment for killing one
person who was crushed to death by his Court’s order before the Bombay High
Court praying that is case fell under Section 279 and not under Section 304 II.
He was, however released on bail bending the appeal.
Section 304-B, Dowry Death: (1) Where the death of a woman is caused by any burns
or bodily injury occurs otherwise than under normal circumstances within seven years
of her marriage and it is shown that soon before her death, she was subjected to
cruelty or harassment by her husband or any relative of her husband for, or in
connection with, any demand for dowry, such death shall be called “dowry death”,
and such husband or relative shall be deemed to have caused her death.
Explanation - for the purpose of this sub-section, “dowry”, shall have the same
meaning as in section 2 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961.
(2) Whoever commits dowry death shall be punished with imprisonment for a term
which shall not be less than seven years but which may extent to imprisonment for
life.
This section was inserted in the Penal Code by an amendment in 1986. Sub-section
(1) of this section defines dowry death.
Essential ingredients:
(i) Death must be caused by burns or bodily injury or it must occur other wise than in
normal circumstances.
(ii) Death must occur within seven years of marriage; and
(iii) It must be shown that soon before her death the woman was subjected to
cruelty or harassment by her husband or any relative of her husband.
(iv) Such cruelty or harassment must be for or in connection with any demand
for dowry.
(v) Here the dowry shall have the meaning as assigned to it under Section 2 of
the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961.
Another important feature of this section, which can be said to be departure
from the normal feature of the Code is that a minimum of not less than 7 years’
imprisonment is prescribed but this may extend to imprisonment for life.
In Meka Ramaswamy v. Dasen Mohan, 1998, it was held by the Supreme Court
that if the bride dies within four months of marriage and their is absence of
demand of dowry as well as ill-treatment, the husband and his family cannot be
held liable under Section 304, IPC.
In Sharad v. State of Maharastra, 2011, deceased put herself on fire within 2 1/2
years of marriage. Evidence of uncle and other witness that she complained
about dowry harassment by husband two days before incident. Harassment
soon before death this stands proved. The defence plea that death was due to
accident was not supported by any evidence. Therefore it was held untenable.
More so when it was raised for first time in appeal. Therefore conviction of
accused husband under section 304-B was held to be proper.
In Raman Kumar v. State of Punjab, 2009, it was alleged that the appellant
husband and the mother-in-law of deceased Suman Bala Set deceased ablaze
after pouring kerosene oil. It was pleaded by the appellants that the death was
accidental. The letter written by deceased Suman Bala showed that there is not
even a whisper about demand of dowry. There were also improvements in the
statement of witnesses recorded in Court. There is also a clear indication in
history sheet of hospital where deceased was treated that deceased while
referred to this aspect. Prosecution failed to establish accusations. The
conviction of the appellant was, therefore set aside. It was made clear that the
expression “soon before her death” used in Section 304-B, IPC would normally
imply that interval should not be much between cruelty or harassment
concerned and death in question.
Construction of cruelty or harassment ‘soon before death’: the facts of the
present case Namely, Rajinder Singh V. State of Punjab, 2015, raised questions
relating to one of the great social evils practice against the women of the
country for centuries, that is dowry. Parliament responded mush earlier so far
as the prohibition of dowry is concerned by enacting the Dowry Prohibition Act,
1961 under which mild sentence was prescribed as penalty for the giving or
taking of dowry. The specific menace of dowry deaths, however , was tackled by
the introduction of a new provision section 113-B of the evidence Act.
It was also pointed out that the words “soon before her death” used in section
304-B are to be understood in relative and flexible sense. Those words cannot
be construed as laying down a rigid/period of time to be mechanically applied in
each case.
The Supreme Court in Vijayapal Singh v. State of Uttarakhand, 2015, observed
that it is only when in the course of trial, if the court finds no evidence or proof
beyond doubt to establish a code of homicide, the Court should proceed under
Section 304-B of IPC.
Section 305: Abetment of suicide of child or insane person: If any person
under eighteen years of age, any insane person, any delirious person, any idiot,
or any person in a state of intoxication, commits suicide, whoever abets the
commission of such suicide, shall be punished with death or imprisonment for
life, or imprisonment for a term not exceeding ten years, and shall also be liable
to fine.
Section 305 and 306 apply when suicide is in fact committed. These sections
have been inserted because the ordinary law of abetment is inapplicable.
Section 306: Abetment of suicide: if any person commits suicide, whoever
abets the commission of such suicide, shall be punished with imprisonment of
either description for a term which may extend to ten years, and shall also be
liable to fine.
Those who aid and abet the commission of suicide by the hand of the person
himself who commits the suicide, may be punished under this section. When
another person, at the request of or with the consent of the suicide , be killed
that person, he would be guilty of culpable homicide under exception 5 to
To Section 300. Those who assists a Hindu widow in becoming sati will be guilty
of abetment of suicide. B by instigation voluntarily causes C, a person of 18
years to commit suicide. B will be liable under this section.
In Praven Pradhan v State of Uttaranchal, 2012, constitute instigation it must be
with intention and words uttered in anger without any intention do not
constitute instigation. In this case deceased was persistently harassed by
accused superior. On one occasion accused disgraced deceased and told him
that any other person in his place would have committed suicide. Charge-sheet
for offence under Section 306 was filed against him. It was held not liable to be
quashed.
It was held in many cases that harassment of wife by husband or in laws due to
difference per se dies not attract Section 306 read with section 102, IPC, if the
wife commits suicide. For charge under Section 306, IPC, there has to be
something more.
It was held in Nachatter Singh v. State of Punjab2012, that in case of suicide on
account of cruelty, cruelty meted out must be of nature is would drive a person
of common prudence to commit suicide. Expecting daughter in law to look after
aged -in-laws is not cruelty of category contemplated in section 498-A. Indian
Penal Code. Therefore conviction of appellant -in-laws of deceased under
section 306, IPC held to be set aside.
It was also observed that abetment involves a mental process of instigating a
person or intentionally aiding tht person in doing of a thing. More active role
which can be described as instigating or aiding doing of a thing is thus required
before a person can be said to be abetting suicide.
Instigation by conduct: In Girija Shanker v. State of M.P., 2010, one Dinesh was
married with Urmila. Sometimes after the marriage Urmila was being ill-treated
by her husband and in-laws, who had in fact started searching another bride for
Dinesh, she was made to starve and work like a bonded labour and also
subjected to mental and physical torture. One day her dead body was found in
a well situated at a distance of about a furlong from the house of appellants.
The three were tried under Section 302 and alternatively under Section 306,
IPC. They were found guilty under section 306, IPC. The court held that it is not
Necessary that the instigation should be only in words and may not be by
conduct. Direct evidence of any instigation or aid is not necessary. It is a
matter which can deduced from the circumstances. In this case maltreatment
and starvation coupled with a search for another bride for their son was
proved and therefore appellants were guilty of abetment of suicide.
Section 307: attempt to Murder : Whoever does any act with such intention
or knowledge, and under such circumstances that, if he by that act caused
death, he would be guilty of murder, shall be punished with imprisonment of
either description for a term which may extend to ten years, and shall also be
liable to fine; and if hurt is caused to any person by such act, the offender shall
be liable either to imprisonment for life, or to such punishment as is
hereinbefore mentioned.
Attempts by life convicts: when any person offending under this section is
under sentence of imprisonment for life , he may, if hurt is caused, be
punished with death.
Illustrations: (a) A shoots at Z with intention to kill him, under such
circumstances that, if death ensued, A would be guilty of murder. A is liable to
punishment under this section
(b) A, with the intention of causing the death of a chid of tender years exposes it
in a desert place. A has committed the offence defined by this section, though
the death of the child does not ensue.
(c ) A, intending to murder z, buys a gun and loads it. A has not yet committed
the offence. A fires the gun at Z. He has committed the offence defined in this
section, and if by such firing he wounds Z, he is liable to the punishment
provided by the latter part of the first paragraph of this section.
(d) A, intending to murder Z by poison purchases poison and mixes the same
with food which remains in A’s keeping. A has not yet committed the offence
defined in this section. A places the food on Z’s table or deliver it to Z’s
servant to place it to Z’s table. A has committed the offence defined in this
section.
The section penalises attempt to commit murder as an offence. Intention to
commit murder and some overt act in execution thereof are the two essential
elements of the offence under this Section.
The Supreme Court in Om Prakash v. State, 1961, held that an offence
under section 307 is committed where a person with requisite intention or
knowledge does an act towards commission of murder but death does not
result in. In that case, he shall be guilty of attempt to murder under section 307
of IPC and not under section 511 of the Indian Penal Code.
Intention to cause death: For invoking the provisions of Section 307, the court
has to see whether the act, irrespective of its result, was done with intention or
knowledge to cause death. The section does not insist that an injury must have
been caused to a person on whom attempt to murder was made, though the
nature of injury actually caused may be of considerable help to know the
intention of the accused.
The Supreme Court in Bipin Bihari v. State of Madhya Pradesh,2006, ruled
that the Court can ascertain intention from the facts and circumstances of the
case even without reference to actual injuries caused.
A person cannot be convicted for both murder as well as attempt to murder:
Section 302, provided punishment for the offence of murder, whereas section
307 penalises attempt to murder. The Supreme Court in T.M. Balkirshna
Mudliar v. Satyanaraya Rao, 1993, held that an accused cannot be convicted
for both under Section 302 as well as Section 307, and in case of murder, the
conviction under section 307 cannot sustain and therefore, it has to be set
aside.
The Supreme Court in Juge Ram v. State of Haryana, 2015, observed that;, For
the conviction under Section 307, IPC, the prosecution has to establish:
(i) The intention to commit murder, and
(ii) the act was done by the accused.
To justify a conviction under Section 307, it is not essential that fatal injury
capable of causing death should have been caused. The intention of the
accused is to the gathered from the circumstances like the nature of the
weapon used, words used by the accused at the time of the incident, motive of
the accused, part of the body where the injury was caused and the nature and
severity of the blow given etc.
Write also here the case, (Omprakash v, State, discussed under Dowry death).
In R. Prakash v. State of Karnataka, 2004, the accused assaulted the victim
hitting on his vital parts and non-vital parts of the body. As many as five
persons tried to intervein and rescue the victim but despite that, the accused
continued to assault and injure the helpless victim. The Court held that this act
of the accused was enough to show that he wanted to kill the victim and
therefore, he was rightly convicted under Section 307 of IPC. The Court in this
case made it clear that the conviction of the accused under Section 307 should
not be set aside merely on the ground that the injuries caused by him were
simple.
Section 308: Attempt to commit culpable homicide: Whoever does any act
with such intention or knowledge and under such circumstances that, if he by
that act caused death, he would be guilty of culpable homicide not amounting
to murder, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term
which may extend to three years, or, with fine, or with both; and , if hurt is
caused to any person by such act, shall be punished with imprisonment of
either description for a term which may extend to seven years, or with fine, or
with both.
Illustrations: A, on grave and sudden provocation, fires a pistol at Z, under such
circumstances that if he thereby caused death he would be guilty of culpable
homicide not amounting to murder. A has committed the offence defined in
this section.
The phraseology issued in this section is similar to that of the preceding
section 307, except that Section 307 is related to offence of attempt to murder,
whereas section 308 concerns with attempt to commit culpable homicide. It is
to be interpreted in the same way as Section 307 of IPC.
In Om Prakash v. State of Delhi, 1982, the accused fired at the police party
which was chasing him but it was misfired, it did not convert the case of
attempt to murder(Section 307) into one of attempt to commit culpable
homicide under section 308 and the accused was therefore, convicted under
Section 307. the attempt of cases described under second and third clauses of
section 299 and those under any of the five exceptions of section 300 fall within
the ambit of this section.
Section 309: Attempt to commit suicide: Whoever attempts to commit suicide
and does any act towards the commission of such offence, shall be punished
with simple imprisonment for a term which may extend to one year or with fine,
or with both.
In order to constitute an offence of suicide under this section, the
‘intention’ to commit suicide is an essential element. Thus where a person
jumped into well to avoid the police and later came out of it at his own, he was
not held guilty of an offence under this Section. Similarly, where a woman
jumped into a well in order to avoid and escape from her husband and
subsequently came out of the well herself, she could not be convicted under
section 309, in the absence of any evidence that she wanted to commit suicide.
Euthanasia is not legally recognised in India and therefore, it is an offence
punishable under Section 309, IPC. Although some efforts were made through
a private member’s bill to decriminalise it in 1980. but the bill was defeated in
the House of Parliament. It was also introduced in Maharashtra Legislative
Council but met the same fate.
However, the Supreme Court in its decision in Aruna Shanbang’s case, allowed
passive euthanasia as valid and lawful but not the active euthanasia which will
continue to be offence of attempt to commit suicide under Section 309 of the
Indian Penal Code.
In the instant case, Aruna Shanbang, who was a nurse in KEM Hospital Mumbai
was sexually assaulted by a ward boy at that hospital some 47 years ago, and
was permanently rendered in a vegetative state throughout the period of 42
years Permission was sought on her behalf from the Apex court for mercy-
killing. But the petition for allowing mercy killing of Aruna the court allowed
only passive euthanasia for permanently vegetative patients by withdrawing life
support but rejected active euthanasia of ending life through administration of
lethal injection drug etc. but Aruna was not PVS.
Hence the Supreme Court in its decision this case, allowed passive
euthanasia as valid and lawful but not the active euthanasia which will continue
to be offence of attempt to commit suicide under Section 309 of the Indian
Penal Code.
It is important here to note that in this case, on 9 March 2018, the Supreme
Court of India, passed a historic judgement-law permitting Passive Euthanasia in
the country.
The Supreme Court specified two irreversible conditions to permit Passive
Euthanasia Law :
(I) The brain-dead for whom the ventilator can be switched off.
(II) Those in a Persistent Vegetative State (PVS) for whom the feed can be
tapered out and pain-managing palliatives be added, according to laid-down
international specifications.
Going on hunger strike is not attempt to commit suicide: Hunger strike cannot be
equated with attempt to commit suicide for the obvious reason that the intention
of hunger striker is not really to kill himself or end his life, but it is an act of
calculative and purposive coercion giving time to authority to yield to the striker's
demand. Therefore the essential element required for the offence of suicide,
namely, “intention to kill oneself” is missing in hunger strike.
to conclude, Gian kaur judgment, the five judge bench of the Supreme Court of
India had ruled that the section 309 was not violative of article 21 of the
Constitution.
Section 309 is an unique section, which only seeks to penalise attempt and not
the actual offence, because if actual offence of suicide happens, no one will be
there for punishment.
Recently, the law commission has recommended for removal of S. 309 from IPC.
A bill has been introduced in Parliament, but has not been passed yet. The
Supreme court has also recommended the Parliament to take appropriate
action.
However, the section is still there in IPC standing valid.
But technically, even though the section has not been removed, the Mental
Healthcare Act 2017,passed by the government effectively decriminalizes
attempted suicide.
Therefore, despite Section 309 being there in IPC, technically it has no effect.
Section 310: Thug: Whoever, at any time after passing of this Act, shall have been
habitually associated with any other or others for the purpose of committing robbery
or child-stealing by means of or accompanied with murder, is a thug. According to
Section 311, a Thug, shall be punished with imprisonment for life, and shall also be
liable to Fine.
Causing Miscarriage or injuries to unborn Children
Sections 312 to 318 of the Code deal with offences affecting human body which are
related to causing of miscarriage or injuries to unborn child, exposure of infants and
concealment of births.
1. Causing Miscarriage: According to Section 312: Whoever voluntarily causes a
woman with child to miscarry shall, if such miscarriage be not caused in good faith for
the purpose of saving the life of the woman, be punished with imprisonment of either
description for at term which may extend to three years, or with fine, or with both;
and, if the woman be quick with the child, shall be punished with imprisonment of
either description of a term which may extend to seven years, and shall be liable to
fine.
Explanation: A woman who causes herself to miscarry, is within the meaning of this
section.
According to Section 313, Causing miscarriage without woman’s consent:
Whoever commits the offence defined in the last preceding section without the
consent of the woman, whether the woman is quick with child or not shall be
punished with imprisonment for life or with imprisonment of either description
for a term which may extend to ten years and shall also be liable for fine.
2. According to section 314: Death caused by act done with intent to cause
miscarriage: Whoever, with intent to cause the miscarriage of a woman with
child, does any act which causes the death of such woman, shall be punished
with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to ten
years, and shall also be liable to fine:
3. If act done without woman’s consent - and if the act is done without the
consent of the woman, Shall be punished either with imprisonment of life.,
or with the punishment above mentioned and it is not essential to this
offence that the offender should know that the act is likely to cause death.
4. According g section 315: Act done with intent to prevent child being born
alive or to cause it die after birth, will be punished with imprisonment of either
description for a term which may extend to ten years . The only exception to
this section is that if such act has been done in good faith for saving the life of
the mother, then in that case no liability will incur under this section.
5. According to Section 316, causing death of quick unborn child by act
amounting to culpable homicide:
6. According to Section 317, exposure and abandonment of child under
twelve years, by a parent or persons having care of it: The section seeks to
protect children below 12 years of age against harmful exposure or
abandonment. The parent and those who have custody of children under
twelve years of age are expected to extend adequate protection and such
protection extends to both legitimate as well as the illegitimate children.
Abandoning the child unprotected at a place where he or she may be exposed
to wind , rain, heat or cold weather or danger from wild animals etc., would
constitute an offence under Section 217 of IPC.
7. Concealment of birth by secret disposal of dead body: The object of this
section is to prevent infanticide. Whoever disposes the dead body of a child
secretly to conceal the birth of child, shall be punished with imprisonment of
Either description for a term which may extend two years.
In Murugan v. State,1991, the accused physically assaulted his 20 weeks
pregnant wife thereby causing death of foetus. The medical evidence showed
the foetus starts taking shape after about 12 weeks of conception. The accused
was therefore, convicted for the offence of causing death of a quick unborn
child under Section 316 of IPC.
Chapter: Hurt and Grievous Hurt
Questions: 1. Explain the circumstances under which hurt amounts grievous
hurt.
2. What is hurt ? Explain the circumstances under which hurt becomes grievous
hurt. Illustrate.
3. Differentiate between Hurt from grievous Hurt.
4. ‘A’ intending to permanently disfigure B’ face gives ‘B’ a blow which does
not permanently disfigure B’s face, but causes ‘B’ to suffer a severe bodily pain
for 20 days. Discuss the liability of ‘A’.
Section 319 to 338 of the Indian Penal Code deal with causing of hurt and
grievous hurt and punishment for them . The break-up of the subject may
briefly be summarised as follows:
(1) simple hurt.
(2) Grievous hurt
(3) Voluntarily causing hurt or grievous hurt by dangerous weapons or dangerous
means .
(4) Causing hurt or grievous hurt to extort property .
(5) Causing hurt by poison
(6) Causing hurt or grievous hurt to extort confession or compel restoration of
property
(7) Causing hurt or grievous hurt to deter Public servant
(8) Causing hurt or grievous on provocation
(9) Causing hurt or grievous hurt by endangering life or personal safety of others.
Hurt: According to Section 319 : Whoever causes bodily pain, disease or infirmity
to any person is said to cause hurt.
This section defines ‘hurt’ as causing of bodily pain, disease or infirmity by a
person to some other person. The duration of period is immaterial in case of
‘hurt’ under this section. The expression ‘bodily pain’ used in this section refers to
physical pain only and not any mental or emotional pain. It may be invisible also.
Severity of the pain is also not a material factor to be taken into consideration
from the applicability of this section. Even a simple first blow may amount to
‘hurt’ if it causes bodily pain.
The meaning of the term ‘infirmity’ used in this section, the Courts have held
that it denotes inability of an organ of the body to perform its normal function
and such infirmity may be temporary or permanent in a nature.
The self inflicted pain or infirmity is not covered under the term ‘hurt’ used in
this section.
In Raka v. Emperor, 1887, the High Court of Bombay held that a prostitute who
has sexual intercourse with the complainant and thereby infected him with a
venereal disease had committed an offence under Section 269 for spreading
the infectious disease and it could be treated as hurt under Section 319,
because of the remoteness of the act and its consequences.
Pulling a woman by hair amounts to causing hurt under section 319 of the IPC.
In Marcelino Fernandes v. State, 1976, the accused along with four other
persons went to the victim to teach a lesson to him for selling to them a fake
ring, and
Kicked him and inflicted blows by a broken brick at the back of his neck as a
result of which, he fell down, vomited blood and ultimately died. The court
held that in the absence of any previous enmity between the accused and the
victim and absence of requisite intention or knowledge and circumstances for
culpable homicide, they could be held guilty of only causing hurt under section
319 of IPC.
Grievous Hurt: According to Section 320: the following kinds of hurt only are
designated as “Grievous”.
firstly - Emasculation.
Secondly – Permanent privation of the sight of either eye.
Thirdly – permanent privation of the hearing of either ear.
Fourthly – Privation of any member of joint.
Fifthly – Destruction or permanent impairing of the powers of any member or
joint.
Sixthly – Permanent disfiguration of the head or face.
Seventhly – Fracture or dislocation of a bone or tooth.
Eighthly – Any hurt which endangers life or which causes the suffers to be
during the space of twenty days in severe bodily pain. Or unable to follow
ordinary pursuit.
this section stipulates certain nature of injuries which are categorised as
grievous hurt. Unless a hurt caused by a person falls within the categories of
grievous hurt specified in Section 320, it will be treated as only a simple hurt.
About the eight clause of Section 320, mere hospitalization for 20 days or
more than 20 days will not necessarily turn a simple hurt into a grievous hurt
where the victim himself has actively contributed to long term hospitalisation
due to his own fault or negligence.
In Formina Sebastio Azardeo v. State of Goa, 1992, the two accused persons tied
their victim to an electric pole and assaulted him to teach him a lesson for
spreading scandalous information about the alleged love affair of the accused .
The victim died without any further overt act on the part of the accused persons
or they had the intention to kill him. It was held that their offence fall in eight
clause of grievous hurt under Section 320 as they endangered the life of the
victim and not under Section 300.
A fracture or dislocation bone or tooth are held to be grievous hurt clause
seventh of Section 320. but mere loosening of four teeth or a cut across the
bone cannot be held as grievous hurt. Splintering of bone or rupture or tissue
in it, is a fracture and therefore, a grievous hurt as per seventh clause of section
320, IPC.
According to clause sixthly of section 320, permanent disfiguration of head or
face amounts to grievous hurt. Disfiguration impels spoiling the figure, shape
amounts to grievous hurt. Disfiguration implies spoiling the figure, shape or
beauty or deforming it. For example, cutting of ear, nose, branding cheeks or
forehead by red hot iron, cut inflicted by a razor on the face etc. have been held
to be causing grievous hurt.
A distinction has to be drawn between offences of ‘hurt’ and offences affecting
life. The position of the law therefore would be that there is only common
intention to cause a grievous injury without any intention to kill, an accused
cannot be convicted of murder. However, if this distinction is rigidly followed
the accused who has killed a person by crushing and smashing the person’s
head would plead in his defence that he never intended to cause that person’s
death but only intended to cause him grievous hurt and thus succeed in
escaping extreme penalty of death or life imprisonment which is prescribed
For the offence of murder. It will thus frustrate the cause of criminal justice and
punishment.
In Guruvulu V. Emperor, 1945, the accused was charged for cutting a part of
nose of the deceased woman with a view to stealing nose-ring which she was
wearing in her nose, but she died as a result of the same. The accused was
charged for culpable homicide not amounting to murder but the court in appeal
held that the accused has committed the offence of grievous hurt only as death
was not atall likely to result nor was it intended or foreseen.
Voluntarily causing hurt: According to section 321: Whoever does any act with
the intention of thereby causing hurt to any person, or with the knowledge that
he is likely thereby to cause hurt to any person, and does thereby cause hurt to
any person, is said ‘voluntarily to cause hurt”.
Voluntarily causing grievous hurt: According to Section 322: Whoever
voluntarily caused hurt, if the hurt which he intends to cause or knows himself
to be likely to cause is grievous hurt, and if the hurt which he causes is grievous
hurt, is said “voluntarily to cause grievous hurt”.
Explanation – A person is not said voluntarily to cause grievous hurt, except
when he both causes grievous hurt and intends or know himself to be likely to
cause grievous hurt. But he is said voluntarily to cause grievous hurt, if,
intending or knowing himself to be likely to cause grievous hurt of one kind,
he actually causes grievous hurt of another kind.
Illustration: A, intending or knowing himself to be likely permanently to
disfigure Z’s face gives Z a blow which does not permanently disfigure Z’s face,
but which causes Z to suffer severe bodily pain for the space to twenty days.
A has voluntarily caused grievous hurt.
The provisions contained in section 321 and the explanation to this section
clearly indicates that the ingredient of intention or knowledge must invariably
be present in order to constitute the offence of hurt or grievous hurt.
Punishment for voluntarily causing hurt: According to section 323: Whoever,
except in the case provided for by Section 334, voluntarily causes hurt, shall
be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may
extend to one year, or with fine which may extend to one thousand rupees or
with both.
In Public Prosecutor v. N.S.Murthy, 1973, the accused, a shopkeeper in a
sudden quarrel with his wife hit on her head with an iron weight of 200 grams
which resulted in her death. The medical report showed that the hurt caused
was of a simple nature and there was no evidence to show that the accused
intended or had the knowledge that death would thereby caused. The report
showed that the deceased died of shock due to injury. The accused was
therefore, held liable for causing hurt and sentences under Section 323 and not
Section 304 of IPC.
In Om Prakash v. State(NCT, Delhi), 1990, the two accused who were brothers
met at their sister’s place , to teach her a lesson for filing a civil suit against
them and one of them was carrying knife, but this was not known to the other
accused, inflicted a knife injury on a vital part resulting in her death. The
accused who inflicted knife injury on a vital part resulting in her death. The
accused who inflicted knife injuries on the deceased was convicted and
sentenced under Section 304, Part II, whereas the other accused was convicted
for the offence of causing simple hurt under Section 323, IPC.
Voluntarily causing hurt by dangerous weapons or means: According to Section
324: this section applies when a dangerous weapon or dangerous means has
been used to cause a simple hurt. Dangerous weapon for the purpose of this
section may include fire, poison, explosive substance etc. which are deleterious
to the human health. It must, however, be stated that where dangerous
weapon or means are used to cause a grievous hurt as defined in section 320,
then in that case Section 326 will apply and not 324 which relates only to simple
hurt.
Obviously, the punishment under Section 324 is harsher than provided under
Section 323 because of dangerous weapon or means being used to cause such
hurt. But where simple hurt is caused by a person as a result of provocation,
even if the offender has used dangerous weapon or means, his act will not be
covered under section 324 and the accused will be punished under Section 323
which prescribes a lighter punishment for such hurt caused in provocation.
Section 325, talks on punishment for voluntarily causing grievous hurt:
Whoever except in the case provided for by section 335, voluntarily causes
Grievous hurt, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a
term which may extend to seven years, and also be liable for fine.
In Mohinder Singh v. State, 1986, the accused assaulted the deceased with a
lathi blow on is forehead. The medical report showed that the attack on the
forehead of the deceased by lathi and the internal injury causing death of the
deceased could not be correlated. The Court therefore, convicted the accused
under Section 325 and not under section 326.
Section 326: Voluntarily causing grievous hurt by dangerous weapons or means:
This section applies where a grievous hurt as defined under section 320 is
caused by a dangerous weapon or dangerous means. Where there are no signs
of grievous hurt on the body of the victim, the accused cannot be convicted for
an offence under this section.
In Dattunana Pawar v. Emporer, 1918, the two parties had a fight with stone
pelting at each other. The death of the deceased ws caused due to stone being
thrown at him by the accused which hit and damaged his liver. Held, the
accused was guilty of the offence under section 326 as stone was a dangerous
means and his conviction for murder under Section 302 was set aside.
Section 326-A. Voluntarily causing grievous hurt by use of acid etc: the
following are covered by this section:
(i) Causing permanent or partial damage or deformity to any person.
(ii) Causing burn.
(iii) Any person who maimes or disfigures or disables any part or parts of the
body of a person; or
(iv) Causing grievous hurt by throwing acid or by administering acid, or
(v) Causing injury by any other means.
Another requirement is that any of the above kinds of injuries may be caused
with the intention or knowledge that he is likely of injuries my be caused with
the intention or knowledge that he is likely to cause any such injury or hurt.
Causing any offence of the above category is punishable with imprisonment of
either description for a term which shall not be less than ten years but which
may extend to imprisonment for life and with fine.
Provided that such fine shall be just and reasonable to meet the medical
expenses of the treatment of the victim. Provided also that any fine so imposed
under this section shall be paid to the victim.
The following offences are also covered under this chapter:
1. Section 326-B: deals with the offence of voluntarily throwing or attempting
to throw acid.
2. Section 327: Voluntarily causing hurt to extort property, or to constrain to
an illegal act: this section applies to cases wherein the offender voluntarily
causes hurt for the purpose of extorting property or to compel a person to
do an illegal act.
3. Section 328: Causing hurt by means of poison etc, with intent to commit an
offence: In Nanjundappa’s case, the accused administered Dhatura powder
to a woman and robbed her of her jewellery while she became unconscious,
he was held guilty of offence under this section.
4. Section 329: Voluntarily causing grievous hurt to extort property, or to
To constrain to an illegal act: This section applies to cases where the offender
voluntarily causes grievous hurt for extorting property or to compel a person to
do an illegal act. Thus, the section is similar to earlier section 327 with the only
difference that hurt caused under this section is grievous in nature whereas it is
simple hurt in case of section 327.
Section 330: deals with voluntarily causing hurt to extort confession, or to
compel restoration of property .
Illustration: A, a police officer, tortures Z , in order to induce Z to confess that
he committed a crime. A is guilty of an offence under this section.
Section 331: Voluntarily causing grievous hurt to extort confession, or to
compel restoration of property: This section is similar to the preceding section
except tht the hurt caused for the application of this section should be grievous
whereas it is simple hurt in case of section 330, IPC.
In Public Prosecutor v. Ranniappa, 1955, a boy was accused of theft. In order to
extort confession from him, his hands were tied together and wrapped with a
cloth and kerosene poured over it and fire was lit. The accused was convicted
under Section 331 and sentenced to one year rigorous imprisonment.
Section 332: Voluntarily causing hurt to deter pubic servant from his duty: this
section resembles Section 353 with the only difference tht under this section
causing of hurt toa public servant in order to deter him from discharging his
duty is made a punishable offence whereas under section 353, there is assault
or use of criminal force for the same purpose.
Section 333: Voluntarily causing grievous hurt to deter public servant from his
duty : this section provided for an aggravated form of offence dealt with in the
preceding section.
Section 334: Voluntarily causing hurt on provocation: Whoever voluntarily
causes hurt on grave and sudden provocation, if he neither intends nor knows
himself to be likely to cause hurt to any person other than the person who gave
the provocation,. Shall be punished with imprisonment for a term which may
extend to one month with or without fine.
Section 335: voluntarily causing hurt on provocation for which the punishment
may extent for four years. The essential ingredients are:
(1) The offender should have caused hurt or grievous hurt under section 335
voluntarily.
(2) It should have been caused due to provocation.
(3) The provocation so caused should be both, grave and sudden;
(4) The accused should not have intended to cause hurt/ grievous hurt to any
other person than the person who provoked him; or
(5) He should not have knowledge that his act is likely to cause hurt/grievous
hurt to any person other than the person who provoked him.
Section 337: Causing hurt by act endangering life or personal safety of others :
Whoever causes hurt to any person by doing any act so rashly or negligently as
to endanger human life, or the personal safety of others, shall be punished with
imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to six months.
Section 338: this section deals with causing grievous hurt by act endangering
life or personal safety of others.
It may be stated tht grievous hurt caused due to motor accident are generally
dealt with under the Motor Vehicle Act, 1988.
Wrongful restraint and Wrongful confinement
Questions: 1. Briefly discuss wrongful restraint and wrongful confinement.
2. ‘A’ causes ‘B’ to go within a room and locks ‘B’ in, with an intention to
prevent him from proceeding in any direction beyond the room. What offence
has ‘A’ committed?
3. A builds a wall across a path along which B has a right to pass. B is thereby
prevented from passing what is the offence committed by A?
Sections 339 to 348 of IPC, deal with the offences of wrongful restraint and
wrongful confinement.
Wrongful restraint: According to Section 339, Whoever voluntarily obstructs,
any person so as to prevent that person from proceeding in any direction in
which that person has a right to proceed, is said wrongful to restrain that
person.
Exception – The obstruction of a private way over land or water which a person
in good faith believes himself to have a lawful right to obstruct, is not on offence
within the meaning of this section.
Illustration: A obstructs a path along which Z has a right to pass, A not believing
in good faith that he has a right to stop the path, Z is thereby prevented from
passing. A wrongfully restrains Z.
Restraining a person from going wherever and whenever he likes and has right
to go in a lawful manner is called wrongful restraint which is punishable under
this Section. There are two main ingredients of this offence, namely;
(i) Voluntary obstruction of a person;
(ii) The obstruction should be such as to prevent that person from proceeding
in any direction in which he has a right to proceed.
The restrain as contemplated under this section to be wrongful, must be
complete from all directions. Thus where the house-owner, who partially
restrained his tenant by closing one of the door leaving the main entrance gates
open, was not held guilty of wrongful restraint as the complainant had passage
to move in and out through the main entrance gate.
In re M Abraham case, the accused the driver of a bus purposely made his bus
Stand across the road in such a manner as to prevent another bus which was
coming from behind, to proceed further. He was held guilty for wrongful
restraint under Section 339.
The Supreme Court in Vijay Kumari Magee v. Smt. S. R. Rao, 1996, held that
necessary pre-condition for wrongful restraint is that a person concerned must
have a right to proceed, and therefore, the complainant lady teacher who was
a licensee of a hostel room could not have a right to live there after termination
of her licence, and hence the school authorities could not be charged for
wrongful restraint in not allowing her entry in the room.
II Wrongful Confinement: Section 340: Whoever wrongfully restrains any
person in such a manner as to prevent that person from proceeding beyond
certain circumscribing limits, is said “ wrongfully to confine” that person.
Illustrations: (a) A causes Z to go within a walled space, and locks Z in, A is thus
prevented from proceeding in any direction beyond the circumscribing line of
wall. A wrongfully confines Z.
(b) A places men with firearms at the outlets of a building, and tells Z that they
will fire at Z, if Z attempts to leave the building. A wrongfully confines Z.
This Section describes another form of wrongful restraint which is known as
wrongful confinement. It is a wrongful restraint of a person which prevents him
from proceeding beyond certain circumscribed limits.
Where a police officer arrested and detained a person in police lock-up
despite that person producing bail order of the Court , the police officer was
held guilty of offence under Section 340 and was sentenced under Section 342
of IPC.
and confining a person by merely spoken words or telling him that he is
completely confined will not amount to wrongful confinement under this
section unless he is prevented to go in ay direction he has right to go by creating
voluntary obstruction.
Where a person armed with firearms threats ‘A’ that if ‘A’ tried to go out of the
House, he would fire at him, that person will be guilty of wrongfully confining ‘A’
under Section 340 because ‘A’ is compelled to remain inside the house out of
fear of being fired and killed.
In Madhubala v. Narendra, 1982, a married woman left her husband’s home
and came to live with her parents. The husband in the habeas corpus petition
charged the parents of his wife of wrongful confinement. The Supreme Court
dismissed the petition and held the parents could not be held guilty of wrongful
confinement.
Whereas a person is forced to walk in particular direction under duress, it will
amount, to his wrongful confinement.
In the case of State of Gujurat v. Maganbhai Jogani, 2009, the officials visited
the house of the accused for making some inquiry under the Money Lenders
Act. They were not allowed to go out of the house for some time, but at the
same time they did not apprehend any use of force by the accused in case they
attempted to get out, it was held that the accused had not committed the
offence of wrongful confinement under Section 340 of the Code.
Distinction between Wrongful restrain (Section 339) and wrongful
confinement(Section 340).
Though wrongful confinement is a specific form of wrongful restraint the two
differ in the following aspects:
(1) In wrongful confinement, a person is restrained from proceeding in any
direction beyond a certain area but in wrongful restraint, he is restrained
from proceeding in some particular direction, though free to proceed else
where.
(2) Wrongful confinement is an aggravated form of wrongful restraint.
(3) Wrongful confinement is punishable under section 342 with imprisonment
simple or rigorous up to one year and a fine of Rs. 1000/-whereas wrongful
restraint is punishable under Section 341 with simple imprisonment of one
month and a fine of rs500/-.
(4) Wrongful confinement necessarily involves wrongful restrain but not the
vice versa.
Punishments for wrongful restraint and Wrongful confinement:
1. Whoever wrongfully restrains any person shall be punished with simple
imprisonment from a term which may extend to one month, or with fine which
may extend to five hundred rupees or with both.
2. Whoever wrongfully confines any person shall be punished with imprisonment
for either description for a term which may extend to one year, or with fine
which may extend to one thousand rupees.
Chapter: Criminal force and Assault
Questions: What is force ? When does it becomes criminal force.
• ‘Assault’ is only an attempt or apprehension of using criminal force’ – Discuss.
• Write a note on Criminal force and assault
• Write a short notes on Assault.
• A shakes his fist at B, intending or knowing it to be likely that he may there by
cause b to believe tht A is about to strike B. weather A has committed any
offence?
Introduction: 1. Sections 350 to 358 deals with the offences of criminal force
and assault.
2. While Sections 350 and 351 define the term ‘force’ and ‘assault’ respectively.
3. Sections 352 to 358 contain the penal provisions for these offences.
The term ‘force has been defined in Section 349.
Section 349: Force: a person is said to use force to another, if he causes
motion, change of motion, or cessation of motion as brings that substance into
contact with any part of that other’s body, or with anything which that other is
wearing or carrying or with anything so situated that such contact affects that
other’s sense.
Provided that the person causing the motion, or change of motion, or cessation
of motion, causes that motion, change of motion or cessation of motion in one
of the three ways hereinafter described:
Firstly - By his own bodily power.
Secondly by disposing any substance in such a manner that the motion or
change or cessation of motion takes place without any further act on his part,
Or the part of any person.
Thirdly- by inducing any animal to move, to change its motion. Or to cease to
move.
The section defines ‘force’ which is not an offence by itself. The term ‘force’
denotes exertion of energy or strength producing a movement or change. The
definition of force in this section is united in its use by a human being against
another human being and does not extend to inanimate objects. Thus, a motion
or change of motion or cessation of motion caused to inanimate object such as
property, without affecting human being is not the ‘use of force to another’
within the meaning of section 349, IPC.
The Supreme Court in Chandrika Rao v. State of Bihar, 1967, explained the
meaning of the term force used in Section 349 and held that a person can be said
to have used force against another, if he causes motion, change of motion or
cessation of motion to that other person.
In this case, an assistant Superintendent of commercial taxes paid a surprise
visit to the shop of the accused to inspect the record and books of accounts. He
found two set of account books being maintained in the shop. When he
`turning pages and looking into them, the accused suddenly snatched away both
books from him. The accused was charged under section 353 of IPC. It was
contended on behalf of the accused that mere snatching of books does not
amount not ‘use of force’ as contemplated by Section 3349. Rejecting the plea
of the accused, the supreme court held that snatching away of books from the
hands of the Commercial Tax Superintendent amounted to sue of force as it
caused jerk to his hands and its sensation could also be felt by the hands and
therefore, the accused was guilty of offence under Section 353, IPC.
This chapter consists of three parts. the first part, namely , Section 463 to 477-
A of the Chapter deals with forgery of documents and accounts whereas the
second part comprising sections 479.
Section 463: forgery: Whoever makes any false document or false electronic
record or part of a document or electronic record, with intent in cause
damages or injury, to the public or to any person, or to support any claim or
title, or to cause any person to apart with property, or to enter into any
express or implied contract, or with intent to commit fraud or that fraud may
be committed, commits forgery.
Section 463 to 477-Aofthe Indian Penal Code describe five different kinds of
offences relating to forgery of documents. They are as follows:
1. forgery- (definition, Section 463 and punishment under Section 465)
2. Making a false document(section 464)
3. Forged documents(section 470)
4. Falsification of accounts(section 477-A); and
5. Other offences relating to documents (Section 472 to 477-A).
The origin of the offences of forgery may be traced back to the
invention of writing. Forgery may be defined as making of a false document
with the criminal intention to cause damage to any person. The forgery Act
1913 was, however, repealed by the Forgery and Counterfeiting Act, 1981
and Section 1 of this Act says that a person is held guilty of “forgery” when
he makes a false document with the intent to use or induce somebody to
accept it as a genuine one.
Like the English law, Section 463 of IPC also defines forgery as making a false
record or electronic record with the criminal intention to sue it as a genuine
record or electronic record. Merely making a false document or electronic
document is not punishable unless it is used as if it were a genuine
document when it will amount to a forgery.
The main ingredients of the offence of forgery as defined in this section are as
follows:
1. Making a false document or electronic record or part of it.
2. Such making of document or electronic record should be with intent:
(a) to cause damage or injury to (i) public; or (ii) any person; or
(b) to support any claim or title; or
(c ) to cause any person to apart with property; or
(d) To cause any person to enter into express or implied contract or
(e) To commit fraud or that a fraud may be committed .
Thus it would appear that forgery is a means to deceive a person. As In case of
offence of cheating, the element of false representation is also present in the
offence of forgery, but cheating is mainly oral whereas forgery is essentially
in a written form.
Where a person on being authored by another person to sign the signature of
that another person, does so, he commits no forgery. Thus, when a son on
being authorised by is father, makes his father’s signature on a document,
he commits no forgery.
In Vasappa v. State, 1973, it was held that in order to constitute an offence of
forgery merely making a false document is not enough but the intention to
cause damage or harm to a public servant or any other person should also
be present.
Where in a proceeding in a Court of Justice, the accused manages to insert a
document on the record and makes an interpolation in the list of
documents, the accused would be guilty of committing a fraud on the
Court, either to save himself from being prosecuted or to cause damage to
the opposite party. It is immaterial whether he succeeds in deceiving of
defrauding or not or had he succeeded, it would not have adversely affected
him or caused no damages to the other party as he had intended or
contemplated.
As stated earlier, forgery implies making of a false document. What constitutes
a false document is the next section 464 of IPC.
Section 464: Making of false document: A person is said to make a false
document or false electronic record:
(a) Makes, signs, seals or executes a document or part of a document;
(b) Makes or transmits any electronic record or part of any electronic record;
(c) Affixes any electronic signature on any electronic record;
(d) Makes any mark denoting the execution of a document or the authenticity
of the electronic signature.
With the intention of causing it to be believed that such document or part of
document, electronic record or electronic signature was made, signed,
sealed, executed, transmitted or affixed by or by the authority of a person by
whom or by whose authority he knows that it was not made, signed sealed,
executed or affixed; or
Secondly: Who without lawful authority, dishonestly or fraudulently by
cancellation or other wise, alters a document or an electronic record in any
material part thereof, after it has been made, executed or affixed with
electronic signature either himself or by ay other person, be living or dead
at the time of such alteration; or
Thirdly : Who dishonestly or fraudulently cause ay person to sign, seal,
executes or alter a document or an electronic record or to affix his
electronic signature or any electronic record knowing that such person by
reason of unsoundness of mind or intoxication cannot, or that by reason of
deception practiced upon him, he does not now the contents of the
document or electronic record or the nature of the alteration.
Illustrations: (a) A has a letter of credit upon B for Rs 10,000 written by Z, A, in
order to defraud B, adds a cipher to the 10, 000 and makes the sum
1, 00,000 intending that it may be believed by B tht the purchase money, A
has committed forgery.
(b) Z’s will contains these words: “I direct that all my remaining property be
equally divided between A, B, and C”. A dishonestly scratches out B’s name,
intending that it may be believed that the whose was left to himself and C,
A has committed forgery.
Explanation 1: A man’s signature of his own name may amount to forgery:
A signs his own name to a bill of exchange, intending that it may be believed
that the bill was drawn by another person of the same name. A has
committed forgery.
Explanation 2: the making of a false document in the name of fictitious person,
intending it be believed that the document was made by real person, or in
the name of a deceased person, intending it to be believed that the
document was made by the person in his life-time may amount to forgery;
Illustration: A draws a bill of exchange upon a fictitious person, and
fraudulently accepts the bill in the name of such fictitious person with intent to
negotiate it. A commits forgery.
Explanation 3: For the purpose of this section, the expression affixing electronic
signature shall have the meaning assigned to it in clause (d) of Sub-section (1) of
section 2 of the Information Technology Act, 2000.
According to this section, a person who makes a false document or false electronic
record commits forgery which the accused intends, should appear to be genuine
possessing some legal validity.
The term document as defined in ‘section 29, IPC denotes ‘any matter expressed or
described upon any substance by means of letter, figures or marks, in a manner
capable of conveying an idea to the mind of a person who is able to understand
them. Similarly, the term electronic data inserted as defined in Section 29-A of
the IPC by the Information technology Act 2000 means “data record of data
generated image, or sound stored, received or sent in an electronic form or
microfilm or computer generated microfiche”.
The section also describes the manner as to how a false document or false electronic
record can be made. It may be prepared in the following ways:
(1) By making, sealing, signing or executing a document or a part thereof or
making or transmitting any electronic record or a part thereof, or by affixing
any digital signature on any electronic record; or
(2) By alteration of a document or an electronic record; or
(3) By causing a person who is innocent of the contents or nature of the
alteration made in a document or an electronic record to sign seal or
execute it.
Examples of forgery are:
1. forging or altering date of birth for deriving certain consequential benefits
there from; or
2. Making false caste certificate to seek benefit of reservation in jobs or
admission in professional institutes and colleges under reserved categories.
3. Making a false or forged document with a view to support a legal claim
would be punished under Section 464.
Where several persons are involved in making a forged document, all of the are
liable to be punished for forgery under Section 464, IPC.
The Supreme Court held In T.N. Rugmani v. C. Achutta menon, 1991, held that
making an application in another’s name without any intention to defraud or
causing harm to anyone does not amount to an offence of forgery. The
Supreme court held tht the handwriting expert’s opinion forms an important
part of evidence in forgery cases.
Section 465: Punishment for forgery: Whoever commits forgery shall be
punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may
extend to two years.
Currency notes and Bank Notes
Section 489-A to 489-E, contains five offences relating to currency notes and bank
notes. These were inserted in IPC in order to provide more adequately for the
protection of currency-notes and bank-notes from forgery.
The five offences specified in Section 489-A to 489E , the Indian Penal Code
relating to currency notes and bank notes may briefly be summarised as
Follows:
(1) Counterfeiting currency notes and bank notes.
(2) Possession of forged or counterfeit currency notes or bank notes with
intention to pass them as genuine.
(2) Making or possessing instruments or materials for forging or counterfeiting
currency notes and banks notes.
(3) Making or using documents resembling currency notes or bank notes or
refusing to disclose to a police officer, the name or address of the person by
whom such forged or counterfeit notes were printed or other wise made.
Section 489-A: counterfeiting currency notes or bank notes: Whoever
counterfeits, or knowingly performs any part of the process of
counterfeiting, any currency notes or bank-note, shall be punished with
imprisonment for life, or with imprisonment of either description for a term
which may extend to ten years, and shall also be liable to fine
Explanation: For the purpose of this section and of other sections, the
The expression “bank-note” means a promissory note or engagement for the
payment of money to bearer on demand issued by any person carrying on
the business of banking in any part of the world, or issued by or under the
authority of any State or Sovereign world, or issued by or under the authority
of any State or Sovereign power, and intended to be sued as equivalent to, or
as a substitute for money.
Offences relating to Marriage
Questions: 1. Explain the offences relating to marriage.
2. Discuss the offence of adultery with recent developments
3. Write short not Adultery
4. Write a short notes on “Bigamy’.
5. Write note on cruelty by husband and his relatives.
Introduction: the purpose of including this chapter in the Indian Penal Code is
to prevent deceitful practices which adversely affect the marriage and
Marriage relations of the spouses. Particularly women who fall a victim to an
offence relating to marriage are most affected. The offence enumerated in
this chapter comprising sections 493 to 498, IPC are intended to prevent
infidelity within the institution of marriage. The main offences under this
chapter are as follows:
(1) Invalid marriage(Sections 493 and 496);
(2) Bigamy (Section 494 and 495);
(3) Adultery (section 487); and
(4) Criminal element(Section 498).
Section 493: Cohabitation caused by a man deceitfully inducing a belief of
lawful marriage: every man who by deceit causes any woman who is not
lawfully married to him to believe that she is lawfully married to him and to
cohabit or have sexual intercourse with him in that belief, shall be punished
with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to ten
years, and shall also be liable to fine.
Ingredients : The main ingredients of an offence under Section 493 are:
(1) The accused (man) must have practised deception;
(2) Such deception was intended to induce a woman to believe that she was
lawfully married to him; and
(3) There was sexual intercourse as result of deception.
Where there is deception on the apart of the man to induce a woman to have
sexual intercourse with her after making her to believe that he was her
husband, though in fact it was not so, but ultimately sexual intercourse does
not take place, then in such a case, the provisions of Section 493, IPC will not
be attracted.
In one of the cases it was held that where the woman knows that the person to
whom she is giving consent to have sexual intercourse with her, is , infact not
her husband, she would not be entitled to launch prosecution against that
person under this section.
The High Court of Orissa, in Sudhanshu Shekhar Samantray v. State, 2002, held
Held that the statement of the prosecutrix that she had resisted to having sexual
intercourse with the accused but when he put vermilion on the mang thus
declaring her as his wife with the assurance to accept her publicly after securing a
job, she submitted herself to cohabitation, it would be sufficient to constitute an
offence under section 493 because the accused deceitfully induced the woman to
believe that it was a lawful marriage.
Section 198(1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, specifically provides that no
court shall take cognizance of an offence punishable under this chapter of IPC
except upon a complaint made by the person who is aggrieved by the offence.
The offence under this section is non-congnizable , non-bailable and non-
compoundable, and is triable by the Magistrate of first class.
Question: Write a short notes on “Bigamy’.
4. Section 494: Marrying again during lifetime of husband or wife(Bigamy): Whoever
having a husband or wife living, marries in any case in which such marriage is void
by reason of its taking place during the life of such husband or wife, shall be
punished with imprisonment of either description for a term
which may extend to seven years, and shall also be liable to fine.
Exception – this section does not extend to ay person whose marriage with such
husband or wife has been declared void by a court of competent
jurisdiction, nor to any to any person who contracts a marriage during the
life of a former husband or wife, if such husband or wife, at the time of the
subsequent marriage , shall have been continually absent from such person
for the space of seven years, and shall not have been heard of by such
person as being alive within that time provided the person contracting such
subsequent marriage shall, before such marriage takes place, inform the
person with whom such marriage is contracted of the real state of facts so
far as the same are within his or her knowledge.
In order to constitute an offence of bigamy under this section it must be proved
that the first marriage was subsisting at the time of the second marriage and
it was validly contracted marriage and also the first wife/husband was living
when the second marriage was contracted.
This section itself provides two exceptions when contracting of second marriage
Will not be an offence, namely:
(1) When the first marriage has been declared void by the Court of competent
jurisdiction; and
(2) When the former wife/husband has been continually absent for over seven
years ad not heard of as being alive, and this fact is duly disclosed to the
person with whom the second marriage is being contracted.
The provisions of this section are not attracted where the second marriage
(despite the first marriage being valid and in subsistence with the spouse
living) is not a valid marriage. It is only when second marriage is also legally
valid that the person may be charged for the offence of bigamy under this
section.
Scope of the Section: The provision of this section relating to bigamy that is
marrying again during the lifetime of husband or wife, as the case may be, do
not apply to Mohammedan , males who are legally allowed to have more than
one wife, but it does apply to Mohammedan females and to Hindus, Parsis
and Christians, whether male or female.
Ingredients: the main ingredients of he offence under Section 494 are:
(1) Existence of the first wife or husband at the time of second marriage; and
(2) The first marriage should have been validly contracted and should be in
subsistence.
A divorce dissolves a valid marriage and therefore, the parties are free to
remarry after obtaining a valid decree of divorce.
In the case of Santosh Kumar v. Surjit Singh, 1990, the lower Court without
granting a divorce passed an order relieving the physically weak wife from
the burden of sex demand of her husband and also permitted him at the
request of the wife, to have another wife. The High Court held that the
decision of the lower Court being wrong , was labile to be set aside.
In Urmilla V. State, 1994, the marriage of the accused was solemnized according
to Arya samaj rituals under which only three and half rounds of sacred fire
are deemed enough to complete the marriage formality instead of
traditional saptapadi under the Hindu Marriage. The Supreme Court held
That the marriage was not complete and therefore, the accused could not be
convicted for the offence of bigamy under Section 494, IPC.
to wind up there are two Exceptions to Section 494: There are two exception
stated I the text of section 494 itself when second marriage would not
amount to bigamy namely:
(i) When the first marriage has been declared void by a competent court having
jurisdiction; and (ii) when one of the spouse to the marriage has not been
hers of continually for a period of more than seven years, as the law
presumes him to be dead.
Where a priest or pundit has the knowledge that the marriage which he is going
to solemnise is void because one of the spouse is entering the second
marriage though his/her wife or husband, as the case may be, is alive, he
would be guilty of abetment of that offence of bigamy and will be
punishable.
In one of the cases, the High Court of Andhra Pradesh held that in order to
to secure conviction under Section marriage validity has to be proved by the
complainant beyond doubt, it will be no excuse for the accused that he
converted himself to a religion which permits polygamy.
Briefly stated, the law relating to bigamy as contained in Section 494IPC,
provides tht when parties to a marriage get married under a particular
personal law, that marriage continues to be governed by the personal law
under which they got married, irrespective of the fact that either of the
spouses have converted to another religion. Therefore, spouses cannot and
should not be allowed to escape liability under section 494, IPC, by resorting
to conversion to Islam or nay other religion.
the next offence relating to marriages are:
Section 495: Same offence with concealment of former marriage from person
with whom subsequent marriage is contracted: Whoever commits the
offence defined in the last preceding section having concealed from the
person with whom the subsequent marriage is contracted, the fact of the
former marriage, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description
For a term which may extend to ten years, and shall also be liable to fine.
This section describes an aggravated form of the offence defined in
Section 494 for which an enhanced punishment has been prescribed. The
provision of this section applies to cases in which the person conceals the
fact of his former marriage from the spouse with whom he is going to
contract subsequent marriage.
Ingredients: The main ingredients of the offence under section 495 are:
(1) The accused must be already married;
(2) That his first marriage must be legally valid;
(3) The spouse whom he married is alive and has not been divorced;
(4) The accused has contracted second marriage; and
(5) He has with fraudulent intention concealed the fact of his first marriage and
spouse being alive with the person with whom he/she is contracting the
second marriage.
The next offence relating to marriage is:
Section 496: Marriage ceremony fraudulently gone through without lawful
marriage: whoever, dishonestly or with a fraudulent intention, goes through
the ceremony of being married, knowing that he is not thereby lawfully
married, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term
which may extend to seven years., and shall also be labile to fine.
This offence can be committed both men and woman and also the
offence under this section requires no deception, cohabitation or sexual
intercourse. It involves dishonest and fraudulent abuse of marriage
ceremony.
Questions: 1. Discuss the offence of adultery with recent developments
2. Write short not Adultery.
Section 497: Adultery: Whoever has sexual intercourse with a person who is and
whom he knows or has reason to believe to be wife of another man, without
the consent or connivance of that man, such sexual intercourse not
amounting to the offence of rape, is guilty of the offence of adultery, and
And shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a tem which
may extend to five years, or with fine or with both. In such case the wife
shall not be punishable as an abettor.
According to the definition of the offence of adultery as given in this section, it
is an offence committed by a third person against a husband with his wife. It
is not necessary that the adulterer should know whose wife the woman is,
provided he knew that she was a married woman.
Ingredients: the essential ingredients of the offence of adultery are:
(1) Sexual intercourse by a man with a woman whom he knows and has reason
to believe to be wife of another man;
(2) Such sexual intercourse must be without the consent or connivance of the
husband; and
(3) Such sexual intercourse shall not amount an offence of rape.
(4) Though proof of sexual intercourse is an essential element of the offence but
direct evidence is seldom available and in most cases it has to be inferred
From totality of circumstances. If the victim is a widow , or an unmarried woman
or a married woman whose husband consents or connives to the sexual
intercourse, it will not be an offence of adultery and therefore, section 497,
IPC will not be attracted.
It is to be notes that the aggrieved party in the offence of adultery is the husband
whose wife has consented to have sexual intercourse with some other person
than her own husband. Section 198(1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure,
1908, specifically provides that no person other than the husband of the
woman shall be deemed to be aggrieved by an offence of adultery under
Section 497 or Section 498 of IPC, provided that in the absence of the
husband, some person who had care of the woman on behalf of the aggrieved
husband with leave of the court, make a complaint against the accused. But
the consenting woman ( wife of the aggrieved husband) cannot be made a co-
accused in the case.
The offence of adultery not being a continuing offence, continuous indulgence
adulterous intercourse would be liable to a second conviction for the fresh
act.
Thus every fresh act of adultery would entail fresh conviction of the accused.
It has been expressly provided in Section 497 tht the woman who is a party
to the offence of adultery will not be prosecuted as an abettor or a co-
accused because the law considers her as a victim and not as an author of
the crime.
In adultery the wife is treated as a property of her husband and provide new
dimension adding to it “by making not only the trespasser but the property
also liable to punishment.
Punishment According to IPC: shall be punished with imprisonment of either
description for a term which may extend to five years, or with fine, or with
both. In such case the wife shall not be punishable as an abettor.
Constitutional validity of Section 497, IPC: A historical review of the law relating
to adultery in India would reveal tht when Lord Macaulay prepared the first
draft if IPC in 1837, adultery was very must recognised as a crime in England
and France, yet he chose to keep adultery out of his draft because of the
polygamy then prevalent among Hindus and Muslims in Indian.
It is rather surprising that this British legacy remained till very recently even after
the constitutionality of the discriminatory provision of Section 497 on
adultery was challenged successively before the supreme Court by both sides
of the gender.
Recent Developments in the offence Adultery:
Because of this problematic interpretation, the Supreme Court in December
2017 decided to accept the public interest litigation in which it has been
prayed that the Court strikes down or completely does away with Section 497
of the Indian Penal Code entirely.
It has been argued that the section violates two articles of the Constitution of
India- Article 14 and Article 15.
Article 14 reads as follows: "The State shall not deny to any person equality
before the law or the equal protection of the laws within the territory of India.”
Article 15 reads as follows: "The State shall not discriminate against any citizen
on grounds only of religion, race, caste, sex, place of birth or any of them."
On accepting this petition, the Court felt that laws are supposed to be gender
neutral. However, in this case, it merely makes the woman a victim and thus
"creates a dent on the individual independent identity of the woman.“
It further argues that if the petition is allowed, then "adulterous relations will
have more free play than now." As an alternative, it provides that the
recommendations of the Committee on Reforms of Criminal Justice System
(2003) be implemented. This committee recommended that the wording of
the section be changed to: "Whoever has sexual intercourse with the spouse of
any other person is guilty of adultery..." to tackle the problem of gender bias
which arises from the reading of the current section.
The land mark judgment was delivered by the Supreme Court in the case Joseph
Shine v. Union of India, 2018, wherein in October 2017, Joseph Shine, a non-
resident Keralite, filed public interest litigation under Article 32 of the
Constitution. The petition challenged the constitutionality of the offence of
adultery under Section 497 of the IPC read with Section 198(2) of the Cr.PC.
Section 497 IPC criminalised adultery by imposing culpability on a man who
engages in sexual intercourse with another person’s wife. Adultery was
punishable with a maximum imprisonment of five years. Women, including
consenting parties, were exempted from prosecution. Further, a married
woman could not bring forth a complaint under Section 497 IPC when her
husband engaged in sexual intercourse with an unmarried woman. This was in
view of Section 198(2) of Cr.PC which specified how a complainant can file
charges for offenses committed under Sections 497 and 498 IPC.
A five-judge Constitution bench of the Supreme Court on 27 September 2018
unanimously struck down Section 497 of the Indian Penal Code as being
violative of Articles 14. 15 & 21 of the Constitution.
While reading the judgment, Chief Justice Dipak Misra said, "adultery cannot be
a criminal offence under IPC," however it can be a ground for civil issues like
divorce.
The next offence relating to marriage is :
Section 498: Enticing or taking away or detaining with criminal intent a married
woman: Whoever takes or entices away any woman who is and whom he
knows or has reason to believe to be the wife of any other man, from that
man, or from any person having the care of her on behalf of that man, with
intent that she may have illicit intercourse with any person, or conceals or
detains with that intent any such woman, shall be punished with imprisonment
of either description for a term which may extent to two year.
Cruelty by Husband or Relatives of Husband
Question: Write note on cruelty by husband and his relatives.
Section 498-A: Husband or relatives of a husband of a woman subjecting her to
cruelty: Whoever, being the husband or the relative of the husband of a
Woman, subjects such woman to cruelty shall be punished with imprisonment
for a term which may extend to three years and shall also be liable to fine.
Explanation- For the purpose of this Section, “cruelty” means :
(a) Any wilful conduct which is of such a nature as is likely to drive the woman to
commit suicide or to cause grave injury or danger to life, limb or health,
whether mental or physical of the woman; or
(b) Harassment of the woman where such harassment is with a view to coercing
her or any person related to her to meet any unlawful demand for any
property or valuable security or is on account of failure by her or any person
related to her to meet such demand.
This section has been added to the Indian Penal Code by the Criminal law
(Amendment) Act, 1983 with a view to punishing the husband and his
relatives who harass or torture the wife to coerce her or her relatives to
satisfy unlawful demands of dowry. The section therefore, deals with cruelty
against woman within the institution of marriage.
As a consequential change , Section 304-B was added to the IPC and Section
113-B was inserted in the Evidence Act, 1872, wherein it was provided that if
it was shown soon before the death of a woman, that she was subjected to
cruelty or harassment by her husband or his relatives for the demand of
dowry, then it will be presumed that the person or persons who harassed
the woman had caused her death. In other words, it will be presumed to be
a’ dowry death'. similarly, Section 174 of the Code of Criminal Procedure
1973 was also amended making inquest by executive Magistrate mandatory
in case of suicide or suspicious death of a woman within seven years of her
marriage.
Despite the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961 and Amendment in it in 1987 providing
for a more stringent punishment, the menace of dowry demands and dowry
deaths persists unabated. In mist of the dowry cases the Courts are often
confronted with the problem of establishing the exact cause of death. The
problem becomes more acute when husband and wife are alone in the
house and wife’s unnatural death takes place. In the absence of conclusive
Evidence, the husband and /or his relatives invariably get acquitted on benefit of
doubt.
The insertion of new Section 498-A in IPC and consequential amendments in the
law of evidence and criminal procedure have solved the problem to a
considerable extent.
The Supreme Court in Sushil Kuman Sharma v. Union of India,2005, held that
the object of Section 488-A of the IPC, is to get to the root of dowry menace
and its unleashing will led to a legal terrorism. The provision of this section is
to be used as a shield and not as an assassin’s weapon. The legislature has
by inserting this provision in Penal Code and amendment in Evidence Act,
made penal law more stringent for dealing with and punishing offences
against married woman.
Cruelty is a continuing offence:
Since the law recognises cruelty as a continuing offence, every act of cruelty
would give rise to a fresh offence of cruelty for the purpose of Limitation
Under Section 468 , Cr.p.c.
Interrelationship between Section 498-A and 304-B of IPC
Section 498-A deals with cruelty to a woman by her husband or his relatives
which drives her to commit suicide or physical or mental injury whereas
section 304-B deals with dowry deaths. Thus , Section 498-A relates to
cruelty alone which section 304-B deals with actual death.
Section 304-B only deals with those dowry deaths which occur within seven
years of marriage but no such period d is stipulated in case of cruelty under
section 498-A.
A person charged under Section 304-B but acquitted, can be convicted under
Section 498-A of IPC.
In Shyamla v. State of Haryana, 1997, the prosecution could only prove the fact
that there was a dispute between parties regarding dowry and that the wife
was sent back to her parental him and she came back to her matrimonial
home after the ‘panchayat’ intervened about 10-15 days before she died.
There was no evidence that she was treated with cruelty or harassed with dowry
demand . The Supreme Court held that the accused was liable to be
convicted under Section 498-A on the basis of evidence of the father of the
deceased and her dying declaration, but Section 304-B would not apply in
this case.
Defamation
Questions: 1. Explain defamation? Explain its ingredients.
2. Explain Defamation state the exceptions.
Section 499: Defamation: Whoever, by words either spoken by words either
spoken or intended to be read, or by signs or by visible representations, making
or publishes any imputation concerning any person intending to harm, the
reputation of such person , is said, except in the cases hereinafter excepted, to
defame that person.
Explanation-1 It may amount to defamation to impute anything to a deceased
person, of the imputation would harm the reputation of that person if living, and
is intended to be hurtful to the feelings of his family .
Explanation 2- It may amount to defamation to make an imputation concerning a
company or an association or collection of person as such.
Explanation 3 -An imputation in the form of an alternative or expressed ironically,
may amount to defamation.
Explanation 4- No imputation is said to harm a person's reputation unless that
imputation directly or indirectly, in the estimation of others, lowers the moral
or intellectual character of that person, or lowers the credit of that person, or
causes it to be believed that the body of that person is in loathsome state, or
in a state generally considers as disgraceful.
Illustrations: 1. A says-”Z is an honest man, he never stole B’s watch”. Intending
to cause it to be believed that Z did steal B’s watch. This is defamation, unless
it falls within one of the exceptions.
2. A is asked who stole B’s watch. A points to Z, intending to cause it to be
believed that Z stole B’s watch. This is defamation unless it falls within one of
the exceptions.
A draws a picture of Z running away with B’s watch, intending it to be believed
3. that Z stole B’s watch. This is defamation, unless it falls within one of the
exceptions.
First Exception – Imputation of truth which public good requires to be made or
published- It is not defamation to impute anything which is true concerning any
person, if it be for the public good that the imputation should be made or
published. Whether or not it is for the public good is a question of fact.
Second Exception- Public conduct of public servants- It is not defamation to
express in good faith any opinion whatever respecting the conduct of a public
servant in the discharge of his public functions, or respecting his character
appears in that conduct and no further.
Third Exception- Conduct of any person touching any public question-It is not
defamation to express in good faith any opinion whatever respecting the conduct
of any person touching any public question, and respecting his character appear
in that conduct and no further.
Illustration: It is not defamation in A to express in good faith any opinion
whatever respecting Z’s conduct in petitioning Government on a public
Illustration: It is not defamation in A to express in good faith any opinion whatever respecting
Z’s conduct in petitioning Government on a public question, in signing a requisition for a
meeting on a public question, in presiding or attending at such voting or canvassing from
a particular candidate for any situation in the efficient discharge of the duties of which the
public is interested.
Fourth Exception: Publication of reports of proceedings of Courts- It is not defamation to
publish a substantially true report of the proceedings of a Court of Justice, or of the result
of any such proceedings.
Explanation - A justice of the Peace or other officer holding an enquiry in open Court
preliminary to a trial in A Court of Justice, is a Court within the meaning of the above
section,
Fifth Exception: Merits of case decided in Court or conduct of witnesses and others
concerned- It is not, defamation to express in good faith any opinion whatever respecting
the merits of any case, civil or criminal, which has been decided by a Court of Justice, or
respecting the conduct of any person as a party, witness or agent, in any such case, or
respecting the character of such person, as far as his character appears in that conduct,
and no further.
Illustrations: (a) A says-”I think Z’s evidence on that trial is so contradictory that he must
be stupid or dishonest”. A is within this exception if he says this in good faith, in as much as the
opinion which he expresses respects Z’s character as it appears to Z’s conduct as a witness.
(b) But if says-”I do not believe what Z asserted at that trial because I know him to be a man
without veracity.” a is not within this exception, in as must as the opinion which he
expresses of Z’s character, is an opinion not founded on Z’s conduct as a witness.
(c) Sixth exception- Merits of public performance: It is not defamation to express in good faith
any opinion respecting the merits of any performance which its author has submitted to
the judgement of the public or respecting the character of the author so far as his
character appears in such submixing to the judgment of the public.
Explanation – A performance may be submitted to the judgment of the public expressly or by
acts on the part of the author which imply such submission to the judgment of the public.
Illustrations: (a) a person who published a book, submits that book to the judgment of the
public.
(b) a person who makes a speech, in public, submits that speech to the judgment of the public.
(c) an actor or singer who spears on a public stage, submits his acting or singing
to the judgment of the public.
(d) A says of a book published by Z – “Z must be a weak man. Z’s book is
indecent; Z must be a man of impure mind”. A is within the exception, if he
says in good faith, in as must as the opinion which he express of Z in respects
Z’s character only so far as it appears in Z’s book, and no further.
(e) But if A says- “I am not surprised tht Z’s book is foolish and indecent, for he is
a weak man and a libertine”. A is not within the exception, inasmuch as the
opinion which he expresses of Z’s character is an opinion not founded on Z’s
book.
Seventh Exception- Censure passed in good faith by person having lawful
authority over another- It is not defamation in a person having over another any
authority, either conferred by a law or arising out of a lawful contract made with
that other, to pass in good faith any censure on the conduct of that other in
matters to which such lawful authority relates.
A Judge censuring in good faith the conduct of a witness or of any officer of the
Court; a head of the department censuring in good faith those who are
under his order: a parent censuring in good faith of a child in the presence
of other children: a school master, whose authority is derived from a parent,
censuring in good faith a pupil in the presence of other pupils: a master
censuring a servant in good faith for remissness in service: a banker
censuring in food faith the cashier of his bank for the conduct of such
cashier as such cashier – are within this exception.
Eighth exception: Accusation preferred in good faith to authorised person: It is
not defamation to prefer in good faith an accusation against any person to
any of those who have lawful authority over that Person with respect to the
subject-matter of accusation.
Illustrations: if A in good faith accused Z before a Magistrate: If A in good faith
complains of the conduct of Z, a servant, to Z’s master: if a in good faith
complains of the conduct of Z, a child, to Z’s father –A is within this
exception.
Ninth Exception- Imputation made in good faith by person for protection of his
or there’s interests-It is not defamation to make an imputation on the
character of another provided that the imputation be made in good faith for
the protection of the interest of the person making it, or of any other person,
or for the public good.
Illustrations: (a) A, a shopkeeper, says to B, who manages his business -”Sell
nothing to Z unless he pays you ready money, for I have no opinion of his
honesty”. A is within the exception, if he has made this imputation on Z in
good faith for the protection of his own interests.
(b) A , a Magistrate, in making a report to his own superior officer, castes an
imputation on the character of Z, Here, if the imputation is made on good
faith, and for the public good, A is within the exception.
Tenth Exception: Causation intended for good of person to whom conveyed or
for public good- It is not defamation to convey a caution, in good faith, to one
person against another, provided that such causation be intended for the good
of the person to whom it is conveyed, or of some person in whom that person is
Interested, or for the public good.
Defamation is both a crime as well as civil wrong. Under the English
law, spoken words do not amount to a crime, but under the Indian Penal
code, there is no distinction between spoken and written defamation, which
is called slander and libel respectively and both are actionable as a civil
wrong ad also as an offence under Section 499, IPC. However, before the
enactment of the Indian Penal code, defamation was merely a civil wrong.
The main ingredients of the offence of defamation are:
(1) Making or publishing any imputation concerning any person;
(2) Such imputation must have been made but:
(a) words, either spoken or written and intended to be read, or by signs; or
(b) visible representation;
(3) Such imputation must have been made with the intention of harming or
with knowledge or reason to believe tht it will harm the reputation for the
person concerned.
The term ‘reputation’ in general means opinion of others about a person, that is
estimation in which a person is held by others. A person’s own reputation
about himself in not his reputation.
Explanation 4 of section 499 further elaborates the concept of defamation as an
offence.
1. Makes or publishes any imputation: the word makes used in the definition
includes composing, dictating , writing or contributing in other way, to then
making of a defamatory imputation similarly, the word publishes denotes
bringing to the knowledge of a third person other than the person defaming
and the person so defamed. It means communicating the defamatory matter
to any other person than the person who is intended to be defamed.
2. Privileged communication: a privileged communication between husband
and wife or a lawyer and his client is not a publication and therefore it will
not incur criminal liability under sections 499/500 , IPC. Again ,
communication of an official entry in a confidential report of a superior
officer through the official channel will not amount to publication an therefore it
is not a defamation.
Advocates as a class are incapable of being defamed and therefore a general
statement that ‘all lawyers are liars’ is no defamation, but where referring to
a particular lawyer it is said that ”all lawyers are liars and you being a lawyer
are also liar”, it would certainly be capable of defamation under Section 499,
IPC.
Innuendo: there may be a statement which does not refer to the complainant
directly, but he alleges that in fact he was the real target of attack is when
referred to him carried a defamatory meaning. Thus, innuendo is a specific
kind of defamation.
In Sahib Singh v. State of UP, 1965, the editor of a newspaper ‘ Kaliyug’published
a article alleging that the public prosecutors and Assistant Public prosecutors
of UP, were openly taking bribe from both the parties. Aggrieved by this
publication, the public prosecutors and Assistant Public prosecutors of Algarh
filed a complainant against the accused editor with sanction of the State
Government. The accused took the plea that complaints against a group does
not constitute the “person” referred to in section 499. but rejecting the plea
the Court held that the editor should take care before publishing anything
which trends to harm the reputation of a person and avoid reckless
defamatory comments. The Court found that the article challenged was
without any justification and was published with an ulterior motive,
therefore, it was not excusable under explanation 3 of section 499, IPC and
the accused was held guilty of the offence of defamation.
Punishment for defamation: According to section 500, Whoever defames
another shall be punishable with simple imprisonment for a term which
may extend to two years , with or without fine.
Chapter: Criminal intimidation, Insult and Annoyance
Question: Write a short notes on criminal intimidation.
Section 503: Criminal intimidation: Whoever threatens another with any injury
to his person, reputation or property, or to the person or reputation of any
one in whom that person is interested, with intent to cause alarm to that
person, or to cause that person to do any act which he is not legally bound
to do, or to omit to do any act which that person is legally entitled to do, as
the means of avoiding the execution of such threat commits criminal
intimation.
Explanation: A threat to injure the reputation of any deceased person in whom
the person threatened is interested, is within this section.
Illustration: A, for the purpose of inducing B to desist from prosecuting a civil
suit, threatens to burn B’s house. A is guilty of criminal intimidation.
Section 503 defines the offence of criminal intimidation whereas punishment for
the offence is prescribed in Section 506, IPC. Section 507 and 508 deal with
Punishment for aggravated forms of criminal intimidation may briefly be stated
as follows:
1. Threatening a person with injury to his person, reputation or property or to
the person or reputation of any one in whom that person is interested; and
2. The threat must be with the intention:
(i) to cause alarm to that person; or
(ii) to cause that person to do any act which he is not legally bound to do; or
(iii) to cause a person to omit to do any act which that person is legally
entitled to do as the means of avoiding the execution of that threat.
Threatening a perjson of taking revenge will be an offence under this section.
Thus in Purshottam Vanmali v. Emperor, the Sub-inspector of Police sent a
constable to bring some persons from whom he wanted to gather
information about a certain offence. While the constable was bringing two
persons with him the accused intervened and threatened the constable,
with the result, the two persons refused to accompany the constable who
had to return to police station without those persons. The accused was held
guilty of criminal intimidation under Section 503, IPC.
Where a person threatens another to commit suicide, it would no be an offence
of criminal intimidation unless the person to whom the threat is given has an
interest in the person giving the threat.
Difference between Criminal Intimidation and Extortion(Section 503 and 383, IPC)
Though there is similarity between criminal intimidation and extortion, they differ
in the following aspects:
(1) The main object of extortion is to obtain money or money’s worth by putting
a person in the instant threat of danger to life or injury but the purpose of
criminal intimidation is to induce the person threatened to do or refrain from
doing something he is not legally bound to do or omit.
(2) In extortion, the threat is addressed directly to the victim who is present
before the offender but criminal intimidation need not be directly addressed
to the perjson intended to be threatened.
(3) In criminal intimidation the threat need not have actually produced the
desired result, but still the person intimidating will be laible for the offence.
It is not so in case of extortion.
(4) The delivery of the property is the essence of the offence of extortion,
whereas there is no delivery of property by the victim to the accused in
criminal intimidation.
(5) The offence of criminal intimidation which is punishable under Section 506 is
non-cognizable, bailable and punishable with imprisonment up to 2 years,
whereas the offence of extortion under section 383 is cognizable and
punishable with imprisonment up to three years. It is therefore, evidence that
the offence of extortion is graver than that of criminal intimidation.
Section 504: Intentional insult with intent to provoke breach of the peace:
Whoever intentionally insults, and thereby gives provocation to any person,
intending or knowing it to be likely that such provocation will cause him to
break the public peace, or to commit any other offence, shall be punishable
with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to two
years, with or without fine.
An analysis of the provision contained in this Section, indicates that it comprises,
the following ingredients , namely
(a) intentional insult;
(b) Such insult should be such as to give provocation to the person insulted, and
(c) The accused must intend or know that such provocation would cause
another to break the public peace or to commit any other offence.
Thus one of the essential elements constituting the offence under Section 504 is
that there should have been an act or conduct amounting to intentional
insult and the mere fact that the accused abused the complainant, as such,
is not sufficient by itself to warrant a conviction under this section.
A person may be insulted by use of vulgar and abusive words or by conduct.
When such insult provokes breach of peace, the provision of the section is
attracted. But it should be intentional or with knowledge of the accused that
breach of peace is likely to result out of such insults.
The court held in one of the cases that the term insult means to treat with
Offensive disrespect or offer indignity to the person so insulted.
The use of obscene abusive words by the landlord to his woman tenant at the
water-tap to constitute the offence under this section. Similarly, use of
abusive and insulting words like harmazad, sooar, badmash, sala etc, were
held to be sufficient to provoke the person who was targeted to cause
breach of peace in public and therefore, punishable under Section 504, IPC.
Distinction between Defamation (section 499) and Insult(Section 504)
The main difference between the two offences is that ‘insult’ is directly
addressed to the person who is insulted but defamatory statement is
referred to a person other than the person defamed.
Where a defamatory statement is straightway addressed to the person
defamed, it will not be an offence of defamation but may amount to the
offence of insult. Secondly, likelihood of the breach of peace is an essential
requirement for the offence of insult under Section 504 but defamation does
Thirdly, insult under Section 504 is punishable with imprisonment, which may be
either rigorous or simple, but defamation is punishable only with simple
imprisonment and does not provide for rigorous imprisonment.
Fourthly, the offence of insult is triable by any Magistrate but the offence of
defamation is triable by Court of Session and not by any a Magistrate.
Section 505. Statements conducing to public mischief:
1. Whoever makes, publishes or circulates any statement, rumour or report:
(a) with intent to cause, or which is likely to cause, any officer, soldier, sailor or
airman in the army, Navy or Airforce of India to mutiny or otherwise disregards
or fail in his duty as such; or
(b) with intent to cause, or which is likely to cause, fear or alarm to the public, or
to a any section of the public whereby any person may be induced to commit an
offence against the State or against the public tranquillity; or
(c ) with intent to incite, or which is likely to incite, any class or community of
persons to commit any offence against any other class or community:
Shall be punished with imprisonment which may extend to three years with or
without fine.
(2) Statements creating or promoting enmity, hatred or ill-will between classes:
whoever makes, publishes, or circulates any statement or report containing
rumour or alarming news with intent to create or promote, or which is likely
to create or promote, on grounds of religion, race place of birth, residence,
language, caste or community or any other ground whatsoever, feeling or
enmity, hatred or ill-will between different religious, racial, language or
regional groups or castes or communities, shall be punished with
imprisonment which may extend to three years.
(3) offence under sub-section (2) committed in place of worship etc: Whoever
commits an offence specified in sub-section (2) in any place of worship or in
an assembly engaged in the performance of religious worship or religious
ceremonies, shall be punished with imprisonment which may extend to five
years and shall also be liable to fine.
Exception: It does not amount to an offence, within the meaning of this section,
when the person making, publishing or circulating any such statement, rumour or
report, has reasonable grounds for believing that such statement, rumour or
report is true and makes, publishes or circulates it in good faith and without
intent as aforesaid.
Section 506: Punishment for criminal intimidation: Whoever commits, the
offence of criminal intimidation shall be punished with death or imprisonment
for life, or with imprisonment for a term which may extend to seven years, or
to impute, unchastity to a woman, shall be punished with imprisonment of
either description for a term which may extend to seven years, or with fine, or
with both.
In State of Himachal Pradesh v. Prem Singh, 2009, the accused was a teacher
who allegedly had sexually ravished the prosecutrix and had outraged the
modesty of not only the prosecutrix but several other girl students of the
school. However, the case of rape on prosecutrix could not be established for
want of sufficient evidence but the court converted the offence of the accused
into sections 354/506, IPC and sentenced him to two years and six months
imprisonment.
Section 507: Criminal intimidation by an anonymous communication: Whoever
commits the offence of criminal intimidation by an anonymous
communication, or having taken precaution to conceal the name or abode of
the person from whom the threat comes, shall be punished with
imprisonment of either description for a term which ay extend to two years,
in addition to punishment provided for the offence by the last proceeding
section.
Criminal intimidation by anonymous communication such as by unnamed letter,
telephonic conversation, mobile or e-mail being a common occurrence, it has
been made a specific separate offence under this section of the IPC.
According to Section 508, where a person by his act induces a person to believe
that he will be rendered an object of Divine displeasure, if he does not do the
thing which the offender wants to cause him to do, or if he does the thing
which the offender wants him to omit to do, he shall be punishable under this
section. To cite, an illustration: A sits dharna at Z’s door with the intention of
causing it to be believed that, by sitting, he renders Z, an object of Divine
Section 509: Word, gesture or act intended to insult the modesty of a woman:
Whoever, intending to insult the modesty of any woman, utters any word,
makes any sound or gesture, or exhibits any object, intending that such word
or sound shall be herd, or that such gesture or object shall be seen, by such
woman, or intrudes upon the privacy of such woman shall be punished with
simple imprisonment for a term which may extend to three years, and also
with fine.
In Rupan Deol Bajaj v. K.P.S Gill, D. G. Police, Punjab, 1996, the accused Gill, D.
G. Police, Punjab was held guilty of offence under Sections 354/509 for
slapping I.A.S officer Mrs. Rupan Deol Bajaj on her posterior in a party. His
act was held to be affront to the dignity of a lady and it amounted to
outraging the modesty of Mrs. Bajaj.
Section 510: Misconduct in public by a drunken person: Whoever, in a state of
intoxication, appears in any public place, or in any place which it is a trespass
in him to enter, and there conducts himself in such a manner as to cause
annoyance to any person, shall be punished with simple imprisonment for a
term which may extend to twenty-four hours, or with fine.
This section penalises a person for his misconduct or act of trespass while he is
a drunken state. Thus, if a drunken person commits any act of nuisance in a
public place, he would be punished under this section. Public roads,
educational or professional institutions, public market, railway bogie, bus
stand, public part or library etc. are some of the examples of public places.
It is to be noted that this section does not punish mere being in a state
of intoxication or drunkenness.one more noteworthy feature of the offence
under this section is that no ‘mens rea’ is required to commit this offence.
Chapter: attempts to commit offences
Questions: 1. State the law relating to preparation and attempt to commit
offence.
2. Write a note on attempt to commit offences.
Section 511: Punishments for attempting to commit offences punishable with
imprisonment for life or other imprisonment: Whoever attempts to commit an
offence punishable by this code with imprisonment for life or imprisonment, or
to cause such an offence to be committed, and in such attempt does any act
towards the commission of the offence, shall, where no express provision is
made by this Code for the punishment of such attempt, be punished with
imprisonment for any description provided for the offence, for a term which
may extend to one-half of the imprisonment for life or, as the case may be, one-
half of the longest term of imprisonment for life or, as the case may be, one-half
of the longest term of imprisonment provided for that offence, or with such fine
as is provided for the offence, or with both.
Illustrations: (a) A makes an attempt to steal some jewels by breaking open a
box, and finds after so opening the box, that there is no jewel in it. He has
done an act towards the commission of theft, and therefore is guilty under
this section.
(b) A makes an attempt to pick the pocket of Z by thrusting his hand into Z’s
pocket. A fails in the attempt in consequences of Z’s having nothing in his
pocket. A is guilty under this section.
Before dealing with the scope and extent of the offence under this section, it
must be understood that commission of a crime involves four main stages:
1. Motive or intention;
2. Preparation;
3. Attempt; and
4. Commission of criminal act.
Mere intention to commit a crime is no offence unless is followed by an overt
act or commission. That being so, though intention alone is not punishable
the penal law, but it is equally true that there cannot be an offence without
mens rea, which is one of the essential pre-requisites for a crime.
‘Preparation’ is the next stage of a crime. Having formed the intention to
commit a particular crime, the offender moves ahead to prepare for the
commission for that offence. Preparation essentially involves arranging for
means and measure necessary for the contemplated offence. As a general
rue, preparation for committing a crime is not punishable. However, there
are four exceptions where ‘Preparation by itself is punishable offence under
The Indian Penal Code. They re:
1. Collecting arms etc., with intention of waging war against the Government of
India(Section 122, IPC)
2. Committing depredation on territories of Power at peace with the
Government of Indian(Section 126, IPC).
3. Making, selling or possessing instrument or material for counterfeiting
coins(Sections 233, 234 and 235, 256,257, IPC).
4. Making preparation to commit dacoity(section399, IPC);
5. Making or possessing counter seals etc., (Sections 472, 473, 474, 475 and
476);
6. Making or possessing instruments for counterfeiting (sections 485, 486).
The third stage of an offence is attempt to commit the same. The offender
proceeds ahead to attempt a crime after making necessary preparation for it. In
fact, attempt is a step ahead towards commission of an intended offence.
As Sir James Stephen rightly observed “attempt to commit a crime is an act
done with intent to commit that crime, and forming part of series of acts, which
would constitute its actual commission, if it were not interrupted”.
Thus, attempt is an act which a person does, towards the commission of the
intended offence, but for being hindered by circumstances beyond his control.
The distinction between preparation and attempt may be illustrated by a simple
example. Where a person purchases a gun and loads it with the intention of
shooting his enemy, it is the stage of preparation for which he incurs no criminal
culpability, but if he moves towards his enemy and chases him with the
loaded gun in his possession, and is arrested before the act of shooting, he
would be liable for attempt to murder his enemy. However, if he succeeds in
the act of shooting, he will be guilty of having committed the offence of
murder.
The Supreme Court, in Koppula Venket Rao v. State of Andhra Pradesh, 2004 ,
held tht a solitary Section 511 included in Chapter XXIII that is the last
chapter) captioned of attempts to commit offences under IPC make attempt
to commit an offence punishable.
According to this section, attempt to commit only the offences which are
punishable with life-imprisonment or other imprisonment are punishable
under this provision. This means that this section is not applicable to
attempt to commit an offence which is punishable with death or an offence
which is punishable only with fine. One-half of the imprisonment for life, for
the purpose of this section would be imprisonment for 10 years by virtue of
The provisions as to ‘attempt’ as an offence under the Indian Penal Code may
broadly be place in three categories as follows:
1. The offences for which punishment has been provided along with attempt to
commit them in the same section.
2. the offence the attempt of which is made punishable under a separate
independent section keeping in view the gravity of these offences.
They are :
(i) Attempt to murder (Section 307)
(ii) Attempt to commit culpable homicide (Section 308)
(iii) Attempt to commit suicide(Section 309) Now it stand repealed,
(iv) Attempt to commit robbery(Section 393); and
(v) Attempt to commit robbery or dacoity when armed with deadly
weapon(Section 398)
3. Attempt to commit any of the offences for which there is no separate
provision under Penal Code, is made punishable under Section 511 of IPC.
The Supreme Court in Aman Kumar v. State of Haryana ,1862 observed that
attempt to commit an offence is a stage subsequent to preparation of that
offence . Collecting or making available means or materials for committing
the offence generally constitutes ‘preparation 'for that crime whereas
attempt is a stage next to preparation wherein some effort is made to
transform that offence into action.
Tests for distinguishing preparation from attempt
Though it has been generally accepted that whether a particular act is
preparation to a crime circumstances of each case, certain guiding principles
have been evolved to decide the complex issue. They are as follows:
1. The proximity rule.
2. Doctrine of locus poenitentiae.
3. The equivocality Test.
(1) Proximity Rule - where the accused has completed services of act for the
accomplishment of he intended crime except the final contemplated result,
then it would be said that he has attempted to commit that crime. Thus, an
act or services of acts done by the accused are considered proximate, to the
ultimate commission of the crime.
(2) Doctrine of Locus poenitentiae – In many case a person having made all
preparations to commit an offence, backs out and drops the idea of
committing it any further due to call for conscience (change of heart),
compulsion, fear and apprehension of being watched etc. Thus where the
person on his own accord abandons the idea of committing a crime before
any act in furtherance thereof is called out, it will amount only to
preparation and not attempt.
(3) The essence of the doctrine of locus poenitentiae as a test for determining
whether the offence(act) constituted an attempt or preparation lies in the
fact whether the overt act already done were such that if the offender
changed his mind and decided not to proceed further with the act, the acts
already done would be completely harmless. If it is some it will account to only
preparation for that offence and not the attempt.
3. The Equivocality test – While the locus poenitentiae test is founded on the
presumption of ‘no attempt’ the equivocality test is based on the
presumption that offence of attempt to commit a crime is deemed to have
been committed if the act or acts unequivocally indicate the intention of the
perpetrator to accomplish the criminal object that is, the intended crime.
This, in other words, means that if the act done by the accused indicates
beyond reasonable doubt that the end towards which it is directed, it will be
an attempt, otherwise it will be a mere preparation.
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