Socratic Piety In The Euthyphro

Mark L. McPherran

Journal of the History of Philosophy, Volume 23, Number 3, July 1985, pp.
283-309 (Article)

Published by Johns Hopkins University Press

DOI: https://doi.org/10.1353/hph.1985.0060

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 Socratic Piety
In The Euthyphro
MARK L. M c P H E R R A N

A PERSISTENT AND MUCH DEBATED issue i n t h e i n t e r p r e t a t i o n o f t h e Euthyphro

is w h e t h e r t h e d i a l o g u e is m e r e l y a peirastic i n q u i r y o r a s o u r c e o f positive
Socratic d o c t r i n e o n t h e n a t u r e o f p i e t y . ' T h e m a j o r i t y o f c o m m e n t o r s f a v o r
t h e l a t t e r view a n d h a v e p r o d u c e d v a r i o u s r e c o n s t r u c t i o n s o f t h e positive
Socratic d o c t r i n e o f p i e t y t h e y f i n d i m p l i c i t i n t h e text f o l l o w i n g t h e " a p o -
retic i n t e r l u d e " (Eu. i I b - e ) . ~ A few p r o m i n e n t scholars h a v e r a i s e d objec-

I wish to thank the National Endowment for the Humanities and all my fellow seminar
members in the 1983 NEH Summer Seminar on the philosophy of Socrates for providing me
with the stimulating environment in which this paper was written. I am particularly indebted to
the director of the seminar, Gregory Vlastos, for his comments on an earlier draft of this paper.
I also wish to extend my gratitude to my colleague, Charles Chiasson, and an anonymous
referee for the Journal of the History of Philosophy for their constructive criticisms of earlier
versions of my paper.
See W. G. Rabinowitz, "Platonic Piety: An Essay Toward the Solution of an Enigma,"
Phronesis 2 (1958): 112-14 (hereafter cited as "Platonic Piety"), for a partial history of this issue,
the discussion of which extends from ThrasyUus of Alexandria to a recent article by C. C. W.
Taylor, "The End of the Euthyphro," Phronesis 2 0982): 1o9-18 (hereafter cited as "The End").
Among the constructivists are J. Adam, Platonis Euthyphro (Cambridge, 19o2); H. Bonitz,
Platonische Studien (Berlin, t866): 233-34; T. Brickhouse and N. Smith, "The Origin of Soc-
rates' Mission," Journal of the History of Ideas 4 (1983): 657 -66 (hereafter cited as "Socrates'
Mission"); J. Burnet, Plato's Euthyphro, Apology of Socrates and Crito (Oxford, x924), 82-142
(hereafter cited as 'Plato's Euthyphro'); P. Friedl~inder, Plato, 3 vols. (New York, z964), 2: 82-91;
W. A. Heidel "On Plato's Euthyphro," TAPA 31 (19oo): 173ff.; T. Irwin, Plato's Moral Theory
(Oxford, 1977), 1--131; B. Jowett, The Dialogues of Plato, 4 vols. (Oxford, 1953), l: 3o3-o8;
Rabinowitz, "Platonic Piety"; P. Shorey, What Plato Said (Chicago, ~933), 74-8o; A. E. Taylor,
Plato, the Man and His Work (New York, 1927), 146-56; C. C. W. Taylor, "The End"; and G.
Vlastos, "The Unity of the Virtues in the Protagoras," in Platonic Studies (Princeton, 1981): 221-
69 and 427-45 (hereafter cited as "Unity"). For further references, see Rabinowitz, "Platonic
Piety," 113, n. 4, and L. Versenyi, Holiness and Justice: An Interpretation of Plato's Euthyphro
(Washington, D.C., 1982): 111, n. 4 (hereafter cited as "Holiness").

[283]
284 J O U R N A L OF THE HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY 2 3 : 3 JULY 1 9 8 5

tions to this constructivist approach. ~ R. E. Allen, for instance, taking the

Socratic profession of ignorance to heart, holds that the Euthyphro "bears its
meaning on its face," and that (hence) it neither states nor implies a defini-
tion of piety. 4 Lazlo Versenyi, another anticonstructivist, argues more co-
gently that no definition of piety involving reference to the gods may be
culled from the dialogue's explicit statements (contra all the constructivists),
and that in fact, the notion of piety towards which Socrates is directing
Euthyphro is a thoroughly secular one, identical to the whole of virtue)
It seems to me that the anticonstructivists are wrong, and that most of the
interpretations the constructivists have offered involve the mistaken use of
textual references which do not plausibly bear on the views of the historical
Socrates, 6 and/or do not do justice to a reasonable understanding of Soc-
rates' profession of ignorance, his claims to be pursuing a god-ordered work,
and the evidence of his somewhat traditional religious practices and beliefs.
In the following, I argue for a cautiously constructive view of Socratic piety
derived from the Euthyphro, which is consonant with a reasonable conception
of the historic Socrates.

1.

Following the aporetic interlude of the Euthyphro, Socrates offers to aid

(ov~t~xQo0vlx~oolxctt) Euthyphro in the search for a definition of piety (6otog;
Eu. 11e3-5). 7 Socrates initiates this assistance by raising the question of
whether justice and piety are coextensive concepts (such that all and only

See, e.g., R. E. Allen, Plato's Euthyphro and the Early Theory of Forms (New York, 197o )
(hereafter cited as " T h e Early Theory"); J. Beckman, The Religious Dimension of Socrates' Thought
(Waterloo, 1979) (hereafter cited as "The Religious Dimension"); G. Grote, Plato and Other
Companions of Socrates, 4 vols., (London, 1888), 1: 437-57; and Versenyi, "Holiness."
4 " T h e Early Theory," 67; see also 6 - 9. Curiously, Allen nonetheless finds little difficulty in
discovering most of Plato's theory of Forms in a text which is perfectly coherent without such an
attribution (employing, instead of Forms, universals ]abstract qualities]). Those very principles
of interpretation which Allen endorses (9) sanction the constructive claim concerning piety I will
derive from the text. Cf. Versenyi, "Holiness," 16.
5 "Holiness," l o 4 - 3 4 ; cf. Versenyi's other work relevant to this topic, Socratic Humanism
(New Haven, 1963). C. C. W. Taylor, "The End," 117-18, also holds a view which makes piety
identical to the whole of virtue. Beckman, "The Religious Dimension," 51-54, argues in a
m a n n e r similar to Versenyi and Taylor that no definition of piety may be derived from the
explicit statements of the text. Rather, he claims, Socrates argues implicitly that "real" piety is
nothing but the whole of justice, for whose understanding and definition no gods are required.
Irwin, Plato's Moral Theory, 22, seems to hold this view as well.
6 A star instance of this is Heidel, "On Plato's Euthyphro," 174, who defines piety as the
"intelligent and conscious endeavor to further the realization of the [Platonic!] Good in human
society, as u n d e r God," (my brackets).
7 I will assume, as most commentators do, that 6otog and eOoel~g are used synonymously in
the dialogue.
 S O C R A T I C PIETY 28 5

just acts are pious acts) or whether justice is a broader concept than piety
such that piety is a 'part' of justice (so that pious acts are a subset of just acts;
Eu. l le4-a2d5). Subsequent to his careful explanation to Euthyphro of
these alternatives, Socrates secures Euthyphro's free assent to the second
proposition that piety is a part of justice. Socrates' explanation, and his
illustrative use of the relation of odd-numberedness to number (Eu. 12c6-
8), make it clear that both he and Euthyphro accept that as a consequence
there may exist just acts which are neither pious nor impious. 8 With this
established, the search then begins for the characteristic which differentiates
pious justice from the remainder. Although Euthyphro's claim that piety is
the part of justice having to do with our service to the gods (0eQa~e~ct 0e~v;
Eu. 12e5-8 ) is shortly defeated (Eu. l ~ e l - 1 3 d 4 ) , it seems evident that the
proposition only fails on Socrates' view because of the problems ("one little
point"; Eu. 13al ) he raises for Euthyphro's use and interpretation of the
term '0e0aate~a'. Socrates says, for instance (Eu. 12e3-4), that if Euthyphro
identifies for him the part of justice that piety is, he will then be able to
understand adequately (~• what piety is, 9 and after having made this
attempt, he congratulates Euthyphro for having "spoken well" (•
q~o~vn X~yetv; Eu. 12e9). '~ This much, then, seems a Socratically acceptable
claim about piety:
P, Piety is that p a r t o f justice h a v i n g to d o with the relation o f m e n to the gods.

There are many additional reasons for attributing a belief in P, to Soc-

rates. It is Socrates himself who introduces the view that piety is a part of
justice, and claims to do so as an aid to the definitional search (Eu. 1 le3). It
is also significant that Socrates keeps the form of P~'s answer constantly
before Euthyphro for the remainder of the dialogue, H and it remains unre-
futed throughout the dialogue (I do not, however, think that every unrefuted
claim in a Platonic dialogue represents positive doctrine'2). Socrates might
wish to mislead Sophists at such length, but not, one would think, such a
confused soul as Euthyphro. This would seem to be especially true where

8 Cf. Vlastos, "Unity," 231, 435-36, who accepts this interpretation.

9 Vlastos, ibid., 228, n. 17; Rabinowitz, "Platonic Piety," 114.
,o See the Vlastos---Irwin dispute over whether or not this is to be read as an endorsement
of Euthyphro's attempt; Vlastos, "Unity" 434; Irwin, Plato's Moral Theory, 3ol, n. 57.
i, Noted by Rabinowitz, "Platonic Piety," 115.
1, By making this point I am not, then, endorsing the mistaken (I believe) "Bonitz princi-
ple" that whatever remains unrefuted in Platonic text represents positive doctrine; Bonitz,
Platonische Studien, 233-34; cf. Adam, Platonis Euthyphro, xii; Heidel, "On Plato's Euthyphro,"
171. For criticisms of this principle, see R. E. Allen, "The Early Theory," 6; Versenyi, "Holi-
ness," 111, n. 3"
z86 J O U R N A L OF T H E H I S T O R Y OF P H I L O S O P H Y 9 3 : 3 J U L Y 1 9 8 5

there exists a possibility of some harm coming to someone (viz., Euthyphro's

father) if Euthyphro comes to perceive himself to be a victim of mere eris-
tics. In any case, it would be odd to view this section of the dialogue as an
attempt to reduce Euthyphro to a state of aporia, since Euthyphro has al-
ready confessed his confusion in the aporetic interlude/~ Socrates does not
generally pursue trickery for simple enjoyment, and it is hard to see how an
insincere Socratic commitment to P, throughout the dialogue would be of
any pedagogic value. It is of further significance that P~ follows the aporetic
interlude: a familiar feature of Plato's dramatic style is for positive doctrine
to be suggested following such interludes in the discussion (e.g., Protagoras,
Phaedo, Phaedrus, Theatetus). ~4 With all this, then, we have compelling inter-
nal evidence that Socrates finds P~ to be true, though not definitional, of
piety? 5
The attribution of P, to Socrates has further support external to the
Euthyphro. Both P~ and Eu. i e e 5 - 8 make clear that while piety is a form of
justice concerned with the relation of men to the gods, there is another
distinct part of justice concerned with the relation of men to other men. This
division o f justice into two kinds of just relations according to two different
sets of relata is suggested by Crito 54b-c, Laches 199d-e, and especially
Gorgias 5o7a-b, where Socrates asserts that a man doing his duty to men acts
justly and doing his duty to the gods acts piously. '6 Furthermore, Socrates'
division of the virtue wisdom into two sorts, human and divine, suggests that
he would also divide another virtue such as justice into two 'parts' on the
basis of their respective domains of concern: man-to-man versus man-to-
god? 7 Finally, Xenophon (Mere. 4.6.9-5) represents Socrates as analyzing

13 I take this point from Brickhouse and Smith, "Socrates' Mission," 661.
14 As noted by Rabinowitz, "Platonic Piety," 114. This, and the points noted by nn. 12 and
13 above, are at least obstacles to R. E. Allen's claim, "The Early Theory," 5, that no substantive
issue in the interpretation o f the Euthyphro turns on its dramatic structure. C. C. W. Taylor,
"The End," 11 ~, notes that other dialogues contain clear hints of a conclusion not explicitly
drawn (e.g., Charm. t 7 4 d - 7 5 a ). For the possible connection o f the Euthyphro to the Theatetus see
Allen, 7-
~5 What would count as a definition o f some concept for Socrates is a thorny issue. But
what he seems to be after (ideally) is a relation o f mutual entailment between definiendum and
defieniens, where the definiens of 'F' gives a complete explanation of why any x/s F, such that
any instance o f an F-thing can be thereby recognized as being F. See also the beginning of
section III; cf. G. Santas, Socrates (London, 1979): 97-135.
,6 As C. C. W. Taylor, "The End," 11o, notes: "Ordinary Greek idiom would naturally
appropriate the term Dikaiosun~ as the name for the virtue of social relations with human
agents, and it is in accordance with that usage that the good man is described at Gorg.5o7b as
one who would do right by men . . . . It is unnecessary to suppose any difference of doctrine
between that passage and the Euthyphro... "
~7 Ap. 2oe, 23a-b.
 SOCRATIC PIETY 287
legal conduct into two sub classes, where pious persons are therein defined
as those who know what is lawful in respect of the gods (in contrast to what
is lawful in respect of men). 18 This again supports the view that Socrates
would have found it natural to divide justice into two subclasses, human
secular justice and divine justice (piety). To what extent Xenophon can be
trusted on this is a live issue. Still, given the other evidence, it would be odd
if it did not have some credibility, especially given the widespread, if unclear,
traditional connection between being 6~xcttog and being 6otog/eOoe[3~g.19

2~

Statement P~, as we saw, was derived from Euthyphro's first attempt (~ 2e 5 -

8) to specify the nature of the relationship between men and gods which
would constitute just relations. That attempt may be represented as:
P~ Piety is that part of justice which is our tendance (~}eQcut~ct) to the gods.

,8 Pious acts, on this view, would be those we ought to perform, doing so in accordance
with the laws governing the relations of men and gods.
19 CY. K. J. Dover, Greek Popular Morality (Berkeley, 1974): 247-48, and A.W.H. Adkins,
Merit and Responsibility (Oxford, 196o): 133. As Dover notes (247-248): "The formal conjunc-
tion of hosios with dikaios was sometimes augmented by reference to "both gods and men," as if
recognizing a distinction between divine law and man-made law." Irwin, Plato's Moral Theory, 22,
points out that piety had a well-established association with justice for Hesiod, Solon, and
Aeschylus, a m o n g others; cf. C. C. W. Taylor, " T h e End," 1 lo. It is useful to note Aristotle's
connection of impiety with injustice at N.E. I 122a5- 7.
I should note that despite the strength of the case for P,, there is one serious objection to it.
P, differentiates pious justice from non-pious justice, and yet at Protagoras 331a6-b8 we find
Socrates claiming that '~justice is pious" (i.e., that there is no non-pious justice). Much is made of
this difficulty by those who subscribe to T. Penner's view in "The Unity of Virtue," Philosophical
Review 82 (1973): 35-68, that the unity of the virtues is a thesis asserting their identity: e.g.,
Irwin, Plato's Moral Theory, 22; C. C. W. Taylor, "The End," 116-18. In defense of that view,
they reject any constructivistic interpretations of the text which employ the substance of P, (in
their arguments, both Versenyi and C. C. W. Taylor unjustifiably assume that piety/s the whole
of virtue. Taylor, however, tries to retain a sense of P, by maintaining that piety is virtue "under
a certain aspect" (viz., the relation of man to the gods)). Vlastos, "Unity," 224-28, on the other
hand, utilizes the evidence of the Socratic commitment to P, as partial grounds for the rejection
of Penner's interpretation. An adequate discussion of this dispute goes far beyond the practical
limits of this paper. Nonetheless, the weight of the evidence for P, we have seen, together with
the observation that the dialogue seems primarily interested in the piety of acts (noted by I.M.
Crombie in An Examination of Plato's Doctrines, 2 vols. (New York, 1962), 1 :z 11 ; see also n. 34)
leads me to endorse the Vlastos solution to this apparent incompatibility.
In brief, this solution allows us to analyze the claim of the Protagoras to be the claim that
someone is a just person if and only if he is a pious person (and likewise for the other virtues
(Vlastos, "Socrates O n 'the Parts of Virtue,' " in Platonic Studies (Princeton, 1981): 418-23)). On
the other hand, P, should only be taken to claim that while all pious acts are just, a just act (of
any sort of person) need not also be a pious one (e.g., repaying a small loan; cf. Vlastos, ibid.,
421, n. 5, on the concept of virtue's "parts"; cf. P. Woodruff, "Socrates on the Parts of Virtue,"
Canadian Journal of Philosophy, Supplementary Volume 2 ( 1976): t o l - 16).
288 J O U R N A L OF T H E H I S T O R Y OF P H I L O S O P H Y 23:3 JULY t985
Socrates attempts to clarify the term "0e0ct~egcx.... by means of a craft anal-
ogy ( t 3 a l - d 4 ) . "Oeqct~egct," it is shown, can imply a kind of knowledge
whose practice aims at the substantive i m p r o v e m e n t of that which is tended.
This in t u r n implies that the subject to which tendance is given lacks both
self-sufficiency and excellence, and that the agent is superior to that subject
in some aspect o f power or knowledge. These implications are incompatible
with Euthyphro's conception of the gods' and man's relative powers, which,
in accord with p o p u l a r belief, represented the gods as vastly superior to m e n
in respect o f knowledge, power, self-sufficiency, and enjoyment. ~ It is on
these g r o u n d s that P, is rejected by Euthyphro. In addition, Socrates gives
some indication (13c-d) that he would find P~ objectionable on the same
grounds? '
By the replacement of the objectionable term "Oeqct~xe~cx"(a "little" mat-
ter, says Socrates at Eu. 13a1-2 ) with "a3~t~lOeXt• term which does not
imply the i m p r o v e m e n t of a s u b j e c t - - E u t h y p h r o produces ( t 3 d 3 - 8 ) a candi-
date for a definition of piety much more consonant with (I shall argue) both
traditional a n d Socratic belief:
Piety is that part of justice which is a service (tS~xvlQextxfi:along the lines of servants to
masters) of men to the gods.
Both Socrates and E u t h y p h r o are portrayed in the craft-analogy sequence
which follows (13d-e) as reasoning by analogy (naturally enough) from the
fact that m a n y h u m a n ~xTIQeO~at which help with some ergon are productive
o f some e n d result, to the implicit conclusion that all h u m a n services aim at
helping those they serve to achieve the result which defines the professional
activity o f those helped; e.g., the service to a shipbuilder is the service which
aids him to build a ship. With this general principle before him, E u t h y p h r o
is t h e n asked to specify precisely the nature of that "most beautiful work"
(mft,/xctkov ~:pVov) for which the gods must then desire o u r assistance (13e-
t4a ). E u t h y p h r o tenaciously avoids answering this question which, signifi-
cantly, is asked three times? 3 T o this Socrates responds clearly and emphati-
cally that E u t h y p h r o had just " t u r n e d aside" at the very m o m e n t he was close

~~ Which can simply mean the correct treatment of any class of beings; see Burnet, "Plato's
Euthyphro," 135; Versenyi, "Holiness," loo.
2, This analysis is derived from the excellent discussion by Versenyi, ibid., loo-o2.
'~ Socrates does not press P2 upon Euthyphro and would have found it "surprising" for
Euthyphro to maintain it. As shown later, the evidence indicates that Socrates also believed in
gods vastly superior to men in power and knowledge.
~ As Rabinowitz, "Platonic Piety," 115, has noted, the fact that Socrates is pressing Euthy-
phro to produce the gods' ergon constitutes evidence of Socrates' commitment to something like
P3 (below).
 SOCRATIC PIETY 28 9
to giving a briefer answer (than he did), which would have given Socrates all the
i n f o r m a t i o n he n e e d e d about piety. Many scholars have f o u n d this powerful
evidence for ascribing to Socrates a belief in something like the following:
P~ Piety is that part of justice which is a service (a3~rlpeXtm'l) of men to the gods,
assisting the gods in their work (~0"/ov), a work which produces some good result.

T o this I would add the claim that Socrates also believes that pious acts
please the gods. This claim was left in place at Eu. 9 e and was accepted to be
a ruSta$og o f piety at 1 ta, and is t h e r e a f t e r left u n r e f u t e d ? 4 Notice too that at
9e Socrates seems to hint that a statement allowed to pass t h r o u g h the
discussion u n c h a l l e n g e d would be one accepted by both o f them. Finally, it is
Socrates who implies (Eu. 1 l a 6 - b l ) that E u t h y p h r o has (in fact) identified an
attribute o f piety. T h e anticonstructivists wishing to deny this and P3 to
Socrates are thus left with the task o f reconciling the Socrates who insists
that p e o p l e state what they truly believe with the deceptive Socrates their
anticonstructivism forces o n them. Moreover, t h e r e are several o t h e r consid-
erations that s u p p o r t o u r attributing P3 to Socrates.
T o begin, all the evidence in s u p p o r t o f P, serves as s u p p o r t for P3, whose
f o r m it preserves and f r o m which it derives. Like P , for instance, P~ is left
u n r e f u t e d at the e n d o f the dialogue. 25 As distinct f r o m P , and constitutive
o f P3's i m p r o v e m e n t o v e r P , P3 makes use o f the concept o f a service assist-
ing a work which p r o d u c e s something good. Such a m o t i f is a typical meth-
odological m o d e l o f Socrates, characteristic o f his teleological outlook and
use o f craft-analogies? 6 Socrates later emphasizes that this question o f ser-
vice to the gods is o f the greatest i m p o r t a n c e to him (Eu. t 4 d 4 - 7 ) ~7 and,
significantly, urges E u t h y p h r o to specify the n a t u r e o f o u r service to the
gods no f e w e r t h a n six times between 13e6 and the e n d o f the d i a l o g u e ? s
Plato also credits Socrates with conceiving o f o u r relation to the gods as
being a kind o f master-slave relation (Phaedo 6 2 d - 6 3 d ; Ion 53e; Parmenides
1 3 4 d - e ; Alc. Major 122a) as d o e s X e n o p h o n (Memorabilia 1.4.9--12 ). This
represents, as well, what the Greeks usually had in mind when discussing a

~4 Again, no endorsement of the Bonitz principle is intended. See n. 12.

~5 See nn. 24 and ~2.
~6 Noted by Brickhouse and Smith, "Socrates' Mission," 66o-61; see also W. K. C. Guthrie,
Socrates (Cambridge, 1971), 136-39.
97 Noted by Rabinowitz, "Platonic Piety," i 15. Although this remark as a whole has some
flavor of irony to it, that is explicable on the grounds that by this point in the dialogue it is quite
reasonable to portray Socrates as becoming bored with Euthyphro's avoidance of the question.
Socrates, giving up the hope of eliciting a useful answer, is perhaps playfully needling Euthy-
phro on his pretensions to divine knowledge.
98 Eu. 13e6, 13elo--tl, 14a9--1o, 14d6, 14e9--15a4, 15a7-8.
~9 o J O U R N A L OF T H E H I S T O R Y OF P H I L O S O P H Y 2 3 : 3 J U L Y ~985
0epane~a 0e~v. 29 Nonetheless, this evidence remains at best suggestive until
we see its confirmation by the historical touchstone of the Apology.
The argument which connects the Euthyphro to the Apology has convinc-
ingly been made elsewhere, s~ and it should be enough to point out that the
dramatic settings and internal remarks of both combine to present an his-
torically continuous characterization of Socrates. The Apology emphatically
portrays in careful detail a Socrates who both conforms to traditional reli-
gious practice and belief, and who has a divine mission which is the result of
a pious (~oel3o~ev) duty to follow a god's commands (Ap. 3oa). This mission
is thus a service to the god(s) (fflv ~/lv x~ 0e~ ~m]Qeo~av; Ap. 3oa6-7, cf.
Ap. ~3b-c) 3' producing good results (Ap. 3oa5-7), such as the improvement
of those who are persuaded by Socrates to care for their souls and do what is
right (Ap. 3oa-b, 36c-d; Crito 4 7 d - 4 8 d ; cf. Eu. 14el x-15a2). It would be
hard to produce stronger evidence that Socrates in fact believes P3 to be
true. Nonetheless, as Socrates himself sees, P3 is not definitional of piety, and
is thus left incomplete by the conclusion of the discussion.
There have been numerous interpretations attempting to make good P3's
deficiencies by characterizing the work and produce of the gods, thereby
inferring the nature of our service to them (see n.2). Unfortunately, these
attempts either impute Platonic doctrine to Socrates, or ignore Socrates'
ambivalence concerning the precise work and nature of the gods, or dis-
count the claim that piety is but a part of the justice mentioned in P, and P3
(or some combination of these). In section 3 below I will suggest and defend
a hypothetical completion of P3 that I think Socrates would have endorsed.
Returning to the text, it remains to discuss Euthyphro's "wrong-turning,"
which introduces the conception of piety as a kind of knowledge or craft of
proper giving to (which is again a service; t~lQEo~a) and requesting from
the gods (a kind of ~ o ~ a ) (Eu. 14b~-7, 14c4-15b5). This section we
should see as primarily a transition to a somewhat different matter which
Socrates is forced to follow--as he suggests (14c3-4)--by the rules of elenc-
tic discourse? 2 but whose course he shapes in pursuit of the unresolved issue

29 Od. 11,225; Erga. 136 (as noted by Versenyi, "Holiness," 1o2).

30 E.g., Heidel, "On Plato's Euthyphro," 169; "Socrates' Mission," 657-66; Beckman, "The
Religious Dimension," 42.
n' In the Apology Socrates often refers to his service to the god as a latreia, but like hyperetike,
this connotes the work of, among other things, a servant for a master. Note also that though the
term "xEke60~" at Ap. 3oa5, commonly translated as "command," does have several other possi-
ble translations, it is this sense of the term which should be preferred, given Socrates' likening
of his situation to a man's being on station at a military post (Ap. 28e-29a).
32 Not to mention Plato's artistic considerations: this is the move which finally leads the
discussion full-circle, back to Euthyphro's earlier rebuffed claim that piety is what pleases the
gods.
 SOCRATIC PIETY 291

of P3; i.e., the nature of our service to the gods. Here the service is identified
as a "giving" to the gods of prayerful praise and sacrifice, for which we may
hope to receive the good things we request. Though Euthyphro concedes
that there is nothing artful in giving someone what they do not need, he
nonetheless maintains (rather inconsistently) his earlier position (13 bl 3-c2)
that while our gifts cannot benefit the gods, they can still please them (which
wouldn't seem to be a need on their part). With this answer, Socrates con-
cludes that they have returned to the definition of piety which was rejected
in the first portion of the dialogue (at Eu. 1oe9-1 Ib5).
The logical details of this section deserve careful treatment, but here I will
only contend that it represents a digression in the discussion. In evidence of
this is the reluctance of Socrates to pursue Euthyphro's new definition and
Euthyphro's own apparent inconsistency mentioned above. In addition, So-
crates only helps to advance Euthyphro's definition in order to clarify Euthy-
phro's own initial reply to his quest for the completion of P3. Since Euthyphro
is not portrayed as having any philosophical acumen, the dialogue does not
then seem to argue for this approach. ~ Furthermore, this section has
moved--by Euthyphro's casting his "wrong-turned" answer in terms of the
"know-how" pious people would have--from a consideration of the nature of
pious acts, the dialogue's primary concern? 4 to that of the knowledge pious
persons would have. This is not to imply that genuine piety cannot be charac-
terized in terms of knowledge or that some of that knowledge will not include
knowledge of orthodox religious practices. Socrates would affirm both these
claims, and the dialogue makes clear that Euthyphro's attempted definition

33 Crombie, A n Examination of Plato's Doctrines, 2 vols., 1:2 ] 1.

34 Crombie's observation, ibid., 2o9: "There are two ways of expressing an abstract noun in
Greek; firstly one can use the definite article with the neuter of the appropriate adjective ('the
holy'), and secondly one can use a noun formed from the adjective ('holiness'), It is natural to
use the first form for the thing-abstract and the second for the person-abstract, and this the
Euthyphro does. Socrates begins by asking for a definition of the thing-abstract; the primary
subject of the dialogue is the quality attaching to objects and actions which makes them holy."
T h e evidence for this claim includes the fact that the dialogue begins with a concern over
whether or not Euthyphro's act of prosecuting his father is pious (Eu. 4 e - 5 a, 5d-6a, 8a-e) and
the charge that Socrates has acted impiously by "making new gods and not believing in the old
ones" (2a-3e, t 2e). In addition, Socrates requests that Euthyphro state what piety and impiety
are with reference to the act of m u r d e r and all other cases (acts), specifying whether "the holy
[is] always one and the same thing in every action (~Q6~et)" (5c9-d2) and what the form of
holiness is that is found in every holy action (6d9-el). This latter concern continues right up to
the aporetic interlude (1 ] b-e), which is followed by a concern over what sort of acts of service to
the gods would constitute pious action (] 2e-14a). Socrates then turns the discussion of piety as a
kind of knowledge back to a discussion of what sort o f actions this knowledge calls for 0 4 d - ] 5 b ) .
T h e dialogue then concludes by returning to the topic of whether or not Euthyphro's act of
prosecuting his father and Socrates' actions are pious or not 0 5 c - t 6 a ) .
992 JOURNAL OF T H E H I S T O R Y OF P H I L O S O P H Y 2 3 : 3 JULY 198 5
has only b e e n rejected o n the g r o u n d s that it is i n c o m p a t i b l e - - t a k e n as a
definition--with the earlier rejection o f the same claim. ~5 Socrates n e v e r
doubts in this section that pious actions is a virtuous relationship o f m e n and
gods, with benefits accruing to the w o r s h i p p e r (cf. Eu. t 4 e l l - t 5 a 2 ) and
pleasure accruing to the gods. F u r t h e r m o r e , it is left o p e n for Socrates to
affirm at this point that t h o u g h f u l l and certain knowledge o f piety would
necessitate a knowledge o f how o u r acts o f sacrifice, prayer, and obedience to
their c o m m a n d s are a service to those gods (what about t h e m is pleasing), no
h u m a n may possess knowledge so extensive o r certain. Nevertheless, he may
claim, t h e r e are practical standards to guide us in the p e r f o r m a n c e and
identification o f pious acts. P3, he could claim, gives us a general f o u n d a t i o n
which will allow us to rationally derive what pragmatic knowledge we need
(what we could be c o n t e n t with; 14c2-3) for the pious conduct o f o u r every-
day lives. It is this view, I shall a r g u e (in section 3), which the discussion
s u r r o u n d i n g P3 intimates and which E u t h y p h r o - - - s h r o u d e d in his eccentric
religious d o g m a t i s m - - h a s failed to appreciate. I will also show how this view
bears o n E u t h y p h r o ' s justification o f his prosecution o f his father on the
g r o u n d s o f its piety (Eu. 3 e - 6 a ) . B e f o r e doing so, however, I must first
d e f e n d P3 against f o u r anticonstructivist challenges.
1. B u r n e t , Allen, and Versenyi have a r g u e d that nothing like P3 can be
attributed to Socrates, since it is not possible in the context o f the dialogue to
specify an ergon (and product) which piety serves. 36 Versenyi takes this line
o f a r g u m e n t f u r t h e r by claiming that the reason for this is that the gods,
being perfect, c a n n o t be conceived to have any ergon: "if the gods are al-
r e a d y as g o o d as possible a n d possessed o f all that is good for them, t h e n . . .
[t]hey can have no ends still o u t s t a n d i n g . . , and thus no rational motivation
for action. ''~7
This misses the mark. While the perfect gods o f Versenyi are no d o u b t
incompatible with P3, t h e r e is n o evidence that such perfect beings were the

35 See P. T. Geach, "Plato's Euthyphro," The Monist 3 (1966): 369-82, who argues (rightly, I
think) that this incompatibility is not something Euthyphro is logicallycommitted to (381).
36 Burnet, "Plato's Euthyphro," 137; R. E. Allen, "The Early Theory," 6- 7, 5-8; Versenyi,
'Holiness,' lo7-to. Allen maintains that the dialogue takes no stand on the issue of piety's ergon,
since none of the virtues have products. Burnet similarly argues that the Euthyphro contains the
suggestion that there is no ergon achieved by piety since piety is not a specialized art but a
condition of the soul. But as Brickhouse and Smith note, "Socrates' Mission," 7, "Socrates'
frequently drawn analogies between virtues and crafts make little sense if crafts produce erga,
but virtues do not."
As will be seen, my own position relies on the notion that though we cannot (with certainty)
specify the ergon of the gods, that does not prevent us from attributing P3 (as a pathos of piety) to
Socrates.
37 Versenyi, "Holiness," t lo. He derives this line of reasoning (122) from Meno 77c-78b.
 SOCRATIC PIETY 293
gods of either Socrates or the majority of his fellow Greeks. One can import
Platonic text (e.g., Rep. 38xb-c, Sym. 2o9c-d) to the contrary (as Versenyi,
surprisingly, does38), but such a tactic is not even helpful for conclusively estab-
lishing Plato's views. In the Phaedrus (247a), for instance, each god/s said to have
his own ergon. In any case, there is good evidence that Socrates believed in
divine activity (e.g., that they give us commands and gifts; Ap. 33 c, 41d)? 9
Aside from all this, Versenyi's argument contains a confusion. Though
perfect gods themselves may be incapable of improvement in their own
natures, from this it follows that such gods do not now act only if we suppose
them to act solely out of rational se/f-interest so as to have already achieved
all their desires. But it is possible that it could be in the rational interest
(self-regarding or otherwise) of the gods to have left some of their ends
outstanding. The accomplishment (improvement) of these, unlike the im-
provement o f their natures, we could be in a position to help achieve (e.g.,
they could have left the world or our souls unfinished4").
2. Versenyi has argued against the coherence of our performing a ser-
vice (a3~xq0eTtnfi) to the gods (as in P~) along similar lines as those above. 4'
Such a service implies that those assisted by us are benefited, yet Euthyphro
rejected the previous definition of piety as a Oe0ctz~ei(x Oe~v (P0 precisely on
the grounds that the gods could not be benefited and thereby improved. The
notion of a a3ztrl0extrcr] is thus just as incompatible with the gods' self-suffi-
ciency as was that of a ~eOct~xe(ct ~e~v.
If the above is correct, it is then very curious that Socrates should not
have leapt upon this repetition of a previous "wrong-turning" rather than
pursuing (as he does) for a full Stephanus page a much more obscure point
(viz., the god's ergon), and does not return to drive home what---on Versen-
yi's interpretation--would be a very simple elenchus. 4~ Such neglect (on this

38 Ibid., ao9. This is surprising because of Versenyi's condemnation of those constructivists

who import Platonic, rather than Socratic, doctrine into their theses 007).
s9 See also Phaedrus ~29e , Mere. 1.3.2. Even the gods of Aristotle, after all, have an ergon
(viz., noesis), sublime though it may be (N.E. 1178b9-3o).
4o This latter task is C. C. W. Taylor's specification of the gods' ergon, "The End," i 13:
"There is one good product they can't produce without h u m a n assistance, namely, good h u m a n
souls." Unfortunately, he provides no evidence for attributing this claim to Socrates. In fact, it
seems to me that Socrates would not have held the gods so powerless in any sphere of activity.
Rather (he would think), the gods have left our souls unfinished in respect of goodness for
whatever reasons they have, though it is still in their power to produce such good h u m a n souls.
However (for Socrates), it is not within the grasp of fallible human wisdom to understand why
they refrain from doing so.
4, Versenyi, "Holiness," l o 4 - t I.
42 In fact, Socrates cannot, since as the discussion of piety conceived of as emporike reveals
(Eu. 14b-15b), Euthyphro has become educated on this matter, and thus does not allow himself
to be interpreted as suggesting that we further the excellence of the gods (by giving gifts).
~94 J O U R N A L OF T H E H I S T O R Y OF P H I L O S O P H Y 2 3 : 3 J U L Y 1 9 8 5

account) is made all the more malicious by Socrates' remark that Euthyphro
was close to a satisfactory answer by his pursuit of the question concerning
the god's ergon. Versenyi's argument, then, has the effect of portraying
Socrates as an ineffective and deceitful teacher. Worse than that, it renders
him guilty of impiety, since in the Apology, he claims (under the threat of
impious perjury) to be pursuing a service to the god (e.g., 22a, 23 b, 3oa). 43
Irrespective of this, Versenyi's objection fails on grounds similar to those in
point 1 above.
Socrates' rejection of "~e0et~e~a" seemed to rest on two implications of
that term: that the gods lack in their nature self-sufficiency and excellence,
and that men are superior to them in some respect (the respect in which it is
that man may improve the gods). The concept of ~mlOextx~ clearly lacks the
second implication, and so Versenyi is apparently claiming that the only
service we could perform for the gods would be a service which would (per
impossibile) improve the nature of the gods. But it does not follow from the
concept of a3~rlOe~tm] that by assisting the gods in their work ("their func-
tioning") we thereby improve their capacity to function (their nature, as
0eO~uxe~a was taken to imply), "and thus their very being. T M It is quite within
the realm of Greek religious conceptions that the gods should delegate to us
the performance of some beneficial and god-pleasing service which they are
quite sufficient in themselves to perform, but from which they abstain (e.g.,
as a parent might--for various reasons---allow his child to bring him a cup
which he is quite able to get on his own).
3. Taking lb~lqOextm] to imply a "slavish, ignorant, and utterly submis-
sive" kind of service, Versenyi argues that accepting something like P~ would
undercut Euthyphro's and the city's claim to know--and thus prescribe--
pious behavior; it would also, he implies, undercut our having any knowl-
edge of piety at all. 45 On the other hand, if we can have knowledge of the
gods' ergon, and that ergon is the fostering of goodness in human life (say
through philosophical activity), then any references to the gods in the defini-
tion of piety (as in P~) are gratuitous. This is so, Versenyi claims, because of
the lesson of the first half of the dialogue we are supposed to have learned:

43 Socrates insists at Ap. 35 d that perjury is impious. Socrates also testifies that he has a
service to the gods, but by crediting Socrates with the additional belief that such service is
incompatible with the nature of the gods (since Versenyi would hardly think that Socrates is
missing his own point), Versenyi very implausibly--must then discount all of Socrates' talk
concerning his divine mission as ironic, "Holiness," 111--12n. 7. Thus we'see his motivation for
doing so, i.e., to avoid just the sort objection to his rejection of "~SmlpeXtx~" I have given above.
44 Versenyi, ibid., lo 9.
45 Ibid., ao4, 1o7-o8. I say "implies" because Versenyi does not clearly assert this, but
requires it for his dilemma (lo7-o8) to be formally valid.
 SOCRATIC PIETY 295

that to know what is pious is to know what is just in human life, and that
knowledge one can have independently of and without reference to the gods
or their love. Piety, on this view, is then not a part (as in P:~), but the whole o f
moral virtue, for whose performance we all have the necessary intrinsic
motivation, and which is what it is whether or not the gods even exist. 46 This
secular account of piety is furthermore inconsistent (according to Versenyi)
with the notion of serving the gods in the subordinate fashion ofaS~t~lpeXt•
By serving human justice we serve ourselves, and this is a relation between
equals (in fact, he says, if the gods' work is realizing the good in human life,
that seems to make them our servants). 47
To this tortured line of reasoning Socrates can (and would, I shall later
argue) respond that it is precisely Euthyphro's and the city's claim to know
with certainty what pious actions are that he wishes to undercut, and that if
~tTIpE'gt~ has this effect, so much the better. Indeed, such an undercutting
is the thrust of the entire dialogue. It also perfectly accords with Socrates'
constant confession that he lacks all divine (certain) knowledge and can only
reasonably hope for human (fallible) wisdom. In comparison with the
knowledge o f divine things we are indeed ignorant (cf. Ap. z3a-c), but this
need not imply complete ignorance about piety, as Versenyi suggests. If we
understand P3 as it stands, and it is true, then we understand something
about piety. 48
The remainder of Versenyi's argument is based on the supposition that
the gods' ergon--if they had one--would be the accomplishment of the good
in human life. Versenyi provides no argument for this crucial supposition,
which arbitrarily delimits the class of the gods' good acts to those in human
life. Further, by making this supposition, and thus identifying piety with the
whole of h u m a n justice, Versenyi also contradicts all the evidence for P, and
P3, since both P, and P3 imply that some just acts need not be pious. Of
course, if the gods' ergon is simply the establishment of good in the universe,
the possibility remains open that some of the tasks involved in helping them
to attain that end might simply be a matter of following the gods' orders

46 Ibid., 86, l o 4 - 1 o ; see also "The Religious Dimension," 51-54; "The End," 113-18.
47 Ibid., 1o4-o 9.
48 If we assume that the gods are much more knowledgeable beings not 'of this world' (as
both Socrates and Versenyi would), then that does suggest that we can't fully know the reasons
(ends) of the gods, which on the model of P3 suggests that we can't fully understand the piety of
actions. By analogy, servants might not be in a position to fully know the reasons of their
masters, and so not fully understand the nature of their service. But that need not keep them
from knowing enough to recognize and perform particular acts which are "master-pious." Cf.
Mere. t.4.4; Geach, "Plato's Euthyphro," 38 I.
296 J O U R N A L OF THE H I S T O R Y OF P H I L O S O P H Y 2 3 : 3 J U L Y 198 5
without knowing their reasons. In such a case, any remotely clear notion of
piety must involve reference to the gods.
Even if we suppose the ergon of the gods to be simply the establishment of
the good in human life (and are thus able to serve the gods' ends by a
knowledge that involves no reference to them), it does not follow that an
attempted definition of "piety" may ignore these gods. For example, though
my father may not wish for anything but my good, and though the acts of
filial piety he sanctions are only those acts productive of such good, that does
not entail that the meaning of "filial piety" is the same as "the son pursuing
his own good." Rather, an act of filial piety would seem to crucially involve
an intention to satisfy parental desires. Analogously, the difference between a
piously just act and one which is merely secularly just could simply be that in
the former case one acts with the intention to please and honor the gods. 49
Finally, I take Versenyi's last point to be a reductio of his own position. Since
making piety the whole of virtue on Versenyi's account would suggest a
relation to the gods of equality or superiority, we ought not to make such an
identification.
4- Versenyi recognizes that the conclusion of the first part of the dia-
l o g u e - t h a t "the god-pleasing" is not definitive of piety--still leaves open
the possibility that all and only god-pleasing acts are those which are pious. I
have earlier argued in section 2 that this claim would probably be acceptable
to Socrates. In order to preclude the attribution to Socrates of even so
minimally a positive claim as this about piety, Versenyi presents an argument
which, when generalized, would falsify all the statements of the Euthyphro
concerning the relation of men and gods. On his account, both the early and
middle dialogues, 5~ and especially the Lysis, make it clear that love (as a
desire for what is lacking) is irreconcilable with perfection, and that there-
fore the (perfect) gods cannot love anything. Furthermore, if they cannot
love anything, and since all rational activity is rooted in rational love, they
cannot act at all, be pleased by (for this implies lack) or care about anything,
or thus be the givers of what is good to men. 5'
Socrates, however, clearly believes that the gods act and have given men
good things. Versenyi has also not established that Socrates' gods are perfect,
or that he had any beliefs entailing this, or that (having such beliefs) he was
aware of that entailment, or (being so aware) that he would have seen Versen-

49 1 derive this point from Geach, ibid., 381.

5,, Viz., Lysi.~2 2 1 - ~ 2 2 a , 217a-218c, ~14e-215b, 21oc-d; Sym. ~oob-e, 2o2b-d, zo3e-2o4a;
Rep. 334c.
.~' Versenyi,"Holiness," t2o-23.
 SOCRATIC PIETY 297
yi's inference. 5~ It is also d o u b t f u l that Versenyi may establish such claims on
the basis o f middle dialogue text, which on the whole is not directly relevant
to issues c o n c e r n i n g Socratic belief. As for the Lysis, it is r e g a r d e d as a late
early dialogue, and so what positive doctrine it contains is m u c h m o r e likely
than the material o f the Apology (in which the gods have desires) to i m p o r t
Platonic d o c t r i n e into the Socratic portrayal. T h e Lysis is also aporetic and
makes it clear that Socrates no m o r e believes that perfection and action are
irreconcilable than that he doesn't. In fact, by the end o f the dialogue,
Socrates has consciously led Lysis and M e n e x e n u s by the nose to conclude
not only that "those who are already good are no longer friends to the good"
( 2 1 4 e - 2 1 5 b : one o f Versenyi's pieces o f 'evidence'), but also its contradic-
tory that " n o n e are friendly with the good but the good" (222d). It would be
h a r d to find as clear a case o f eclectic data-gathering.
With the preceding, then, the claim that P~ represents a Socratic belief
emerges unscathed. It remains to be seen w h e t h e r and how Socrates himself
would characterize the n a t u r e o f the gods' ergon and o u r service in its behalf.
In the following section I provide this answer and use it as the canvas for a
sketch o f Socratic piety.

Let us r e t u r n to the dialogue and ask what answer would have satisfied
Socrates w h e n he asked E u t h y p h r o to specify the m~y• ~Qyov o f the
gods. Close inspection o f the text at this point (1 3 e - 14c ) might suggest that
Socrates uses a false analogy to mislead E u t h y p h r o . While it is true that
d i f f e r e n t h u m a n professions have a chief (• result, it is not a neces-
sary c o n s e q u e n c e that the gods qua gods then have a single characteristic
product. I n d e e d , as a traditionalist, E u t h y p h r o should persist in his initial
answer (13e12) that they p r o d u c e many fine things (being many d i f f e r e n t
gods, after all). H o w e v e r , when pressed by Socrates, he does not insist on
this, but goes on to a new conception o f o u r relations with the gods (one o f
gpato0~et; 14a-b). Why, then, does Socrates press this, and why does Euthy-
p h r o not r e p e a t his earlier answer? Because, as the earlier discussion has
indicated ( 6 d - l o a ) , Socrates believes, and has convinced E u t h y p h r o as well,
that piety is o n e thing the gods must all agree about i[ piety is to be an
objective f e a t u r e o f acts. I f then, piety is a service which helps (as in P:~),

52 Or, seeing it, that he would not have rejected one of his other entailing beliefs so as to
save the gods from being thought indifferent and inactive. In any case, I do not see how
Versenyi makes his attribution of a belief in perfect gods compatible with the statement of
Socrates' alleged agnosticism (Crat.4ood) which Versenyi calls "the most likely candidate" for an
accurate account of Socrates' religious beliefs, "Holiness," 193.
~,98 JOURNAL OF THE HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY ~ 3 : 3 JULY 1 9 8 5

there must be at least some project commonly agreed upon by the gods
which pious actions serve to promote.
What then is this "chief" ~ty• gQyov? The answer to this--the "chief
part" of P~ outstanding, on Socrates' view (as he puns)--should be, I submit,
that we cannot know (other than that it is good). This--and not some con-
structivistic speculation--is just the answer we should expect from a man
who claims not to have any wisdom of things "more than human" (Eu. 6a-b,
Ap. 2oe) had only by god (Ap. 23a), and who is quite conscious of this
shortcoming (e.g., Ap. 2od). 5~ By such "divine wisdom" I interpret Socrates
to mean a kind of infallible and complete knowledge: such a certain and
complete understanding of piety would be certain knowledge of the defini-
tion of piety, wherein the terms of its definiens are mutually entailing with
the definiendum "piety," and where the definition constitutes a complete ex-
planation of why instances of piety are pious (see n. 15). Such a definition of
piety would require a specification of the gods' ergon, and yet the complete
specification of that ergon would seem a prerogative of the gods: only they
can know with completeness and certainty what their ergon is.
This profession of ignorance is also what we should expect Socrates to be
attempting to elicit from such a person as Euthyphro, whose claim to know
things more than human and to be guided thereby in the performance of
serious actions leaves Socrates in awe (Eu. 4a-5d). Euthyphro is even so pre-
sumptuous as to think that actions permissible for Zeus himself are likewise
permissible for him. 54 Since Euthyphro ~ ignorant of piety, it is then part of
Socrates' mission to force him to concede that--like Socrates himself--he lacks
infallible and even fallible knowledge of the gods' ergon. This response would
be in accord with Socrates' claim that a satisfactory answer would have been
much briefer than the one Euthyphro offered (Eu. 14b8-cl ). Furthermore,
Socrates presents a subtle modus tollens for the view that piety is not completely
known by using the evidence of Euthyphro's own ignorance: he states that if
anyone knows what piety is, it is Euthyphro (Eu. 15d2-3). Thus, by having
repeatedly demonstrated Euthyphro's ignorance, Socrates is here perhaps in-
forming us that no person knows (completely and infallibly) what piety is. 55
Besides having discredited Euthyphro's claim to a complete understand-
ing of piety, Socrates has also thereby undermined Euthyphro's justification
of his attempt to prosecute his father for the murder of a laborer. That is,
since Euthyphro does not understand what piety is, its relation to the gods,

~s My attention was first drawn to this point by Brickhouse and Smith, "Socrates' Mission,"
661-62, and in conversation with them.
54 See R. F. Holland, "Euthyphro," AristoteleanSocietyProceedings82 O981-82): 3.
55 For the reasons given above, 1 interpret Socrates' remark to be more than just an ad
hominemattack on Euthyphro.
 SOCRATIC PIETY 299
o r t h e precise n a t u r e o f t h e gods, he c a n n o t justify his action by simply
a p p e a l i n g to its e v i d e n t piety o r to the b e h a v i o r o f the g o d s (Eu. 5 d - 6 a ) .
F u r t h e r m o r e , by h a v i n g a c k n o w l e d g e d t h a t (as in P,) piety is b u t a p a r t o f
justice c o n c e r n e d with o u r r e l a t i o n to the gods, E u t h y p h r o can n o l o n g e r
s t r a i g h t f o r w a r d l y claim t h a t the p r o s e c u t i o n o f his f a t h e r f o r an act c o n c e r n -
ing a n o t h e r man is j u s t by reason o f its piety a n d the d a n g e r o f religious
p o l l u t i o n (Eu. 4 b - 5 a ) . R a t h e r , t h e case n o w a p p e a r s to be a m a t t e r w h o s e
merits c a n o n l y be d e t e r m i n e d o n the g r o u n d s o f secular justice. 56
It is t h u s p r o b a b l y m o r e t h a n j u s t an a t t e m p t at an ironic parallel that
Plato p r e s e n t s b o t h E u t h y p h r o a n d Socrates to be involved in c o u r t cases
w h o s e crucial c o n c e r n is p i o u s action. 57 T h e implicit m e s s a g e i n t e n d e d by
t y i n g these two cases t o g e t h e r (see especially Eu. 15 c - 16a) w o u l d s e e m to be
this: in v i r t u e o f P3 ( a n d P,), c h a r g e s c o n c e r n i n g the piety o r i m p i e t y o f a
p e r s o n ' s actions a r e n o t m a t t e r s o f secular justice. F u r t h e r , since we as m e r e
h u m a n s c a n n o t c o m p l e t e Pa a n d so c a n n o t k n o w precisely w h a t acts serve the
gods, we s h o u l d a c k n o w l e d g e t h a t we c a n n o t c o n f i d e n t l y k n o w w h e t h e r
s o m e o n e ' s acts a r e p i o u s o r i m p i o u s . H e n c e , j u s t as E u t h y p h r o ' s f a t h e r
o u g h t n o t to be p r o s e c u t e d f o r a c r i m e against a n o t h e r m a n o n the basis o f
the alleged i m p i e t y o f his actions (or the i m p i e t y o f failing to p r o s e c u t e him),
n e i t h e r s h o u l d Socrates be c h a r g e d with impiety. 58 S u c h a c h a r g e is b o t h

5~ This, however, is not provided for by Athenian legal practice, which, as noted by Burnet,
"Plato's Euthyphro," 83, "only took cognizance of homicide in so far as it created a religious
pollution." This explains Socrates' remark at the end of the dialogue that it would be unthink-
able for Euthyphro to initiate a prosecution of his father for murder without knowing what
piety is (Eu. 15d). That is, it would be unthinkable for someonelike Euthyphro who seems to agree
with Athenian legal practice and whose only apparent justification for his prosecution is the
danger of religious pollution posed by a failure to prosecute (4b-c). The question of whether or
not Euthyphro's father still ought to be prosecuted on non-religious grounds is thus left open
(note that there is some question whether or not Euthyphro's father even committed the act in
question; Eu. 4d).
57 Note, additionally, how the two cases are made to seem more analogous than they might
by Plato's treating the two charges of impiety and corruption of the Apology (24b-c) as one
charge of impiety: Socrates is said to corrupt the young by making new gods and not believing
in the old ones (Eu. 2c-3b ).
My discussion of Euthyphro's legal case and n. 58 owe much to a very interesting unpub-
lished paper (as of this writing) by R. Weiss, "When Gods Are Like Men: An Interpretation of
Plato's Euthyphro."
~a Hence, one moral Plato may be suggesting in this dialogue is that the Athenian practice
of prosecuting people for impiety ought to be abandoned. Socrates, he seems to be telling us, is
especially unjustly charged with impiety if the basis of those charges lies in Socrates' doubts (Eu.
6a-d) concerning the sorts of quarreling gods Euthyphro ignorantly appeals to in.justification
of his legal case. These same gods may well have not been taken very seriously by much of the
Athenian populace, and if so, the charges against Socrates are unfairly brought (see Adam,
Platonis Euthyphro, xviii-xix). All this accords with and helps to explain the common intuition
that the Euthyphro was written with more than Plato's usual degree of apologetic intent (cf., e.g.,
Versenyi, "Holiness," x53).
300 J O U R N A L OF THE HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY 2 3 : 3 JULY ~985
inappropriate--since the real issue would seem to concern whether Socrates
corrupts other men--and unwarranted, given our very fallible and incom-
plete understanding of the gods, as well as Socrates' claim that (in accord
with P3) he obeys divine commands.
However, whether or not this moral is implied by the Euthyphro, my
primary thesis remains unaffected: given that the implicit answer of the
Euthyphro is that P3 is true and yet cannot be fully completed by mortals, then
neither the constructivists nor anticonstructivists have been correct. I will
now adduce further evidence in support of my view, and offer a sketch of
the pragmatic guidelines to pious action Socrates understood P3 to warrant.
According to P3, we may credit Socrates with the beliefs that (1) pious acts
are a species of just acts, (2) whose performance is a service to the gods
(which pleases them), (3) which assists them with their work productive of a
good result, and now, (4) that all these elements exist in the context of a
limited agnosticism that precludes their specification in full detail. An elabo-
ration of (x) through (3) and a mapping of the extent of that agnosticism are
hampered by a lack of unequivocal evidence on the subject of Socratic piety,
but this is the portrait I find most plausible: in Socrates we find what might
be called a species of theist who believes that there are gods, but that our
understanding of their nature and relation to us is extremely limited. Full
knowledge of the gods is simply not within the power of finite human
understanding to achieve. Nonetheless, we can and should acknowledge the
great morality, knowledge, and power of the gods, and doing so is a sign of
the proper intellectual humility which is partially constitutive of pious wis-
dom; that is, a recognition that our relation is in fact one of servant to great
unseen master. Because of their excellence, the gods--who for Socrates may
be addressed by their traditional names--do not bear all their traditional
descriptions. They are, for instance, wholly moral and so---unlike the gods
of Greek tradition---do not quarrel (Eu. 6 b - d , Phd. 6~c-d). Socrates would
hold the acts of traditional sacrifice to be pious, but not to constitute the
whole of orthodox religious practice as he conceives it, which additionally
includes the practice of philosophy. Thus, for Socrates there is no radical
split between the life of philosophy and that of true religion. Both call for
virtuous acts and a clear understanding through philosophy of their differ-
ing spheres of influence. I will discuss the connection between Socratic piety
and the practice of philosophy at length below.
Socrates is also somewhat traditional in belief. He holds that we do re-
ceive goods from the gods, that they deserve our gratitude and honor, that
we owe obedience to their commands, and that pious acts are productive of
good things. Furthermore, there are occasions on which our human knowl-
edge may be supplemented by divine and nondiscursive sources of informa-
 SOCRATIC PIETY 301
tion such as d r e a m s , divinations, a n d divine voices. T h e s e sources are not,
however, to be r e g a r d e d as p r o v i d i n g s t a n d a r d m e t h o d s o f inquiry. Finally, I
would h y p o t h e s i z e that all the e l e m e n t s above are fully i n t e g r a t e d in the
t h o u g h t a n d practice o f Socrates, a n d thus in his belief in the unity o f the
virtues; e.g., to the e x t e n t that we u n d e r s t a n d the n a t u r e o f pious relations
b e t w e e n m e n a n d gods, we likewise u n d e r s t a n d the n a t u r e o f right relations
b e t w e e n m e n , a n d conversely. 59
Socratic agnosticism is f o u n d e d u p o n the distinction between h u m a n and
divine w i s d o m o r knowledge, w h e r e it is only the f o r m e r fallible sort o f
k n o w l e d g e that we m a y p r o p e r l y lay claim to (Ap. z3a). T h e field o f h u m a n
wisdom c o m p r i s e s the k n o w l e d g e o f h u m a n affairs, including the k n o w l e d g e
(fallible) o f virtue; it does not e x t e n d to the full a n d infallible a p p r e h e n s i o n
o f divine objects such as gods, o r facts such as w h e t h e r or not d y i n g is
certainly g o o d (Ap. 4~a), w h e t h e r the life o f p h i l o s o p h y certainly achieves
s o m e t h i n g (Phd. 69d), o r what it is the gods call themselves (Crat. 4ood).
T h u s , n e i t h e r does it e x t e n d to the c o m p l e t e a n d infallible u n d e r s t a n d i n g o f
the definition o f piety, since that would r e q u i r e a c o m p l e t e and infallible
k n o w l e d g e o f the gods' ergon. T o strive a f t e r such k n o w l e d g e in the h o p e o f
actually o b t a i n i n g it is futile. Socrates, for instance, castigates the Sophists
a n d n a t u r e p h i l o s o p h e r s f o r a t t e m p t i n g to be "wise in a wisdom m o r e t h a n
h u m a n " (Ap. 2oe), an a t t e m p t he has given u p (cf. Ap. 2oe, Phd. 9 7 b - l o l a ,
Phdr. 229 e, Mem. 1.1.11-16). 6o Lacking such k n o w l e d g e (e.g., o f f u t u r e
events) we s h o u l d p r a y for no specific thing, since we c a n n o t know (with
certainty) if the fulfillment o f o u r p r a y e r would be a g o o d for us o r not
(Mere. 1.3.2 ). T h i s is so, since divine w i s d o m is a p r o p e r t y o f the gods (Ap.
2 3 a - b ; Mem. 1.1.6-8, 1.1. 9, 1.1.13) a n d we m u s t thus be content with the
investigation o f h u m a n m a t t e r s (Mem. 1.1. 9, t . l . I6), for to do otherwise is

59 This, of course, is in essence the Vlastos interpretation of the doctrine of the unity of the
virtues (in "Unity"), which I have not attempted to argue for in this paper. See n. 19.
60 Socrates would seem at Ap. 2oe to be referring back to not only Sophists such as Gorgias
(mentioned at 19e) but also those who inquire "into things below the earth and in the sky" who,
due to the portrait of him in The Clouds of Aristophanes (19b-c), he has been confused with; e.g.,
the nature philosopher Anaxagoras, who does have a theory about a thing "in the sky," viz., the
sun (Ap. 26c-e). Socrates has "no disrespect for such knowledge, if anyone reallyis versedin it" (Ap.
19c5-8; my italics). See also Phaedo 97b-lola for Plato's portrait of Socrates' disappointments
with Anaxagoras' theories. Two of his more important and relevant points there would seem to
be that as far as Socrates was concerned Anaxagoras was not well-versed in the knowledge of
divine things he laid claim to, and that his theories didn't provide a knowledge of the proper ends
of human--not divine--action (i.e., he didn't possess human wisdom). Although the Phaedo is a
middle dialogue, this section clearly purports to give us a relatively accurate picture of a period in
Socrates' youth (cf. e.g., Eu. 5a, which supports the attribution to Socrates of a youthful--and now
past interest in the 'divine things' of the nature philosophers).
302 JOURNAL OF T H E H I S T O R Y OF P H I L O S O P H Y 23:3 JULY 1985
r i d i c u l o u s a n d i r r a t i o n a l (Phdr. 2 ~ 9 e - 2 3 o a , Mem. 1.1.8--10). 6' S o c r a t e s h a s
s u c h h u m a n w i s d o m , as t h e p r i e s t e s s o f D e l p h i testifies (Ap. 2 l a ) , a n d h e
d e m o n s t r a t e s it b y r e c o g n i z i n g t h e w o r t h l e s s n e s s (the fallibility) o f h u m a n
w i s d o m in r e s p e c t o f d i v i n e w i s d o m (Ap. 2 3 a - c ) . T h e p u r s u i t o f this
w i s d o m - - t h a t s o r t w h i c h is p r a c t i c a l l y o b t a i n a b l e - - i s n o t to b e d e n i g r a t e d ,
h o w e v e r , f o r it is t h e w i s d o m p r o p e r to fallible m e n . I n s o m e cases, o f
c o u r s e , t h e p u r s u i t o f h u m a n w i s d o m will a m o u n t to a n e f f o r t to o b t a i n t h e
m o s t c o m p l e t e k n o w l e d g e a b o u t d i v i n e m a t t e r s w h i c h is h u m a n l y p o s s i b l e
( h u m a n w i s d o m ) , b u t this e f f o r t s h o u l d b e c o n d u c t e d w i t h t h e r e c o g n i t i o n
t h a t we c a n n o t o b t a i n c e r t a i n ( d i v i n e ) k n o w l e d g e o f t h e s e m a t t e r s . 62 S u c h
i n c o m p l e t e a n d f a l l i b l e k n o w l e g e is c o n s t i t u t i v e o f t h e h u m a n w i s d o m Soc-
r a t e s s e e k s to g a i n b y m e a n s o f t h e e l e n c h u s .
T o this p o i n t t h e c h a r a c t e r i z a t i o n o f S o c r a t e s ' t h e i s m h a s b e e n n e g a t i v e .
W h a t k i n d o f g o d s a r e t h o s e we s e r v e in a c c o r d a n c e w i t h P~? A n initial
appraisal of the evidence indicates that Socrates' claims concerning the gods
w e r e at l e a s t c o m p a t i b l e w i t h t h e G r e e k r e l i g i o u s t r a d i t i o n s o f his t i m e .
S o c r a t e s a p p a r e n t l y b e l i e v e s t h a t r e a l g o d s e x i s t (Ap. 35 d, 4 2 a ; Crito 54e; Phd.
62b) a n d t h a t t h e y m a y b e c a l l e d b y t h e s a m e n a m e s as t h e g o d s o f t h e s t a t e
(Ap. 2 6 b - c , Euthd. 3o2c, 6~ Mem. l . l . l O - - 1 1 ) . T h e s e g o d s a r e c o m p l e t e l y

6~ While I appeal to middle dialogue text both here, above, and below in my characteriza-
tion of Socratic piety, I have been careful to use it only to supplement citations from early
dialogues (esp. the Apology and Euthyphro) and/or Xenophon's Memorabilia. My use of citations
from the Memorabilia, in turn, has been generally limited to supporting points which are inde-
pendently testified to by material from the Platonic corpus. In those few cases where this is not
true, the citations generally corroborate a previously supported point, or the point is not crucial
to my thesis.
6, Since, on Socrates' view, the gods presumably know everything (human and divine) with
certainty and we in turn may know some facts (fallibly) concerning the gods (e.g., that P~ is
true), the difference between human wisdom and divine wisdom would not seem to lie primar-
ily in there being different objects of knowledge (human and divine) appropriate to each sort of
wisdom. Rather, it is the degree of epistemic reliability which distinguishes the two: a man may
only hope for a knowledge about any state of affairs which will at best remain fallible relative to
the infallible knowledge had by the gods. In certain cases, however--like that of the ergon of the
gods--the explanation for the impossibility of our having certain knowledge is to be specifically
found in the fact that the gods are divine metaphysical entities not as knowable for men as are,
say, facts having to do with material objects and the practices of human society (e.g. the
knowledge of horse training). Also, the differentiation of human wisdom from divine wisdom
for Socrates seems to be connected with his emphasis upon the importance of the pursuit of
human ethical wisdom, whose human subject matter takes precedence for him over questions
concerning the nature of the divine objects (e.g., the sun) studied by the nature philosophers
(complete and certain knowledge of which would be a kind of divine wisdom) (see n. 58; Mem.
1.1.11--16).
6s This passage provides evidence that Socrates had his own altars and family prayers, from
which it seems reasonable to infer that he prayed to the gods of the state at least in name.
 SOCRATIC PIETY 303

moral (Ap. 21b; Phd. 6 2 d - 6 3 c ) 64 and knowledgeable (Cr. 54c; Ap. 42a; Mere.
1.1.10, 1.4.18 ), a n d so should not be described as identical in n a t u r e to the
gods o f p o p u l a r belief. Also, since Socrates subscribes to a dualist epistemol-
ogy, that suggests that he does not view the gods as intervening extensively
in the e v e r y d a y life o f men. Because o f o u r weak epistemological powers, on
the o t h e r h a n d , they o u g h t not to be confidently described in detail, and so
should not be identified with the metaphysical beings o f the n a t u r e philoso-
phers (Mere. 1 . 1 . 1 1 - t 3 ) . 65 T h u s Socrates may be said to plot a course be-
tween the c o n f u s e d traditionalism o f his day and the overconfident intellec-
tualism o f the Sophists and n a t u r e philosophers. Rather than denying belief
in the gods, Socrates r e n d e r s t h e m more believable by eliminating their non-
sensical squabbles while simultaneously emphasizing the role reason plays in
the m o r a l life: it is, again, part o f Socrates' goal to show that people like
E u t h y p h r o may not invoke traditional divine behavior to justify their course
o f action. T h i s is so, since aside f r o m the belief that the gods are good, the
specifics o f divine behavior (including their chief ergon) and their n a t u r e are
not accessible to us. Rather, we must admit o u r inability to obtain divine
knowledge and search for the h u m a n knowledge o f what constitutes just
behavior between men.
Socrates is not simply a purified traditionalist, however. T h e charge o f
impiety we find in the Apology (24b) and which is c o n f i r m e d in the Euthyphro
( 3 b - d ) , indicates that the Socratic p a n t h e o n also includes a notorious de-
monic force, the 80~ktc0v. T h i s divine voice (Ap. 3 1 c - d ) is negative in its
advice (dissuading r a t h e r than prescribing66), and gives advice which is pri-
marily personal, practical, and particular (Ap. 41 c - d , 4oa; Euthd. 272e; Phdr.
2 4 2 b - d ; Tht. 15xa; Mem. 1.1.4-5). T h u s , Socrates may add to P~ a g r e e m e n t
with E u t h y p h r o that he at least receives fine things f r o m the gods; viz.,
advice o n certain occasions. It is clear that Socrates does r e g a r d this advice as
useful (Ap. 31d) a n d good (Ap. 4 o c - d ) , which may or may not be subject to
rational c o n f i r m a t i o n in this life. For instance, it can be so c o n f i r m e d when it
advises against a life o f politics (Ap. 3 1 c - 3 3 b) and claims Socrates to be the
wisest o f m e n (Ap. 21 a), but is not when it concerns the fate o f the soul after

64 They must be completely moral, since we saw it admitted that the gods can't themselves
be improved (Eu. 13c-d). This view is also suggested by Socrates' remarks concerning the
behavior of the traditional gods at Eu. 6a-d.
65 See n. 60. Of course, given Socrates' youthful attraction to Anaxagoras' Noas (Ph. 97b-
98a), it is possible that Socrates might have been willing to entertain as a hypothesis that it is
Noas which is named by all the traditional names of the gods. This would depend, however, on
how confident Socrates was in his use of the plural 'gods' (cf., e.g., Ph. 62b-c).
66 Although if one follows Xenophon religiously--as I am not inclined to do---the daimonion
also prescribes (see, e.g., Mere. a. 1.4).
304 J O U R N A L OF T H E H I S T O R Y OF P H I L O S O P H Y ~ 3 : 3 J U L Y 198 5
death (Ap. 4ob-c). On the whole it serves Socrates as a source of personal
conviction in pursuing a correct course of action, and may be supplemented
by philosophical reflection.
Such information, which may include that gained by divination and po-
etic inspiration (cf. Ap. 22b-c; Ion 534e; Meno 99c; Mem. 1.1.2; 1.1.6--10,
1.4.16) should be considered a form of human knowledge, for though it
comes from a non-human source, it is often empirically confirmable. 6v Fur-
thermore, Socrates would hardly find such information useful or consoling,
as he does, if he considered it mere conjecture and not a source of
knowledge, but only a kind of hunch. Also, since Socrates conceives of the
gods as our masters, it is (then) reasonable for him to expect those gods to
give their servants--both himself and others (Mem. 1.4. ~5 - 1 9 ) - - g ~ 1 7 6advice.
This good advice in turn may be expected to contribute to the attainment of
our principal good, the improvement of our souls, by providing us with
information and encouragement relevant to the making of good moral judg-
ments (Mem. 1.4-18-19).68
Socrates believes that we receive more than gifts of knowledge from the
gods; he also believes (traditionally) that the gods care for us, and demon-
strate that care by providing us with all manner of good things (Eu. 15a; Ap.
4xc-d; Mem. 1.4.5-1969), including well-designed bodies and the very pre-
condition of our moral excellence and happiness: the best type of soul (Mem.
1.4.13-14). Such care should not be identified with the chief ergon of the
gods, however. T h o u g h they have an ergon according to P~ (cf. Mem. i.4.5,
1.4.10--12), as we have seen, its specification is a task for which human
epistemic powers are not adequate.
Having observed that for Socrates there are gods, whose ergon is good,

67 Socrates, for instance, sets out to test the claim of the Oracle. This also follows from
Socrates' general claim that h u m a n (fallible) knowledge is the best we can hope for. T h a t it
should be regarded as human, and so, fallible knowledge, may be argued for in particular by a
consideration of Ap. 4ob-c. T h e r e the divine sign does not oppose a course of action that
threatens Socrates with death, and Socrates regards that as excellent grounds for supposing his
death not to be an evil. Nonetheless, at Ap. 42a Socrates then claims that it is in fact unknown
whether death will be a happier prospect for himself that continued life will be for the court.
It should be noted that just before Ion 534 e Socrates says that the "inspired" poet is "out of
his mind" and that "intelligence is no longer in him." In the Meno Socrates also says that those
who are "inspired" "don't understand anything they say" (99c). Nonetheless, keeping in mind
how the p r o n o u n c e m e n t of the Oracle served as a source of knowledge for Socrates--once
properly interpreted by philosophical investigations---the ravings of the poets might also serve
as sources o f information for others.
68 I am unable, however, to find textual evidence in the early dialogues of anyone other
than Socrates profiting from such advice.
% T h e claim that this citation from Xenophon accurately represents Socratic doctrine has
been disputed; see, e.g., W. Jaeger, The Theology of the Greek Thinkers (Oxford, 1947), 167.
 SOCRATIC PIETY 305
a n d w h o give us m a n y g o o d things, we c o m e to the task o f specifying the
n a t u r e a n d r e q u i r e m e n t s o f o u r service (~n~lQextm~) to the gods. In accord
with this sense o f s e r v i c e - - t h a t we are servants to masters o f quite a n o t h e r
station a n d u n a b l e to specify their ergon--we m a y not state with any confi-
d e n c e w h a t final e n d o u r service helps the gods to achieve. Nonetheless,
Socrates clearly specifies what the practical guidelines o f that service are, a n d
what g o o d s r e d o u n d to us f r o m c o n f o r m i n g to them. T h e texts indicate that
he u n d e r s t a n d s this service to include acts o f traditional sacrifice a n d wor-
ship a n d especially o b e d i e n c e to the gods' c o m m a n d s , all o f which, as we
saw, please t h e m in their p e r f o r m a n c e (cf. Mere. 4.3.17). Socrates, for in-
stance, obeys a divine c o m m a n d to philosophize (Ap. 2 8 d - e , ~3 b, 29b) taking
p r e c e d e n c e o v e r all others, which helps the cause o f g o d (Ap. 2 3 b - c ; with no
implication that what it achieves is s o m e h o w b e y o n d the p o w e r o f the gods
to effect). 7~
As f o r the e v i d e n c e that Socrates t h o u g h t traditional sacrifice to be a
pious service, we h a v e only o n e clear instance in the Platonic c o r p u s (viz., the
request at Phd. 118a that a cock be o f f e r e d to Asclepius). Nonetheless, we
c a n n o t c o n c l u d e f r o m this that Socrates did not sacrifice on a r e g u l a r basis.
I n d e e d , we m a y i n f e r f r o m Socrates' m o d e s t m o d e o f life a n d X e n o p h o n ' s
explicit claims, that Socrates' sacrifices were h u m b l e (Mere. 1.3.3). I f so, we
n e e d not e x p e c t Plato to have dwelt o n the matter. 7' I n any case, Euthydemus
3o~c, Phaedrus e99e, a n d n u m e r o u s r e f e r e n c e s in X e n o p h o n ' s Memorabilia
(1.1.2, l . l . 1 9 , 1.3.64, 4.3.16--17, 4.6.4--6) all testify to s o m e extent to Soc-
rates' o r t h o d o x religious behavior. A l t h o u g h X e n o p h o n ' s claims m a y well
e x a g g e r a t e the e x t e n t o f Socratic o r t h o d o x y out o f apologetic fervor, he
nonetheless seems to c o n f i r m a d e g r e e o f traditional practice i n d e p e n d e n t l y
testified to in Plato.
Finally, the philosophical justification for the p e r f o r m a n c e o f sacrifice
and the following o f divine c o m m a n d s is implicit in P3: Socrates would have
e n d o r s e d the m o r a l i m p e r a t i v e o f filial piety (including gifts a n d praise), a n d

7o Socrates also obeys the exhortation of a recurring dream (Phd. 6od-6]c), and such
dreams he regards as containing the commands of a god (Ap, 33c).
7, There is no need for testimony to this effect in the Apology. either, for the charges
against Socrates concern an alleged lack of orthodoxy (and of teaching to that effect), not a
failure to sacrifice. Plato would also not be likely to think that such testimony would be a
philosophically relevant matter to bring up in the Apology,just because of its irrelevance to this
issue of one's possessing the correct intellectual attitude to the gods. Plato surely recognizes that
truly impious people may still sacrifice. Xenophon, on the other hand, should not be expected
to distinguish clearly between practice and belief, and in his zeal to defend Socrates betbre
everyone, to emphasize his sacrificial practice. This is just what we find in the Memorabilia
(e.g., Mere. 1.3. t-4).
306 J O U R N A L OF THE H I S T O R Y OF P H I L O S O P H Y 2 3 : 3 J U L Y 1985
thought it a species of human justice. By analogy, then, we are obligated to
perform acts of respect, gratitude, and obedience to our heavenly ancestors
and masters (though we cannot know what benefits they derive from it
[aside from pleasure]). Beyond this, what makes our obedience a matter of
justice per P3? The early dialogues do not address this issue, but in Xenophon
Socrates argues that we are obligated to be pious on the principle that since
we receive many gifts from the gods we owe them in return what it is ours to
give (e.g., sacrifices and obedience) (Mem. 4.3.15-17). Though this is again
Xenophon, it seems just the. sort of argument Socrates might offer, for it
parallels the argument in the Crito (48d-54 d) for our obligation to our civil
'master', the laws of the state. Socrates may argue on such lines that since we
have received many blessings from the gods since birth, we have thereby
entered into an implicit contract with them to obey their commands. Fur-
thermore, as servants, we are the property of the gods (Phd. 62a-63a): there-
fore, the gods have a claim on our service as the right of property owners
(cf. Ap. 99b ). Finally, we have prudential grounds for satisfying our obliga-
tions, given that the gods are both moral and omniscient. 7~
This analysis also shows how piety is a virtue, and provides the basis for
showing why Socrates conceives of philosophy as a pious duty. Given that we
have entered into an implicit contract with the gods, since it is virtuous to
keep our contracts it is virtuous to be pious. As a virtue, pious activity
naturally gives good results: just those which the gods give us and whatever
end is served by our service. Beyond that, there is the good for ourselves
and others we accomplish by the practice of right philosophy. Socrates is
convinced, after all, that his service to the gods is one of the greatest gifts
Athens could have.
One might get the impression from reading the Apology that Socrates sees
the practice of philosophy as a special--not general---obligation imposed in
his particular case by an order of the god. However, while he does see
himself under orders, other passages indicate that he also views philosophy
as a task everyone ought to undertake, for it improves us and makes life
worth living (Ap. 99e-3ob, 36c, 38a). Does Socrates then think that philoso-
phy is a pious activity only for himself, whereas for others it is a matter of
non-pious prudence? I think not, and for somewhat different reasons than
are usually derived from the Euthyphro to show that philosophy is a pious
obligation. Such arguments usually simply identify the ergon of the gods as
the attempt to instantiate goodness in the world, then suppose that philoso-

7~ None of these considerations imply that our service to the gods is a kind of ~laTtoo~et,
which Socrates seemsto ironically discount (Eu. 14e-15a).
 SOCRATIC PIETY 307
phy is the service which does this, and so conclude in uniformity to P:~ that
piety is nothing other than philosophy. 7:~ Now I think that Socrates would
have found it a likely and worthy belief---one which has or would withstand
the test of the elenchus--that an ergon of the gods is to promote the estab-
lishment of goodness in the world, and that as an activity which helps in this,
philosophy is thus probably a pious activity. Nonetheless, he would object to
those arguments (such as the one above) which presuppose as (i) an item of
infallible knowledge that (ii) the establishment of goodness in the world is the
(only or primary) ergon of the gods. As I have already argued, Socrates
would find it presumptuous to identify with certainty the nature of the gods'
ergon. Furthermore, doing so in the manner of the argument above under-
cuts P~, for if our pious service is simply to help instantiate the good in the
world, then there would not seem to be any non-pious just acts (contra P:~),
and as Versenyi argues, any reference to the gods in P~ then begins to
appear superfluous.
Thus, it seems to me that Socrates may well have held philosophical
activity to be the primary (though not sole) form of pious activity for reasons
additional to those which involve an identification of the gods' ergon. One
such reason might be that since the gods are probably wholly good, it is a
compelling hypothesis that they desire our virtuous happiness. Since philo-
sophical activity in both its constructive and destructive modes aims at the
production of this, and since our service to the gods would seem to call for
us to satisfy their desires, philosophical activity is pious. Moreover, it is only
possible to be a pious person by having a fallible human knowledge of piety;
that is, a nondogmatically held claim to a knowledge recognized to be fallible
which one would therefore always be willing to submit to the elenchus. This
knowledge of piety involves the belief that P:~ is true and not completable in
this mortal life, a tentative claim as to why that is so, and elenctically-tested
beliefs as to what rules of pious action ought to be endorsed. I have briefly
explained what those pragmatic rules are and what it is in P:~ that might
justify them. But given the above requirement that we understand that P:~
cannot be completed in this mortal life, it follows that the practice necessary
to know this is then pious itself on derivative grounds. This practice is simply
the elimination via philosophy (in its destructive mode) of the epistemological
conceit most men have. That is, again, the conceit that we mortals might
possess the certain knowledge of divine things (the god's ergon) which would
complete P3, whereas all that is vouchsafed to us is fallible knowledge.
Philosophical practice in its constructive mode is in turn the justification

73 E.g., Heidel, "On Plato's Euthyphro," 174; C. C. W. Taylor, "The End." 1 13-18.
308 J O U R N A L OF T H E H I S T O R Y OF P H I L O S O P H Y 2 3 : 3 JULY 1985
by m e a n s o f the e l e n c h u s o f those b e l i e f s - - s u c h as the belief that P3 is true
a n d not completable---constitutive o f h u m a n wisdom. TM T h i s activity is pious,
as I suggested, because it is p r o d u c t i v e o f the virtuous h a p p i n e s s which g o o d
gods desire for us. I n s o f a r as this is likely to be a m a t t e r o f c o n c e r n to the
gods, this constructive aspect o f pious philosophical activity d e m a n d s that we
serve the gods by p u t t i n g o u r faith only in those beliefs which we have
rigorously tested via the elenchus. Additionally, we should always r e g a r d
such bits o f h u m a n wisdom with a humility a n d caution which will always
c o n s e n t to their re-testing by elenctic p r o c e d u r e s . 75 T h i s active humility a n d
caution are called for, since as Socrates' practice o f the destructive m o d e o f
the elenchus has r e p e a t e d l y d e m o n s t r a t e d (Ap. 2 1 b - 2 3 b ) , m e n are con-
stantly in d a n g e r o f s u p p o s i n g they have certain knowledge o f b o t h divine
a n d h u m a n matters, a n d that they are thus in no n e e d o f i m p r o v e m e n t .
E u t h y p h r o serves as a p a r a d i g m case o f this danger. Such an attitude is
impious a n d is t h e r e f o r e to be g u a r d e d against because (again) it r e p r e s e n t s
a lack o f k n o w l e d g e o f what is true a b o u t piety (that P~ is not c o m p l e t a b l e by
mortals) a n d because it i m p e d e s m e n f r o m serving the (likely) desire o f the
gods that we i m p r o v e souls a n d p r o d u c e virtuous happiness.
It is thus p a r t o f the p r e c e d i n g account that it is impious to s u p p o s e - -
c o n t r a r y to the correct u n d e r s t a n d i n g o f p i e t y - - t h a t we mortals m a y possess
divine wisdom. H e n c e , in the Euthyphro it is precisely Socrates' pious activity
to attack the impiety u n d e r l y i n g E u t h y p h r o ' s p r e s u m p t u o u s claims, which
take divine things to be possible objects o f certain knowledge for mortals a n d
a reliable source o f m o r a l justification. Philosophy on the Socratic m o d e l is
t h e n a p r i m e case o f pious activity designed to reveal the real epistemic state
o f affairs b e t w e e n m e n a n d gods. T h i s activity r e t u r n s us to a state o f h u m a n

74 Recent important papers on the constructive role of the elenchus are G. Vlastos' "The
Socratic Elenchus" and "Afterthoughts on the Socratic Elenchus," R. Kraut's "Comments on
Professor Vlastos' 'The Socratic Elenchus'," all in Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy L (Oxford,
1983), and Brickhouse's and gmith's "Vlastos on the Elenchus," Oxford Studies in Ancient Philoso-
phy 3 (Oxford: Oxford Univ. Press, t984), 185-95.
75 As an anonymous referee has pointed out to me, Socrates even subjects the pronounce-
ment of the Oracle that no one is wiser than he to an exhaustive examination. Brickhouse and
Smith, "Socrates' Mission," 659-65 , have proposed an interesting explanation for Socrates'
puzzling interpretation of the Oracle's claim as a command of the god (Apollo) to carry out this
examination (Ap. 2 lb-22a). They argue, in essence, that Socrates' interpretation of the Oracle's
claim is predicated upon a notion of piety similar to the one I am proposing, insofar as Socrates
conceived of piety (prior to the Oracle's pronouncement) as a duty to serve the gods in the
manner of slave to master, promoting what is good. On their view, the god has said something
Socrates finds mysterious and paradoxical (Ap. 2 lb), and since anything a master might say to
his servant could conceal a demand for some sort of service on the slave's part, Socrates con-
ceives it to be part of his pious obligation--a religious duty--to discover the meaning of the
god's claim.
 SOCRATIC PIETY 309

wisdom and the correct appraisal of what that activity is epistemically worth.
Piety is also linked to the rest of the virtues by philosophy. That is, the
human knowledge of the virtues sought by philosophy is only possible by
performing a pious activity which, if performed correctly, results in the
proper knowledge of piety.
Socrates' methodological skepticism emerges from the preceding as the
expression of a piety (as Socrates himself claims) more sincere than tradi-
tional Greek piety, which presupposes an extensive knowledge of the gods
(Ap. 35d). It is also an activity grounded in faith in the power of the elenchus
to win for us some measure of human wisdom, as well as a faith in that
divine certainty by which the fallible worth of human knowledge is recog-
nized. Socrates, therefore, emerges from the Euthyphro as not only a hero of
critical rationality, but of a kind of religious faith as well: it might be said
that by rejecting more than we, he out-believed us all.

University of Texas at Arlington