Case Dig
Case Dig
Case Dig
FACTS:
This case at bar arose out of an earlier case with the same G. R. No. promulgated on
October 12, 1998. This particular case involves the resolution of issues raised by
Public Respondents in their Urgent Motion for Reconsideration against the TRO
issued and the Supplemental Motion to the Urgent Motion for Reconsideration that
was the meat of the October 1998 ruling.
The Facts of the case of both cases are as follows:
The Supreme Court had earlier affirmed the conviction of petitioner Leo Echegaray for
raping the minor daughter of his common-law-wife and the corresponding penalty of
death for the said crime.
Petitioner subsequently filed a Motion for Reconsideration raising mainly factual issues
and the constitutionality of R. A. 7659 (the death penalty law) and the imposition of the
death penalty for the crime of rape. The Motion was denied, the Court ruling that the
death penalty was not unconstitutional.
Pending petitioner's execution, Congress changed the mode of execution from
electrocution to lethal injection by passing R. A. 8177.
Petitioner then filed a petition (which was resolved in the October 1998 ruling) for
Prohibition, Injunction and or a Temporary Restraining Order, enjoining the
Respondents from carrying out the execution by lethal injection. Contending that it is
unconstitutional and void for being cruel, degrading and inhuman punishment per set
as well as by reason of its being arbitrary, unreasonable and a violation of due process,
among others.
The Court granted the request for a Temporary Restraining Order and directed the
Respondents to give their Comment on the case.
Respondents filed an urgent motion for Reconsideration against the said TRO and the
Supplemental Motion to Urgent Motion for Reconsideration of the Petitioner. They
submit, among others, that the Court already lost jurisdiction since the Decision in the
case at Bar has already become final and executor, thus its execution has entered the
exclusive ambit of authority of the Executive Authority. And, that, the issuance of the
TRO may be construed as trenching on that sphere of Executive Authority.
ISSUE: Whether or Not the Court has lost Jurisdiction over the case upon the Decision
becoming final and executory.
HELD:
We do not agree with the sweeping submission of the public respondents that this
Court lost its jurisdiction over the case at bar and hence can no longer restrain the
execution of the petitioner. Obviously, public respondents are invoking the rule that
final judgments can no longer be altered in accord with the principle that "it is just as
important that there should be a place to end as there should be a place to begin
litigation." To start with, the Court is not changing even a comma of its final Decision.
Contrary to the submission of the Solicitor General, the rule on finality of judgment
cannot divest this Court of its jurisdiction to execute and enforce the same judgment.
Retired Justice Camilo Quiason synthesized the well established jurisprudence on this
issue as follows:
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the finality of a judgment does not mean that the Court has lost all its powers nor the
case. By the finality of the judgment, what the court loses is its jurisdiction to amend,
modify or alter the same. Even after the judgment has become final the court retains
its jurisdiction to execute and enforce it. There is a difference between the jurisdiction
of the court to execute its judgment and its jurisdiction to amend, modify or alter the
same. The former continues even after the judgment has become final for the purpose
of enforcement of judgment; the latter terminates when the judgment becomes final. .
. . For after the judgment has become final facts and circumstances may transpire
which can render the execution unjust or impossible.
In truth, the arguments of the Solicitor General has long been rejected by this Court.
As aptly pointed out by the petitioner, as early as 1915, this Court has unequivocably
ruled in the case of Director of Prisons v. Judge of First Instance, viz:
This Supreme Court has repeatedly declared in various decisions, which constitute
jurisprudence on the subject, that in criminal cases, after the sentence has been
pronounced and the period for reopening the same cannot change or alter its
judgment, as its jurisdiction has terminated . . . When in cases of appeal or review the
cause has been returned thereto for execution, in the event that the judgment has
been affirmed, it performs a ministerial duty in issuing the proper order. But it does not
follow from this cessation of functions on the part of the court with reference to the
ending of the cause that the judicial authority terminates by having then passed
completely to the Executive. The particulars of the execution itself, which are certainly
not always included in the judgment and writ of execution, in any event are absolutely
under the control of the judicial authority, while the executive has no power over the
person of the convict except to provide for carrying out of the penalty and to pardon.
Getting down to the solution of the question in the case at bar, which is that of
execution of a capital sentence, it must be accepted as a hypothesis that
postponement of the date can be requested. There can be no dispute on this point. It
is a well-known principle that notwithstanding the order of execution and the executory
nature thereof on the date set or at the proper time, the date therefor can be
postponed, even in sentences of death. Under the common law this postponement
can be ordered in three ways: (1) By command of the King; (2) by discretion (arbitrio)
of the court; and (3) by mandate of the law. It is sufficient to state this principle of the
common law to render impossible that assertion in absolute terms that after the convict
has once been placed in jail the trial court can not reopen the case to investigate the
facts that show the need for postponement. If one of the ways is by direction of the
court, it is acknowledged that even after the date of the execution has been fixed, and
notwithstanding the general rule that after the (court) has performed its ministerial duty
of ordering the execution . . . and its part is ended, if however a circumstance arises
that ought to delay the execution, and there is an imperative duty to investigate the
emergency and to order a postponement. Then the question arises as to whom the
application for postponing the execution ought to be addressed while the
circumstances is under investigation and so to who has jurisdiction to make the
investigation.
The power to control the execution of its decision is an essential aspect of jurisdiction.
It cannot be the subject of substantial subtraction for our Constitution vests the entirety
of judicial power in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be established
by law. To be sure, the important part of a litigation, whether civil or criminal, is the
process of execution of decisions where supervening events may change the
circumstance of the parties and compel courts to intervene and adjust the rights of the
litigants to prevent unfairness. It is because of these unforseen, supervening
contingencies that courts have been conceded the inherent and necessary power of
control of its processes and orders to make them conformable to law and justice. For
this purpose, Section 6 of Rule 135 provides that "when by law jurisdiction is conferred
on a court or judicial officer, all auxiliary writs, processes and other means necessary
to carry it into effect may be employed by such court or officer and if the procedure to
be followed in the exercise of such jurisdiction is not specifically pointed out by law or
by these rules, any suitable process or mode of proceeding may be adopted which
appears conformable to the spirit of said law or rules." It bears repeating that what the
Court restrained temporarily is the execution of its own Decision to give it reasonable
time to check its fairness in light of supervening events in Congress as alleged by
petitioner