2022-04-08 Nasa-Std-3001 Vol 2 Rev C Final
2022-04-08 Nasa-Std-3001 Vol 2 Rev C Final
2022-04-08 Nasa-Std-3001 Vol 2 Rev C Final
NASA-STD-3001,
NASA TECHNICAL STANDARD VOLUME 2, REVISION C
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FOREWORD
This NASA Technical Standard is published by the National Aeronautics and Space
Administration (NASA) to provide uniform engineering and technical requirements for
processes, procedures, practices, and methods that have been endorsed as standard for NASA
programs and projects, including requirements for selection, application, and design criteria of an
item. This NASA Technical Standard provides uniform technical requirements for the design,
selection, and application of hardware, software, processes, procedures, practices, and methods
for human-rated systems.
This NASA Technical Standard is approved for use by NASA Headquarters and NASA Centers
and Facilities, and applicable technical requirements may be cited in contract, program, and other
Agency documents. It may also apply to the Jet Propulsion Laboratory (a Federally Funded
Research and Development Center [FFRDC]), other contractors, recipients of grants and
cooperative agreements, and parties to other agreements only to the extent specified or
referenced in applicable contracts, grants, or agreements.
This NASA Technical Standard establishes Agency-wide requirements that minimize health and
performance risks for flight crew in human space flight programs. This NASA Technical
Standard applies to space vehicles, habitats, suits (extravehicular activity [EVA] and
intravehicular activity [IVA]/launch, entry and abort [LEA]), facilities, payloads, and related
equipment with which the crew interfaces during space flight and lunar and planetary, e.g., Mars,
habitation.
04/08/2022
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TABLE OF CONTENTS
SECTION PAGE
1. SCOPE ........................................................................................................................ 15
1.1 Purpose......................................................................................................................... 15
1.2 Applicability ................................................................................................................ 16
1.3 Tailoring ....................................................................................................................... 17
1.4 Authority ...................................................................................................................... 17
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LIST OF APPENDICES
APPENDIX PAGE
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LIST OF FIGURES
FIGURE PAGE
LIST OF TABLES
TABLE PAGE
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1. SCOPE
The scope of this NASA Technical Standard is restricted to human space flight missions and
includes activities affecting crew in all phases of the life cycle (design, development, test,
operations, maintenance), both inside and outside the spacecraft, while on the ground, in space
and on extraterrestrial surfaces.
1.1 Purpose
The purpose of this NASA Technical Standard is to provide uniform technical requirements for
the design, selection, and application of hardware, software, processes, procedures, practices, and
methods for human-rated systems.
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flight, tailoring must take into consideration a lack of emphasis on partial gravity operations and
spacecraft that will be used in both microgravity and partial gravity. This may include
adjustments to existing requirements as well as inclusion of additional requirements to
encompass the same intent as the content of this document. A supplementary NASA document,
NASA/SP-2010-3407, Human Integration Design Handbook (HIDH), can help with the
preparation of the system-specific design requirements. The HIDH is a compendium of human
space flight history and knowledge. It is organized in the same sequence as NASA-STD-3001,
Volume 2, and provides useful background information and research findings. While the HIDH
is not a NASA Technical Standard or a requirement, it should be a resource to understand the
background associated with the standards to prepare the program- or project-specific
requirements. The HIDH can be used not only in the preparation of requirements but also as a
useful tool for designers. A complementary reference document to the HIDH is NASA/TP-2014-
218556, Human Integration Design Processes (HIDP). The HIDP describes the “how-to”
processes, including methodologies and best practices that NASA has used during the
development of crewed space systems and operations.
This NASA Technical Standard addresses the equipment and operational interfaces for both
flight crew and ground personnel. System requirements fall into one of two categories:
• Requirements for the design of systems that directly interface with the flight crew (and
only the flight crew) during a mission are in sections 3 through 11. These requirements
include such topics as environmental support systems, architecture, controls and displays,
and operations.
• Requirements for the design of systems that ground support personnel and/or flight crews
access during assembly, test, checkout, or troubleshooting procedures supporting ground
processing, launch, landing, and recovery operations, including simulations for training
and/or ground operations development/refinement purposes are addressed in section 12.
Section 12 ensures that ground personnel capabilities are accommodated during ground
processing and that the flight hardware will not be damaged during ground operations.
Requirements for these systems consider the unique characteristics, capabilities, and
needs of both the flight crew and ground support personnel.
1.2 Applicability
This NASA Technical Standard is applicable to programs and projects that are required to obtain
a human-rating certification. NPR 8705.2, Human-Rating Requirements for Space Systems,
defines the requirements for space systems. HEOMD-003, Crewed Deep Space Systems Human
Rating Requirements and Standards is a tailoring of NPR 8705.2 for crewed deep space systems.
The intent of this NASA Technical Standard is to be the foundation for the program/project
requirements and verification documentation.
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This NASA Technical Standard is approved for use by NASA Headquarters and NASA Centers
and Facilities, and applicable technical requirements may be cited in contract, program/project,
and other Agency documents. It may also apply to the Jet Propulsion Laboratory (a Federally
Funded Research and Development Center [FFRDC]), other contractors, recipients of grants and
cooperative agreements, and parties to other agreements only to the extent specified or
referenced in applicable contracts, grants, or agreements.
This NASA Technical Standard applies to all internationally provided space systems only if
required and documented in distinct separate agreements such as joint or multilateral agreements.
The NASA Technical Authorities—Health and Medical Technical Authority (HMTA), Chief
Engineer, and Chief, Safety and Mission Assurance—assess NASA programs and projects for
compliance with NASA-STD-3001. If the program or project does not meet the provisions of
this NASA Technical Standard, then the associated risk to the health, safety, and performance of
the crew is evaluated by the Technical Authorities.
Verifiable requirement statements are designated by the acronym “V2” (Volume 2), numbered,
and indicated by the word “shall.” Explanatory or guidance text is indicated in italics beginning
in section 3. To facilitate requirements selection and verification by NASA programs and
projects, a Requirements Compliance Matrix is provided in Appendix D, Table 38.
1.3 Tailoring
As per NPR 7120.5, NASA Space Flight Program and Project Management Requirements,
tailoring is the process used to adjust or seek relief from a prescribed requirement to
accommodate the needs of a specific task or activity (e.g., program or project). Tailoring is both
an expected and accepted part of establishing proper requirements. The tailoring of the
requirements and associated waivers and deviations from this NASA Technical Standard for
application to a specific program or project shall be formally documented as part of program or
project requirements and require formal approval from the HMTA/OCHMO in accordance with
NPR 7120.5.
1.4 Authority
NASA policy for establishing standards to provide health, performance, and medical programs
for crewmembers during all phases of space flight and to protect the health, performance, and
safety of the crew is authorized by NPD 1000.3, The NASA Organization, and NPD 8900.5,
NASA Health and Medical Policy for Human Space Exploration.
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2. APPLICABLE DOCUMENTS
2.1 General
The documents listed in this section contain provisions that constitute requirements of this
NASA Technical Standard as cited in the text.
2.1.1 The latest issuances of cited documents apply unless specific versions are designated.
NASA
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ANSI C78-377 (see Electric Lamps - Specifications for the Chromaticity of Solid
NEMA C78.377) State Lighting (SSL) Products
ANSI/ASA S2.70 Guide for the Measurement and Evaluation of Human Exposure
(2006) to Vibration Transmitted to the Hand
ANSI LIA Z136.1 American National Standard for Safe Use of Lasers
(2014)
ASTM International
ASTM F2291-20 Standard Practice for Design of Amusement Rides and Devices
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IEEE C95.1™ IEEE Standard for Safety Levels with Respect to Human
Exposure to Electric, Magnetic, and Electromagnetic Fields, 0 Hz
to 300 GHz
ISO 7731:2003(E) Ergonomics -- Danger signals for public and work areas --
Auditory danger signals
2.4.1 The requirements and standard practices established in this NASA Technical
Standard do not supersede or waive existing requirements and standard practices found in other
Agency documentation.
2.4.2 Conflicts between this NASA Technical Standard and other requirements documents
will be resolved by the delegated Technical Authority.
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a. Gravitational Environment,
b. Full Mission Duration (see section 3.1.1),
c. Time to receive terrestrial medical capability,
d. Radiation Environment,
e. Spacesuit Capability (see Appendix E, spacesuit),
f. Destination,
g. Mission Phase, or
h. Other definable mission parameter.
As per NPR 7120.5, during the systems requirements phase of program or project development,
the appropriate requirements will be deemed applicable based on the program mission
parameters. Refer to Figure 1, Applicability, Tailoring, and Verification of Requirements for
Human Space Flight Programs/Projects, for the process of applicability, tailoring, and
verification of requirements for programs or projects.
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Applicability
Selection of which standards
are applicable to a program.
Program-Specific Requirements
A detailed requirement levied on a Program-Specific Requirement: Detailed verifiable
requirement based on a unique program’s detailed
program that must be verified. If not
mission operations and defined task. May be the same as
met, a waiver must be initiated and a standard—“Agency requirement.”
approved.
In order to protect human health and performance from exposures or conditions that have a
cumulative effect, requirements will be tailored into program requirements pertaining to the full
mission duration (from launch of crew through their landing back on Earth) for each human
space flight vehicle or habitat which is used to conduct one or more segments of a multi-segment
or multi-vehicle mission, even if their isolated segment would have allowed for higher exposures
on its own.
Missions may be comprised of consecutive segments that occur in different vehicles, take place
in different locations in space with varying distances from Earth, and last for different durations.
Many requirements that pertain to cumulative exposures and conditions (such as Permissible
Exposure Limits) have been tailored (relaxed) to accommodate short missions occurring in
single vehicles. However, for multi-segment or multi-vehicle missions, cumulative exposure over
the entire duration of the mission needs to be considered. Exposure in one vehicle that is
occupied for a segment of the full mission duration cannot be taken in isolation of the rest of the
mission. It is not advisable for each vehicle to maintain its own short duration exposure
requirements and expect other vehicles or habitats in the mission to lower their exposure limits
to compensate for a higher exposure level in another vehicle. Similarly, a vehicle cannot expect
other vehicles within the enterprise to compensate for lack of countermeasures in that vehicle.
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This NASA Technical Standard is tightly linked with NPR 7123.1, NASA Systems Engineering
Processes and Requirements, and NPR 8705.2. NPR 7123.1 requires a human-centered design
(HCD) process along with a Human Systems Integration Plan (HSIP). The HCD process is
characterized by task analysis, prototyping, early user involvement, and iterative, developmental
human-in-the-loop (HITL) testing. The HSIP includes guidance for integrating the
implementation of integration of human considerations into the system acquisition and
development processes to enhance human system design, reduce life-cycle ownership cost, and
optimize total system performance. NASA HSI domains include human factors engineering,
operations, safety, training, maintainability and supportability, and habitability and
environment. These six NASA HSI domains are considered concurrently and integrated with all
other systems engineering design activities. NPR 8705.2 requires the program/project to
establish a human-systems integration team to support the implementation of the HSIP. NASA-
STD-3001 extends human-centric design and HSI as outlined in NPR 7123.1 and NPR 8705.2.
[V2 3006] Each human space flight program or project shall perform a human-centered task
analysis to support systems and operations design.
[Rationale: A task analysis is a methodical and iterative process that analyzes tasks allocated to
the human by decomposing individual tasks into simpler actions (task steps) and identifying the
task parameters and conditions that can either enable or constrain human interface interactions,
including identification of information required to perform the task. The focus of the task
analysis is on the human and how they interact, both physically and mentally, with the hardware,
software, procedures, and other users of the system to perform the tasks. It spans all mission
phases and includes nominal, maintenance, contingency, and emergency operations. A task
analysis may be performed for any human interaction with the system and is not restricted to
flight crew.
The task analysis can be initiated as early as the Concept and Technology Development phase,
when baseline mission concepts, requirements, technologies, and the human role are being
defined. As design concepts are iteratively evaluated and matured, task definitions are refined.
By the critical design phase, the task analysis should be a mature product. A task analysis can
continue to be iteratively updated after the critical design phase and even after certification to
reflect changes in design or operational use between missions. Task analysis can be used in the
development or identification of gaps in requirements. The analysis is used to drive design,
developmental HITL evaluation, and verification efforts for task effectiveness, efficiency,
satisfaction and safety. It also informs the development of human error analysis, operational
procedures, and training. Task analysis is critical to the implementation and verification of
numerous other standards. For more information, see 4.1 in the HIDP.
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Task analysis will be updated and delivered throughout the development lifecycle as contractual
data requirements in Statements of Work, Data Requirements Documents (DRDs), Data
Procurement Documents (DPDs), and/or relevant Verification Closure Notices (VCNs).]
[V2 3102] Each human space flight program or project shall perform a task-based human error
analysis (HEA) to support systems and operations design.
[Rationale: HEA is a systematic approach to evaluate human actions and identify potential
human error, consequences, and mitigations. Potential human errors include inadvertent
operator actions, failure to perform an action, performing a wrong action, performing an action
incorrectly, and performing an action with incorrect timing. The intent of the HEA is to identify
human error and apply the appropriate error management to mitigate its effect on the system by
designing the system according to the following precedence: (1) prevent the error, (2) reduce the
likelihood of the error and provide the capability for detection in time to correct and recover,
and (3) limit the negative effects of the error.
HEA spans all mission phases and includes nominal, contingency, and emergency operations,
including ground operations when crew is present. It includes interactions with hardware,
software, procedures, and other users of the system. Since the number of tasks associated with a
system’s operation and maintenance can be immense, the HEA should focus on those tasks, as
defined by task analysis and safety hazard analyses, that are most important to mission success,
starting with those that could result in catastrophic failure.
The HEA is used to identify and mitigate error traps in design and assist in scoping the selection
of task sequences and scenarios for HITL verification testing. The HEA will be updated and
delivered throughout the development lifecycle as contractual data requirements in either
Statements of Work, Data Requirements Documents (DRDs), Data Procurement Documents
(DPDs) and/or Verification Closure Notices (VCNs). A summary of the human error analysis
performed and how the results influenced the system design is required to be included in the
Human Error Analysis Summary Report in the Human Rating Certification Package at each
lifecycle milestone design review.]
[V2 3101] Each human space flight program or project shall perform iterative HITL testing
throughout the design and development cycle.
[Rationale: As a key component of the HCD process as defined in Human Integration Design
Process (NASA/TP-2014-218556) and the HSI process as defined by the NASA Human Systems
Integration Handbook (NASA/SP-20210010952), iterative testing is an important method for
identifying issues early, when changes are affordable and feasible. It is a structured way to
mature the design and to track readiness for verification. Iterative HITL testing is required
throughout the design and development cycle to identify issues related to usability, operability,
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workload, situation awareness, display design, and commonality. Test report products and
evidence of the influence of outcome on design are to be delivered throughout the development
lifecycle as contractual data requirements in the Statement of Work, Program and Design
Milestone entry and exit criteria, or Data Procurement Documents.]
Physical characteristics and capabilities include body dimensions, range of motion, mass,
volume, surface area, and strength. It is important that the design of equipment, including
vehicles, spacesuits, and other interfaces, accommodates the physical characteristics of the
entire user population. Adjustments for the effects of external factors such as gravity
environments, clothing, pressurization, and deconditioning related to mission duration are to be
included in the design.
A system designed for human use or habitation must accommodate the range of human
characteristics and capabilities relevant to the system and operating environment for the NASA-
defined crew population. Datasets are provided that include characteristics and capabilities for
anthropometric dimensions, range of motion, strength, mass, volume, and surface area. The
datasets and their supplemental information in Appendix F, Physical Characteristics and
Capabilities, take into account human characteristics such as age, sex, and physical condition as
well as mission characteristics such as clothing and suit pressurization.
[V2 4102] The system shall ensure the range of potential crewmembers can fit, reach, view, and
operate the human systems interfaces by accommodating crewmembers with the anthropometric
dimensions and ranges of motion as defined in data sets in Appendix F, Physical Characteristics
and Capabilities, Sections F.2 and F.3.
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[Rationale: All crewmembers need to be able to perform any planned tasks efficiently and
effectively. Physical crew interfaces need to be located within the visible and functional reach
limits of the worst case (i.e., most limited) crewmember in his/her working posture using the
most encumbering equipment and clothing anticipated. Design constraints may dictate layouts
or tasks that force a crewmember to move, twist, or stretch into awkward positions. However, the
system design must not require the crewmember to achieve ranges of motion outside those
defined in Appendix F. When applied to suit design, the suit must allow an unpressurized and
pressurized suited crewmember to achieve the entire range of motion defined in the appendix.
The suit must be designed to allow for suited crewmembers to operate in an independently
designed vehicle or habitat, and the vehicle or habitat must not require a range of motion a suit
cannot provide.
The intent of this requirement is to accommodate the entire potential user population, not just
meet the criteria in the datasets, which provide the most frequently used values in standard
reference postures. When a design requires a posture outside of the standard reference posture,
such as rotation from upright to recumbent seating, minimum and maximum values for the new
posture must be developed for the unique design posture.
Identification of a posture, dimension, or range of motion not provided in the table needs
coordination and concurrence from NASA Stakeholders. When a system must accommodate a
suited crewmember, an additional suited dataset can be provided that accurately identifies suited
human dimensions. A tailored data set may be provided by NASA based on program or mission
specific criteria, especially when a specific spacesuit has been identified.]
[V2 4103] The system shall accommodate the body characteristic data for mass, volume, and
surface area as defined in Appendix F, Physical Characteristics and Capabilities, Sections F.4,
F.5, and F.6.
[Rationale: Depending on mission or design requirements, system developers could need body
mass, volume, and body surface area data that accurately describe the entire size range of
potential crewmembers.
Surface area data could be needed when assessing radiation exposure or designing a body
contact cooling system. Volume data may be needed for center of gravity or buoyancy
calculations.
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Body mass data can describe both whole body mass and body segment mass. In addition to
simple body mass, data includes centers of gravity and moments of inertia. Body mass data is
important for multiple systems. Propulsion and dynamic systems calculations depend on
accurate data of crewmember mass to size hardware systems and design proper vehicle dynamic
controls. Body mass data is used to characterize forces exerted between crewmembers and
equipment such as body support systems (e.g. seats, brackets, and restraints) under all
anticipated acceleration and gravity environments. Body segment centers of gravity may be an
important design consideration for crewmember balance and stability during dynamic mission
phases or for understanding how loads are distributed during acceleration. Guidance on the
evaluation of design using body characteristic data can be found in NASA/TP-2014-218556
Human Integration Design Process (HIDP).
The intent of this requirement is to accommodate the entire potential user population, not just
meet the criteria in the datasets provided, which provide the most frequently used values.
Identification of body characteristic data not provided in the table needs coordination and
concurrence from NASA Stakeholders. A tailored set may be provided by NASA based on
program or mission specific criteria.]
All crewmembers need to be able to perform any planned tasks efficiently and effectively, without
risk of injury and without undue concern of the hardware sustaining damage. Human-System
Interfaces need to accommodate both the minimum and maximum anticipated strength of
potential crewmembers. Strength refers to a person’s ability to generate force. The system must
withstand the load that is imparted and must not require excessive forces to operate.
[V2 4104] The system shall be operable by crew during all phases of flight, including prelaunch,
ascent, orbit, entry, and postlanding, with the lowest anticipated strength as defined in Appendix
F, Physical Characteristics and Capabilities, Section F.7.
[Rationale: All crewmembers need to be able to perform any planned tasks efficiently and
effectively. The crew operating load data in Appendix F defines the lowest anticipated forces that
can be applied by crewmembers in unsuited, suited-unpressurized, and suited-pressurized
conditions, taking into account deconditioning and factors of safety for critical tasks. A task
analysis that identifies planned crew tasks, hardware interfaces, expected postures, and task
criticality, frequency, and duration is used with Appendix F to define the maximum acceptable
value for actuation and continued operation of hardware interfaces. Guidance on the evaluation
of design using crewmember strength data can be found in NASA/TP-2014-218556 Human
Integration Design Process (HIDP).
The intent of this requirement is to accommodate the entire potential user population, not just
meet the criteria in the datasets provided, which provide the most frequently used values.
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Identification of postures or forces not provided in the table needs coordination and concurrence
from NASA Stakeholders. A tailored data set may be provided by NASA based on program or
mission specific criteria.]
[V2 4105] The system shall withstand forces imparted by the crew during all phases of flight,
including prelaunch, ascent, orbit, entry, and postlanding, as defined in Appendix F, Physical
Characteristics and Capabilities, Section F.7 without sustaining damage.
The intent of this requirement is to accommodate the entire potential user population, not just
meet the criteria in the datasets provided, which provide the most frequently used values.
Identification of postures or forces not provided in the table needs coordination and concurrence
from NASA Stakeholders. A tailored data set may be provided by NASA based on program or
mission specific criteria.]
Deleted:
[V2 4001] Requirement merged into [V2 4102], [V2 4103], [V2 4104], and [V2 4105].
Deleted:
[V2 4002] Requirement merged into [V2 4102], [V2 4103], [V2 4104] and [V2 4105].
Deleted:
[V2 4003] Requirement merged into [V2 4102], [V2 4103], [V2 4104] and [V2 4105].
Deleted:
[V2 4004] Requirement merged into [V2 4102], [V2 4103], [V2 4104] and [V2 4105].
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Deleted:
Deleted:
Deleted:
Deleted:
Deleted:
Deleted:
Deleted:
Deleted:
[V2 4012] Requirement split into [V2 4104] and [V2 4105].
[V2 4013] The effects of muscle endurance and fatigue shall be factored into system design.
[Rationale: Tasks with high force requirements and repetitive tasks (even with low force
requirements) can cause fatigue. The crew task analysis is to identify factors that can lead to
overexertion or fatigue such as task frequency, duration, repetitive motions, high forces, current
and previous gravity environments and duration, suit configuration, etc. The applicable factors
are needed for NASA to provide an appropriate strength dataset and they should be considered
in designs for crewmember operation. Apollo EVA crew reported forearm muscle fatigue due to
repetitive force exertion to grasp and manipulate items while wearing pressurized gloves. The
issue was exacerbated by the design of the gloves having fingers that returned to extended
position rather than neutral, curved position requiring the crew to exert additional, unproductive
movement and force. The effects of muscle fatigue may be mitigated through task design that
includes providing mechanical aids, recovery rest periods, or varies the use of muscle groups.
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[V2 4015] The system shall be operable by crewmembers with the aerobic capacity as defined in
NASA-STD-3001, Volume 1.
[Rationale: An individual’s aerobic capacity determines the ability to perform a task at a given
level of work. The aerobic capacity in conjunction with the operational concept provides an
upper bound for oxygen (O2) demand, carbon dioxide (CO2) production, heat rejection
requirements, etc. This information is vital for all spacecraft Environmental Control and Life
Support System (ECLSS) designs, including the EVA suits. This information would help in sizing
the primary and emergency O2 systems, scrubbers, etc., and help the engineers perform trade
studies on various designs based on the operational scenarios and metabolic expenditure.]
For detailed discussions regarding human performance capabilities, e.g., visual perception,
auditory perception, cognition, and workload, see chapter 5, Human Performance Capabilities,
of the HIDH. For detailed discussions regarding the design of user interfaces, e.g., visual
acquisition of displays, visual displays, layout of displays and controls, see chapter 10, Crew
Interfaces, of the HIDH.
Visual capabilities include, at a minimum, visual acuity, spatial contrast sensitivity, visual
accommodation, field of regard, color discrimination, stereoscopic depth perception, and
temporal contrast sensitivity. Further explanation of these terms can be found in Appendix C,
Definitions, of this NASA Technical Standard.
[V2 5001] The system shall accommodate anticipated levels of crew visual capabilities under
expected task demands.
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[Rationale: Design of interface elements such as text, graphics, and icons, as well as design of
the display itself and its placement relative to the user, are to ensure that relevant visual
information is visible and readable (text) or interpretable (graphical icons or symbols) while a
crewmember performs mission tasks. Determination of anticipated levels of crewmember
capability and anticipated levels of task demands is based on a detailed task analysis.]
[V2 5002] The system shall accommodate anticipated levels of crew auditory perceptual
capabilities under expected task demands.
[V2 5003] The system shall accommodate anticipated levels of crew sensorimotor capabilities
under expected task demands.
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[V2 5004] The system shall accommodate anticipated levels of crew cognitive capabilities under
expected tasks demands.
[Rationale: Cognitive capabilities include attention, memory, decision making, problem solving,
logical reasoning, and spatial cognition applied in both an individual and team. Accommodating
cognitive performance capabilities is important to ensure optimal task performance and crew
safety. Design of hardware, including displays and controls, and software, including problem-
solving aids, is to take into account the capabilities and limitations of humans to acquire,
interpret, and retain information such that the relevant information is available and intelligible.
Tasks assigned to humans are to be those best-suited to humans (i.e., dealing with unexpected
events or complex problem solving). Tasks requiring memory, calculations, and speed are to be
assigned to computer automation. This approach considers the relative strengths of the human
versus the computer and minimizes risk of errors by assigning tasks accordingly. This is
especially important during space flight, where microgravity can cause deconditioning and
affect spatial orientation, and where stress can affect several cognitive processes. For detailed
discussions regarding the effects of stress on cognitive performance, see chapter 5, Human
Performance Capabilities, of the HIDH. Determination of anticipated levels of crew capability
and anticipated levels of task demands is based on a detailed task analysis with consideration of
all nominal, off-nominal, and emergency scenarios, including those of low probability.]
Deleted:
Moved:
Moved:
Deleted:
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human performance such as crew station layout and lighting are discussed in section 8,
Architecture, in this NASA Technical Standard. Overall, the system’s environment is to be
compatible with tasks to be performed and promote crew health and performance.
[V2 6001] The system shall provide environmental monitoring data in formats compatible with
performing temporal trend analyses.
[Rationale: Requirements are to consider all environmental parameters that may require trend
analysis for a given mission. Trending of environmental parameters such as internal atmosphere
constituents, temperature, humidity, water, acoustics, radiation, acceleration and dynamic loads
see sections 6.2 through 6.8 in this NASA Technical Standard for the detailed requirements) is
necessary for both anticipating harmful conditions before they occur and troubleshooting using
previously stored data. To properly trend, aspects of the data such as the measurement rate are
also to be considered, as some parameters may otherwise only be measured infrequently.]
A safe, breathable atmosphere is critical to human health and performance. Early identification
of potential air quality issues enables mitigation by design. Monitoring atmospheric quality and
evaluating trends are essential. The system is to be robust enough to control or allow crew
control of atmospheric pressure, humidity, temperature, ventilation flow rate, airborne
particulates, inspired partial pressure of O2 (PIO2), partial pressure of CO2 (ppCO2), and trace
contaminants within ranges necessary to maintain task performance and human health and
safety. Although the following requirements address these components individually, they must be
considered as a whole because they are dependent on each other. Additional information about
the interplay among internal atmosphere components and the effects on the human is available
in section 6.2 of the HIDH. An iterative process should be employed to integrate the human
system internal atmospheric limits into the design process, ensuring optimization of the design to
afford the most protection possible, within other constraints of the vehicle systems. Atmospheric
requirements specific to suited operations can be found in section 11.1, Suit Design and
Operations, in this NASA Technical Standard.
[V2 6002] Cabin atmospheric composition shall contain at least 30% diluent gas (assuming
balance oxygen).
[Rationale: This mitigates clinically significant absorption atelectasis. The assumption is that
the diluent gas will be nitrogen (N2). Use of helium (He) or argon (Ar) has been considered, but
would affect decompression sickness (DCS), thermal and ventilation requirements. Validation
and verification of alternate diluent gases must be adjudicated by program medical team and
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another requirement set be developed. Measurable oxygen absorption atelectasis (lung collapse)
occurs with fractions of oxygen above 50%. A diluent gas is required to prevent excessive levels
of oxygen absorption atelectasis during prolonged exposures, in addition to reducing the
ignition/flammability threshold. Unacceptable risk occurs when breathing less than 20% diluent.
Although oxygen absorption atelectasis can be observed in the 25-50% diluent range, clinical
and space flight experience shows that diluent fractions as low as 25% maintain acceptable
levels of pulmonary function for long duration space flight activities. The choice of diluent gas is
dependent on many factors, including physiological activity and contribution to (DCS).
Reference [V2 6003] O2 Partial Pressure Range for Crew Exposure in this NASA Technical
Standard for hyperoxic/hypoxic limits. Clinically significant atelectasis is unlikely when
combining the expected habitat total pressures (typically 8.2 to 14.7 psia) with the hyperoxic
bounds established in Table 1, Inspired Oxygen Partial Pressure Exposure Ranges.]
[V2 6003] The system shall maintain inspired oxygen partial pressure (PIO2) in accordance with
Table 1, Inspired Oxygen Partial Pressure Exposure Ranges.
[Rationale: For all systems, the range of ambient dry-gas ppO2 is to be considered in the
context of PIO2. Since physiological limits for hypoxic (and hyperoxic) exposure during space
flight are unknown, systems designed for humans are to be normoxic unless strong rationale is
provided for an alternative suggestion. For confined and enclosed spaces at sea level, the
Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) defines oxygen-deficient atmosphere as
<19.5% oxygen by volume, and oxygen-enriched atmosphere as >23.5% oxygen by volume
(Electronic Code of Federal Regulations, 1910.146(b)(3), current through July 29, 2021 ) with a
correlating normoxic PIO2 range between 139-168 mmHg. The OSHA-enriched atmospheric
limit is more applicable to material flammability than human hyperoxic limit. Hyperoxia limits
are provided to allow needed prebreathe and if necessary, DCS treatment. It is generally
accepted that there are no medical or performance issues with constant exposure to one-half an
atmosphere of O2 partial pressure (Clarke, J.M., Oxygen Toxicity [Chapter 6]. The Physiology
and Medicine of Diving [4th ed], Bennett, P.B., Elliott, D.H. [eds]. W.B. Saunders Company Ltd:
Philadelphia, 1993, pp. 153-69); this is a pp O2 of 7.35 psia, or 380 mmHg, or as PIO2, it is 333
mmHg. NASA operates the extravehicular mobility unit (EMU) at 4.3 psia with 100% O2, so this
is a pp O2 of 222 mmHg; or as PIO2, it would be 175 mmHg, and there are no performance or
medical issues to date with this limit. A practical and defensible hyperoxic exposure limit would
be a PIO2 of 333 mmHg with the assumption that adaptations to microgravity do not modify this
terrestrial limit. As far as a hypoxic limit, it has been shown that a mildly hypoxic vehicle system
atmosphere as part of a denitrogenation protocol to reduce the risk of DCS is advantageous
during space flight (e.g., shuttle 10.2 psia/26.5% O2), as well as recommended by the
Exploration Atmospheres Working Group and endorsed by Human Exploration and Operations
Mission Directorate (Exploration Atmospheres, HEOMD memo, February 2013). There is no
indication on Earth that living and working with chronic PIO2 of 127 mmHg degrades health or
performance. There are no indications or predictions based on limited past experience that
extending exposure time with PIO2 of 127 mmHg in micro or partial gravity past 7 days leads to
degradation of health or performance in otherwise healthy astronauts. There is no opportunity to
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collect data in microgravity with PIO2 of 127 mmHg to cover the durations of Exploration Class
missions, so a health monitoring and mitigation plan are required to implement this condition.
These guiding PIO2 values may change as further research yields information to better define the
physiological limits and acceptable duration for an alternative space flight system environment.]
[V2 6004] The system shall limit the average one-hour CO2 partial pressure (ppCO2) in the
habitable volume to no more than 3 mmHg.
[Rationale: Achieving this level is dependent on individual and total crew generation of CO2 for
all planned activities (factoring in metabolic rates and respiratory quotient), appropriate CO2
scrubbing and adequate ventilation flow rates to ensure that no localized pockets of CO2 are
generated throughout the habitat. Considerations from other payloads that generate CO2 are to
be taken into account of these totals.
Note: Off-nominal CO2 values are not included within this NASA Technical Standard due to the
unique circumstances of each mission (expected human performance, duration of exposure,
access to medical care, etc.) and will be derived as a lower level program/project requirement.]
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[V2 6006] The system shall maintain the pressure to which the crew is exposed to between
26.2 kPa < pressure ≤ 103 kPa (3.8 psia < pressure ≤ 14.9 psia) for indefinite human exposure
without measurable impairments to health or performance.
[Rationale: Designers and physiologists have to evaluate and trade off the various atmospheric
combinations. A low total pressure is desirable because it allows simple transfer to a low-
pressure EVA suit. (Low pressure EVA suits are less stiff and allow greater range of motion.)
Low total pressure requires a higher percentage of oxygen in the atmosphere to provide an
acceptable ppO2. Oxygen-rich atmospheres, however, present safety hazards because of their
ability to feed fires. The lowest pressure at which normoxia (PIO2 = 149 mmHg) is maintained at
100% O2 is 3.8 psia. Total pressure has to be considered in conjunction with O2 and CO2
requirements. Under certain spacesuit operations (e.g., DCS treatment, leak checks), the
crewmember may be exposed to pressure above or below this range for a limited period of time.]
[V2 6007] For pressure changes >1.0 psi, the rate of change of total internal vehicle pressure
shall not exceed 13.5 psi/min.
[Rationale: This rate of pressure change is used across numerous environments and provides a
good boundary for human tolerance. This rate of change helps decrease risk of injury to
crewmembers’ ears and lungs during depressurization and repressurization but does not replace
the [V2 6150] Barotrauma Prevention requirement. Microgravity may have affected head and
sinus congestion and is therefore much more conservative than the 30 psi/min (1550 mmHg/min)
(75 ft/min) descent rate limit allowed by the U.S. Navy Diving Manual. The negative rate of
change limit is consistent with the U.S. Navy Diving Manual 13.5 psi/min (700 mmHg/min) (30
ft/min) ascent rate allowance, which is used primarily for DCS prevention, not barotrauma
prevention. For transient pressure changes ≤ 1.0 psi, the rate of change of total internal vehicle
pressure can exceed 13.5 psi/min.]
[V2 6150] During a commanded pressure change, the system shall pause within 1 psi of the
pause command being issued by the unsuited or suited crewmember, with ability to increase or
decrease pressure as needed after the pause.
[Rationale: During all intentional pressure changes, crewmembers may need to pause the
pressure change within the system allowing additional time to adjust to the change in pressure
and to avoid barotrauma. If the pause does not alleviate discomfort, the crewmember needs to be
able to reverse the direction of the pressure change. This could be necessary if a crewmember is
unable to equalize pressure in their ears and sinuses.]
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[V2 6008] Each program shall define mission unique DCS mitigation strategies to achieve the
level of acceptable risk of DCS as defined below within 95% statistical confidence:
[Rationale: DCS risk limits have been defined to develop coordinated requirements for the
habitat (e.g., vehicle, EVA suit) including total pressure, ppO2 and prebreathe before vehicle or
suit depressurization, which are all variables in DCS risk.]
[Rationale: DCS is a potential hazard of space flight and EVA because of changes in the
operational pressure environment. Rapid and appropriate intervention is required to optimize
the outcome for the affected crewmember. If treatment for DCS is instituted quickly, the outcome
of therapy has a higher probability of success and will likely require less magnitude and
duration of hyperbaric O2 therapy.
It is important, therefore, to have the crewmember back to his/her initial saturation pressure as
soon as possible, which may resolve DCS symptoms. Initial saturation pressure is defined as the
highest pressure to which the crewmember has been exposed during the 36 hours before
beginning the EVA. If not addressed quickly, higher pressures may be required to address DCS
symptoms. The U.S. Navy Treatment, Table 6, Oxygen Treatment of Type II Decompression
Sickness (treatment in a hyperbaric treatment facility) found in the U.S Navy Diving Manual, is
the terrestrial standard for treating most forms of DCS; however, the terrestrial standard may
not be achievable, or required, because the resources required to support it would be
prohibitive, and the expected outcomes from sub-terrestrial standard therapy are likely to be
adequate for altitude-induced DCS symptoms.]
[V2 6011] For nominal post landing operations, the system shall limit RH to the levels in
Table 2, Average Relative Humidity Exposure Limits for Post Landing Operations.
[Rationale: Average humidity is to be maintained above the lower limits stated to ensure that
the environment is not too dry for the nominal functioning of mucous membranes. During low
humidity exposures, additional water is to be provided to the crew to prevent dehydration.
Humidity is to be maintained below the upper limits for crew comfort to allow for effective
evaporation and to limit the formation of condensation. In unsuited scenarios, high RH may
interfere with the nominal evaporation process that enables perspiration to cool the body. Thus,
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high RH in warm environments can pose an additional hazard for core body temperature
excess.]
Table 2—Average Relative Humidity Exposure Limits for Post Landing Operations
Average RH Time Allowed
25% < RH ≤ 75% (nominal range1) Indefinite2
75% < RH ≤ 85% 24 hr3
85% < RH ≤ 95% 12 hr3
95% < RH 8 hr3
1. Nominal humidity range is included for completeness.
2. Assumes temperature is within nominal range in accordance with requirement [V2 6012] Crew Health Environmental
Limits in this NASA Technical Standard.
3. Only after doffing a suit post landing; duration may be shorter if temperature is outside nominal range (specified in
requirement [V2 6012] Crew Health Environmental Limits in this NASA Technical Standard).
Deleted:
[V2 6012] The system shall maintain levels of cabin humidity and temperature within the
boundaries of the Operating Limits as shown in Figure 2, Crew Health Environmental Limits, to
protect for crew health during pressurized operations when crew occupies the cabin, excluding
suited operations, ascent, entry, landing, and post landing.
[Rationale: The intent of the Crew Health Environmental Limits is to provide the range of cabin
humidity and temperature that protects crew health. Figure 2 is based on ASHRAE 55 and
anchored at 18°C and 75% humidity on the upper left corner and 27 °C and 25% humidity on
the lower right corner. Operations outside of these boundaries may cause crewmembers to
experience health impacts (dry, stuffy and/or irritated mucous membranes), skin rashes (due to
microbial growth at high humidity levels) thermal discomfort (overheating depending on tasks)
and/or decreased performance. From an engineering perspective, average humidity is to be
maintained above this lower limit (25%) to ensure that the environment is not too dry to prevent
static electricity buildup within the cabin, which could pose an electrical hazard to crew and a
possible ignition hazard. Refer to [V2 6013] Crew Health and Performance Environmental Zone
for the range that protects for both health and performance. This requirement does not apply to
EVA suits. Corresponding EVA suit requirements addressing temperature, humidity, pressure,
and other elements that affect comfort in a spacesuit are defined in section 11 of this NASA
Technical Standard.]
F
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[V2 6013] The system shall be capable of reaching atmospheric humidity and temperatures of
nominally occupied habitable volumes within the zone provided in Figure 3, Crew Performance
Environmental Zone, during all nominal operations, excluding suited operations, ascent, entry,
landing, and post landing.
[Rationale: This temperature zone is defined as the operating zone of environmental conditions
in which humans can achieve thermal comfort and not have their performance of routine
activities affected by thermal stress. Operating outside of this zone will cause performance
decrements and impact productivity. Due to individual variability among crewmembers and the
likelihood of different crewmembers performing different tasks at different metabolic rates, it is
necessary to have the capability to change temperature set points, adjust localized air flow,
and/or have various clothing options available to achieve thermal comfort for all crew. Studies
of office working environments and OSHA recommendations generally find these atmospheric
parameters (20°C -25°C and 30-60% humidity) to support human comfort and performance
(T.M. Ikaheimo, 2014; Seppanen, Fisk, & Lei, 2006; OSHA Policy on Indoor Air Quality: Office
Temperature/Humidity and Environmental Tobacco Smoke, 2003).]
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[V2 6151] The system shall provide selectable set points for internal atmosphere temperature in
step sizes no greater than 0.5°C increments in the habitable volume.
[Rationale: The intent of this requirement is to allow the crew to adjust the temperature to
accommodate crew performance and provide some adjustment for crew preference. It is
expected that the system can be set to temperatures in the environmental operating range (per
[V2 6012] Crew Health Environmental Limits) and the system will accommodate those
temperatures if the capability exists.]
[V2 6152] The system shall be capable of adjusting temperature in the habitable volume by at
least 1°C/hr.
[Rationale: The cabin temperature needs to be capable of being adjusted in a timely manner (1°
Celsius per hour) in order to accommodate real-time crew activities, performance, and crew
preference.]
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Deleted:
[V2 7041] The system environmental control shall accommodate the increased O2 consumption
and additional output of heat, CO2, perspiration droplets, odor, and particulates generated by the
crew in an exercise area.
[Rationale: The ppO2 in the exercise area(s) is to be maintained at normal levels; otherwise, the
required physiological capabilities of crewmembers may be impaired. This requirement also
addresses any particulate that may be generated by the exercise activity, e.g., skin, hair, or lint
from clothing or other materials.]
[V2 6017] The system shall allow for local and remote control of atmospheric pressure,
humidity, temperature, ventilation, and ppO2.
[Rationale: The ability to control atmospheric conditions is important for crew comfort, e.g.,
temperature and humidity, and for mission tasks, e.g., ppO2 and total pressure for expected
cabin depressurization, to ensure efficient and effective performance. This requirement does not
apply to spacesuits. The corresponding spacesuit requirement is defined in requirement [V2
11033] Suited Thermal Control, in this NASA Technical Standard. The ability to adjust
atmospheric parameters remotely is important for cases in which a crewed vehicle is to dock
with an uncrewed vehicle whose atmosphere is to be habitable before ingress. This may be done
from other spacecraft located in microgravity, extraterrestrial body surfaces, or Earth- or lunar-
based control centers
Deleted:
[V2 6020] For each isolatable, habitable compartment, the system shall automatically record
pressure, humidity, temperature, ppO2, and ppCO2 data continuously.
[Rationale: Access to atmospheric data is needed for each habitable compartment (that can be
isolated with a pressure hatch) to which the crew has access, as each of these parameters is
critical to crew health and comfort. Additionally, the ability to view past recorded data helps to
prevent environmental conditions that could harm the crew or vehicle and can aid in the effort to
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troubleshoot problems. This requirement does not apply to spacesuits. The corresponding
spacesuit requirement is defined in requirement [V2 11034] Suited Atmospheric Data Recording,
in this NASA Technical Standard.]
[V2 6021] The system shall display real-time values for pressure, humidity, temperature, ppO2,
and ppCO2 data to the crew locally and remotely.
[Rationale: These atmospheric parameters are critical to human health and comfort, and access
to this atmospheric data needs to be provided to the crew. The crew needs to view the
environmental status in real time to help prevent environmental conditions that could harm them
or the vehicle. This requirement does not apply to spacesuits. The corresponding spacesuit
requirement is defined in requirement [V2 11035] Suited Atmospheric Data Displaying in this
NASA Technical Standard.]
[V2 6022] The system shall alert the crew locally and remotely when atmospheric parameters,
including atmospheric pressure, humidity, temperature, ppO2, and ppCO2 are outside safe limits.
[Rationale: Systems are to be capable of alerting the crew when atmospheric parameters are
outside set limits so the crew can take appropriate actions to maintain health and safety. See
sections 10.3.4, Audio Displays, and 10.7.2, Caution and Warning, in this NASA Technical
Standard for additional information. This requirement does not apply to spacesuits. The
corresponding spacesuit requirement is defined in requirement [V2 11036] Suited Atmospheric
Monitoring and Alerting, in this NASA Technical Standard.]
[V2 6023] The system shall monitor trace volatile organic compounds (VOCs) in the cabin
atmosphere and alert the crew locally and remotely when they are approaching defined limits.
[Rationale: Monitoring and alerting are required to identify when hazardous contaminants are
detected and to alert the crew so they can take appropriate actions to maintain health and safety.
Trace contaminant monitoring is important for identifying a wide range of contaminants that
may impact human health and safety, including toxic substances that cannot be predicted now or
substances that are not normally thought of as part of the atmosphere. Accepted limits may be
based on JSC-20584, Spacecraft Maximum Allowable Concentrations (SMACs), or on
agreements from international partners. There may be specific mission scenarios (e.g., short-
duration missions and alternate controls) where trace contaminant monitoring may not be
required.]
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[V2 6024] The system shall monitor in real-time the toxic atmospheric components listed in
Table 3, Recommended Combustion Product (CP) Monitoring Ranges, that would result from
pre-combustion and combustion events in the ranges and with the accuracy and resolution
specified in the table, and alert the crew locally and remotely in sufficient time for them to take
appropriate action.
[V2 6025] The system shall monitor and display atmospheric compound levels that result from
contamination events, e.g., toxic release, systems leaks, or externally originated, before, during,
and after an event and alert the crew locally and remotely in sufficient time for them to take
appropriate action.
[Rationale: Alerting the crew when contaminants are present is necessary for them to take
appropriate action to maintain health and safety. In addition, monitoring after the event is
important to verify that levels are safe for human exposure. Monitoring is required to identify
when components are detected so that alerting can occur. Potential contaminants, e.g.,
hydrazine, monomethylhydrazine (MMH), unsymmetrical dimethylhydrazine (UDMH), nitrogen
tetroxide/nitrogen dioxide and ammonia, need to be monitored after EVA.]
[V2 6153] The vehicle shall monitor celestial dust and alert the crew locally and remotely when
they are approaching defined limits.
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[Rationale: Celestial dust includes, but is not limited to, lunar, Martian and other
extraterrestrial bodies. In-flight monitoring of habitable environments is required to
characterize concentrations of celestial dust which enables any necessary crew action to
maintain health and safety, tracking of average exposure, while also informing necessary
treatment options after the mission, and providing a record of crew exposures. Lunar dust
monitoring frequency and particle size fraction is dependent on mission characteristics and
whether crew health concerns are based on chronic or acute exposure considerations as noted in
[V2 6053] Lunar Dust Contamination. There may be other specific mission scenarios (e.g.,
surface launch vehicle docking to orbital vehicle) where dust monitoring may be required.]
[V2 6107] The system shall maintain a ventilation rate within the internal atmosphere that is
sufficient to provide circulation that prevents CO2 and thermal pockets from forming, except
during suited operations, toxic cabin events, or when the crew is not inhabiting the vehicle.
[Rationale: Crew and equipment give off heat, moisture, and CO2 that will lead to parameters
outside the bounds of environmental requirements if adequate ventilation is not provided.
Maintaining proper ventilation within the internal atmosphere is necessary to ensure that
stagnant pockets do not form, and the temperature, humidity, and atmospheric constituents are
maintained within their appropriate ranges. Similar values have been used on the International
Space Station (ISS). Exceptions and more detail on ventilation rate measurement are listed in the
verification requirement. The two-thirds value for atmosphere velocities in the requirement has
historically proven to be a reasonable balance between design constraints such as power,
acoustics, and safety. The effective atmosphere velocity range of 4.57-36.58 m/min (15-120
ft/min) pertains to the time averaged velocity magnitudes in the crew occupied space using
averages over time periods sufficient to achieve stability. This range is considered sufficient to
provide circulation that prevents CO2 and thermal pockets from forming. Cabin ventilation is not
required during suited operation since the suit will provide necessary air circulation. Fire or any
toxic release into the atmosphere are examples of periods during which the mentioned
ventilation rates are not in the best interest of air quality and crew health. In those cases, the
ventilation system may need to be shut down to protect the safety of the crew.
[V2 6108] The system shall control for ppO2, ppCO2, and relative humidity during off-nominal
operations, such as temporary maintenance activities in areas not in the normal habitable volume.
[Rationale: The crew may be required to perform maintenance behind a panel in an area that is
not part of the normal habitable volume, and which therefore does not have ventilation.
Maintaining proper ventilation within the internal atmosphere is necessary to ensure that
stagnant pockets do not form and the temperature, humidity, and atmospheric constituents are
maintained within their appropriate ranges. See [V2 6003] O2 Partial Pressure Range for Crew
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Exposure, [V2 6004] Nominal Vehicle/Habitat Carbon Dioxide Levels, and [V2 6012] Crew
Health Environmental Limits, in this NASA Technical Standard. Examples of historical
ventilation techniques include equipment such as flexible (reconfigurable) ducting, portable fans,
or diverters.]
Note: For contamination, units of measure are expressed in metric units only in the sections that
follow.
[V2 6050] The system shall limit gaseous pollutant accumulation in the habitable atmosphere
below individual chemical concentration limits specified in JSC-20584, Spacecraft Maximum
Allowable Concentrations for Airborne Contaminants (SMACs).
[Rationale: Exposure limits for expected airborne spacecraft contaminants are established to
protect crewmembers from illness and injury. The SMACs provide guidance for short-term (1
and 24 hours), medium-term (7 and 30 days), and long-term (180 days and 1,000 days) exposure
of these constituents. The SMACs take into account several unique factors of human space flight
missions, including the stress on human physiology, the uniform good health of astronauts, and
the absence of pregnant or very young individuals. Short-term SMACs are intended for off-
nominal events and are not to be used for system design or evaluation of routine exposures.
Considerations are to be taken for scenarios where there is a period of dormancy or uncrewed
operations.]
[V2 6052] The system shall limit the habitable atmosphere particulate matter concentration for
total dust to <3 mg/m3 with a crew generation rate of 1.33 mg/person-minute, and the respirable
fraction of the total dust <2.5 μm (micrometer) in aerodynamic diameter to <1 mg/m3 with a
crew generation rate of 0.006 mg/person-minute.
[Rationale: These values were derived by applying a factor of five to the OSHA limits for
nuisance dusts, which is the best analog for the ordinary dust present in spacecraft. They do not
apply to reactive dust, e.g., lithium hydroxide (LiOH) or extraterrestrial dust. The factor of five
is applied to adjust from intermittent occupational exposure to continuous space flight exposure.
The basis for the particulate matter generation rates is documented in ICES-2019-58, The
Impacts of Cabin Atmosphere Quality Standards and Control Loads on Atmosphere
Revitalization Process Design. The generation rate for the respirable fraction of the total dust
was calculated by adding the generation rate for particles <1 μm in diameter and one-half the
generation rate for particles with diameters between 1 μm and 5 μm.]
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[V2 6053] The system shall limit the levels of lunar dust particles less than 10 μm in size in the
habitable atmosphere below a time-weighted average of 0.3 mg/m3 during intermittent daily
exposure periods that may persist up to 6 months in duration.
[Rationale: This limit was based on detailed peer-reviewed studies completed by the Lunar
Atmosphere Dust Toxicity Assessment Group (LADTAG) and is specific to the conditions
relevant to the lunar surface, i.e., this requirement would not necessarily be applicable to other
missions. The requirement assumes that the exposure period is episodic and is limited to the time
before ECLSS can remove the particles from the internal atmosphere (assumed as eight hours
post introduction). Although the requirement is being conservatively applied to all inhalable
particles (all particles ≤10 μm), it is most applicable to dusts in the respirable range (≤2.5 μm)
that can deposit more deeply into the lungs. Studies show that the particle size of lunar dust
generally falls within a range of 0.02-5 µm . The ability to meet this requirement will depend
upon factors such as the level of lunar dust introduction and ECLSS removal rates. The
monitoring of dust is captured in [V2 6153] Celestial Dust Monitoring and Alerting.]
[V2 6059] The system shall provide air in the habitable atmosphere that is microbiologically safe
for human health and performance.
[Rationale: Microbiologically safe air is essential to prevent infection, allergic response, and
mitigate risk to crew health and performance. Assessing microbiological safety of air relies
primarily on the enumeration and identification of viable, medically significant microorganisms
(bacteria and fungi) that are known to cause disease. Historically, atmospheric microbial
concentrations in spacecraft habitable atmosphere have been controlled by maintaining a
continuous flow of air through High Efficiency Particulate Air (HEPA) filters that remove at
least 99.97% of airborne particles 0.3 μm in diameter, or larger. Medical significance of
microorganisms and allowable levels of microorganisms are set based on guidance from the JSC
Microbiology Laboratory. Program level requirements for atmospheric quality include
considerations for factors such as vehicle architecture and mission duration. Considerations are
to be taken for scenarios where there is a period of dormancy or uncrewed operations.]
6.3 Water
The challenges of providing quality water vary for different system designs and diverse water
sources, e.g., recycled humidity condensate and ground-supplied water. In the design process,
early identification of potential water quality impacts enables mitigation by design. Water
quality monitoring through the use of in-flight and preflight analysis techniques are essential
tools for use in verifying water quality, evaluating trends, and documenting potential exposures.
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[V2 6026] At the point of crew consumption or contact, the system shall provide aesthetically
acceptable potable water that is chemically and microbiologically safe for human use, including
drinking, food rehydration, personal hygiene, and medical needs.
[Rationale: Point of crew consumption or contact refers to the location from which potable
water is dispensed for use in drinks, food rehydration, personal hygiene, and medical needs and
any potential in-flight maintenance sites. Safe water pollutant levels have been established for
certain prioritized compounds specifically for human-rated space vehicles by the JSC Toxicology
and Environmental Chemistry Laboratory in cooperation with a subcommittee of the National
Research Council Committee on Toxicology; however, the current list in JSC-63414, Spacecraft
Water Exposure Guidelines (SWEGs), is not all inclusive, and other compounds may be of
concern. For these other compounds, the United States Environmental Protection Agency
maximum contaminant levels can be utilized as conservative screening limits. (For additional
guidance, reference chapter 6, Natural and Induced Environments, in the HIDH.) To determine
which contaminants are present, a complete chemical characterization of potential water
sources is to be performed. Evaluation of aesthetic properties is important to ensure that the
potable water does not have an adverse odor or taste such that it would cause crewmembers to
diminish consumption and increase the risk of underhydration or dehydration of the
crewmember. Aesthetic acceptability can either be assessed qualitatively by an evaluation panel
or indirectly through compliance with the applicable water quality requirements.
Special consideration should be taken with treatment chemicals and residual biocides. For
example, at effective biocidal levels iodine can alter the aesthetics of the water as well as cause
iodine-related illness; refer to Section 6.3 of the HIDH, NASA/SP-2010-3407. Allowable
concentrations for other treatment chemicals and biocides can be found in JSC-63414 and
United States Environmental Protection Agency guidelines.
Microbially safe water is essential to prevent infection and mitigate risk to crew health and
performance. Microbiological assessment of water safety relies primarily on the identification of
viable, medically significant microorganisms (bacteria, fungi, and parasitic protozoa) that are
known to cause disease. Monitoring targets have included specific categories of microorganisms
(e.g., coliform bacteria) that indicate that the water may have been contaminated or not
adequately treated. Microbial enumeration of potable water has also been used historically as
an indicator of overall system performance. Previous space flight missions have used a
combination of these monitoring approaches in combination with mitigation strategies to
confirm the safety of potable water. Medical significance of microorganisms and allowable
levels of microorganisms are set based on guidance from the JSC Microbiology Laboratory.
Program level requirements for water quality include considerations for factors such as water
source, vehicle architecture, and mission duration.]
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[V2 6051] The system shall prevent potable and hygiene water supply contamination from
microbial, atmospheric (including dust), chemical, and non-potable water sources to ensure that
potable and hygiene water are provided.
[Rationale: While ensuring the delivery of potable water to crew on orbit is important,
contamination from sources within the delivery system or from the environment is also possible.]
[V2 6046] Water quality monitoring capability shall include preflight, in-flight, and post landing
sampling and analysis.
[Rationale: On-orbit water quality is critical to the health of the crew. Rigorous ground
processing with preflight water sampling and contamination assessment prevents in-flight water
quality problems and thus minimizes the need for in-flight contamination monitoring and
remediation of any water quality parameters that are out of specification. In-flight sampling
capability supports real-time contaminant monitoring and remediation of stored or regenerated
water systems as needed for long-duration missions. Ground-based quality analyses of in-flight
and post landing samples provide a record of crew exposures and are used to determine follow-
on ground processing steps.]
Deleted:
[V2 6109] The system shall provide a minimum water quantity as specified in Table 4, Water
Quantities and Temperatures, for the expected needs of each mission, which should be
considered mutually independent.
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For fluid loading, 1.5 L of water per crewmember is based on the Space Shuttle and the
Commercial Crew Program (CCP) prescriptions for reentry fluid loading. Table 4 calls out a
minimum of 1 L (33.8 fl oz) of water per crewmember, and an additional 500 mL (16.9 fl oz) will
be available per crewmember from their unused daily water allocation. Vehicles that may wave
off prior to reentry need to protect for two fluid loadings per crewmember. Fluid loading is
based on crewmember weight and requires the use of salt tablets in addition to water, unless an
alternative solution is used. Without fluid loading, the crew is more likely to experience
orthostatic intolerance (passing out when standing) during and after deorbit.
Of note, the water required during the post landing phase, for up to about 36 hours, is to ensure
crewmembers are properly hydrated. Less water may be needed for hydration following a launch
abort, since crewmembers will not have undergone space flight fluid loss. Additionally, for
missions longer than a few days, hot and cold food and beverages provide an important
psychological benefit. The amount of hot and cold water to be provided depends on the number
of crew, mission length, and types of food and beverage available. To ensure the crew have
adequate hydration, the Potable Water for Hydration minimum amount per day is available for
drinking, and for rehydrating foods/drinks. This value does not change with removal of
rehydratable foods or addition of thermostabilized food as the minimum amount is based on the
physiological needs and not how it is consumed.
Water is also needed for personal hygiene, which will depend on the mission length, number of
crewmembers, and design of the hygiene system. Clean water is necessary for maintaining skin,
hair, and dental health of the crew. Water may not be required for some hygiene activities where
alternatives, e.g., rinseless shampoo, pre-wetted towels, are provided. Water for medical
contingency use is required for many situations, including wound irrigation during the various
activities of a mission, which is based on experience and data from Shuttle, ISS, and Apollo
programs. The amount of contingency water will be determined on the expected events to occur
and frequency of events. Eye wash capability for particulate events is expected, especially for
lunar and planetary missions, as there is an increased risk of exposure to dust and regolith on
the lunar or other planetary surfaces. Some medical situations require large quantities of water,
for example, LiOH or other toxic substances in the eye or skin, or in a wound. However, these
events are off-nominal and occur at lower frequency during the mission than particulate events
and may be considered contingencies. The quantity of water to be provided depends on the
number of crewmembers, duration of mission, and expected contingency events and should
ensure that medical treatment can be provided.
Additional considerations for water quantities should include sampling needs for routine water
testing and monitoring, as well as any agricultural or hydroponic systems that would be in
addition to the crew needs for hydration. All quantities should be considered mutually
independent. Water quantities provided are not limited to only what is replenished with the
arrival of cargo or crew vehicles and can be obtained by other means, include that of recycling.]
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Deleted:
Deleted:
Deleted:
Deleted:
Deleted:
Deleted:
Deleted:
Deleted:
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[V2 6110] The system shall provide the appropriate water temperature as specified in Table 4,
Water Quantities and Temperatures, for the expected needs of each mission and task.
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[Rationale: Over the course of long-duration missions, crewmembers can tire of repetitive
beverages and foods. Providing hot and cold water is an important way of keeping the
crewmembers interested in their meals and providing a familiar contact to normal Earth living,
as well as making the food items more acceptable and palatable. Additionally, the use of higher
water temperatures allows for faster rehydration of beverages and foods, as well as aiding in the
prevention of microbial growth.
Additionally, providing proper temperature of the hygiene and medically used waters will
support comfortable body cleansing and preventing thermal injury to the tissue, especially when
performing irrigations. Terrestrially, building code for typical shower valves is to limit the outlet
temperature to 120F (48.9C), which is at the tissue damage limit. Note that the average ISS
Potable Water Dispenser (PWD) hot water is 180°F (~82°C) but can vary from 150-200°F (~65-
93°C). Crewmembers are trained to use a combination of Ambient and Hot to get the desired
temp for hygiene.]
Deleted:
Deleted:
Deleted:
Deleted:
Deleted:
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Potable Water for Medical between 18ºC (64ºF) and 27ºC (81ºF)
Minimum of 5 L (169.1 fl
Use and Medical
oz) per event
Contingency
Minimum 240 mL (8.1 fl
Potable Water for EVA
oz) per crewmember per
Operations
EVA hour
Potable Water for Fluid
between 68ºC between 18ºC
Loading for Reentry from Minimum of 1 L (33.8 fl maximum temperature of
(155ºF) and (64ºF) and
Microgravity to Partial or oz) per crewmember* 16ºC (60ºF)
79ºC (175ºF) 27ºC (81ºF)
Earth Gravity
Potable Water for Crew Minimum of 1 L (33.8 fl
Recovery During Entire oz) per crewmember for
Recovery Period every 8-hour period
Agriculture Water
Mission dependent*** TBD
Quantity
* Vehicles that may wave-off prior to reentry are to protect for this quantity of water for fluid loading for each of two deorbit
attempts.
** Critical for missions longer than three days.
*** Mission dependent as sized by appropriate sampling or plant science personnel.
†† The bulk supply of water should be accessible as ambient and/or cold.
[V2 6039] Water shall be dispensed at a rate that is compatible with the food system.
[Rationale: A water dispensing rate is to be defined as a rate that is compatible with the food
packaging and time demands of the allotted meal schedule to ensure that the crew is able to
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prepare for and perform tasks, e.g., filling drink bags and/or rehydrating food in a reasonable
amount of time. The rate will depend on the design of the food system and the amount of water
required, if necessary, to rehydrate beverages and food. The program will define appropriate
increments in accordance with HMTA. This rate is not intended to require an additional water
quantity beyond that required for nominal mission water usage. It needs to be compatible with
the increments. For example, a rate of 500 mL/minute (16.9 oz/minute) can ensure timely food
preparation when rehydration is needed for multiple meals or drinks for all crewmembers and
meals.]
[V2 6040] To prevent overflow, water shall be dispensable in specified increments that are
compatible with the food preparation instructions and time demands of the allotted meal
schedule.
[Rationale: Water dispensing increments are to be defined to properly hydrate food and
beverages. In addition, palatability is to be included as part of the assessment when determining
the proper hydration of food and beverages. On ISS today, water is dispensed at 25 mL
(milliliter) increments. All food portions are sized to be compatible with this increment (i.e.,
25 mL to 250 mL). The increment was different in previous missions, as low as 15 mL. The
program will define appropriate increments in accordance with HMTA.]
Moved:
The system interior atmosphere, water, or surfaces can become contaminated from multiple in-
flight sources during operations, including material offgassing, payloads, other vehicles, crew,
and planetary environments. Accordingly, only those materials or substances that, if offgassed or
released into the habitable volume, are not or will not form hazardous substances and would not
threaten human health are to be used within the spacecraft.
[V2 6047] The system shall use only chemicals that are Toxic Hazard Level Three or below, as
defined in JSC-26895, Guidelines for Assessing the Toxic Hazard of Spacecraft Chemicals and
Test Materials, in the habitable volume of the spacecraft.
[Rationale: Potential contamination assessed as Toxic Hazard Level Four cannot be cleaned up
by the crew and pose a risk of permanent injury or death. As such, only materials that either
pose limited risk to crew or can be contained and disposed of by an appropriate clean-up
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procedure should be used in the habitable volume or in systems that may credibly be released
into the habitable volume (i.e., thermal working fluids). Toxic Hazard Level ratings are assigned
by JSC Toxicology based on information received per JSC-27472, Requirements for Submission
of Data Needed for Toxicological Assessment of Chemicals and Biologicals to be Flown on
Manned Spacecraft.]
[V2 6048] The system shall prevent Toxic Hazard Level Four chemicals, as defined in
JSC-26895, from entering the habitable volume of the spacecraft.
[Rationale: Potential contamination assessed as Toxic Hazard Level Four cannot be contained
by crew and may cause appreciable effects on coordination, perception, and memory, long-term
serious injury (e.g., cancer), or may result in internal tissue damage. Toxic Hazard Level ratings
are assigned by JSC Toxicology based on information received per JSC-27472, Requirements for
Submission of Data Needed for Toxicological Assessment of Chemicals.]
[V2 6049] The system shall use only chemicals that, if released into the habitable volume, do not
decompose into hazardous compounds that would threaten health during any phase of operations.
[Rationale: Only a few compounds, such as fluorinated coolants, have been shown to
decompose into hazardous compounds during nominal spacecraft Atmosphere Revitalization
System (ARS) operation. These compounds could present a toxic threat if the amount of the
compound involved is sufficient, the ARS temperature is adequate, and the product compound is
hazardous. Halon is an example of such a chemical; if it is sufficiently heated during its normal
use as a fire suppressant, it breaks down into highly toxic gaseous compounds.]
Moved:
Moved:
Moved:
Moved:
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Deleted:
Deleted:
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Moved:
Moved:
[V2 6060] Biological payloads, as well as the associated operational procedures and supporting
personal protective equipment, shall meet the criteria defined by the JSC Biosafety Review
Board guidelines contained in JPR-1800.5, Biosafety Review Board Operations and
Requirements.
[Rationale: Biohazardous agents, which include bacteria, fungi, protozoa, viruses, cell cultures,
and recombinant deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA), may be infectious and result in disease or
contamination of water and food supplies or the internal environment. Payloads that contain
biohazardous materials are to ensure that these materials are properly contained, handled, and
discarded. JPR-1800.5 establishes requirements for the identification and assessment of
biohazardous materials used in payload or ground-based experiments.]
[V2 6061] The system shall provide controls to prevent or otherwise minimize (as appropriate)
biological cross-contamination between crew, payloads and vehicles to acceptable levels in
accordance with the biosafety levels (BSL) defined in JPR-1800.5, as well between crew,
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payloads, vehicles and extraterrestrial planetary environments with the extent of application
specific to individual planetary bodies and special locations thereon.
[V2 6062] The system shall provide toxicological and environmental hazard information in
formats accessible by the crew throughout the mission.
[Rationale: In case of accidental contact with hazardous materials during a mission, crew
access to hazard information, e.g., Safety Data Sheets (SDSs), is necessary to determine methods
of cleanup and exposure treatment.]
[V2 6063] The system shall provide a means to remove or isolate released chemical and
biological contaminants and to return the environment to a safe condition.
Exceeding acceleration limits can significantly impair human performance and cause injury,
thereby threatening mission success and crew survival.
For mission durations > 30 days, the crew is considered deconditioned. For mission durations ≤
30 days, the crew is considered non-deconditioned. Emergency conditions refer to off-nominal
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conditions within first 30 days of Earth launch where crew survival is prioritized (e.g. launch
aborts, emergency entry).
[V2 6064] The system shall limit the magnitude, direction, and duration of crew exposure to
sustained (>0.5 seconds) translational acceleration by staying below the limits in Figure 4, Gx
Sustained Translational Acceleration Limits (Seated), Figure 5, Gy Sustained Translational
Acceleration Limits (Seated), and Figure 6, Gz Sustained Translational Acceleration Limits
(Seated) for seated posture, and Figure 7, Gx Sustained Translational Acceleration Limits
(Standing), Figure 8, Gy Sustained Translational Acceleration Limits (Standing), and Figure 9,
Gz Sustained Translational Acceleration Limits (Standing) for standing posture.
[Rationale: The limits in these figures represent safe levels of sustained translational
acceleration under nominal and off-nominal conditions. Exposure to acceleration above these
limits could significantly affect human performance for maneuvering and interacting with a
spacecraft. A separate limit was defined for deconditioned crew because crewmembers are
expected to have capabilities due to deconditioning from exposure to reduced gravity. For the
extreme conditions of a launch abort or emergency entry, limits are higher because it may be
necessary to expose the crew to accelerations more severe than those experienced nominally.
Humans are never to be exposed to translational acceleration rates greater than these elevated
limits, as this significantly increases the risk of incapacitation, thereby threatening crew
survival. The acceleration vectors are relative to the “axis” of the upper body, particularly with
a focus on a line running from the eye to the heart with the neck in a neutral posture. However,
the acceleration limit charts do not account for all body types or temporary off-axis
accelerations or body positions. Each axis is to be analyzed separately, and conservatism in the
limits for each axis covers any cumulative effect of acceleration in multiple axes.
All limits further assume adequate restraint(s) are provided for all body postures during the
period of sustained loading. Adequate restraint for the purposes of Linear Sustained
Acceleration Limits are defined as devices sufficient to arrest motion between the occupant and
vehicle interior by applying counterforce. Restraints must also prevent unintended contact
between the crewmember and the interior of the vehicle within the linear sustained acceleration
limits described herein, while facilitating continual access to and operation of vehicle displays
and controls. All limits also assume the crew is wearing a counterpressure garment intended to
mitigate the effects of orthostatic intolerance.
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[V2 6065] The system shall limit crew exposure to rotational velocities in yaw, pitch, and roll by
staying below the limits specified in Figure 9, Rotational Velocity Limits.
[Rationale: The limits in this figure represent safe levels of sustained rotational acceleration for
crewmembers under nominal and off-nominal conditions. Exposure to rotational acceleration
above these limits could significantly affect human performance for maneuvering and interacting
with a spacecraft. The limits for deconditioned crewmembers are lower because crewmembers
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are expected to have degraded capabilities due to deconditioning from exposure to reduced
gravity. For emergency conditions, limits are higher because it may be necessary to expose the
crew to accelerations more severe than those experienced nominally. Humans are never to be
exposed to rotational acceleration rates greater than these elevated limits as this significantly
increases the risk of incapacitation, thereby threatening crew survival.]
[V2 6066] The system shall prevent the crew exposure to sustained (>0.5 second) rotational
accelerations caused by cross-coupled rotations greater than 2 rad/s2.
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head-referenced coordinate frame. Ideally, rotational velocities should be decomposed into their
orthogonal principal components before computing the acceleration due to cross-product terms.
For scientific references regarding this subject, see chapter 6, Natural and Induced
Environments, of the HIDH.]
[V2 6067] The system shall limit transient (≤0.5 seconds) rotational accelerations in yaw, pitch,
or roll to which the crew is exposed and the limit used appropriately scaled for each crewmember
size from the 50th percentile male limits of 2,200 rad/s2 for nominal and 3,800 rad/s2 for off-
nominal cases.
Deleted:
[V2 6069] The system shall mitigate the risk of injury to crewmembers caused by accelerations
during dynamic mission phases per Table 5, Acceptable Injury Risk Due to Dynamic Loads.
[Rationale: During dynamic flight phases, there is potential for impact and flail injury, which
includes crewmember extremities impacting vehicular surfaces or objects, hyperextending,
hyperflexing, hyper-rotating, fracturing, or dislocating if proper restraints and supports are not
used. Features such as harnesses, form-fitting seats, and tethers may help maintain the proper
position of the crewmember's body and limbs to reduce movement or contact with vehicle
surfaces that would produce injury. In addition, the design of spacesuits may contribute to
reducing injury to the crew. Preventing the inadvertent contact of extremities with vehicular
structure or interior components significantly reduces the likelihood of limb fracture or soft
tissue injury during a dynamic flight event. Extremity guards, tethers, garters, and handholds
have been used to reduce injury in other spacecraft, aircraft, and automotive vehicles. Injury
classifications are based on the Operationally Relevant Injury Scale defined in NASA/TP-2015-
218578, Final NASA Panel Recommendations for Definition of Acceptable Risk of Injury Due to
Space Flight Dynamic Events. Occurrence of dynamic cases identified in Table 5 are based on
statistical modeling of possible dynamic events. See NASA/TP-2015-218578 for more
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information. For example, during the reentry of Space Transportation System (STS)-107, the
crew had notable flail injuries in their extremities, upper body, and head from the dynamic
accelerations and motions that were determined to be a lethal event. Contributing factors to this
involved both inertial reels from the seat belts and the helmet when the crew were exposed to
cyclical motions. The seat belt inertial reel mechanisms failed, which resulted in crew body flail.
The helmets did not conform to crew head, which resulted in lethal head injuries when exposed
to cyclical forces.]
[V2 6070] The system shall limit crew exposure to transient translational acceleration (≤0.5
seconds) by limiting the injury risk criterion (β/beta) to no greater than 1.0 (Low) for seated or
standing crew as defined by Dynamic Response (DR) limits in NASA/TM-20205008198 Table 2
“Updated Dynamic Response Limits for Standing”, while crew are restrained as required in
NASA/TM-2013-217380REV1 for seated crew, or NASA/TM – 20205008198 for standing
crew.
[Rationale: The Brinkley Dynamic Response model will provide an injury risk assessment
during dynamic phases of flight for accelerations <0.5 second. Application of this model
assumes that a crewmember will be similarly restrained during all events where the Brinkley
model is applied. Human tolerance for injury risk limits for development of space vehicles that
are based on human volunteer impact test data and operational emergency escape system
experience such as the Brinkley criterion have been adjusted for landing impact after reentry
considering existing knowledge of the physical and physiological deconditioning related to long-
term exposure to the microgravity of space. The vast experience in human testing of aircraft
ejection seats and operational experience with emergency escape systems have enabled the
highest fidelity for injury prediction, using the Brinkley model in the Gz axis. Although the
maximum allowable Brinkley β value is 1.0 for any given level of risk, the vehicle occupant
protection system design is to strive to achieve β values as low as reasonably achievable for as
many of the landing conditions and scenarios as possible. The criteria include dynamic response
limits that have been established for varying probabilities of injury. This model may be used
primarily for landing scenarios, but it is applicable for all dynamic phases of flight for
accelerations less than 0.5 second. Application of the Brinkley Dynamic Response model is
described in NASA/TM-2013-217380REV1. Structural failure may present an occupant
protection hazard through impinging upon occupant volume in such a way as to injure
crewmembers.
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The threshold for what constitutes standing posture is less than 80% of the total +Gz axis force
being transmitted through the crewmember’s buttock and thighs. Crewmembers in a standing
posture without the protections offered by a seat or similar support structure will have lower
tolerance to transient acceleration. Lower acceleration limits have been established to account
for the risk of injury to the lower extremities. For transient accelerations occurring more than 30
days mission elapsed time, a lower limit is specified to account for space flight deconditioning
effects on injury tolerance. These additional limits assume additional equipment mass, such as
the spacesuit, borne by the crewmember is less than 20% of the crewmember’s shirtsleeve mass.
They also assume sufficient extremity and torso restraints to prevent flail and motion that could
result in further injury not accounted for by the reduced limits. It is assumed that the primary
direction of loading will be in +GZ direction for the standing posture, and that the crewmember
will remain in an upright orientation during the dynamic event, as it assumed the load would be
primarily in the +Gz direction. The limits specified in NASA/TM-20205008198, Table 2
“Updated Dynamic Response Limits for Standing” are only valid if the restraint configuration
prevents the crewmember from losing balance during the dynamic event.]
[V2 6111] The system shall collect vehicle and crewmember acceleration parameters, specific
kinematic responses, and associated metadata, during all dynamic mission phases and suited
operations (defined as ascent, abort, entry, descent, landing, post landing, and EVA operations)
to correlate with any injuries incurred by crewmembers.
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[V2 6112] The system shall limit crew exposure to suspension trauma conditions to seven
minutes or less.
[Rationale: The hang time tolerance limit of seven minutes was chosen to protect the crew from
a variety of life-threatening post landing complications when their vehicle lands in an inverted
posture. This time limit reduces the probability the crew will experience suspension trauma
symptoms. Suspension trauma, or harness hang syndrome, is the closest comparable terrestrial
condition to the crew hanging in an inverted seated position. Space Flight Medicine literature
review identified that cognitive deficits could occur within three and a half minutes for a
deconditioned crew, affecting their ability to take action if required. They also concluded that
uprighting should be complete within seven minutes to prevent a decrease in blood pressure and
loss of consciousness to the crew. This could be met through a variety of mechanisms in addition
to uprighting, such as allowing crewmember seat egress. See Barr, Y & Fogarty, J (2010).
Assessment of Prone Positioning of Restrained, Seated Crewmembers in a Post Landing Stable 2
Orion Configuration, JSC-CN-19414.]
[V2 6113] The time in which crewmembers are on back with feet elevated in a launch
configuration shall not exceed 3 hours and 15 minutes, excluding subsequent safing and egress
time.
[Rationale: This position can be extremely fatiguing, painful, and cause musculoskeletal
discomfort and difficulty urinating. These effects have the potential to impair a crewmember’s
ability to perform launch duties, emergency egress procedures, and post launch tasks, and,
coupled with the length of the crew day, can also affect cognitive performance. The time interval
ends with lift-off. The “crew time on back” is the period from the first crewmember’s adoption of
an on-back posture until launch or, in the event of a scrub, until vehicle safing begins. This time
accounts for crew ingress and hold time leading to the planned launch time. It does not include
vehicle safing or egress time.]
6.6 Acoustics
To ensure that an integrated vehicle (including suit systems) meets the acoustic limits, it is
necessary to develop an Acoustic Noise Control Plan that establishes the overall noise control
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strategy, acoustic limit allocations, acoustic testing, analyses, remedial action steps, schedule,
and follow-up activities. This plan needs to be initially released early in the design cycle and
then updated as new data and design information become available. The included acoustic limit
allocations would define a set of allocated and sub-allocated acoustic limits for systems, sub-
systems, and hardware components so that the total contributions of all hardware will result in
compliance with this NASA Technical Standard. As part of the Acoustic Noise Control Plan, it is
best practice to verify acoustic requirements with test of the actual flight hardware. Modeling the
acoustic environment of the vehicle with measured noise sources and propagation paths is best
practice. Small design changes or even different part numbers of the same design such as with
fans can change the acoustic level. Previous space flight experience has shown that without such
a plan, it is difficult to develop an integrated system that can meet acoustic limits.
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Table 7—Acoustic Limits for On-Orbit, Lunar, and Planetary Operations Phase*
24-Hour
Mission Hazardous Continuous Hazardous Intermittent Impulse Referenced
Phase Noise Exposure Noise Noise Noise Noise Requirements
Limits
Specified
Noise dose ≤100, NC-50 Octave Sound Level V2 6077
equivalent to 8- Band SPL limits. (dBA) <140 dB V2 6078
On-Orbit <85 dBA
hour 75 dBA See Figure 9 and depending on peak SPL V2 6080
TWA Table 8 duration, see V2 6083
Table 6
Noise dose ≤100,
a. For NC-40 Octave +10 dB
equivalent to 8- +10 dBA or V2 6077
Sleep on Band SPL limits. peak or less
hour 75 dBA <85 dBA less above V2 6079
Missions See Figure 9 and above
TWA background V2 6082
>30 days Table 8 background
b. For Noise dose ≤100, NC-50 Octave +10 dB V2 6077
equivalent to 8- +10 dBA or
Sleep on Band SPL limits. peak or less V2 6078
hour 75 dBA <85 dBA less above
Missions See Figure 9 and above V2 6079
TWA background
<30 days Table 8 background V2 6082
*Hearing protection CANNOT be used to satisfy these limits.
[V2 6073] During launch, entry, and abort operations, the noise exposure level (not including
impulse noise) at the crewmember's ear, calculated over any 24-hour period, shall be limited
such that the noise dose (D) is ≤100:
N
Cn
D = 100 , (Eq.1)
n =1 Tn
where:
N = the number of noise exposure events during the 24-hour period
Cn = the actual duration of the exposure event in minutes
Tn = the maximum noise exposure duration allowed, based on the specific sound level (Ln) of an
exposure event in dBA, calculated using the following equation:
480
Tn = ( Ln −85 ) / 3
(Eq. 2)
2
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using the 3 dB trading rule. The noise attenuation effectiveness of hearing protection or
communications headsets may be used to satisfy this requirement. Any planned use of hearing
protection to satisfy this requirement is to be well documented and approved. Requirements
established to meet this requirement are to be included in the Acoustic Noise Control Plan. The
Acoustic Noise Control Plan allocates noise levels to individual components and is maintained
to ensure that the total system meets the levels defined in this NASA Technical Standard.]
[V2 6074] During launch and entry operations, the system shall limit the combined A-weighted
sound levels (not including impulse noise) at the crewmembers’ ears to a maximum of 105 dBA.
[Rationale: Noise levels above 115 dBA have been shown to produce noise-induced hearing
loss. In cases where audio communications are required, e.g., launch, entry, a 105 dBA limit is
recommended to allow 10 dB of headroom for alarms and voice communications. The noise
attenuation effectiveness of hearing protection or communications headsets may be used to
satisfy this requirement; however, any planned use of hearing protection is to be well
documented and approved. Requirements established to meet this requirement are to be included
in the Acoustic Noise Control Plan.]
[V2 6075] During launch abort operations, the system shall limit the combined A-weighted
sound levels (not including impulse noise) at the crewmembers’ ears to a maximum of 115 dBA.
[Rationale: Noise levels above 115 dBA have been shown to produce noise-induced hearing
loss. In cases where no audio communications are required, e.g., during abort operations, there
is no need to allow 10 dB of headroom for alarms and voice communications. The noise
attenuation effectiveness of hearing protection or communications headsets may be used to
satisfy this requirement; however, any planned use of hearing protection is to be well
documented and approved.]
[V2 6076] During launch, entry, and abort operations, impulse noise measured at the
crewmember’s ear location shall be limited to less than 140 dB peak SPL.
[Rationale: A limit of 140 dB peak SPL for impulse noise prevents trauma to the hearing organs
caused by impulse noise (MIL-STD-1474, current version, Department of Defense Design
Criteria Standard, Noise Limits). The noise attenuation effectiveness of hearing protection or
communications headsets may be used to satisfy this requiremen; however, any planned use of
hearing protection to satisfy this requirement is to be well documented and approved.
Requirements established to meet this requirement are to be included in the Acoustic Noise
Control Plan.]
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6.6.1.5 Hazardous Noise Limits for All Phases Except Launch, Entry, and Abort
[V2 6077] For off-nominal operations, broadcast communications, depressurization valves, and
maintenance activities, the A-weighted sound level (excluding impulse noise and alarm signals)
shall be less than 85 dBA, regardless of time duration; except in the case of depressurization
valves, the noise attenuation effectiveness of hearing protection or communications headsets may
not be used to satisfy this requirement.
[Rationale: The 85 dBA overall SPL defines the hazardous noise limit during all phases except
launch, entry, and abort, at which action to reduce the noise level is to be taken so that
interference with voice communications and alarms, as well as increased risk for hearing loss,
does not occur. This is to help ensure that the habitable volume is safe. This is not intended for
nominal hardware emissions but to limit the sound level of sources such as communications
systems, depressurization valves, and levels that occur during planned off-nominal operations
and maintenance activities. Nominal on-orbit acoustic levels are limited by requirements [V2
6078] Continuous Noise Limits and [V2 6080] Intermittent Noise Limits of this NASA Technical
Standard.]
[V2 6115] The noise exposure level (not including impulse noise) at the crewmember's ear,
calculated over any 24-hour period, except during launch, entry, and abort operations, shall be
limited such that the noise dose (D) is ≤100:
(Eq. 3)
N
Cn
D = 100 ,
n =1 Tn
where:
N = the number of noise exposure events during the 24-hour period
Cn = the actual duration of the exposure event in minutes
Tn = the maximum noise exposure duration allowed, based on the specific sound level
𝟒𝟖𝟎
𝑻𝒏 =
𝟐(𝑳𝒏 −𝟕𝟓)/𝟑
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effectiveness of hearing protection or communications headsets may not be used to satisfy this
requirement. Requirements established to meet this are to be included in the Acoustic Noise
Control Plan. The Acoustic Noise Control Plan allocates noise levels to individual components
and is maintained to ensure that the total system meets the levels defined in this NASA Technical
Standard.]
[V2 6078] In spacecraft work areas, where good voice communications and habitability are
required, SPLs of continuous noise (not including impulse noise) shall be limited to the values
given by the Noise Criterion (NC)-50 curve in Figure 11, NC Curves, and Table 8, Octave Band
SPL Limits for Continuous Noise, dB re 20 µPa (micropascals); hearing protection cannot be
used to satisfy this requirement.
[Rationale: NC-50 limits noise levels within the habitable volume to allow adequate voice
communications and habitability during mission operations. The noise limit at 16 kHz does not
appear in Figure 11 but is given in Table 8. SPLs for continuous noise do not apply to alarms,
communications, or noise experienced during maintenance activities. The corresponding
spacesuit requirement is defined in requirement [V2 11009] Continuous Noise in Spacesuits, in
this NASA Technical Standard.]
[V2 6079] For missions greater than 30 days, SPLs of continuous noise shall be limited to the
values given by the NC-40 curve (see Figure 11, NC Curves, and Table 8, Octave Band SPL
Limits for Continuous Noise, dB re 20 µPa) in crew quarters and sleep areas. Hearing protection
cannot be used to satisfy this requirement.
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90
40 41
40
NC-30
31 31
30 NC-20
Approximate
threshold of 21
20 hearing for
continuous noise
10
0
63 125 250 500 1k 2k 4k 8k A- SIL(4)
wtd.
Octave Band Center Frequency, Hz SPL
Note: Corresponding A-weighted SPLs and speech interference levels (SILs) are given for reference only
(Beranek and Vér, 1992). SIL (4) is Speech Interference Level, 4-band method.
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[V2 6080] For hardware items that operate for eight hours or less (generating intermittent noise),
the maximum noise emissions (not including impulse noise), measured 0.6 m from the loudest
hardware surface, shall be determined according to Table 9, Intermittent Noise A-Weighted SPL
and Corresponding Operational Duration Limits for any 24-hour period (measured at 0.6 m
distance from the source). Hearing protection cannot be used to satisfy this requirement.
[Rationale: Table 9 limits crew exposure to intermittent noise levels of hardware items that are
inherently noisy but that operate for short time periods. Intermittent sources can result in
unacceptable noise levels, add to the overall crew noise exposure, impede communications, and
cause disruption in crew rest/sleep.]
[V2 6081] The maximum alarm signal A-weighted sound level shall be less than 95 dBA at the
operating position of the intended receiver.
[Rationale: This allows alarm sound levels to exceed the 85 dBA hazard limit because of the
need for alarm audibility. Also, alarms can be silenced at the crew’s discretion.]
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[V2 6082] With the exception of communications and alarms, the system shall limit impulse and
intermittent noise levels at the crewmember’s head location to 10 dB above background noise
levels during crew sleep periods. Hearing protection cannot be used to satisfy this requirement.
[V2 6083] The system shall limit impulse noise measured at the crewmember’s head location to
less than 140 dB peak SPL during all mission phases except launch and entry. Hearing protection
cannot be used to satisfy this requirement.
[Rationale: A limit of 140-dB peak SPL for impulse noise prevents acoustic trauma (MIL-STD-
1474, current version).]
[V2 6084] The maximum SPL of narrow-band noise components and tones shall be limited to at
least 10 dB less than the broadband SPL of the octave band that contains the component or tone.
[Rationale: Narrow-band noise component and tone levels should be limited to 10 dB below the
broadband level to prevent irritating and distracting noise conditions which could affect crew
performance.]
[V2 6085] Infrasonic SPLs, including frequencies from 1 to 20 Hz but not including impulse
noise, shall be limited to less than 150 dB at the crewmember’s head location. Hearing
protection cannot be used to satisfy this requirement.
[Rationale: The 150 dB limit for infrasonic noise levels in the frequency range from 1 to 20 Hz
provides for health and well-being effects. (Refer to ACGIH, Threshold Limit Values (TLVs®),
Infrasound and Low-Frequency Sound, 2001.)]
[V2 6106] The system shall limit the maximum A-weighted sound level at the crewmember’s
ear created by a personal audio device to 115 dBA or less.
[Rationale: Noise levels above 115 dBA have been shown to produce noise-induced hearing
loss. Sound levels produced by personal audio devices are allowed to be at high levels to
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overcome the noise generated during launch and descent. A personal audio device may be an
integrated part of the EVA helmet or an independent communication or listening headset but
does not include cabin or broadcast speakers. OSHA identifies 115 dBA as the allowable ceiling
for noise exposure limits. This ceiling limit is allowed as long as it does not result in the overall
daily TWA exposure exceeding the limit of 85 dBA per requirement [V2 6073] Launch, Entry,
and Abort Noise Exposure Limits.]
[V2 6087] Broadband and frequency-dependent SPLs shall be monitored and quantified as
needed for crew health and safety.
[Rationale: Acoustic monitoring is needed to ensure that sound levels during the mission are
below established limits for crew health and performance. Periodically on ISS, the crew uses
acoustic monitors to monitor their environment.]
[V2 6088] Noise exposure levels shall be monitored and quantified for each crewmember as
needed for crew health and safety.
[Rationale: To protect the crew from excessive noise exposure, the noise exposure experienced
by the crew is to be understood. Understanding of noise exposure is critical to the protection of
crew hearing and helps determine the degree of remedial actions, including moving to a different
environment, hardware shutdown, or proper implementation of countermeasures. Periodically
on ISS, the crew uses acoustic monitors to monitor their environment.]
6.7 Vibration
Limiting crew exposure to vibration is important for mission success. Excessive whole-body
vibration can cause injury, fatigue, discomfort, and vision degradation, whereas the primary risk
resulting from hand vibration is reduced fine motor control.
[V2 6089] The system shall limit vibration to the crew such that the frequency-weighted
acceleration between 0.1 to 0.5 Hz in each of the X, Y, and Z axes is less than 0.05 g
(0.5 m/s2) root mean square (RMS) for each 10-minute interval during prelaunch (when
calculated in accordance with ISO 2631-1:1997(E), Mechanical Vibration and Shock -
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[Rationale: Low-frequency vibration, especially in the range between 0.1 and 0.5 Hz, has the
potential to cause motion sickness over relatively short exposure periods. This may be
encountered while the crew is in the vehicle during the prelaunch period, given that a tall vehicle
stack may be susceptible to back-and-forth sway. Reducing the amount of sway will prevent the
onset of motion sickness during the prelaunch phase. According to ISO 2631-1: 1997(E), Annex
D, the percentage of unadapted adults who may vomit is equal to 1/3 motion sickness dose value.
The value 0.05 g weighted RMS acceleration indicates that approximately 14% or one out of
seven crewmembers may vomit. Although ISO 2631-1:1997(E) limits the acceleration
measurement for assessing motion sickness to the vertical direction, this is based on the
assumption that the human is in the seated upright posture. Since occupants of a vehicle are
likely to be in the semi-supine posture, the requirement is applied to all three orthogonal axes (X,
Y, and Z). The purpose of the 10-minute integration time is to constrain the deviations around
the permitted average sway during a 2-hour prelaunch period.]
[V2 6090] The system shall limit vibration during dynamic phases of flight to the crew such that
the vectorial sum of the X, Y, and Z accelerations between 0.5 and 80 Hz, calculated in 1-s
intervals and weighted in accordance with ISO 2631-1:1997(E), is less than or equal to the levels
plotted for the accumulated durations in Table 10, Frequency-Weighted Vibration Limits by
Exposure Time during Dynamic Phases of Flight, and Figure 12, Frequency-Weighted Vibration
Limits by Exposure Time during Dynamic Phases of Flight.
[Rationale: Although there are limited data on the effects of high levels of vibration on health,
especially during concurrent hypergravity acceleration, i.e., >1-g bias, internal organs and
tissue structures may be damaged if the vibration amplitude goes over these time durations. This
duration (under 10 minutes) is expected to bracket the vibration period during ascent and return.
If the dynamic event exceeds this 10-minute duration, requirement [V2 6091] Long-Duration
Vibration Exposure Limits for Health during Non-Sleep Phases of Mission has to be used from
the 10-minute point onward. In accordance with ISO 2631-1, Section 6.3.1, vibration
calculations are based on a running 1-second time window.]
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6.7.1.3 Long-Duration Vibration Exposure Limits for Health during Non-Sleep Phases
of Mission
[V2 6091] The system shall limit vibration to the crew such that the vectorial sum of the X, Y,
and Z frequency-weighted accelerations, as computed according to ISO 2631-1:1997(E), do not
exceed the minimum health guidance caution zone level defined by Figure B.1 in ISO 2631-
1:1997(E), Annex B.
[Rationale: Biodynamic and epidemiological research provides evidence of elevated health risk
related to long-term exposure to high-intensity whole-body vibration. According to ISO 2631-
1:1997(E) Annex B.3.1, “[f]or exposures below the [health guidance caution] zone, health
effects have not been clearly documented and/or objectively observed.”]
[V2 6092] The system shall limit vibration to the crew such that the acceleration between 1.0
and 80 Hz in each of the X, Y, and Z axes, weighted in accordance with ISO 20283-5,
Mechanical Vibration—Measurement of Vibration on Ships; Part 5 - Guidelines for the
Measurement, Evaluation and Reporting of Vibration with Regard to Habitability on Passenger
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and Merchant Ships, Annex A, is less than 0.01 g (0.1 m/s2) RMS for each two-minute interval
during the crew sleep period.
[Rationale: For long-duration (approximately eight hours), smaller vibration exposure can
adversely affect crew sleep.]
[V2 6093] Crew tasks shall be evaluated for performance (e.g., motor control accuracy and
precision, vision/readability, speech clarity, attentional focus) for all expected (nominal and off-
nominal) vibration levels.
[Rationale: It is critical to ensure that the crew can perform mission tasks in the environment to
which they will be exposed. For example, ascent and landing are typically accompanied by
periods of significant vibration that can affect the crewmembers’ motor control and visual
performance. Off-nominal conditions such as an aborted launch will expose crewmembers to
challenging vibration levels that will limit their ability to perform functions such as reading
display panels, turning knobs, activating switches, using touch screens and/or utilizing joystick
controllers.]
[V2 6094] The system, including tools, equipment, and processes, shall limit vibration to the
crewmembers’ hands such that the accelerations, as computed according to ANSI/ASA S2.70-
2006, Guide for the Measurement and Evaluation of Human Exposure to Vibration Transmitted
to the Hand, do not exceed the Daily Exposure Action Value defined by ANSI/ASA S2.70-2006,
Annex A, Figure A.1.
[Rationale: In accordance with ANSI/ASA S2.70-2006, Annex A.1.1, the Daily Exposure Action
Value delineates the health risk threshold defined as “the dose of hand-transmitted vibration
exposure sufficient to produce abnormal signs, symptoms, and laboratory findings in the
vascular, bone or joint, neurological, or muscular systems of the hands and arms in some
exposed individuals.”]
6.8 Radiation
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astronauts do not approach radiation limits and that such limits are not considered as tolerance
values. In practice, the application of the ALARA principle dictates that actions be taken during
design and operational phases to manage and limit exposures to ionizing radiation.
[V2 6095] The program shall set system design requirements to prevent potential crewmembers
from exceeding PELs as set forth in NASA-STD-3001, Volume 1.
[Rationale: The radiation design requirement is imposed to limit the risk of exposure-induced
death (REID) and to prevent clinically significant health effects, including performance
degradation or sickness in-flight as discussed in NASA-STD-3001, Volume 1. The mission
scenario and prior crewmember exposure are to be considered for mission planning and
allocation of system design limits across architectural elements, including EVA. The program is
to consider the cumulative REID over several missions for individual astronauts in setting the
design requirements. This allows experienced crewmembers to potentially support multiple
missions; however, the minimum functionality of protection to the most restrictive career limit
does not allow unrestricted crew selection related to a crewmember having prior radiation
exposures. That is, previous exposures are to be taken into account during crew selection to
ensure that career PELs are not violated. Examples of the various mission and crew selection
scenarios are discussed in the HIDH.]
Deleted:
[V2 6097] The program/project shall design systems using the ALARA principle to limit crew
radiation exposure.
[Rationale: The ALARA principle is a legal requirement intended to ensure astronaut safety. An
important function of ALARA is to ensure that astronauts do not approach radiation limits and
that such limits are not considered tolerance values. ALARA is an iterative process of integrating
radiation protection into the design process, ensuring optimization of the design to afford the
most protection possible, within other constraints of the vehicle systems. The protection from
radiation exposure is ALARA when the expenditure of further resources would be unwarranted
by the reduction in exposure that would be achieved.]
[V2 6098] The program shall specify the radiation environments to be used in verifying the
radiation design requirements.
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[Rationale: The relevant space radiation environment is to be used in establishing system design
requirements, vehicle design and development of all program architectural elements, and
verification of requirements. System design requirements derived from the uncertainty in the
calculation of cancer career risk limits are to specify the relevant radiation environment used in
determining the requirement. Relevant space radiation parameters include solar maximum and
minimum conditions, energy spectra, or precise model inputs, assumptions, and model options.]
[V2 6099] The program shall set requirements specifying appropriate capabilities to be provided
for real-time monitoring of space weather (solar particle events (SPE), galactic cosmic rays
(GCR), etc.) for characterization of the radiation environment and operational response by
ground personnel and the crew.
[Rationale: Radiation protection for humans in space differs from that on Earth because of the
distinct types of radiation, the small population of workers, and the remote location of astronauts
during space flight. Radiation sources in space have distinct physical and biological damage
properties compared to terrestrial radiation, and the spectrum and energy of concern for
humans differ from that for electronics. Space weather can directly impact a broad portion of the
space radiation environment on short- and long-time scales. Space weather conditions are to be
known at all times during missions to allow for appropriate radiation protection planning.]
[V2 6100] The system shall include a method to alert the crew locally and remotely when
radiation levels are expected to exceed acceptable levels.
[Rationale: The data from charged particle monitoring are the fundamental environmental
information required for radiation transport calculations and crew exposure evaluation. Given
an accurately measured energy spectra incident on the vehicle during an SPE, detailed crew
exposure can be evaluated. This limits the uncertainty of a single absorbed dose measurement in
determining crew exposure from an SPE. The crew, at all times, is to be alerted to excessive
fluence of particles. Should communications from the ground be interrupted or lost, the crew
requires onboard warnings when the radiation environment crosses dangerous thresholds so
that appropriate countermeasure actions can be taken. Varying user-defined thresholds may be
set according to the radiation environmental conditions that may be encountered, depending on
mission phase. The intent is for the vehicle data management system to provide the alerting
functionality. Crew need to be given sufficient time to prepare for a high radiation event.]
[V2 6101] To characterize and manage radiation exposures, the program shall provide methods
for monitoring personal dose and dose equivalent exposure, ambient monitoring of particle
fluence as a function of direction, energy, and elemental charge and monitoring of ambient dose
and ambient dose equivalent.
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[Rationale: These measurements are the primary means for controlling crew exposure during
missions to ensure that short-term and career space PELs, as specified in NASA-STD-3001,
Volume 1, are not exceeded. Tissue-equivalent micro-dosimeters have been used extensively for
crew exposure monitoring in space for this purpose. There is a large set of data and calculations
in the published literature that can be directly applied to crew exposure and risk determination,
using tissue-equivalent micro-dosimeters. Passive area monitors provide a time-integrated
measure of the spatial distribution of exposure rates. The exposure rates change with stowage
reconfigurations. Knowledge of the spatial distribution of exposure rate is necessary to identify
areas that have a relatively high exposure rate, i.e., avoidance areas, and to reconstruct a
crewmember’s exposure in the event of lost or unusable personal dosimeter data. The data are
used to track the crew exposure throughout the mission, as well as to provide positive indication
of proper health and status of the absorbed dose instrument. Passive dosimeters collect data
even during situations when power is lost to other instruments. Radiation data are vital for
quantifying in-flight risks to the crew and for allowing mission operations to advise the crew on
appropriate action in response to an SPE. For periods of time when the crew is not in
communication with mission operations, the crew is to be able to ascertain the radiation
conditions within the vehicle and take appropriate actions as required. The changes in the
radiation environment that could cause additional crew exposure can occur in time periods as
small as 1 to 5 minutes. The corresponding EVA spacesuit requirement for radiation dose
monitoring is defined in requirement [V2 11010] EVA Suit Radiation Monitoring in this NASA
Technical Standard.]
Sources of non-ionizing radiation are present in space flight applications, and exposure is
potentially hazardous. Astronaut occupational exposure to non-ionizing radiation is managed
through mission architecture, system design, procedures and planning, and application of
appropriate countermeasures. This NASA Technical Standard classifies non-ionizing radiation
into four categories: radio frequency (RF) electromagnetic radiation, lasers, natural incoherent
light, and artificial incoherent light.
[V2 6102] The system shall maintain the crew exposure to RF electromagnetic fields to or below
the limits stated in Table 11, Maximum Permissible Exposure (MPE) to RF Electromagnetic
Fields, and shown graphically in Figure 13, RF Electromagnetic Field Exposure Limits.
[Rationale: Examples of devices that generate radio frequency radiation include, but are not
limited to, antennas and wireless systems. These limits are modified from the C95.1-2005,
Institute of Electrical and Electronic Engineers (IEEE). They are intended to establish exposure
conditions for radio-frequency and microwave radiation to which it is believed that nearly all
workers can be repeatedly exposed without injury. Modifications were made to the C95.1-2005
power density values to remove a safety margin that was added in the C95.1 standard to include
the children population. This is not applicable to astronaut corp and resulted in the relaxation of
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the C95.1-2005 limits as per Figure 5.7.3.2.1-1, Occupational Exposure Limits for Radio-
Frequency Electromagnetic Fields.]
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Power Density
10 10
1 1
0.01 0.01
0.01 0.1 1 10 100 1000 10000 100000 1000000
Frequency (MHz)
(Illustrated to show whole-body resonance effects around 100 MHz) (modified from IEEE C95.1-2005, lower tier)
Figure 13—RF Electromagnetic Field Exposure Limits
[V2 6103] The system shall maintain the crew ocular and dermal exposure to laser systems and
the ocular exposure of the uncontrolled ground population to space lasers to or below the limits
specified in ANSI Z136.1, 2014, American National Standard for Safe Use of Lasers, Table 5
(ocular) and Table 7 (dermal) without Personal Protective Equipment.
[Rationale: This requirement limits crew ocular and dermal exposure to both continuous and
repetitively pulsed lasers to protect against eye injury. The limits are adopted from the Laser
Institute of America’s (LIA) publication ANSI Z136.1, 2014. The term laser system includes the
laser, its housing, and controls. This requirement applies to laser systems utilized both internal
and external to the vehicle. The safety analysis of all lasers will be carried out by ANSI Z136.1
methodology as specified in the verification requirement. In addition, this requirement limits
uncontrolled ground population ocular exposure to space lasers. The limits are adopted from
ANSI Z136.1, 2014. ANSI Z136.6, 2015 may be used for guidance on laser hazard analysis
methodology.]
[V2 6104] The system shall maintain the crew exposure to natural sunlight for spectral radiance
or irradiance (as applicable) within wavelengths between 180 nm and 3000 nm, as noted in Table
12, Natural Sunlight Exposure Limits for Different Damage Mechanisms.
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[Rationale: This requirement is intended to prevent ocular and dermal injury from sunlight
exposure with wavelengths between 180 and 3000 nm. Any exposure should consider the entire
window configuration of the incident radiation prior to its interaction with a crewmember's
body, including any concentration, diffusion, or filtering. The transmittance required for
windows, visors, and other optical devices can be reconciled with protection from natural
sunlight through the use of protective personal equipment, temporary filters, proper material
selection, apertures, or other appropriate means. The sun subtends an angle of approximately
9 milliradians when observed from the Earth and is, therefore, considered a small source. The
limits are based on the methodology given in the 2014 American Conference of Governmental
Industrial Hygienists (ACGIH) standard, Threshold Limit Values® (TLVs) and Biological
Exposure Indices® (BEIs), sections Light and Near-Infrared Radiation and Ultraviolet
Radiation (2014 or newer). This requirement is applicable to both hatch and module windows.]
[V2 6117] The system shall fully contain UV sources to prevent crew exposure.
[Rationale: This requirement is intended to prevent ocular injury and skin damage caused by
exposure to ultraviolet radiation. Acceptable methods of containment included the use of light-
tight structures and enclosures to fully contain the UV at the source and/or UV optical light
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obstruction by other means (e.g., screens, shields, filters) before reaching the crew to prevent
exposure.]
7. HABITABILITY FUNCTIONS
This section addresses the features of the system required for human occupancy. The specific
needs and designs for each feature vary with the type of mission.
[V2 7001] The food system shall provide the capability to maintain food safety and nutrition
during all phases of the mission.
[Rationale: A nutritious, viable, and stable food system that the crew is willing and able to
consume is critical for maintaining the health of the crew. The viability of the food system
requires not only that food be available for consumption but also that the food has the
appropriate nutrient mix to maintain crew health over time. The food is to retain its safety,
nutrition, and acceptability for any space flight concept of operations, be it of short or long
duration.]
[V2 7002] The system shall provide food that is acceptable to the crew for the duration of the
mission.
[Rationale: A viable and stable food system that the crew is willing and able to consume is
critical for maintaining the health of the crew. The crew’s willingness to consume these nutrients
is impacted by the variety and flavor of the food. Consideration is given to provide a variety of
food frequency, texture, and flavor while maintaining nutritional integrity as these factors can
affect crew food acceptance.
The dynamics of space flight present numerous challenges to food acceptability. A NASA food
item measuring an overall acceptability rating of 6.0 or better on a 9-point hedonic scale for the
duration of the mission is considered acceptable. The hedonic scale is a quantitative method that
is accepted throughout the food science industry as a means to determine acceptability. Further
information regarding methods for determining food acceptability can be found in Meilgaard,
M., et al. (1999). Food freshness will impact acceptability over time; thus, it is imperative to
provide acceptable food initially and a packaging and storage system that will maintain this
freshness. Alternatives include growing food or providing basic ingredients and allowing
flexibility in their combination and preparation, as well as providing the crew with various
condiments to adjust flavors as needed due to the fluid shifts in their sinuses. The ability to
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customize with some preference foods and with condiments is important to add some variety and
customization, which can help to prevent menu fatigue and support adequate consumption,
especially as missions become longer.]
[V2 7003] The system shall provide each crewmember with an average of 12,698 kJ (3,035 kcal)
per day, else an average energy requirement value is determined using Table 13, EER Equations
and applying an activity factor appropriate to the mission gravity and planned level of physical
activity.
[Rationale: The metabolic intake provisioning will need verification by analysis to determine
energy content of each food item and subsequent menu. The minimum number of calories per day
is based on the estimated energy requirements (EER) with an activity factor (AF) of 1.25 (active)
as calculated according to Table 13, EER Equations. With this activity factor applied, the
average for 84 male crewmembers with an average body mass of 82.9 kg is 12,724 kJ (3,041
kcal). The average for 20 female crewmembers with an average body mass of 65.1 kg is 9,807 kJ
(2,344 kcal). Refer also to document JSC 67378 Nutritional Requirements for Exploration
Missions up to 365 days, which notes activity factors ranging from 1.0 to 1.25 based on local
gravity and exercise capability.]
[V2 7004] For crewmembers performing EVA operations, the food system shall provide an
additional 837 kJ (200 kcal) per EVA hour above nominal metabolic intake as defined by [V2
7003] Food Caloric Content, of this NASA Technical Standard.
[Rationale: Additional energy and nutrients are necessary during EVA operations, as
crewmember energy expenditure is greater during those activities. Consumption of an additional
837 kJ (200 kcal), similar in nutrient content to the rest of the diet, per hour of EVA would allow
a crewmember to maintain lean body weight during the course of the mission. This is the
metabolic energy replacement requirement for moderate to heavy EVA tasks.]
[V2 7100] The system shall provide a food system with a diet including the nutrient composition
that is indicated in the Dietary Reference Intake (DRI) values as recommended by the National
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Institutes of Health, with the exception of those adjusted for space flight as noted in Table 14,
Nutrient Guidelines for Space Flight.
[Rationale: Macronutrients are nutrients that provide calories for energy and include
carbohydrates, protein, and fat. Micronutrients are essential elements the body uses in trace
amounts and can include vitamins and minerals. These are necessary to maintain the health of
the crew.]
Table 14—Nutrient Guidelines for Space Flight
Nutrients Daily Dietary Intake*
Vitamin D 25 µg (micrograms)
Vitamin C Women: 110 mg, Men: 125 mg (milligrams)
* This field is only expressed in metric units of measure.
Deleted:
Deleted:
Deleted:
Table 13 deleted.
[V2 7007] Microorganism levels in the food and production area shall not exceed those
specified in Table 15, Food Microorganism Levels.
[Rationale: To maintain the health and safety of the crew, it is necessary to control
microorganism growth.]
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[V2 7008] The system shall provide the capability for preparation, consumption, and stowage of
food.
[Rationale: A viable and stable food system that the crew is willing and able to consume is
critical for maintaining the health of the crew. Preparation addresses the heating of the food, if
necessary, and the use of whatever equipment is required. Consumption relies on utensils or
implements such as forks or spoons, a method to open packaging, or a method to rehydrate.
Stowage is needed for the food, as well as all the implements for preparation and consumption.]
[V2 7009] The food system shall allow the crew to unstow supplies, prepare meals, and clean up
for all crewmembers within the allotted meal schedule.
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[Rationale: Meal preparation and cleanup activity planning takes into account previous space
flight lessons learned, the water delivery and food heating systems, stowage configuration, and
desire of the crew to dine together. This is to help ensure that mission goals, objectives, and
timelines are not negatively impacted.]
[V2 7010] The food storage, preparation, and consumption areas shall be designed and located to
protect against cross-contamination between food and the environment.
[Rationale: Contamination can occur from a number of sources, including proximity to cross-
contamination, toxic materials, and the growth of microorganisms. Food is to be processed
properly and stored to control or eliminate microbiological concerns. Furthermore, it is critical
for crew physical and psychological health that waste management systems (such as food waste,
body waste, personal hygiene, exercise) are separate from food preparation, stowage, and
consumption activities to protect from cross-contamination. Space flight lessons learned indicate
this has been an issue during Apollo and ISS missions.]
[V2 7011] The system shall provide the capability to heat food and beverages to a temperature
appropriate for the given item.
[Rationale: Heating is necessary for the subjective quality of food. Heating food and liquid
enhances the palatability of some items, which is important for psychological health, as well as
for ensuring that crewmembers eat the food provided. Maintaining the temperature of
rehydrated food helps prevent microbial growth. The vehicle is to provide the ability to heat
dehydrated and non-rehydrated foods.]
[Rationale: Dining together has been shown to support the crew’s psychological health and
well-being. The food system should account for the volume for all the crewmembers to prepare
their meal, gather simultaneously, and accommodate any equipment needed to restrain the food
and implements, including utensils necessary for dining. The design and layout of the dining
space should be based on a functional task analysis. The specific volume and layout are to meet
the requirements defined in section 8, Architecture, in this NASA Technical Standard. Additional
guidance for design for habitable volume is provided in Chapter 8 of the HIDH.]
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[V2 7014] The system shall provide the ability to contain and remove food particles and spills.
[Rationale: The ability to clean spills or food particles in any area of the vehicle helps to
minimize contamination of the spacecraft. Contamination of the food system might occur if spills
are not contained, and the physical debris of food particles can jeopardize the safety and health
of the crew.]
[V2 7015] The system shall provide methods for cleaning and sanitizing food facilities,
equipment, and work areas.
[Rationale: The ability to clean and disinfect the food system areas helps to minimize microbial
contamination of the food system. Contamination of the food system by physical debris can
jeopardize the safety and health of the crew.]
[V2 7016] Personal hygiene items shall be provided for each crewmember, along with
corresponding system capabilities for oral hygiene, personal grooming, and body cleansing.
[Rationale: Oral hygiene and personal grooming activities are to be accommodated by the
system through provision of adequate and comfortable bathing and body waste management
facilities as these enhance self-image, improve morale, and increase productivity of the
crewmember. Each crewmember is to have personal hygiene provisions, e.g., toothbrush,
toothpaste, moistened cloth wipes for body cleansing, deodorant for odor control, oral hygiene,
and personal grooming throughout each space mission. Personal hygiene equipment and
supplies are to accommodate the physiological differences in male and female crewmembers in
microgravity and partial gravity environments. Considerations for crew acceptability should be
taken into account as this will impact their overall behavioral performance.]
[V2 7017] The system shall provide for privacy during personal hygiene activities.
[Rationale: Certain hygiene functions are to have a degree of privacy, especially in a vehicle in
which other crewmembers may be performing other functions simultaneously. Privacy provides
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for the psychological well-being of the crew and is to be provided for whole-body and partial-
body cleaning and donning and doffing of clothing.]
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[V2 7019] The system shall provide an environmentally compatible sanitization method for
personal hygiene facilities and equipment.
[V2 7020] The system shall provide the capability for collection, containment, and disposal of
body waste for both males and females.
[Rationale: A body waste management system facilitates the clean, efficient, and reliable
collection and management of human waste (urine, feces, vomitus, and menses) and associated
equipment and supplies.]
[V2 7021] The body waste management system shall be isolated from the food preparation and
consumption areas for aesthetic and hygienic purposes.
[Rationale: Contamination can occur from a number of sources, including proximity to cross-
contamination and the growth of microorganisms. It is critical for crew physical and
psychological health that any interference between body waste management functions and food
preparation and consumption be prevented. The isolation of the body waste management system
can be achieved by a physical barrier and/or distance from the food system areas to prevent
concerns from cross-contamination. Space flight lessons learned indicate this has been an issue
during Apollo and ISS missions. For example, due to the close proximity (about 1-foot) of the
food system area and body waste management areas, the Apollo crews commented on having
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diminished appetites. Additionally, complaints from Skylab included the difficulties during
defecation due to the awkward placement of the toilet.]
[V2 7022] The system shall provide privacy during use of the body waste management system.
[Rationale: Certain hygiene functions are to have a degree of privacy, especially in a vehicle in
which other crewmembers may be performing other functions simultaneously. Privacy provides
for the psychological well-being of the crew and is to be provided for use of the body waste
management system.]
[V2 7023] Body waste management supplies shall be provided for each crewmember and be
located within reach of crewmembers using the body waste management system.
[Rationale: Personal hygiene and body waste management supplies such as tissues and towels
may need to be accessed rapidly.]
[V2 7024] The body waste management system shall allow a crewmember to urinate and
defecate simultaneously without completely removing lower clothing.
[Rationale: Accidental discharge of one or both waste components into the habitable volume is
not wanted, and it may be difficult for a human to relax the gastrointestinal control sphincter
without relaxing the urinary voluntary control sphincter and vice versa. To minimize impact to
crew operations, waste elimination needs to be accomplished with minimal crew overhead, e.g.,
without completely removing clothing.]
[V2 7025] The system shall prevent the release of body waste from the body waste management
system.
[Rationale: A release of waste into the closed environment of a spacecraft can contaminate the
human and risk the initiation or spread of disease but also can contaminate surfaces, materials,
and consumables.]
[V2 7026] The system shall provide odor control for the body waste management system.
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[V2 7027] Body waste management trash collection shall be accessible to and within reach of
crewmembers using the body waste management system.
[Rationale: Waste management items that cannot be collected and contained with human waste
are to be disposed of immediately after use. Waste management trash collection items are to be
within reach of the crewmember so that it is not necessary to egress the waste management
restraint system or to access closed compartments.]
Deleted:
[V2 7029] All body waste management facilities and equipment shall be capable of being
cleaned, sanitized, and maintained.
[V2 7101] For missions greater than 30 days, the system shall provide separate dedicated
volumes for body waste management and personal hygiene.
[Rationale: Evidence from ISS suggests that locating personal hygiene (e.g., body cleansing,
personal grooming) in the same volume as body waste management is impractical and disliked
by the crew. Conducting personal hygiene in the Waste and Hygiene Compartment (WHC) limits
its use by other crewmembers. Additionally, due to the effects of microgravity, the WHC volume
may not be sufficiently clean to support hygiene activities. ISS crewmembers improvise spaces
aboard station to conduct personal hygiene that are separate from the WHC volume, which may
lead to issues with space utilization and microbial growth due to water liberation. A dedicated
space for personal hygiene with appropriate surfaces that limit microbial growth needs to be
provided in future vehicles.]
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[V2 7102] The human body waste management system shall be capable of collecting and
containing the various human body waste as specified in Table 16, Body Waste Quantities, for
the expected needs of each mission and task.
[Rationale: Body waste collection is to be performed in a manner that minimizes the possible
escape of feces, urine, vomitus, or menses into the habitable volume during microgravity and
partial gravity operations, not only due to the high content of microbes present in the feces, but
also due to the potential injury to crewmembers and hardware that could result from inadvertent
discharge into the cabin. The presence of bacteria in urine is not typical for healthy crew;
however, during certain medical conditions, like urinary tract infections, there could be a
presence of bacteria, so precautions should consider this.
The body will generate the same quantity of fecal material as is normal in terrestrial
circumstances based on food consumption and an individual’s metabolism, with individual
variables being evacuation frequency and water content. An individual can only evacuate the
maximum value at a rate lower than average from limited food consumption inputs. Solid fecal
matter is used to describe fecal material that is eliminated as discrete boli and will have surface
characteristics that range from relatively dry to sticky depending on the internal water content,
which is graphically demonstrated in a Bristol Stool chart derived from Heaton and Lewis, 1997.
Diarrheal events are assumed to be in place of normal fecal elimination with the increased
quantity based on increased water content and minor amounts of intestinal cellular material. In
practice, a waste system should be capable of accommodating fecal consistency across the
continuum from solid low water content to diarrheal without allowing escapes of fecal material
to the cabin environment. Alternatively, the urine output may be slightly greater or lower in
various phases of the mission associated with gravity transitions and fluid intake levels.
Space Adaptation Syndrome (SAS) occurs in up to 70% of first-time fliers (30% of whom may
experience vomiting) during the first 48 to 72 hours of microgravity. Also, a possible water
landing may cause crewmembers to experience seasickness. Stowage and disposal are to be
adequate for a worst-case number of involved crew, severity, and duration of symptoms, as well
as the volume of gastrointestinal contents regurgitated. Vomiting and its associated odor, mainly
produced by the compound butyric acid, may trigger a wave of bystander nausea and vomiting
reaction in adjacent crewmembers in an enclosed space.
It is expected that female crew will have a menstruation cycle approximately every 27-31 days
with a discharge of 30-50 mL of menses, with approximately 80% discharged in the first 3-4
days. The frequency and volume will vary from each crewmember. It should not be assumed that
a crewmember is hormonally suppressed or that she will not have a change in her cycle or
breakthrough bleeding at any point during a mission, thus appropriate capabilities of containing
and disposing of menses should be accommodated.
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The average values and frequencies of various body waste are representative over the entire
mission (launch and return landing) and include occasional occurrences of the maximum values,
which are noted in Table 16. Mass and volume values are for the biological material only;
however, collection and containment will need to include both the biological material and all
hygiene products required for immediate body cleaning after evacuation.
The collection capacity accounts for the healthy adult maximum output during a single event.
The human body waste management system should always (nominally) be capable of collecting a
maximum fecal event, as it is unknown when a maximum event will occur. The fecal discharge
related to gastrointestinal illness (diarrhea) occurs at an increased frequency but is also
variable, unpredictable, and largely dependent on etiology. Terrestrial sources of infectious,
pathogenic diarrhea such as Rotavirus A and Enterotoxigenic Escherichia coli (ETEC) can
produce single-episode volumes as high as 1.5 L. For NASA missions, the preflight crew
quarantine period (refer to NASA-STD-3001, Volume 1) is utilized to reduce the risk of
infectious disease in-flight. Potential in-mission sources of comparable high-volume diarrhea is
from acute radiation events such as SPEs for missions beyond low earth orbit (refer to NASA-
STD-3001, Volume 1) and/or food that is not properly stored and prepared (refer sections [V2
7007] Food and Production Microorganism Levels, [V2 7008] Food Preparation, [V2 7010]
Food Contamination Control, [V2 7015] Food System Cleaning and Sanitizing and [V2 7021]
Body Waste Management System Location). Both of these potential risks need to be addressed as
part of whole mission planning. The total collection volume is to accommodate diarrhea caused
by likely pathogens or from diarrhea caused by salt/fluid shifts. When a diarrhea event will
occur is unknown, so the body waste management system may process the collection differently,
e.g., no compaction. The urinary collection system is to be capable of collecting all of the
crewmember's output in succession, as well as the simultaneous evacuation of urine and feces
with the presence of tissue from either sloughing or menses.]
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Deleted:
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[V2 7085] The body waste management system shall be capable of collecting and containing all
waste during simultaneous defecation and urination.
[Rationale: It is common for individuals to not be able to separate defecation and urination.
Body waste collection systems design are to have sufficient capability to capture and contain
both.]
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[V2 7035] The human body waste management system shall be capable of collecting and
containing urine for either processing or disposal of an average total urine output volume of Vu =
3 + 2.5t liters per crewmember, where t is the mission length in days.
[Rationale: Urine production on the first day after launch, i.e., flight day 0, is 3 L
(101.4 fl oz) per crewmember. Urine output may be slightly greater or lower in various phases of
the mission associated with gravity transitions and fluid intake levels. Reference Table 16 for
maximum output values.]
Deleted:
Deleted:
[V2 7038] The system shall provide countermeasures to meet crew bone, muscle, sensorimotor,
thermoregulation, and aerobic/cardiovascular requirements defined in NASA-STD-3001,
Volume 1.
[Rationale: Exercise is used to maintain crew cardiovascular fitness (to aid in ambulation
during gravity transitions, minimize fatigue, maintain cardiovascular health and function, and
preserve thermoregulation capacity), to maintain muscle mass and strength/endurance, for
recovery from strenuous tasks and confined postures, to rehabilitate minor muscle injuries, and
to maintain bone mass. Exercise also has behavioral health benefits. Exercise is to commence as
early as possible during the mission and continue throughout all mission phases in accordance
with results from the Apollo crew’s participation in the June 2006 Apollo Medical Summit
(NASA/TM-2007-214755, The Apollo Medical Operations Project: Recommendations to
Improve Crew Health and Performance for Future Exploration Missions and Lunar Surface
Operations), and recommendations from the 2005 Operational and Research Musculoskeletal
Summit. See Appendix A, Reference Documents, for complete citations.]
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[V2 7040] The physiological countermeasure system design shall allow the crew to unstow
supplies, perform operations, and stow items within the allotted countermeasure schedule.
[Rationale: The ease and the efficiency of the countermeasure system assist in the crew being
able to perform their countermeasure activities. The crew needs these activities to maintain
health and fitness. It can be expected that daily countermeasure activity will occur.]
Deleted:
[V2 7042] The system shall provide countermeasures to mitigate the effects of orthostatic
intolerance when transitioning from weightlessness to gravity environments and during Gz (head-
to-foot) vehicle accelerations defined in the sustained acceleration limits.
7.5 Medical
[V2 7043] A medical system shall be provided to the crew to meet the medical requirements of
NASA-STD-3001, Volume 1.
[Rationale: NASA-STD-3001, Volume 1, includes Health and Medical Care Standards required
to reduce the risk that exploration missions are impacted by crew medical issues and that long-
term astronaut health risks are managed within acceptable limits. The Health and Medical Care
Standards and associated appendices define the health care, crew protection, and maintenance
capability required to support the crew as appropriate for the specific mission destination and
duration, as well as for the associated vehicular constraints.]
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[V2 7045] Medical equipment shall be usable by non-physician crewmembers in the event that a
physician crewmember is not present or is the one who requires medical treatment.
[Rationale: Medical equipment is to be simple and easy to use and require minimal training so
that non-medical personnel can administer care to ill or injured crewmembers. Medical
equipment also is to have consistent interfaces to assist in crew usability.]
[V2 7046] The capability shall exist to position and restrain a patient, care provider, and
equipment during treatment.
[Rationale: Patient restraints are to be capable of preventing the motion of arms and legs, allow
stabilization of the head, neck, and spine, and provide attachment to the spacecraft or habitat.
Care provider restraints are to allow the care provider to remain close to the patient to
administer treatment but should be easily removable or allow movement to access nearby
equipment. Equipment restraints are to be able to safely restrain large items such as medical
kits, as well as individual items.]
Deleted:
Deleted:
[V2 7049] Each human space flight program shall provide the capability to handle deceased
crewmembers.
[Rationale: Despite screening, health care measures, and safety precautions, it is possible for
crewmembers to die during a mission, particularly on extended duration missions. Problems that
can threaten the health and safety of remaining crewmembers include grief, mission delays, and
contamination. Facilities and plans for handling deceased crewmembers that are socially,
biologically, and physically acceptable are to be established during system development. The
plan needs to consider the following factors: minimizing risk to surviving crewmembers,
potential forensics collection, biohazard containment (via pressurized suit or human remains
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containment unit) and legal jurisdiction which will involve working with other agencies (such as
the Federal Bureau of Investigation) and international partners (via treaties).]
7.6.1 Provision
Stowage provision includes stowage volume (e.g., containers, racks, shelves), and stowage
restraints. Defined stowage space is needed to accommodate items including but not limited to
crew personal items, crew hygiene and body waste supplies, medical supplies, cleaning supplies,
and food. Some stowed items are removed from stowage, used, and then returned to the provided
provisions/location. Other items are temporarily removed from stowage, relocated to another
use location, and much later stowed. Stowage design for crew access needs must be defined
through iterative crew task analysis and include frequency of use, stowed item criticality,
operational use/need timeline and priority, interference from/to adjacent or parallel tasks,
spacesuit or PPE configuration, anthropometry (e.g., reach, clearance). For operational
efficiency, design of stowage provisions should be integrated with inventory management,
labeling, and operational nomenclature.
[V2 7050] The system shall provide for the stowage of hardware and supplies, to include
location, restraint, and protection for these items.
[Rationale: Some stowed items are removed from stowage, used, and then returned to the
provided provisions/location. Other items are temporarily removed from stowage, relocated to
another use location, and much later stowed.]
[V2 7051] The system shall provide a stowage location for personal items and clothing.
[Rationale: Stowage locations for personal items and clothing aids crew morale and well-being.
When integrated with inventory management, labeling, and operational nomenclature, the
stowing of and access to these personal items should be accomplished efficiently.]
[V2 7052] All relocatable items, e.g., food, EVA suits, and spare parts, shall have a dedicated
stowage location.
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volume necessary for the crew to execute their tasks safely and efficiently. Stowage is not to
hinder the access to any emergency equipment.]
[V2 7053] The system shall provide defined stowage locations that do not interfere with crew
operations.
[Rationale: Having defined stowage locations supports efficient operations and helps prevent
the stowage system from interfering with operations such as translation and vehicle control.
Care is to be taken when designing the stowage system so that clear translation can occur in the
event of an emergency. To maintain a high level of efficiency in crew operations, it is important
to locate items within easy reach of their point of consumption.]
[V2 7054] The system shall provide the capability to restrain hardware, supplies, and crew
personal items that are removed or deployed for use as defined by crew task analysis.
[Rationale: Stowed and deployed items are to be restrained so that they are secure for crew use
and prevent uncontrolled movement causing injury, damage, or inefficient task performance
under expected conditions for acceleration, vibration, or crew contact. Restraints must also be
designed to facilitate operations in expected gravity environment. For example, in microgravity,
restraints should be retainable in open or loosened position to facilitate stow/unstow of items
during stowage operations. Stowage restraints help protect the crew from injury and equipment
from damage or loss, and ensure that stowed or deployed items remain where required during
operations and crew tasks.]
7.6.2 Accessibility
Accessibility means having the ability to reach and retrieve objects with relative ease. The
following subsections define requirements for implementing this feature.
[V2 7055] Stowage items shall be accessible in accordance with their use, with the easiest
accessibility for mission-critical and most frequently used items.
[V2 7056] Stowage containers and restraints shall be operable without the use of tools.
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[Rationale: To maximize the use of crew time, the stowage system is to permit crew access and
reconfiguration without the use of tools.]
[Rationale: The stowage system must be designed to include features that allow a suited
crewmember to access, open, close, or manipulate stowed items. This means the integrated
system must accommodate suit constraints and volumetric requirements. This applies to normal
as well as contingency operations.]
[V2 7058] The stowage identification system shall be compatible with the inventory
management system.
[Rationale: Space Shuttle and ISS experience has shown that stowage management and
identification—the knowledge of the quantity, location, and type of each supply—is crucial for
mission planning and maintaining crew productivity. Quantity and location are not the only
aspects of stowage identification. Stowage, labeling, inventory tracking, and operational
nomenclature are also to be considered when developing an integrated system.]
[V2 7059] The system shall provide an inventory management system to track the locations and
quantities of items (including hazardous trash) throughout the mission.
[Rationale: Space Shuttle and ISS experience has shown that inventory/stowage management—
the knowledge of the quantity and location of each type of supply—is crucial for mission
planning and maintaining crew productivity. Quantity and location are not the only aspects of
inventory tracking. Stowage, labeling, and operational nomenclature are also to be considered
when developing an integrated system.]
[V2 7060] The system shall be designed to allow inventory management functions to be
completed within the allotted schedule.
[Rationale: The inventory management system is to be efficient, and the amount of time required
by the crew to perform the functions of the system minimized. A flexible system allows for
changes in stowage locations or quantities any time during missions. Lessons learned in past
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space flight have indicated that past inventory operations have exceeded the allocated time
required to accomplish the tasks. This can interfere with other expected tasks.]
[V2 7061] The nomenclature used to refer to the items tracked by the inventory management
system shall be consistent with procedures and labels.
[Rationale: It is imperative that space flight operations personnel, including all ground
controllers and crewmembers, communicate using common nomenclature that unambiguously
and uniquely defines all hardware and software items. This nomenclature is also to be common
among all operational products, including commands, procedures, displays, planning products,
reference information, system handbooks, system briefs, mission rules, schematics, and payloads
operations products.]
[V2 7062] Items that need to be uniquely identified shall have a unique name.
[Rationale: Unique names for inventory items assist in the location and clear identification of
the items. This promotes efficiency and reduces the likelihood of mis-selection of items for tasks.
This also assists to minimize training.]
[V2 7063] Items within the inventory management system that are identical and interchangeable
shall have identical nomenclature.
[Rationale: Names for inventory items assist in the location and clear identification of the items.
This promotes efficiency and reduces the likelihood of mis-selection of items for tasks.]
7.8.1 Provision
[V2 7064] The system shall provide a trash management system to contain, mitigate odors,
prevent release, and dispose of all expected trash.
[Rationale: All wet and dry waste, including food, sharp items, biological, chemical, and
radioactive materials should be planned for and accommodated within the system for the
duration of the mission until planned disposal. Task analysis should identify waste generating
tasks, waste types and quantities, biological content, environmental conditions (including
gravity), odor, and other relevant task conditions. Odors may be mitigated by neutralizing,
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removing, or containing. Considering potential health effects to the crew, waste containment
systems should control microbial growth and not allow inadvertent escape of biological or
chemical contaminants and should protect crew from inadvertent injury from sharp items and
medical equipment. A good practice is to separate and isolate hazardous and non-hazardous
waste containment, such as body waste and food packaging waste. Hazardous waste containers
are to be clearly and visibly identified with text and/or symbolic labeling. If multiple types of
hazardous waste are accumulated in a single container, the outermost containment label
indicates the highest level of hazard (e.g., toxicity, biohazard) contained. Trash stowage volumes
and locations are to be defined to ensure stored waste does not interfere with crew operations.
The design should consider how crew will operate the system in their intended environment:
How will crew prevent waste particles from escaping in microgravity; How will the containment
system withstand changing pressure environment; What is the planned duration of containment
until trash can be removed from the vehicle.]
[V2 7065] Trash stowage volumes shall be allocated for each mission.
[Rationale: The trash plan defines the types and quantities of trash expected during mission
operations. Trash buildup occurs, especially on missions where there is no expendable vehicle to
carry away the trash, or capability to jettison or recycle the waste. Dedicated trash stowage
volumes and locations are needed and are to be coupled with appropriate packaging and
containment. The volume and mass allocations for body waste are referenced in Table 16 of
requirement [V2 7102] Body Waste Quantities.]
[V2 7066] The system shall provide defined trash stowage that does not interfere with crew
operations.
[Rationale: This requirement is intended to prevent the trash system from interfering with
normal operations such as translation and vehicle control. Design requirements are to ensure
that the trash system does not interfere with translation during emergency events. As well, in an
effort to maintain a high level of efficiency in crew operations, it is important to locate trash
receptacles within easy reach of their point of use.]
Deleted:
Deleted:
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[V2 7069] The hazard response level (HRL) of all liquids, particles, gases and gels shall be
labeled on the outermost containment barrier in location(s) visible to crew.
[Rationale: Hazard response labeling informs the crew of appropriate personal protective
equipment (PPE) and clean-up response in the event of an unintended release. Assessment of
liquids, gels, gasses, and particles used in the habitable volume are performed by NASA JSC
Toxicology, BioSafety, Materials, and Environmental Control teams to determine appropriate
HRL. System and hardware developers can submit information to NASA per JSC-27472,
Requirements for Submission of Data Needed for Toxicological Assessment of Chemicals and
Biologicals to be Flown on Manned Spacecraft. The requirements for HRL labeling are defined
in JSC-27260, Standard Flight Decal Catalog.]
[V2 7070] The system shall provide volume, restraint, accommodations, environmental control
(e.g., vibration, lighting, noise, and temperature), and degree of privacy for sleep for each
crewmember, to support overall crew health and performance.
[V2 7071] For long duration missions (>30 days), individual privacy facilities shall be provided.
[Rationale: Isolation, confinement, mission task demands, social density, and other associated
aspects of space flight can lead to stress, which tends to increase with mission duration.
Therefore, privacy is a countermeasure needed to protect the behavioral health of the crew,
particularly in space flight vehicles with a relatively smaller volume. Terrestrial literature has
further shown that greater distance between workstations is associated with improved job
performance relative to smaller distances and that increased privacy is related to decreased
emotional exhaustion. Providing private accommodations for crew to accommodate sleep and
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social retreat will allow for improved sleep quality and completion of tasks with reduced
distractions and will allow for crew to temporarily withdraw for emotional restoration. Tasks
that require privacy, such as private medical or psychological conferences, will also need to be
facilitated by accommodations for visual and auditory privacy.]
[V2 7073] The system shall provide for horizontal sleep surface areas for partial-g and 1-g
environments.
[Rationale: The sleeping area volume is to accommodate crew body sizes in all gravity
environments. Partial-g, i.e., lunar (1/6) and Mars (1/3) gravity, defines the orientation of the
volume. Orientation and body support (e.g., cushioning) should be considered in partial-g
environments.]
7.10 Clothing
[V2 7074] Clean, durable clothing shall be provided in quantities sufficient to meet crew needs.
[V2 7075] Clothing shall be provided for each individual crewmember’s exclusive use.
[Rationale: Requirements for exclusive clothing use are to include considerations for individual
stowage areas, clothing identification (particularly if clothing is laundered), sizing, and
individual preference accommodation.]
[V2 7076] Clothing shall be comfortable in fit and composition, for the environment, e.g.,
temperature and humidity, in which it will be worn.
[Rationale: Requirements for clothing types are to be based on anticipated crew activities, e.g.,
exercise, maintenance, lounging, work, etc., and gravity environments, e.g., very loose clothing
and shoes would be inappropriate in a microgravity environment. Layering of clothing may
accommodate temperature and personal preferences. (See Figure 2, Crew Health Environmental
Limits, [V2 6012] Crew Health Environmental Limits and [V2 7041] Environmental Control.)
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Clothing design is also dependent on the range of crew sizes as defined in the physical
characteristics database. (See section 4.1 Physical Data Sets in this NASA Technical Standard.)
Clothing material should be assessed as stated in NASA-STD-6016. Material selection should
include evaluation for material degradation that produces lint or fuzz.]
Deleted:
7.11 Housekeeping
[V2 7079] The system shall provide sufficient volume to access areas that need to be cleaned
and perform housekeeping duties.
[Rationale: Access to areas that need to be cleaned include physical access (e.g., panels and
covers can be easily removed) and the provision of sufficient volumes for cleaning activities and
associated hardware. The full-size range of personnel with appropriate cleaning tools and
equipment is to be able to access all areas for routine cleaning. Areas such as vents that need to
be cleaned regularly need to be easily accessible. Complex access procedures (e.g.,
disassembling panels, disconnecting alarms) add time and frustration to task performance. Fixed
equipment should not have to be unsecured and moved for routine cleaning. Inaccessible areas
are to be closed off to prevent the accumulation of trash, dirt and dust particulates.]
[V2 7080] The system shall be designed for access, inspection, and removal of particulates that
can be present before launch or that can result from mission operations.
[V2 7081] The system shall provide surfaces that are microbiologically safe for human contact.
[Rationale: Microbiologically safe surfaces are essential to prevent infection and mitigate risk
to crew health and performance. Assessing the microbiological safety of internal surfaces relies
primarily on the enumeration and identification of viable, medically significant microorganisms
(bacteria and fungi) that are known to cause disease. Historically, microbial concentrations on
internal surfaces of crewed spacecraft have been controlled by the selection of materials that do
not promote microbial growth and can be cleaned/disinfected in-flight. Medical significance of
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microorganisms and allowable levels of microorganisms are set based on guidance from the JSC
Microbiology Laboratory. Program level requirements for surface contamination include
considerations for factors such as intended uses, vehicle architecture, and mission duration.
Considerations should be taken for scenarios where there is a period of dormancy or uncrewed
operations.]
[V2 7082] The system shall contain surface materials that can be easily cleaned and sanitized
using planned cleaning methods.
[Rationale: Program requirements are to be established so that surface materials such as highly
textured materials are assessed for this feature.]
[V2 7083] The system shall provide cleaning materials that are effective, safe for human use,
and compatible with system water reclamation, air revitalization, waste management systems,
and spacesuits.
[Rationale: Program requirements are to be established so that cleaning materials are assessed
for these features. Effective cleaning materials leave a cleaned surface ready for use without the
need for additional cleaning. For example, an effective window cleaning material leaves the
window with no accumulation, streaking, or any other artifact that could interfere with the use of
the window (photography or piloting tasks). On the other hand, cleaning material used on a
dining table could be considered effective even with the presence of streaks or accumulation, as
long as the surface is safe on which to prepare, serve, and consume food.]
[V2 6058] The system shall prevent condensation persistence on surfaces within the vehicle.
[Rationale: The presence of free water can promote the growth of microbial organisms, which
poses a hazard to human health. The system is to provide controls and mitigation steps to
prevent the formation of condensate on internal surfaces for a length of time, thus preventing
microbial growth to unacceptable levels. Initial microbial concentration, the probable types of
organisms, the porosity of the surface materials, and exposure can affect the acceptable
persistence of the condensate based upon crew health risk mitigation. Examples of moisture
buildup from previous space flight missions that resulted in fungal growth include non-insulated
cold surfaces and designed operations, which moisten surfaces (such as wetting a cloth) without
appropriate drying. Condensation on a non-ventilated surface will be difficult to dry. Current
ISS requirements provide some flexibility in allowable condensate persistence for areas
determined to have minimal crew health risk.]
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[V2 7084] The system shall provide individual and team-oriented recreational capabilities for the
crew to maintain behavioral and psychological health.
[Rationale: Appropriate recreational facilities depend on the nature and duration of the
mission. Program development requirements are to provide time and resources for psychological
assessment of crew needs. The system design is to include recreational facilities, materials, and
operational accommodations identified in these assessments.]
8. ARCHITECTURE
Architecture is defined as the arrangement and configuration of the functional areas where the
crew lives and works. This includes any items necessary for translation, restraints and mobility
aids, hatches, windows, and lighting. For detailed requirements to accommodate the physical
characteristics of the crew, see section 4, Physical Characteristics and Capabilities, in this
NASA Technical Standard. Accommodations for the specific functions that occur within the
architecture of the habitat are addressed in section 7, Habitability Functions, in this NASA
Technical Standard. Environmental qualities of the architecture are in section 6, Natural and
Induced Environments.
8.1 Volume
[V2 8001 The system shall provide the defined habitable volume and layout to physically
accommodate crew operations and living.
[Rationale: The architectural layout of space for living and working should be designed to
provide defined locations and volumes that allow for expected crew activities, including mission
operations, habitability functions, and translation. Required volume is a function of the number
of crew, number of mission and contingency days, and the crew activities. Design and layout of
functional volumes are guided by function and task analysis, as well as iterative process of
design and evaluation. Task attributes such as operational flow, frequency, dependencies,
compatibility, interference, equipment, crew postures and gravity environment should be
considered in the functional layout and interfaces. Tasks that are sensitive or incompatible with
other activities, such as food prep, body self-inspection and cleansing, and use of the lavatory,
should be separated or isolated to avoid contamination or detrimental impacts to performance,
health, or well-being. Private self-inspection following use of the lavatory will impose additional
volume needs in microgravity or very low fractional environments to ensure that waste has
separated from the body and clothing and not recirculated in adverse trajectories – something
that is less necessary in 1g or higher fractional gravities. Longer mission duration will increase
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functional volume needs for accommodation of stowage, increased volume for exercise
equipment including exercise performance, medical treatment facilities and equipment; as well
as crew sleep, recreation and privacy for behavioral health. Volume, size, and layout of medical
treatment facilities and equipment will need to consider number of crewmembers, level of care,
mission duration, crew activities, and the likelihood that multiple crewmembers may require
simultaneous medical attention. For spacecraft volume design methodology and best practices,
refer to SA-16-156, Level II JSC CMO HMTA Position on NHV and Internal Layout
Considerations for Exploration Missions; NASA/TP-2014-218556; NASA/SP-2010-3407, section
8.2, Overall Architectural Design, and JSC 63557, Net Habitable Volume Verification Method.]
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[V2 8005] Habitability functions shall be located based on the use of common equipment,
interferences, and the sequence and compatibility of operations.
[Rationale: Design for any system, function, or activity is to be based on the logical sequence
and smooth flow of activities that are to occur. Generally, the most efficient layout is to place
functions adjacent to each other when they are used sequentially or in close coordination. There
are some limitations to this general rule, however. Adjacent positions are not to degrade any of
the activities within the stations, nor is the positioning to degrade any of the activities in
surrounding stations. General adjacency considerations, beyond simple activity flow, include
transition frequency, sequential dependency, support equipment commonality, physical
interference, traffic interference, privacy, confidentiality, noise output and sensitivity, lighting,
vibration, simultaneous use or adjacent use by multiple crewmembers, and contamination.]
8.1.3 Interference
[V2 8006] The system shall separate functional areas whose functions would detrimentally
interfere with each other.
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8.2 Configuration
Configuration refers to the visual aides that inform crewmembers about their spatial orientation
and location within the spacecraft. This section describes requirements for consistent visual cues
for orientation and location within and among modules.
[V2 8007] The system shall have consistent spatial and interface orientations relative to a
defined vertical orientation.
[Rationale: The human working and living position is to be established with respect to a defined
local vertical, especially when there is no gravity cue that identifies the up or down orientation.
To promote efficient performance and avoid disorientation or errors, the system designer should
define the spatial and interface directional orientation using design features such as visual
orientation cues (e.g., labeling), orientation of work surfaces, positioning of displays and
controls, etc. Maintaining a consistent orientation of interfaces minimizes crewmember
rotational realignments needed to perform tasks that have directionally dependent components
such as reading labels and displays. Inconsistent and varied display and control orientations
may contribute to operational delays or errors. Given the complexity of some operations (e.g.,
piloting), a single orientation for all controls, displays, and labels may not be possible; but the
design is to minimize crewmember repositioning to efficiently perform a task. This requirement is
meant to ensure that all equipment at an interface is aligned with respect to the crewmember's
head so that an operating crewmember only needs to adjust body orientation slightly in pitch
and yaw at a workstation but does not need to adjust body orientation in roll. Orientations are to
be consistent within a given functional volume where crew may interface with multiple different
elements. Separate functional volumes (e.g., lab module, cargo module, observation cupola) may
each have their own local orientation, different from other volumes, but internally consistent to
support crew interfaces.]
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[V2 8010] A standard location coding system shall be provided to uniquely identify each
predefined location within the system.
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[Rationale: Location coding provides a clear method of referring to different locations within
the vehicle habitat and serves as a communication and situational awareness tool when
traversing the vehicle or unstowing/stowing equipment.]
[V2 8011] The system shall provide aids to assist crewmembers in locating items or places
within the system and orienting themselves in relation to those items or places.
[Rationale: Crewmembers need visual cues to help them quickly adjust their orientation to a
local vertical position. When adjacent workstations have vertical orientations differing by
45 degrees or greater, visual demarcations need to be provided to prevent inadvertent use of the
adjacent workstation elements.]
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Translation paths are to be designed so traffic flow does not detrimentally interfere with other
unrelated activities such as sensitive spacecraft control, routine servicing, experimentation,
eating, sleeping, and relaxation. Pathways should be clear of hazards (e.g., protrusions,
entanglements (cables, hoses), free-floating equipment) to avoid crew injury or equipment
damage. Pathways that dead-end or may have unpassable hazard (i.e., open ignition source)
should be sized to allow crewmembers to turn around and retreat.
[V2 8013] The system shall provide intravehicular activity (IVA) translation paths that allow for
safe and unencumbered movement of suited and unsuited crew and equipment.
[Rationale: Translation paths are the defined volumes reserved for safe and efficient movement
of crew and equipment for nominal, contingency, or emergency operations. Pathway size and
shape is based on task analysis to take into account needs and constraints such as the location,
type, and level of activity that will occur in functional areas or workstations (e.g., movement
within recreation area, cargo translation between vehicle and module, temporary rack rotation);
the crew movement postures (e.g., upright or prone position, pushing or pulling equipment); the
type of equipment being translated; the number of crew (simultaneous or sequential flow); the
configuration of crew (unsuited, suited unpressurized, suited pressurized, PPE). Translation
paths are to be designed so traffic flow does not detrimentally interfere with other unrelated
activities such as sensitive spacecraft control, routine servicing, experimentation, eating,
sleeping, and relaxation. Lessons learned from the ISS indicate that translation paths around the
ISS eating area have disrupted crew rest and relaxation required during meals. Pathways should
be clear of hazards (e.g., protrusions, entanglements (cables, hoses), free-floating equipment) to
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avoid crew injury or equipment damage. Pathways that dead-end or may have unpassable
hazard (i.e., open ignition source) should be sized to allow crewmembers to turn around and
retreat. Slip, trip, and fall hazards must be taken into account for any translation paths that may
be used in full or partial gravity. This requirement also applies to pressurized tunnels, which
allow for translation between docked pressurized elements, and should be designed to allow for
static or dynamic forces and variations of alignment (such as uneven terrain) without imparting
forces onto the elements.]
[V2 8014] The system shall provide unimpeded and visible emergency escape routes
commensurate with the hazard analyses and response concept.
[Rationale: The system developer should plan emergency escape routes early in the design
process. This begins with analysis to identify system hazards, time-to-effect of hazards or
emergencies, and crew tasks which define the system design needs and constraints. The routes
should be free of obstructions (snags, protrusions, stowed items, etc.), clearly marked to guide
the way to safety (e.g., with color-coded strip lighting, photoluminescent decals, etc.),
illuminated for emergency tasks, and require a minimal number of operations for passage (such
as awkward turns or hatch operations). Pathway markings should be visible during power loss.
If multiple escape paths lead to different areas depending on the emergency, the correct pathway
should be made clear to crew. An open hatchway is insufficient identification of an egress route.
When considering time required, account for the entire route the crew would need to take to get
to safety as well as time to access and carry necessary equipment. When sizing the route,
designers need to consider the dimensions of the users, including suits and special
protective/survival equipment, and the number of concurrent users, including possible rescue
personnel.]
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[V2 8020] The system shall provide translation paths that accommodate the ingress and egress of
a crewmember assisted by another crewmember.
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Deleted:
[Rationale: Safety is paramount for all EVA tasks. When translation paths and mobility aids are
properly provided, they can reduce the hazards associated with colliding with hardware,
intruding into keep-out zones, contacting sharp edges and burrs, or contacting contaminated
surfaces. Without predefined translation paths and carefully located mobility aids, items or
equipment not intended as mobility aids can be damaged from induced loads, such as grabbing,
pushing, and pulling.]
See Appendix C for definitions of Hatch, Hatch Cover, Hatchway, Door and Doorway.
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8.4.1 Operability
[V2 8022] Hatches and doors shall be operable on either side by a single crewmember without
the use of tools in expected gravity conditions, orientations, suit configurations, and operational
configurations.
[V2 8023] Hatches shall require two distinct and sequential operations to unlatch.
[V2 8024] For nominal operations, hatches and doors shall be operable by a single crewmember
in no more than 60 seconds, from both sides of the hatch.
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[V2 8025] The forces required to operate each crew interface for the hatches and doors shall be
within the crewmember strength defined by requirement [V2 4104] Crew Operational Loads for
the worst-case pressure differential and anticipated encumbering equipment and clothing.
[Rationale: All crewmembers are to be able to operate hatches and doors. Designing operating
forces to the strength of the weakest crewmember ensures the crew can perform activities related
to safety and to LOM. Determination of anticipated worst-case parameters can be made through
a detailed task analysis. For example, in 1997, a Progress collided with Mir and caused a cabin
depressurization; the crew were unable to close the hatch due to the force of the rushing air.]
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[V2 8027] Hatchways and doorways shall be sized and shaped to accommodate all planned
translations, including unrestricted passage of a suited crewmember and crewmembers carrying
cargo or equipment.
[V2 8028] Each side of each hatch shall have manual pressure equalization capability with its
opposite side, achievable from that side of the pressure hatch by a suited or unsuited
crewmember.
[Rationale: Air pressure is to be equalized on either side of a hatch to safely open the hatch. In
some vehicle failure scenarios, non-manual methods for pressure equalization may fail. Manual
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pressure equalization enables hatch opening regardless of vehicle status. This capability does
not need to be physically located on the hatch if task analysis supports a different location.]
[V2 8029] The system shall provide a window for direct, non-electronic visual observation of
the environment on the opposite side of the hatch.
[Rationale: Direct visual observation of the environment on the opposite side of the hatch
allows the crew to determine the conditions or obstructions for safety purposes, such as the
presence of fire or debris. Windows do not have the failure modes associated with cameras and
display systems that may not be operable during emergencies when most needed. While cameras
or other sensors may be used to supplement the situational awareness afforded by a window,
those systems alone do not meet the intent of this requirement. The minimum window field of
view and what environmental conditions must be detected for crew and vehicle safety will be
determined via task analysis, and verification should be done through the observation of the
volume on the opposite side of the hatch in both viewing directions (internal to external and vice-
versa for crew and vehicle safety) via a flight-like hatch window in flight-like configuration to
determine if the objects or conditions identified via task analysis can be detected. Hazards may
be assessed to determine if sensors, cameras and procedural processes can be considered in lieu
of windows for certain vehicles/modules not meant for habitation.]
[V2 8030] When opened, hatches, hatch covers, and doors shall allow for unrestricted flow of
traffic.
[Rationale: Open hatches, with or without hatch covers, and doors are not to protrude into
translation space and inhibit the safe and effective movement of both the crewmembers and any
equipment they need to move from one location to another. In addition, open hatches, with or
without hatch covers, and doors are to allow for a clear emergency translation pathway.]
[V2 8031] Pressure hatches shall indicate closure and latching status on both sides of the hatch.
[Rationale: Indication of hatch closure and latch status on both sides of the hatch allows both
ground personnel (launch pad) and crewmembers to verify that each hatch is closed and latched.
For cases in which multiple latches must close in order to secure a hatch, this requirement
applies to the system-level latched status of the hatch. By providing both closure and latch
position status, proper security of the hatch can be verified. Hatch closure implies that the hatch
is in proper position to be latched.]
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[V2 8032] Pressure hatches shall indicate, viewable from both sides of the hatch, pressure
differential across the hatch.
[Rationale: Indication of pressure difference on both sides of the hatch allows both ground
personnel and crewmembers to see the changes in pressure across the hatch and to know when
the pressure difference is low enough to safely open the hatch. Use of numerical values, color, or
other cues can be used to indicate when it is safe to operate a hatch. Direct, non-electronic
pressure difference measurement and display on both sides of the hatch will allow both ground
personnel and flight crew to see a direct measurement and view the changes in pressure across
the hatch to know when the pressure difference is low enough to safely open the hatch, without
reliance on mental calculations or being subject to failure modes of an electronic display. This
function is especially needed during an emergency. Direct measurement display does not need to
be directly on the hatches but must be viewable by the crew at the hatch worksite while operating
the hatch.]
8.4.4 No Drag-Throughs
[Rationale: During emergencies, hatchway may need to be closed quickly; therefore, no item
should inhibit their function. Hatchways should remain clear of items, including, but not limited
to, cargo, cables, and wires. For example, during a cabin depressurization, the crew will need to
immediately close a hatch, which cannot be inhibited, like what occurred on Mir when there was
resupply vehicle collision with the U.S. habitat module, and the crew could not quickly close the
hatch because of the obstructions in the hatchway.]
In reduced gravity and dynamic acceleration environments, restraints are needed by crew to
position and stabilize themselves and protect from injury. Restraints are also needed to react to
operational forces, such as during hatch opening/closing operations. The design and placement
of crew restraints begins with crew task and worksite analysis to determine physical task factors
such as crew body positions (e.g., workstation, sleep, personal hygiene, medical treatment), suit
configuration (e.g., suited or unsuited, pressurization, gloves, boots), movement action (e.g.,
single- or two-handed operation), movement direction, range of motions, force, duration, etc.
[V2 8033] The system shall provide restraints for expected crew operations.
[Rationale: In reduced gravity and dynamic acceleration environments, restraints are needed
by crewmembers to position and stabilize themselves and protect from injury across a wide
range of operations as identified by task analysis. Restraints are also needed to react to
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operational forces, such as during hatch opening/closing operations. The design and placement
of crew restraints begins with crew task and worksite analysis to determine physical task factors
such as gravity conditions (e.g., micro, partial, or 1-g), crew body positions (e.g., workstation,
sleep, personal hygiene, medical treatment), operational configuration (e.g., suited or unsuited,
pressurization, gloves, boots, PPE), movement action (e.g., single- or two-handed operation),
movement range and direction, force, duration, etc. Worksite analysis is an extension of the task
analysis to further describe the expected physical interactions between the crew and their system
interfaces. Restraints may be intentionally designed and dedicated to specific task(s) or may be
planned for multi-purpose use such as designing cargo straps to also be used as foot restraints
during cargo operations. Restraints should not impede task performance. Adjustable restraints
may be appropriate to accommodate variations in crew anthropometry or range of motion. If
task sensitivity or duration requires crew to be stabilized for an extended period of time, design
consideration should be given to avoid pain or fatigue which can be detrimental to task
performance. Body posture and joint angles should also be considered in the design and
placement of restraints. Suited posture, joint angles, and range of motion are unique and should
be factored into the design of suit restraints for EVAs, airlock, etc. Standardizing the form factor
of restraints will help crew to easily identify and use intentional restraints. In the absence of
intentional restraints, ISS experiences have shown that crew will use convenient physical
features to stabilize themselves. Hardware failures have occurred due to unplanned use of
features that were not designed to withstand loads or repeated use.]
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[V2 8038] Restraints and mobility aids shall be standardized, clearly distinguishable, and located
to aid crewmembers in starting or stopping movement, changing direction or speed, or
translating equipment.
[Rationale: Restraints and mobility aids such as handholds and foot restraints allow
crewmembers to efficiently move from one location to another in microgravity, as well as reduce
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the likelihood of inadvertent collision into hardware that may cause damage to the vehicle or
injury to the crew. Without predefined restraints and mobility aids, personnel may use available
equipment that may be damaged from induced loads. By standardization of the restraints and
mobility aids, reduction in crew training can occur, and the aids can be easily identified when
translating inside or outside the spacecraft. Commonality among visual cues is important so that
crews can easily distinguish intended restraints and/or mobility aids from equipment or
structures that may be damaged by the application of crew-induced loads. During emergencies,
crews need to be able to quickly discern restraints and/or mobility aids from the surrounding
structures. Visual cues such as color coding may aid in this function.]
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[V2 8040] Mobility aids shall be provided for the assisted ingress and egress of suited or
unsuited crewmembers.
[V2 8041] Mobility aids shall be provided for ingress, egress, and escape of crewmembers
without assistance from other crew or ground personnel.
[Rationale: In off-nominal situations, the crew may need to ingress, egress, or escape unassisted
while suited or unsuited. Because a suited crewmember has limited maneuverability, mobility
aids allow a more safe and efficient ingress and egress of the vehicle and escape from the pad.
Mobility aids should be employed to protect crewmembers from a fall when descent from height
is necessary to reach surface for EVAs. Note that the term "mobility aids" is not intended to
indicate a specific design solution; rather, the intent is to ensure that physical design of vehicles
accommodate operations such as those described here. Mobility aids may refer to specially
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designed hardware (e.g., handholds) or the use of existing features of the system for mobility
(e.g., a handle on a hatch), in which case additional testing and verification may be required.]
[V2 8042] Mobility aids shall be provided to support all expected suited and unsuited tasks.
[Rationale: Mobility aids must support all IVA tasks, which may be suited or unsuited. Mobility
aids for EVA operations must be provided along the expected translation paths of suited
crewmembers at an interval that accommodates the suited crewmember’s reach. Mobility aids
such as handholds and foot restraints allow crewmembers to efficiently move from one location
to another in microgravity, as well as reduce the likelihood of inadvertent collision into
hardware that may cause damage to the vehicle or injury to the crew. Early experience in the
Skylab program showed the problems of movement in microgravity. Stopping, starting, and
changing direction all require forces that are best generated by the hands or feet. Appropriately
located mobility aids make this possible. Mobility aids are to be designed to accommodate a
pressurized-suited crewmember by providing clearance, non-slip surfaces, and noncircular cross
sections. Without predefined mobility aids, personnel may use available equipment that may be
damaged from induced loads. Because of the limited maneuverability of a suited crewmember,
mobility aids are required to allow crewmembers to safely and efficiently ingress and egress the
vehicle, as well as to protect crewmembers from a fall when descent from height is necessary to
reach surface for EVAs.]
Deleted:
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[V2 8102] The human transport vehicle, when operating in fractional (lunar or planetary)
gravity, shall provide a restraint for each person inside the vehicle.
[Rationale: On surfaces with reduced gravity, the need for a physical restraint (e.g., lap belts or
over-the-shoulder) within the human transport vehicle is necessary to prevent injury to the crew.
Injury could occur from the continued motion of the crew when the vehicle is accelerating in any
direction. Restraints help crewmembers remain in position and within the confines of the vehicle,
while also preventing crewmembers from colliding with the vehicle’s features or walls. It is not
sufficient to rely on crewmembers to brace themselves in the vehicle. Each rider should have
individual restraints to reduce the chances of injury.]
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8.6 Window
Windows are an integral part of many aspects of space flight operations with respect to their
location, optical properties, fields of view, and protection. The minimum critical design
parameters for windows to support these operations and tasks are size, color balance, haze,
transmittance, wavefront quality, reflectance, material inclusions, surface defects, ambient
illumination, visual obstructions, e.g., mounting for optical hardware and cameras, internal and
external contamination, the position of windows on the spacecraft, and the distance, position,
and orientation of the user relative to a window.
[V2 8043] The system shall provide windows with unobstructed fields of view for expected crew
operations.
[Rationale: Windows provide direct, non-electronic, through-the-hull viewing and are essential
to mission safety and success, as well as to maintaining crew psychological and physical health
and safety. They support crew photography (a primary on-and-off duty activity of onboard
crews), provide situational awareness of the external environment, facilitate piloting and robotic
operations, and permit safe viewing through hatches. Windows also permit stellar navigation,
vehicle anomaly detection and inspection, and environmental and scientific observations.
Windows do not have the failure modes associated with cameras and display systems that may
not be operable during emergencies when most needed. The following hardware is not
considered an obstruction to the window field of view: (1) hardware designed and intended to
protect and cover windows; (2) hardware used in conjunction with piloting (i.e., Head’s Up
Display (HUD), Crew Optical Alignment System (COAS), or other similar equipment); (3) the
outer mold line and hull structure of the vehicle, other windows, and window mullions; and (4)
instrumentation applied within 13 mm (0.5 in) of the perimeter of the viewing area.]
[V2 8045] System windows shall have optical properties commensurate with crew task needs.
[Rationale: System windows are required to have the optical properties necessary to prevent
degradation of visual acuity and optical performance. JSC-66320, Optical Property
Requirements for Glasses, Ceramics, and Plastics in Spacecraft Window Systems, specifies
optical properties for different types of system windows according to their associated tasks (the
uses to which they will be put). These optical properties provide system windows with the
minimal optical performance necessary to support those tasks and permit the retrieval of
imagery through windows so that the retrieved images are not blurred, degraded, or distorted.
This requirement applies to all types of windows provided by the system.]
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[V2 8049] Each system window shall provide a means to prevent external light from entering the
crew compartment, such that the interior light level can be reduced to 2.0 lux at 0.5 m (20 in)
from each window.
[Rationale: External illumination can interfere with internal spacecraft operations such as crew
sleep and onboard still and motion imaging, particularly if the illumination causes glare. Shades
and shutters block external illumination from entering the habitable volume through windows.
This requirement applies to all types of windows provided by the system.]
[V2 8050] System window accessories designed for routine use shall be operable by one
crewmember and be removable or replaceable without the use of tools.
[Rationale: System window accessories such as window covers, shades, and filters should be
designed to be easily installed and removed using their attachment features without additional
tools. The ability to remove, open, replace, or close window accessories efficiently ensures
proper use of the hardware and appropriate protection for the windows and the crew. This
requirement applies to all types of windows provided by the system.]
8.7 Lighting
Lighting affects a crew’s visual ability, health, and safety. This section defines requirements for
adequate lighting, prevention of distractive lighting, compatibility of lighting with sleep cycles,
and informative lighting.
[V2 8051] The system shall provide illumination levels to support the range of expected crew
tasks.
[Rationale: A wide range of crew tasks is expected to be performed within the vehicle during all
phases of flight. The required lighting levels vary, depending on the task being performed. For
instance, cabin reconfiguration after orbit insertion may require simultaneous reading of labels
and checklists, crew translation, mechanical assembly, and manual control at a variety of
vehicle locations, each of which requires sufficient lighting without blockage from crew and
equipment in transit. Similarly, rendezvous and proximity operations may require general cabin
darkening for out-the-window viewing but sufficient lighting for crew translation and manual
control. A single type of lighting at a single illumination level is insufficient to support all tasks;
therefore, both general and task illumination are necessary.]
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[V2 8052] The system shall provide exterior lighting to aid the crew in assembly, maintenance,
navigation, rendezvous and docking, ingress and egress, EVA operations, and external task
operations.
[Rationale: External operations are performed on a routine basis, especially when vehicles are
located on planetary surfaces. The types of operations vary greatly, from supporting the crew in
conducting assembly and maintenance and in the locating of the vehicles and habitats to general
wayfinding and navigation, to surface geology and other science. Lighting types and illumination
levels appropriate to the expected tasks are necessary to accomplish mission objectives.
Planetary surface illumination and reflection are to be addressed; these vary, depending on the
planetary body selected for the mission, as well as the location on that planetary body.]
[V2 8053] The system shall provide emergency lighting for crew egress and/or operational
recovery in the event of a general power failure.
[Rationale: Emergency lighting is a part of the overall lighting system for all vehicles. It allows
for crew egress and/or operational recovery in the event of a general power failure. The
emergency lighting system is to be automatically activated to allow operators and other
occupants of a vehicle to move to a safe location and allow efficient transit between any
inhabited location and designated safe haven(s). Efficient transit includes appropriate
orientation with respect to doorways and hatches, as well as obstacle avoidance along the egress
path.]
[V2 8059] Interior and exterior lighting intended for operational environments requiring
human/camera color vision shall have a chromaticity that falls within the chromaticity gamut for
white light for the Correlated Color Temperature (CCT) range of 2700 K to 6500 K as defined
by ANSI C78-377, Electric Lamps—Specifications for the Chromaticity of Solid State Lighting
Products.
[Rationale: The ability to make variable customized lighting spectra adds risk that an
implementer will come up with a light that meets some color constraints but fails to create an
environment that appears white or will create one in which cameras have trouble operating.
ANSI C78-377 (see NEMA C78.377) forces the definition of white to be a color gamut along the
blackbody locus of the International Commission on Illumination (CIE) 1931 chromaticity chart.
For variable CCT systems, it is important that humans and cameras within that environment see
color correctly and interpret the light as white light anywhere along the color range of white
light as defined by ANSI C78-377. Exceptions to this requirement include conditions that do not
require color vision such as window operations and sleep environment, as determined by a task
analysis.]
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[V2 8060] Interior and exterior lighting intended for human operational environments requiring
photopic vision accuracy shall have a score of 90 ±10 on a color fidelity metric that is
appropriate for the utilized lighting technology, as designated by the Color Fidelity Metric (Rf)
defined by IES TM-30, Method for Evaluating Light Sources Color Rendition methodology.
[V2 8055] The system shall provide the levels of light to support the physiological effects of
light in accordance with Table 17, Physiological Lighting Specifications.
[Rationale: Light is both a stimulant and the most effective signal for entraining and resetting
the circadian clock. The magnitude of these effects depends primarily on the intensity, spectrum,
timing and duration of light. Lighting Systems should provide proper light to promote alertness
during wake and work hours, promote sleepiness during the ‘pre-sleep’ time, and promote or
avoid circadian resetting when required. Failure to provide adequate lighting during wake will
lead to suboptimal alertness and performance. Failure to provide appropriate lighting during
pre-sleep will lead to prolonged sleep latency, reduced sleep duration and reduced sleep quality,
and suppression of the pineal ‘darkness’ hormone melatonin. Failure to provide an adequate 24-
hour light-dark cycle (or a 24-hour and 40 minute cycle for Mars missions) will lead to
misalignment between the circadian clock and the rhythms the clock controls including, but not
limited to, sleep, performance, mood, metabolism, endocrine function, immune function,
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reproductive function and glucose and lipid regulation. It is important to note that in the absence
of an appropriate light signal, the circadian rhythm will IMMEDIATELY begin to mis-align,
which is why it is necessary to require lighting sufficient for entrainment on short-duration
missions. Failure to provide appropriate circadian resetting in response to a shift schedule will
also lead to circadian misalignment.]
[Rationale: Controls for turning lighting on and off within each module allow crewmembers to
see the effect of changes to lighting controls without changing their location. Easy access to the
controls is necessary. Light sources are to be capable of being turned completely off and
returned to on. This control allows for the execution of operations that require observation
through windows or photography and for crew functions such as sleep.]
[V2 8057] Interior lights shall be adjustable (dimmable) from their maximum output level to
their minimum luminance.
[Rationale: Interior lighting is to be adjustable to permit the crew to use out-the-window views
when there is little external light, for example, during rendezvous, and to allow the selection of
lower light levels when crewmembers are resting.]
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[V2 8058] Both direct and indirect glare that causes discomfort to humans or impairs their vision
shall be prevented.
[Rationale: Eye discomfort can occur and visual performance can be negatively affected by
glare. If a light source within the observer’s field of view provides much more luminance than its
surroundings (higher range of contrast) and occupies a significant portion of the field of view, it
may act as a direct glare source. If the reflection of a light source from a surface within the field
of view provides an area whose luminance greatly exceeds that of its surroundings, it may act as
a reflected (indirect) glare source. The types of tasks expected to be performed are to be
considered, as well as the location where the tasks occur, whether they are internal or external
to the vehicle, and whether they are on or off a planetary surface. Glare should first be
eliminated though proper consideration and arrangement of the spacecraft internal system
architectural environment, including the lighting system, window design, architectural surface
treatments, and backlit displays. In situations where this perfect arrangement is not possible,
mitigating measures such as lighting source baffles, window shades, and computer monitor glare
shields can be used.]
Equipment refers to items such as tools used to accomplish a task or activity. Equipment is a type
of hardware, and therefore this term is sometimes used interchangeably with hardware.
Hardware refers to individual components of equipment, including but not limited to fasteners,
panels, plumbing, switches, switch guards, and wiring. This term is sometimes used
interchangeably with equipment.
9.1 Standardization
[V2 9001] Hardware and equipment performing similar functions shall have commonality of
crew interfaces.
[Rationale: The intent of this requirement is to ensure commonality and consistency within a
given human space flight program. This facilitates learning and minimizes crew error.]
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9.1.2 Differentiation
[V2 9002] Hardware and equipment that have the same or similar form but different functions
shall be readily identifiable, distinguishable, and not be physically interchangeable.
[Rationale: The intent of this requirement is to avoid potential confusion crewmembers may
experience that can lead to errors when items with similar form are not readily identifiable or
physically distinguishable.]
[V2 9003] Worksites shall be designed to provide rapid access to needed tools and equipment
for routine/nominal operations.
[Rationale: Good design of systems and equipment can reduce the amount of time to perform
many routine tasks, e.g., food preparation, maintenance, and inventory management. Having to
retrieve, use, and stow tools for the routine/nominal operation of systems, hardware, and
equipment can be especially cumbersome and burdensome for routine tasks. The ability to
perform operations with promptness helps ensure proper use.]
[V2 9004] Hardware and equipment with which crew interact shall minimize the time required
for training.
[V2 9101] The system shall be designed to minimize physical hazards to the crew.
[Rationale: Physical hazards to the crew, such as moving mechanical parts, entrapment,
potential energy, loose item projectiles, sharp edges, pinch points, equipment handling, fluid/gas
release, etc., are to be mitigated throughout the system design. Safety hazard analyses are to be
performed to identify all known hazards to crew and corresponding hazard controls. Hazards
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can be avoided by designing out the hazard, controlled by the use of safety devices, or mitigated
by providing warnings, or through procedures and training. These are arranged in descending
order of preference; designing out the hazard is the most preferred, while relying on procedures
or training is the least preferred.]
[V2 9005] Systems, hardware, and equipment shall protect the crew from moving parts that may
cause injury to the crew.
9.3.1.3 Entrapment
[V2 9006] Systems, hardware, and equipment shall protect the crew from entrapment (tangles,
snags, catches, etc.).
[Rationale: This applies to items with which the crew will come into direct contact. Entrapment
can occur in places where loose cables or equipment items block passageways or where
crewmembers purposely fasten motion restraints (seat belts and shoulder harnesses, foot
restraints, tethers, etc.). Entrapment can also occur from protrusions or openings that snag body
parts or personal equipment. For example, if holes are small, then fingers may be entrapped.
Larger holes, on the other hand, allow free movement. Crewmembers are likely to be under time-
critical conditions when they need to evacuate or return to safety. If possible, requirements are
to focus on those situations.]
[V2 9007] Hardware and equipment shall not release stored potential energy in a manner that
causes injury to the crew.
[Rationale: Requirements are to identify all known sources of stored potential energy. As with
all hazards, this can be mitigated by designing out the hazard, the use of safety devices,
providing warnings, or through procedures and training. These mitigations are arranged in
descending order of preference: designing out the hazard is the most preferred, while relying on
procedures or training is the least preferred.]
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[V2 9008] Hardware mounting and habitat enclosures shall be configured such that the crew is
protected from projectiles and structural collapse in the event of sudden changes in acceleration
or collisions.
[Rationale: Chances for crew survivability in otherwise catastrophic conditions can be greatly
increased by attention (early in the design process) to structure and mounting designs such that
the crew habitable volume remains intact and free of secondary projectiles.]
[V2 9009] Corners and edges of fixed and handheld equipment to which the bare skin of the
crew could be exposed shall be rounded as specified in Table 18, Corners and Edges.
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[V2 9010] Functionally sharp items shall be prevented from causing injury to the crew or
damage to equipment when not in use.
[Rationale: Functionally sharp items are those that, by their function, do not meet the
requirement for exposed corners and edges, e.g., syringes, scissors, and knives. These items are
to be prevented from causing harm when not in nominal use. Capping sharp items is one way of
doing this.]
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[V2 9011] Corners and edges of loose equipment to which the crew could be exposed shall be
rounded to radii no less than those given in Table 19, Loose Equipment Corners and Edges.
[Rationale: The force (and resulting damage) in contact with fixed items depends on the mass
and speed of the crewmember. The damage from loose items, however, depends on the weight of
the item. For example, a person running into a fixed clipboard will cause more damage than if
the clipboard were thrown at that person. Therefore, the corners and edges of a loose item do
not have to be as rounded as a fixed item. Although hand-held items are loose, they are
squeezed, and forces can be high. Therefore, hand-held items are to meet the edge and corner
rounding requirements of fixed items as referenced in [V2 9009] Sharp Corners and Edges–
Fixed, in this NASA Technical Standard.]
9.3.1.9 Burrs
[Rationale: Burrs are manufacturing artifacts or can occur during a mission as a result of
maintenance or assembly operations. Burrs cause damage to equipment and skin. They are to be
removed as a part of the manufacturing process; or, if it is likely that they will be created during
a mission, a means is to be provided to eliminate crew exposure to the burrs.]
[V2 9013] Pinch points shall be covered or otherwise prevented from causing injury to the crew.
[Rationale: Pinch points can cause injury to the crew but may exist for the nominal function of
equipment, i.e., equipment panels. This may be avoided by locating pinch points out of the reach
of the crew or by providing guards to eliminate the potential to cause injury.]
[V2 9016] All items designed to be carried or removed and replaced shall have a means for
grasping, handling, and carrying while wearing the most encumbering equipment and clothing
anticipated.
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[Rationale: Grasping, gripping, and moving hardware using hardware features that are not
intended to be handles can damage the hardware or slip away and injure the crewmember or
damage surrounding hardware. This can be prevented by designing obvious features that are
intended for grasping, gripping, or moving the item. Manual Materials Handling(MMH)
guidance can be used for identifying the appropriate MMH method based on equipment size,
shape, weight (mass), gloved/ungloved, 1- or 2-person carry, etc. Pressurized and unpressurized
suit biomechanics also needs to be considered for any tasks performed while suited as referenced
in [V2 11024] Ability to Work in Suits, in this NASA Technical Standard.]
Deleted:
[V2 9014] Requirement merged into [V2 9102] and [V2 9103].
Deleted:
[V2 9015] Requirement merged into [V2 9102] and [V2 9103].
The following temperature exposure requirements for bare skin [V2 9102] Skin/Tissue Damage
Temperature Limits, and [V2 9103] Pain/Non-Disabling Injury Skin Temperature Limits, which
are summarized in Figure 14, Summary of Bare Skin Exposure Standards Temperature Ranges,
and Table 20, Summary Table of Bare Skin Exposure Standards Temperature Ranges/Limits.
These temperatures are temperature limits for the outer layer of the skin. The calculation of the
material being touched, in relation to its temperature and the contact time, will result in a skin
temperature at the end of the contact period. This temperature must be compared to the values in
Table 20 to determine the need for control(s). Duration of skin contact with an object that is
beyond the skin limits ensures the skin temperature is within the nominal range, may be used as
a control. Refer to tables 22-25 for equations and sample calculations for different materials
that may be used to determine the duration of skin contact. Refer to ASTM C1057-17, Standard
Practice for Determination of Skin Contact Temperature from heated surfaced using a
mathematical model and Thermesthesiometer.
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[V2 9102] Any surface to which the bare skin of the crew is exposed shall not cause skin
temperature to exceed the injury limits in Table 21, Skin Temperature Injury Limits.
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[Rationale: Skin Temperature Injury Limits are defined as any condition that may cause a
permanent or temporary disabling injury/illness or fatal personnel injury/illness. For touch
temperature, this condition was considered when tissue damage may be experienced.
The following references were utilized to determine the limits: Hot: Greene, L.C., et al. (1958)
on human tolerance to heat pain showed that the pain threshold is reached at 43.7ºC (110.7ºF)
skin temperature. Lloyd-Smith, D.L., and Mendelssohn, K. (1948) found the pain threshold to be
44.6ºC (112.3ºF). Defrin, et al. (2006), found the pain threshold to be between 43-46ºC (109-
115ºF). Damage to porcine skin was determined to be at 49ºC (120.2ºF) (Moritz, et al., 1947).
Hand dysfunction and the associated safety risk during occupational practices in the cold
increases with decreasing skin temperature. Onset of cold pain has been reported to occur
between 23°C (73.4ºF) and 14°C (57.2ºF) during cold contact (Havenith, et al., 1992). A marked
deterioration in tactile discrimination occurs at finger skin temperatures <8ºC (46.4ºF) with
numbness found in one-third of subjects at 7°C (44.6ºF) (Morton and Provins, 1960). Risk of
frostbite occurs at 0 °C (32ºF) (Havenith, et al., 1992.). Time of skin exposure may be used as a
control; this will depend on material and contact area and may be calculated using thermal
models.]
[V2 9103] Any surface to which the bare skin of the crew is exposed shall not cause skin
temperature to exceed the injury limits in Table 22, Range/Limits Pain/Non-Disabling
Injury/Possibly Resulting in Illness.
[Rationale: Pain/Non-Disabling Injury Skin Temperature Limits are defined as any condition
which may cause pain, injury, and performance decrements.
The following references were utilized to determine the limits: Hot: Greene, L.C., et al. (1958)
on human tolerance to heat pain showed that the pain threshold is reached at 43.7ºC (110.7ºF)
skin temperature. Lloyd-Smith, D.L., and Mendelssohn, K. (1948) found the pain threshold to be
44.6ºC (112.3ºF). Defrin, et al. (2006), found the pain threshold to be between 43-46ºC (109-
115ºF). Damage to porcine skin was determined to be at 49ºC (120.2ºF) (Studies of thermal
injury ii. The relative importance of time and surface temperature in the causation of cutaneous
burns * A. R. Moritz M.D., and F. C. Henriques, Jr., Ph.D. [From the Department of Legal
Medicine, Harvard Medical School, Boston, Mass, 1946]. Cold Temperature Limit Values For
Touching Cold Surfaces with the Fingertip [Q. Geng, et al., Ann. Occup. Hyg., Vol. 50, No. 8,
pp. 851–862, 2006]). Hand dysfunction and the associated safety risk during occupational
practices in the cold increases with decreasing skin temperature. Onset of cold pain has been
reported to occur between 23°C (73.4ºF) and 14°C (57.2ºF) during cold contact (Havenith, et
al., 1992). A marked deterioration in tactile discrimination occurs at finger skin temperatures
<8ºC (46.4ºF) with numbness found in one-third of subjects at 7°C (44.6ºF) (Morton and
Provins, 1960). Risk of frostbite occurs at 0°C (32ºF) (Havenith, et al., 1992].
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The following information is provided to aid designers in determining the duration of contact
allowed for different materials before the skin exceeds the temperature limits.
The following tables and figures provide data and outline the methodology for determining the
duration of contact time with an object, with respect to the skin temperature limits. In order to
calculate the material thermal inertia, use documented thermophysical property resources. Table
23, Inverse Thermal Inertia for Commonly Used Materials, provides Inverse thermal Inertia for
Commonly Used Materials. For high (43°C, 49°C) or low (0°C, 15°C) temperatures, use the
subsequent figures (15-18) and tables (22-25) to determine the permissible material temperature
(TPM) for the expected time of contact.
To determine the maximum permissible material temperature (TPM) and the allowable
time of contact to ensure the skin temperature does not exceed the limits:
Use either the equation and constants from Table 24, High Temperature Constants: 49°C,
and perform the appropriate calculations;
or
Utilize the calculated and graphed values in Figure 15, High TPM for Incidental and
Intentional (Planned) Contact for 49°C.
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time (s) a b
1 23,600 68.2
10 24,400 54.3
30 24,400 51.9
60 24,400 51.0
¥ 24,400 49.6
140 1 sec
130
10 sec
120
110 30 sec
100 60 sec
90
(°C)
infinite
80
70 6061-T6 Al
60 316 SS
50
glass
40
0 0.0005 0.001 0.0015 0.002 0.0025 Teflon
1/(k c) (m2 s0.5 K/J)
Figure 15—High Temperature TPM for Incidental and Intentional (Planned) Contact
(49°C)
To determine the maximum permissible material temperature (TPM) and the allowable
time of contact to ensure the skin temperature does not exceed the limits:
Use either the equation and constants from Table 25, High Temperature Constants: 43°C,
and perform the appropriate calculations;
or
Utilize the calculated and graphed values in Figure 16, High TPM for Incidental and
Intentional (Planned) Contact for 43°C.
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time (s) a b
1 15,500 55.2
10 15,500 46.4
30 15,500 44.8
60 15,500 44.3
¥ 15,500 43.4
Figure 16—High TPM for Incidental and Intentional (Planned) Contact (43°C)
100
95
10 sec
90
85 30 sec
80
60 sec
75
70 infinite
65
60 6061-T6 Al
55
316 SS
50
45 glass
40
0 0.0005 0.001 0.0015 0.002 0.0025
Teflon
To determine the maximum permissible material temperature (TPM) and the allowable
time of contact to ensure the skin temperature does not exceed the limits:
Use either the equation and constants from Table 26, Low Temperature Constants: 15°C,
and perform the appropriate calculations;
or
Utilize the calculated and graphed values in Figure 17, Low TPM for Incidental and
Intentional (Planned) Contact for 15°C.
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time (s) a b
1s for a/(k c) < 2.34X10-4
-48,600 0
1s for a/(k c) 2.34X10-4 -23,800 -5.8
10 -22,700 15
30 -16,600 15
0 15
20
1 second
10
0 10 seconds
-10
30 seconds
-20
InfiniteTime
-30
-40 6061-T6 Al
-50
316 SS
-60
glass
-70
-80 Teflon
0 0.0005 0.001 0.0015 0.002 0.0025
1/(k c) (m2 s0.5 K/J)
Figure 17—Low TPM for Incidental and Intentional (Planned) Contact (15°C)
To determine the maximum permissible material temperature (TPM) and the allowable
time of contact to ensure the skin temperature does not exceed the limits:
Use either the equation and constants from Table 27, Low Temperature Constants: 0°C,
and perform the appropriate calculations;
or
Utilize the calculated and graphed values in Figure 18, Low TPM for Incidental and
Intentional (Planned) Contact for 0°C.
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time (s) a b
1 -48,600 0
-19,400 0
0
-10
-20 1 second
-30
-40 InfiniteTime
-50
6061-T6 Al
-60
-70 316 SS
-80
glass
-90
-100 Teflon
-110
-120
0 0.0005 0.001 0.0015 0.002 0.0025
1/(k c) (m2 s0.5 K/J)
Figure 18—Low TPM for Incidental and Intentional (Planned) Contact (0°C)
[V2 9017] The system shall provide the crew with capability to control the power to an electrical
circuit.
[Rationale: This assumes that, at some point in a mission, crew could come in contact with
exposed conductors which could cause electrical shock or arcing and/or molten metal resulting
in crew injury/death or equipment damage. Thus, there must be a way for the crew to eliminate
this exposure by interrupting power, as opposed to only remote control.]
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[V2 9018] The system shall provide and display the de-energized status (interruption of
electrical power) of a circuit to the crew and within their fields of regard.
[Rationale: When de-energizing a system, the user should always be provided with feedback
that confirms the function has occurred. For efficiency, the display should be visible to the crew
without having to move from their position. Because of the critical nature of this information, the
complexity of some circuits, and the possibility of a false indication, many times circuit status is
verified using a separate tool such as an electromagnetic sensor.]
[V2 9019] Under nominal situations (routine human contacts to conductive housing), the
program shall limit electrical current through the crewmember to ≤ (less than or equal to) 0.4
mA for Direct Current (DC) and ≤ (less than or equal to) 0.2 mA peak for Alternating Current
(AC).
[Rationale: These values are below the physiological effect of sensation for the most sensitive
members of the astronaut population. This requirement is intended to address typical exposure
situations where human contact can routinely occur with conductive housing of electrical
equipment, and in these situations no perceptible current flow is the design requirement.
Typically, NASA engineering teams establish 1 MΩ (Megaohm) isolation along with grounding
to conductive surfaces with Class H or better bond to prevent current flow through
crewmembers.]
The following two requirements set the physiological electrical current limits used in hazard
analysis (for all circumstances, [V2 9020] Catastrophic Physiological Electrical Current Limits
for all Circumstances, and specifically for unique circumstances where startle reaction may
cause a catastrophic event, [V2 9021] Catastrophic Physiological Electrical Current Limits for
Startle Reaction), for determining hazard severity, failure tolerance, and controls of a system
that could pose a catastrophic electrical shock to the human. These thresholds are used when a
hazard analysis is considering failure scenarios and off nominal events where failures such as
electrical short circuits have compromised system isolation and pose a risk of catastrophic
electrical shock to the human.
[V2 9020] The program shall limit the electrical current through the crewmember to ≤ (less than
or equal to) 40mA for DC and ≤ (less than or equal to) 8 mA peak for AC to avoid catastrophic
physiological effects to the crewmember.
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For the above current limits, utilizing the worst-case body impedance of 850 Ω (Ohms) the
maximum DC voltage would be 34 volts and the maximum AC voltage would be 6.8 volts. The
850 Ω (Ohms) represents the 5th percentile of the population for a touch voltage of 125 volts
and a large contact area (such as full hand or a surface area of 82 cm2) in saltwater-wet
conditions (IEC 60479-1, Effects of current on human beings and livestock, Part 1: General
Aspects, Table 3). Higher body impedances, and thereby higher voltages, may be allowed based
on a case-by-case analysis (contact area, wet conditions etc.) utilizing 5% body impedances
tables in IEC 60479-1, and with the approval by the appropriate Safety Panel.]
Note: AC limit is for 50/60 Hz. If different frequencies are required, refer to IEC 60479-2,
Figure 2. For different waveshapes and AC/DC combinations, refer to IEC 60479-2 limits. For
voltage spikes of short duration (<1 second), refer to IEC TR 60479-5, Effects of current on
human beings and livestock, Part 5: Touch voltage threshold values for physiological effects, for
limits (Figure 5, curve c1 for AC and Figure 14, curve c1 for DC).
[V2 9021] During critical operations where a startle reaction is possible, the program shall limit
electrical current through the crewmember to ≤ (less than or equal to) 2 mA for DC and ≤ (less
than or equal to) 0.5 mA for AC to avoid potentially catastrophic conditions.
[Rationale: IEC is the leading global organization that prepares and publishes international
standards for all electrical, electronic, and related technologies. The current values were chosen
based on the threshold for a startle reaction if shocked (IEC TR 60479-5, Effects of current on
human beings and livestock, Part 5: Touch voltage threshold values for physiological effects,
Table 1). Under certain circumstances such as startle reaction, more restrictive thresholds than
the physiological catastrophic limits ([V2 9020] Catastrophic Physiological Electrical Current
Limits for all Circumstances) may be employed in hazard and risk assessments. Consider the
terrestrial examples of involuntary reaction and let go thresholds.
For a person at rest in a chair not performing a critical task, these exposures are not
catastrophic. However, consider an electrician on a ladder or the pilot of an aircraft where split
second involuntary reactions can have dire consequences where the threshold of safety should be
set lower at the startle reaction electrical current values. The application of these lower
thresholds would be case-by-case in unique circumstances where it is deemed appropriate, such
as during manual control of a spacecraft or during EVA. For the above current limits, utilizing
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the worst-case body impedance of 850 Ω (Ohms), the maximum DC voltage would be 1.7 volts
and the maximum AC voltage would be 0.4 volts. The 850 Ω (Ohms) represents the 5th percentile
of the population for a touch voltage of 125 volts and a large contact area (such as full hand or a
surface area of 82 cm2) in saltwater-wet conditions (IEC 60479-1, Effects of current on human
beings and livestock, Part 1: General Aspects, Table 3). Higher body impedances, and, thereby,
higher voltages, may be allowed based on a case-by-case analysis (contact area, wet conditions,
etc.) utilizing 5% body impedances tables in IEC 60479-1 and with the approval by the
appropriate Safety Panel.]
Note: AC voltage is for 50/60 Hz. If different frequencies are required, refer to IEC 60479-2,
Effect of current on human beings and livestock, Part 2: Special aspects, Figure 2. For different
wave shapes and AC/DC combinations, refer to IEC 60479-2 limits.
[V2 9022] The program/project shall use the 5th percentile values for the appropriate conditions
(wet/dry, AC/DC, voltage level, large/small contact area) from IEC 60479-1, Effects of current
on human beings and livestock - Part 1: General Aspects, to determine the appropriate body
impedance to calculate the voltage associated with any current limit analysis.
[Rationale: IEC is the leading global organization that prepares and publishes international
standards for all electrical, electronic, and related technologies. For example, 850 Ω (Ohm)
represents the 5th percentile of the population for a touch voltage of 125 volts and a large
contact area (such as full hand or a surface area of 82 cm2) in saltwater-wet conditions (IEC
60479-1, Table 3). Higher body impedances and, thereby, higher voltages, may be allowed based
on a case-by-case analysis utilizing 5% body impedances tables with the approval of the
program's Safety Panel. Higher body impedances and, thereby, higher voltages, may be allowed
based on a case-by-case analysis utilizing 5% body impedances tables with the approval of the
program's Safety Panel.]
[V2 9023] For equipment such as bioinstrumentation and medical devices, that are specifically
designed to contact the human body, electrical leakage currents caused by contact with exposed
surfaces shall be kept below the levels specified in Table 28, Leakage Currents-Medical and
Bioinstrumentation Equipment.
[Rationale: Some equipment needs to pass small amounts of current through the body to
accomplish its intended function, e.g., bias currents in medical monitoring equipment. The
amount of current allowed depends on the frequency and whether the part of the equipment
contacting the crewmember is isolated from the power source. Examples of isolated equipment
are intra-aortic catheters and electrocardiogram (ECG) monitors. Examples of non-isolated
equipment are blood pressure cuffs and digital thermometers. These levels of leakage current are
consistent with those in IEC 60601-1, Medical Electrical Equipment – Part 1: General
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Requirements for Basic Safety and Essential Performance, for patient auxiliary and patient
leakage currents in isolated (type CF) and non-isolated (types B and BF) equipment. These
leakage currents are measured across parts applied to the crewmember and from the applied
parts to ground. The summation of all the currents should be compared to the current limits in
Table 28.]
[V2 9024] Hardware and equipment shall not release stored fluids or gases in a manner that
causes injury to the crew.
[Rationale: Crew injuries are likely to be caused by either highly pressurized fluids and gases
or toxic fluids and gases. In both cases, design requirements are to be developed so that the crew
is protected during both storage and handling of these fluids and gases.]
[V2 9025] The system shall provide for the isolation or shutoff of fluids in hardware and
equipment.
[Rationale: Fluids are most likely to be temporarily shut off at service and maintenance points.
System developers are to identify those points and create isolation capabilities. Without
dedicated isolation controls, crews could create bypasses, which waste crew time and possibly
damage systems. Also, to save time and reduce the possibilities of error, e.g., forgetting to shut
them off or to turn them back on when maintenance is complete, the shut-off valves are to be
located near those service points and operable while wearing the most encumbering equipment
and clothing anticipated.
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[V2 9026] The system shall provide for containment and disposal of fluids that might be
released during operation or maintenance.
[Rationale: Excess fluids are likely to be released during draining and filling of systems.
Designs are to accommodate these possibilities to ensure free fluid control, collection,
containment, or disposal that is safe and effective. Some examples of control, collection, and
disposal methods include fluid-sealed connectors, volume sensors, flow sensors, overflow valves,
accumulators, vacuum systems, and system waste venting. Collection and containment facilities
are to be located near the points where release is likely to occur (maintenance or service points).
Control of unexpected gas and fluid release due to system or component failure are to be
assessed by safety hazard analysis. This requirement applies to fluids under the system’s
control.]
9.4 Durability
9.4.1 Protection
[V2 9027] Systems, hardware, and equipment shall be protected from and be capable of
withstanding forces imposed intentionally or unintentionally by the crew.
[Rationale: Unintentional damage can occur if items are in a location where crew is focused on
other activities such as translation, moving equipment, or maintaining other systems. Designers
are to identify areas of crew activity and decide if exposed hardware and equipment are
sufficiently durable for unintended forces. Such hardware and equipment may have to be
relocated, guarded, covered, e.g., with close-out panels, or simply designed to be more durable.
“Intentional” damage may result from crewmembers securing or tightening items (latches,
retainers, bolts, screws, etc.) using forces beyond their design limits. This often occurs under
panic conditions. Hardware designers are to use crew strength data and to assume the crew
could apply their maximum strength forces.]
[V2 9028] Protective provisions, e.g., close-out panels, shall be provided to isolate and separate
equipment from the crew within the habitable volume.
[Rationale: Protective provisions such as closeout panels serve the following functions: provide
protection from forces in accordance with [V2 9027] Protection, in this NASA Technical
Standard; provide fire abatement protection and isolation and support of fire extinguishing
operations; protect crew from ignition sources and sharp edges and retain debris from coming
out into habitable volume; protect equipment from ground or flight crew operations; provide
acoustic barrier for noise generated behind panels; minimize snag potential; and prevent loose
items or equipment from becoming lost. In addition, protective provisions are designed to
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provide a smooth surface, faired-in with the adjacent crew compartment structure, and be
compatible with crew passageway requirements.]
[V2 9029] System hardware and equipment shall be designed so that it cannot be mounted or
installed improperly.
[Rationale: Ideally, similar items are interchangeable. The preferred method of preventing
improper installation and mating is a design that prevents it such as misaligned mounting holes,
pins, or keys. The designs to prevent installation and mating errors are to be rugged enough to
withstand persistent attempts. Cues (such as color or labeling) can be provided to remind
crewmembers, so they save the time of trying to make improper installations. However, these
cues are not to be the sole countermeasure to improper installation and mating.]
[V2 9030] The spacing between connectors shall permit mating and demating by crewmembers
wearing expected clothing.
[Rationale: Adequate access and working space allows personnel to efficiently access
equipment in a way that allows nominal and off-nominal tasks to be performed. Access to
connectors may be required during equipment assembly, reconfiguration, or maintenance.
Access and work envelopes are different for differing tasks. In particular, protective garments,
e.g., spacesuits, may be required by the flight crew and are to be accommodated.]
[V2 9031] Connectors shall be operable without tools for mating and demating while wearing
the most encumbering equipment and clothing anticipated.
[V2 9032] Cable, gas and fluid lines, and electrical umbilical connectors shall prevent potential
mismating and damage associated with mating or demating tasks.
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[Rationale: Ideally, similar items are interchangeable. The preferred method of preventing
improper installation and mating is a design that prevents it such as misaligned mounting holes,
pins, or keys. The designs to prevent installation and mating errors are to be rugged enough to
withstand persistent attempts. Cues (such as color or labeling) can be provided to remind
crewmembers, so they save the time of trying to make improper installations. However, these
cues are not to be the sole countermeasure to improper installation and mating.]
[V2 9033] The system shall not subject personnel and equipment to hazards, including spills,
electrical shocks, and the release of stored energy, during mating or demating.
[Rationale: Maintenance or service tasks are not likely to be familiar, and thus crews may be
more focused on these tasks. Hazards that would normally be identified and avoided may go
unnoticed during maintenance. Design requirements and solutions are to identify hazards that
are exposed during maintenance activities and determine ways to eliminate these hazards or
protect the crew from them.]
[V2 9034] The system shall manage cable, wire, and hose location, protection, routing, and
retention to prevent physical interference with crew operations and safety.
[Rationale: Designers are to define areas of activity and route fixed lines and cables so that
they are both protected and also do not interfere with these activities. Pressurized lines and
hoses should be restrained to prevent crew injury. Also, system designers are to focus on non-
fixed lines and cables that may be unstowed or moved for a specific task or temporary
rearrangement. While the rerouted cable or line may accommodate a specific need, the routing
path may interfere with other, non-related activities such as crew translation and egress.
Designers are to identify potential uses for lines and cables and ensure the start points, end
points, and cable and line routes in between accommodate all crew activities.]
[V2 9035] All maintainable cables, wires, and hoses shall be uniquely identified.
[Rationale: Some conductors do not terminate in a keyed connector; they are individually
attached. It is essential that the conductors be attached to the correct terminal points. All
individual conductors that attach to different terminal points are to be coded. Terminal points
are normally fixed and can be identified with labels and illustrations. Conductors, on the other
hand, are to have identifications affixed to them. This is normally done with color coding of the
insulation materials or by tagging the conductors.]
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Maintenance constitutes a large portion of a system lifecycle and it can consume a significant
amount of time during a mission. Designing for maintainability involves system level
optimization for parts, analyzing the resulting ergonomics, and considering tools and
information as part of the design.
9.7.1 General
[V2 9036] The system shall provide the means necessary for the crew to safely and efficiently
perform routine service, maintenance, and anticipated unscheduled maintenance activities while
wearing the most encumbering equipment and clothing anticipated.
[Rationale: Maintenance and servicing are not directly related to mission goals. Reduction in
the time devoted to maintenance and servicing can mean more crew time devoted to achieving
mission goals. Also, because of the complexity of space missions and the interdependency of
many factors (equipment, supplies, weather, solar flares, political considerations, etc.), designs
are to minimize reliance on outside maintenance support. Designs are to provide the tools, parts,
supplies, training, and documentation necessary for crews to maintain efficient and safe
operations.]
[V2 9037] Maintenance for commercial off-the-shelf equipment shall be suitable to the space
flight environment.
[Rationale: Systems designed for terrestrial environments may be adapted for space missions.
This adaptation is to include procedures and features that will allow maintenance tasks to be
performed safely and effectively in a space mission environment. Major changes that likely need
accommodation are differences in gravity or crewmembers wearing gloves.]
[V2 9038] Each program shall establish a set of in-flight tools necessary to maintain or
reconfigure the space flight system. Also, tools are to be usable by the full range of crew sizes
and strengths wearing any protective equipment (EVA suits, protective eyewear, gloves, etc.).
[Rationale: Tool set design is to be based partly on reducing the demands on the crew:
selecting tools that are likely to be familiar to crewmembers and minimizing the number of
different tools.]
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[V2 9039] Planned maintenance for systems and associated hardware and equipment shall be
capable of being performed within the allotted crew schedule while wearing the most
encumbering equipment and clothing anticipated.
[Rationale: Maintenance and servicing are directly related to the amount of time available for
mission goals. Reduction in the time devoted to maintenance and servicing means more crew
time devoted to achieving mission goals. Also, because of the complexity of space missions and
the interdependency of many factors (equipment, supplies, weather, solar flares, political
considerations, etc.), designs are to minimize reliance on outside maintenance support. Designs
are to provide the tools, parts (as modular units where possible), supplies, training, and
documentation necessary for crews to maintain efficient and safe operations.]
Deleted:
Deleted:
[V2 9042] Fasteners used by the crew during maintenance shall be captive.
[Rationale: Freed fasteners become Foreign Object Debris (FOD) in microgravity, which pose
a risk during the mission. Fasteners can be lost either by loosening during normal use or by
becoming misplaced during maintenance operations. Space missions are generally isolated, and
replacement parts are not available. This is particularly important in zero gravity environments
because small items such as fasteners can be very difficult to find.]
[V2 9043] For items that may be serviceable by the crew, the number of fasteners used shall be
the minimum required to meet structural engineering design practices.
[Rationale: Designers can add a safety factor to some configurations by increasing the number
of fasteners. However, when crews are to routinely remove the fasteners, selection of the number
of fasteners is also to consider reduction of crew time devoted to maintenance activities.]
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[V2 9044] The system shall be serviceable with a common set of fasteners that meet structural
engineering design practices.
[Rationale: Different fasteners require different tools and procedures for removal and
replacement. Commonality of fasteners can reduce times to access and the need for different
tools. It can also reduce training times necessary to introduce crews to the fastener types.]
9.7.3 Accessibility
[V2 9045] The system shall locate maintenance items so that the maintenance task does not
require the removal or disabling of other systems or components.
[Rationale: Location of items depends on many factors (physical room, interface with other
items, manufacturing considerations, etc.), and maintenance can be easily overlooked. It is
important, therefore, that, early in a design, system developers identify those items that will
require maintenance. Accessibility to those items then becomes a higher priority in selecting the
location of these items.]
[V2 9046] Check points and service points for systems, hardware, and equipment shall be
directly accessible while wearing the most encumbering equipment and clothing anticipated.
[Rationale: System designs are to support mission goals that do not normally devote crew time
to maintenance tasks. Removal of items to access check and service points increases
maintenance times. Also, complex and time-intensive maintenance procedures could discourage
performance of scheduled tasks.]
[V2 9047] Physical work access envelopes shall accommodate the crew, required tools, and any
protective equipment needed to perform maintenance.
[Rationale: Maintenance tasks are to be defined and analyzed with worst-case assumptions.
Volume is to be provided to allow the size extremes in the crewmembers performing the tasks
using proper tools and protective equipment within the prescribed times. Hand clearance for in-
flight maintenance tasks is to be provided by the hardware developer to ensure that maintenance
tasks can be performed while wearing the most encumbering equipment and clothing
anticipated.]
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[V2 9048] Maintenance tasks that require visual feedback shall be directly visible during task
performance while wearing the most encumbering equipment and clothing anticipated.
[Rationale: Efficient and safe performance of many maintenance tasks requires vision during
task performance. In crowded spaces, hands and tools can block vision of the task. On those
tasks that require vision during task performance (such as alignments or adjustments), designers
are to locate and design equipment to provide this vision.]
Deleted:
[V2 9050] The system shall provide tool clearances for tool installation and actuation for all tool
interfaces during in-flight maintenance.
[Rationale: Tools to be used for in-flight maintenance are to be identified by the hardware
developer, and clearance for application is to be accommodated to ensure that maintenance
tasks can be performed.]
[V2 9051] The system shall provide rapid and positive fault detection and isolation of defective
items.
[Rationale: Fault detection is a means to reduce crew time devoted to maintenance activities.
Properly designed aids to fault detection and isolation can also reduce crew training
requirements. Terminology, references, and graphics used are to be coordinated with other crew
task demands to minimize additional training. Designers are to define systems that are likely to
fail and then create features that help identify these failures when they occur. In addition to the
fault detection and isolation capabilities, the crew is to be provided tools and supplies to
maintain and repair the defective systems.]
[V2 9052] The system shall alert the crew when critical equipment has failed or is not operating
within tolerance limits.
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[Rationale: An alerting system allows crew to quickly surmise a system or component failure.
Terminology, references, and graphics used are to be coordinated with other crew task demands
to minimize additional training.]
9.8.1.1 General
[V2 9053] Protective equipment shall be provided to protect the crew from expected hazards.
[Rationale: Protective equipment is not used as a control to protect crew from expected hazards
in that design hazard controls, failure tolerance, design for minimum risk are necessary to
protect the crew from "expected" hazards. Analyses are to define anticipated hazards and
appropriate protective equipment. Protective equipment might include gloves, respirators,
goggles, and pressure suits (as specified in [V2 11100] Pressure Suits for Protection from Cabin
Depressurization. The equipment is to fit the full range of crewmembers. This might require
adjustable gear or multiple sizes (with consideration of the number of crewmembers that may
have to use the equipment at the same time). Because the gear could be used under emergency
conditions, it is to be located so that it is easily accessed and is to be simple to adjust and don.]
[V2 9054] Protective equipment shall not interfere with the crew’s ability to conduct the
nominal or contingency operations that the crew is expected to perform while employing the
protective equipment, including communication among crewmembers and with ground
personnel.
[Rationale: Analyses are to be performed of the situations and operations in which protective
equipment is to be used. This analysis is to define the task demands and the requirements for
protective equipment design. Task performance demands might include visibility, range of
motion, dexterity, and ability to communicate.]
[V2 9055] Automation of protective equipment shall be provided when the crew cannot perform
assigned tasks.
[Rationale: The crew may need to perform tasks to activate protective equipment operation or
to activate rescue aids. If these tasks are to be performed under emergency or stressful
conditions (where the crewmember is distracted or disabled), then the tasks are to be automated.
An example of an automatically activated protective system is the automatic parachute release
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[V2 9056] The system shall meet SPL limits of section 6.6.1, Acoustic Limits, in this NASA
Technical Standard, except where otherwise specified in this NASA Technical Standard, without
requiring the use of personal hearing protection.
[Rationale: Hearing protection normally operates by decreasing the level of sound at the ear
(passive protection). Normal, long-term operations are to be conducted without the impairment
to hearing from hearing protection. This would interfere with the ability to communicate and
hear audio signals. In some situations (such as launch and reentry), however, noise levels may
be uncontrollably high for relatively short periods. Facilities for communications and audio
signals can be adapted so that they are possible in those situations. Requirements are to specify
those periods allowing the use of hearing protection, and then designs are to accommodate
effective crew functioning during that time.]
[V2 9057] Appropriate personal hearing protection shall be provided to the crew during all
mission phases for contingency or personal preference.
[Rationale: Crewmembers are to have readily accessible hearing protection for unanticipated
high noise levels. Hearing protection is also to be available to block noise according to
individual preferences such as for concentration or for sleep.]
[V2 9058] The system shall be designed so that hearing protection does not inhibit voice
communication, monitoring of systems, and detection of alerts.
[Rationale: Some conditions might temporarily expose the crew to high noise levels. Facilities
for communications and audio signals can be adapted so that they are possible in those
situations. Requirements are to specify those periods allowing the use of hearing protection, and
then designs are to accommodate effective crew functioning during that time.]
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[V2 9059] A fire protection system comprised of detecting, warning, and extinguishing devices
shall be provided to all spacecraft volumes during all mission phases without creating a
hazardous environment.
[Rationale: Fire protection is to be based on the anticipated nature of the fire and the likely
location of the crew in the event of a fire. Automated systems are to be used where crews are not
capable of extinguishing fires (large fires or fires where crew could be absent, or fires in
volumes inaccessible to the crew). Other systems may be effectively protected with portable
extinguishers. Hand-operated extinguishers are to be clearly labeled and easily accessed by the
crew. All extinguishing systems are not to create any additional hazardous conditions for the
crew.]
[V2 9060] The fire protection system health and status data shall be provided to the crew and
other mission systems.
[Rationale: Design requirements are to ensure that the crew has the capability of determining
the health and status of the fire protection system. The crew is to be aware as soon as possible
when the fire protection system has failed or is unreliable.]
[V2 9061] The crew shall be alerted to failures of the fire protection system.
[Rationale: Design requirements are to ensure that the crew is notified in the event the fire
protection system fails. The crew is to be aware as soon as possible when the fire protection
system cannot be relied upon.]
[V2 9062] The fire protection system shall be capable of being manually activated and
deactivated.
[Rationale: Automated systems may fail and not respond correctly to a fire or may continue
extinguishing after a fire is under control. Design requirements are to ensure that the crew is
provided with a fire protection system that allows for manual activation and deactivation.]
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[V2 9063] A fire protection system shall include manually operated portable fire extinguishers
usable while wearing the most encumbering equipment and clothing anticipated.
[Rationale: Small fires might be detected and controlled early (before detection by an
automated system). Design requirements are to ensure that the crew is provided with a portable
fire-fighting capability, even if a fixed firefighting system is provided.]
[V2 9064] Emergency equipment shall be clearly identified, accessible, and useable to complete
emergency response in the time required during all mission phases where the corresponding
emergency may occur while wearing the most encumbering equipment and clothing anticipated.
[Rationale: Design requirements are to consider all emergency scenarios requiring access to
emergency equipment. Clear identification of emergency equipment includes markings, placards,
labels, or etchings. The location and proximity of emergency equipment, with respect to the
crew, impacts the accessibility of emergency equipment. For equipment to be usable, its design
has to consider the crew-system interfaces to allow crew to safely, accurately, and completely
respond to the emergency (e.g., fire). The design also has to account for the effects of the specific
environment where the equipment may be used (e.g., microgravity, partial gravity).
Requirements need to be defined in terms of time constraints to perform emergency actions.
Furthermore, each emergency may have a unique time requirement and, therefore, a different
constraint on access. Refer to HIDH for guidance on emergency response times, including fire
extinguishment times.]
This section covers the crew interfaces through which static and dynamic information is
exchanged between the crew and the system (primarily through controls and displays). Well-
designed crew interfaces are critical for crew safety and productivity, and for minimizing
training requirements. Visual displays deliver information by using visible media to present text,
graphics, colors, images, video, animations, and symbols. Audio displays deliver information
using sound and include voice communication and audio alarms. Haptic displays deliver
information using the sense of touch for the purpose of information presentation. Labels form a
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distinct class of crew interfaces, usually providing a static identification of a device or device
component, or brief static message. Labels may consist of text or graphic symbols.
Communication systems form another special class of crew interfaces involving ongoing
dynamic exchange of voice, text, video, and/or telemetry information between humans or
between humans and systems.
10.1 General
The system needs to adequately support the crew to operate safely in both nominal and off-
nominal situations, i.e., that the integrated design remains within acceptable performance
envelopes. Indications of adequate crew support include: (1) tasks can be accomplished within
time and performance criteria, (2) the human-system interface supports a high degree of
onboard SA, (3) the system design and allocation of functions provide acceptable workload
levels to ensure vigilance and a balance between underload/boredom and overload, and (4) the
interfaces minimize operator error and provide for error detection and recovery when events do
occur. Verification of integrated human performance requirements requires HITL testing using
appropriate tools and methods.
[V2 10001] The system shall provide crew interfaces that result in a NASA-modified System
Usability Scale (SUS) score of 85 or higher.
[Rationale: Systems that are usable are acceptable and operable by the intended user for
performing expected tasks. If a design does not meet the users’ needs, expectations, intuitions, or
capabilities, and as a result causes frustration or confusion, the design is not effective.
Ineffective design may directly or indirectly impact operational timelines, crew stress and
behavioral health, or safety. Errors may occur, tasks may take longer to complete, or users may
abandon, work around, or choose not to perform the tasks. Design for perceived crew
acceptability is guided by task analysis and iterative prototyping and evaluation. Human-in-the-
loop acceptability evaluation is conducted early and throughout system design to gather user
feedback on design effectiveness, efficiency, and potential design-induced errors to influence
design improvements and measure design progress. While many tools exist for assessing user
acceptability, NASA recommends use of the SUS with participants that have been trained on the
tasks and system design to a pre-set performance criterion throughout design development. SUS
is a reliable instrument that is short and easy to administer and is valuable for eliciting feedback
on specific design elements for iterative improvement. The SUS scale and information on scoring
and interpreting results can be found at https://measuringu.com/sus.]
[V2 10002] The system shall provide crew interfaces that result in the maximum observed error
rates listed in Table 29, Maximum Observed Design-Induced Error Rates.
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[Rationale: Errors are detrimental to crew effectiveness, efficiency, acceptability, and safety.
Even when recoverable or resulting in minimal impact, errors can still negatively impact crew
performance in terms of productivity and satisfaction. Errors are defined as an action that does
not result in the intended outcome or a failure by the crew to perform an action within the
required limits of accuracy, sequence, or time which results in unwanted consequences. Design-
induced errors include, but are not limited to: missed or incorrect inputs or selections, display
navigation errors, errors due to inadequate hardware component design, errors due to lack of
system feedback to user inputs, errors due to inadequate information, errors due to design
inconsistency or unfamiliar terminology, and the inability to complete a step or task.
Unintentional errors that are related to human reliability (e.g., bumping a control due to fatigue)
are not considered design-induced errors.
For purposes of HITL testing, a scenario requiring evaluation will be defined as an activity
driven by one or more related and sequential procedures. The procedure consists of a series of
task steps, where a task step will be defined as a single instruction to the test subject, as is
typical of current space flight procedures. Participants will maintain task completion times
commensurate with the performance requirements.
• If any errors classified as having the potential of leading to a catastrophic outcome
occur, the root cause of the error must be identified, mitigated satisfactorily (approved by
NASA), and a re-test of the task performed to prove that the error has been eliminated.
• The percentage of errors (erroneous task steps) for each user shall be calculated by
dividing the number of erroneous task steps and incomplete task steps by the total
number of task steps and multiplying the result by 100.
• The percentage of users committing each error (erroneous task step) shall be calculated
by dividing the number of users committing each erroneous task step by the total number
of users and multiplying the result by 100.]
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[V2 10003] The system shall provide interfaces that enable crewmembers to successfully
perform tasks within the appropriate timeframe and degree of accuracy.
[Rationale: Operability is the ability of the intended user to achieve the required or desired
outcome, within the planned or required time to effect and degree of accuracy, using the system
and procedures as designed. Successful task performance within the appropriate completion time
and degree of accuracy is an objective measures of design usability and effectiveness. Ineffective
design may directly or indirectly impact operational timelines, crew stress and behavioral
health, or safety. Design for operability is guided by function and task analysis, iterative design,
and HITL evaluation. To ensure crew have SA, detailed analysis of information needs should be
performed to ensure needed information is presented in the time and context necessary for crew
to perform correct actions at the correct time. The task analysis will define tasks where timing
and degree of accuracy is critical, as well as the performance outcome parameters. The human,
along with the hardware/software systems, must be able to complete such tasks within the time
constraints. HITL operability evaluation should be conducted early and throughout system
design to gather user feedback on design effectiveness, efficiency, and potential design-induced
errors to influence design improvements and measure design progress.]
[V2 5007] The system shall provide crew interfaces that result in Bedford Workload Scale
ratings of 3 or less for nominal tasks and 6 or less for off-nominal tasks.
[Rationale: Cognitive workload is the users’ perceived level of mental effort that is influenced
by many factors, particularly task load and task design. Acceptability of cognitive workload level
for critical or frequent operations/task sequences should be measured using a validated
workload scale such as the Bedford Workload Scale. On the Bedford scale, acceptable level of
workload is a rating of 3 or less for critical or frequent tasks, and 6 or less for infrequent, non-
critical tasks. The workload measurement enables standardized assessment of whether temporal,
spatial, cognitive, perceptual, and physical aspects of tasks and the crew interfaces for these
tasks are designed and implemented to support each other. Application of workload
measurement for crew interface and task designs in conjunction with other performance
measures, such as usability and design-induced error rates, helps assure safe, successful, and
efficient system operations by the crew. Workload levels may be modulated (raised or lowered)
through the combination of user-interface design and task design (e.g., task simplification,
subtask combination and sequencing, and the distribution of tasks among multiple crewmembers
and between crew and automation).]
[V2 10200] The system shall provide crew interfaces that result in a Borg-CR10 rating of
perceived exertion (RPE) of 4 (somewhat strong) or less.
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[Rationale: The design of interfaces for physical tasks is important because of the risks of
musculoskeletal injuries and disorders that arise out of mismatch between a crew capability and
the physical demands of their task. Minimizing these risks is especially important for space flight
where schedule and specialized crew training for unique tasks and environments cannot easily
be adjusted. Attention should be paid to design of tasks that are high effort, extended duration,
or involve repetitive motions that can result in over-exertion or fatigue, such as suit donning or
doffing and EVAs. To ensure task and interface designs result in acceptable levels of physical
workload, human-in-the-loop evaluation should be conducted early and throughout system
design to gather user feedback on perceived exertion and task performance. The Borg RPE is a
useful tool for measuring an individual’s effort and exertion, breathlessness, and fatigue during
physical work. See the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention website for additional
information about the Borg RPE.]
[V2 5006] Systems shall provide the Situation Awareness (SA) necessary for efficient and
effective task performance and provide the means to recover SA, if lost, for anticipated levels of
crewmember capability and anticipated levels of task demands.
[Rationale: SA refers to the process and outcome of understanding the current context and
environment, evaluating that situation with respect to current goals, and projecting how that
situation will evolve in the future.
Lack of SA has been associated with numerous accidents and incorrect decisions by flight crews
in commercial aviation and in ground-based simulation of spacecraft operations. To maximize
SA and optimize operational accuracy and efficiency, designers are to perform a detailed
information requirements analysis of all onboard operations and ensure that the crew-vehicle
interfaces provide all required information to perform the operation. A useful and effective
system design supports the crewmember’s ability to rapidly and accurately assess the current
situation. Occasional loss of SA is expected in an operational setting where crew may have to
unexpectedly move from task to task as events demand. It is important that the system design
provides the necessary information, cues, or indicators to help the crewmember easily recover
SA. Determination of anticipated levels of crew capability and anticipated levels of task demands
is based on a detailed task analysis.]
[V2 10004] The spacecraft shall exhibit Level 1 handling qualities (Handling Qualities Rating
(HQR) 1, 2 and 3), as defined by the Cooper-Harper Rating Scale, during manual control of the
spacecraft's flight path and attitude when manual control is the primary control mode or
automated control is non-operational.
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tasks required” (Cooper and Harper, 1969). The Cooper-Harper rating scale is a standard
method for measuring handling qualities.
Level 1 handling qualities are the accepted standard for manual control of flight path and
attitude in military aircraft. Level 1 handling qualities will allow the crew to effectively control
the spacecraft when necessary for mission completion or to prevent a catastrophic event. “Non-
operational” is defined as automated control system failed or manually disabled. Select manual
control scenarios that have to meet Level 1 handling qualities will be defined and scoped with
applicable program/project agreement. A scenario includes one or more handling quality-
related vehicle control tasks performed during a flight phase under specified conditions. A
handling quality-related task is defined as the manual control capability that is being rated with
the Cooper-Harper Rating Scale. Each task within a scenario is rated separately and has to meet
the appropriate Level 1 handling qualities (handling quality ratings of 1, 2, or 3). Reference
NASA-TN-D-5153, The use of pilot rating in the evaluation of aircraft handling qualities, for the
Cooper-Harper Rating Scale.
Level 2 or better handling qualities (HQR 1-6) are acceptable during manual control in all other
scenarios.]
10.1.3 Standardization
[Rationale: The intent of this requirement is to ensure as much commonality and consistency as
possible across a system. This facilitates learning and minimizes interface-induced crew error.
Standardized/common interfaces are easy to learn and use, because new learning does not have
to occur with each new interface. The use of lower level design standards and guidelines that
specify the “look” (visual characteristics) and “feel” (style of interaction or operation) can help
ensure standardization.]
[Rationale: It is imperative that space flight operations personnel, including all ground
personnel and crewmembers, communicate using common nomenclature that unambiguously
and uniquely defines all aspects of crew operations. This includes, but is not limited to, defining
the operations, the methods employed by the crew, the equipment, hardware and software items
used, and any associated data. This nomenclature is also to be common among all operational
products, including inventory, commands, procedures, displays, planning products, reference
information, system handbooks, system briefs, mission rules, schematics, and payloads
operations products.]
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[V2 10007] Each program shall establish display standards, an icon library, and a labeling plan.
[Rationale: A program-wide display standards document and icon library are to specify and
archive characteristics of the display design, including text, graphics, and icons. These products
result in cost savings due to less crew training and rework and increased safety due to reduced
errors with a familiar design and simplified label verification. A labeling plan is to explicitly
specify the characteristics of labels such as font, size, style, color, etc., and includes many
example pictures.]
[Rationale: The intent of this requirement is to ensure the use of one unit across a system for
common types of measurements. This minimizes crew training and the potential for conversion
errors by crew and ground personnel, which can impact crew and vehicle safety.]
[V2 10009] Methods of operating crew interfaces shall be standardized within and across system
elements.
[Rationale: The intent of this requirement is to ensure as much commonality and consistency of
crew interface operations as possible across a spacecraft. This facilitates learning and
minimizes interface-induced crew error. For example, if the operational design of a toggle
switch for one spacecraft is such that up is on and down is off, that operational design should be
the same across all spacecraft to avoid the potential for error and reduce training
requirements.]
[V2 10010] Crew interfaces shall use consistent control and display layout within and across
system elements.
[Rationale: The intent of this requirement is to ensure as much consistency of displays and
controls as possible across a spacecraft. Consistent layouts make crew interfaces easy to learn
and use, because learning does not have to occur when new displays or controls are encountered
within or across the spacecraft.]
[V2 10011] Display and control interfaces performing similar functions shall have commonality.
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[Rationale: The intent of this requirement is to ensure as much commonality of displays and
controls as possible across a system. This can be achieved by specifying a standard “look”
(visual characteristics) and “feel” (style of interaction or operation) for similar displays and
controls. Common displays and controls are easy to learn and use because learning does not
have to occur with each display or control.]
10.1.4 Distinction
[V2 10013] Display and control actions that result in different outcomes shall be distinguishable
to preclude unintended results.
[Rationale: Display and control actions that have different outcomes are not to be easily
confused, else errors result. It is important that display and control actions be distinct, having
different visual, haptic, and operational characteristics].
[V2 10014] The syntax of any two commands that result in different outcomes shall be
distinguishable to preclude issuing of the unintended command.
[Rationale: The syntax of commands that have different outcomes should be easy to
differentiate. As an example, ending a program or navigating to the end of the data set should be
issued by different commands such as "Quit" and "Go to End." Using the command "End" for
both could be confusing to a person using a database.]
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[V2 10015] The system shall provide cognitive aids to reduce the demand on crewmember
memory to allow the crew to accomplish their tasks within the required performance parameters.
[Rationale: Design requirements are to ensure that visual, auditory, or haptic cues are used as
appropriate to communicate information and options and to remind the crew of expected events
or actions. Such cues can speed understanding, maximize productivity, and minimize error.
Visual, auditory, and haptic cues can be designed to communicate meaning, an event or
condition, or group membership. Examples of reminder cues are pop-up visual alerts or auditory
alarms. Examples of option cues are menus or other lists of applicable items.]
[V2 10016] Cue saliency shall be consistent with the importance of the message to be conveyed
and urgency of response.
[Rationale: Visual, auditory, and haptic cues are to be highly noticeable when the message
being conveyed is important and less noticeable when the message to be conveyed is not as
important. The most important or critical alerts are to be highly noticeable, and less important
alerts are to be less noticeable. This is done so that, when there is an off-nominal event, the
response of the crew is appropriate. Edworthy (1994) provides design guidance for alert tones
that convey meaning.]
[V2 10017] The system shall provide system health and status information to the crew, either
automatically or by request.
[Rationale: Key system parameters and off-nominal system, subsystem, and component trend
data are to be available for crew viewing. System health and status information is critical for the
crew to retain SA and to have the information necessary to make decisions and troubleshoot
problems.]
[Rationale: System messages are to be clearly written and understandable, so that they provide
all the information necessary to address any issue at hand. Messages that are not specific and
informative can cause errors. For example, when performing certain scientific experiments, a
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person may need to take certain actions at specific times throughout the experiment. Therefore, it
may be necessary to display the actual time elapsed in seconds versus providing a simple on/off
indicator. This level of detail is determined as a result of a task analysis of the scientific
operation.]
Deleted:
[V2 10020] The system shall provide unique feedback when a data parameter is stale, missing,
or unavailable.
[Rationale: The human operator must be made aware/cued when display systems are no longer
receiving live telemetry, and data values may be “stale” or missing. Use of standard
color/symbology to represent missing data prevents misinterpretation and errors regarding the
system’s state.]
[V2 10021] The system shall provide a positive indication of crew-initiated control activation.
[V2 10022] The system shall provide feedback to the crew within the time specified in Table 30,
Maximum System Response Time(s).
[Rationale: Timely feedback to inputs is critical for crew to feel they are interacting with a
responsive system. Slow response times can result in redundant inputs to the system, which can
add to crew confusion and errors. A response time of 0.1 s gives the feeling of instantaneous
response, and a response time of 1.0 s keeps the user’s flow of thought seamless (Miller, 1968;
Card, et al., 1991; Nielsen, 1993, 2010).]
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[V2 10201] The system shall implement LED indicator lights that meet the characteristics shown
in Table 31, LED Indicator Light Characteristics.
[Rationale: This requirement promotes consistency across LED indicators and the use of color
for alerts, reducing the risk of misinterpretation and error. Care should be taken to ensure
colors are distinguishable (e.g., yellow is not confusable with green).]
[V2 10023] The system shall indicate to the crew which step in the electronically displayed
procedure is currently being executed.
[Rationale: The current procedure line is to be highlighted in some way to prevent the crew
from missing steps, which can result in errors and wasted time. In addition, if the crew becomes
distracted or called to support a different task and needs to be able to come back to the last
completed step, devices/markers should be available to support resuming the interrupted
procedure.]
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[V2 10024] The system shall indicate to the crew which steps in the electronically displayed
procedure have been completed.
[Rationale: This requirement prevents the crew from re-executing steps in a procedure by
highlighting the steps that have been completed. Completed steps need to be highlighted in some
way to prevent the crew from re-executing steps, which can result in errors and wasted time.]
[V2 10025] The system shall provide a method for viewing prior and future steps in the
electronically displayed procedure.
[Rationale: The crew is to be able to look back in procedures to see what has been completed
and to be able to look forward in procedures to see upcoming steps.]
[V2 10026] The system shall provide a method for the crew to make real-time insertion,
deletion, and rearrangement of electronic procedures.
[Rationale: During the course of a mission, the crew may need to make real-time modifications
of procedures. In addition, performance can often be more effective if the sequence of
procedures remains flexible throughout the mission. For lunar robotic activities, a priori
information (resolution of maps, simulation of mobility over lunar regolith) of the lunar surface
(or lack thereof), plans, and timelines for activities will be subject to change in real time. Real-
time replanning of lunar surface activities will be necessary, and corresponding electronic
procedures will need to be rearranged and assessed accordingly.]
[Rationale: This requirement allows for the design to preclude inadvertent operation which
would cause a critical or catastrophic event. For example, accidental activation by bumping can
be prevented by the use of guards, covers, and physical separation from other controls.
Accidental activation of commands using a computer display can be prevented with an “arm-
fire” mechanism. This requirement is not intended to prevent operators from initially selecting
the wrong control.]
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[V2 10028] Control systems shall allow for recovery from inadvertent operation and accidental
changes in system status.
[Rationale: This requirement allows for the design of mechanisms for fixing a control input. If
there has been an inadvertent input or a mistake in input, design requirements are to ensure the
crew can recover with minimal impact.]
10.2.1 Location
[V2 10030] Displays and controls shall be designed and located so that they are operable to the
required degree of accuracy in expected operating positions and conditions.
[Rationale: Displays need to be visible and controls need to be within the functional reach
envelope and operable to the required degree of accuracy (determined by a task analysis). This
applies to all vehicle conditions (e.g., g-loads and vibration), suit conditions (e.g. unsuited,
suited unpressurized, suited pressurized), and expected crew postures (e.g., standing, seated,
restrained, and unrestrained). Controls can include display devices such as touchscreens. This
requirement is intended to encourage the design of a layout that optimizes operations in the
cockpit.]
[V2 10031] Emergency, critical, important, and most frequently used displays and controls shall
be located in the most prominent crew viewing and operating zones.
[Rationale: During the design process, tradeoff of location of critical controls is to be made;
however, all controls are required to be within the functional reach envelope of the crew. The
most important or critical displays and controls are to be located in the most prominent,
noticeable locations and also be quickly accessible. This helps ensure quick processing and
reaction to important displays and controls. Criticality is be determined through a detailed task
analysis.]
[V2 10032] Displays and controls shall be grouped according to purpose or function.
[Rationale: This requirement is intended to encourage the design of a layout that optimizes
operations in the cockpit. This would help ensure that displays and controls are easily accessible
when used together. Grouping is determined through a detailed task analysis.]
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[Rationale: The relationship between displays and controls needs to be obvious. This
relationship can be indicated by relative location, color coding, and labeling. This requirement
is intended to encourage the design of a layout that optimizes operations in the cockpit. This
helps ensure that it is easy for the crew to understand how displays and controls are related
without additional instructions or explanations.]
[V2 10034] Displays shall be compatible with control movement, e.g., control motion to the
right is compatible with clockwise roll, right turn, and direct movement to the right.
[V2 10035] Displays and controls shall be arranged in relation to one another according to their
sequence of use.
[Rationale: Rapid, error-free operation and quick comprehension of system status are all
improved by well-designed co-location of related controls. Displays and controls that are used in
sequence are to be placed accordingly.]
10.3 Displays
[V2 10036] Displays shall have identifying features (such as location, size, shape, and color) that
allow the crew to correctly navigate, locate, and identify the display in a timely manner.
[Rationale: Display characteristics are to make displays easy to identify to prevent mode
confusion and maintain SA.]
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[V2 10037] The system shall provide the display area to present all critical task information
within a crewmember's field of regard.
[Rationale: To ensure that critical tasks can be performed quickly, easily, and accurately,
especially during critical mission phases, it is important to avoid scrolling or switching among
several display pages and to avoid excessive head or body movement by the crewmember to view
several displays. Criticality should be determined through a detailed task analysis.]
[V2 10038] Displays shall be accurately interpretable within the time required to meet mission
needs.
[Rationale: To increase the user’s accuracy and response time, displays need to provide the
required information in a manner that is compatible with the operating environment and the
decision to be made.]
[V2 10039] Displays shall be readable by the crewmember from the crewmember’s operating
locations and orientation.
[Rationale: Design of the displays is to be appropriate for the possible viewing angles, distances
of the crew, and the expected environmental conditions during use (such as high acceleration
and/or vibration). This will ensure that the information on the displays will be accurately and
completely read from all operating locations and orientations.]
[V2 10040] Information displayed shall contain only what is needed for the crew to maintain
SA, diagnose, make decisions, plan responses, and perform the required tasks.
[Rationale: Too much information increases visual clutter and leads to increased task
completion times. Lack of relevant information impacts SA and increases the chances of an
error. Appropriate display content can be determined by task analysis.
[V2 10042] Information displayed shall be grouped, arranged, and located to support task flow.
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[Rationale: The information displayed are to be grouped, arranged, and located based on
frequency of use, sequence of use, and criticality to support the task flow. This helps ensure that
the task is accomplished in a timely manner. Task flow is determined through a detailed task
analysis.]
[V2 10043] Display navigation shall allow the crewmember to move within and among displays
without loss of SA and in a timely manner.
[Rationale: Unnecessary steps in navigation may increase task time and may reduce a
crewmember’s SA related to task completion. In general, to make navigation more transparent, it
is recommended to have a shallow navigational structure for navigation instead of a deep
structure.]
[V2 10044] The nomenclature for each item or process shall be self-explanatory and direct the
crew to the function or usage of the item.
[Rationale: Item and process names are to be easy to understand and to remember. This limits
the time spent on recognizing and understanding names. Also, this limits the training needed to
understand the nomenclature of the items.]
[V2 10045] For critical information and critical tasks when color is used to convey meaning, the
system shall provide an additional cue.
[V2 10046] Units of measure shall be displayed with their corresponding values.
[Rationale: Measurement units are to be identifiable with the correct magnitude and scale. This
ensures correct decision making when comparing or using these units in some other way.]
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[V2 10047] Displays shall be legible in the viewing conditions expected during task
performance.
[Rationale: Legibility includes both text elements, as well as meaningful graphic elements such
as symbols, icons, and maps, and is important for the timely and accurate processing of
information. Legibility depends upon display properties such as resolution and contrast, as well
as text properties such as font contrast, color, and size, background color and texture, as well as
the visual capabilities of the crew and the ambient illumination. In addition, the possible viewing
angles, distances of the crew from displays, the presence of a visor, and the expected
environmental conditions during use (such as high acceleration and/or vibration) need to be
considered.]
[V2 10048] Displays shall meet the visual display requirements in Table 32, Visual Display
Parameters.
[Rationale: Legibility of displayed information is important for the timely and accurate
processing of information. To ensure legibility and visual quality, displays are to have sufficient
spatial and temporal resolution, brightness, luminance contrast, and color gamut, taking into
account the ambient illumination, glare, reflections, vibration, and distance, position, and
orientation of the display relative to the crewmember.]
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[V2 10049] Displays shall meet the visual display character requirements in Table 33, Visual
Display Character Parameters.
[Rationale: Character (text) elements are a critical component of displayed information, and the
legibility of characters is important for timely and accurate processing of information. To ensure
legibility of text, characters are to have sufficient luminance contrast and size, taking into
account the ambient illumination, glare, reflections, vibration, and distance, position, and
orientation of the display relative to the crew. Character contrast refers to the ratio of character
luminance to background luminance. Font height in degrees refers to the angle subtended at the
eye by the height of an upper-case letter in the font.]
[V2 10050] Font size and type shall be selected to ensure acquisition, readability, and
interpretability of visual displays.
[Rationale: Choice of text font and size can have a large impact on legibility and is important
for the timely and accurate processing of information. While a minimum character height may be
acceptable in some circumstances, in general, the size required depends on the task. For
example, the smallest font sizes are acceptable for occasional scrutiny, but comfortable reading
relies on larger font sizes; rapid comprehension of critical displays relies on larger fonts still.
All font size choices depend on the visual capabilities of the crew, including visual acuity and
ability to accommodate. In addition, the possible viewing angles, distances of the crew from
displays, and the expected environmental conditions during use (such as high acceleration
and/or vibration) need to be considered.]
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[V2 10052] Electronically stored speech messages from audio displays shall have 100%
intelligibility and discriminability between the ensemble of different messages the audio display
is programmed to produce (as measured under realistic background noise conditions and at
locations where the display will be used).
[Rationale: Some audio displays and alarms express their messages using electronically stored
speech. The consequences of misunderstanding these messages can result in lost time and
possible missed or false alarms and can ultimately be a critical safety issue.]
[V2 10053] The system shall provide SPLs above background noise and compliant with acoustic
limits to ensure audio display usability.
[Rationale: Auditory displays are to be audible as well as interpretable by the crew. This helps
make sure that appropriate responses are taken as needed.]
[V2 10054] The system shall provide audio signals with a minimal level of distortion and an
appropriate frequency range to ensure usability of the audio display.
[Rationale: Auditory displays are to be audible as well as interpretable by the crew. This helps
make sure that appropriate responses are taken as needed.]
[V2 10055] The system shall provide distinguishable and consistent alarms to ensure audio
display usability.
[Rationale: Different types of alarms (different enough to be easy to identify) are to be used. To
avoid confusion, the alarm system is to use a distinctive signal to ensure appropriate responses
from the crew.]
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[V2 10056] The system shall produce non-speech auditory annunciations with an SPL that meets
at least one of the following criteria:
[Rationale: To get the attention of the crew, alarms are to be louder than the background noise.
The masking threshold is the SPL of a sound one needs to hear in the presence of a masker
signal. Having the audio displays 13 dB above the masked threshold ensures that the crew can
hear them, regardless of the background noise.]
[V2 10057] The system shall provide a reverberation time of less than 0.6 seconds within the
500-Hz, 1-kHz, and 2-kHz octave bands.
[Rationale: This 0.6 s reverberation time requirement limits degradation of speech intelligibility
to no more than 10% for ideal signal-to-noise ratios of >30 dB or 15% for a signal-to-noise
ratio of 3 dB (Harris, 1997).]
10.3.4.2.3 Frequency
[V2 10058] Frequency content of auditory alarms shall correspond to maximal human sensitivity
(200 Hz to 4 kHz).
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[Rationale: Auditory alarms are to use frequencies that are appropriate for human hearing.
Using frequencies below or above those appropriate for human hearing makes auditory displays
inaudible for the crew.]
Deleted:
10.3.5 Labels
[V2 10060] Labels shall be provided, as necessary, for the crew to identify items, interpret and
follow nominal and contingency procedures, and avoid hazards.
[Rationale: Crew interface items are to have identifiers (labels) to aid in crew training and
error-free operation. Labels reduce memory load and improve accuracy of tasks. This includes
identification of emergency equipment and procedures.]
[V2 10061] Labels shall be consistent and standardized throughout the system.
[V2 10062] Labels shall meet the requirements of visual displays (section 10.3.3, Visual Display
Devices, in this NASA Technical Standard), except font height ([V2 10066] Label Font Height
in this NASA Technical Standard).
[Rationale: The requirements that apply to visual displays also apply to labels in all aspects
such as font size, colors, contrast, and legibility. By meeting requirements, crew performance
across systems is enhanced.]
[V2 10063] Labels shall be positioned on or directly adjacent to the item they are labeling.
[Rationale: Labels that are placed far from items they intend to label can result in the crew
missing their association or misidentifying items. This can slow down task performance and may
cause errors.]
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[V2 10064] Labels shall be categorized by type, e.g., safety, procedure, and identification, with
each label type having standardized, visually distinct characteristics.
[Rationale: Labels are to be categorized as a certain type and thus be identified as being part of
that category. Providing similar characteristics for labels of similar type can improve
identification and interpretation of labels.]
[V2 10065] Labels shall be easily recognizable and distinguishable from other labels.
[V2 10066] Font height of 0.4 degrees or greater shall be used on labels.
[Rationale: Font height in degrees refers to the angle subtended at the eye by the height of an
uppercase letter in the font. Labels are to use a large enough font size to ensure legibility. Small
fonts can make labels difficult to perceive by the crew, consequently increasing the time needed
for item identification. The font height given is a minimum. The font may have to be larger for
readability when taking into account the ambient illumination, glare, reflections, vibration,
position, and orientation of the label relative to the crew.]
[V2 10067] The shape of a control shall not interfere with ease of control manipulation.
[Rationale: The shape chosen for a control is to facilitate use, rather than making it more
difficult to use. This makes sure that the operation of controls is easy and does not cause fatigue
or time delays.]
10.4.2 Identification
[V2 10068] Controls that are intended for out-of-view operation shall be spatially or tactually
distinct from one another.
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[Rationale: When the crew inadvertently operates the wrong control, serious errors can result.
Controls designed to be out of view while being operated are to be spaced or shaped/textured
such that the control can be identified with a pressurized gloved hand without line of sight. This
would include controls for vehicle operation, as well as other controls, e.g., seat positioning). It
has been shown that human operators can use simple tactile coding to reliably distinguish
between items.]
[V2 10069] The system shall provide coding for emergency controls that are distinguishable
from non-emergency controls.
[Rationale: When the crew inadvertently operates the wrong control, serious errors can result.
Controls designed to be out of view while being operated are to be spaced or shaped/textured
such that the control can be identified with a pressurized gloved hand without line of sight. This
would include controls for vehicle operation, as well as other controls, e.g., seat positioning. It
has been shown that human operators can use simple tactile coding to reliably distinguish
between items.]
10.4.3 Access
[V2 10070] The size and spacing of controls shall be optimized for operation by the expected
body part, e.g., finger, hand, foot, and expected clothing.
[Rationale: The size of a control is to be appropriate for the way it is intended to be used.
Controls operated by finger are to be smaller than controls operated by hand to ensure optimal
manipulation. Incorrectly sized controls may cause errors during control operation.]
[V2 10071] The arrangement and location of functionally similar or identical controls shall be
consistent throughout the system.
[Rationale: Controls with similar functions are to have similar properties, specifically location
and arrangement for easy identification. This helps reduce the time necessary to find and
operate a control.]
[V2 10072] Controls used by a restrained or unrestrained crewmember shall be located within
the functional reach zones of the crew.
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[Rationale: A control that is required to be used at any time in a task is to be readily available
and reachable by the crew to ensure smooth operation. Controls that are not readily available or
not reachable can increase the time to perform operations.]
[V2 10073] The system shall provide body or limb supports and restraints that enable accurate
crew control of applicable interfaces and prevent inadvertent control inputs during expected
microgravity, acceleration, and vibration conditions.
[Rationale: During expected microgravity acceleration and vibration conditions, the accuracy
of gross limb movements is compromised, and thus control action under these conditions is to be
limited to hand and wrist motions alone. Furthermore, accidental actuation of controls can
result in errors and reduce safety.]
[V2 10074] Controls shall have operating characteristics, e.g., control type, forces, response rate,
response latency, tactile feedback, to allow the crew to make the controlled item respond with
the required levels of accuracy, precision, and speed.
[Rationale: Controls are to have the appropriate properties to allow for error-free operation.
Controls can be tested to make sure that their speed, response to action, and other properties are
optimal for their intended operational conditions. Control operating characteristics of vehicle is
evaluated in conjunction with handling qualities, controllability, and maneuverability.]
[V2 10075] Controls shall be compatible with the resulting system response.
[Rationale: The relation between input direction and system responses is to be intuitive and
easy to perceive. This makes sure that when a control is used, system response is easy to link and
conforms to crew expectations. Operator confusion may result if system responses are not
compatible with input directions.]
[V2 10076] The system shall provide controls such that the crew is unimpeded by the time lag
between the operation of a control and the associated change in system state.
[Rationale: State changes associated with the operation of a control are to be easy to link
together in time. If the two events occur with a time lag, it is difficult to identify whether the
operation of the control had the intended effect.]
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[V2 10077] Control resistive force shall prevent unintended drifting or changing of position.
[Rationale: Controls are not to be capable of being accidentally actuated by unintended actions.
This reduces the number of errors and increases safety.]
[V2 10078] Detent controls shall be provided when control movements occur in discrete steps.
[Rationale: Mechanisms that provide control feedback to crewmembers are to be based on the
amount of the movement applied to the control. This is usually provided using auditory and
haptic feedback.]
[V2 10079] Stops shall be provided at the beginning and end of a range of control positions, if
the control is not required to be operated beyond the end positions or specified limits.
[Rationale: Limits within which controls can be operated are to be obvious to the crew by the
provision of easy-to-perceive stops in the mechanism of the controls. Failure to include stops can
result in increased operations time, as the operator may needlessly continue to turn a dial after it
has reached its functional end point.]
[V2 10080] Crew confirmation shall be required before completing critical, hazardous, or
destructive commands.
[Rationale: Critical commands are to be prevented from being accidentally issued, which can
be accomplished by requesting confirmation from the crew, thus reducing the chance of errors.]
[Rationale: Controls that are intended to be used by suited crewmembers are to have the
appropriate features for suited use. For instance, these controls may have to be adjusted to
increase haptic feedback when used with gloved hand to make sure that the speed and accuracy
of suited use is comparable to unsuited performance.]
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[V2 10082] Controls to be used by suited crewmembers shall be spaced such that they can be
operated by a suited crewmember without inadvertent operation of adjacent controls.
[Rationale: Control layout is to take into account the fact that pressurized suited operators
cannot operate with the same precision and dexterity as lightly clothed crewmembers in expected
conditions, e.g., g-loads, vibration, and acceleration. Insufficient spacing may lead to
inadvertent operation of an adjacent control.]
Communication systems include information (e.g., telemetry) provided to and from the crew by
way of voice, text, or video.
[V2 10083] Communication systems shall be designed to support coordinated and collaborative
distributed teamwork.
[V2 10084] The system shall provide the capability to send and receive communication among
crewmembers, spacecraft systems, and ground systems to support crew performance, behavioral
health, and safety.
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[V2 10085] Audio communication systems shall allow crew to communicate with one another
and with the ground at normal speech levels and with expected background SPLs.
[Rationale: When crewmembers and ground personnel use the voice communication systems,
they are to be able to do so using their normal level of speech, rather than having to raise their
voices to higher levels. Higher voice levels distort sounds, make speech less intelligible, and are
more strenuous to keep up for longer periods.]
[V2 10086] The audio communication system shall provide intelligible speech by addressing
system operational parameters, including frequency, dynamic range, noise cancelling and
shields, pre-emphasis, and peak clipping.
[Rationale: Communication is optimized by taking into account all parameters needed for
speech intelligibility. For example, noise cancelling can enable normal voice levels.]
[V2 10087] The audio communication system shall provide intelligible speech by addressing
appropriate background sound levels and architectural acoustical characteristics for both
transmitter and receiver area.
[Rationale: Background noise, reverberations, and other acoustic phenomena are not to
interfere with crew communications. High levels of background noise can make audibility of
speech difficult; similarly, high reverberations interfere with speech intelligibility.]
[V2 10088] To ensure intelligibility, audio communications shall address operating controls and
procedures, including volume, squelch, natural language, acknowledgement feedback, and
muting.
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[V2 10089] To ensure intelligibility, audio communications shall address transmitter and
receiver configuration, e.g., headsets, microphones, air conduction, and bone conduction.
[Rationale: Transmitters and receivers are to have optimal properties to support good
communication. By having appropriate headsets and microphones, the crew can send and
receive high-quality voice and audio.]
[V2 10090] The audio communication system shall provide speech quality that does not impact
crew performance.
[Rationale: Audio communication is to be of the appropriate quality to help and not impede task
completion. If procedures, for example, cannot be heard appropriately, it is likely that errors are
going to occur.]
[V2 10091] For critical communications, the system shall ensure 90% English word recognition,
using ANSI/ASA S3.2-2009, Method for Measuring the Intelligibility of Speech over
Communication Systems.
[V2 10093] The system shall provide the capability for private audio communication with the
ground.
[Rationale: Private communication capabilities are to exist for the crewmember to discuss
topics such as family, health, and medical issues with the ground in private.]
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[V2 10094] Video communications shall employ digital encoding or alternate coding of
equivalent visual quality.
[V2 10095] Video communications shall provide sufficient spatial resolution (width and height
in pixels) to accomplish relevant tasks.
[Rationale: The resolution of video is to be appropriate for the task that it is intended to serve,
so that errors related to artifacts of low resolution and delays in task completion are avoided.]
[V2 10096] Video communications shall provide sufficient temporal resolution (frames/s) to
accomplish relevant tasks.
[V2 10097] Video communications shall provide sufficient color and intensity levels to
accomplish relevant tasks.
[Rationale: Color and intensity are to be transmitted appropriately. Inappropriate color and
intensity in video communication may cause misidentification and misinterpretation of
information, thus causing errors and problems in task completion.]
[V2 10098] Video communications systems shall support bit rates high enough to ensure that
compression artifacts are as low as reasonably achievable.
[Rationale: The compression method and level used for video communication are not to
introduce excessive visible artifacts. Artifacts can hinder information transfer and can cause
communication difficulties.]
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[V2 10099] Communications systems that carry sound and video that are intended to be
synchronized shall ensure that the sound program does not lead the video program by more than
15 ms or lag the video program by more than 45 ms.
[Rationale: The video and associated audio time lag can cause perceptual difficulties for the
crew. When listening to human speech, even small lags between audio and video can be
noticeable and disturbing.]
Automation is the use of machines or computers to perform tasks for the purpose of reducing
crew workload, increasing productivity, or decreasing risk in operations that cannot be safely
performed by the crew. A special category of automated systems is the mobile machine, which
includes rovers, robotic agents, and mobile assistants, operating in space or on planetary
surfaces.
[V2 10100] Automated or robotic systems shall be provided when crew cannot reliably, safely,
or efficiently perform assigned tasks.
[Rationale: Systems are to have automated or robotic solutions that can perform tasks where (1)
crew cannot respond as quickly, precisely, or repeatedly as necessary; (2) crew cannot
physically complete the task; or (3) using automation/robotic solutions reduces crew risk
exposure (e.g., high radiation environments, limited life support availability).]
[V2 10101] Automated and robotic systems shall include safeguards to prevent mission
degradation, equipment damage, or injury to crew.
[Rationale: Automated and robotic systems are to have preventive/safety measures in place such
as mechanical constraints, threshold set points, automatic shutoffs, and emergency stops to
ensure that they cannot negatively impact the mission, hardware, or crew health and safety.
Robotics systems with internal safety checks that recognize and avoid unsafe conditions, e.g.,
excessive speed, force, torque, are more likely to achieve mission success. This applies to robotic
systems both inside and outside spacecraft. For more information regarding this subject, see
Chapter 10, Crew Interfaces, of the HIDH.]
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[V2 10102] For a given robotic system, operator control stations shall be common and
consistent, independent of physical location, e.g., on Earth, in space, on the lunar surface, or on a
planetary surface.
[Rationale: The intent of this requirement is to ensure that robotic control stations are the same
to the greatest extent possible, especially when the tasks are the same, regardless of their
physical location. This includes all operator hardware and software interfaces, as well as
physical layout and design. Control stations for a given system may exist in different locations,
such as on Earth, in space, on the lunar surface, or on a planetary surface. Likewise, a robotic
system may be controlled or monitored by multiple operators simultaneously. It is important that
operators be able to transfer skills and share knowledge in real time without losing SA or
experiencing negative training. Limitations may be present when real estate or other potential
constraints exist, i.e., control of a robot from an EVA suit.]
Deleted:
[V2 10104] Crew interfaces to automated and robotic systems shall support the appropriate
level(s) of automation to accomplish the task effectively.
[Rationale: Design requirements are to ensure that different levels of automation are available,
depending on which level best suits the task/situation. While higher levels of automation can
result in increased crew performance (e.g., less errors) and lower workload, they can also result
in poorer SA and loss of crew skills (Onnusch, Wicken, Li, and Manzey, 2013). This tradeoff
should be taken into consideration when designing automated and robotic systems. Task analysis
in conjunction with function allocation evaluations should determine the appropriate level of
automation, and a trade analysis should be conducted. Systems are not to be so reliant on
automation that human operators cannot safely recover from emergencies or operate the system
manually if the automation fails.]
[V2 10105] Crew interfaces to automation shall provide information on the status of the
automation, including when the system changes between levels of automation.
[Rationale: The intent of this requirement is to ensure that operators are always able to
ascertain the status of automated processes in an effort to maintain mode awareness. It needs to
be clear whether the human operator or the system is supposed to perform a particular task at a
specific time. The operators need to be able to determine and affect what level of automation the
system is operating in, as well as which processes are being automated. Analysis will determine
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cases where alerting may be required when automation takes control from human operators or
switches to a higher level of automation.]
[V2 10106] Crew interfaces to robotic assets shall provide information on the status of the
robotic asset, including health, past and intended future actions, procedural information, and the
ability of the robotic asset to comprehend and accept operator commands.
[Rationale: The crew need to have constant awareness of the status of a robotic asset to allow
sufficient time for deliberate procedural modifications or emergency actions.]
Deleted:
[V2 10108] Automated and robotic systems shall be capable of receiving and sending commands
and performing tasks in the presence of a communication latency and intermittent transmission
related to remote operations.
[Rationale: Automated and robotic systems need to be designed such that any delays associated
with remote mission operations are accounted for to ensure efficient and effective performance.
Automation should be sufficiently autonomous to function without continuous human
supervision. Time delays between control inputs and system responses can cause problems, and
mechanisms need to be in place to ensure that the system functions as expected. Consideration
should be given to telerobotic software and hardware that may be required to operate robotic
systems in the presence of such time delays, intermittent transmission of data, or when the
operator and robot are not co-located.]
[V2 10109] Crew interfaces shall provide the ability to shut down automated and robotic
systems.
[Rationale: The system is to allow the crew the ability to shut down automated or robotic
systems if it is determined that these systems present a risk or are no longer providing the
intended benefit. The crew is to remain in ultimate control of the vehicle at all times throughout
a mission.]
[V2 10110] Crew interfaces shall provide the ability to override automated and robotic systems.
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[Rationale: The system is to allow the crew the ability to override automated or robotic systems
if it is determined that these systems present a risk or if redirection of activities is needed. The
system is to provide consequence information and guidance to the operator for an override of
automated and robotic systems. The crew is to remain in ultimate control of the vehicle at all
times throughout a mission.]
Deleted:
[V2 10112] Crew interfaces to robotic systems shall be designed to enable effective and efficient
coordination of or shifting between multiple frames of reference.
[V2 10113] The information management system shall provide data critical to mission planning,
mission operations, system maintenance, and system health and status at an appropriate level of
detail to support effective and efficient crew performance.
[Rationale: The information management system is to provide all types of data needed by the
crew to perform their tasks at the proper level of detail needed for each task in such a way that it
is rapidly recognized and understood. The system should minimize requirements for making
mental calculations or transformations and use of recall memory. Task analysis can help define
data and level of detail needed for crew task performance.]
10.7.2 Alerts
[V2 10114] The information management system shall provide visual and audio annunciations to
the crew for emergency, warning, and caution events.
[Rationale: Visual and audio annunciations are to be defined and provided for all levels of
alerts. Annunciations are to have dual coding, e.g., be seen and heard, and are to be distinctive
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and identifiable. Audio annunciations can implement speech alarms as a way to provide
information efficiently and lead to quick and accurate response times.]
[V2 10115] The system shall alert the crew if the selected set-points are outside safe limits.
[Rationale: A set-point is the target value that an automatic control system aims to reach. Two
set-points, e.g., high and low set-points, define a range of values within which a system operates.
The crew or ground personnel may be able to select set-points in an automatic control system. In
the event that a set-point is changed to one that is outside the safe limit, the system will alert the
crew that a change has been made that puts the set-point at an unsafe setting. The alert acts as a
check to ensure that the crew intentionally made the change and reminds them that there is a
hazard associated with a set-point in this range.]
[V2 10116] The information management system shall provide a manual silencing feature for
active audio annunciations.
[Rationale: The capability to manually silence any alarm is to be provided to the crew.
Requirements are to prescribe a method of manual silencing that is intuitive, achievable from
different locations within the cabin and during different flight phases, and consistent with any
other manual silencing mechanisms.]
[V2 10117] The information management system shall test for a failure of the visual and
auditory annunciators upon crew request.
[Rationale: A mechanism is to be provided to allow the crew to independently test for a failure
of the visual or auditory annunciation system. The mechanism is to consist of a control to initiate
the test and some type of display to provide the results for the visual and auditory portions of the
system.]
[V2 10118] The color red shall be used as a visual indicator for the highest alert level.
[Rationale: In situations where there is a need to communicate information about the highest
level of alert, the color red is to be used for the text and/or graphics.]
[V2 10119] The color yellow shall be used as a visual indicator for the second highest alert level.
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[Rationale: In situations where there is a need to communicate information about the second
highest level of alert, the color yellow is to be used for the text and/or graphics.]
[V2 10120] The information management system shall provide methods and tools that allow the
crew to effectively input, store, receive, display, process, distribute, update, and dispose of
mission data.
[Rationale: The system is to provide the hardware and software architecture, including crew
interfaces necessary, to manage all of the data in the information management system. Usability
testing can help ensure that the information management methods and tools provided are easy to
use and effective.]
[V2 10121] The information management system shall use standard nomenclature.
[V2 10122] The information management system shall be compatible with other systems within
the spacecraft.
[Rationale: The information management system displays, controls, nomenclature, and user
interfaces are to be consistent and compatible with other systems within the spacecraft.
Requirements are to ensure that the systems work together successfully and efficiently to ensure
task and mission success.]
[V2 10123] The information management system shall operate at a rate that enables the crew to
perform tasks effectively and efficiently, e.g., within acceptable error limits and scheduled
operating times.
[Rationale: Response times that are too long prevent the crew from performing tasks effectively
and efficiently; thus, minimal system response times are to be established for information
management functions.]
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[V2 10124] The information management system shall provide the crew with data to perform
tasks at each workstation where those tasks are to be performed.
[Rationale: Design requirements are to specify which tasks are to be performed at which
workstations and subsequently ensure that all task-relevant data be available at those
workstations. Task analysis is to be performed to identify tasks and data needs.]
[V2 10125] The information management system shall have features for the protection of
sensitive and private data, transmission, secure viewing, and sender verification.
[Rationale: Data sensitivity and protection or handling measures are to be identified such that
mechanisms for the protection of the data such as encryption or password protection can be put
in place.]
[V2 10126] The information management system shall allow for ground access to perform all
onboard database functions without crew intervention.
[Rationale: Ground personnel are to have the capability to access and perform data
management functions for all onboard data. Architecture is to be in place to support this as a
ground-to-vehicle interaction, without crew participation. This access is to take the following
into consideration: data protection, data transmission bandwidth, and—most importantly—
visibility to the crew. Although the crew is not required to accomplish these ground-initiated
functions, the crew is to be aware that the operations will occur, are presently occurring, or
have taken place.]
[V2 10127] The information management system shall provide a capability for the crew to
capture and transfer information in a portable fashion.
[Rationale: The system is to provide the crew with the capability to transport information from a
display to another location. Requirements are to specify techniques such as screenshots or
digital downloads or captures to provide access to displayed information in locations where
there is no permanent display device.]
[V2 10128] The information management system shall provide a capability for annotation by the
crew.
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[Rationale: The capability to allow the crew to annotate data displays through techniques such
as real-time markup capability, direct display modification, or hardcopy printing and redlining
is to be provided by the system. Annotation capability provides documentation of changes to
procedures or notes and tips from the crew that may be forgotten if left only as verbal
commentary.]
[V2 10129] The information management system shall provide for crew-initiated data backup
and restoration for all mission data and automatic backup for critical data.
[Rationale: Measures such as data backups and data restores are to be in place to ensure that
data are protected from accidental loss. Backups are to occur automatically for critical data that
cannot be recreated; backups for less critical data are to be initiated on crew request, using
standard user interface commands.]
[V2 10130] The information management system shall provide alternative information sources
for use in the event of the loss of the information management system.
[Rationale: In the event that the information management system becomes unavailable, the
system needs to ensure that backup information sources are available for critical tasks, e.g.,
emergency procedures may have paper cue cards.]
[V2 10131] The information management system shall be rapidly recoverable from a software
system crash.
11. SPACESUITS
Section 11 includes requirements that are specific to spacesuits and suited operations.
Spacesuits provide a self-contained habitable atmosphere that sustains human life and meets
crew health, safety, and performance needs throughout suited mission durations. Suited activities
(EVA, LEA or IVA) are an essential part of many human space missions. Unless otherwise
identified as being applicable to EVA, IVA or LEA spacesuits, requirements in this section will
be considered applicable to both. For the purposes of this NASA Technical Standard, the
following definitions are used for LEA Spacesuit Systems and EVA Spacesuit Systems:
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LEA Spacesuit System Definition: Any spacesuit system designed without an independent life
support system and primarily for use during launch, entry, and abort phases of space flight,
primarily to protect against toxic exposure, ebullism, hypoxia, and decompression sickness in the
event of an unplanned cabin depressurization or toxic release into the cabin. It may also be worn
during other dynamic phases of flight such as rendezvous and docking during which there is an
increased risk of cabin depressurization due to cabin leaks. The duration for which LEA
spacesuits are designed to operate will depend on mission scenarios and may range from a few
hours to several days per use.
EVA Spacesuit System Definition: Any spacesuit system designed to allow astronauts to perform
tasks outside of a spacecraft or habitat in microgravity or partial gravity. Performance of space
flight EVA consists of placing a human in a micro-environment that provides all the life support,
nutrition, hydration, waste, and consumables management function of an actual space vehicle,
while allowing crewmembers to perform mission tasks. EVA spacesuits are designed to be used
for durations of less than a day due to potential human and suit system constraints. This includes
all suited phases (e.g., prebreathe, leak checks, airlock/cabin/suitport depress).
As described in section 3.1 and Appendix E, many other requirements in this NASA Technical
Standard are also intended to be applicable to spacesuits; section 11 is a subset of requirements
that are uniquely applicable to spacesuits and suited operations. For planetary exploration
missions, crew access to the planetary surface within an EVA suit is fundamental to mission
success and safety. Suited activities allow many aspects of mission science, exploration, and
maintenance. Compliance with the requirements stated here is crucial to the health, safety, and
performance of the suited crew. Consult NASA-STD-3001, Volume 1, for EVA health and
medical requirements. Consult EVA-EXP-0035, Exploration EVA System Compatibility, for
detailed guidance and constraints primarily concerned with safety, design of EVA support
equipment, layout of EVA translation paths, and human-machine interfaces for crew operation.
It is important for vehicle designers to understand and account for the interfaces between vehicle
systems and spacesuits. Human system requirements that require consideration of the suit-to-
system interface are also identified in Appendix E.
[V2 11001] The system shall accommodate efficient and effective donning and doffing of
spacesuits for both nominal and contingency operations.
[Rationale: Spacesuit donning and doffing is a non-productive activity. Plus, tedious and
difficult tasks are more prone to neglect and human error. Finally, rapid donning can be critical
in an emergency. System developers need to consider total system design and human
accommodation, including emergency scenarios, assess donning task times, and evaluate
features such as unassisted donning.]
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[V2 11006] The suit shall provide the capability for the crewmember to select discrete suit
pressure set-points within the suit operating pressure ranges during pressurized and
unpressurized suited operations.
[V2 11007] Suits shall maintain pressure within 1.72 kPa (0.25 psi) after the suit has achieved an
equilibrium pressure for a set-point.
[Rationale: Maintaining a constant pressure level after a set-point has been reached is
important to protect the crewmember from discomfort in body cavities and sinuses, especially in
the ear. Maintaining a constant pressure level is intended to protect the crewmember in the
pressurized suit. Because of the relatively small total pressure volume in the suit, it is important
that the pressurized-suited crewmember is exposed to a pressure set-point that is constant
(unchanging). Excess fluctuations in suit pressure cause pressurized-suited crewmembers to
constantly re-equilibrate pressure in body cavities and sinuses, which increases the likelihood of
pressure-induced discomfort in these areas.]
[V2 11009] Suits shall limit suit-induced continuous noise exposure at the ear to NC-50 or
below without the use of auxiliary hearing protection.
[Rationale: This requirement limits noise levels within the suit to allow for adequate voice
communications and comfort. This requirement does not apply to alarms, communications, or to
any noise experienced during maintenance activities. The noise attenuation effectiveness of
hearing protection or communications headsets may not be used to satisfy this requirement
unless they are included in the nominal suit configuration, i.e., not added to meet this
requirement. Consideration is to be given to protect the frequencies necessary for
communications transmission from ambient or suit-generated noise.]
[V2 11010] The suit shall provide or accommodate radiation monitoring and alerting functions
to allow the crew to take appropriate actions.
[Rationale: Radiation monitors are to provide primary data for controlling crewmember
radiation exposures during EVA. The current exposure limits for deterministic effects (short-term
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[V2 11011] The system shall prevent the energy stored by each crewmember during nominal
suited operations from exceeding the limits defined by the range 3.0 kJ/kg (1.3 Btu/lb) > ΔQ
stored > -1.9 kJ/kg (-0.8 Btu/lb), where ΔQ stored is calculated using the 41 Node Man or
Wissler model.
[Rationale: This requirement applies to nominal microgravity EVA operations and nominal
surface EVA operations. Excess heat load and accumulation may quickly reach human tolerance
limits and may impair performance and health. Impairment begins when skin temperature
increases greater than 1.4ºC (2.5ºF -17) (0.6ºC [1ºF -17.4]) core or if pulse is greater than 140
bpm). Increases in body core temperature may lead to associated performance decrements.
Keeping the heat storage value below the performance impairment line allows the crewmember
the ability to conduct complex tasks without heat-induced degradation. If the crewmember is in a
suit, the heat load may increase rapidly. Supporting data from military aircrew protective
ensembles suggest body temperature may increase more rapidly over time in suited
crewmembers compared to those in a shirt-sleeve environment. The current change in heat
storage limit is to allow nominal suited operations with crewmember metabolic rates of 528 to
2220 kJ/hr (500 to 2100 Btu/hr) without undue heat discomfort.]
[V2 11013] Suits shall provide for management of urine, feces, menses, and vomitus of suited
crewmembers.
[Rationale: The total system is to be designed for body waste collection, as well as disposal of
waste in the system’s waste management system and cleaning of the suit for reuse. Waste
management items are to be able to contain and dispose of human waste with as much
containment and isolation as possible. Provisions are to be available for personal hygiene and
suit cleaning.]
[V2 11028] EVA suits shall be capable of collecting a total urine volume of Vu = 0.5 +2.24t/24
L, where t is suited duration in hours.
[Rationale: This EVA suit requirement is separate from the LEA suit requirement below
requirement [V2 11014] LEA Suit Urine Collection, to ensure that the increased EVA suit
hydration (per requirement [V2 11030] EVA Suited Hydration, specifying an additional 8.1 fl oz
≈ 240 mL per hour for EVA suited operations) is a design consideration for EVA suit urine
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collection. This straightforward input-output equation does not consider variables such as
metabolic rate, relative humidity, or hydration, which could affect the total volume. The voided
urine is to be isolated to prevent inadvertent discharge in the suit that could result in injury to a
crewmember's skin or mucous membranes or damage to the suit system.]
[V2 11014] LEA suits shall be capable of collecting a total urine volume of Vu = 0.5 + 2t/24 L
throughout suited operations, where t is suited duration in hours.
[Rationale: This requirement allows crewmembers to eliminate liquid waste at their discretion
without affecting work efficiency during suited operations. The suit is only responsible for the
expected urinary output during the time that the crewmember is in the suit. The urinary
collection system is to be capable of collecting all of the crewmember’s output in succession,
with an average void varying from 100 to 500 mL (3.4 to 16.9 fl oz). The rate of urinary delivery
into the system from the body varies by sex (greater for females because of lower urethral
resistance) but averages 10 to 35 mL/s (0.34 to 1.2 fl oz/s). Maximum flow rate with abdominal
straining in a female may be as high as 50 mL/s (1.9 fl oz/s) for a few seconds. Output collection
capacity is designed to match water input potential; the Vu equation does not consider variables
such as metabolic rate, relative humidity, or hydration, which could affect total urine volume.
The voided urine is to be isolated to prevent inadvertent discharge in the cabin that could result
in injury to a crewmember's skin or mucous membranes or damage to equipment.]
[V2 11015] For contingency suited operations lasting longer than 24 hours, suits shall be capable
of collecting and containing 1 L (33.8 fl oz) of urine per crewmember per day.
[Rationale: Urine output may be slightly greater or lower in various phases of the mission
associated with g-transitions and fluid intake levels. Rarely, a single void might be as much as 1
L (33.8 fl oz), so the equipment is to be able to accommodate this maximum. Also, in the event of
an unrecoverable vehicle pressure failure wherein an extended stay in the suit is used to
maintain life, crewmembers are to have the capability to access fecal and urine collection
systems. The voided urine is to be contained by the stowage and disposal hardware to prevent
inadvertent discharge into the suit that could result in injury to the crewmember’s mucous
membranes or equipment.]
[V2 11016] During contingency suited operations, suits shall be capable of collecting 75 g
(0.17 lb ) (by mass) and 75 mL (2.5 fl oz) (by volume) of fecal matter per crewmember per day.
[Rationale: In the event of an unrecoverable vehicle pressure failure wherein an extended stay
in the suit is used to maintain life, crewmembers are to have the capability to access fecal and
urine collection systems. Fecal waste collection is to be performed in a manner that minimizes
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escape of fecal contents into the general suit environment during microgravity operations
because of the high content of possibly pathogenic bacteria contained in the stool. In addition,
there is the potential of injury to crewmembers and hardware that could result from such
dissemination. EVA suits are to accommodate for fecal waste collection and containment during
all suited activities. Suited activities are nominally not expected to exceed 10 hours. The waste
quantities reflect the altered composition of the nutrition supplied during contingency suited
operations and are characteristically low in residue.]
[V2 11017] Suits shall be shown to not create any catastrophic hazards in the event of vomitus
from the crewmember.
[Rationale: SAS has affected crewmembers in the first 72 hours of flight. The crew is nominally
suited during the first 72 hours of flight for certain dynamic phases; vomiting in the suit may
occur at these times or if a contingency EVA occurs within that timeframe. On the planetary
surface, a high magnitude SPE could result in exposures that produce prodromal nausea and
vomiting. If vomitus enters the internal suit environment, it should be kept away from the suited
crewmember’s naso-pharyngeal space. Uncontrolled accumulation of vomitus may also interfere
with a crewmember’s vision.]
[V2 11018] Suits shall provide a field of regard sufficient to allow the crewmember to
accomplish required suited tasks.
[Rationale: To enhance work efficiency index and mission success, the visor is to have minimal
interference with nominal visual acuity. The visor is to promote an adequate field of regard to
perform ground, IVA, and EVA tasks and prevent tunnel vision. Suit designers need to consult
with vehicle designers.]
[V2 11019] Suit helmets shall have sufficient optical qualities to allow the crewmember to
accomplish required suited tasks and maintain a level of SA necessary to maintain safety.
[Rationale: To enhance work efficiency index and mission success, the visor is to have minimal
interference with nominal visual acuity. The visor is to minimize haze, discoloration, and fog.]
[V2 11020] Suit helmets shall provide protection to suited crewmembers from viewing objects
with luminance that could prevent successful completion of required suited tasks.
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[Rationale: Individual tasks or crewmembers may require or desire higher or lower lighting
levels than that provided for other tasks or crewmembers.]
[V2 11022] Suit helmet field of regard shall be unencumbered if helmet- or head-mounted
displays are provided.
[V2 11023] The system shall allow the crewmember to effectively input, store, receive, display,
process, distribute, update, monitor and dispose of relevant information on consumable levels,
suit status and alerts, and biomedical data.
[Rationale: Feedback of relevant suit atmospheric and physiologic information to the crew
allows better consumable management, improves optimization of EVA task performance, and
reduces risk of physiologic stress/injury. Having insight into trends in physiological parameters
and life-sustaining consumables allows the IVA or EVA crew to act prospectively in preventing
unsafe operating conditions or responding to off-nominal scenarios. This requirement may be
met by integrated systems with the details of each system’s responsibility defined in individual
System Requirements Documents (SRDs) and in Information Requirements Documents (IRDs).
Where feasible, it may be desirable for ground medical support to see biomedical telemetry
during contingency and mission-preserving EVA, as well as during unrecoverable vehicle
pressure loss, to ensure the health and safety of the crew. These data will also be monitored
during nominal lunar surface operations to ensure the health and safety of the crew, although
automated suit algorithms may be the primary method rather than ground medical support.
Derived body core temperature and heart rhythm (real-time) are desired for microgravity
operations, and derived body core temperature is desired for lunar operations. Note that crew
may refer to the suited crewmember, the intravehicular crew, or ground crew. The recipients of
the data should be defined by the program or project. Relevant information should be
determined through task analysis.]
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[V2 11100] The system shall provide the capability for crewmembers to wear pressure suits for
sufficient duration during launch, entry, descent (to/from Earth, or other celestial body) and any
operation deemed high risk for loss of crew life due to loss of cabin pressurization (such as in
mission dockings, operations during periods of high incidence of Micrometeoroids and Orbital
Debris (MMOD) or complex vehicle maneuvers).
[Rationale: Pressure suits for each crewmember are required to protect the crew in the event of
a large cabin leak beyond the vehicle’s ability to feed and maintain a habitable atmosphere for
an operationally relevant period of time. The duration the vehicle/suit system must maintain
habitability during exploration class missions may be orders of magnitude longer than during
LEO operations, where emergency return to Earth can be measured in hours. The use of
pressure suits increases the probability of crew survival by allowing crewmembers sufficient
time to remedy any vehicle failure and arrive at the next closest breathable atmosphere, either
on Earth or alternative safe haven.
Launch, entry, and descent operations have the increased probability of decompression events
based on past space flight history. Docking event risk profile is dependent on vehicle size,
docking vestibules, and availability of access to alternate sealable pressurized volumes. For
operations within the spacesuit, the crew will be protected against ebullis, hypoxia, toxic
exposure and decompression sickness. Refer to the Chapter 11 for requirements (such as
required O2 and CO2 concentrations, DCS prevention, suit pressures, waste management, etc.)
associated with the design and capabilities of a pressure suit.
[V2 11024] Suits shall provide mobility, dexterity, and tactility to enable the crewmember to
accomplish suited tasks within acceptable physical workload and fatigue limits while minimizing
the risk of injury.
[Rationale: Suited crewmembers are to be able to perform tasks required to meet mission goals
and operate human-system interfaces required for use during suited operations. Suits can limit
the crew mobility, dexterity, and tactility below that of unsuited crewmember. Wear and tear on
the suit as exposed to extraterrestrial environments should be considered. Suit pressurization
can further reduce crewmember capabilities. For example, the crewmember should not have to
remove gloves to operate the controls while in the LEA suit. In the event of a rapid
decompression event, the crewmember will not likely have enough time to don any unsecured
equipment.]
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[V2 11025] The system shall provide a means for crewmember nutrition in pressure suits
designed for surface (e.g., Moon or Mars) EVAs of more than 4 hours in duration or any suited
activities greater than 12 hours in duration.
[Rationale: Additional nutrients, including fluids, are necessary during suited operations as
crewmember energy expenditure is greater during those activities. Additional kilocalories (kcal),
based on metabolic energy replacement requirements from moderate to heavy EVA tasks, allow
the crewmember to maintain lean body weight during the course of the mission. Lean body
(especially muscular) weight maintenance is a key component of preserving crew health during
the missions and keeping performance at a level required to complete mission objectives.
Nutritional supply during suited operations allows the crewmembers to maintain high
performance levels throughout the duration of the EVA. Apollo astronauts strongly
recommended the availability of a high-energy substance, either liquid or solid, for consumption
during a surface EVA as mentioned in the Apollo Medical Summit. During contingency
microgravity EVAs and/or for EVAs less than 4 hours in duration, this capability is not required.
During long-duration suited operations such as an unplanned pressure reduction scenario, the
crew is to be able to consume nutrition from an external source to maintain crew performance.]
[V2 11029] The system shall provide a means for on-demand crewmember hydration while
suited, including a minimum quantity of potable water of 2 L (67.6 fl oz) per 24 hours for the
LEA suit.
[Rationale: Potable water is necessary during suited operations to prevent dehydration caused
by perspiration and insensible water loss, as well as to improve crewmember comfort. LEA-
suited hydration has to be available both while suited and unpressurized as well as suited and
pressurized. Having the potable water system be rechargeable from an external source is
acceptable as long as the suit system has sufficient capacity to allow on-demand ready access to
water at crewmember discretion without impacting work efficiency. During long-duration LEA-
suited operations such as an unplanned pressure reduction scenario, the crew is to be able to
consume water from an external source to prevent crew performance degradation associated
with dehydration.]
[V2 11030] The system shall provide a means for on-demand crewmember hydration while
suited, including a minimum quantity of potable water of 240 mL (8.1 fl oz) per hour for EVA
suited operations.
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[Rationale: Potable water is necessary during suited operations to prevent dehydration caused
by perspiration and insensible water loss, as well as to improve crew comfort. Having the
potable water system be rechargeable from an external source is acceptable as long as the
internal suit reservoir has sufficient capacity to allow ready access to water without impacting
work efficiency. Hundreds of microgravity EVAs have been performed using a 950 mL (32.1 fl
oz) in-suit drink bag, but this alone does not meet the minimum recommendations for hydration
during moderate activity. Factors that may affect an individual’s hydration needs include body
size, sweat rates, thermal environment, humidity, and metabolic rate. Given the wide range of
differences between people and EVA characteristics, 240 mL (8.1 fl oz)/hour is the minimum
recommendation to cover most applications. During surface EVAs, crewmembers will most likely
be suited for 10 hours, including approximately 7 hours expending energy on the lunar surface.
Apollo astronauts strongly recommended the availability of an appropriate quantity of water for
consumption during a lunar EVA. Specifically, Apollo astronauts recommended during the
Apollo Medical Summit, that the availability of 240 mL (8.1 fl oz) per hour of water for
consumption during a lunar EVA, with water available for contingency scenarios such as a 10-
km walk-back in case of rover failure. The intent of this requirement is for the suit system to have
sufficient capacity to allow on-demand ready access to water at crew-discretion without
impacting work efficiency.]
[V2 11027] The system shall provide a means for administration of medication to a suited,
pressurized crewmember for pressurized suited exposures greater than 12 hours.
[V2 11031] For suited operations, the system shall limit RH to the levels in Table 34, Average
Relative Humidity Exposure Limits for Suited Operations.
[Rationale: Average humidity is to be maintained above the lower limits stated to ensure that
the environment is not too dry for the nominal functioning of mucous membranes. During low
humidity exposures, additional water is to be provided to the crew to prevent dehydration.
Humidity is to be maintained below the upper limits for crew comfort to allow for effective
evaporation and to limit the formation of condensation. Excess moisture in the glove can
contribute to trauma at the fingertips.]
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[V2 11032] LEA spacesuits shall be capable of operating at sufficient pressure to protect against
Type II decompression sickness in the event of a cabin depressurization.
[Rationale: LEA spacesuits are worn inside spacecraft to protect crewmembers in the event of
contingencies such as contamination or depressurization of the spacecraft cabin. For example,
in Soyuz 11, a rapid decompression due to a faulty valve occurred at an altitude of about 104
miles, led to the death of all three (unsuited) crewmembers within two minutes. Protection
against serious life-threatening (Type II) DCS in the event of an unplanned rapid cabin
depressurization depends on providing adequate suit pressure to crewmembers because there is
no opportunity for oxygen prebreathe or immediate post event treatment. Based on best available
data and computational models, LEA spacesuit pressure of 40 kPa (5.8 psia) will limit the
probability of Type II DCS occurrence to less than 15% for a rapid depressurization when
saturated at a cabin pressure of 14.7 psia. If cabin pressure is nominally less than 14.7 psia, as
expected during Exploration missions, the resulting minimum suit pressure could be less than 5.8
psia.]
[V2 11033] The suit shall allow the suited crewmembers and remote operators to adjust the suit
thermal control system.
[Rationale: The ability to control suited atmospheric conditions is important for crew health
and comfort, and for mission tasks, to ensure efficient and effective performance. Temperature
can be adjusted in a number of ways depending on the suit and vehicle system design (e.g.,
changing water flow, inlet temperature.]
[V2 11034] Systems shall automatically record suit pressure, ppO2, and ppCO2.
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[Rationale: Access to atmospheric data is needed for suit systems, as each of these parameters
is critical to crew health and comfort. Additionally, the ability to view past recorded data helps
to prevent suited environmental conditions that could harm the crew or suit system and can aid
in the effort to troubleshoot problems. ppO2 can be directly measured or calculated indirectly
and recorded. Recording of thermal comfort variables may be useful.]
[V2 11035] Suits shall display suit pressure, ppO2, and ppCO2 data to the suited crewmember.
[Rationale: These atmospheric parameters are critical to human health and comfort, and access
to this atmospheric data needs to be provided to the crewmember. The crewmember needs to
view the environmental status in real time to help prevent environmental conditions that could
harm them or the suit system. The implementation of the display is addressed by various
requirements in section 10 of this NASA Technical Standard.]
[V2 11036] Suits shall monitor suit pressure, ppO2, and ppCO2 and alert the crewmember when
they are outside safe limits.
[V2 11039] The spacesuit shall limit the inspired CO2 partial pressure (PICO2) in accordance
with Table 35, Spacesuit Inspired Partial Pressure of CO2 (PICO2) Limits.
[Rationale: Spacesuit design (flow rate, helmet shape, etc.) and crewmember metabolic rates
(average and transient) affect the extent to which CO2 accumulates inside a spacesuit and is
inspired by crewmembers. Inspired CO2 partial pressure levels in Table 35 are based on review
of scientific literature combined with past EVA experience, prescribed standardized human-in-
the-loop testing, suit inlet CO2 of <2 mmHg, and suit ventilation utilized in heritage designs.
Verification methods would utilize the standardized testing method as published in ICES-2018-
15, Bekdash, et al., July 2018.]
Note: Off-nominal CO2 values are not included within this NASA Technical Standard due to the
unique circumstances of each mission (expected human performance, duration of exposure,
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access to medical care, etc.) and would be derived as a lower level program/project
requirement.
The requirements in Table 35 are to be met in the presence of the expected average and transient
metabolic rates for the full suited duration, including prebreathe, checkout, EVA, and
repressurization time. Total duration in the suit is not to exceed 14 hours.
† The values in Table 35 are based on Shuttle and ISS EVA experience, representing a frequency
of up to 4 EVAs over a 14-day mission or up to 5 EVAs during a 6-month mission. If additional
frequency of EVAs beyond the existing experience base is required, monitoring of crewmembers
for hypercapnic signs and symptoms will be necessary until a sufficient experience base is
generated.
[V2 11037] The system shall measure or calculate metabolic rates of suited EVA crewmembers.
[Rationale: Real-time monitoring during EVA is a current medical requirement and provides
awareness of exertion level, including whether or not exertion levels are above or below normal
for a particular crewmember and task.]
[V2 11038] The system shall display metabolic data of suited EVA crewmembers to the crew.
[Rationale: Metabolic data are important indicators of human health and performance, and
access to these data needs to be provided to the crew. The crew needs to view the metabolic
information in real time to provide awareness and potential adjustment of exertion level,
including whether or not exertion levels are above or below normal for a particular crewmember
and task. Note that crew may refer to the suited crewmember, the intravehicular crew, or ground
crew. The recipients of the data should be defined by the program or project.]
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This section focuses on the design of space flight systems, hardware, and equipment that are
accessed, used, or interfaced in some way by personnel other than just the space flight crews
(e.g., ground support personnel). Space flight systems include those systems that support crew
launch, orbit, transit, surface ops, return, and recovery. Ground support personnel perform
numerous tasks utilizing space flight systems, hardware, and equipment at times other than
during space flight such as during ground operations before launches and after landings.
Incapable, incomplete, or improper performance of tasks and/or improper use of hardware and
equipment by the ground support personnel could lead to LOM or LOC of the space flight crew.
The requirements in this section ensure that the capabilities and needs of the ground processing
crew are considered during the design and development of the flight system along with ensuring
that the flight system is not compromised during the assembly, test, and operational phases.
The requirements listed in section 12.1 of this NASA Technical Standard apply only to the design
and development of flight systems interfaced by ground support personnel at integration, launch,
landing, recovery, and deservicing sites. These requirements are optional for designs at
manufacturing and development sites.
This section is applicable for the following: when NASA is performing the ground processing for
vehicles built by non-NASA vendor or when one vendor builds the vehicle and a second vendor is
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responsible for the assembly, integration, and maintenance. If one vendor is responsible for the
design, assembly and maintenance then this section does not apply.
[V2 12003] Each human space flight program shall document the system support design and
environment:
[V2 12004] Each program shall identify an anthropometry, biomechanics, range of motion, and
strength data set for the ground support population to be accommodated in support of all
requirements in this section of this NASA Technical Standard.
[V2 12005] The system shall accommodate ground personnel protective equipment and attire.
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[Rationale: The design has to accommodate for ground personnel functions constrained or
increased by protective equipment or combinations of such (e.g., pressurized or unpressurized
suits, breathing hoses or air packs, gloves, fall protection harnesses, masks, hats or helmets,
sensors, cords). Protective equipment often limits human capabilities (e.g., visual envelope,
range of motion, reach envelope, audio, communication, grasp) and often increases personnel
work volumes or quantity of personnel anticipated (e.g., pressurized suited tasks often require a
minimum of two personnel and air packs or hoses). Design factors for audio, communication,
displays, and control systems should accommodate for face, ear, and/or hand protection (e.g.,
larger knobs, increased volume, larger tactile surfaces, resistive touchscreens). Integrated task
analysis has to be performed to identify designs or functions that may be affected by protective
equipment or attire. Physical characteristics of protective equipment need to be provided to
designers so the protective equipment can be accommodated in system design.]
[V2 12006] The system shall provide the volume necessary for the ground support personnel to
perform all ground processing tasks using the required tools and equipment.
[Rationale: The physical work envelopes have to accommodate full or partial access for the
expected number of ground support personnel, equipment required to perform the task, and any
associated protective equipment. The volume has to accommodate body, work, reach, visual,
tool, and protective equipment envelopes to accomplish the task. The physical work envelopes of
doors, hatches, and entryways should consider further volumetric restrictions imposed by
ground processing, including door/hatch masses and hinges, if captive, actuators, or other entry
mechanisms along with air ducts, cords, sensors, protective covers, safety equipment, portable
lighting, and potential mechanical assist devices (e.g., personnel and equipment entry platforms,
lift devices). For safe passage, timeliness, and to prevent collateral damage, hatches and
ingress/egress openings have to be large enough for the ground support personnel to pass safely
and efficiently in situations involving suited personnel, transporting equipment or hardware
through the opening, emergency or contingency operations, or incapacitated personnel rescue.]
[V2 12007] Systems, hardware, and equipment shall be protected from or be capable of
withstanding forces imposed by the ground support personnel or ground support equipment
(GSE), in a 1-g environment.
[Rationale: Either by vehicle design (preferred) or through other means (e.g., labels, placard,
cover, training, walking platforms, procedures), the space flight system needs to be protected
from the forces imposed by ground support personnel (and their associated equipment) while
performing vehicle tasks. Furthermore, any accessible items that could be inappropriately used
such as handles, steps, handrails, or mobility aids should either be designed to withstand the
forces imposed by the ground support personnel or be clearly labeled as a keep-out zone.
Historical experience with Shuttle and ISS has shown that it is important to make it clear which
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parts of a vehicle may not be used as handles, steps, or handrails so that ground support and
space flight crews do not inadvertently damage delicate portions of the vehicle. Priority should
be given to areas where ground support and space flight crews will traverse and /or work most
frequently and those areas with the most severe potential hazard consequences.]
[V2 12008] System components, hardware, and/or equipment that requires ground support
personnel inspection or interaction shall be accessible.
[Rationale: Ground support personnel have to be able to access system components, hardware,
or equipment that requires inspection or interaction. Consideration needs to be given for type of
access and inspection (e.g., physical and visual) needed for each component, hardware, and
equipment during vehicle design. Proximity and envelope required for the access and inspection
is defined by the function.]
[V2 12009] The system shall provide tool clearances for tool installation and actuation for all
tool interfaces during ground processing.
[Rationale: The required tool clearance for fit and actuation is to be determined and applied to
the design of hardware. Consideration needs to be given to type of tool, the user's hand action,
the tool’s motion envelope and forces needed, the user population hand anthropometric data,
adjacent equipment, the inclusion and use of appropriate shields/guards/gloves, and the need for
tool tethering when determining the minimum clearance dimensions.]
[V2 12010] Flight system components that have the same or similar form but different functions
shall not be physically interchangeable.
[Rationale: Components requiring installation (including, but not limited to, Line Replacement
Units (LRUs) that are not interchangeable functionally will not be interchangeable physically.
This requirement addresses installation of a component in the wrong location. While some
installable units may be used for the same function in multiple instances (e.g., redundant
strings), many may be physically similar but functionally distinct. In such cases, installation in
the wrong location could result in damage to the hardware or to the system into which it is
inserted. This requirement is intended to preclude such installation in the wrong location.
Physical designs may include incompatible bolt patterns, pin/hole alignment, and/or baseplate
differences that do not allow incorrect and/or inadvertent location installation. In addition to
differentiation, labeling to show distinctions should be applied.]
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[V2 12011] The system shall provide a means of protecting flight hardware and equipment from
damage during ground processing.
[Rationale: Equipment that can reasonably sustain damage during ground processing should
have a means of being protected during ground operations (e.g., window covers, wire covers,
propulsion line covers). Note that removable Ground Support Equipment can be used to
accomplish this goal.]
[V2 12012] The system shall provide mobility aids to support expected ground support
personnel tasks.
[Rationale: Mobility aids such as handholds allow ground support personnel to safely and
efficiently move from one location to another, preventing inadvertent damage to equipment.
Required tasks will need to be determined by task analysis, which will include the identification
of mobility aids.]
[V2 12013] All items designed to be carried, supported, or removed and replaced shall have a
means for grasping, handling, and carrying.
[Rationale: This requirement is intended to avoid damage to flight hardware and to prevent
injury to ground support personnel. Items that are unable to be reasonably moved may incur
injury to ground support personnel or damage to the flight systems if handled inappropriately.
Flight items that have to be moved may be damaged if handled inappropriately. Damage to flight
hardware and injury to the ground support personnel can result from poor grips on a non-
handle protrusion or from protrusions that do not hold the weight of the hardware. Non-handle
protrusions can break and lead to dropping flight hardware. Handles or handholds need to be
designed to support the weight of the hardware, any lifting mechanisms, accommodate bare or
gloved hands where appropriate, be non-slip, and/or be clearly labeled.]
[V2 12014] The system shall be designed to prevent inadvertent operation of controls during
ground processing.
[Rationale: The system needs to be designed to preclude inadvertent operation. For example,
accidental activation by contact can be prevented by the use of guards, covers, and physical
separation from other controls. Accidental activation of commands can be prevented with an
“arm-fire” mechanism. Two-step commanding allows for ground support personnel
confirmation before completing critical, hazardous, or destructive commands. Controls need to
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be spaced to prevent inadvertent actuation of adjacent switches. For example, hard plastic,
molded covers may be placed over contact-sensitive items, covers placed over adjacent switches,
or metal foot and handholds may be added to assure only applicable steps are executed.]
[V2 12015] System hardware and equipment shall be designed to prevent incorrect mounting or
installation.
[Rationale: This requirement is intended to assure that fasteners are inserted in the correct
holes, brackets are attached in the correct location, connectors are installed in the correct
position, etc. Improperly mounting equipment during ground processing will result in unsafe
conditions for space flight crews and increase the risk of LOC/LOM events through damage to
hardware or changes in configuration during launch and ascent. Physical features to prevent
incorrect mounting or installation largely prevent these situations. Examples of physical features
include supports, guides, size or shape differences, fastener locations, and alignment pins.
Physical features are the first line of defense for preventing such errors. In addition to physical
features, labeling or marking mitigates human error. Visual indication might include any
marking on or adjacent to the hardware/equipment interface, labels, or color coding that
provides information about mounting. Unique labeling of hardware/equipment provides an
indication that the item to be mounted and the mounting location match. Labels provide
contextual information to help assure that the ground support personnel do not attempt to install
a hardware item incorrectly; such an attempt could damage the hardware or the interfaces on
the vehicle.]
[V2 12016] The system shall be designed to be assembled, prepared for launch, maintained, and
reconfigured using a pre-defined set of standard tools and lesser set of any pre-established set of
specialized tools.
[Rationale: Establishing a minimal set of tools for pre and postmission processing of flight
hardware requires integration across space flight systems, hardware, and equipment designs.
The goal is to have an integrated set of tools (across systems or programs) that can be used for
all ground processing tasks, using common tools wherever possible. Defined toolsets would
reduce the number and types of tools and subsequently reduce the number and types of fasteners.
Minimizing the variations and quantity within the tool set reduces training time, processing time,
potential damage to hardware and injury to personnel, and decreases the chance of using the
wrong tool for the work. System designs and tool determinations should accommodate tool
reach, grasps, and volumes of ground personnel populations, tool motions, and any concurrent
flight system component volume needed around the tool use. For example, designs should
account for tools being used by one person while adjacent personnel assist in securing the
weight or positioning of a removable or tested component. Tool grasps, weights, tethering, and
clearance may also be affected by varying postures needed for access or visibility. Integrated
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task analyses should be performed to support use of common tools or determine where
specialized tools may need to be pre-defined.]
[Rationale: A captive fastener is one that is automatically retained in a work piece when it is not
performing its load-bearing job. Captive fasteners for maintenance, assembly, integration, and
processing tasks, therefore, do not require ground support personnel to restrain and store them
during task performance, and can more easily be installed with one hand, reducing task times
and reducing the chance of fastener loss. Dropped fasteners could become Foreign Object
Debris (FOD), which pose a risk during the mission. They can cause injury, impact launch
schedule, and damage equipment.]
[V2 12018] The system shall be designed for assembly, testing and checkout, troubleshooting,
and maintenance that prevents damage to other components.
[Rationale: Damage to certified flight components will cause costly recertification and may
impact the launch. This requirement is intended to limit such damage and recertification by
maintaining a flight configuration for all systems that are not part of the maintenance activity
and providing mitigation strategies when possible. To define the necessary accommodations for
maintenance without damage, an integrated task analysis has to be performed for each
maintenance activity. Methods that have been successfully used to preclude damaging other
components during maintenance include the following: (1) routing cables to prevent mechanical
damage, pinching by doors, or twisting; (2) protecting against inadvertent actuation; and (3)
implementing provisions for components that are susceptible to abuse or those frequently used.]
[V2 12019] The system shall locate maintenance items so that a planned ground processing or
corrective or preventive maintenance task does not require the deintegration or demating of other
systems or components.
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[V2 12020] The system shall provide direct line-of-sight visual access to all flight system
components requiring inspections or other human-system interactions, except self-mating
connectors, on which ground processing is performed by ground personnel.
[Rationale: Direct line-of-site visual access reduces the likelihood of human error that can
occur when blind (by feel) operations or operations requiring the use of specialized tools (e.g.,
mirrors or bore scopes) are performed. The addition of obstructions from the hands, tools,
equipment, PPE (e.g., gloves, protective suits), corrective lenses, and the components or cabling
needs to be considered during the line-of-sight operation. Reliance on just the “feel” of the
hardware introduces human error variances. A self-mating connector is a connector that, when
two pieces of hardware slide into place, they automatically self-mate. See requirement [V2
12014] Inadvertent Operation Prevention.]
12.1.3.12 Lighting
[V2 12021] The flight system in combination with ground support equipment shall provide
lighting to perform ground processing tasks in the vehicle.
[Rationale: Lighting is required to ensure that the ground support personnel can adequately
view the hardware/equipment associated with the task, and it is generally accomplished through
GSE but may include flight lighting. Additionally, this may require an integrated solution,
utilizing the flight vehicle and ground equipment providers. Lighting or illumination types,
levels, controls, selection, and design factors should accommodate general assembly or bench
work tasks down to extra fine precision while accounting for lux or lumen levels, shadow
prevention, indirect and direct glare mitigations, color temperature, brightness adjustability,
dark adaptation, color rendering, and lighting color techniques (e.g., red flood, low-color
temperature, bright markings [foot-lamberts]). Variations in operating conditions such as
natural sunlight, artificial lighting, or filtering also have to be considered.]
[V2 12022] The system shall be designed to support any supplemental systems that are required
to assist ground support personnel when an assigned task cannot reliably, safely, or effectively be
performed by ground support personnel alone.
[Rationale: Tasks that cannot be reliably, safely, or efficiently performed by the ground support
personnel are to be identified. In those cases, supplemental systems (such as GSE) will need to
be accommodated in design. This may include providing attach points for GSE, rails, tracking or
removal guides, and/or accommodation of ground support lighting.]
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[V2 12023] The system shall be designed for consistent operation across ground processing
tasks.
[Rationale: The intent of this requirement is to ensure commonality and consistency across
flight systems. This will facilitate learning and minimize interface-induced ground support
personnel error. Examples include consistent use of control direction (“on” is always “up”),
“closed” direction is always the same (right), consistent use of a release mechanism,
terminology, markings, color coding, etc.]
[V2 12024] The system shall accommodate restraint and platform placement that ensures the
reach and work envelope of the suited or unsuited ground support personnel for the required
tasks.
[Rationale: Restraints and platforms are intended to keep personnel from falling (or related
hazards), allow for hardware access, and protect the hardware from inadvertent ground support
personnel collision. A task analysis will identify locations where restraints and platforms are
needed. A worksite analysis will inform the placement and design the restraints and platforms
needed.]
[V2 12025] The system shall provide feedback to the operator indicating successful task
completion.
[Rationale: Feedback can include visual indication, audible click, handle position, bolt height,
alert, etc. Feedback at task completion is important to prevent continual inputs into the system,
which may lead to damage to the system. For example, when filling a tank, feedback that the tank
is full is important to prevent overfilling, which may result in human injury or
hardware/equipment damage. If system feedback is not possible, another means of feedback is
necessary (i.e., GSE). For example, if the system does not provide indication of a full tank, the
equipment used to fill the tank should provide the feedback.]
[V2 12026] The system shall provide access for ground support personnel to spacecraft stowage
volumes that require late loading and early unloading of items.
[Rationale: Ground personnel are responsible for any “late loading” of items such as fresh
food, pharmaceuticals, and experiment items with short lifetimes that need to be placed onboard
the spacecraft within 24 hours of launch. Similarly, “early access” items need to be retrieved off
the spacecraft within a short time after landing. Regular unloading requires waiting until the
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spacecraft returns to the processing facility, which could be weeks later. The intent of this
requirement is to allow the ground support personnel to perform these access operations safely
without disruption to the space flight crew or spacecraft.]
[V2 12027] The system shall allow the ground support personnel safe operation of flight
software systems for ground processing.
[Rationale: Ground support personnel may be required to access flight software systems during
ground operations tasks. Therefore, it is critical for flight software systems to have a mode or
configuration for safe operation by ground support personnel.]
12.1.4 Safety
[V2 12028] The system shall protect ground support personnel from injury resulting from sharp
edges and burrs.
[Rationale: Protection of ground support personnel from injury controls ground operations
costs by assuring that bodily fluids, such as blood, do not contaminate flight systems, degrading
flight safety. In those areas that the ground support personnel would access for ground
processing and maintenance, the design should protect them from burrs, sharp edges, and sharp
corners. Support personnel may have an additional risk that system hardware may be in a more
exposed configuration during maintenance or installation/removal operations. The intent of this
requirement is for a design solution, not an operational solution, since the latter results in
expensive recurring costs. The requirement might be met by rounding of edges and corners,
sanding burrs, or by designing flight structure that hides sharp edges and corners and burrs
from ground personnel during planned operations. It cannot be met by design of remove-before-
flight protective structure.]
[V2 12029] The system shall be designed to protect ground personnel from injury due to pinch
points.
[Rationale: A pinch point can cause injury to ground personnel or damage to hardware if not
protected. Pinch points may exist for the nominal function of equipment (i.e., equipment panels),
but need to be covered or protected during ground operations. Injury may be avoided by locating
pinch points out of the reach of the ground personnel or providing guards to eliminate the
potential to cause injury.]
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[V2 12030] The system shall be designed to prevent unnecessary exposure of ground support
personnel and equipment to hazards, including spills, electrical shocks, and the release of stored
energy.
[Rationale: Ground support personnel should not be exposed to hazards unnecessarily. Spill
hazards can be avoided by capturing the spill or by adding extensions to the flight vehicle to
relocate the hose to flight connection away from the vehicle. Electrical exposure can be avoided
by shielding, interlocks, and de-energizing electrical stored energy. Interlocks should not be the
sole mean of de-energizing electrical circuits of equipment and are not substitutes for lockout
and tag-out procedures and practice.]
[V2 12031] The system shall alert and allow ground personnel to safe the system before
performing any ground operation.
[Rationale: Elements or systems have to provide methods for system safing during ground
assembly and maintenance activities to protect the system, hardware, and equipment from
damage or personnel from injury. To ensure all areas in which a method should be in place for
system safing, an integrated task analysis has to be performed. The system has to alert ground
personnel of unsafe conditions. To safe or unsafe a system, a combination of mechanical
actuation (physical lockout) with corresponding indicators (tagout means) should allow ground
personnel to engage or disengage the system while informing personnel of safe or unsafe
conditions (e.g., flashing or steady lights of various colors, distinct audio alarms, positive
locking engagements, other status indicators using multiple modalities). Safing or unsafing
mechanisms and controls have to be accessible to ground personnel for safe and timely
execution. Methods that have been successfully used as controls for system safing include
physical protection, interlocks, software disabling or multiple key combinations, cut-out
switches, warning placards, and guards.]
[V2 12032] The system shall have controls in place to prevent the introduction of contaminants
to the flight vehicle.
[Rationale: Elements or systems cannot release hazardous or non-hazardous materials into the
space flight system during maintenance activities. Controls have to be designed to prevent
contamination.]
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[V2 12033] The system shall provide for containment and disposal of the inadvertent release of
fluids and gases into the flight system.
[V2 12034] Hardware and equipment installed or removed by ground support personnel without
ground support equipment shall be less than a safe weight limit.
[Rationale: Handling of hardware and equipment that is too heavy can result in injury or
damage to the equipment (e.g., dropped hardware). NIOSH has published a lifting equation,
designed to determine a recommended weight limit for safely lifting loads. It accounts for factors
that would affect a person's ability to lift, including the position of the load relative to the body,
the distance lifted, the frequency of lifts, and the coupling (gripping) method. These various
factors need to be accounted for while determining safe weight limits for the ground support
personnel during assembly, processing, and maintenance tasks. Other factors such as
obstructions, surrounding environment, the carefulness needed in placing an object should also
be considered in design.]
[V2 12035] Flight system components shall be arranged, or located to prevent hazards,
interference, or errors during concurrent ground processing tasks.
[Rationale: Hardware, personnel, software, and/or automation could interact in such a way
during concurrent tasks as to create undesired outcomes. For example, crossing cables during
installation may lead to inadvertent forces on those cables which may cause problems in-flight.
The system and components should provide a means of damage detection by inspection or test
and a means to recover. Consequences of errors on safety or system performance should be
made clear. Placing items in view on system mold lines, rather than stacked or hidden, can
provide visual indicators of damage or interferences. Obtaining a test failure should indicate the
isolated area of the fault, and the system should provide physical and visual means to the
affected area. For pneumatic systems, clear sight glasses have been incorporated showing
mechanical indicators to clearly identify performance flow or inoperability. In software or
instrumentation, system status windows with conditional indicators for online, offline, optimal,
or off nominal, can provide means of detecting the failure or damage in time to recover before
flight.]
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12.1.5 Connectors
[V2 12036] Connectors shall be designed and spaced to allow for accurate, damage-free mating
and demating by ground support personnel.
[Rationale: Connectors need to be grasped firmly for connecting and disconnecting. The
clothing, gloves, equipment, and PPE worn by the ground support personnel during the task
have to be considered in design.]
[V2 12037] Connectors shall have physical features to preclude incorrect mating and mismating.
This can be accomplished by differing connector shell sizes, differing connector keyway
arrangements, and having different contact arrangements (these are listed in order of most
preferred to least preferred).
[Rationale: Connector similarity could lead to inadvertent mismating, which is the mating of a
male plug to the wrong female jack. Mismating can damage pins or mechanisms, or even (once
powered or filled with fluids) lead to personal injury or equipment damage. Incomplete electrical
connector mating can result in short circuits or open circuits. Incomplete fluid connector mates,
especially in pressurized systems, can result in unexpected and possibly hazardous fluid release.
Physical features such as color coding, different size connectors, connector keying, and tactile
feedback can help ensure proper installation. Connector savers can be used to reduce the
probability of extensive rework caused by high repetition of mating/demating or the possibility of
mismating. Labels can help to identify which connector plug is intended to be mated with which
jack, as well as proper orientation for mating.]
12.1.6 Labels
These requirements ensure that the design and placement of labels allow users to locate and
identify controls and human interfaces, to interpret and follow procedures, or to avoid hazards.
Labels may include permanent labels, placards, etchings, engravings, part markings, decals, ink-
stamped labels, engraved labels, or silk-screened labels.
[V2 12038] Labels and placards shall be provided for the ground support personnel to identify
items, interpret and follow procedures, and avoid hazards.
[Rationale: Ground support personnel interface items have to have identifiers (labels) to aid in
assembly, maintenance, test, and checkout operations. Labels for ground support personnel
interfaces help prevent ground processing mishaps, process escapes, and human errors. Labels
need to be positioned so it is intuitive which item is being identified. Labels reduce memory load
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and improve accuracy of tasks. This includes, but is not limited to, identification of emergency
equipment and procedures, safe weight limits, and hazards identification.]
[V2 12039] Labels and placards shall be consistent and standardized throughout the system.
[Rationale: Systems, hardware, and equipment that are intended to be used by ground support
personnel and the space flight crew need to employ standardized nomenclature, label formats,
coding, language, measurement units, and icons in concordance with the space vehicle system.]
[V2 12040] The content of labels and placards shall be of sufficient size, color contrast, and
character height and style to support readability.
[Rationale: Labels and placards need to be readable at the intended viewing distance.
Designers need to consider the distances at which the labels and placards are expected to be
viewed, any worn PPE, and the lighting conditions in which the labels and placards will be
viewed.]
[V2 12041] Labels and placards shall be located such that they are readable by the operator,
considering ambient lighting conditions, orientation in the integrated configuration, and position
of the operator relative to the label.
[Rationale: Labels and placards need to be readable in the normal operating position.
Designers need to consider the lighting conditions for the operation of the hardware and make
sure the labels are readable, given the task demands.]
[V2 12042] Labels, placards, or part markings used for ground processing shall not visually or
operationally interfere with space flight crew interface labeling.
[Rationale: Space flight crew interface flight labeling has to take precedence over ground
labeling to ensure safe flight operations. Interference with the flight labeling by ground labeling
can cause confusion for the space flight crew. When and where possible, the ground labeling
should not be visible to the crew in-flight.]
The capability for ground support personnel emergency egress and access to medical care
during ground processing, preflight and postflight is critical to ensure the safety and health of
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ground and space flight crews. Note these requirements augment the requirement in NPR
8705.2, section 3.6.1.1, that requires the space system to provide the capability for unassisted
crew emergency egress to a safe haven during Earth prelaunch activities.
[V2 12043] The system shall be designed such that the space flight crew and ground support
personnel can egress within the time required to preserve the health and safety of all space flight
crew and ground support personnel in the event of an emergency.
[Rationale: Space flight crew egress may require the assistance from ground support personnel,
and ground support personnel may need to egress due to emergencies during processing.
Ground support personnel wearing protective clothing need to be accommodated, in addition to
the space flight crewmember wearing an ascent/entry suit during emergency egress scenarios.
Ground support protective clothing may include a bulky backpack and air tank. Egress
scenarios need to be evaluated to adequately configure the egress paths in the design.
[V2 12044] The system shall be designed to ensure space flight crew and ground support
personnel can egress to a location providing advanced pre-hospital life support.
[Rationale: Egress systems primarily relocate personnel to a safe location. Upon an emergency
egress, it is possible that medical care will be needed. An egress system that delivers personnel
to a location that provides advanced pre-hospital life support is important to prevent delayed
medical treatment.]
[V2 12045] Following a post mission nominal landing, launch scrub, or abort scenario, crew
egress from the system shall be expedited to ensure crew health.
[Rationale: Environmental, safety, and health considerations may necessitate expedited egress.
For the well-being of all crewmembers, it is necessary to expedite egress. For example, it is
possible that one or more crewmembers may experience health issues following a re-adaptation
to Earth’s gravity. In addition, following a launch scrub/mission abort, vehicle troubleshooting
may be required quickly after crew egress.]
[V2 12046] For ground emergency egress systems (EES), the system shall limit the magnitude
and direction of crew exposure to accelerations according to Table 36, EES Acceleration Limits
– Sustained, and Table 37, EES Acceleration Limits – Jerk.
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[Rationale: Emergency egress systems should provide and maintain a level of system safety
sufficient to permit routine use of the system in crew training operations while ensuring that
safety measures do not adversely affect the performance of the system during its intended use in
emergency scenarios. Human tolerance levels and stability under acceleration vary broadly
depending on the axes of acceleration, restraint type, duration, and condition of the subjects. The
limits in this requirement represent safe levels of translational acceleration and start and stop
changes in acceleration or jerk for the human. Exposure to acceleration above these limits could
cause injury.
* This requirement may be revised based on tailoring of ASTM F2291-20, Standard Practice for
Design of Amusement Rides and Devices, to be more specific to human space flight system
parameters.]
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APPENDIX A
REFERENCE DOCUMENTS
A.1 PURPOSE
This Appendix provides guidance made available in the reference documents listed below.
Reference documents may be accessed at https://standards.nasa.gov, obtained directly from the
Standards Developing Body or other document distributors, obtained from information provided
or linked, or by contacting the Center Library or office of primary responsibility.
The latest issuances of cited documents apply unless specific versions are designated.
Department of Defense
Federal
29 U.S.C. §1915.12(a)(2), Precautions and the order of testing before
entering confined and enclosed spaces and other dangerous
atmospheres, March 28, 2017
49 CFR Part II, Parts 213 and 238, U.S. Department of Transportation
(DOT) Standards, Federal Railway Administration: Vehicle/Track
Interaction Safety Standards; High-Speed and High Cant Deficiency
Operations; Final Rule March 13, 2013
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OMB Circular No. A- Federal Participation in the Development and Use of Voluntary
119 Consensus Standards and in Conformity Assessment Activities, as
revised January 27, 2016, at Federal Register Vol. 81, No. 17, page
4673, accessible at
https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-
content/uploads/2020/07/revised_circular_a-119_as_of_1_22.pdf
The National Institute Criteria For a Recommended Standard: Occupational Noise Exposure
for Occupational https://www.cdc.gov/niosh/docs/98-126/pdfs/98-
Safety and Health 126.pdf?id=10.26616/NIOSHPUB98126
(NIOSH)
Environment, Health Biological Exposure Indices® (BEIs), sections Light and Near-
& Safety Infrared Radiation and Ultraviolet Radiation (2014 or later).
Centers for Disease Perceived Exertion (Borg Rating of Perceived Exertion Scale)
Control and https://www.cdc.gov/physicalactivity/basics/measuring/exertion.htm
Prevention (CDC)
NASA
Clarke, J.M. Oxygen Toxicity (Chapter 6). The Physiology and
Medicine of Diving (4th ed), Bennett, P.B., Elliott, D.H. (eds). W.B.
Saunders Company Ltd: Philadelphia, 1993, pp. 153-69)
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SA-12-067 Level II Johnson Space Center (JSC) Chief Medical Officer (CMO)
Health and Medical Technical Authority (HMTA) Position on
Potential Atmospheres for Exploration, August 8, 2012
SA-16-156 Level II JSC CMO HMTA Position on NHV and Internal Layout
Considerations for Exploration Missions
JSC-39116 EMU Phase VI Glove Thermal Vacuum Test and Analysis Final
Report, Doc. #CTSD-SS-1621, NASA Johnson Space Center, August
20, 1998
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(https://forum.nasaspaceflight.com/index.php?action=dlattach;topic=5
1325.0;attach=1945174;sess=0)
NASA/TM-2008- The Use of a Vehicle Acceleration Exposure Limit Model and a Finite
215198 Element Crash Test Dummy Model to Evaluate the Risk of Injuries
during Orion Crew Module Landings
(https://ntrs.nasa.gov/citations/20080018587)
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NPD 8900.5 NASA Health and Medical Policy for Human Space Exploration
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Beranek, L.L., and Vér, I.L, 1992. Noise and Vibration Control
Engineering - Principals and Applications. (1992). (Eds.) pp 685-720.
John Wiley and Sons
Chatterjee, I., Wu, D., and Gandhi, O. P. Human Body Impedance and
Threshold Currents for Perception and Pain for Contact Hazard
Analysis in the VLF-MF Band. IEEE Transactions on Biomedical
Engineering, BME-33(5): 486-494, 1986
Cooper, G.E., and Harper, R. P., Jr. The Use of Pilot Rating in the
Evaluation of Aircraft Handling Qualities. North Atlantic Treaty
Organization Advisory Group for Aerospace Research and
Development (Organisation du Traite de l'Atlantique Nord). Ames
Research Center, Moffett Field, CA. Cornell Aeronautical Laboratory,
Buffalo, NY. April 1969
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Heaton, K.W., & Lewis, S.J., 1997, “Stool form scale as a useful guide
to intestinal transit time.” Scandinavian Journal of Gastroenterology,
vol.32, no.9, pp.920 – 924.
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Moritz, A.R., and Henriques, F.C. (1947). Studies in Thermal Injury II.
The Relative Importance of Time and Air Surface Temperatures in the
Causation of Cutaneous Burns. American Journal of Pathology,
23:695-720
Roscoe, A.H, & Ellis, G.A. (1990). A Subjective Rating Scale for
Assessing Pilot Workload in Flight: A Decade of Practical Use. Royal
Aerospace Establishment, Technical Report 90019.
Seppanen, O., Fisk, W.J., & Lei, Q.H. (2006). Effect of Temperature
on Task Performance in Office Environment. Ernest Orlando Lawrence
Berkeley National Laboratory.
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IEC 60479-2 Effects of Current on Human Beings and Livestock, Part 2: Special
Aspects
IEC 60479-5, Edition 1.0 Effects of current on human beings and livestock – Part 5: Touch
voltage threshold values for physiological effects
IEC/TR 60479-5, Edition Effects of current use on human beings and livestock – Part 5: Touch
1.0 voltage threshold values for physiological effects
ISO 7731:2003(E) Ergonomics – Danger signals for public and work areas – Auditory
danger signals, method a in section 5.2.2.1
ANSI Z136.1, 2014 Laser Institute of America’s (LIA) publication ANSI Z136.1, 2014 &
ANSI Z136.6, 2015
VESA FPDM 2.0 Video Electronics Standards Association (VESA) Flat Panel Display
Measurements (FPDM) Standard Version 2.0 (June 1, 2001),
www.vesa.org
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APPENDIX B
~ approximately
β beta, injury risk criterion
° degree
Δ delta (change)
ΔQ delta Q
= equal
> greater than
≥ greater than or equal to
< less than
≤ less than or equal to
- minus
µg microgram
µ mu, micro
µm Micrometer
µPa micropascal
omega, ohm
% percent
+ plus
± plus or minus
θ theta, angle of incidence
ρ rho, density
A ampere
A/m ampere per meter
AC alternating current
ACGIH American Conference of Governmental Industrial
Hygienists
AGARD Advisory Group for Aerospace Research and Development
ALARA as low as reasonably achievable
ANSI American National Standards Institute
APP Applicable
Ar Argon
ARS atmosphere revitalization system
ASA Acoustical Society of America
ASHRAE American Society of Heating, Refrigerating, and Air-
Conditioning Engineers
B/W black and white
BEI biological exposure index (indices)
BET Blur Edge Time
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UV ultraviolet
u’v’ uniform-chromaticity scale (CIE 15.2, Colorimetric 2nd ed.
Commission International d l’ Cellarage, Vienna Austria
1986)
V Volt
volume
V/m volt(s) per meter
V1 Volume 1 (in designating numbered requirements)
V2 Volume 2 (in designating numbered requirements)
VESA Video Electronics Standards Association
VGE venous gas emboli
VOC volatile organic compound
Vu urinary output volume
W watt
WHC waste and hygiene compartment
WHO World Health Organization
W/m watt(s) per meter
W/m2 watt(s) per meter squared
y year
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APPENDIX C
DEFINITIONS
This Appendix provides guidance, made available in the definitions listed below:
Accessibility: A design feature referring to the ability to see and maneuver within a
spatial volume for the purpose of operating, cleaning, retrieving, or maintaining parts of a
subsystem.
Activity Center: A specific location uniquely configured for a human activity such as
personal hygiene, body waste, food, sleep, trash, stowage, and exercise countermeasures.
Acute Field of View: The region of visual angle in which acuity remains at least half its
maximum. It is about 3 degrees in diameter.
All Mission Systems: Includes terrestrial ground control centers, other spacecraft on an
occupied planetary body, other orbiting spacecraft, and other locations onboard a spacecraft.
Anthropometry: The science of measuring the human body and its parts and functional
capabilities. Includes lengths, circumferences, body mass, etc.
Automation: (1) The implementation of a process by automatic means. (2) The theory,
art, or technique of making a process more automatic. (3) The investigation, design,
development, and application of methods of rendering processes automatic, self-moving, or self-
controlling.
Biomechanics: The study of the principles and relationships involved with muscular
activity.
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Blur Edge Time (BET): A measure of the amount of motion blur on an electronic
display, especially liquid crystal display. This metric is defined in ICDM-DMS 1.0.
Catastrophic: (1) A hazard that could result in a mishap causing fatal injury to personnel
and/or loss of one or more major elements of the flight vehicle or ground facility. (2) A
condition that may cause death or permanently disabling injury, major system or facility
destruction on the ground, or loss of crew, major systems, or vehicle during the mission
(NPR 8715.3, NASA General Safety Program Requirements).
Caution: Notification of an event that needs attention but not immediate action.
Clear Viewing Aperture: The area of a window that is not covered by the window
assembly frame or other structure that would block incident light rays.
Color Discrimination: The ability to distinguish between pairs of colors that span the
space of colors under standard viewing conditions. The International Commission on
Illumination (CIE) has defined ∆E units that specify the perceptual distance between colors.
Contamination: The act of rendering unfit for use by the introduction or deposition of
unwholesome or undesirable, usually foreign, elements.
Continuous Noise: Noise that exists in a steady state for durations of more than 8 hours
in a 24-hour period. Typical continuous sources of noise include environmental control
equipment and avionics equipment (e.g., fans, pumps, ventilation systems).
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Crew: Team of two or more crewmembers assigned to a mission that have been trained
to monitor, operate, and control parts of, or the whole space system.
Critical: A condition that may cause severe injury, occupational illness, or major
property damage to facilities, systems, or flight hardware (NPR 8715.3); also of essential
importance, vital, or indispensable as in “critical” design parameters. Frequently used in this
NASA Technical Standard to cover both “critical” (as defined above) and “catastrophic.”
Dedicated Equipment Work Volume: Volume that cannot have multi-use but must be
associated full-time with the equipment (such as interior volume of glove box, etc).
Display Device: The hardware used to present visual, aural, and tactile information to
the crew or ground operations personnel. Display devices include computer monitors and
Personal Digital Assistants (PDAs).
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Doors: A moveable physical barrier that acts to provide physical separation between
areas or to provide privacy. Examples of doors include enclosures for an unpressurized payload
bay, or a privacy divider for a personal crew quarter or hygiene area.
Doorway: The opening, the area of the vehicle, that houses the doors.
Drag Through: Any item that inhibits hatchway function by interfering with the clear
passage through the hatchways including, but not limited to, cargo, cables, and wires.
Effective Masked Threshold: The level of auditory danger signal just audible over the
ambient noise, taking account of the acoustic parameters of both the ambient noise in the signal
reception area and the listening deficiencies (hearing protection, hearing loss, and other masking
effects). The method for calculating the masked threshold is given in ISO 7731:2003(E) Annex
B.
Error: Either an action that is not intended or desired by the person or a failure on the
part of the person to perform a prescribed action within specified limits of accuracy, sequence,
or time that does not produce the expected result and has led or has the potential to lead to an
unwanted consequence.
Emergency: Time-critical event that requires immediate action and crew survival
procedures.
Emergency Only Controls: Controls that are only used during emergencies, e.g., eject,
abort.
EVA Spacesuit System: Any spacesuit system designed to allow astronauts to perform
tasks outside of a spacecraft or habitat. Performance of space flight EVA consists of placing a
human in a micro-environment that has to provide all the life support, nutrition, hydration,
waste, and consumables management function of an actual space vehicle, while allowing
crewmembers to perform mission tasks. EVA spacesuits are designed to be used for durations of
less than a day due to potential human and suit system constraints. This includes all suited
phases (e.g., prebreathe, leak checks, airlock depress, repress).
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Field of Regard: The solid angle that can be seen by an observer with eye and head
movements.
Field of View: The solid angle that can be seen at one time by the stationary eye. It is
about 150 degrees horizontally by 125 degrees vertically. When the two eyes operate together,
the horizontal extent enlarges to about 190 degrees.
Field of View for Windows: All points through a window that can be viewed directly by
at least one eye, given the combination of achievable eye, head, and body movement. The field
of view is restricted by obstructions imposed by the facial structure around the eye and/or placed
in front of the eye such as the crewmember's helmet if worn, mullions, structure, and/or other
equipment. Achievable movement varies for different flight phases and operational tasks and is
dependent on any constraints to movement that are extant such as being suited, seated, and/or
restrained, and any g-loads present. With respect to line-of-sight phenomena such as
contamination deposition and pluming, any point outboard of the window that is above the plane
of the outer surface of the outermost pane of the window port is considered within the field of
view of the window.
Gaussian Edge Time (GET): A measure of the amount of motion blur on an electronic
display, especially a liquid crystal display. This metric is defined in ICDM-DMS 1.0.
Ground Support Personnel: Human team of one or more members supporting a mission
from the ground during preflight, in-flight, surface, and post flight operations.
Habitability: The state of being fit for occupation or dwelling. Meeting occupant needs
of health, safety, performance, and satisfaction.
Habitat: A type of spacecraft, not normally mobile, that has the conditions necessary to
sustain the life of the crew and to allow the crew to perform their functions in an efficient
manner.
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Habitable Volume: The measure of space livable and functionally usable to crew within
a pressurized volume after accounting for all installed hardware and systems.
Hardware: Individual components of equipment, including but not limited to, fasteners,
panels, plumbing, switches, switch guards, and wiring. This term is sometimes used
interchangeably with equipment.
Hatch: An operable, sealable cover that separates two adjoining environments and
allows physical passage of people and/or material from one environment to the other. Hatches
can maintain pressurized environments. Hatches may function as ingress/egress points for crew
prior to launch, postlanding, and for EVAs, and may also serve as connections between modules
in a spacecraft.
Hatch Cover: A protective encasement that protects the hatch from unwanted exposure.
Hatchway: The opening, the area of the vehicle that houses the hatch.
Impulse Noise: A burst of noise, which exists for 1 second or less, that is at least 10 dB
above the background noise.
Interpretable: Capable of being explained or told the meaning of; translated into
intelligible or familiar language or terms.
Ionizing Radiation: Radiation that converts impacted items wholly or partly into ions
(electrically charged particles). The particulate radiation component includes all subatomic
particles such as protons, neutrons, electrons, atomic nuclei stripped of orbital electrons,
mesons, etc.
Intermittent Noise: Noise that is generated for operational durations of 8 hours or less in
a 24-hour period. Typical intermittent sources of noise are waste control system components
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(pumps, fans, separators, valves), exercise equipment (treadmill, cycle ergometer), galley fans,
personal hygiene station components (pumps, fans, valves), and pressure regulators.
LEA/IVA Spacesuit System: Any spacesuit system designed for use during launch,
entry, and abort phases of space flight, primarily to protect against toxic exposure, ebullism,
hypoxia, and decompression sickness in the event of an unplanned cabin depressurization or
toxic release into the cabin. It may also be worn during other dynamic phases of flight such as
rendezvous and docking during which there is an increased risk of cabin depressurization due to
cabin leaks. The duration for which LEA spacesuits are designed to operate will depend on
mission scenarios and may range from a few hours to several days per use.
Linear Acceleration: The rate of change of velocity of a mass, the direction of which is
kept constant.
Maintenance: All actions necessary for retaining material in (or restoring it to) a
serviceable condition. Maintenance includes servicing, repair, modification, modernization,
overhaul, inspection, condition determination, corrosion control, and initial provisioning of
support items (MIL-HDBK-1908B, Definitions of Human Factors Terms).
Mission Duration: The total time the crew is away from the surface of Earth, measured
from launch of the Earth launch vehicle to landing or splashdown of the Earth return spacecraft.
If the crew transfers between multiple spacecraft during this mission, except where indicated
otherwise in these standards, every spacecraft the crew inhabits is subject to the requirements
identified for the mission duration.
Net Habitable Volume (NHV): The functional volume left available on a spacecraft after
accounting for the loss of volume caused by deployed equipment, stowage, trash, and any other
items that decrease the functional volume.
Noise: Sound in the auditory range (15 Hz to 20,000 Hz) that is hazardous, undesired,
and/or inappropriate to the intended use of the space. In this NASA Technical Standard, the
word "noise" is used interchangeably with “sound” and is not intended to convey any relative or
absolute degree of hazard or other acoustical characteristic.
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Perception: The process of acquiring knowledge about environmental objects and events
by extracting and processing the information received through the senses.
Privacy: Having an acceptable level of control over the extent of sharing oneself
(physically, behaviorally, or intellectually) with others. Acceptable level is dependent upon an
individual’s background and training.
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Regolith: Unconsolidated residual or transported material that overlies the solid rock on
the Earth, Moon, or a planet.
Safe: Freedom from those conditions that can cause death, injury, occupational illness,
damage to or loss of equipment or property, or damage to the environment.
Sensory: The information-gathering abilities of humans to see, hear, touch, smell, and
taste. Includes temperature, pain, kinesthesia, and equilibrium.
Sound Quality: Those features of a sound that contribute to the subjective impression
made on a listener, with reference to the suitability of the sound for a particular set of design
goals. It is meant particularly to account for aspects of communication systems that are not
quantifiable by intelligibility measurements.
Spacecraft: A habitable vehicle or device, including, but not limited to, orbiters,
capsules, modules, landers, transfer vehicles, rovers, EVA suits, and habitats designed for travel
or operation outside Earth's atmosphere.
Space flight: A process that begins when the crew has boarded the spacecraft on Earth
and the hatch is closed and terminates when the spacecraft has returned to Earth, and all of the
crew have egressed the spacecraft and are in the care of ground personnel. In the event of a
launch abort, space flight continues until all crew have been returned to the care of ground
personnel.
Spatial Contrast Sensitivity: Defined by the inverse of the smallest contrast of a spatial
sinusoidal luminance grating that can be detected, at each spatial frequency, under standard
viewing conditions. Peak contrast sensitivity is about 500, and the highest frequency visible is
about 60 cycles/deg.
Specular Reflectance: The perfect, mirror-like reflection of an incident wave or ray such
as light from a surface, in which the wave or ray from a single incoming direction is reflected
into a single outgoing direction as described by Snell's Law (θi (theta i) = θr (theta r)). Diffuse
reflection, on the other hand, refers to light that is reflected in a broad range of directions. (See
“diffuse reflectance.”) The most familiar example of the distinction between specular and
diffuse reflection in the case of light waves would be glossy and matte paints or photo prints.
While both finishes exhibit a combination of specular and diffuse reflectance, glossy paints and
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photo prints have a greater proportion of specular reflectance, and matte paints and photo prints
have a greater proportion of diffuse reflectance. Anti-reflection coatings reduce the amount of
light that is reflected from a given surface. Reflectance for an uncoated glass surface is ~4%,
which yields ~8% for the two surfaces of a single “pane.” Anti-reflective coatings can reduce
the total reflectance to ~2% or less.
Suited: Wearing clothing that is designed to protect the crewmember from differences in
environment such as pressure, atmosphere, acceleration, or temperature. “Suited” can refer to
both pressurized and unpressurized pressure suits.
Sustained Accelerations: Events, linear or rotational, with a duration of greater than 0.5
seconds.
System: The combination of elements that function together to produce the capability to
meet a need. The elements include all hardware, software, equipment, facilities, personnel,
processes, and procedures needed for this purpose. (Source: NPR 7120.7, NASA Information
Technology and Institutional Infrastructure Program and Project Management Requirements.)
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Tailoring: The process by which requirements are derived for a specific system. This
process involves two steps:
Task: A specific type, piece, or amount of work; a subset of an activity or job that is
called out in a procedure.
Transient Accelerations: Events, linear or rotational, with a duration of less than or equal
to 0.5 seconds.
Unsuited: Wearing the type of clothing that is ordinarily worn in the interior of a
spacecraft, especially a habitat, and as might be worn on Earth.
Visual Accommodation: Defined by the change in optical power of the eye to bring
objects at different distances into focus. In young observers, average accommodative power is
about 15 diopters but declines to 0 by the age of 60.
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Visual Acuity: Defined by the smallest letters that can be identified under standard
viewing conditions. An average acuity for young adults is about -0.1 logMAR but declines with
age.
Wavefront: The surface joining all adjacent points on a wave that have the same phase,
particularly light that travels as an electromagnetic wave.
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Wavefront Error: The total optical path difference induced into a wavefront with respect
to the wavelength of light, usually referenced to a helium-neon (HeNe) laser wavelength of
632.8 nm. For planar waves, wavefront error occurs when the wavefront is distorted such that an
individual wavefront is no longer in phase. This occurs when different parts of the wavefront
travel different optical path lengths. In an ideal window, a planar wave will pass through it such
that the optical path length at each point on the window is the same, and the wavefront retains
the same phase. Wavefront error is aperture dependent. In an imperfect window, the wavefront
is distorted, i.e., the phase is not maintained. Wavefront error can be distorted by surface
imperfections (the window is not “flat”) or by material inhomogeneities (the index of refraction
varies across the window).
Window Assembly: The same as and used interchangeably with window and window
port.
Window Port: The finished assembly, including the frame structure (includes all gaskets,
bolts, spacers, and other such parts) and all window panes that would normally be used at a
specific location with any protective panes, permanent coatings, plastic films, or laminates
applied or in place; the same as and used interchangeably with window and window assembly.
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Window Shutter: An internally and remotely operable external cover intended to prevent
natural and induced environmental degradation, e.g., contamination, erosion, and impacts, of the
outboard-most windowpane with open and close indicators that are readable from the remote
operating location. Window shutters can be operated through their full range of motion in less
than 10 seconds and can serve as window shades.
Workload: The amount of work expected in a unit of time. Physical workload refers to
the number of individual physical activities that are conducted simultaneously or in close
succession. Similarly, mental or cognitive workload refers to the number of mental operations or
activities that are conducted simultaneously or in close succession.
APPENDIX D
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APPENDIX D
D.1 PURPOSE
Due to the complexity and uniqueness of space flight, it is unlikely that all of the requirements in a NASA technical standard will
apply. The Requirements Compliance Matrix below contains this NASA Technical Standard’s technical authority requirements and
may be used by programs and projects to indicate requirements that are applicable or not applicable to help minimize costs. Enter
“Yes” in the “Applicable” column if the requirement is applicable to the program or project or “No” if the requirement is not
applicable to the program or project. The “Comments” column may be used to provide specific instructions on how to apply the
requirement or to specify proposed tailoring.
Missions may be comprised of consecutive segments that occur in different vehicles, take place in
different locations in space with varying distances from Earth, and last for different durations.
Many requirements that pertain to cumulative exposures and conditions (such as Permissible
Exposure Limits) have been tailored (relaxed) to accommodate short missions occurring in single
vehicles. However, for multi-segment or multi-vehicle missions, cumulative exposure over the
entire duration of the mission needs to be considered. Exposure in one vehicle that is occupied for a
segment of the full mission duration cannot be taken in isolation of the rest of the mission. It is not
advisable for each vehicle to maintain its own short duration exposure requirements and expect
other vehicles or habitats in the mission to lower their exposure limits to compensate for a higher
exposure level in another vehicle. Similarly, a vehicle cannot expect other vehicles within the
enterprise to compensate for lack of countermeasures in that vehicle.
3.2.1 V2 3006 Human-Centered Task Each human space flight program or project shall perform a human-centered task analysis to support
Analysis systems and operations design.
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where:
N = the number of noise exposure events during the 24-hour period
Cn = the actual duration of the exposure event in minutes
Tn = the maximum noise exposure duration allowed, based on the specific sound level
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APPENDIX E
E.1 PURPOSE
The purpose of this generic applicability matrix is to serve as a starting point for the tailoring
process for future spacesuit designers by indicating those standards that are likely to impact
design. While spacesuit-specific standards are described in section 11, several requirements from
other sections of this NASA Technical Standard are also applicable to spacesuit systems.
Spacesuit designers should work closely with HMTA to tailor the entirety of this NASA
Technical Standard to the specific project based on unique mission attributes. Applicable
standards for spacesuits are identified as applicable (APP) or not applicable(N/A). There are
instances in which standards may or may not apply to spacesuit systems, because design
approaches and operational concepts may differ significantly among different systems. For
example, provision of treatment for decompression sickness may be provided by spacesuits or
could alternatively be provided by other vehicle systems. In these instances, standards are
designated as potentially applicable (PA). The applicability of standards to spacesuits is also
dependent upon the spacesuits’ intended functionality. Accordingly, all spacesuit-applicable
standards are identified as being applicable to EVA spacesuits, LEA spacesuits, or both EVA and
LEA spacesuits as defined below:
• LEA Spacesuit System Definition: Any spacesuit system designed for use during
launch, entry, and abort phases of space flight, primarily to protect against toxic
exposure, ebullism, hypoxia, and decompression sickness in the event of an
unplanned cabin depressurization or toxic release into the cabin. It may also be worn
during other dynamic phases of flight such as rendezvous and docking during which
there is an increased risk of cabin depressurization due to cabin leaks. The duration
for which LEA spacesuits are designed to operate will depend on mission scenarios
and may range from a few hours to several days per use.
The Interface column is an important component of the Applicability Matrix, whose purpose is
to identify standards that are applicable to interfaces between spacesuits and other systems rather
than directly to spacesuits themselves. Standards that require consideration of the suit/system
interface are identified in the Interfaces column by an “X” and should be reviewed by designers
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of both spacesuits and other systems to ensure compatibility among all systems in the context of
the overall system and mission design. For example, if the suit is being designed for an existing
vehicle, the suit has to be designed to fit through existing hatches. However, if the vehicle has
not yet been built, the suit design may influence the size of the hatches. As another example, the
fire protection system standards are marked as an interface interaction to capture the scenario in
which any suited crew should be alerted to potential issues regarding the vehicle and its fire
protection system. Standards that have interface applicability should be considered especially in
situations where one of the systems is pre-existing. While effort was made to identify those
standards that are likely to directly impact spacesuit design, standards that are marked as N/A
should still be examined. This is especially important in those instances in which the Interfaces
column has been marked, as these standards have the potential to influence both spacesuit and
vehicle design.
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APPENDIX F
The intent of the standards in Section 4 is to accommodate the entire potential user population,
not just meet the criteria in the datasets provided, which provide the most frequently used values.
Identification of a design criteria not provided in the tables needs coordination and concurrence
from NASA Stakeholders. Each dataset may be tailored by NASA based on program or mission
specific criteria.] Guidance on the evaluation of design for physical characteristics and
capabilities can be found in NASA/TP-2014-218556, Human Integration Design Process
(HIDP).
F.2.1 References
Gordon, C.C., Churchill, T., Clauser, C.E., Bradtmiller, B., McConville, J.T., Tebbetts, I.,
Walker, R.A. (1989). 1988 Anthropometric survey of U.S. army personnel: methods and
summary statistics. NATICK/TR-89/044, United States Army Natick Research, Development
and Engineering Center, Massachusetts.
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2
For measurements that include the length of the spine in sitting postures, 6% of the sitting measurement must be
added to allow for spinal elongation due to micro-gravity exposure. Additional information on the derivation 6%
values can be found in NASA/SP-2010-3407 Revision 1, Human Integration Design Handbook (HIDH).
3
For measurements that include the length of the spine in standing postures, 3% the standing measurement must
be added to allow for spinal elongation due to micro-gravity exposure. Additional information on the derivation
3% values can be found in NASA/SP-2010-3407 Revision 1, Human Integration Design Handbook (HIDH).
Table 41, Unsuited Range of Motion, provides several joint measures that were present in old
versions of this table but were not reinvestigated as a part of the 2007/2008 mobility study.
These values are specifically called out when listed in the table.
Tables 42 and 43 provide Range of Motion (ROM) for several joint measures under
unpressurized and pressurized suit conditions. It should be noted that since pressurization causes
severe restrictions to range of motion, no pressurized ROM for a LEA type suit is provided.
Hence, pressurized ROM data are applicable only for an EVA type suit.
F.3.1 References
“1979 Study” refers to data from SP-2-86L-064 Thornton, W, and Jackson, J. Anthropometric
Study of Astronaut Candidates, 1979 to 1980, (Unpublished Data) NASA-JSC.
Ankle
25 -50
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-125 0
Flexion Extension
165 -15
Abduction Adduction
-65 20
Hip
Internal External
Rotation Rotation
35 -35
Flexion Extension
-45 15
Torso
Right Lean Left Lean
40 -40
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CCW CW
30 -30
Flexion Extension
145 -70
Shoulder
Abduction Adduction
-165 45
Interior Exterior
Transverse Transverse
Rotation Rotation
-45 135
Shoulder
1979 Study
Lateral Medial
-46 91
Flex Ex
-34 65
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-73 72
Flexion Extension
Elbow
130 0
Extension Flexion
-90 60
Abduction Adduction
(Radial (Ulnar
Wrist Deviation) Deviation)
30 -25
Supination Pronation
-80 80
Flex Ex
-65 34
Neck
1979 Study
Bend Right Bend Left
-35 29
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Rot R Rot L
-73 72
Interior Exterior
Transverse Transverse
Hip Rotation Rotation
1979 Study
-30 35
Ankle
40 -30
Flexion Extension
Knee
-125 0
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130 -30
Abduction Adduction
-30 20
External
Internal Rotation
Rotation
35 -35
Flexion Extension
-45 15
Torso
25 -25
CCW CW
30 -30
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140 -60
Shoulder
Abduction Adduction
-120 25
Interior Exterior
Transverse Transverse
Rotation Rotation
-25 120
Addt’l
Shoulder
Lateral Medial
-25 60
Flexion Extension
Elbow
110 0
Extension Flexion
-90 50
Wrist
Abduction Adduction
(Radial (Ulnar
Deviation) Deviation)
30 -30
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Supination Pronation
-80 80
Ankle
40 -20
Flexion Extension
Knee
-95 0
Flexion Extension
130 -30
Hip
Abduction Adduction
-20 20
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Internal External
Rotation Rotation
5 -5
Flexion Extension
0 0
Torso
0 0
CCW CW
0 0
Flexion Extension
115 -10
Shoulder
Abduction Adduction
-110 0
Interior Exterior
Transverse Transverse
Addt’l Rotation Rotation
Shoulder
0 120
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Lateral Medial
-25 60
Flexion Extension
Elbow
120 0
Extension Flexion
-60 50
Abduction Adduction
(Radial (Ulnar
Deviation) Deviation)
Wrist
25 -25
Supination Pronation
-80 80
Whole body surface areas were computed by using a simple linear regression equation developed
by Gehan and George (1970), as applied to the NASA dataset. Anthropometric data within the
NASA dataset is for an age truncated subset of participants from the 1988 Anthropometric
Survey of the U.S. Army (ANSUR) projected forward to the year 2015. This database is
considered the most representative dataset for the American astronaut population.
Data for all members of the NASA dataset (both male and female) was entered into the equations
to calculate whole-body surface areas. From the resulting values, mean and standard deviation
for each gender were used to calculate the 1st percentile female and 99th percentile male whole-
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body surface area values. The 1st percentile value represents the minimum and the 99th
percentile value represents the maximum in Table F.4.1, Body Surface Area of a Crewmember.
F.4.2 References
Gehan, E.A., & George, S.L. (1970). Estimation of human body surface area from height and
weight. Cancer Chemotherapy Reports, 54, 225-235.
The anatomical axis system is based on skeletal landmarks and provides a consistent reference
for the principal axes system and the center of volume/mass independent of body-segment
orientation as described in McConville et al. (1980) and Young et al. (1983). The principal axis
of inertia originates at the center of volume/mass.
Regression equations from McConville et al. (1980) and Young et al. (1983) were used to
compute the Body-Segment Properties (BSP); however, because the sample sizes in these two
studies were relatively small (31 and 46 subjects, respectively), this document uses data from the
ANSUR database for input into the regression equations.
The regression equations from the McConville et al. (1980) and Young et al. (1983) studies were
used in their most simple form, which uses only the stature and weight of the subject to calculate
the volume and moments of inertia. A Matlab code was written to identify all females with a
small stature (based on the female data only) and all males with a large stature (based on the
male data only) in the ANSUR database; from this extracted data, the lightest female and
heaviest male were identified. These values were then used in the regression equations to
compute the BSP. McConville and Young did not generate regression equations to predict all
BSP presented in this report; however, presented below is a description and reasoning (based on
the available data) of how each BSP presented here was generated.
For tables Whole-Body Mass of Crewmember, Body-Segment Mass Properties for the Male and
Female Crewmember, and Whole-Body Center of Mass Location of the Male and Female
Crewmember, minimum values correspond to a small female in mass, and maximum values
correspond to a large male in mass, respectively. These values are considered to be
representative of those for a small female and a large male crewmember, respectively.
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Regressions equations from the McConville et al. (1980) and Young et al. (1983) studies were
used to compute the whole-body volume. Whole-body mass was calculated by assuming the
density of the human flesh was homogeneous; a density value of 1 g/cm3 was used. With a value
of unity for the density, the mass values are numerically equal to their corresponding volume
values.
Assuming that the human flesh was homogeneous, it can also be assumed that the center of
volume is at the center of mass location. McConville et al. (1980) and Young et al. (1983)
provided ranges for the location of the center of volume for the male and female, respectively, in
each study. Because regression equations were not given for the center of volume, the range
values from the McConville et al. (1980) and Young et al. (1983) studies were used here.
Specific values for the locations of the center of mass with respect to the anatomical axes were
taken from each study to form the range; specifically, the upper range was set by the male upper
range, and the lower range was set by the female lower range.
Moments of inertia regression equations from the McConville et al. (1980) and Young et al.
(1983) studies were used.
Regressions equations from the McConville et al. (1980) and Young et al. (1983) studies were
used to compute the segment volume. Segment mass was calculated by assuming the density of
the human flesh was homogeneous; a density value of 1 g/cm3 was used. With a value of unity
for the density, the mass values are numerically equal to their corresponding volume values.
Regression equations from the McConville et al. (1980) and Young et al. (1983) studies were
used to compute the moments of inertia. The moments of inertia presented are those about the
principal axes Xp, Yp, and Zp.
F.5.6 References
McConville, J.T., Churchill, T.D., Kaleps, I., Cuzzi, J., (1980). Anthropometric relationships of
body and body segment moments of inertia. AFAMRL-TR-80-119, Wright-Patterson Air Force
Base, Ohio.
Young, J.W., Chandler, R.F., Snow, C.C., Robinette, K.M., Zenner, G.F., Lofberg, M.S. (1983).
Anthropometrics and mass distribution characteristics of the adult female. FAA-AM-83-16,
Revised Edition, FAA Civil Aeromedical Institute, Oklahoma City, Oklahoma.
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Min Max
Segment Anatomical Axis
(cm, (in)) (cm, (in))
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Min Max
Segment Anatomical Axis
(cm, (in)) (cm, (in))
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Min Max
Segment Anatomical Axis
(cm, (in)) (cm, (in))
Xa 0.43 (0.17) 0
Min Max
Axis
(kg·m2, (lb∙ft2)) (kg·m2, (lb∙ft2))
Xp 6.59 (156.38) 17.69 (419.79)
Yp 6.12 (145.23) 16.43 (389.89)
Zp 0.73 (17.32) 2.05 (48.65)
NOTE: The axes in the figure above represent the
principal axes.
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Zp 14 (322) 16 (379)
Xp 15 (347) 23 (540)
Zp 21 (500) 35 (826)
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Min Max
Segment Axis (kg·m2x10-3 (kg·m2 x10-3
(lb∙ft2x10- 3)) (lb∙ft2x10- 3))
Yp 5.5 (130) 19 (449)
Zp 13 (318) 29 (696)
Zp 14 (324) 28 (671)
Xp 34 (800) 79 (1,885)
Right thigh minus flap
Yp 33 (785) 82 (1,941)
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Min Max
Segment Axis (kg·m2x10-3 (kg·m2 x10-3
(lb∙ft2x10- 3)) (lb∙ft2x10- 3))
Zp 14 (327) 32 (753)
Xp 34 (798) 75 (1,784)
Zp 13 (317) 31 (729)
Xp 26 (615) 75 (1,790)
Xp 26 (614) 77 (1,826)
Zp 27 (651) 59 (1,401)
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Min Max
Segment Axis (kg·m2x10-3 (kg·m2 x10-3
(lb∙ft2x10- 3)) (lb∙ft2x10- 3))
Zp 27 (649) 57 (1,350)
Xp 11 (262) 40 (939)
Right forearm plus
Yp 11 (257) 39 (935)
hand
Zp 0.7 (16) 2.4 (58)
Xp 11 (260) 37 (887)
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Tables F-6-1 through F-6-5 provide both minimum (operational) and maximum (withstand)
strength capabilities for unsuited, suited unpressurized, and suited pressurized conditions.
Vehicle components and equipment are to be designed to withstand large forces exerted by a
strong crewmember during nominal hardware operation, without breaking or sustaining damage
that would deem the hardware inoperable. Humans may also exert high forces when operating
controls in emergency situations, such as attempting to open a hatch for emergency egress. The
resulting possible damage to equipment could make it impossible to respond safely to the
emergency. To avoid overdesign, a task analysis is performed to identify which interfaces must
tolerate maximum crew loads. This includes identifying critical hardware that may be
inadvertently used as a mobility aid or restraint. Identified crew interfaces must withstand the
value provided in the corresponding “withstand crew loads” column, which provides the
maximum loads that crew can be expected to exert. The data provided in the tables are for
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The design must allow for all crewmembers to perform any of the requested tasks efficiently and
effectively, thus ensuring task and/or mission success. A human-centered design process is to be
used when implementing operational strength limits. Analysis of expected crew operations,
activities, and tasks is to drive the design of human-machine interfaces. The analysis should
evaluate and define activities/tasks in terms of criticality and required postures. Identified crew
interfaces must be actuated and operable at the value provided in the corresponding “Crew
Operational Loads” columns, which provide the maximum load that the weakest crewmember
could be expected to exert. The data provided in the tables are for unsuited, suited-
unpressurized, and suited-pressurized conditions. Data was derived from a collection of journal
articles associated with human strength data.
For this purpose, tasks that involve the possibility of a single failure causing loss of life or
vehicle have a definition of Criticality 1 Operations in the following tables. Tasks involving Loss
of Mission (LOM) alone have a definition of Criticality 2 Operations. The values in the
criticality 1 and 2 columns also include decrement factor(s) to reflect the deconditioning effects
on crewmembers after an extended duration of mission. All other tasks fall into the “Other
Operations” category, and do not have deconditioning or a factor of safety applied over minimal
anticipated crew strength. It is important to note that the designer should be careful not to
implement multiple safety factors. For example, NASA-STD-5017 torque/force margin
requirements (4.10.0) levy an extra safety factor on the applied torque/force to a given
mechanism. Implementing this requirement along with the already built-in safety factor (i.e.,
criticality) in the strength tables results in an overly conservative design.
Data was derived from a collection of journal articles associated with human strength data. In
addition, other references were used, such as the MIL-STD-1472F and the Occupational and
Biomechanics textbook (Chaffin, D. B., Occupation Biomechanics, Second Edition, John Wiley
& Sons, Inc., 1991), to set a standard for very specific strength data such as lifting strength
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Lifting
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13 15 28 75
Arm Up2 Subject moves handle up
(3) (4) (6) (17)
15 22 41 81
Arm Down2 Subject moves handle down
(4) (5) (9) (18)
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Lifting
Standing with feet apart with
a slight bend at the knees and
waist, grasping a handle with
Lifting 25 34 65 860
both hands located directly in
Strength2 (6) (8) (15) (193)
front and pulling upward
using primarily arms and
shoulders, and legs
Elbow
Subject maintains an
324 853
Grasp1,3 eccentric tight hold of an 243 (55) 486 (109)
(73) (192)
object
Subject maintains a
25 34 51 392
Grip1 concentric tight hold of an
(6) (8) (12) (88)
object
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9 11 20 54
Arm Up2 Subject moves handle up
(2) (3) (5) (12)
11 16 29 58
Arm Down2 Subject moves handle down
(3) (4) (7) (13)
7 9 18 38
Arm Out2 Subject moves handle laterally
(2) (2) (4) (9)
Lifting
Standing with feet apart with a
slight bend at the knees and
waist, grasping a handle with
18 25 47 614
Lifting Strength2 both hands located directly in
(4) (6) (11) (138)
front and pulling upward using
primarily arms and shoulders,
and legs
Elbow
Subject moves forearm in a
7 9 18 174
Flexion2, 3 sagittal plane around the
(2) (2) (4) (39)
elbow joint
Subject moves forearm in a
14 18 34 125
Extension2, 3 sagittal plane around the
(3) (4) (8) (28)
elbow joint
Wrist & Hand
Subject bends wrist in a 19 25 37 101
Wrist Flexion2, 3
palmar direction (4) (6) (8) (23)
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Leg
Subject moves leg in
the sagittal plane
58 78 145 323
Hip Flexion2,3 around the hip joint
(13) (18) (33) (73)
toward the front of the
body
Subject moves leg in a
2,3 sagittal plane around 96 127 238 329
Hip Extension
the hip joint toward the (22) (29) (54) (74)
back of the body
Subject pushes a
309 414 1292
Leg Press1,3 weight away from them 776 (175)
(70) (93) (291)
using their legs
Subject moves lower
27 36 69 163
Knee Flexion1,3 leg in a sagittal plane
(6) (8) (16) (37)
around the knee joint
Subject moves lower
71 96 192 392
Knee Extension1 leg in a sagittal plane
(16) (22) (43) (88)
around the knee joint
1. Post space flight maximal measured strength decrement.
2. Post space flight estimated strength decrement. Range is 0%-47%. Average estimated is 33%. Based on CRV Requirements
Document.
3. Suit decrement not measured directly, but estimated based on functional strength testing of other movements
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