5/28/24, 1:49 PM [ G.R. No. L-42408.

September 21, 1984 ]

217 Phil. 93

SECOND DIVISION
[ G.R. No. L-42408. September 21, 1984 ]
ISIDRA P. CADIRAO, ACCOMPANIED BY HER HUSBAND, PABLO
CADIRAO, AND CONSOLACION P. CAMARISTA, ACCOMPANIED BY
HER HUSBAND, RAMON CAMARISTA, PETITIONERS, VS. THE
HONORABLE NUMERIANO G. ESTENZO, JUDGE, COURT OF FIRST
INSTANCE OF ILOILO AND JUANITA M. DIEGO, REPRESENTED BY
HER ATTORNEY-IN-FACT, SALVADOR NICANO, RESPONDENTS.
DECISION

CUEVAS, J.:

Private respondent Juanita M. Diego, represen­ted by her attorney-in-fact Salvador Nicano, filed
before the defunct Court of First Instance of Iloilo-Branch III a complaint (Civil Case No.
10104) against petitioners Isidra P. Cadirao and her husband Pablo Cadirao, together with
Consolacion P. Camarista and the latter's husband, Ramon Camarista "To Quiet Title and
Remove Clouds of Ownership of Real Property with Damages" over a parcel of land situated at
the Pobla­cion of Miag-ao, Iloilo, Philippines, which is more particularly described as follows:

"A parcel of unregistered land, situated in the Poblacion of Miag-ao, Iloilo, known as
Assessor's Lot N 276, bounded on the North by the properties of Gerardo Nemiada,
Hrs. of Julian Frantilla and Eusebio Mueda; on the East by Eusebio Mueda and
Quezon Street; on the South by Hrs. of Jesus Nequino and Lucas Pa­guntalan; and on
the West by Osmeña Street and Ignacio Nasilom, contain­ing an area of about eight
hundred and eighty-nine (889) square meters, more or less. This is assessed for
P360.00 and used for residential pur­poses and declared for tax purposes in the name
of Eusebio Mueda under Tax Declaration NO. 26957."

The complaint among others, alleged that pri­vate respondent is the only child and exclusive
legal heir of the deceased Eusebio Mueda, who died sometime in the year 1973 and as such, is
the soles and exclu­sive owner of the afore-described parcel of land; that private respondent has
been and still is in possession of the same continuously, peacefully, publicly and ad­versely
against the whole world in the concept of legal owner thereof; and that for almost two years
now, petitioners have been surreptitiously and illegally committing acts of intrusion, conversion
and spoilia­tion on the afore-described parcel by means of strategy and stealth, thereby taking
away for their own use, some of the products of the fruit trees thereon and planted later some
banana plants besides putting up a bamboo fence on the boundaries of the said land abut­ting the
streets and extending a portion of their house to a portion of the lot in question.

Answering the complaint, petitioners (then defendants) denied the material averments thereof
and set up by way of special and affirmative defenses that the parcel of land described in the
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complaint is ex­clusively owned by them, having inherited the same from their deceased father
Rafael Paguntalan who died sometime on December 30, 1969; that Rafael Paguntalan was the
real and exclusive owner of the aforementioned parcel of land before and after the second world
war; that the said property was declared in his name in 1945 under Tax Declaration NO. 23404
and land taxes thereon from 1945 to 1948 paid by him as per Official Receipt NO. W522534
issued on May 31, 1950; that on July 19, 1971 and February 27, 1973, land taxes on the said
parcel of land were paid twice for the years 1945 to 1973 as per Official Receipt NOS.
E6937592 and F7037446 in their names; that for the years 1974 to 1975, the above parcel of
land was declared for taxation purposes under a new declaration (Tax Decla­ration NO. 0011054)
and taxes were correspondingly paid thereon in their names as per Official Receipt Nos.
G8562337 and 1630946 dated May 11, 1974 and Feb­ruary 24, 1975 respectively; that the
deceased Rafael Paguntalan had never mortgaged, encumbered or sold the aforementioned
parcel of land; and that the petitioners, not private respondents, have been and are still
exercising ownership and possession conti­nuously, peacefully, publicly and adversely against
the whole world for a long period of time by virtue of the principle of tacking of possession
from their predecessor-in-interest up to the present.

Traversing petitioners' aforementioned special and affirmative defenses, private respondents in

their REPLY alleged –

"That with the exception of those that are deemed admitted in the Com­plaint and this
Reply, the plaintiff denies the material allegations of Paragraphs 5 to 9 of the Special
and Affirmative Defenses in the defendants' Answer, especially with refe­rence to
their claim of ownership of the land in question, because (a) the deceased, Rafael
Paguntalan, during his lifetime recognized the ownership thereof by the deceased
Eusebio Mueda, father of the plaintiff, and due to such recognition Tax Declaration
No. 23404 (in the name of Rafael Pagunta­lan) was cancelled and substituted by Tax
Declaration No. 26957 (in the name of Eusebio Mueda), as evidenced by a copy of a
document, a copy of which is hereto attached to form part of this Reply to Answer, as
Annex "A"; (b) that in recognition Rafael Paguntalan never exercised any act of
ownership over the land in question nor paid the taxes thereof up to the time of his
death which covered a period of more than twenty (20) years; and (c) that it was only
in 1973, or four (4) years after the death of Rafael Paguntalan, when the defendants
started to pay taxes on said land and committed illegal acts thereon as alleged in the
complaint."[1]

The issues having been joined, the case was thereafter set for pre-trial on September 8, 1975,
during which date, the trial court, then presided by the Hon. respondent Judge Numeriano G.
Estenzo, re­quired the parties to submit affidavits of their wit­nesses and their exhibits in order to
enable the court to determine the propriety of rendering a summary judgment or a judgment on
the pleadings.

After the parties had submitted their respec­tive affidavits, exhibits and memorandum in support
of their stand, the trial court rendered a Summary Judgment on September 17, 1975, the
pertinent portion of which reads as follows –

"Section 8, Rule 8 of our Rules of Court, reads as follows:

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'Sec. 8. How to contest genuineness of such documents. - When an action

or defense is founded upon a written instru­ment, copied in or attached to
the corresponding pleading as provided in the preceding sec­tion, the
genuineness and due execution of the instrument shall be deemed
admitted unless the adverse party; under oath, specifically denies them,
and sets forth what he claims to be the facts; but this provision does not
apply when the adverse party does not appear to be a party to the
instrument or when compliance with an order for an inspection of the
original instrument is refused.'

Taking into account the fact that no specific denial and under oath had been made on Annex "A"
to the reply to the said pleading wherein the document was attached so that the same is being ad­‐
mitted.

Considering such admission on Annex "A" to the rejoinder to the ans­wer, the genuineness and
due execution of Annex "A" of reply to the answer is deemed admitted. So that any intrusion of
claim of right of ownership into the land described in Annex "A" to the reply to answer as above
copied will have no leg to stand on.

WHEREFORE, summary judgment is here­by rendered in favor of the plaintiff and against the
defendants declaring the plaintiff as the owner of Asses­sor's Lot No. 276 of Miag-ao, Iloilo
covered by Tax Declaration No. 26957 hereby ordering that clouds of the title of the plaintiff
over the land in question be removed and prevented by declaring that Tax Declaration No.
23404 in the name of Rafael Pagunta­lan over the land in question is dec­lared null and void and
of no force and effect and further ordering the defendants to remove whatever construction they
may have made on the land in question or otherwise have said construction demolished and fin­‐
ally ordering defendants to refrain from further committing acts of in­trusion, conversion and
spoiliation on the land in question with costs against the defendants."

Petitioners, (then defendants) moved to re­consider the Summary Judgment in question

contending that the document referred to as Annex "A" in the judgment, appears to have been
signed by the late Rafael Paguntalan who is not a party to the case and therefore, petitioners who
are not signatories there­to are not bound to make a denial under oath pursuant to the concluding
sentence of Sec. 8, Rule 8 of the Rules of Court.

In an Order dated October 1, 1975, Judge Valerio V. Rovira, in his capacity as Executive Judge,
(respondent Judge Estenzo's temporary assignment to Branch III having expired in the
meantime) set aside the Summary Judgment dated September 17, 1975 and ordered the case to
be tried anew. The pertinent portion of the said Order reads as follows –

"According to the defendants, Annex "A" of plaintiffs' reply is not an actionable

document defined in Sec. 7, Rule 8 of the Rules of Court, on the ground that the
person who alle­gedly executed Annex "A" was Rafael Paguntalan while the
defendants in this case are his children. The mo­vants contend that when the adverse
party does not appear as a party to the instrument, like in the present case, they are
not bound by the note signed by their deceased father even if they do not deny under
oath the genuineness and due execution thereof. (Nery Lim Chiago vs. Terairay, 5
Phil. 120) In Macias vs. Warner Barnes, 43 Phi. 155; Velarde vs. Paez, 101 Phil 376,

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the real parties in in­terest are those, who on the face of the contract, appear to be the
parties thereof.

To the mind of the Court Exh. "A" is not an actionable document but evi­dentiary in nature and,
hence, need not be denied under oath.

The important issue in this case is this: Who is the owner of the land described in paragraph 2 of
the com­plaint? The plaintiff claims that she is the owner thereof, having inherited the same from
her deceased father Eu­sebio Mueda. The defendants, on the other hand, also claim that the land
belongs to them and that they have been possessing the same since the year 1945. In other
words, the fact in is­sue are disputed. There is genuineness of controversy upon the question of
facts. Summary judgment is proper if the facts are clear and undisputed, and there is no genuine
controversy upon any question of fact (Sec. 3, Rule 34, Rules of Court; Gatchalian vs. Paulin,
G.R. NO. L-17619, October 31, 1962; Clemente vs. Pascua, G.R. No. L-25153, October 4,
1968)

The Court finds the motion of the defendants to be tenable."

Private respondent, then plaintiff, moved to reconsider the aforesaid Order but the same was
denied by Executive Judge Rovira in his Order dated November 24, 1975.

On December 3, 1975, private respondent filed a Second Motion for Reconsideration.

On December 8, 1975, Judge Numeriano G. Estenzo whose temporary assignment in Branch III
had been ex­tended, reconsidered the Order dated November 24, 1975, and sustained the
Summary Judgment previously rendered by him on September 17, 1975.

Hence, on December 22, 1975, petitioners filed the instant petition for review on certiorari
before this Court praying for the annulment and setting aside of the challenged Summary
Judgment, contending that the same was allegedly issued with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack of jurisdiction.

In the Resolution of the First Division dated March 22, 1976, the petition was given due course
and treated as a special civil action.

The principal issue which We are called upon to resolve is whether or not the trial court gravely
abused its discretion in disposing the case by Sum­mary Judgment.

Rule 34 of the Rules of Court authorizes the rendition of a summary judgment when on motion
of the plaintiff, after the answer to the complaint had been filed, it would appear at the hearing
for such a judgment, from the pleadings, depositions and admissions on file, together with the
affidavits that, except as to the amount of damages, there is no genuine issue as to any material
fact and that the winning party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.[2] Conversely, the
rendition of a summary judgment is not proper when the defending party's pleading tenders vital
issues which calls for the presentation of evidence.[3] As we have earlier held in the case of
Viajar vs. Estenzo, 89 SCRA 684 –

"Relief by summary judgment is intended to expedite or promptly dis­pose of cases

where the facts appear undisputed and certain from the plea­dings, depositions,

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admissions and affidavits. But if there be a doubt as to such facts and there be an
issue or issues of fact joined by the par­ties, neither one of them can pray for a
summary judgment. Where the facts pleaded by the parties are disputed or contested,
proceedings for a sum­mary judgment cannot take the place of a trial.

An examination of the Rules will readily show that a summary judgment is by no means a hasty
one. It as­sumes a scrutiny of facts in a sum­mary hearing after the filing of a motion for summary
judgment by one party supported by affidavits, depositions, admissions or other documents
(Section 3, Rule 34). In spite of its expediting character, relief by summary judgment can only
be allowed after compliance with the minimum requirement of vigilance by the court in a
summary hearing considering that this remedy is in derogation of a party's right to a plenary trial
of his case. At any rate, a party who moves for summary judgment has the burden of
demonstrating clearly the absence of any genuine issue of fact, or that the issue posed in the
com­plaint is so patently unsubstantial as not to constitute a genuine issue for trial, and any doubt
as to the existence of such an issue is resolved against the movant."

The case at bar may not, even by the most liberal or strained interpretation, be considered as one
not involving genuine issues of fact which neces­sitates presentation of evidence to determine
which of the two conflicting assertions of facts is correct. A careful examination of the pleadings
will show that private respondent claims ownership of the land in question having allegedly
inherited the same from her deceased father, Eusebio Mueda. Said claim is contro­verted by the
petitioners who also assert ownership over the same land having allegedly also inherited the
same from their deceased father Rafael Paguntalan, the owner thereof. These diametrically
opposed and con­flicting claims present a factual dispute which can be resolved and settled only
by means of a trial on the merits. The affidavits, documents and memorandum submitted by the
parties all the more show that the facts pleaded are disputed or contested. The issue of
ownership, thus raised by the parties may not be categorized as frivolous and sham so as to
dispense with the presentation of evidence in a formal trial. Reliance by the trial court on
Section 8, Rule 8 of the Rules of Court as its basis for the rendition of the challenged Summary
Judgment is misplaced and with­out legal support. As correctly contended by the petitioners, the
genuineness and due execution of Annex "A" of private respondents' Reply which is alle­gedly
an Acknowledgment of Ownership signed by the late Rafael Paguntalan, petitioners'
predecessor-in­-interest, is not deemed admitted by the failure of the petitioners to deny the same
under oath, they not be­ing parties to the said instrument.

And that is not all. The nullity of the as­sailed Summary Judgment stems not only from the cir­‐
cumstances that such kind of a judgment is not proper under the state of pleadings obtaining in
the instant case, but also from the failure to comply with the procedural guidelines for the
rendition of such a judgment. Contrary to the requirements prescribed by the Rules,[4] no
motion for a summary judgment was filed by private respondent. Consequently, no notice or
hearing for the purpose was ever conducted by the trial court. The trial court merely required the
parties to submit their affidavits and exhibits, together with their respective memoranda, and
without conducting any hearing, although the parties presented opposing claims of ownership
and possession, hastily rendered a Summary Judgment. The trial court was de­cidedly in error in
cursorily issuing the said Judgment.

Anent the propriety of the remedy availed of by the petitioners, suffice it to state, that although
appeal was technically available to them, certiorari still lies since such appeal does not prove to

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be a speedy and adequate remedy.[5] Where the remedy of appeal cannot afford an adequate and
expeditious relief, certiorari can be allowed as a mode of redress to pre­vent irreparable damage
and injury to a party.[6] Certiorari is a more speedy and efficacious remedy of nullifying the
assailed summary judgment there being absolutely no legal basis for its issuance. Moreover, the
records show that private respondent had already moved for the issuance of a writ of execution
and that respondent Judge merely held in abeyance resolution of the same pending resolution by
this Court of the ins­tant petition. Clearly then, even if appeal was avail­able to the petitioners, it
is no longer speedy and adequate.[7]

WHEREFORE, the Summary Judgment and the Order dated December 8, 1975 issued in Civil
Case No. 10104 are hereby SET ASIDE and the Presiding Judge of the sala to whom the
aforementioned case has been assigned is directed to proceed with the trial of the said case and
to render judgment accordingly.

No costs.

SO ORDERED.

Makasiar (Chairman), Aquino, Abad Santos, and Escolin, JJ., concur.

Concepcion, Jr., and Guerrero, JJ., on leave.

[1] Paragraph 2, Reply.

[2] Sec. 3, Rule 34, Rules of Court.

[3] Villanueva vs. National Marketing Corporation, 28 SCRA 729.

[4] Rule 34, Rules of Court.

[5] Dimayacyac vs. CA, 93 SCRA 265 (1979); Zenith Ins. Corp. vs. Purisima, 114 SCRA 63
(1982).

[6] Marcelo vs. de Guzman, 114 SCRA 657 (1982).

[7] Matute vs. CA, 26 SCRA 772 (1969).

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