Leadership Change in Vietnam A Reader, Thayer Consultancy Reader No. 13

Leadership Change
in Vietnam: A
Reader
Carlyle A. Thayer
Thayer Consultancy Reader No. 13

May 27, 2024
Leadership Change in Vietnam 1
Leadership Change in Vietnam: A Reader\

Table of Contents
Introduc)on .................................................................................................................................................. 2
Nguyen Phu Trong Takes Reins in Personnel Selec)on for Next Party Congress .............................................. 2
Is Vietnam Entering Uncharted Waters?......................................................................................................... 4
Vietnam: Nguyen Phu Trong’s Life & Legacy ................................................................................................... 7
Vietnam’s Politburo Issues Direc)ve 24 on Na)onal Security ....................................................................... 11
Does Vietnam View Interna)onal Integra)on a Threat to Na)onal Security? ............................................... 15
Vo Van Thuong’s Resigna)on Will Throw a Spanner into Vietnam’s Leadership Selec)on Process ................ 17
Vo Van Thuong Resigns as Vietnam’s President – 1 ...................................................................................... 19
Who Will be Nguyen Phu Trong’s Successor? ............................................................................................... 25
Personnel Issues Facing Vietnam’s Party Leadership .................................................................................... 27
Vietnam’s President Resigns: Should Investors be Worried?......................................................................... 30
Van Thinh Phat Group and Accountability .................................................................................................... 35
Truong My Lan and the Vietnam Communist Party ...................................................................................... 40
Implica)ons of Leadership Change in Vietnam ............................................................................................. 41
Should Investors Be Concerned By Poli)cal Instability in Vietnam? .............................................................. 42
To Lam Last Man Standing?.......................................................................................................................... 43
Will To Lam Become Vietnam’s Next Party Leader? ...................................................................................... 44
Is Vietnam’s Party Leadership A Three-Horse Race? ..................................................................................... 48
Has the Public Security Sector Assumed Power in Vietnam? ........................................................................ 49
To Lam’s Grab for Power .............................................................................................................................. 51
Vietnam: Perfec)ng the State Apparatus ..................................................................................................... 52
Leadership Upheaval in Vietnam: Implica)ons for Rela)ons with China....................................................... 53

Carlyle A. Thayer Biography ......................................................................................................................... 56
Introduc)on
This is the third Thayer Consultancy Reader on leadership change in Vietnam. It covers the
period from October 2023, when General Secretary Nguyen Phu Trong became head of the
Personnel Sub-CommiIee tasked with veKng candidates for the Central CommiIee to be
elected at the Fourteenth NaMonal Congress of the Communist Party of Vietnam, to late May
2024. The Reader contains twenty-three Background Briefs chronicling the unprecedented
resignaMons of three Politburo members and the process by which their replacements were
selected.
Carlyle A. Thayer
Carlyle A. Thayer, Director
May 27, 2024
Nguyen Phu Trong Takes Reins in Personnel Selec)on for Next Party Congress
It has just been reported that General Secretary Nguyen Phu Trong will be Head of the
Personnel SubcommiIee for the 14th Congress (Tổng bí thư Nguyễn Phú Trọng làm Trưởng
Tiểu ban nhân sự đại hội 14) to be held in early 2026.
Q1. How will Trong's posiMon as Head of the Personal SubcommiIee impact on the poliMcal
and economic context of Vietnam? During the 13th Congress, Trong was also Head of the
Party Congress Personnel CommiIee. He laid down the regulaMons for Tran Quoc Vuong to
succeeded him. Trong was unsuccessful and Vuong had to reMre. Does this have any
implicaMons for poliMcal life within the Party? Will history repeat itself again in the 14th
NaMonal Congress in 2026?
ANSWER: In his posiMon as party General Secretary Nguyen Phu Trong has the responsibility
of nurturing and recommending his successor. In his capacity as head of the Personnel
CommiIee Trong will lead the commiIee in determining the size of the new Central
CommiIee (how many full members and alternate members), age structure (under 50, under
60, 60 to 65, and special exempMons for those over 65), and composiMon of the next Central
CommiIee in terms of “blocs” or sectors.
The sectors include provincial and local government, cadres holding posiMons in naMonal
government and central agencies, the military, public security and other areas.
Q2. What is the significance of and responsibiliMes of the Head of the Personnel
SubcommiIee? Please explain what the Personnel SubcommiIee of the 14th Congress is and
its significance within the broader context of the congress.
ANSWER: The head of the Personnel CommiIee will lead meeMngs of the CommiIee to assess
whether those nominated for posiMons on the Central CommiIee meet the essenMal
requirements as laid down by party statues and regulaMons and ensure that the pre-
established quotas on sectoral representaMon and age are met.
Once the Personnel CommiIee has met its recommendaMons must be signed off by the
Politburo and then submiIed to the Central CommiIee for its approval. The Central
CommiIee has the final say. Nominees to the next Central CommiIee must receive at least
fiuy percent plus one of votes cast. In November 2020, the Central CommiIee overrode
General Secretary’s nominaMon of Tran Quoc Huong as his successor.
The outgoing Central CommiIee will send its recommendaMons to the delegates to the 14th
naMonal party congress. On the final day of the congress, the delegates will elect the new
Central CommiIee. The new Central CommiIee will then meet and elect the Politburo and
then vote who on the new Politburo will be the party Secretary General.
In sum, the Personnel CommiIee has a pivotal role in shaping the structure and membership
of the new Central CommiIee to be elected at the 14th naMonal party congress in 2026. But
the final say rests with party delegates to the 14th naMonal congress.
Q3. What is the raMonale behind appoinMng General Secretary Nguyen Phu Trong as the Head?
Please analyze the importance of having the General Secretary lead the Personnel
SubcommiIee and how it reflects the party's prioriMes and objecMves.
ANSWER: The party General Secretary is primus inter pares (first of equals) on the Politburo.
Nguyen Phu Trong is finishing his unprecedented third term in office and will very likely reMre
at the 14th naMonal congress. He has devoted his enMre career to party-building and weeding
out corrupt and incompetent officials and holding others accountable for how they carried
out party policy.
Trong wants to bequeath his legacy to the Vietnam Communist Party. His nominaMon to the
posiMon as head of the Personnel CommiIee as well as head of the Documents CommiIee
indicates that he has the support of the majority of the Central CommiIee. Party-building,
anM-corrupMon and opposing negaMve phenomena will remain key prioriMes for the next
generaMon of party officials.
Q4. What determines the votes of delegates to the congress? Is there a campaign among poten6al
candidates for the posi6on of General Secretary during the party congress?
ANSWER: In 2021, 1,857 delegates aGended the 13th Na6onal Congress of the Vietnam
Communist Party. Each delegate was given a list of all candidates approved by the outgoing Central
CommiGee for elec6on to the new or 14th Central CommiGee. This list was annotated with the
details of what posi6on the candidate would serve if elected.
There is no ac6ve campaigning by individuals at the Congress and delegates cannot nominate any
new candidates to the approved list. The ballot is secret. There were reports that due to COVID
restric6ons vo6ng was electronic at the last conference.
There is likely to be informal discussion among delegates at the Congress. For example, delegates
from the same province might discuss their views.
The delegates first vote on elec6ng candidates to the new Central CommiGee. Only those
candidates who receive fiWy percent plus one of the votes are elected.
AWer the new Central CommiGee is elected, it holds its first plenary session on the last day of the
Congress to elect the new Politburo. They then vote on which Politburo member will be the
General Secretary. At the last congress, the outgoing Central CommiGee set the desired number
of Politburo members at 19. Only 18 =were elected.
5. How might the internal elec6on within the party congress, if it exists, shape Vietnamese
poli6cs?
ANSWER: Delegates to the na6onal congress have only a marginal impact on the composi6on of
the new leadership. They are given a choice of candidates that is greater than the number required
to serve on the Central CommiGee. The end result varies only marginally from quotas set for
gender, age, and sectoral blocks for the new Central CommiGee.
The most important outcome of vo6ng at the na6onal party congress is con6nuity in genera6onal
change as incumbents who are over 65 years and have not been given an exemp6on are re6red.
The pool of candidates for the “four pillars” of the leadership – party general secretary, prime
minister, state president and chairman of the Na6onal Assembly – must have served one five-year
term on the Politburo to be qualified. The new Central CommiGee votes on who will be a Politburo
member and who will be the party General Secretary.
It is the new Politburo that will determine who will be nominated to the Na6onal Assembly for its
approval as state President, Prime Minister and Chairman of the Na6onal Assembly.
Thayer Consultancy Background Brief, October 18, 2023.
hIps://www.scribd.com/document/678782969/Thayer-Nguyen-Phu-Trong-Takes-Reins-in-
Personnel-SelecMon-for-Next-Party-Congress.
Is Vietnam Entering Uncharted Waters?

This month Communist Party of Vietnam (CPV)’s General Secretary Nguyen Phu Trong failed
to make an appearance during the recent visits of the Lao prime minister and Indonesian
president. This gave rise to intense speculaMon in the Western media that Trong is seriously ill
and is being treated in hospital.
While Trong subsequently appeared at a NaMonal Assembly meeMng on January 15, in
apparent good health, his prolonged absence raised the quesMon of what Vietnam might do
in the event of his incapacitaMon before the end of his term as party leader. Trong’s absence
gave rise to three plausible scenarios: (1) Trong is unable to resume full-Mme official duMes
due to health reasons; (2) Trong is physically incapacitated and unable to carry out any official
duMes; and (3) Trong passes away. Who would assume the responsibiliMes of party leader
under each scenario?
Trong is currently serving his third five-year term as party leader. His term will expire in early
2026 when the CPV’s 14th NaMonal Congress is expected to be held. One of the duMes of the
party general secretary is to recommend his successor subject to the approval of the Central
CommiIee. Last year, Trong was appointed head of the Personnel CommiIee to vet nominees
for the Central CommiIee and other high-level party posts to be elected in 2026.
The next general secretary must first be elected to the new Central CommiIee by delegates
to the 14th NaMonal Congress. The new Central CommiIee will then elect the new Politburo
and among its members the next general secretary.
Scenario One: If Trong were at any point unable to resume full-Mme official duMes due to
health reasons, but was able to consult occasionally, the Politburo could decide to maintain
the status quo and let Trong serve out the remainder of his term. This opMon would follow the
precedent set when state President Tran Dai Quang fell ill and was retained in office unMl his
death.
Scenario Two: If Trong were to be incapacitated and unable to resume official duMes, the
Politburo would have to nominate a successor for approval by the Central CommiIee. Trong’s
successor could be a caretaker (or to use a cricket term “night watchman”) who would serve
out the remaining term of office but not seek elecMon for a full five-year term.
Scenario Three: If Trong should pass away while in office, the Politburo would have to
immediately nominate a successor subject to approval by the Central CommiIee. There is
only one precedent in Vietnam’s post-reunificaMon period. In 1986, when party leader Le
Duan died in office, he was replaced by the chairman of the Council of State who served unMl
the 6th NaMonal Congress in December 1986. The Council of State has since been replaced by
the office of state president.
The Central CommiIee would have to decide whether or not to accelerate the two-year
transiMon process by selecMng a member of the Politburo to serve out the remaining period
of Trong’s term and then stand for elecMon as general secretary at the 14th NaMonal Congress
for a full five-year term.
Who will next lead the CPV?
The nominee for party general secretary must have served one full five-year term on the
Politburo.
The VCP’s 13th NaMonal Congress originally elected a Politburo of 18 members. Two members,
Nguyen Xuan Phuc and Pham Binh Minh, have since resigned. Trong’s health likely rules him
out, reducing the pool of possible candidates for the next party general secretary to 15.
If the CPV follows its regulaMons on compulsory reMrement at age 65 (those born before 1961)
only four of the remaining 15 members are qualified: Tran Tuan Anh (62 years of age in 2026),
Tran Thanh Man (64 years of age), Dinh Tien Dung and Tran Cam Tu (both 65 years of age).
Three other criteria need to be taken into account: seniority and party rank, age, and region
of birth.
On seniority, of the pool of 15 possible candidates, four were elected to the Politburo at the
12th NaMonal Congress in 2016; all the rest were elected at the 13th NaMonal Congress in
2021. Politburo members are currently ranked according to the votes received when they
were elected in this order: Pham Minh Chinh (second), Vuong Dinh Hue (third), Vo Van Thuong
(fourth), and Truong Thi Mai (11th).
Three of the four possible candidates will be aged sixty-eight or older in 2026: Pham Minh
Chinh (68), Truong Thi Mai (68), and Vuong Dinh Hue (69). The one excepMon is Vo Van
Thuong, who will be 56 years old in 2026. Party regulaMons, however, permit exempMons to
the reMrement age for “excepMonal” candidates.
The party’s general secretary usually hails from a northern province but that is not a statutory
requirement. Pham Minh Chinh (Thanh Hoa) and Vuong Dinh Hue (Nghe An province) are
from the north, Truong Thi Mai (Quang Binh province) is from the centre, and Vo Van Thuong
(Vinh Long province) is from the south.
Looking Into the Crystal Ball
There is ongoing discussion within CPV circles about raising the mandatory reMrement age of
65 by two or three years. If this were promulgated it would expand the number of incumbent
Politburo members eligible to stand for elecMon as party general secretary from five to six (if
raised by two years) to 10 (if raised by three years).
There are potenMally six likely candidates to replace General Secretary Trong under scenarios
two and three discussed above.
Scenario 2: Three senior members of the Politburo could serve as caretakers: Pham Minh
Chinh, Vuong Dinh Hue, and Truong Thi Mai.
Pham Minh Chinh is the most senior member of the Politburo auer Trong.
Vuong Dinh Hue appears the most qualified as two previous party leaders, Nong Duc Manh
and Nguyen Phu Trong, served as chairman of the NaMonal Assembly before taking on the
duMes as party leader. Hue scored well in the NaMonal Assembly’s 2023 vote of confidence
coming second with the most votes of high confidence.
AppoinMng Chinh or Hue could be disrupMve given that they are respecMvely the prime
minister and chairman of the NaMonal Assembly Standing CommiIee.
Truong Thi Mai is frequently menMoned as a likely candidate for the party’s leadership. She is
currently the Permanent Member of the Secretariat and head of the CPV’s Central
OrganizaMon Commission.
Chinh, Hue, and Mai will be over the 65 reMrement age by early 2026 and would need an
exempMon for excepMonal performance to conMnue in office for a full five-year term.
Scenario 3: There are potenMally three other candidates to replace Trong should he die
in office: Minister of Public Security To Lam, Gen. Phan Van Giang, the Minister of NaMonal
Defense, and State President Vo Van Thuong. Lam and Giang would need exempMons to serve
beyond their role as caretaker.
Lam is reputed to be a strong supporter of Trong’s anM-corrupMon campaign. He performed
poorly in the NaMonal Assembly’s 2023 vote of confidence. While Lam received 329 votes of
high confidence, well behind Giang, Hue, and Chinh, he received a solid 109 votes of
confidence. Lam has his detractors, however, as he received 43 votes of low confidence (or
36th place out of 44).
Giang topped the NaMonal Assembly’s 2023 vote of confidence with 448 high confidence votes
and only four low confidence votes. Giang is also a likely candidate for state president if
Thuong, the current incumbent, should be elected general secretary. Giang would be
following in the footsteps of Le Duc Anh, a former Minister of NaMonal Defense who later
served as president.
President Thuong is the youngest member of the Politburo. He was born in 1970 and will be
56 in 2026, raising the possibility that he could serve two full five-year terms as party general
secretary. Thuong would provide stability to the Politburo, though his youth, southern origins,
and relaMve inexperience are ouen cited as drawbacks.
Crisis and Power Struggle?
As noted above, the CPV’s general secretary has the responsibility for grooming and
recommending his successor. Ordinarily one or more straw polls would be conducted by the
Central CommiIee prior to the next naMonal party congress. These polls would determine the
final candidate list for selecMon to the new Central CommiIee, including the next party
leader.
If General Secretary Trong becomes incapacitated or dies in office at any Mme before the end
of his current term, this would compress the two-year leadership planning cycle for the 14th
NaMonal Congress set for early 2026.
Leadership selecMon for a future naMonal congress is usually a process of give and take
between the party and government wings of the naMonal leadership. Each wing has its own
personality-centred cliques or facMons.
A compressed decision-making cycle is likely to put stress on Vietnam’s consensual style of
decision-making and intensify compeMMon between the party and government wings because
of the absence of a paramount leader. General Secretary Trong’s network of supporters in the
party wing would want to move quickly to see that their interests and expectaMons are not
overridden. Party officials who are members of the government wing will want to take this
unexpected opportunity to advance their interests.
While Trong's absence threatened to push Vietnam into uncharted poliMcal waters, the
country is unlikely to experience a poliMcal crisis or a power struggle because the prevailing
poliMcal culture affecMng leadership selecMon and generaMonal transiMon favors stability and
sectoral balance.
Thayer Consultancy Background Brief, January 14, 2024.
https://www.scribd.com/document/702850095/Thayer-Is-Vietnam-Entering-Uncharted-
Waters.
Vietnam: Nguyen Phu Trong’s Life & Legacy

Q1. Compared to his predecessors (General Secretaries and Presidents), how do you rate
Nguyen Phu Trong? How formaMve was his influence on the Communist Party of Vietnam and
the country?
ANSWER: Le Duan served as First Secretary/Secretary General of the Vietnam Communist
Party from 1960 to 1986. Since 1986, Vietnam has had six secretary generals only two of
whom have served two 5-year terms. Le Duan was replaced by Truong Chinh who served as
caretaker from July to December 1986.
Nguyen Van Linh was elected secretary general at the sixth naMonal party congress and made
an indelible impression on state and society by his introducMon of doi moi or renovaMon. He
abolished Vietnam’s Soviet-styled central planning system, introduced market forces into the
economy and welcomed foreign investment. He also presided over Vietnam’s military
withdrawal from Cambodia in 1989. But the collapse of socialism in the Eastern Union that
year led Vietnam to adopt a more cauMous approach to reform. Linh was replaced by aging
veteran Do Muoi at the 7th naMonal party congress.
Do Muoi served out one 5-year term. He was likened to a “Confucian referee” who had to
mediate compeMng party facMons. The 8th naMonal party congress in 1996 could not reach
consensus on who should replace him so Do Muoi was re-elected on the understanding he
would step down before mid-term.
In December 1997, Le Kha Phieu replaced Do Muoi at a meeMng of the party Central
CommiIee. Phieu was the former head of the General PoliMcal Department of the Vietnam
People’s Army whose term in office was lack lustre. He was jeKsoned at the 10th naMonal
party congress in 2001.
Nong Duc Manh, an ethnic Tay, was the first post-Vietnam War secretary general to serve two
5-year terms. He was the first party leader with a university degree. He became party
secretary general auer nine years in the NaMonal Assembly where, as chairman, he honed his
skills at poliMcal brokerage.
Manh made a major contribuMon to poliMcal and administraMve reform in Vietnam. His major
accomplishment was to transform Vietnam into a “law governed state”. Under Manh’s
stewardship, the party set Vietnam’s overall socio-economic goals while the NaMonal
Assembly approved legislaMon to achieve these ends.
Manh let Prime Minister Phan Van Khai run the government with a Cabinet where ministerial
responsibility eclipsed collecMve leadership. Khai iniMated the long-term strategy of making
Vietnam a modern and industrialized state.
Manh, meanwhile, took the first steps to try to reign in corrupMon auer the major Nam Cam
scandal in Ho Chi Minh City where municipal government was subverted by Vietnam’s
equivalent of the mafia.
Nguyen Phu Trong, also holds a PhD and is now compleMng his second term as party leader.
His major contribuMon has been to reign in the sprawling complex of state-owned
corporaMons, general corporaMons and state banks that flourished as a result of high GDP
growth rates and to aggressively prosecute corrupt officials and their network. Trong will long
be remembered for his anM-corrupMon campaign [burning or blazing furnace/đốt lò] which
neIed party officials at all levels including the Politburo and heretofore sacrosanct ministries
such as public security and naMonal defence.
In addiMon, Trong’s program to select and groom “strategic candidates,” and define in party
regulaMons selecMon criteria for higher office, is a major contribuMon to party-building.
Six of Vietnam’s seven state presidents have served from five to nine years in office during the
period from 1981 to the present. Tran Dai Quang served only two before passing away.
Nguyen Phu Trong assumed the concurrent post of state president upon the death of
incumbent Tran Dai Quang in October 2018. He has only been in office for eighteen months
and for two-thirds of this Mme was either ill or recovering from serious illness. Trong made no
discernible impact on Vietnam’s state and society in his posiMon as state president other than
ensure conMnuity in leadership unMl the 13th naMonal party congress scheduled for January
2021.
A comparison of his contribuMons with his presidenMal predecessors is inappropriate.
Q2. The stages of his career point to a straigh„orward rise within the party. Is this percepMon
correct?
ANSWER: Absolutely. Nguyen Phu Trong became party secretary general as a specialist in
ideology as a result of a long career within the party apparatus topped by five years as
Chairman of the NaMonal Assembly (2006-2011).
Auer being admiIed to the party in 1968, Trong worked for the party’s journal, Hoc Tap
(Studies), later renamed Tap Chi Cong San (Communist Review) where he started in the Party-
Building Department. He aIended the Nguyen Ai Quoc Party School as a post-graduate for
three years, (1973-76), auer which he was appointed editor of the Communist Review’s Party-
Building Department.
From 1981-83, auer studying Russian, he completed his PhD on party-building at the Soviet
Academy of Social Sciences in Moscow. On return to Vietnam he re-joined the Communist
Review’s Party-Building Department and rose up the ranks over thirteen years to become a
member of the Editorial Board, deputy editor, and editor-in-chief (1983-1996). In 1994 he was
elected to the party’s Central CommiIee.
Trong then gained pracMcal experience as deputy secretary of the Hanoi party commiIee
(1996-98) and member of the Politburo (1997). From 1998-2000, Trong headed the Central
CommiIee’s Ideology-Culture and Science-EducaMonal Affairs Commission.
Q3a. What does Nguyen Phu Trong stand for poliMcally? He is ouen described as conservaMve,
China-friendly, strongly Leninist, as someone who has subjected the party to strict control -
correct?.
ANSWER: Trong is the archetypical “true believer” or strict adherent to the Vietnamese tenets
of Marxism-Leninism and the Thoughts of Ho Chi Minh. He is also a party apparatchik par
excellence. He believes in one-party rule by the Vietnam Communist Party comprised of men
and women of high ethnics, talent, experience superior educaMon and training and self-
discipline.
Trong is a pragmaMst when it comes to relaMons with China. As an ideologue and party
apparatchik he values relaMons between the Vietnam Communist Party and the Communist
Party of China because they provide a special conduit for bilateral relaMons,
Q3b. in domesMc policy
ANSWER: In terms of socio-economic policy, Trong appears to occupy the middle of the
spectrum in terms of balancing the role of state-owned enterprises (SOEs) and encouraging
the growth of the private sector. Trong wants SOEs to be efficient and corrupMon free. Trong’s
anM-corrupMon campaign was aimed in part at ending the free-wheeling behaviour of SOEs
under the prime ministership of Nguyen Tan Dung.
Generally, like relaMonship between his predecessor Nong Duc Manh and Prime Minister Phan
Van Khai, Trong lets Prime Minister Nguyen Xuan Phuc take the lead.
Q3c. in foreign policy
ANSWER: Trong accepts the long-standing framework of Vietnam’s foreign policy of
“diversifying and mulMlateralising” its foreign relaMons through a network of strategic and
comprehensive partnerships.
In this area, Trong has given Foreign Minister Pham Binh Minh leeway to conduct foreign
policy. Trong also accepts that naMonal interest (lợi ích dân tộc), rather than socialist ideology,
should guide foreign policy, a momentous change made in Vietnam in the 1990s [Trong
popularised the term bamboo diplomacy/ngoại giao cây tre].
Q4. Nguyen Phu Trong was the first and only one to combine the office of President and
Secretary General into one person. He has also promoted an anM-corrupMon campaign. There
seem to be certain parallels to China's Xi Jinping. Rightly so?
ANSWER: The parallels between Xi Jin-ping and Nguyen Phu Trong are superficial. While they
hold the same posiMons, Xi is virtually “president for life” and “the General Secretary of
everything.” Xi is also “the core of the Communist Party of China.”
Trong, in contrast, is limited to two-terms as party Secretary General (and theoreMcally two
terms as state president). He was only given a second term as party leader because he was
given an exempMon from the reMrement age of 65 years. The exempMon is given to
“excepMonal” individuals, invariable the party Secretary General.
Trong was made concurrent state president due to the sudden death of Tran Dai Quang. It was
easier to combine the two posts than reshuffle the party leadership hierarchy at the top level.
Trong did not seek to combine these two offices to enhance his personal power.
Vietnam’s one-party system is sMll a collecMve leadership in which the Secretary General is
primus inter pares. Given his advanced age and health Trong will reMre from both posts at the
13th naMonal party congress [Trong was re-elected for a third term- Carl Thayer].
Q5. How is Nguyen Phu Trong seen by the populaMon?
ANSWER: The general populaMon views Trong as an avuncular Uncle-type figure. His anM-
corrupMon campaign is genuinely popular.
Trong appears modest, low-key and respec„ul at public meeMngs. The Vietnamese public is
genuinely proud of the way its leaders have managed the coronavirus pandemic. While other
figures, such as Vu Duc Dam and Nguyen Xuan Phuc, have had a high profile, Trong is a
beneficiary of public opinion.
Q6. What is Nguyen Phu Trong's greatest success?
ANSWER: Trong’s greatest success is his ability to manipulate party direcMves, resoluMons and
rules to prevent Nguyen Tan Dung from making the unprecedented switch from prime
minister to party secretary general at the 12th naMonal party congress. Dung was snookered
from allowing his name to be put forward for consideraMon by party delegates to the 12th
congress.
Prior to the congress, the office of the prime minister, arguably, had become more powerful
than the Vietnam Communist Party. Auer the congress, the party reasserted its control over
the government.
Q7. What is Nguyen Phu Tong's greatest failure?
ANSWER: Trong’s greatest failure was to allow the 19-member Politburo elected in 2016 to
atrophy through death and illness and thus lead to a criMcal shortage of eligible candidates for
selecMon to the top four leadership posiMon at the 13th naMonal party congress.
Q8. What role can/will he play auer the 13th NaMonal Congress?
ANSWER: ReMred high-level officials, like the party Secretary General, serve as advisers to the
Politburo. But Vietnamese poliMcal pracMces dictate that Trong will not be able to wield any
behind-the-scenes influence on party decision-making.
Q9. If you would have to describe Nguyen Phu Trong in one sentence. What would that
sentence be?
ANSWER: Secretary General Nguyen Phu Trong is a Leninist ideologue devoted to ensuring
that the Vietnam Communist Party retains its legiMmacy to govern on the basis of high moral
standards and administraMve efficiency.
Thayer Consultancy Background Brief, June 18, 2020. Released January 12, 2024.
https://www.scribd.com/document/702849514/Thayer-Vietnam-Nguyen-Phu-Trong-s-Life-
Legacy-Copy.
Vietnam’s Politburo Issues Direc)ve 24 on Na)onal Security

On 13 July 2023, the Politburo of the Communist Party of Vietnam (CPV) issued Directive No.
24 “On Ensuring National Security in the Context of Comprehensive and Deep International
Integration.” Although the text of this Directive has not be made public officially, a copy is
being privately circulated by the 88 Project. Analysts who have read Directive 24 are divided
on whether this document signals a new wave of repression against civil society activists in
Vietnam or whether this document is just a statement of long-standing policy.
This Background Brief will examine four set of issues: the Mming of this DirecMve, provisions
of concern in Vietnam’s recent free trade agreements (FTA), the threats to naMonal security,
and the acMons that party and government officials and agencies are directed to carry out.
Timing of Directive 24
Directive 24 was issued in July 2023 after President Joe Biden and CPV General Secretary
Nguyen Phu Trong had spoken over the telephone on 29 March, and subsequent discussions
on 29 June between Jake Sullivan, National Security Advisor, and Le Hoai Trung, Head of the
CPV External Relations Committee, that led to raising bilateral relations to a comprehensive
strategic partnership by skipping the intermediate stage of a strategic partnership. This
momentous decision was also made in tandem to elevate relations with South Korea, Japan
and Australia to comprehensive strategic partners.
What factors led Vietnam to raise its bilateral relations with four advanced economies at the
same time?
In January 2021, the 13th CPV National Congress set the following goal:
• By 2030, also the Centenary of the founding of the Party, Viet Nam will become a developed
country with modern industry and join the upper-middle income group.
• By 2045, also the Centenary of the nation's founding, Viet Nam will become a developed and
a high-income country.
In 2023, Vietnam reached the mid-term between its five yearly national congresses. At that
time China’s economy was in the doldrums due to a variety of factors including a prolonged
lockdown during the COVID-19 pandemic. During the pandemic China closed its border with
Vietnam severely curtailing Vietnam’s exports to China. The global economy was also slowing.
Vietnam’s leaders came to the conclusion that a breakthrough in relations with the U.S. and
other advanced economies was necessary in order to achieve the 13th Congress goals by
transforming Vietnam’s economy through technological innovation.
In order to take this step, Vietnam needed to revise its long-standing policy classifying major
powers as partners of cooperation (đối tác) if they supported Vietnam’s national interests,
and partners of struggle (đối tượng) if they opposed or harmed Vietnam’s national interests.
This classification was not a binary but a dialectical concept of struggling in order to promote
cooperation (vừa hợp tác, vừa đấu tranh).
After a prolonged discussion the CPV decided to relax the rigidity with which this policy had
been applied in relations with the United States thus clearing the way for the unprecedented
elevation of bilateral relations to a comprehensive strategic partnership.
Provisions of Concern in Vietnam’s FTA
Directive 24 notes at the onset that “comprehensive and deep international integration and
implementation of trade agreements has created new difficulties and challenges for national
security.” This section provides an overview of these “sensitive areas.”
Vietnam’s decision to elevate relations with the United States and other major economies
raised concerns and even opposition within the CPV based on Vietnam’s experience in
negotiating FTAs over the last decade. For example, during the Obama Administration
Vietnam participated in negotiations for a Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP). Vietnam agreed to
accept a provision on labour rights allowing workers to join independent unions. Reportedly,
Vietnam signed a separate agreement on human rights. The TPP was a non-starter when
newly elected President Donald Trump abruptly withdrew the United States from the TPP.
The TPP took on new life as the Comprehensive and Progressive Trans-Pacific Partnership
(CPTPP). It came into force in December 2018 and Vietnam acceded to it in January 2019. The
CPTPP’s Labour Chapter contained provisions requiring compliance with the International
Labour Organisation’s (ILO) standards including: freedom of association, collective bargaining,
elimination of compulsory labour and child labour, and prohibition of goods made by forced
labour. The Labour Chapter also contained provisions for a minimum wage for workers, hours
of work, occupation health and safety, and anti-discrimination. Finally, the Labour Chapter
required that laws at the national level incorporate the ILO Declaration on Fundamental
Principles and Rights at Work (1988, amended 2022), prohibit weakening the protection of
labour laws or other infringements, and effective enforcement of labour laws.
Vietnam also became a party of an FTA with the European Union that came into force in
August 2020 after five years of negotiations. along with an Investment Protection Agreement.
The EU-Vietnam FTA incorporated the ILO’s core standards and Vietnam committed to
ratifying relevant international labour conventions and drafting a national Labour Code.
The EU-Vietnam FTA also included a democracy clause, an essential requirement for all EU
bilateral agreements of this nature, that empowered the EU to partially or fully suspend an
agreement unilaterally in case of a breach by the other party.
Vietnam is currently a party to the Biden AdministraMon’s Indo-Pacific Economic Framework
(IPEF) for Prosperity. The U.S. wants workers to receive vocaMonal training and wages that
they and their families can live on and protecMon for migrant workers and opposes goods
made in low-wage sweat shops, forced labour or by material imported from China that uses
Uighur prison labour.
U.S. negoMators would like to see puniMve measures put in the IPEF’s trade pillar similar to
those in the U.S.-Canada-Mexico FTA for countries that violate IPEF agreements.
U.S. negoMators also want IPEF members to agree to seven mulMlateral environmental
agreements covering combaMng illegal fishing and logging, and protecMng endangered species
and wild fauna and flora. The U.S. supports a dispute seIlement mechanism for breaches of
IPEF labour and environmental standards that could lead to penalMes for non-compliance.
DirecMve 24 provides this guidance based on Vietnam’s past experience with FTAs:
Strictly pilot the establishment of several employee organisaGons in businesses; take proacGve
iniGaGves when parGcipaGng in the InternaGonal Labour OrganizaGon’s ConvenGon that
protects freedom of associaGon and the right to organize, ensuring the ongoing leadership of
the Party, leadership of party cells, and government management at all levels. Monitor and
deal with, in a Gmely and strict manner, labour organizaGons that establish or operate in
violaGon of the law. Prevent the establishment of labour organisaGons on the basis of ethnicity
or religion.
What Are the Threats to NaQonal Security?
DirecMve 24 paints an alarmist almost paranoid picture of widespread threats to Vietnam’s
naMonal security arising from internaMonal integraMon and engagement with foreign
governments, aid agencies, enterprises, non-governmental organisaMons and other
unspecified “hosMle forces.” For example, DirecMve 24 warns of the danger of
being caught off guard when parGcipaGng in iniGaGves of great powers; allowing foreign
investors to “hide in the shadows,” take over domesGc markets and businesses and occupy
vital economic sectors, while holding influenGal posiGons in defence and security that
adversely affects our independence, economic autonomy and poliGcal stability, and people
taking advantage of internaGonal insGtuGons and commitments that Vietnam has signed to
mobilise and form opposiGon poliGcal organisaGons that implement “colour revoluGons” and
“street revoluGons”.
These threats are compounded by the failure of Vietnamese party and government officials
to properly monitor and control threats to naMonal security as they develop. For example,
DirecMve 24 asserts that “Security in the economy, finance, currency, foreign investment,
energy, labour… is not firm, there is a latent risk of foreign dependence, manipulaMon, and
seizures of certain ‘sensiMve areas’.”
DirecMve 24 enjoins party and government leaders to strictly implement
security mechanisms, policies and laws, especially in relaGon to internaGonal cooperaGon
programmes and projects, foreign investment, acGviGes of mulGnaGonal corporaGons and
foreign non-governmental organisaGons in Vietnam, associaGons, social funds, chariGes,
religious organisaGons, social enterprises and alliances, as well as the links between these
groups, organisaGons and acGviGes that receive foreign support and aid; cultural acGviGes; the
establishment and operaGon of trade unions; dialogue, negoGaGon, and signing of collecGve
labour agreements; connecGons, especially connecGons formed in the organisaGon of strikes…
Party and government officials are directed to closely monitor and manage party and
government officials involved in internaMonal cooperaMon fields involving “foreigners and
foreign organisaMons” and especially party and government officials and ordinary Vietnamese
ciMzens “that go abroad to do business, cooperate, engage in exchanges, visit, and travel…”
Party and government officials are also directed to
Increase the management of foreign aid, especially for projects related to policymaking and
legislaGve development; do not accept funding for legislaGve development projects that have
complex and sensiGve content; and by all means limit other projects. Closely manage
internaGonal cooperaGon acGviGes; regularly inspect, examine, monitor, promptly detect and
take measures to prevent aVempts to exert influence through economic, cultural, and social
acGviGes that affect naGonal security.
AcQons to be Carried Out
DirecMve 24 asserts that
HosGle and reacGonary forces have thoroughly taken advantage of the internaGonal
integraGon process to increase their sabotage and internal poliGcal transformaGon acGviGes,
impacGng policymaking and legislaGve development, creaGng linkages developing forces,
forming “civil society” alliances and networks, “independent trade unions, … creaGng the
premise for the formaGon of domesGc poliGcal opposiGon groups.
DirecMve 24 then enumerates nine orders that organisaMons and agencies are directed to
carry out “to improve performance and overcome limitaMons and difficulMes associated with
ensuring naMonal security.” These nine orders include:
1. Take measures to prevent, stop and promptly handle complex national security issues.
2. Promote extensive, regular, and continuous propaganda work in the political system,
with officials, party members, and people to raise awareness and promote
responsibility for ensuring national security…
3. Harmonize policies and laws with international commitments and Vietnam’s practices,
create a solid legal basis to prevent and resolve complex national security issues.
4. Strengthen the work of protecting the internal political system and state secrets.
5. Build an independent and self-reliant economy along with proactive positive,
comprehensive, and effective deep international integration…
6. Effectively manage and overcome limitations and inadequacies in cultural activities,
information, media, the press and foreign cultural products, promote the role of the
press and media in fighting populist trends, civil disobedience, wrongful views and
sabotage by hostile forces and efforts to promote hybrid culture that does not
conform to the customs and traditions of the nation. Strictly handle the act of taking
advantage of information communication infrastructure and social networks to
spread false propaganda that sabotages the Party, State, People, and our country’s
socialist regime.
7. Promote the role of the Vietnam Fatherland Front and mass society organizations in
mobilizing people from all classes to actively participate in patriotic movements and
activities that contribute to ensuring national security.
8. Pay attention to building and strengthening people’s security conditions, people’s
security posture, and the All-People’s National Security movement, especially in
residential communities, industrial parks, economic zones, export processing zones,
and areas with a large concentration of workers…
9. Cells and organizations at all levels under the Central Party Committee must
promulgate and disseminate this directive in line with their assigned functions and
tasks, while developing specific plans and programs of actions and regularly evaluating
implementation of the directive.
Conclusion
It is significant that the agreement with the U.S. on a comprehensive strategic partnership was
signed by CPV General Secretary Trong and not the state President Vo Van Thuong. It is also
important to note that the DirecMve 24 was issued by Truong Thi Mai, Permanent Secretary
of the CPV Secretariat. DirecMve 24 is the CPV’s response to party and government officials
who oppose or hold reservaMons about raising Vietnam’s relaMons with the U.S. and other
major economies to comprehensive strategic partnerships. In summary, the authority of the
party General Secretary was invoked to guarantee that raising relaMons with the United States
would not undermine one-party rule and Vietnam’s socialist market economy.
DirecMve 24 clearly spells out the difficulMes of proacMve internaMonal integraMon and the
trade-offs Vietnam must make in order to ensure that this process is successful in order to
meet the 13th Congress goals menMoned above. The DirecMve seeks to reassure party
members that their concerns have been noted and that all necessary steps have been taken
to safeguard Vietnam’s naMonal security if party officials and party members carry out the
nine orders in the DirecMve.
In summary, DirecMve 24 does not signal a new wave of internal repression against civil society
and pro-democracy acMvists so much as business as usual, that is, the conMnuing repression
of these acMvists while at the same Mme acceleraMng Vietnam’s proacMve internaMonal
integraMon. While not menMoned in the DirecMve internaMonal integraMon includes Vietnam’s
enhanced engagement with the U.S., Japan, Australia and South Korea by raising bilateral
relaMons to comprehensive strategic partnerships.
Party members and government officials are called to order to rededicate themselves to
protecMng naMonal security through more efficiently applying tried and true methods of
monitoring, propaganda, and enforcement.
Thayer Consultancy Background Brief, February 28, 2024.
https://www.scribd.com/document/709660092/Thayer-Vietnam-s-Politburo-Issues-
Directive-24-on-National-Security.
Does Vietnam View Interna)onal Integra)on a Threat to Na)onal Security?

We have recently viewed a confidenMal naMonal security policy direcMve from the PoliMcal
Bureau of the Communist Party of Vietnam, known as DirecMve 24. The direcMve outlines
threats to naMonal security arising from internaMonal commerce and cooperaMon.
We request your assessment of the following issues:
Q1. Does DirecMve 4 provide any insights into Vietnam's leaders' mindset regarding the
country's integraMon with the world?
ANSWER: DirecMve 24 reveals that Vietnam’s leaders are deeply obsessed with total control
over all aspects of Vietnam’s “proacMve and acMve integraMon” with the global economy. They
appear to view any economic, poliMcal and social interacMon with foreign countries, enMMes
and persons as holding the potenMal to challenge the legiMmacy of Vietnam’s one-party state
and socialist market economy. Their response is to exert greater monitoring, management
and repression that runs counter to the interests of the Communist Party of Vietnam.
Q2. What are the potenMal consequences of DirecMve 24 on human rights within Vietnam and
the country's image internaMonally?
ANSWER: Human rights cover a broad area including poliMcal and civil rights and freedom of
religion.
DirecMve 24 does not signal a new wave of repression against civil society and pro-democracy
acMvists so much as “business as usual,” that is, conMnued repression against any independent
acMvity by advocacy groups, civil society and pro-democracy acMvists that challenges the
party’s monopoly of power.
DirecMve 24 puts Vietnam at odds with its commitment to labour rights when it joined the
World Trade OrganisaMon in 2007 and through its raMficaMon of the Comprehensive and
Progressive Trans-Pacific Partnership in 2019 and European Union-Vietnam Free Trade
Agreement in 2020. DirecMve 24, when it becomes public, will prove a sMcking point in
Vietnam’s negoMaMons over the Bidens AdministraMon’s Indo-Pacific Economic Framework for
Prosperity.
For example, the InternaMonal Labour OrganisaMon’s Labour Rights bans products made
through forced labour. These right are included in the CPTPP and EU-Vietnam FTA. This year
Vietnam became the main culprit in exporMng products to the United States with material
from Uighur minority forced labour camps in China.
Vietnam’s aIempts to subvert workers’ rights to form independent trade unions and
collecMve bargaining will result in blow back from the U.S. and European states.
Q3. Considering this direcMve and the current situaMon in Vietnam, how does the country
appear today compared to a decade ago?
ANSWER: Ten years ago, Vietnamese leaders sMll feared that peaceful evoluMon or colour
revoluMons were major challenges to the party-state. Currently, Vietnamese leaders hold the
same fears. However, Vietnam today is more open to internaMonal integraMon through free
trade agreements. The United States is no longer considered the “object of struggle” (đối
tượng).
Vietnam’s leaders have always taken steps to protect the leading role of the Communist Party
in Vietnam’s state and society. However, under the tutelage of Nguyen Phu Trong and his
“burning furnace” anM-corrupMon campaign, party control over state and society has
intensified parMcularly by repressing domesMc challenges to the party.
Also, Vietnam today is more open to foreign influence, especially in the auermath of the
COVID-19 pandemic. And Vietnam will come under even greater pressure as free trade
agreements impact on society, the structure of the economy, and economic growth. Vietnam’s
leaders will face difficult challenges reconciling the centrifugal forces that FTAs generate with
the party’s aIempt to maintain comprehensive over society.
Q4. In your assessment, what measures should the internaMonal community consider
taking concerning Vietnam and the members of Vietnam’s PoliMcal Bureau, given the
disclosure of such direcMve?
ANSWER: Foreign Ministries from the EU, the United States, Japan, Australia and other
likeminded countries should instruct their ambassadors in Hanoi to seek an explanation of
Directive 24 from responsible officials.
All of Vietnam’s new comprehensive strategic partners (CSPs) – South Korea, United States,
Japan and Australia (pending) will have to negotiate a multi-year Plan of Action with Vietnam
to execute the partnership. This will provide an opportunity to press Vietnam to comply with
its commitment to implement ILO labour standards.
Vietnam’s new CSPs should raise Directive 24 during high-level exchanges such as summits or
ministerial-level dialogues. Vietnam’s compliance should be regularly reviewed. Vietnam’s
partners should hold back if Vietnam procrastinates or subverts its commitments.
The United States Customs is already seizing Vietnamese exports that includes material from
Uighur forced labour camps in China. The EU-Vietnam FTA includes a democracy clause that
empowers the EU to partially or fully suspend an agreement unilaterally in case of a breach

by the other party.
Q5. We have observed parallels between DirecMve 24 and the Chinese Communist Party's
(CCP) Document No. 9. Could you provide your assessment of this comparison?
ANSWER: Leaving aside the East Sea disputes, Vietnamese leaders have long viewed China as
a partner of cooperaMon (đối tác). China was Vietnam’s first comprehensive strategic partner
but holds a special designaMon not given to any other of Vietnam’s CSPs – China is designated
as strategic and comprehensive cooperaMve partner (Vietnam-China Joint Statement, June 1,
2008).
CCP Document No. 9, Communiqué on the Current State of the Ideological Sphere (July 2012),
contains an elaboraMon of seven subversive currents that threaten party rule in China:
1. Western constitutional democracy
2. Universal values (human rights)
3. Civil society and individual rights
4. Neo-liberalism (economic system)
5. Economic liberalisation, privatisation, and marketisation
6. Western ideas of journalism
7. Historical nihilism
8. Questioning reform and opening and socialism with Chinese characteristics
Document No. 9 was wriIen twelve years ago and is unlikely to have been the direct source
for the CPV Politburo’s DirecMve 24. However, the two documents, Document No. 9 and
DirecMve 24, run parallel in idenMfying similar challenges to one-party rule. They both exhort
party cadres to get their act together to suppress these challenges.
The Chinese Communist Party and the Communist Party of Vietnam regularly hold theoreMcal
seminars. Public Security officials exchange views on external and domesMc threats to one-
party rule. Given the broad convergence of the two communist parMes in promoMng socialism
(albeit each with its own naMonal characterisMcs) it should come as no surprise that they share
and learn from each other’s experiences.
Thayer Consultancy Background Brief, February 29, 2024.
https://www.scribd.com/document/709671544/Thayer-Does-Vietnam-View-International-
Integration-a-Threat-to-National-Security.
Vo Van Thuong’s Resigna)on Will Throw a Spanner into Vietnam’s Leadership

Selec)on Process
We request your assessment of the following report by Reuters that was just released:
Vietnam's parliament is set to meet on Thursday to discuss unspecified "personnel
issues", according to a leIer sent to legislators seen by Reuters, amid speculaMon of a
reshuffle of the Communist-ruled country's top leadership.
MulMple Vietnamese officials and diplomats said the possible resignaMon of the
country's president Vo Van Thuong may be one of the personnel maIers the
parliament will discuss.
Q1. Why might President Thuong be forced out auer only a year in office ?
ANSWER: Vo Van Thuong is being forced to resign as state president for his failure to exercise
proper supervision over province officials in Quang Ngai province during his tenure as
provincial party secretary from 2011-14.. Thuong signed off on a decision to award the Phuc
Son Group responsibility to develop the Tra Phuc South Bank River Road Project.
On 8 March this year, the Ministry of Public Security, auer an invesMgaMon, arrested and
detained provincial officials from Quang Ngai province for receiving bribes during Thuong’s
tenure as provincial party secretaty. Among the officials arrested were Cao Khoa, the former
permanent deputy secretary of Quang Ngai province, Dang Van Minh, former Director of the
Quang Ngai province Department of Traffic and Transport, and Dang Trung Hoanh, a relaMve
of Thuong and a district party official in Vinh Long province.
Thuong’s case closely parallels that of his predecessor Nguyen Xuan Phuc whose wife was
reportedly involved in a COVID-19 related scandal and Pham Binh Minh, Deputy Prime
Minister and former Minister of Foreign Affairs, who also failed to properly supervise senior
officials involved in bribery for return air transport back to Vietnam during the COVID-19
pandemic.
Q2. How significant would a leadership reshuffle be and what are the possible reasons behind
it?
ANSWER: This is an immensely significant leadership reshuffle becomes it involves replacing
one of the four pillars of Vietnam’s leadership (party secretary general, state president, prime
minister, chairman of the NaMonal Assembly) twenty-one months in advance of the 14th
naMonal congress of the Vietnam Communist Party. The Central CommiIee must decide
whether Thuong’s replacement is a caretaker for Thuong’s remaining term in office or whether
Thuong’s replacement will conMnue in office auer the next party congress.
There are likely two candidates vying for the post of president, Minister of Public Security To
Lam and Permanent Member of the Secretariat Truong Thi Mai. Both will be over 65 in 2026.
Vietnam faces a conundrum in selecMng its new leaders in 2026. The original 18-member
Politburo elected in 2021 will be reduced to fourteen if Thuong resigns. Unless an exempMon
is given to the statutory reMrement age of 65, only three incumbents will be qualified for the
four top leadership posiMons – Tran Thanh Man, Dinh Tien Dung and Tran Cam Tu. None
appear to be in the running as the next party leader.
Since Nguyen Phu Trong, now in his unprecedented third term in office, is expected to reMre
in 2026. Thuong, who is the youngest member of the Politburo was was widely viewed as
Trong’s protege. Thuong would have been qualified to serve two five-year terms as party
General Secretary. Now an exempMon on the age requirement will have to be given for Trong’s
successor.
Usually the process of determining the new party leadership takes place commencing from
mid-term between naMonal party congresses. It involves a through veKng of possible
candidates and a series of straw polls to determine who has the support of the majority of
the Central CommiIee.
Thuong’s resignaMon will likely throw a spanner (monkey wrench) into the leadership
selecMon process as potenMal candidates for future leadership posts are forced to show their
hand.
However, it must be noted that the final selecMon of future leaders will be in the hands of
party delegates to the fourteenth naMonal party congress. They will elect the new party
Central CommiIee. The new Central CommiIee will elect the new Politburo and from among
its members the next party General Secretary.
Thayer Consultancy Background Brief, March 18, 2024.
https://www.scribd.com/document/716888133/Thayer-Vo-Van-Thuong-s Resignation-Will-
Throw-a-Spanner-Into-Vietnam-s-Leadership-Selection-Process.
Vo Van Thuong Resigns as Vietnam’s President – 1

The breaking news in Hanoi is that the Vietnam Communist Party Central CommiIee has
agreed on the resignaMon of President Vo Van Thuong just now. Could you provide an
assessment of this controversial development?
ANSWER: Vietnam has just witnessed the resignaMon of two state presidents within two years.
And the eighteen-member Politburo elected in 2021 has been reduced to fourteen. This is
unprecedented and indicates that Vietnam has much work to do to ensure a smooth
leadership transiMon at the next naMonal party congress n early 2026.
According to the official media President Vo Van Thuong violated party regulaMons and his
flaws negaMvely affected public percepMon as well as the Party's reputaMon. Therefore, the
Central CommiIee accepted his resignaMon as president and from all other posiMons in the
government. Social media says Thuong's short comings occurred 12 years ago when he was
party secretary of Quang Ngai province where there was a bribery scandal by officials whom
Thuong supervised. There is no explanaMon that explains the Mming of Thuong's resignaMon
auer such a long Mme.
The party Central CommiIee apparently did not recommend who would replace Thuong. This
means that the Vice President, Vo Thi Anh Xuan, will step up as acMng president. She is not a
member of the Politburo, and it is unlikely she will serve out the remaining term in office of
21 months. Therefore, the Central CommiIee will have to meet again, likely at the regular
session in May, to decide who among the president Politburo will be president
But the maIer doesn't end there. Will the new president serve out the remaining term of
office, which is 21 months, as a care taker? Or will the next president be expected to remain
in office auer 2026 to serve out a full five-year term? Even if the Central CommiIee decides
on this course, it will have to be approved by the delegates to the fourteenth naMonal
congress scheduled to meet in early 2026.
Vietnam needs to clarify and streamline its regulaMons to ensure a swiu and orderly transiMon
in the future. The maIer is pressing because Vietnam has just elevated four countries as
comprehensive strategic partners with the expectaMon that increased trade and investment
would boost Vietnam's development.
hIps://www.scribd.com/document/716889084/Thayer-Vo-Van-Thuong-Resigns-as-Vietnam-
s-President-1.

The Vietnam Communist Party Central Committee has just approved the resignation of
President Vo Van Truong/ We urgently request your analysis of this unexpected event.
Q1. Why was Vo Van Thuong considered as a rising star?
ANSWER: Thuong acquitted himself well after graduation from university in the Ho Chi Minh
Communist Youth Movement and in local government in Ho Chi Minh City. He was quite
popular young people particularly university students.
Q2. What does Thuong’s resignation mean for Congress 26?
ANSWER: There are only three members of the current Politburo who now qualify for
selection to the four pillars of leadership – general secretary, prime minister, state president
and chairman of the National Assembly – at the next national party congress scheduled for
early 2026. Thuong would have been the youngest of four if he had not resigned. Any other
incumbent member of the Politburo would have to be given a special exemption from the
mandatory retirement age of 65 to serve in one of the top for posts.
Q3. How did you react knowing Thuong’s resignation?
ANSWER: The party’s official explanation for Thuong’s resignation did not specify precisely
what party rule he violated or when the violation took place. Also, what explains the timing
of the charges brought against Thuong if social media is correct that the alleged incident took
place twelve years ago.
It appears to me that To Lam, Minister of Public Security, may have moved pre-emptively to
eliminate a possible rival for party leadership before candidates were selected for review by
the Central Committee in advance of the fourteenth national congress scheduled for early
2026. It is possible the health condition of General Secretary Nguyen Phu Trong made have
played a role.
Social media reported that then Nguyen Xuan Phuc resigned last year, To Lam threw his hat
into the ring to replace Phuc. Thuong won the vote.
Q4. What should we anticipate or look forward to next?
ANSWER: The National Assembly today approved Vo Van Thuong’s resignation as president
but as of this writing has not confirmed that Vice President Tran Thi Anh Xuan will be the
acting president under the terms of the state Constitution. Anh Xuan is not expected to serve
out the remaining term of office which ends in May 2026. The party Central Committee is
likely to make a decision at its ninth plenum around May this year.
Vietnam’s poliMcal system will remain stable and party commiIees and sub-commiIees will
conMnue to prepare policy documents and long-term socio-economic development plans for
the next naMonal congress. The personnel sub-commiIee, head by General Secretary Nguyen
Phu Trong will conMnue to vet and approve candidates for the new Central CommiIee to be
elected by delegates to the fourteenth naMonal party congress. There will, of course, be
jostling within the top leadership to see who replaces General Secretary Trong.

s-President-2.
We are preparing a report on the resignaMon of President Vo Van Thuong, the second
Vietnamese President who has fallen from grace in a liIle over a year. As a top expert on
Vietnam and regional affairs, we request your insights on the possible implicaMons of this
development.
Q1. What’s your take of his resignaMon?
ANSWER: While there was plenty of forewarning over the last two weeks that Vo Van Thuong
was likely to resign as state president, the official announcement was a disappointment
because of its lack of specificity. Thuong is accused of violaMng party rules but no specific
details were provided or when the violaMons took place. Social media in Vietnam points to a
bribery scandal that took place under Thuong’s watch when he was party secretary of Quang
Ngai province twelve years ago. That was before General Secretary Nguyen Phu Trong
launched his “burning furnace” anM-corrupMon campaign and before he promulgated his list
of what party members should not do.
The Mming of the charges were described as a “recent”: development. This raises the suspicion
that the Minister of Public Security To Lam may have organised a poliMcal hit against a
potenMal rival for party leaders at the next naMonal congress scheduled for early 2026.
Q2. How will this shocking episode affect Vietnam’s internal poliMcs, and parMcularly the
succession process considering Thuong is considered a protege of Nguyen Phu Trong, who is
widely believed to have health issues?
ANSWER: Thuong’s resignaMon reduces the Politburo from its original 18 members to 14. If
Nguyen Phu Trong, who is aged, ailing and into his unprecedented third term reMres, this
number will be reduced to 13. If present party rules on length of service (no more than two
terms in office and mandatory reMrement at 65) are enforced there will be only 3 candidates
for the four top leadership posiMons – party general secretary, prime minister, president and
chairman of the NaMonal Assembly.
In short, the Central CommiIee with have to give special exempMons for over aged candidates
or alter the party rules prior to the next naMonal party congress.
In October last year the eighth plenum of the Central CommiIee commended formal planning
for the fourteenth naMonal congress scheduled for early 2026. General Secretary Nguyen Phu
Trong took charge of the personnel sub-commiIee that will vet and nominate candidates for
the new Central CommiIee. Ordinarily this process takes place at a measured pace over two
and a half years with straw polls coinducted in the final year prior to the congress.
Filling the post of state president will be a delicate maIer of deciding whether to appoint a
care taker who will reMre at the end of term in May 2026 or appoint a person who will be
expected to be re-elected auer the next party congress. This will precipitate jostling among
the party and government wings for a seat on the Politburo and for a say in who will fill the
top leadership posts known as the”four pillars.“
It is likely that those who supported General Secretary Trong’s anM-corrupMon campaign will
exert strong pressure to preserve his legacy and protect their own posiMons. Those in the
government wing will want to increase their influence and limit the anM-corrupMon campaign
to contemporary violaMons of the law and party regulaMons.
Q3. Will it have any major implicaMons on Vietnam’s foreign policy and its relaMons with major
powers, especially China? Vietnam’s Le Hoai Trung just visited China and met Liu Jianchao on
Mar 18 in Jinlin.
ANSWER: Vietnam’s foreign policy orientaMons to diversify and mulMlateralize external
relaMons and the four no’s defence policy are firmly set in stone and will not alter. What will
change is Vietnam’s engagement with its four new comprehensive strategic partners – South
Korea, United States, Japan and Australia. The key here is economic relaMons, trade and
investment and science and technology innovaMon. China will have to liu its game to retain
influence in Vietnam.
s-President-3.

We request your assessment about the resignaMon of Vietnamese President Vo Van Thuong.
Q1. The ruling Vietnam Communist Party said Thuong resigned due to “violaMons” and
“shortcomings” auer only a year in office. What do you make of that?
ANSWER: It is unclear from the official party announcement precisely what party regulaMons
Vo Van Thuong violated and when these violaMons took place.
Social media commentary strongly suggests the violaMons took place in 2012 when Thuong
was party secretary of Quang Ngai province. Either Thuong failed to properly supervise
subordinate provincial officials under him or he or a family member directly benefited from a
road development scheme that was awarded auer provincial officials were paid bribes.
Thuong has been veIed many Mmes for higher office since his term as Quang Ngai province
party secretary ended in 2014. The quesMon that arises is why has this case surfaced auer
twelve years? This leads to the supposiMon that the Minister of Public Security To Lam is
geKng rid of possible rivals in a bid to stay on in power auer the fourteenth party congress in
early 2026.
Q2. Who do you believe will be picked as the next president?
ANSWER: This is likely to be a two-step process. The NaMonal Assembly is likely to appoint the
current vice president, Tran Thi Anh Xuan as acMng president in the interim. Next, the Central
CommiIee will have to decide who will serve as president for the remaining term of office
that ends in May 2026. There appear to be two likely candidates, To Lam and Truong Thi Mai,
Permanent Member of the Secretariat.
Q3. Thuong is the second president who has been forced to resign within a year in Vietnam.
In your view, how would this reshuffle influence the country’s poliMcal stability?
ANSWER: Last year the eighth Central CommiIee plenum commenced planning for the next
naMonal party congress; this included appoinMng a personnel sub-commiIee headed by
General Secretary Nguyen Phu Trong to vet and nominate candidates for the new Central
CommiIee. Ordinarily this would be a mulM-stage process right up to the eve of the naMonal
congress in which several straw polls would be taken to determine the support that each
prospecMve candidate has. Thuong’s abrupt resignaMon will have the effect of speeding up
this process and exposing differences within the leadership.
Q4. Do you think Vietnam’s deepening poliMcal upheaval will undermine investor confidence?
ANSWER: These events are taking place while an American business mission of approximately
fiuy companies are currently visiMng Vietnam. They will be reassured by their Vietnamese
counterparts that Vietnam will remain on a steady course. Vietnam made an orderly transiMon
auer the death of President Tran Dai Quang and there is no reason why that won’t be able to
do so now.
Q5. Would the leadership changes have an impacts on the country’s strategic orientaMon in
foreign policy, parMcularly its mulM-alignment between the US and China?
ANSWER: No. These policies are set in stone and are the result of collecMve decision-making
by the Central CommiIee and Politburo. Individual personaliMes do not have a decisive
impact. The state president follows the script he is given.
s-President-4.

Q1. What is your assessment of the resignaMon of President Vo Van Thuong and how
damaging is this for General Secretary Nguyen Phu Trong?
ANSWER: Recall that Nguyen Phu Trong was expected to reMre at the thirteenth naMonal
congress in early 2021 and nominated a successor, Tran Quoc Vuong. At a Central CommiIee
meeMng in November 202o Vuong failed to get majority support and dropped out. So Trong
is not the unchallenged strong man in Vietnam’s poliMcal system.
At the eighth plenum of the Central CommiIee in October last year, planning for the next
party congress commenced. General Secretary Nguyen Phu Trong took charge of the
personnel sub-commiIee responsible for veKng and nominaMng candidates for the new
Central CommiIee to be selected at the fourteenth naMonal party congress in early 2026.
Trong experienced some blow back for his heavy-handed or lack of consensual approach.
Trong’s current health problems signal his era as party leader is coming to an end. Those who
have benefiIed from or used his anM-corrupMon campaign are anxious to preserve their
influence for the next 21 months.
Trong’s hand is weakened with the demise of Thuong. If Trong wants to preserve his legacy of
anM-corrupMon and party-building he will now have to horse trade with the various “interests
groups” (Vietnamese term for facMons).
Q2. Were they completely unaware of the scandal in Quang Ngai province, and his possible
links to it, when they appointed him last year?
ANSWER: There is evidence that other provincial officials were well aware of the bribery
scandal but it was such a normal occurrence no one took acMon. Auer Thuong leu Quang Ngai
and moved to higher office, he was veIed at each step of the way. He was almost untouchable
when Trong took him under his wing.
The key here is the Mming of dredging up a scandal that took place 12 years ago. This has the
fingerprints of To Lam and the Ministry of Public Security. Social medias reports that wen
Nguyen Xuan Phuc was forced to resign as state president, To Lam stood against Thuong and
lost the vote.
Q3. In Nguyen Phu Trong showing he is willing even to go auer close allies in his relentless
pursuit of corrupMon?
ANSWER: Trong’s anM-corrupMon campaign evolved to demonstrate that no person or
organisaMon would be leu untouched and in a new fillip that officials would be held
accountable for the acMons of their subordinates and if they recanted first they would be
permiIed to reMre with some dignity. Thus Nguyen Xuan Phuc and Pham Binh Minh fell vicMm.
Q4. Or NPT being outmanoeuvred by rival facMons, using Thuong’s resignaMon to discredit
him?
ANSWER: Trong’s hand was forced when the Ministry of Public Security and the internal party
commiIee with responsibility in this area presented him with evidence that Thuong was
culpable in the bribery scandal. Funds reportedly were given to a family member to be used
for housing/ancestral home.
Vo Van Thuong was widely viewed as Trong’s protege. If party regulaMons on length of service
(one full 5-year term on the Politburo but no more than two terms in a ministerial-level post)
and mandatory age reMrement age of 65, only three members of the present Politburo would
qualify. Vo Van Thuong at 54 is the youngest of this group and at his age he could be elected
party general secretary for two consecuMve terms. Anyone else on the Politburo would need
a special exempMon to the age requirement to serve as party leader but given their present
age that person would only be able to serve one five-year term.
Q5. They really do seem to be struggling with corrupMon. Blazing furnaces are all very well
but if all the public can see is infernos might they conclude that the party is failing to keep
control, rather than being in control and stamping out the fires?
ANSWER: There is no doubt that Vietnam’s one-party state is “ruled by law” rather than
“governed by law” and this contributes to a high incidence of corrupMon. For example,
Transparency InternaMonal’s PercepMons of CorrupMon Index (PCI) for 2022 ranked Vietnam
77th out of 180 states surveyed. Vietnam received a score of 42 on a scale ranging from 0
(highly corrupt) to 100 (very clean).
But – and this is significant – Vietnam’s PCI score rose from 2.7 in 2010 (ranked 127 out of 175
states surveyed) to 31 in 2015 (111/168) at the end of General Secretary Nguyen Phu Trong’s
first term in office, to 36 in 2020 (104/180) at the end of Trong’s second term in office, and to
39 in 2021 (87/180) when Trong was elected for a third term. In sum, Vietnam’s PCI score
jumped just over 39 points during Trong’s tenure as party leader. Vietnam’s score of 42 in 2022
was just below the global average of 43 of 180 countries surveyed.
s-President-5.
Who Will be Nguyen Phu Trong’s Successor?

We request your experMse in responding to the following quesMons:
Q1. Vo Van Thuong was once considered “the morally authoritaMve leader the Communist
party needs to conMnue its anM-corrupMon campaign”, but now he has also stepped down,
most likely because of a corrupMon scandal. May I ask do you think this reflects that the
corrupMon problem is deep rooted in Vietnam, or the power and facMonal struggle in the party
become more serious?
ANSWER: The official announcement of Vo Van Thuong’s resignaMon was issued by the Office
of the Party Central CommiIee (Thông cáo Văn phòng Trung ương Đảng) on 20 March.. This
announcement stated, “recently (vừa qua) according to reports from the Central InspecMon
CommiIee and competent agencies (Ủy ban Kiểm tra Trung ương và các cơ quan chức năng),
he violated RegulaMons on what party members cannot do and the RegulaMons on the
responsibility of seKng an example for officials and the party members, first of all, members
of the Politburo, members of the Secretariat, members of the Party Central CommiItee…”
The announcement concluded, ”Mr Vo Van Thuong’s violaMons and shortcomings have caused
bad public opinion, affecMng the reputaMon of the Party, the State and him personally.”
There has been intense speculaMon in Vietnamese social media that Thuong was implicated
in a bribery scandal related to a road development project that he approved when he was
party secretary of Quang Ngai province in 2012. It is unclear whether Thuong failed to properly
monitor his subordinates or whether Thuong or a family member benefiIed from the bribery
scheme. Regardless which account is accurate what explains the charges brought against him
twelve years later?
The reference to “recently” in the announcement by the Office of the Party Central CommiIee
suggests Thuong commiIed a serious violaMon of party regulaMons within the last two and a
half years. Secretariat RegulaMon No. 37-QD-TW on what party members should not do (Quy
Định V ề những điều đảng viên không được làm) was issued in October 2021.
What account for Thuong’s demise – the anM-corrupMon campaign or party in-fighMng? There
is no quesMon that corrupMon is rife at all levels in Vietnam and that General Secretary Nguyen
Phu Trong has made his “burning furnace” (đốt lò) campaign against corrupMon not only his
highest priority but his legacy to party as he prepares to step down auer an unprecedented
third term in office at age 80. The campaign has been wide-ranging and leu virtually no stone
unturned. Since the last naMonal party congress n 2021, four members of the 18 member
Politburo elected then have been forced to resign for violaMng party regulaMons.
In June 2022, on the tenth anniversary of Trong’s anti-corruption campaign, the Ministry of
Information released the following figures:
• 168,000 CPV members were disciplined and 7,390 “punished for corruption or links
with corruption,” including “170 officials under the Party Central Committee’s
management”
• 16,699 cases of corruption, abuse of position, and economic-related irregularities
were prosecuted. US$2.6 billion worth of ‘corrupt assets’ have been recovered,
including 76,000 hectares of wrongfully appropriated land. US$41.8 billion in fines
have been levied.
At least seventy high-ranking party officials, including five ministers or former ministers, were
disciplined since 2021 alone.
Under General Secretary Trong Vietnam has improved its ranking on Transparency
InternaMonal’s PercepMons of CorrupMon Index (PCI) where scores are tabulated on a scale
from 0 (highly corrupt) to 100 (very clean).
Vietnam’s PCI score rose from a low of 2.7 in 2010 (ranked 127 out of 175 states surveyed) to
31 in 2015 (111/168) at the end of General Secretary Nguyen Phu Trong’s first term in office.
Vietnam’s PCI score rose to 36 in 2020 (104/180) at the end of Trong’s second term in office,
and to 39 in 2021 (87/180) when Trong was elected for a third term. Vietnam’s PCI score rose
to an all-Mme high of 42 in 2022 (77/80) but dropped slightly to 41 (87/180) in 2023.
In sum, Vietnam’s PCI score improved over 38 points during Trong’s tenure as party leader.
But Vietnam ranks just below the global average and sMll has a long way to go.
Prior to Thuong’s resignaMon, there were only four members of the Politburo, including
Thuong himself, who were qualified under exisMng regulaMons to stand for elecMon to
Vietnam’s four top leadership posts at the next party congress in early 2026 – party General
Secretary, prime minister, president and chairman of the NaMonal Assembly. Thuong is the
youngest member of the Politburo was widely Mpped to replace Throng as party leader. Given
his age, Thuong would have been eligible to serve two consecuMve five-years terms before
reaching the mandatory reMrement age of 65.
Now that Thuong is out of the picture, the Central CommiIee will have to grant a special
exempMon from the statutory reMrement age for another member of the Politburo to qualify
for elecMon. The current Minister of Public Security To Lam is most likely to benefit from
Thuong’s demise.
If Thuong commiIed a serious breach of party regulaMons in recent years, then without
quesMon he is a vicMm of General Secretary Trong’s “burning furnace” anM-corrupMon
campaign. However, it Thuong’s demise is related to a twelve-year old bribery case, his is most
likely a vicMm of party-facMonalism.
Q2. As Thuong was seen as an ally and potenMal successor of General Secretary Nguyen Phu
Trong, does Thuong’s resignaMon means that Trong’s power has been weakened?
ANSWER: Party General Secretary Trong is not all-powerful. At the last naMonal party congress
in 2021, he advanced Tran Quoc Vuong as his successor. The Central CommiIee failed to raMfy
Vuong when a coaliMon of provincial representaMves voted against him.
In March, General Secretary Trong successfully removed President Nguyen Xuan Phuc and
Deputy Prime Minister Pham Binh Minh from the Politburo for their failure to supervise
subordinates involved in corrupt pracMces. But when Trong considered taking acMon against
Prime Minster Pham Minh Chinh, whose family members were allegedly implicated in a
COVID-19 related scandal, members of the Politburo pushed back arguing this would be
destabilising.
General Secretary Trong is a “lame duck” leader who is expected to reMre at the 2026 naMonal
party congress. He had a stroke in 2019 and was reportedly seriously ill earlier this year. His
protege, Thuong, is now out of the running.
In sum, Trong, who heads the Personnel Sub-CommiIee to select candidates for elecMon at
the next naMonal congress, cannot dictate who will replace him as party leader. He will have
to bargain and seek consensus among members of the Personnel Sub-CommiIee before
seeking raMficaMon by the Central CommiIee.
Q3. Based on the current situaMon, could you please analyze who will replace Thuong and be
the new potenMal successor of Trong in 2026?
ANSWER: Vietnam’s NaMonal Assembly has already approved Tran Thi Anh Xuan, the current
vice president, as acMng president. Anh Xuan is unlikely to hold this posiMon unMl the end of
the term in May 2026 because she is not a member of the Politburo.
It seems likely that the Central CommiIee will nominate a candidate for state president at its
next execuMve session, the 9th plenum, in May if not sooner. The Central CommiIee must
decide whether it should appoint a caretaker to fill out the term in office and reMre, or pick a
person who is expected to serve on as the next president auer the next party congress. Truong
Thi Mai, Permanent Member of the Secretariat, and Public Security Minister To Lam, are
viewed as the front runners
The Central CommiIee could follow the precedent set when President Tran Dai Quang died
office, that is, appoint someone on the Politburo to hold two post concurrently unMl the end
of term.
Regardless of which scenario is followed the new state president can only serve unMl the
expiraMon of the current term in May 2026.
At present, only three members of the fourteen member Politburo are qualified to stand for
elecMon to one of the four top leadership posts – Tran Thanh Man (deputy chairman of the
NaMonal Assembly), Dinh Tien Dung (secretary of the Hanoi party commiIee) and Tran Cam
Tu (head of the Central InspecMon CommiIee). All three persons will be under 65 years of age
in early 2026.
If it is assumed that Nguyen Phu Trong will reMre, there are ten remaining members of the
Politburo who would need an exempMon for excepMonal service to serve beyond age 65. The
current prime minister, Pham Minh Chinh, chairman of the NaMonal Assembly, Vuong Dinh
Hue, and Permanent Member of the Secretariat, Truong Thi Mai, are the most senior having
served two terms on the Politburo and will be aged 68-69 when the next party congress is
held.
Vuong Dinh Hue would appear to be the most qualified person to replace Trong as party
leader. He would be following in the footsteps of general secretaries Nong Duc Manh and
Nguyen Phu Trong who both served as Chairman of the NaMonal Assembly. Hue scored the
second highest number of votes in the NaMonal Assembly’s 2023 vote of confidence.
hIps://www.scribd.com/document/716894769/Thayer-Who-Will-Be-Nguyen-Phu-Trong-s-
Successor.
Personnel Issues Facing Vietnam’s Party Leadership

When the Vietnam Communist Party selects the next state president behind closed doors, we
will prepare a report on who is most likely to win the presidency. We request your insights
into the following quesMons:
Q1. Who do you think is more likely to replace Vo Van Thuong: To Lam or Truong Thi Mai?
Why?
ANSWER: The person who replaces the current AcMng President of Vietnam, Tran Thi Anh
Xuan, will serve out the remaining term in office that ends in May 2026, that is, four months
auer the fourteenth naMonal party congress scheduled for early 2026.
There is a remote possibility that General Secretary Nguyen Phu Trong could follow the
precedent set when Tran Dai Quang died in office, and serve concurrently as party General
Secretary and state President. Trong’s current health condiMons and physical stamina weigh
heavily against this scenario.
Truong Thi Mai would be “safe as houses” to become the next president. She is an experienced
veteran senior leader who has held a variety of high-level posts in the Vietnam Communist
Party. Recently, Mai stood in for President Thuong to receive the Lao Ambassador, giving rise
to speculaMon in some quarters that she was Mpped to replace Thuong.
As a Permanent Member of the Secretariat and Head of the OrganisaMon CommiIee Mai
would be expected to play a substanMal role in personnel selecMon for the next party congress.
Mai, who is 66 years old, would be a good replacement for Thuong especially if she has no
future leadership aspiraMons. Mai will be 68 when the next naMonal congress is scheduled to
be held. In order to conMnue in office she would need a special exempMon on excepMonal
grounds. Her gender could stand against her.
When Tran Dai Quang died in office there were conflicMng claims about To Lam and his
ambiMons. One account avers that Lam put his hand up and stood against Vo Van Thuong and
lost the vote. The other account states that when Lam was asked to stand for president he
declined. It was speculated that Lam had ambiMons to become party leader and did not want
to give up his influenMal post as Minister of Public Security at that Mme.
It is strongly rumoured that Lam has ambiMons to become party General Secretary. Lam will
be over 68 when the next party congress is scheduled. He too would need a special exempMon.
Mai would seem the best candidate to serve as president unMl May 2026. She is senior to Lam
in party ranking. Both were subject to a party vote of confidence but the results remain
confidenMal.
Lam, as a minister, was also subject to a vote of confidence by depuMes to the NaMonal
Assembly. These results were made public and they reveal that while Lam has substanMal
support among his peers, he also has his detractors. He received 43 votes of low confidence
placing him thirty-sixth out of forty-four officials who were voted on. Lam’s indiscreMon in
eaMng gold plated steak offered to him on a sword while on official business in London in late
2021 may come back to haunt him.
Q2. What are the qualificaMons/criteria the Party wants most of the next president to make
sure he/she serves out the rest of the term?
ANSWER: As Thuong’s dismissal made clear, the person to serve as state president must have
a clean sheet and not commiIed any of the nineteen things party members must not do as
well as regulaMons on the responsibility of seKng an example for officials and party members,
first of all members of the Politburo, members of the Secretariat and members of the party
Central CommiIee.
Q3. Is the current Politburo short-staffed to fill vacant posiMons? Is the CPV going through a
personnel shortage?
ANSWER: From the very beginning the Politburo was under-staffed. At the thirteenth naMonal
congress in early 2021, the outgoing Central CommiIee recommended a Politburo of 19
members. Only 18 were elected. Since 2021, four members of the Politburo have been
dismissed and not replaced, bringing the total down to 14. Of this number only three are
qualified for elecMon to a higher post without the need for a special exempMon from the
mandatory reMrement age or exceeding the two-year limit in holding the same office. To Lam,
for example, will have served two full 5-years terms as Minister of Public Security.
Q4. With 4 out of 18 members kicked out of the Politburo more than half way through its
term, what has gone wrong with the personnel work of the 13th Central CommiIee? What
lessons looking forward to the 14th Congress?
ANSWER: Since 2011, when Nguyen Phu Trong was elected party General Secretary, he has
made party-building his main priority including his campaign against corrupMon and negaMve
phenomena. His anM-corrupMon campaign has two lines of effort, punishing officials and
cadres for violaMng the law and holding officials accountable for supervising their
subordinates.
General Secretary Trong headed the personnel commiIee charged with veKng candidates for
the Central CommiIee for the tweluh and thirteenth naMonal congresses. In June 2022, on
the tenth anniversary of Trong’s anM-corrupMon campaign, it was announced that 170 officials
under the party Central CommiIee had been punished for corrupMon. Since 2021, at least
seventy high-ranking party officials, including five ministers or former ministers were
dismissed. Thuong was the fourth Politburo member to be dismissed since 2021.
General Secretary Trong deserves credit for his effort to combat corrupMon and improve
leadership selecMon by establishing rigorous criteria. But Trong must also bear responsibility
for leaving Politburo vacancies unfilled and some responsibility for overseeing a leadership
selecMon process that has turned up so many bad apples. Trong must redeem himself as head
of the personnel commiIee that is presently selecMng candidates for elecMon to the Central
CommiIee by party delegates to the fourteenth naMonal party congress. The personnel
commiIee must be extremely rigorous in veKng candidates for future leadership posiMons.
Q5.With the anM-grau campaign sweeping away top leaders like Nguyen Xuan Phuc and Vo
Van Thuong, how has it affected the Party's credibility? Will it be slowed down or ramped up?
Why?
ANSWER: In the absence of public opinion polls and independent media reporMng in Vietnam,
it is not possible to establish credible metrics to judge public opinion. The results are likely
mixed. Anecdotal evidence suggests that the results are mixed with the public generally
supporMve of General Secretary Trong’s anM-corrupMon efforts. Vietnamese academics have
raised the quesMon, however, is this only the Mp of the iceberg?
The other side of the coin is elite cynicism over why some leaders are punished and other are
not. While it is early days, the feedback I have received from Vietnam is total surprise that Vo
Van Thuong was forced to resign and the lack of transparency about what he did that merited
such disciplinary acMon.
The future of Genera Secretary Trong’s anM-corrupMon campaign hangs in the balance,
parMcularly if he reMres at the end of his current term. The party is divided between those
who have jumped on board the anM-corrupMon campaign in order to pursue it to advance
their careers, and those who fear the anM-corrupMon campaign has gone too far and has been
needlessly disrupMve.
Tran Quoc Vuong, Trong’s protégé, fell into the former category and his career was cut short
by a coaliMon of provincial officials who were concerned about likely domesMc disrupMon if he
became party leader. A similar coaliMon pushed back against Trong’s supporters who wanted
to see Prime Minister Pham Minh Chinh dismissed.
It is too early to tell what the trajectory of the anM-corrupMon campaign will take because the
leadership transiMon will take twenty-one months to conclude. Whatever decisions are made
about candidates for membership on the next Central CommiIee will have to wait unMl early
2026 when delegates to the fourteenth congress elect the new Central CommiIee. The new
Central CommiIee will then elect the Politburo and from among its members the next party
General Secretary.
hIps://www.scribd.com/document/717885830/Thayer-Personnel-Issues-Facing-Vietnam-s-
Party-Leadership.
Vietnam’s President Resigns: Should Investors be Worried?

Q1. Do you have any snapshot thoughts on what President Vo Van Thuong's resignaMon
suggests about domesMc poliMcal stability and the trajectory of the 'blazing furnace' campaign
in Vietnam?
ANSWER: Vietnam’s one-party state has been led by an eighteen-member Politburo elected
at the thirteenth naMonal congress of the Vietnam Communist Party in early 2021. Members
of the Politburo serve a five-year term that will expire in early 2026 when the fourteenth
naMonal party congress is scheduled to be held.
There are no limits on the number of terms a person can serve on the Politburo. However, in
order to qualify for one of the four top leadership posiMons in Vietnam (the so-called “four
pillars”– party general secretary, prime minister, state president and chairman of the NaMonal
Assembly) a candidate must have served one full five-year term on the Politburo.
Party regulaMons set a limit of two-terms in office for the party general secretary, president,
prime minister, chairman of the NaMonal Assembly, minister or equivalent etc. Party
regulaMons also set a mandatory reMrement age of 65; an exempMon can be given for
excepMonal service. This clause was invoked to allow General Secretary Nguyen Phu Trong to
serve an unprecedented three terms. Trong will be just over 81 years at the next naMonal
congress.
In an unprecedented development, Vietnam’s Politburo has been reduced to fourteen
members due to forced resignaMon of two members in 2023 and another two members in
2024, including President Vo Van Thuong. Their vacancies have not been filled.
The abrupt resignaMon of Thuong casts a pall of uncertainty over what should be an orderly
process of leadership transiMon over the next twenty-one months in the run up to the next
naMonal congress. Thuong was widely viewed as a protégé of Trong and was expected to
replace Nguyen Phu Trong as the next party leader. Thuong was the youngest member of the
Politburo and at age 53 would have been eligible to serve two terms as party leader, thus
giving stability to the leadership.
Thuong’s resignaMon now throws the door wide open for other members of the Politburo to
seek the party leadership.
Currently, Vo Thi Anh Xuan, the Vice President, is acMng President of Vietnam. She is a
temporary place holder because she is not a member of the Politburo.
It is imperaMve that Vietnam have a senior leader as president to represent the country
externally at major summits and host official visits by counterparts from abroad. Vietnam’s
party Central CommiIee must now move quickly to elevate one of the fourteen members of
the Politburo to serve as state president unMl the term expires in May 2026. There are three
possible scenarios:
(1) a caretaker could be appointed who will reMre in May 2026;
(2) a person could be appointed who would use the presidency as a stepping stone to secure
a place among the four top leadership posiMons auer the 2026 naMonal congress; and
(3) following precedent when President Tran Dai Quang died in office, the party General
Secretary Nguyen Phu Trong could concurrently serve out the presidenMal term.
Vietnam’s orderly leadership transiMon is further complicated by the rumoured ill health of
General Secretary Trong and the possibility he might become incapacitated before his
expected reMrement in early 2026.
In short, if Trong becomes a lame duck leader this could encourage facMons to form to contest
the post of party General Secretary.
There are only three Politburo incumbents who will be under the mandatory reMrement age
in 2026. All three are serving their first term on the Politburo.
Assuming Trong will reMre in 2026, all of the ten remaining incumbents will be over 65 and
therefore will need an exempMon for excepMonal service to run for office. There is the
possibility, however, that party regulaMons on mandatory reMrement could be amended
changing the age of reMrement by two or more years. Four of the ten incumbents are
compleMng their second term on the Politburo and their seniority could weigh in their favour
– Pham Minh Chinh, Vuong Dinh Hue, To Lam and Truong Thi Mai.
Two individuals are considered likely candidates for party General Secretary: Vuong Dinh Hue
(Chairman of the NaMonal Assembly) and To Lam (now compleMng his second term as Minister
of Public Security). Both were born in 1957 and will be 68 in early 2026. Truong Thi Ma
(Permanent Member of the Secretariat), is a third possibility; however rumours are circulaMng
that she has no ambiMon for higher office; her gender may weight against her. Pham Minh
Chinh is compleMng his first term as Prime Minister and is likely to conMnue in office.
The 180 person party Central CommiIee is the final arbiter of who will be candidates for re-
elecMon at the fourteenth naMonal congress. The Central CommiIee will make its final
decision on a list of candidates auer a series of execuMve sessions and straw polls in 2004 and
2005 running up to the eve of the naMonal congress.
At that point, the responsibility for elecMng the new Central CommiIee will rest with roughly
1,600 delegates to the naMonal congress. Auer the Central CommiIee is chosen, it will hold
its first plenum and elect the Politburo and from among its members the next party General
Secretary.
The anM-corrupMon campaign is the brainchild of General Secretary Trong who has devoted
his enMre career to “party-building” to weed out criminally corrupt and ineffecMve party
officials and hold them accountable. Trong vowed not to leave a single stone unturned. He
was good at his word as heretofore sacrosanct sectors such as the military, public security and
senior party officials including ministers, were disciplined for their transgressions.
In the course of Trong’s “blazing furnace” campaign, several Politburo members such as To
Lam and Truong Thi Mai (also Head of the party’s OrganisaMon Commission), jumped on
board. They will double down to ensure that next party leader gives the same priority to the
anM-corrupMon campaign as General Secretary Trong.
The key to how Vietnam’s leadership transiMon plays out rests on General Secretary Trong’s
ability to gain consensus among Central CommiIee members on his successor now that
Thuong is out of the picture. If Trong can’t gain consensus or becomes incapacitated, his lame
duck status will give a fillip to those in the “government wing” to find an alternate to To Lam,
such as Vuong Dinh Hue. Two previous party general secretaries, Nong Duc Manh and Nguyen
Phu Trong, used the NaMonal Assembly as a stepping stone to party leadership. The
“government wing” will want to moderate the intensity of the anM-corrupMon campaign and
ensure stability in the party and government leadership.
Q2. What is your assessment of President Thuong’s resignaMon and the implicaMons for
Vietnam as an investment locaMon and operaMng environment for foreign businesses
(parMcularly those in the automoMve sector)?
ANSWER: Because Vietnam is a one-party state with a collecMve decision-making system the
role of individuals, their ideological procliviMes, and policy-preferences are not dominant
features. The resignaMon of Thuong as state president will have liIle or no impact on
Vietnam’s current socio-economic trajectory. While the president has a seat on the Politburo,
real power on economic issues rests with the prime minister and his Cabinet and to a lesser
extent the chairman of the NaMonal Assembly.
The broad contours of Vietnam’s socio-economic policy-making are set in stone and unlikely
to be altered prior to the fourteenth congress because of the recent forced resignaMons of
Politburo members Tran Tuan Anh (Head of the Central Commission for Economic Affairs and
former Minister of Industry and Trade) and Vo Van Thuong (as state president).
At every naMonal party congress Vietnam adopts a five-year development plan. This plan is
the result of several years of drauing, inter-ministerial discussion, and consultaMons with
relevant stakeholders and finally the general public.
Progress on achieving the goals of the development plan are monitored by plenary sessions
of the party Central CommiIee at least twice a year. The development plan is also reviewed
and funded annually by the NaMonal Assembly at its regular sessions.
The thirteenth naMonal congress adopted a socio-economic plan for 2021 to 2025 and set the
following long-term objecMves:
- By 2025, Vietnam aims to become a developing country with the modern-oriented
industry and surpass the low-middle income level.
- By 2030, Vietnam aims to become a developing country with the modern-oriented

industry and the high-middle income level.
- By 2045, Vietnam aims to become a developed country with ahigh income.
Vietnam remains commiIed to “acMve and proacMve” economic integraMon with the regional
and global economies. Vietnam currently has sixteen bilateral and mulMlateral free trade
agreements with Japan, South Korea, United Kingdom, Eurasian Economic Union, European
Union, and the Comprehensive and Progressive Trans-Pacific Partnership and the Regional
Comprehensive Economic Partnership. Vietnam also is a member of the Biden
AdministraMon’s yet to be concluded Indo-Pacific Economic Framework for Prosperity.
In 2023, Vietnam’s leaders reached the conclusion that due to a down turn in global growth
and China’s sluggish recovery from the COVID-19 pandemic, that Vietnam needed to step up
its GDP growth rate and aIract more foreign investment that promoted science and
technology innovaMon, infrastructure, and green energy and digital transformaMon.
Vietnam made the momentous decision to raise relaMons with the United States, Japan and
Australia to its top Mer – comprehensive strategic partnership – alongside China, Russia, India
and South Korea. Science and technology innovaMon is to drive these partnership.
Vietnam also welcomes the China Plus One arrangement whereby enterprises in China shiu
some of their producMon processes to Vietnam. Vietnam is keen to develop resilient and
reliable supply chains with its new comprehensive strategic partners, especially the United
States.
According to S & P Global Market Intelligence (see Chart 1 below):
The economic outlook from 2023 to 2026 [for Vietnam] is for rapid economic
expansion, with GDP growth forecast to grow at a pace of around 6.5% in 2023, with
sustained strong growth at a pace of around 6.7% per year over 2024-2026. However,
Vietnam's economy faces near-term risks from the slowdown in key export markets,
notably the US and the EU.
Over the medium-term economic outlook, a large number of positive growth drivers
are creating favorable tailwinds and will continue to underpin the rapid growth of
Vietnam's economy. This is expected to drive strong growth in Vietnam's total GDP as
well as per capita GDP.
With strong economic expansion projected over the next decade, Vietnam's total GDP
is forecast to increase from USD 327 billion in 2022 to USD 470 billion by 2025, rising
to USD 760 billion by 2030. This translates to very rapid growth in Vietnam's per capita
GDP, from USD 3,330 per year in 2022 to USD 4,700 per year by 2025 and USD 7,400
by 2030, resulting in substantial expansion in the size of Vietnam's domestic consumer
market.
On April 3, 2024, Vietnam’s Minister of Planning and Investment announced a GDP growth
target of 6% to 6.5% for 2024. The Minister noted that the slow growth of consumer demand
and high competition were the main challenges facing manufacturing businesses this year. A
day later, Finance.Yahoo.com placed Vietnam sixth among the fastest growing economies in
Asia for 2024 with a projected real GDP growth rate of 5.8% and per capita GDP growth at
7.41%.
Within the context of continued high economic growth, however, Vietnam’s automotive
market dropped from fourth to fifth place in Southeast Asia in 2023 due to a decline in the
sale of domestically-produced and assembled vehicles as well as imported vehicles. This
prompted car manufacturers to offer significant discounts and incentives. The Government
intervened and reduced registration fees by half for domestically produced and assembled
cars.
Chart 1
Source: S & P Global Market Intelligence

Vietnam’s automobile market has not recovered as expected due to two factors: high
inventory stocks leading to an oversupply over demand and high interest rates that
discouraged consumer borrowing. Significantly, automobile companies in Vietnam
maintained the number of models on sale and did not cut back or stop sales.
As of March 2024, Vietnam’s automobile market continues to face high supply, excess of
inventory and low demand leading to a decline in sales. The General Statistics Office reported
as significant drop in domestically produced and assembled cars in February compared to
previous months and the same period in 2023. The number of imported cars also declined.
During this period the Government’s inventive scheme of offering a fifty percent reduction in
registration fees expired. Sales were also affected by the Tet or Lunar New Year extended
holiday. Post-Tet, car manufacturers offered substantial discounts and promotions to
stimulate demand; it is projected that these deep discounts will continue.
Some Hanoi-based observers have reported investor concern about Vietnam’s poliMcal
stability. Some analysts have noted a slow-down in processing approvals for investment
projects. This is likely to be a temporary process. According to Vietnam’s Foreign Minister Bui
Thanh Son in remarks to the Brookings InsMtuMon in Washington on 26 March 2024:
The resignaMon of the president I think in Vietnam has not affect(ed) our foreign policy
as well as our own policies of economic development.
If you look at the situaMon in Vietnam, we have collecMve leadership, we have

collecMve foreign policy. We have collecMve-decided economic development…
And I think (if) one or two figures in the leadership has resigned, (it) does not change
this situaMon.
Thayer Consultancy Background Brief, April 7, 2024.
hIps://www.scribd.com/document/723095138/Thayer-Vietnam-s-President-Resigns-Should-
Investors-Be-Worried..
Van Thinh Phat Group and Accountability

The Van Thinh Phat Group (Tập đoàn Vạn Thịnh Phát) was founded by Trương Mỹ Lan in
1992 as a real estate business in Saigon that specialised in luxury residenMal buildings, office
blocks, shopping centres, hotels and financial services. Lan served as Chairman of Van Thinh
Phat Group’s Board of Directors.
Lan was born in Saigon in the late 1950s. She is reportedly of Sino-Vietnamese heritage. She
later married Eric Chu Nap Kee, a businessman based in Hong Kong,
Lan became a shareholder in and eventually took control of the Saigon Joint Stock
Commercial Bank (SCB) established in 2012 following the merger of three banks on the
verge of bankruptcy.
The SCB soon established itself as the largest bank by assets in Ho Chi Minh City. By 2022,
the SCB grew to become Vietnam’s fourth largest bank by assets auer three state-owned
banks. At that Mme Lan’s Van Thinh Phat Group, operaMng through network of two dozen
middlemen, had become the controlling shareholder in SCB.
Lan was arrested in October 2022 and charged with illegally selling bonds and fraudulently
manipulaMng loan applicaMons to siphon off an esMmated 304 trillion VND (US $12.5 billion).
Lan was put on trial in Ho Chi Minh City in March 2024 along with 84 defendants, including
her husband, family members, forty-five SCB officials, fiueen former officers from the State
Bank of Vietnam, three officials from the Government Inspectorate and one official from the
State Audit Office.
Accountability
Trương Mỹ Lan’s meteoric rise in Ho Chi Minh City and subsequent trial for Vietnam’s (if not
Southeast Asia’s) largest fraud and embezzlement case raises quesMons about the
accountability of senior member of the Vietnam Communist Party in Ho Chi Minh City and
on central bloc party commiIees in the State Bank of Vietnam, Government Inspectorate
and State Audit Office. Only small fry appear to have been charged with receiving bribes in
the current court proceeding.
In March 2020, Vietnam Communist Party’s Central InspecMon CommiIee (Ủy ban Kiểm tra
Trung ương Đảng) recommended disciplinary acMon against Le Thanh Hai who was Secretary
of the Ho Chi Minh City Party CommiIee and member of the Politburo from 2006-2016, and
Le Hoang Quan, head of the Standing CommiIee of the Ho Chi Minh City Party CommiIee,
2010 – 2015. They were charged with serious violaMons in managing the Thu Thiem New
Urban Area investment project, causing financial and property losses to the state.
Le Thanh Hai and his network very likely facilitated Lan’s rise. Why Hai and his associates were
not further disciplined for involvement in Lan’s fraud and embezzlement acMviMes remains an
open quesMon. Perhaps it is a case of “let sleeping dogs lie.” x General Secretary Nguyen Phu
Trong’s anM-corrupMon campaign has now zeroed in on Lan’s private sector networks to
decimate whatever residual influence Le Thanh Hai and his network reportedly exert in
Vietnam’s largest municipality.
hIps://www.scribd.com/document/722540326/Thayer-Van-Thinh-Phat-Group-and-
Accountability.
Vietnam: From Four to Two Leadership Pillars?

Could you answer some quesMons about the current Vietnamese poliMcal situaMon?
Q1. In March, the state President was forced to resign. Now the Chairman of the NaMonal
Assembly is rumoured to be about to resign. Could you analyze what is happening in
Vietnamese poliMcs right now?
ANSWER: Since October last year, the senior leadership of the Vietnam Communist Party has
begun making preparaMons for the next naMonal party congress, the fourteenth, scheduled
for the first quarter of 2026. Part of pre-congress preparaMons includes selecMng candidates
for the new Central CommiIee, a necessary stepping stone to the next Politburo and key
leadership posiMons.
The current General Secretary, Nguyen Phu Trong, heads the personnel sub-commiIee (Mểu
ban nhân sự), whose task is to recommend suitable candidates. Trong is widely expected to
reMre at the fourteenth congress due to his advanced age and health. Trong had a stroke in
2019.
One of the duMes of party General Secretary is to groom and nominate a successor. It was
widely anMcipated that Trong would nominate his protégé President Vo Van Thuong. Thuong
was the youngest member of the Politburo and could have served two 5-year terms as party
leader.
In January this year, Trong reportedly fell ill and was hospitalised. This raised the quesMon
whether he would be fit enough to conMnue as party leader for the remaining two years of
his term in office.
Uncertainty over the General Secretary’s health, and the absence of a clear successor when
President Thuong was forced to resign in March, disrupted what should be an orderly
leadership transiMon. There is undoubted growing contestaMon within the highest echelons
of the party leadership over who will become the next party General Secretary.
Only three members of the current fourteen-member Politburo meet the criteria for selecMon
as one of Vietnam’s “four pillars” (tứ trụ) leadership (party General Secretary, Prime Minister,
state President and Chair of the NaMonal Assembly) at the Mme of the next naMonal party
congress – under the mandatory reMrement age of 65 and having served one 5-year term on
the Politburo – Tran Thanh Man (August 1962), Tran Cam Tu (born August 1961) and Dinh Tien
Dung (born May 1961).
Assuming Trong reMres in 2026, all the remaining ten Politburo members will be over 65 years
of age. However, an individual can be given an exempMon from these requirements on the
basis of exemplary performance.
In addiMon, senior officials are not permiIed to hold office for more than two terms unless an
exempMon is given.
Senior members of the party who have supported Trong’s anM-corrupMon campaign want to
ensure they retain power auer the next party congress under a leader who will conMnue the
anM-corrupMon campaign. Other senior party leaders, many with responsibility for
government affairs, want to ensure the next party General Secretary brings stability and
predictability to the top leadership. They want to moderate the pace and scope of the
anM0corfrupMon campaign.
It is in this contested environment that the backgrounds of any Politburo member seeking
higher office has come under intense scruMny.
Q2. What do you think caused the Chairman of the NaMonal Assembly to resign?
ANSWER: Vuong Dinh Hue reportedly tendered his resignaMon from all government and party
posts auer the arrest of Nguyen Duy Hung, chairman of the Thuan An Group Joint Stock
Company, was announced on 15 March and auer Pham Thai Ha was called in to the Ministry
of Public Security for quesMoning in relaMon to the Thuan An Group and a bribery scandal on
12 April. Hue had a long working relaMonship with Hung, and Ha was a long-serving aide and
Hue’s relaMve.
As of this wriMng, there has been no official confirmaMon that Hue has submiIed a formal
resignaMon or the reasons behind his decision. There have been rumours that the Politburo
has met to discuss this issue. There were also rumours that an emergency special session of
the Central CommiIee would be convened. As of this wriMng none of these rumours have
been confirmed. The Central CommiIee generally convenes in May prior to the opening of
the legislaMve session of the NaMonal Assembly.
Q3. Who is at the center of the push for Hue’s resignaMon?
ANSWER: There are two agencies that appear to play a leading role in unearthing corrupMon
scandals involving members of the Politburo, the Central InspecMon CommiIee (Ủy ban kiểm
tra trung ương) headed by Politburo member Tran Cam Tu and the Ministry of Public Security
headed by Politburo member To Lam.
The Central InspecMon CommiIee has responsibility for veKng candidates for higher office to
determine if they have complied with party regulaMons. Tran Cam Tu reportedly forms part of
a Nghe An facMon including Hue, and Politburo members Nguyen Xuan Thang and Phan Dinh
Trac.
The Ministry of Public Security invesMgates allegaMons of criminal behaviour violaMng
Vietnam’s laws. Minister To Lam has ambiMons to become the next party General Secretary
and is the likely insMgator of Vo Van Thuong’s resignaMon and pressures on Vuong Dinh Hue
to resign.
Q4. Do you think this is part of the anM-corrupMon movement? Is the Secretary General aware
of all the developments? Or is the Minister of Public Security using the anM-corrupMon
movement to throw out other influenMal people?
ANSWER: General Secretary Nguyen Phu Trong has made party-building and the campaign
against corrupMon and negaMve phenomena his main prioriMes since being elected party
leader in 2011.
General Secretary Nguyen Phu Trong’s anM-corrupMon campaign has two lines of effort. The
first is to uncover and punish criminal behaviour by party members and government officials.
The second is to hold senior party officials accountable for carrying out their responsibiliMes
both under law and party regulaMons such as seKng an example (2018) and on what party
members should not do (2021).
In the course of the anM-corrupMon campaign Trong has vowed to leave no stone unturned.
He has been good at his word in bringing down members of the Politburo, Central CommiIee,
ministers and former ministers, and officials in various agencies including the Coast Guard,
army and Ministry of Public Security.
At the first session of the personnel sub-commiIee on 13 March, General Secretary Trong
stressed that party officials who had degraded morals, degenerate lifestyles, ambiMons to
aIain power, pursued individualism, and formed regional facMons should not be allowed to
advance.
Trong’s anM-corrupMon campaign and its focus on accountability, has opened the door for
party hard-liners to bring down current members of the Politburo, thus clearing the path for
hard-liners to assume higher office at the fourteenth naMonal party congress.
It would appear that General Secretary Trong has had his hand forced, parMcularly in the case
of Vo Van Thuong. Although General Secretary Trong is primus inter pares on the Politburo,
he nevertheless must comply with the majority.
Q5. Do you think Is there a replenishment of Politburo vacancies? Who do you think are the
candidates?
ANSWER: The original eighteen member Politburo has been reduced to fourteen with the
resignaMons of Nguyen Xuan Phuc, Pham Binh Minh, Tran Tuan Anh and Vo Van Thuong. It will
be further reduced to thirteen if Vuong Dinh Hue resigns. This is unprecedented.
Vacancies on the Politburo can only be filled by members the Central CommiIee. If any
vacancies are filled they likely will come from current members of the party Secretariat or
chairmen of central party commiIees.
Q6. Who will replace the state President and the Chairman of the NaMonal Assembly?
ANSWER: There are two likely Politburo members to fill these vacancies, Truong Thi Mai and
Tran Thanh Man.
If Vuong Dinh Hue has resigned, and if his resignaMon is accepted, his vacancy could be filled
by the Deputy Chair of the NaMonal Assembly, Tran Thanh Man, a member of the Politburo.
There is a rumour that Hue, protected by his Nghe An facMon, might be shunted to the office
of state President to serve out the remaining term and then reMre. If this is not the case,
Truong Thi Mai appears to be the odds on favourite to serve as a caretaker president before
reMring.
Minister of Public Security To Lam will want to retain his powerful post as Minister of Public
Security unMl the fourteenth naMonal party congress. He is presently compleMng his second
and final term as minister.
Q6. Do you believe that the anM-corrupMon campaign will conMnue?

ANSWER: Vietnam’s anM-corrupMon campaign will conMnue because corrupMon has long been
idenMfied as one of the major threats to the legiMmacy of the Vietnam Communist Party. The
real quesMon is: will it conMnue at the same pace, scope and intensity as the present
campaign?
There have been straws in wind that many provincial level party officials, who are members
of the Central CommiIee, as well as senior party members of the government wing (ministers
and other agency heads) that are concerned about the destabilizing impact of Trong’s “fiery
furnace” campaign. For example, Trong’s proposed successor Tran Quoc Vuong, failed to get
majority support of the Central CommiIee in late 2020 on the eve of the thirteenth naMonal
congress because his strong support for the anM-corrupMon campaign was viewed as poliMcal
expediency by provincial party leaders and threatening to their bailiwicks.
Also, in early 2023, senior party leaders opposed disciplinary acMon against Prime Minister
Pham Minh Chinh for his family’s alleged indiscreMons in the wake of the dismissals of
Politburo members Nguyen Xuan Phuc and Pham Binh Minh. They argued forcing Chinh to
resign would be too destabilizing.
Q8. Vietnam has aIracted foreign investment largely because of its poliMcal stability. Some
Western companies are beginning to hesitate to invest. How do you see the anM-corrupMon
movement affecMng the economy and investment?
ANSWER: First, Vietnam’s socio-economic development policies are set in stone and unlikely
to change significantly over the next two years. Vietnam is fully commiIed to “acMve and
proacMve internaMonal integraMon” through its network of sixteen bilateral and mulMlateral
free trade agreements. At the same Mme, Vietnam will push to implement the objecMves of
its four new comprehensive strategic partnerships with South Korea, the United States, Japan
and Australia. Vietnam is a parMcipant in negoMaMons for the Biden AdministraMon’s Indo-
Pacific Economic Framework for Prosperity that includes anM-corrupMon provisions.
Second, General Secretary Trong’s anM-corrupMon campaign has led to an improvement in the
business environment as measured by Transparency InternaMonal’s PercepMons of CorrupMon
Index (PCI). The PCI ranks states on a scale ranging from 0 (highly corrupt) to 100 (very clean).
Vietnam’s PCI score rose from 2.7 in 2010 (ranked 127 out of 175 states surveyed) to 31 in
2015 (111/168) at the end of General Secretary Trong’s first term in office, to 36 in 2020
(104/180) at the end of Trong’s second term in office, and to 39 in 2021 (87/180) when Trong
was elected for a third term. In 2022, Vietnam ranked 77th out of 180 states surveyed with a
score of 42 or just below the global average of 43 of 180 countries surveyed. Vietnam’s score
dropped slightly to 41 in 2023.
In sum, under General Secretary Trong Vietnam’s PercepMons of CorrupMon Index rose
posiMvely by 38.3 points. This should be encouraging news for foreign investors; but Vietnam
has a long way to go. Vietnam’s economy is a high performer in regional terms with a GDP
growth rate of 5.05 percent in 2023.
According to a 3 April 2024 Vietnam Briefing by Dezan Shira Associates:
With over US$6.17 billion in newly-registered, additional, and contributed capital,
along with share purchases by foreign investors in Q1 of 2024, there has been a
significant uptick of 13.4 percent compared to the previous year.
In Q1, Vietnam granted investment certificates to 644 new projects with a total
registered capital of US$4.77 billion. This marks a notable increase of 23.4 percent in
the number of projects and 57.9 percent in value year-on-year.
hIps://www.scribd.com/document/727324332/Thayer-Vietnam-From-Four-to-Two-
Leadership-Pillars.
Truong My Lan and the Vietnam Communist Party

We are currently wriMng a report regarding the case of Truong My Lan and her relaMonship
with the leadership of the Vietnam Communist Party. we have three quesMons regarding this
topic and request your assessment.
In Vietnam, where all land officially belongs to the state, a real estate business person's
fortune is bound to have a close connecMon with the government. There are rumors that Le
Thanh Hai, former Secretary of HCMC Party CommiIee, is very close to Truong My Lan, and
that Van Thinh Phat could not have developed without his help.
Q1. The Saigon Commercial Bank (SCB) has been scrutinized by the government several times,
but the problems have been covered up and Lan has always escaped charges. As she was
finally arrested in 2022, is it a sign that the fight against corruption has been stepped up? Or
maybe the "bigwig" behind Lan cannot support her this time?
ANSWER: Le Thanh Hai was a member of the Politburo from 2006-16 and secretary of the Ho
Chi Minh City party committee from 2010 to 2015. He is of Sino-Vietnamese ancestry with
strong connections to the Sino-Vietnamese community in Ho Chi Minh City.
In March 2020, Hai and Le Hoang Quan, head of the Ho Chi Minh City party Standing
Committee, were disciplined for serious mismanagement of the Thu Thiem New Urban Area
project that resulted in property and financial losses.
Reportedly, Hai continued to exert strong influence behind the scenes on municipal politics.
Truong My Lan became director of the board of the Saigon Joint Stock Commercial Bank in
2012. Lan is also of Chinese ancestry and well-connected to the Sino-Vietnamese business
network in what used to be called Chợ Lớn (or Big Market). Saigon’s sister city, as well as
Chinese business communities in Hong Kong and Singapore.
It is inconceivable that Lan did not have a strong connections with Hai and Quan. As long as
Hai was in office he served as her “umbrella” to protect her from legal action.
Lan’s problems were of her own making because many of the SCB’s shareholders and clients
suffered losses and complained. Investigators uncovered Lan’s large scale scam. She was
arrested in October 2022 as General Secretary Nguyen Phu Trong’s anti-corruption campaign
began to focus on fraud in the private sector.
Lan’s case is the reverse of recent high profile resignations by government leaders. In Lan’s
case the senior leader, Hai, was disciplined first for an unrelated issue. In recent cases, the
Ministry of Public Security worked up from the bottom, identifying businessmen involved and
the network linking them to high level officials.
Q2. There was an opinion piece published five years ago that said Trong wanted to put Hai in
prison. But no high-ranking official has been arrested in the case of Lan so far. What you think
is the reason for this? Is Trong still unable to shake Hai?
ANSWER: General Secretary Trong is honouring the deal agreed to in 2020, that is, to
discipline Hai and let him retire. His days are over. Trong’s action is purely a pragmatic
response to maintain political stability. In short, it is a case of letting sleeping dogs lie.
In Lan’s case fifteen officials of the State Bank of Vietnam, three officials from the
Government Inspectorate and one official from the State Audit Office have been charged and
convicted.
Q3. Do you think Lan's case is a trial related economic corruption, or is it mixed with political
factors?
ANSWER: Lan’s trial and conviction is mainly aimed at punishing criminal behaviour in the
private sector and to send a strong message to the business community that so-called white
collar crime will not go unpunished.
Lan defrauded the system of US $12.5 billion. The State Bank of Vietnam has been forced to
provide up to US $24 billion in special loans to prevent the SCB from collapsing and causing a
financial panic, The SCB is under special government monitoring as plans are drawn up to
restructure the bank. This is a very sensitive issue for Vietnam’s leadership as they continue
to encourage foreign investment.
hIps://www.scribd.com/word/document_edit/728605010/presentaMon
Implica)ons of Leadership Change in Vietnam

The State Bank of Vietnam has just released 20 billion USD to rescue the SCB Bank. SCB Bank’s
troubles are said to reduce the confidence of foreign investors.
Q1. How will Vietnam's economy be affected by this development?
ANSWER: The recent resignaMon of President Vuong Dinh Hue, if taken on its own, is unlikely
to have any major impact on Vietnam’s economy.
In the first quarter of this year, four other members of the Politburo resigned from office,
including the president. During this period Vietnam recorded a 13.4 percent rise in newly
registered, addiMonal and contributed capital (US $6.17 billion) and share purchases by
foreign investors compared to the same Mme period a year ago.
During the first quarter, 644 new investment projects were approved with a total registered
capital of US $4.77 billion or a rise of 23.4 percent in the number of projects, and a 57.9
percent increase in value year on year.
The greatest threat to economic growth comes from possibility the Saigon Joint Stock
Commercial Bank could collapse and spark a contagion of withdrawals from other large banks
in Vietnam.
Q2. One more person of the "four pillars" lost his posiMon. How 2ill this event impact on the
relaMonship between Vietnam and the U.S. and China?
ANSWER: Vietnam’s foreign policy orientaMons are set in stone and are unlikely to be altered
because of the current turbulence in the top leadership. Vietnam will conMnue to adhere to
the spirit of its comprehensive, strategic and comprehensive strategic partnerships and its
sixteen bilateral and mulMlateral free trade agreements, parMcularly the Comprehensive and
Progressive Trans-Pacific Partnership for Prosperity.
Q3. More and more of Vietnam’s top leaders are being accused of corrupMon. Does this create
any difficulMes or challenges to the legiMmacy of the Vietnam Communist Party?
ANSWER: General Secretary Nguyen Phu Trong has made party-building his life’s work. The
recent spate of resignaMons call into quesMon internal party mechanisms and regulaMons
regarding personnel management and promoMon.
At the end of the thirteenth naMonal party congress in February 2021, Trong praised the
quality of the newly elected leadership. How can he explain the number of high-level officials
– members of the Central CommiIee, Politburo and Cabinet, and former ministers and deputy
ministers – who were subsequently disciplined?
This raises the quesMon about the culpability of province -level officials who played a role in
advancing the careers of colleagues who were later disciplined.
In March this year, at the first meeMng of the Personnel Sub-CommiIee that Trong chairs,
Trong vowed the no person who failed to live up to the party statutes on seKng an example
and direcMve on things party members should not do would be nominated for high office.
This raises two quesMons. Are the current leadership dismissals just the Mp of the iceberg and,
if so, what is to be done to ensure that all members of the Politburo are thoroughly veIed?
And who will vet the officials, such as Public Security Minister To Lam, charged with
invesMgaMng all candidates for higher office?
Added to this is the apparent lack of a statute of limitaMon on offenses so that officials can be
charged with violaMng party regulaMons ex post facto or retrospecMvely?
Q4. Who will be the candidates to fill the two vacant seats of President and Chairman of the
NaMonal Assembly?
ANSWER: There are two likely Politburo candidates, Truong Thi Mai and Tran Thanh Man. Mai
has served previously in the NaMonal Assembly. Man is currently the Vice Chair of the NaMonal
Assembly Standing CommiIee who has served as head of the Vietnam Fatherland Front.
Thayer Consultancy Background Brief, May 1, 2024.
hIps://www.scribd.com/document/736446014/Thayer-ImplicaMons-of-Leadership-Change-
in-Vietnam.
Should Investors Be Concerned By Poli)cal Instability in Vietnam?

Q1. How should foreign investors understand and react to leadership resignaMons in Vietnam?
ANSWER: Vietnam is preparing for a rouMne major leadership change at the next congress of
the ruling Vietnam Communist Party scheduled for the first quarter of 2026. Ordinarily,
leadership transiMon is a smooth process that takes place over several months prior to the
congress. Consensus is reached following a number of straw polls.
Recent leadership changes in the ruling Politburo have created an unprecedented situaMon.
The General Secretary of the party, Nguyen Phu Trong, has health issues and is expected to
reMre at the 2026 congress. The dismissal of President Vo Van Thuong, Trong’s preferred
successor earlier this year, has opened the door for various facMons to compete to fill the void
by undermining their rivals.
Q2. Does Vietnam's lack of transparency add to the confusion and difficulMes of people trying
to understand what is happening? Does it contribute to conspiracy talk?
ANSWER: Decision-making in Vietnam’s one-party state is opaque at the best of Mmes. The
lack of transparency has been exacerbated by the manner in which high-level officials have
been dismissed. They have been pressured into formally resigning from their government
posts on vague charges of failure to follow party regulaMons. No specific details are provided.
Public speculaMon and rumours have filled the void.
In previous years, specific charges were laid and the public accepted the result. Now the
dismissals have been linked to an on-going anM-corrupMon campaign launched by the party
General Secretary Trong and strongly supported by the Minister of Public Security, To Lam.
This has resulted in two major reacMons. The first reacMon is to ask is this the Mp of the iceberg
and will more dismissals follow? The second reacMon is to ask are the dismissals being
orchestrated by the Public Security Minister to advance his ambiMons to be the next party
leader?
Q3. Should foreign investors be concerned?
ANSWER: Foreign investors should be concerned but not alarmed. Vietnam’s current socio-
economic policy is set in stone. Economic policy is under the control of the Prime Minister and
his Cabinet. So far no Minister with responsibiliMes that touch on economic policy, trade and
investment has been involved.
The present leadership upheaval should be viewedf as a speed bump on the road to the next
naMonal party congress. The party Central CommiIee will likely meet this month and fill the
vacancies of state president and Chairman of the NaMonal Assembly.
hIps://www.scribd.com/document/736446867/Thayer-Should-Investors-Be-Concerned-by-
PoliMcal-Instability-in-Vietnam.
To Lam Last Man Standing?

Q1. What is expected from the Ninth Plenum of the Vietnam Communist Party Central
CommiIee?
ANSWER: The ninth plenum will be a short three-day meeMng. Its agenda includes three main
issues.
The first agenda item is to review four drau policy documents to be presented to the 14th
naMonal party congress in early 2026: PoliMcal Report; Socio-Economic Report; Party-Building
Report and Report on ImplementaMon of the Party Charter.
The second agenda item is to consider a drau direcMve on preparaMons for holding congresses
of party commiIees at all levels prior to the naMonal congress. This direcMve will cover the
structure, number and composiMon of provincial and municipal party commiIees; the quota
of young, female and ethnic minority members; age and standards for re-elecMon; increase in
mandatory reMrement age for men and women and elecMon of party commiIee delegates to
higher party congresses.
The third agenda item is personnel issues. The Ninth Plenum will likely approve Truong Thi
Mai’s resignaMon from the Politburo and as Standing Member of the Secretariat.
The ninth plenum will consider and nominate candidates to fill the vacancies of state President
and Chairman of the NaMonal Assembly.
The plenum could also decide to appoint several members of the Central CommiIee to fill
vacancies on the Politburo.
Q2. Can To Lam become the next party General Secretary?
ANSWER: To Lam must past successfully through a number of gates before he can be elected
the next party General Secretary. He needs to be nominated by the present General Secretary
Nguyen Phu Trong. His nominaMon must be approved by the current Central CommiIee. Next,
To Lam must be elected to the new Central CommiIee by delegates to the fourteenth
congress. And then the new Central CommiIee needs to elect him to the Politburo, and if
successful, elect him General Secretary.
To Lam will need an exempMon from the mandatory reMrement age of 65 for exemplary
service.
If To Lam is elected party leader we can expect to see a conMnuaMon of Trong’s “blazing
furnace” campaign against corrupMon and negaMve phenomenon. And we can expect to see
repression against civil society leaders and acMvists.
Q3. Is Vietnam undergoing an unprecedented personnel crisis?
ANSWER: Yes, Vietnam finds itself in an unprecedented personnel crisis because To Lam had
effecMvely made himself the last man standing. This is not the end of the maIer and there
may well be conMnued infighMng along the nineteenth month path to the fourteenth naMonal
party congress.
hIps://www.scribd.com/document/736447392/Thayer-to-Lam-The-Last-Man-Standing.
Will To Lam Become Vietnam’s Next Party Leader?

Recently, two high-level earthquakes erupted in Vietnam's poliMcal arena. We request your
assessment of the following issues:
Q1. Immediately auer the resignaMons of President Vo Van Thuong and NaMonal Assembly
Chairman Vuong Dinh Hue, there were widespread rumors that To Lam, Vietnam’s Minister of
Public Security, would replace Nguyen Phu Trong as Party General Secretary. If To Lam can
successfully replace Nguyen Phu Trong , what poliMcal advantage will To Lam gain?
ANSWER: In order to qualify for the posiMon of party General Secretary a candidate must have
served one full 5-year term on the Politburo and be under 65 years of age. An exempMon for
excepMonal service can be given for the age requirement, as was the case with the current
party leader.
Eighteen members were elected to the Politburo at the thirteenth naMonal party congress in
February 2021. Since then six members have resigned. If we assume that General Secretary
Trong will step down auer his unprecedented third term in office, there are two possible
candidates to assume leadership of the party based on seniority: Prime Minister Pham Minh
Chinh and To Lam. Both would need exempMons from the mandatory reMrement age. All of
the remaining nine Politburo members are compleMng their first term and only three of them
will be under 65 when the fourteenth naMonal party congress is scheduled to meet – Dinh
Tien Dung, Tran Cam Tu and Tran Thanh Man.
The recently concluded ninth plenum of the Vietnam Communist Party’s Central CommiIee
added four new members to the Politburo: Le Minh Hung (Secretary of the Central CommiIee,
head of the Central OrganisaMon CommiIee, and chief of the Central CommiIee Office);
Nguyen Trong Nghia (Secretary of the Central CommiIee and head of the Central Commission
for InformaMon and EducaMon); Bui Thi Minh Hoa (Secretary of the Central CommiIee and
head of the Central Mass MobilisaMon CommiIee); and Do Van Chien (Secretary of the Central
CommiIee and chair of the Vietnam Fatherland Front Central CommiIee). They will not be
qualified as candidates to become the next General Secretary because they have not
completed a full term in office.
The ninth plenum endorsed the nominaMons of To Lam to become the President and Tran
Thanh Man as Chairman of the NaMonal Assembly. To Lam will have to resign his present
posiMon as Minister of Public Security. The NaMonal Assembly will consider these nominaMons
at its next session which opens 20 May.
In order for presumpMve President To Lam to replace Nguyen Phu Trong as party General
Secretary he must successfully negoMate five stages.
First, Normally it is the prerogaMve of the General Secretary to nominate his successor. The
personnel sub-subcommiIee preparing for the fourteenth naMonal party congress, headed by
General Secretary Trong, must vet and approve To Lam as a qualified candidate.
To Lam was born in July 1957 and will be 68 if the fourteenth naMonal party congress is held
in the first quarter of 2026 as scheduled. In order to pass the second stage, To Lam must be
given an exempMon from the mandatory reMrement age of 65 on the grounds of excepMonal
service.
Second, the present Central CommiIee must approve the recommendaMon of the personnel
sub-commiIee or reach consensus on an alternate. This process usually involves several straw
polls before a formal vote. In 2020, for example, General Secretary Trong nominated Tran
Quoc Vuong as his successor. Vuong failed to receive a majority of the votes and a compromise
was reached to allow Trong to serve a third term.
In sum, To Lam has two paths to success in the second stage. Either he is successfully
nominated or he emerges as a consensus candidate.
Third, To Lam must receive a majority of the votes by over 1,500 party delegates to the
fourteenth naMonal congress in order to be elected to the new Central CommiIee.
Fourth, the new Central CommiIee must then elect To Lam to the Politburo.
Fiuh, once the Politburo is selected, the new Central CommiIee must then elect To Lam as
General Secretary.
To Lam’s nominaMon as state president can be viewed in one of two ways. First, he has been
kicked upstairs to a largely ceremonial post and will act as caretaker and reMre in May 2026 at
the end of his term. Or, the presidency can be viewed as a stepping stone to the post of
General Secretary.
At present, To Lam cannot be ruled out as a potenMal candidate for the party leadership. There
are nineteen months to go before the fourteenth naMonal congress and this could be a
turbulent period if To Lam seeks the party leadership and encounters pushback from those
opposed to his rise.
Q2.To Lam’s poliMcal career has been enMrely within the public security system. If he succeeds
Nguyen Phu Trong in power, will Vietnamese poliMcs turn conservaMve and authoritarian? If
To Lam succeeds in replacing Nguyen Phu Trong , what changes will he bring to Vietnam’s
poliMcal scene? Will Vietnam's current poliMcal instability affect foreign investors' confidence
in Vietnam?
ANSWER: If To Lam becomes the new General Secretary we can expect an intensificaMon of
the campaign against corrupMon and negaMve phenomenon throughout all levels of
Vietnamese society. The disclosure of DirecMve 24 reveals the near paranoia of the security
establishment about opening contact with the West that leads to ‘peaceful evoluMon’ and
subversion.
There is already evidence in the leaked leIer of 6 March from the United NaMons and World
Bank to Vietnam, co-signed by eighteen ambassadors, that Vietnam has forfeited at least $2.5
billion in foreign aid over the last three years because of administraMve paralysis. While there
are mulMple causes for this, one is the hesitancy by government officials to approve new
projects that are deemed to have a negaMve impact on Vietnam’s poliMcal stability and get
caught up in the anM-corrupMon campaign.
Q3. Regarding the recent resignaMons of Vo Van Thuong and Vuong Dinh Hue, the outside
world believes that there is a power struggle caused by the main Vietnamese officials
compeMng for the posiMon of the top leader before Nguyen Phu Trong reMres. In parMcular,
some people think that To Lam, as the Minister of Public Security, is using the anM-corrupMon
campaign to eliminate poliMcal opponents. What is yiuyr assessment?
ANSWER: To Lam has undoubtedly been the mastermind behind a campaign that brought
down six members of the Politburo. To Lam has weaponized party direcMves daMng to 2018
and 2021 regarding seKng an example by members of the Politburo, Secretariat and Central
CommiIee and Things Party Members are Not Allowed to Do, respecMvely.
To Lam’s orchestraMon of the surprise resignaMon of Truong Thi Mai, Permanent Secretary of
the Secretariat and likely candidate for the presidency, seemingly removed all potenMal
contenders for the post of party General Secretary except To Lam. Reportedly, this led to push
back by a coaliMon in the Central CommiIee composed of provincial party leaders (37% of the
Central CommiIee) and senior members of the party and state apparatus.
It should be noted that a similar coaliMon blocked Nguyen Phu Trong’s nominaMon of Tran
Quoc Vuong as his successor because Vuong was viewed as an opportunist who supported
the anM-corrupMon campaign to bolster his poliMcal career. A similar coaliMon formed when
there was a push to force the resignaMon of Prime Minister Pham Minh Chinh because of
allegaMons his family was involved in corrupt pracMces.
To Lam is a polarizing figure as the last vote of confidence in the NaMonal Assembly showed.
Nearly five hundred depuMes were tasked with assessing the performance of forty-four
ministers and others holding equivalent rank by voMng in one of three categories – high
confidence, confidence and low confidence. To Lam received 100 votes less than those who
received high confidence vote and he ranked thirty-seventh in the number or no confidence
votes received.
Q4. In recent years, Vietnam’s high-level poliMcs seem to have broken the past paIern of
“North-South rotaMon”. What do you think is the main reason for this? Tran Dai Quang, Pham
Minh Chinh and To Lam, all came from the Vietnamese public security department. Does this
mean that the Vietnamese public security ministry is becoming more and more important in
the distribuMon of high-level power in Vietnam?
ANSWER: You quesMon raises two issues – regional representaMon and sectoral
representaMon.
It has been tradiMonal for the party General Secretary to come from the northern region. Two
recent party leaders, Nong Duc Manh and Nguyen Phu Trong, also chaired the NaMonal
Assembly before becoming General Secretary.
The post of state president has rotated equally among the three regions since 1992 if To Lam
is included (see table below)l
Name Term of Office Province of Birth Region
Le Duc Anh 1992-1997 Thua Thien-Hue Central
Tran Duc Luong 1996-2006 Quang Ngai Central
Nguyen Minh Triet 2006-2011 Binh Duong South
Truong Tan Sang 2011-2016 Long An South
Tran Dai Quang 2016-2018 Ninh Binh North
Nguyen Phu Trong 2018-2021 Hanoi North
Nguyen Xuan Phuc 2021-2023 Quang Nam Central
Vo Van Thuong 2023-2024 Vinh Long South
To Lam designate 2004- Hung Yen North
As for sectoral representaMon, some foreign analysts mistakenly group together all officials on
the Central CommiIee who worked in the Ministry of Public Security as if they were a
monolithic bloc seeking to gain power over the party apparatus. It is important to make a
disMncMon between acMve duty members of the Ministry of Public Security (3% of the Central
CommiIee) and individuals whose careers involved service in the Ministry of Public Security
before moving on to other posiMons. For example, the former freewheeling Prime Minister
Nguyen Tan Dung and the current Prime Minister Pham Minh Chinh both served in the
Ministry of Public Security. They have acted independently of their former employer.

hIps://www.scribd.com/document/736448490/Thayer-Will-to-Lam-Become-Vietnam-s-
Next-Party-Leasder.
Is Vietnam’s Party Leadership A Three-Horse Race?

Auer Truong Thi Mai resigned as Permanent Secretary of the Secretariat, senior Vietnamese
military officer General Lương Cường filled the vacant posiMon.
Q1. Does this mean the rise of the military in Vietnam’s poliMcal system?
ANSWER: The Vietnam People’s Army (VPA) has always been accorded bloc representaMon on
the party Central CommiIee and in the NaMonal Assembly. The military bloc on the party
Central CommiIee elected at the thirteenth naMonal congress in 2021 amounted to thirteen
percent as compared to three percent for the bloc allocated to the Ministry of Public Security.
In 1997, Le Kha Phieu, head of the VPA’s General PoliMcal Department, was elected General
Secretary following the resignaMon of Do Muoi before his term expired. Phieu was not re-
elected at the subsequent naMonal party congress.
General Luong Cuong was already a member of the party Secretariat when Truong Thi Mai
resigned. Reportedly, To Lam lobbied to have his deputy minister, General Nguyen Duy Ngoc,
fill the vacancy. A coaliMon blocked Lam’s nominee.
Cuong’s elevaMon to the post of Permanent member of the Secretariat should be viewed as
an indicaMon of the influence of a loose coaliMon opposing To Lam rise rather than a sign of
the VPA’s increased strength.
Q2. Is it possible that Lương Cường will take over to succeed Nguyen Phu Trong as Vietnam’s
top leader in 2026 instead of To Lam?
ANSWER: Luong Cuong has been a member of the Central CommiIee since the eleventh
naMonal congress He is compleMng his first term on the Politburo, a prerequisite for the office
of General Secretary. Cuong was born in 1957 in Phu Tho province in northern Vietnam, a
poliMcal advantage. However, he will be 69 when the fourteenth party congress meets or four
years over the mandatory reMrement age. He would need an exempMon for exemplary service.
Luong Cuong has a theoreMcal long-shot at becoming the next party leader.
There are rumours that the military is pressing for an invesMgaMon into the Xuan Cao Group
(CTCP Xuân Cầu Holdings với Công ty TNHH Đầu tư Địa ốc Thành phố (CityLand)) run by To
Lam’s younger brother.
Q3. Is there a high chance that Vietnam’s Prime Minister Pham Minh Chinh will succeed
Nguyen Phu Trong as party General Secretarty?
ANSWER: Party seniority and province of birth are two important factors in leadership
selecMon. The three most senior members of the Politburo are General Secretary Nguyen Phu
Trong who is compleMng his third term, and Pham Minh Chinh and To Lam, who are both
compleMng their second term. All three were both in northern Vietnam.
It is expected that Trong will reMre at the fourteenth congress, aged 82. He had a stroke in
2019 and was reported ill at the beginning of 2024.
In sum, Pham Minh Chinh, is a potenMal candidate. He will be 68 when the fourteenth
congress meets and will need an exempMon for exemplary service to qualify.
To Lam, if elected as state President during the May session of the NaMonal Assembly, will be
in prime posiMon to become the next party leader. His posiMon will be even stronger if the
NaMonal Assembly permits him to hold the post of Minister of Public Security concurrently. To
Lam will be 69 when the next congress is held and therefore he will have to receive an
exempMon from the mandatory reMrement age on the ground of exemplary service.
Given the latest leadership reshuffle, two other possible candidates stand out – Tran Thanh
Man and Tran Cam Tu. Both will be under the mandatory reMrement age and both will have
completed a full five-year term on the Politburo.
Man was just elevated from Deputy Chairman to Chairman of the NaMonal Assembly. This has
been the stepping stone for the two most recent party leaders, Nong Duc Manh and Nguyen
Phu Trong.
Tu, reputedly a member of the Nghe An facMon, is head of the party’s Central InspecMon
CommiIee and has played a key role in the anM-corrupMon campaign.
hIps://www.scribd.com/document/736449026/Thayer-Is-Vietnam-s-Party-Leadership-A-
Three-Horse-Race.
Has the Public Security Sector Assumed Power in Vietnam?

General Secretary of the NaMonal Assembly Bui Van Cuong told a press conference, "The
Minister of Public Security has not been approved or dismissed at the 9th plenum of the
Communist Party of Vietnam".
Q1. General To Lam will be the first person in Vietnamese history to be both President and
Minister of Public Security. What are the implicaMons for Vietnam's poliMcal future in the short
and in the long term? How should we interpret this event?
ANSWER: The broad context for the current leadership transiMon is that Vietnam’s system of
selecMng its Politburo is scleroMc and offers liIle choice every five years when naMonal party
congresses are held. In the present case, sclerosis has been intensified by the dismissal of six
members of the original eighteen-member Politburo elected at the thirteenth naMonal
congress in 2021.
The case of To Lam concurrently holding two offices is not without precedent. Nguyen Phu
Trong concurrently held the posts of party General Secretary and state President auer the
death of Tran Dai Quang in 2018. Trong held the concurrent posts for two and a half years
(October 2018-April 2021). If Lam holds both posts concurrently for two years, Lam’s case
should be viewed as sui generis or one of a kind.
There are two ways of viewing the implicaMons of To Lam concurrently holding the posts of
President and Public Security Minister.
The first is that this development was an expedient decision by the Politburo because there
were no other viable opMons. Earlier in the year, following the resignaMon of President Vo Van
Thuong, To Lam reportedly declined to fill the vacancy preferring to retain his posiMon as
minister. The Politburo would have found it very difficult this Mme to force To Lam to resign as
minister in order to be elected President.
The second implicaMon is that the decision to let To Lam hold two posts concurrently was a
compromise to maintain stability in the Politburo. Either To Lam will reMre auer the fourteenth
naMonal congress or he will use the presidency as a stepping stone to the post of party General
Secretary.
In August 2002, the first session of the eleventh legislature of the NaMonal Assembly took the
unprecedented step of rejecMng the Prime Minister’s nominaMon of Le Minh Huong as
Minister of Public Security. It will be instrucMve to see how the vote in the NaMonal Assembly
goes for To Lam’s nominaMon as President if he is permiIed to hold the post of Minister of
Public Security at the same Mme. in last year’s vote of confidence by NaMonal Assembly
depuMes, Lam received forty-three low confidence votes, placing him thirty-sixth out of forty-
four high-level officials who were voted on.
Q2. Will this event create a precedent for the next public security ministers? Can the next
generaMon of police ministers conMnue to do what General To Lam has done?
ANSWER To Lam’s case will set a precedent for the future only if he reMres at the expiraMon of
his term in office, that is, in May 2026. In other words, the precedent is to hold two posts
concurrently only when there is an unexpected vacancy. Future Ministers of Public Security
cannot expect to hold two offices concurrently in normal circumstances.
Q3). Among the new Politburo, there are two military generals, General Luong Cuong, who
holds the posiMon of Standing Secretary of the Communist Party of Vietnam Secretariat,
replacing Ms. Truong Thi Mai who was just dismissed, and General Nguyen Trong Nghia who
holds the posiMon of Head of the Central Propaganda Department (Trưởng Ban Tuyên giáo
Trung ương).
In addiMon, there is Mr. Do Van Chien who is an ethnic minority (San Diu ethnic group, Tuyen
Quang province), Ms. Bui Thi Minh Hoai, who holds the posiMon of Head of the Central Mass
MobilizaMon CommiIee, and Mr. Le Minh Hung, former governor of the Central Bank (holding
the posiMon of Head of the Party Central OrganizaMon CommiIee).
Do you think that the military members of the Politburo (Phan Van Giang, Luong Cuong,
Nguyen Trong Nghia) help balance the Politburo members with police backgrounds (To Lam,
Pham Minh Chinh, Nguyen Van Nen, Phan Dinh Trac, Nguyen Hoa Binh)?
ANSWER: The thirteenth naMonal congress determined the quotas to be alloIed to special
blocs on the Central CommiIee. The Ministry of Public Security was allocated three percent
of membership on the Central CommiIee and one seat on the Politburo. The military was
allocated thirteen percent of the seats on the Central CommiIee and two seats on the
Politburo.
As for bloc representaMon, some foreign analysts misleadingly group together all officials on
the Central CommiIee who worked in the Ministry of Public Security as if they were a
monolithic group seeking to exert power over the party apparatus. It is important to make a
disMncMon between acMve duty members of the Ministry of Public Security (three percent of
the Central CommiIee) and individuals whose careers involved service in the Ministry of
Public Security before moving on to other posiMons. They have acted independently of their
former employer. For example, the former freewheeling Prime Minister Nguyen Tan Dung
served in the Ministry of Public Security before moving into the state bureaucracy.
To take another example, Prime Minister Pham Minh Chinh worked for the Ministry of Public
Security from 1985 unMl 2011. His career shiued to the Vietnam Communist Party when he
became Secretary of Quang Ninh province party commiIee and a member of the Central
CommiIee in 2011.
In sum, power has not shiued to the Ministry of Public Security on the Politburo. Besides,
whatever major decisions the Politburo makes must be approved by the Central CommiIee
thirty-seven percent of the seats are held by provincial/municipal representaMves.
hIps://www.scribd.com/document/736449946/Thayer-Has-the-Public-Security-Sector-
Assumed-Power-in-Vietnam.
To Lam’s Grab for Power

The decision by the Central Committee to endorse To Lam as their nominee for state
president raises as many questions as it answers. Lam is bound by the same party directives
he has used so effectively against six members of the Politburo, particularly Regulation No. 8
(October 25, 2018) on the Responsibility to set an Example to cadres, party members first of
all members of the Politburo, members of the Secretariat and members of the Central
Committee.
It is notable that To Lam’s attempt to fill the vacancy on the Secretariat caused by Truong Thi
Mai’s resignation by advancing his depuoty General Nguyen Duy Ngoc did not succeed.
General Luong Cuong from the army filled the position. The army constitutes 13 percent of
the Central Committee, the Ministry of Public Security constitutes only 3 percent. Provincial
party representatives comprise 37 percent of the Central Committee.
The first question is how will the vote for president go in the National Assembly? In last year’s
vote of confidence on forty-four high-level government officials, To Lam scored well below
the top performers in the number of high confidence votes received. He did well in the
number of confidence votes. However, Lam received 43 votes of low confidence placing him
thirty-sixth out of forty-four officials who were voted on.
The second question is who will replace him as Minister of Public Security? Will it be one of
his deputies who is a member of the Central Committee (and also a deputy in the National
Assembly)? Or will it be an appointment from outside this circle?
To Lam doesn’t need to target anyone else on the Politburo in his quest for the party
leadership. To Lam needs the support of the present Central CommiIee to get on the ballot
for the new Central CommiIee. That decision will be made by nearly 1,500 delegates to the
14th party congress. Then the new Central CommiIee will have to vote To Lam on the new
Politburo. Once the Politburo is established, the CenIsal CommiIee will have to elect To Lam
General Secretary.
If To Lam is replaced as Minister of Public Security and elected state President, he will lose
the power he yielded to bring down his potential rivals. This means there should be relative
smooth sailing and stability in the Politburo’s membership over the next nineteen months
until the fourteenth national congress convenes. The Prime Minister may take this
opportunity to address administrative paralysis in approving and utilizing foreign aid and
investment that has been a by-product of the anti-corruption campaign.
Once elected, President To Lam will follow the script that is issued to him when he carries out
his duties as head of state in meeting and greeting foreign counterparts and attending
international meetings.
To Lam could use his position as one of the ‘four pillars’ as a stepping stone to become General
Secretary at the fourteenth national party congress. Lam would need to mobilise his
supporters on the Central Committee to demonstrate to General Secretary Nguyen Phu Trong
and the Personnel Sub-Committee that he has substantial support. If his name is put forward,
Lam would need to perform well in the straw polls that are normally conducted prior to final
selection.
To Lam’s ambitions to become party leader have already produced a pushback by members
of the Central Committee, reportedly including a bevy of provincial leaders who are
concerned about the impact of the campaign against corruption and negative phenomenon
on the stability of their bailiwicks. It should also be recalled that senior members of the party
opposed moves by To Lam to undermine Prime Minister Pham Minh Chinh by investigating
the business interests of his family.
hIps://www.scribd.com/document/736450619/Thayer-Vietnam-To-Lam-s-Grab-for-Power.
Vietnam: Perfec)ng the State Apparatus

To Lam has been removed from his post as Minister of Public Security. What does this
personnel adjustment mean for To Lam? Why did the Vietnamese poliMcal hierarchy finally
make such a decision
ANSWER: When the Central CommiIee of the Vietnam Communist Party made its decision to
nominate To Lam as the next state President it did not make a concurrent decision to require
him to resign as Minister of Public Security.
At a press conference on 19 May, before the NaMonal Assembly met to consider the Central
CommiIee’s nominaMons of fill the vacancies of state President and Chairman of the NaMonal
Assembly, its General Secretary Bui Van Cuong stated “As competent agencies have not yet
nominated personnel for the post of the Minister of Public Security, the legislature will not
work on this posiMon at the meeMng.”
On 20 May, when the NaMonal Assembly met, General Secretary Luong Cuong reported that
there had been a change in the work programme “based on opinions from relevant
authoriMes, the law and on a proposal from the prime minister.” Vietnamese media reported
that Prime Minister Pham Minh Chinh submiIed a proposal to perfect the State apparatus
without providing further details.
On 21 May, General Secretary Cuong presented a report to depuMes on behalf of the Standing
CommiIee of the NaMonal Assembly to adjust its work programme. The depuMes voted to
accept the report 468 votes out of 469 present. As a result, To Lam was relieved from his post
as Minister of Public Security. He was subsequently elected state President on 22 May.
It is likely that the Prime Minister’s report recommended against the state President
simultaneously holding a ministerial post in the Cabinet under the authority of the Prime
Minister. This would have blurred responsibiliMes under the ConsMtuMon.
When President Tran Dai Quang died in office in 2016, his post was held concurrently by the
party General Secretary Nguyen Phu Trong. This did not blur responsibility as senior members
of the Politburo also hold state posiMons including President, Prime Minister and Chair of the
NaMonal Assembly.
President To Lam is now the second ranking leader in Vietnam as one of the ‘four pillars’. He
will serve unMl his term expires in May 2026.
To Lam is one of three members of the current Politburo who has completed one 5-year term
in office. The other members are Prime Minister Pham Minh Chinh and General Secretary
Nguyen Phu Trong. If General Secretary Trong cannot complete his present term prior to the
fourteenth congress scheduled for early 2026, both Chinh and Lam are the most likely
candidates to fill in as party leader.
General Secretary Trong heads the personnel subcommiIee that is veKng candidates for
elecMon to the next Central CommiIee and higher poliMcal office to be elected at the
fourteenth congress.
To Lam is free to put his name forward as a candidate. He would have to be exempted from
the mandatory reMrement age of 65 on the grounds of exemplary service. Also, To Lam would
have to pass successfully through five stages: selecMon by the personnel subcommiIee,
recommended by the Politburo, selected by the current Central CommiIee, elected to the
new Central CommiIee by nearly, 1,500 delegates to the fourteenth congress, elected to the
Politburo by the new Central CommiIee, and once elected to the Politburo be elected by the
new Central CommiIee as party General Secretary.
Tran Quoc To, the Permanent Deputy Minister of Public Security, will serve as AcMng Minister
unMl the Central CommiIee makes a recommendaMon on a new minister. The Central
CommiIee would have to convene a special session or consider this issue at its next plenum
usually held in October. The nominaMon to be appointed Minister of Public Security must be
approved by the NaMonal Assembly.
hIps://www.scribd.com/document/736451346/Thayer-Vietnam-PerfecMng-the-State-
Apparatus.
Leadership Upheaval in Vietnam: Implica)ons for Rela)ons with China

We are preparing a report on Vietnam’s poliMcal turmoil and its possible implicaMons on
foreign policy direcMon and Mes with China in parMcular. We request your assessment of the
following issues.
Q1. Six Politburo members have been removed since December 2022, including two former
state presidents and the chair of the NaMonal Assembly. How do you assess the
unprecedented poliMcal turmoil in Vietnam ahead of the next leadership transiMon in 2026?
ANSWER: Vietnam’s recent leadership turmoil was precipitated by the Minister of Public
Security To Lam weaponizing party directives to force the resignation of six members of the
Politburo as part of party General Secretary Nguyen Phu Trong’s anti-corruption campaign.
Secretary General Trong repeatedly stated that there would be no area off limits. Minister
Lam held the General Secretary to his word and crucially engineered the demise of President
Vo Van Thuong, Trong’s protégé, thus eliminating the most likely candidate to succeed Trong
as party leader in early 2026 at the next national party congress.
Minister Trong also organized the resignation of Vuong Dinh Hue, Chairman of the National
Assembly. This created two vacancies among the leadership’s ‘four pillars’.
Minister Lam may have been too clever by half when he orchestrated the resignation of
Truong Thi Mai, Permanent Secretary of the Secretariat. Mai was tipped to be the nominee
for state president.
When the Politburo decided to elevate Tran Thanh Man, Deputy Chairman of the National
Secretary to the post of Chairman, that left only three possibilities to fill the vacant post of
state president – General Secretary Trong, Prime Minister Pham Minh Chinh and Minister of
Public Security To Lam.
Trong had previously held the posts of party General Secretary and state President
concurrently after the death of President Tran Dai Quang in 2018. However, Trong’s health
and heavy work load in preparing for the fourteenth party congress likely ruled out this
scenario. Similarly, nominating Prime Minister Chinh would have created another vacancy
among the four pillars.
Minister Lam, therefore, was the default choice. However, the Politburo could not reach
agreement on who should replace him as Public Security Minister. To Lam’s nomination was
transmitted to the National Assembly for its consideration. Within twenty-four hours the
National Assembly approved Prime Minister Chinh’s report on perfecting the state apparatus.
Immediately after Lam’s election as state President, he was relieved from his ministerial post.
Q2. With the rise of the country’s top policeman and other perceived hardliners amid
intensifying infighting within the ruling party, do you think the turbulence will have a lasting
impact on the country’s political stability, economy and overall development, including a
further shift toward an inward-looking, authoritarian state?
ANSWER: Reports that To Lam will be the next party leader and that a network of conservative
hard-line public security old boys will usher in an era of authoritarian rule are greatly
exaggerated. Some foreign analysts have inflated the size of the public security network by
including both active duty officials and individuals who once worked for the Public Security
Ministry.
The thirteenth national congress elected a Central Committee of which 3% were members of
the public security bloc, 17% were from the military bloc, and 37% from the provincial
government bloc. The Public Security bloc was given one seat on the Politburo, the military
was given two. This balance has not changed. If anything, the military bloc’s influence may
have increased slightly by the elevation of Politburo-member General Luong Cuong from
member of the Secretariat to Permanent Secretary.1
In the meantime, Prime Minister Chinh appointed Deputy Minister of Public Security Senior
Lt. General Tran Quoc To as Acting Minister to serve until his term expires in May 2026, or
earlier if the Central Committee appoints a new minister.
Vietnam is likely to remain politically stable until early 2026 now that all vacancies among the
‘four pillars’ have been filled. While there has been temporary disruption of the Politburo,
the Central Committee retains its role as the final arbiter of personnel decisions. Political
turmoil at the top has not affected Vietnam’s sixty-three provinces and five municipalities.
Vietnam’s economic and development policies are set in stone. There is every indication that
Vietnam will continue to seek to actively and proactively pursue economic integration
through its sixteen free trade agreements and thirty formal partnerships.
Vietnam will remain a one-party state and there is little indication that the present political
turmoil will result in a more inward-looking, authoritarian state.
Q3. What are the possible diplomatic implications of Vietnam’s political turmoil?
ANSWER: Vietnam’s swift appointment of To Lam as state President means that normal
diplomatic exchanges, some of which were postponed, can be resumed. Recall that the King
and Queen from the Netherlands had to postpone their visit to Hanoi. Recently, Hon. Sue
Lines, the President of Australia’s Senate, had to cancel her planned visit. And there were
reports that Vladimir Putin’s rumoured visit to Hanoi was put on hold until the leadership
issue is resolved.
There has been no perceptible impact on Vietnam’s major foreign policies as a result of
leadership ructions in Hanoi.
Q4. Should Beijing feel concerned about what’s been happening in Hanoi? Some say the
personnel changes in Vietnam’s leadership reflect Hanoi’s growing concerns about regime
survival and color revolution amid its balancing between Beijing and Washington and will
result in the country’s tilt towards China and away from the West. Do you agree?
ANSWER: The survival of Vietnam’s one-party state is not under major threat nor has the
legitimacy of the Vietnam Communist Party, as perceived by its citizens, been seriously
undermined by recent turmoil among Politburo members. The party Central Committee
remains the arbiter of personnel appointments and foreign and economic policy.
The terms colour revolution and peaceful evolution surface in official discourse from time to
time, such as Secretariat Directive 24. These are more rhetorical flourishes by conservative
security officials tasked with counter-espionage than an indication that regime survival is
threatened by a mass popular movement inside Vietnam.
A senior economist with decades of experience in Vietnam recently reported that so-called
instability at the top is not mirrored in Vietnam’s provinces. These provinces are a diverse lot
and they are all going about their own business.
1
In 2021, Senior Lt. General Nguyen Trong Nghia left his post as Deputy Head of the military’s General
Political Department to become head of the Party Central Committee’s Commission for Information
and Education. He was one of four persons elected to the Politburo in May 2024.
Western observers who opine that Vietnam will tilt towards China and away from the West
are myopic. Vietnam has been on a steady course of diversifying and multilateralizing its
foreign relations for more than three decades. Vietnam has issued four Defence White papers
(1998, 2004, 2009, 2019). All have all reiterated Vietnam’s policy of three no’s: no joining
military alliances, no siding with one country against another, and no foreign military bases.
A fourth no was added to the most recent 2019 White Paper – no using force or the threat of
force.
Vietnam has and will continue to go out of its way to develop all round cooperative relations
with its partners, especially its seven top tier comprehensive strategic partners: Russia, China,
India, South Korea, United States, Japan, and Australia. One indication of Vietnam balancing
act is that as Chinese exports to the U.S. decline, Vietnamese exports to the US increase based
on a rise in Chinese exports to Vietnam.
https://www.scribd.com/document/736452101/Thayer-Leadership-Upheaval-in-Vietnam-
Implications-for-Relations-With-China.
Carlyle A. Thayer Biography

Professional Background
Carlyle (Carl) Alan Thayer is Emeritus Professor of Politics, School of
Humanities and Social Sciences, The University of New South Wales
(UNSW) at the Australian Defence Force Academy (ADFA), Canberra.
He is also Director of Thayer Consultancy, a small business registered
in Australia in 2002 that provides political analysis of current regional
security issues and other research support to selected clients.
Professional Career
Carl Thayer was educated at Brown University where he majored in Political Science (B.A.
1967). He holds an M.A. in Southeast Asian Studies from Yale (1971) and a PhD in International
Relations from The Australian National University (ANU, 1977). He studied Thai language at
The University of Missouri at Columbia (1965), Vietnamese language at Yale and Cornell
(1969-71), and Lao and Vietnamese languages at Southern Illinois University, Carbondale
(1971). Thayer also holds a Certificate in National Security from the Institute of Political
Science, Christian Albrechts Universität, Kiel, Federal Republic of Germany (1987).
After graduating from Brown, Carl served in the Republic of Vietnam with the International
Voluntary Services (1967-68) and as a volunteer secondary school teacher in the Republic of
Botswana with the Unitarian Universalist Service Committee (1968-69).
He began his professional career as a Tutor in Department of Asian Civilisation at the ANU
(1973-74). He commenced his academic career as Lecturer at the Bendigo Institute of
Technology, Victoria in 1975 (renamed the Bendigo College of Advanced Education in 1976).
In 1979, he joined The University of New South Wales (UNSW) and taught first in its Faculty
of Military Studies at The Royal Military College-Duntoon (1979-85) and then at the Australian
Defence Force Academy (1985-2010). He served as Head of the School of Politics from 1995-
97. In 1998, he was promoted to full Professor. During 2007-08 and 2010 he directed Regional
Security Studies at the Australian Command and Staff College while teaching at UNSW
Canberra. Upon retirement in 2010 he was conferred the title Emeritus Professor.
Thayer served three major periods away from UNSW@ADFA:
• From 1992-95, he was seconded to the Regime Change and Regime Maintenance Project,
Department of Political and Social Change, Research School of Pacific and Asian Studies,
ANU to conduct research on Vietnamese domestic politics.
• From 1999-2002, he was granted ‘leave in the national interest’ to take up the position of
Professor of Southeast Asian Security Studies and Deputy Chair of the Department of
Regional Studies at the Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies (APCSS), U.S. Pacific
Command, Hawaii. He revised the curriculum for the Executive Course and was an original
contributor to the Senior Executive Course (two-three star/vice-ministerial level).
• From 2002 to 2004, Carl was seconded to Deakin University as On-Site Academic Co-
ordinator of the Defence and Strategic Studies Course, Australia’s senior defence course,
at the Centre for Defence and Strategic Studies (CDSS) at the Australian Defence College,
Weston Creek.
During his career, Professor Thayer undertook special study leave at the ANU’s Strategic and
Defence Studies Centre; Harvard’s Center for International Affairs; International Institute of
Strategic Studies in London; Institute of Strategic and International Studies, Chulalongkorn
University in Thailand; Institute of Southeast Asian Studies in Singapore; and the Department
of Political Science at Yale.
In 1993, in a career highlight, he was appointed a United Nations observer for elections in
Cambodia.
Service to the Profession
Thayer was a founding member of the Vietnam Studies Association of Australia and served
three terms as National Secretary/Treasurer (1994-98). He also served as National Secretary
of the Asian Studies Association of Australia (1996-98).
Professional Recognition
In June 1971, Thayer was the Graduate School flag bearer for the 270th commencement
ceremonies at Yale University.
In 2003, Thayer was conferred the Joint Meritorious Service Award by the Chairman of the
Joint Chiefs of Staff for his contributions to the Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies, U.S.
Pacific Command.
In 2005, Thayer was appointed the C. V. Starr Distinguished Visiting Professor of Southeast
Asian Studies at The Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies, Johns Hopkins
University in Washington, D.C.
In 2006, Thayer was awarded the Rector’s Commendation for Excellence in Classroom
Teaching at UNSW Canberra.
In 2008, Thayer was appointed the Inaugural Frances M. and Stephen H. Fuller Distinguished
Visiting Professor of Southeast Asian Studies conjointly at the Center for International Affairs
and Center for Southeast Asian Studies at Ohio University, Athens, Ohio.
In 2014, Thayer was invited as a Subject Matter Expert to address the 2nd Expanded ASEAN
Maritime Forum in Da Nang, Vietnam.
In 2015, Thayer was invited as a Subject Matter Expert to address the ASEAN-China Joint
Working Group on the Implementation of the DOC Seminar-Workshop on the
Implementation of the 2002 ASEAN-China Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South
China Sea (DOC-SCS) in Manila, The Philippines.
In April 2015, Thayer was appointed Eminent Person by the Department of Defence Australian
Civil-Military Centre, to facilitate the East Asia Summit mandated Rapid Disaster Response:
Lessons Learned Seminar held in Sydney in September that was attended by senior officials
from fifteen countries. Thayer wrote the Seminar Discussion Paper.
In April 2020, Professor Thayer was inducted into the Marquis Who’s Who Biographical
Registry and in Marquis Who’s Who Top Professionals.
In 2023, Professor Thayer was the Mace Bearer for graduation ceremonies at UNSW
Canberra.
In April 2024, ScholarGPS.com ranked Carl Thayer among the top 0.05% of all scholars
worldwide for his prolific publication record, high impact, and outstanding quality of his
scholarly contributions. Thayer was ranked 8th globally as a Highly Ranked Scholar across all
disciplines for my lifetime work on Vietnam and 1st among Australian social scientists
specialising on Vietnam.
Source: hIps://research.unsw.edu.au/people/emeritus-professor-carlyle-alan-thayer

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Leadership Change

Thayer Consultancy Reader No. 13

Leadership Change in Vietnam: A Reader\

Is Vietnam Entering Uncharted Waters?......................................................................................................... 4

Vietnam: Nguyen Phu Trong’s Life & Legacy ................................................................................................... 7

Vietnam’s Politburo Issues Direc)ve 24 on Na)onal Security ....................................................................... 11

Does Vietnam View Interna)onal Integra)on a Threat to Na)onal Security? ............................................... 15

Vo Van Thuong Resigns as Vietnam’s President – 1 ...................................................................................... 19

Vo Van Thuong Resigns as Vietnam’s President – 2 ...................................................................................... 20

Vo Van Thuong Resigns as Vietnam’s President – 3 ...................................................................................... 21

Vo Van Thuong Resigns as Vietnam’s President – 4 ...................................................................................... 22

Vo Van Thuong Resigns as Vietnam’s President – 5 ...................................................................................... 23

Who Will be Nguyen Phu Trong’s Successor? ............................................................................................... 25

Personnel Issues Facing Vietnam’s Party Leadership .................................................................................... 27

Vietnam’s President Resigns: Should Investors be Worried?......................................................................... 30

Van Thinh Phat Group and Accountability .................................................................................................... 35

Truong My Lan and the Vietnam Communist Party ...................................................................................... 40

Implica)ons of Leadership Change in Vietnam ............................................................................................. 41

Should Investors Be Concerned By Poli)cal Instability in Vietnam? .............................................................. 42

To Lam Last Man Standing?.......................................................................................................................... 43

Will To Lam Become Vietnam’s Next Party Leader? ...................................................................................... 44

Is Vietnam’s Party Leadership A Three-Horse Race? ..................................................................................... 48

Has the Public Security Sector Assumed Power in Vietnam? ........................................................................ 49

To Lam’s Grab for Power .............................................................................................................................. 51

Vietnam: Perfec)ng the State Apparatus ..................................................................................................... 52

Leadership Upheaval in Vietnam: Implica)ons for Rela)ons with China....................................................... 53

Carlyle A. Thayer Biography ......................................................................................................................... 56

Is Vietnam Entering Uncharted Waters?

Vietnam: Nguyen Phu Trong’s Life & Legacy

Vietnam’s Politburo Issues Direc)ve 24 on Na)onal Security

Does Vietnam View Interna)onal Integra)on a Threat to Na)onal Security?

empowers the EU to partially or fully suspend an agreement unilaterally in case of a breach

Vo Van Thuong’s Resigna)on Will Throw a Spanner into Vietnam’s Leadership

Vo Van Thuong Resigns as Vietnam’s President – 1

Vo Van Thuong Resigns as Vietnam’s President – 2

Thayer Consultancy Background Brief, March 21, 2024.

Vo Van Thuong Resigns as Vietnam’s President – 4

Vo Van Thuong Resigns as Vietnam’s President – 5

Who Will be Nguyen Phu Trong’s Successor?

Personnel Issues Facing Vietnam’s Party Leadership

Vietnam’s President Resigns: Should Investors be Worried?

- By 2030, Vietnam aims to become a developing country with the modern-oriented

Source: S & P Global Market Intelligence

If you look at the situaMon in Vietnam, we have collecMve leadership, we have

Van Thinh Phat Group and Accountability

Vietnam: From Four to Two Leadership Pillars?

Q6. Do you believe that the anM-corrupMon campaign will conMnue?

Truong My Lan and the Vietnam Communist Party

Implica)ons of Leadership Change in Vietnam

Should Investors Be Concerned By Poli)cal Instability in Vietnam?

To Lam Last Man Standing?

Will To Lam Become Vietnam’s Next Party Leader?

Name Term of Office Province of Birth Region

Le Duc Anh 1992-1997 Thua Thien-Hue Central

Tran Duc Luong 1996-2006 Quang Ngai Central

Nguyen Minh Triet 2006-2011 Binh Duong South

Truong Tan Sang 2011-2016 Long An South

Tran Dai Quang 2016-2018 Ninh Binh North

Nguyen Phu Trong 2018-2021 Hanoi North