The Buddhist Philosophy of Universal Flux

Chapter XXI - The Theory of Perception as propounded

parent: Part II - Logic and Epistemology

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Perception according to Dharmakīrti consists in the apprehension of an object in its own specific
character (svalakṣaṇa) having nothing in common with other objects similar or dissimilar and is
thus completely free from association with names and verbal expressions—an association which
presupposes and is made possible by relational thought. The object of perception is the reality
which is immediately revealed to the mind and not such other ideas as generality (sāmānya),
quality (guṇa), action (kriyā), substratum (dravya), or name (nāman), which are not a part of the
presented sense-data but are supplied by imagination (vikalpa). The criterion of reality from
unreal creation of fancy or imagination is this: that which by its position of nearness or distance
affects the presentative character of perception is alone real. Thus, a jug or rather its presentation
is seen to vary as faint or distinct according to its situation in relation to the percipient. But ah
idea, which is supplied by memory-association or conjured up in imagination, does not undergo
any variation whether the object represented be situated near to or distant from the perceiving
subject. This reality is alone endowed with practical efficiency (arthakriyā-kāritva) and not the
fancied or inferred object, which is not presented through sense-medium. The test of reality
therefore is practical efficiency alone and not any thing else.

The Theory of Perception of Dharmakīrti, or of the Sautrāntika school for the matter of that
whose system is expounded by Dharmakīrti in his Nyāyabindu, is rather an intricate one. All
existents being momentary in character, the thing that is in contact with the sense-organ at one
moment is not contemporaneous with the idea that springs up in the mind at the second moment.
Thus perception is impossible inasmuch as the mind cannot come in direct relation with the
extra-mental reality but through the medium of sense-organs only. In view of this difficulty it has
been postulated that a sense-object has the power to leave behind an impress of its image in the
consciousness through the sense-channel. By virtue of this peculiar efficiency a sense-object is
regarded as an object of perception. What really is immediately perceived is not the external
[1]

object but a copy or image of it imprinted on the consciousness. And this mental image is
regarded as a faithful representation—an exact copy of the extramental reality existing in its own
right. It is evident therefore that external reality can never be an immediate object of perception
but can at best be mediately known—in other words, it can only be inferred by its supposed
likeness presented in the idea. Perception of an external object is therefore only the perception of
the idea believed to be a copy or picture of the same.

In this connection an interesting but extremely difficult question has been raised as to the
immediate cause of perceptual knowledge (pramāṇa). Our consciousness is seen to be ever
active varying with a constantly variable content. The conscious character is however common to
all the different cognitions forming the sumtotal of consciousness, the differentiating factor being
the varying contents. What is the cause of this variation of contents in consciousness? Certainly,
the Sautrāntika observes, it is nothing but the objective reality lying outside the mind but coming
in contact with it.

But this objective reality lying outside the mind, cannot, as has been shown above, be directly
cognised by the mind because of its momentary character. It is only the image or copy of it that
is directly cognised and the supposed likeness of the percept, that is the idea in the mind, to the
extra-mental reality is to be regarded as the cause and warrant of its validity (arthasārūpyam
asya pramāṇam, tadvaśād arthapratītisiddheh); and the cognition as such is regarded as the
resultant of the same. Thus, the cognition of ‘blue’ has a particular form which is different from
that of the cognition of ‘red.’ The conscient character is common to both; what varies is only the
form, that is, the content. So the immediate cause of a particular cognition (pramāṇam) is the
form or the likeness impressed on it and not sense-organs as supposed by the Naiyāyikas. It is the
particular form or likeness which determines the character of a cognition and not sense-organ,
which is common to cognitions of red, blue, white and so forth. [2]

A difficulty has been raised in this connection by rival schools of thinkers. The cognition and its
likeness (sārūpyam) are not two distinct things but one. So Dharmakīrti makes the same
thing pramāṇa (cause of knowledge) and pramāṇaphala (the resultant cognition), which is
absurd. Pramaṇa is the cause of cognition and the effect of it is the cognition itself revealing a
particular object. To make the same thing both cause and effect only betrays confusion of
[3]

thought.

In reply to this objection Dharmottara says that the relation of pramāṇa and pramā is not a
causal relation but one of determination. When in contradistinction to the perception of a red
object we have a cognition of blue, we feel that the particular cognition refers to a thing which is
different from the red that was perceived immediately before. What enables us to differentiate
the cognition of blue from the cognition of red is the peculiar blue-form experienced in the
percept. Thus the cognition is ascertained to be one of blue and not of any other, only when the
particular likeness imprinted on it is perceived.
[4]

So the objection that the same cognition cannot be both pramāṇa and pramā has no force as the
relation supposed is not one of cause and effect but that of determinant and determinable. They
[5]

are one as relating to one single cognition, but different only on account of one aspect having a
determining force and the other being determined. [6]

We have seen how the selfsame cognition can alternately discharge the dual function
of pramāṇa and pramā, in other words, how a cognition can be both the condition and the result
of itself. It is effected by a change of emphasis. Thus when the emphasis is laid upon the
particular form of the cognition, the form is regarded as the condition of perceptual knowledge
and when the emphasis is transferred to the quality of consciousness endowed with a particular
content, the consciousness is said to be determined or conditioned by the likeness imprinted on
it, which is thus regarded as the determining condition. The Buddhists had recourse to this rather
cumbrous theory because they did not acknowledge the existence of a separate spirit-entity
standing aloof behind the mental apparatus and illumining the psychical processes going on
therein. The Jainas are at one in this respect with the Buddhists, as they also denied the existence
of a spirit-entity as separate and distinct from the mind. The logical consequence of this
[7]

identification of consciousness with the varying mental states has been the doctrine of
momentary consciousness—consciousness reduced to a series of transitory mental states in
perpetual flux. The notion of continuity has been explained away as an illusion, being due to the
homogeneity and the free unimpeded career of the conscious states. The Jainas have avoided this
consequence by their peculiar doctrine of relativity (anekāntavāda), which possesses the
miraculous efficiency of reconciling all contradiction.

The Sāṃkhyas and the Vedāntists have avoided this pitfall by positing the existence of a spirit-
entity standing aloof, detached and unaffected by the varying psychical processes though
animating them all the while with the light of knowledge. The consciousness in the psychical
states is only apparent; it is at best borrowed from the eternal spirit-entity (sākṣī). But with the
Buddhists and the Jainas there is no soul distinct from the mind. Vijñānabhikṣu is very severe
upon the Buddhists for their identifying consciousness with the passing psychical states with the
result that consciousness has been reduced to a congeries of momentary conscious units having
no real nexus between. [8]

Be that as it may, a question has been raised as to why a perception free from determination
(nirvikalpa) is alone regarded as reliable evidence of reality, though it has no practical utility
unless and until it is made determinate. It can be converted into useful knowledge only when
determinative reflection (vikalpa) is brought to bear upon it and this determinative process is
considered to be purely intellectual having nothing to do with reality proper. Indeterminate
perception however has no practical value unless and until it is determined as perception of some
thing. And this determination is rendered possible only by the reflective, intellectual activity,
which certifies ‘it is blue that is perceived and not red or any other thing.’ Unless and until it is
determined as such, the experience is as good as non-existent (asatkalpa), because it cannot lead
to any activity and so there is no acquisition of any thing. As perception, determined by an
intellectual activity is alone endowed with practical efficiency, it is determined perception
(savikalpa pratyakṣa) that should alone be regarded as valid experience (pramāṇa)’, and
if vikalpa is invalid by its very nature, how cau it refrain from infecting it with its own
invalidity?[9]

To this Dharmottara says that there are two kinds of vikalpa and though both the varieties are
equally unreliable and invalid by their very constitution, there is a vital difference in their
functional character. There is a kind of vikalpa which interprets the perceptual experience and
makes it clear and intelligible. It does not assert its independence but functions in the
background. The other variety of vikalpa is pure imagination without any touch with external
reality. This latter variety is absolutely unreliable as evidence of reality. But the reflective
thought, which arises in the trail of perception and is generated under its influence
(pratyakṣabalotpanna), stands in a different category. It does not assert its independence as pure
imagination does, but only serves to determine the perceptual knowledge as knowledge of
something. The nirvikalpaka perception is a simple, homogeneous, unitary cognition, in which
the subject and the object, perception and perceptual matter, are not distinguished but given in a
lump, as it were. But such knowledge is entirely useless and has no pragmatic value. It is only
when perceptual knowledge is interpreted by a subsequent act of reflection, which analyses it
into a subjective and an objective element and imposes a relation upon them, that it can be made
useful in our practical life. It is however the primary, homogeneous experience (nirvikalpa
pratyakṣa) that can be accepted as reliable testimony of the external reality and the reflective
thought and the relational knowledge, which is the result of it, are purely subjective facts and are
no index to the objective reality—the thing-in-itself (svalakṣaṇa). But the purely subjective
character of this reflective process, which is necessary for the interpretation of perception, does
not in any way detract from or add to the evidentiary value of perceptual knowledge. The
analytic-cum-synthetic process, which is involved in the reflective activity, gives us purely
perceptual data and not imaginary things. It is perception all the while even when interpreted by
reflective thought. This interpretation only serves to put the perceptual knowledge in a clear light
and neither supersedes nor overshadows it. The contention that perceptual knowledge together
with vikalpa should be held as valid testimony therefore falls to the ground. Vikalpa is purely
subjective and though requisitioned to interpret perceptual experience does not enter into the
composition of the perceptual data. The apprehension therefore that vikalpa should infect
perceptual knowledge with its own invalid character is without a foundation and only betrays
lack of clear vision. The vikalpa, which is imagination pure and simple, is absolutely without
touch with reality. It only gives us purely fictitious data, in which our knowledge is of the form ‘I
imagine the blue’ and not ‘I perceive the blue.’ It is not attended with that sentiment of belief and
sense of security which invariably distinguish perceptual knowledge. This distinction in this
[10]

functional character is fundamental and must be kept in view for our proper understanding of
Dharmakīrti’s theory of Perception.