11.

Drones and the Ethics of Targeted Killing

Chapter 1: Introduction to Drones and Targeted Killing

[mh]History of Drone Technology

Unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) are aircraft with no on-board crew or passengers. They can be
automated ‘drones’ or remotely piloted vehicles (RPVs). UAV’s can fly for long periods of time at a
controlled level of speed and height and have a role in many aspects of aviation.

The first pilotless vehicles were developed in Britain and the USA during the First World War. Britain’s
Aerial Target, a small radio-controlled aircraft, was first tested in March 1917 while the American aerial
torpedo known as the Kettering Bug first flew in October 1918. Although both showed promise in flight
tests, neither were used operationally during the war.

During the inter-war period the development and testing of unmanned aircraft continued. In 1935 the
British produced a number of radio-controlled aircraft to be used as targets for training purposes. It's
thought the term 'drone' started to be used at this time, inspired by the name of one of these models, the
DH.82B Queen Bee. Radio-controlled drones were also manufactured in the United States and used for
target practice and training.

Reconnaissance UAVs were first deployed on a large scale in the Vietnam War. Drones also began to be
used in a range of new roles, such as acting as decoys in combat, launching missiles against fixed targets
and dropping leaflets for psychological operations.

Following the Vietnam War other countries outside of Britain and the United States began to explore
unmanned aerial technology. New models became more sophisticated, with improved endurance and the
ability to maintain greater height. In recent years models have been developed that use technology such as
solar power to tackle the problem of fuelling longer flights.

Drones now have many functions, ranging from monitoring climate change to carrying out search
operations after natural disasters, photography, filming, and delivering goods. But their most well-known
and controversial use is by the military for reconnaissance, surveillance and targeted attacks. Since the
9/11 terrorist attacks, the United States in particular has significantly increased its use of drones. They are
mostly used for surveillance in areas and terrains where troops are unable to safely go. But they are also
used as weapons and have been credited with killing suspected militants. Their use in current conflicts
and over some countries has raised questions about the ethics of this kind of weaponry, especially when it
results in civilian deaths, either due to inaccurate data or because of their proximity to a ‘target’.

UAVs are aircraft that are guided autonomously, by remote control, or by both means and that carry some
combination of sensors, electronic receivers and transmitters, and offensive ordnance. They are used for
strategic and operational reconnaissance and for battlefield surveillance, and they can also intervene on
the battlefield—either indirectly, by designating targets for precision-guided munitions dropped or fired
from manned systems, or directly, by dropping or firing these munitions themselves.

The earliest UAVs were known as remotely piloted vehicles (RPVs) or drones. Drones were small radio-
controlled aircraft first used during World War II as targets for fighters and antiaircraft guns. They fell
into two categories: small, inexpensive, and often expendable vehicles used for training; and, from the
1950s, larger and more sophisticated systems recovered by radio-controlled landing or parachute. The
vehicles were typically fitted with reflectors to simulate the radar return of enemy aircraft, and it soon
occurred to planners that they might also be used as decoys to help bombers penetrate enemy defenses.

It also occurred to planners that RPVs could be used for photographic and electronic reconnaissance. One
result of this idea was the AQM-34 Firebee, a modification of a standard U.S. target drone built in various
versions since about 1951 by the Ryan Aeronautical Company. First flown in 1962, the reconnaissance
Firebee saw extensive service in Southeast Asia during the Vietnam War. It was also used over North
Korea and, until rapprochement in 1969, over the People’s Republic of China. A swept-wing, turbojet-
powered subsonic vehicle about one-third the size of a jet fighter, the AQM-34 penetrated heavily
defended areas at low altitudes with impunity by virtue of its small radar cross section, and it brought
back strikingly clear imagery. Firebees fitted with receivers to detect electronic countermeasures returned
intelligence about Soviet-built surface-to-air missiles that enabled American engineers to design
appropriate detection and jamming equipment.

Figure: Northrop Grumman RQ-4 Global Hawk, a strategic-range unmanned aerial vehicle used by the
U.S Air Force to relay intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance data to fighting units on the ground.

AQM-34s operated with the limitations of 1960s technology: they carried film cameras, were launched
from underwing pylons on a C-130 Hercules transport plane, and were recovered by parachute—snagged
from the air by a harness hung from a helicopter. The full advantages of UAVs were to remain
unexploited on a large scale until the 1980s, when reliable miniaturized avionics combined with
developments in sensors and precision-guided munitions to increase the capabilities of these vehicles
dramatically. One critical development was small high-resolution television cameras carried in gimbaled
turrets beneath a UAV’s fuselage and remotely controlled via a reliable digital downlink and uplink.
Often, the vehicles also carried a laser designator for homing munitions. Global positioning system (GPS)
sensors provided precise location information for both the UAVs and their guided munitions. Employing
these new technologies, the United States has fielded strategic-range UAVs, using communications
satellites to relay control signals and sensor readouts between UAVs and control centres over global
distances. For instance, in 2003 Ryan (which had been purchased by Teledyne, Inc., in 1968 and by
Northrop Grumman Corp. in 1999) produced the first of a series of RQ-4 Global Hawk UAVs. The
Global Hawk is capable of carrying a wide array of optical, infrared, and radar sensors and takes off from
and lands on a runway. Its service ceiling of 65,000 feet (20,000 metres), its relatively small size, and the
reach of its sensors render it effectively immune to surface-based defensive systems. Prototype Global
Hawks were pressed into wartime use over Afghanistan in 2002 and over Iraq as early as 2003. They are
currently the most important strategic-range UAVs in service.

The advantages of strategic UAVs notwithstanding, the emergent technologies described above were first
exploited in war by Israeli battlefield UAVs. The first of these was the Tadiran Mastiff, a twin-boom
aircraft introduced in 1975 that resembled a large model airplane weighing just over 90 kg (200 pounds)
with a boxy fuselage and a pusher propeller driven by a small piston engine. It could be catapulted from a
truck-mounted ramp, launched by rocket booster, or operated from a runway. The Mastiff and the larger
but similar Scout, produced by Israeli Aircraft Industries (IAI), proved effective in identifying and
locating surface-to-air missiles and marking them for destruction during hostilities in Lebanon in 1982.
The U.S. Marine Corps procured the Mastiff, and it followed up this vehicle with the IAI-designed and
U.S.-built RQ-2 Pioneer, a slightly larger vehicle with secure up- and downlink. The Pioneer, fielded in
1986, was used by the Marine Corps and Navy in the Persian Gulf War of 1990–91. Meanwhile, the U.S.
Army promoted the development of a similar but still larger UAV, the Israeli-designed RQ-5 Hunter,
which had a gross weight of 1,600 pounds (720 kg) and was propelled by both pusher and tractor
propellers. Although not procured in quantity, Hunters served in the 2003 invasion of Iraq.

Following the lead of Israel, the United States has aggressively developed UAVs. The most important
UAV in operational use is the General Atomics MQ-1 Predator, powered by a piston engine driving a
pusher propeller. The Predator entered service in 1995 and, after initial problems, developed into a
capable surveillance craft carrying a wide variety of optical, infrared, electronic, and radar sensors. The
first operational use of armed UAVs involved Predators carrying antitank missiles and operated by the
Central Intelligence Agency during the 2001 invasion of Afghanistan. However, Predators are operated
mainly by the U.S. Air Force, often to locate and mark targets for heavily armed fighter-bombers or
gunships. Supplementing the MQ-1 is General Atomics’ MQ-9 Reaper, a larger version of the Predator
powered by a turboprop engine. The Reaper can carry some 3,000 pounds (1,360 kg) of ordnance and
external fuel and has a significantly higher service ceiling than the Predator. It entered operations over
Afghanistan in the autumn of 2007. Predators and Reapers have been purchased by allies of the United
States, notably the United Kingdom.

Figure: unmanned aerial vehicle

All major military powers and even some militia groups employ battlefield surveillance UAVs to extend
the view of ground and naval forces and to enhance the reach and accuracy of their supporting fire. For
example, in its conflict with Israel, the Lebanese group Hezbollah has used the Iranian-built Ababil
(“Swallow”), a vehicle with a wingspan of 3.25 metres (10 feet 8 inches) that is powered by a pusher
propeller and launched either from a truck-mounted pneumatic launcher or by a booster rocket. Tactical
surveillance craft range in sophistication from vehicles that, like the Ababil, loiter over battlefields
acquiring and designating targets to hand-launched “mini-UAVs” carrying a single visible- or infrared-
spectrum television camera. An early example of the latter is the U.S. AeroVironment FQM-151 Pointer,
a UAV weighing less than 10 pounds (4.5 kg) and resembling a powered model sailplane. The Pointer
first saw service with the U.S. Marine Corps in the Persian Gulf War. It is being replaced by the Puma, a
development of the Pointer with more-advanced sensors, by the RQ-11 Raven, a scaled-down version of
the Puma, and by the Wasp, a tiny vehicle weighing about 1 pound (less than half a kilogram) with a
wingspan of 2 feet 4.5 inches (72 cm); the last is being issued to air force ground combat control teams as
well as marines down to the platoon level.

Figure: Northrop Grumman MQ-8 Fire Scout, a hovering unmanned aerial vehicle, approaching a U.S.
Navy amphibious transport dock ship, 2006.

In 1997 the U.S. Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) began to fund feasibility studies
of extremely small “micro UAVs” no larger than 6 inches (15 cm). These studies (and similar studies
conducted since 2003 in Israel) have produced a bewildering variety of designs powered by electric
motors or tiny gas turbines the size of a watch battery, but no publicly acknowledged use has yet been
found for them.

The next wave of UAV development is likely to be so-called uninhabited combat air vehicles (UCAVs).
If the experimental Boeing X-45 and Northrop Grumman X-47 are representative of these vehicles, they
will resemble small B-2 Spirit stealth bombers and will vary in size from one-third to one-sixth the gross
weight of a single-seat fighter-bomber. They will most likely supplement or even replace piloted fighter-
bombers in the attack role in high-threat environments. Finally, large, extremely light solar-powered
“endurance UAVs” have been flown in order to test the feasibility of communications and surveillance
vehicles that would stay on station at high altitude for months or even years at a time.

[mh] Evolution of Targeted Killing Tactics

[h]Targeted killing

Targeted killing is a form of assassination carried out by governments outside a judicial procedure or a
battlefield.

Since the late 20th century, the legal status of targeted killing has become a subject of contention within
and between various nations. Historically, at least since the mid-eighteenth century, Western thinking has
generally considered the use of assassination as a tool of statecraft to be illegal. Some academics, military
personnel and officials describe targeted killing as legitimate within the context of self-defense, when
employed against terrorists or combatants engaged in asymmetrical warfare. They argue that unmanned
combat aerial vehicles (drones) are more humane and more accurate than manned vehicles.

Scholars are also divided as to whether targeted killings are an effective counterterrorism strategy.

Targeted killings have also been used in Somalia, Kenya, Rwanda and in Libya.
[h]Somalia and Rwanda, 1990s

During fighting in the Somali Civil War, Sean Devereux described torture and killing by warlords in
Kismayo as "targeted killings, a kind of ethnic cleansing", shortly before his assassination.

Also in Africa, Reuters described "targeted killings of political opponents" by Hutu army and militias in
Rwanda during the Rwandan genocide. The American State Department reported the "politically targeted
killings" were a prelude to general massacres in Rwanda.

[h]Americas

During the 1980s and 1990s, targeted killings were employed extensively by death squads in El Salvador,
Nicaragua, Colombia, and Haiti within the context of civil unrest and war.

Starting under the George W. Bush Administration, targeted killings became a frequent tactic of the
United States government in the War on Terror. Instances of targeted killing by the United States that
have received significant attention include the killing of Osama bin Laden in 2011 and the killing of
Ayman al-Zawahiri in 2022, as well as those of American citizens Anwar al-Awlaki and his teenage son
in 2011. Under the Obama administration, use of targeted killings expanded, most frequently through use
of combat drones operating in Afghanistan, Pakistan or Yemen.

[h]American and Russian drug cartels, 1980s

Referring to killings by drug cartels in Washington, D.C. in 1989, mayor Marion Barry infamously stated,
"Washington should not be called the murder capital of the world. We are the targeted-killing capital of
the world." Barry said that "targeted killings" by D.C.'s cartels were comparable to those during the days
of "Al Capone and Eliot Ness" at the time of Prohibition in the United States. Similarly, drug-related
"mob hits" in Moscow during the 1990s were euphemistically described as "targeted killings" by the Cox
News Service and Atlanta Journal-Constitution.

[h]Central and South America

Figure: Operation Condor participants.

active members
collaborators

The U.S.-backed Operation Condor was a campaign of political repression and state terror in Latin
American right-wing dictatorships involving assassination of political opponents and dissidents. The
National Security Archive reported, "Prominent victims of Condor include two former Uruguayan
legislators and a former Bolivian president, Juan José Torres, murdered in Buenos Aires, a former
Chilean Minister of the Interior, Bernardo Leighton, as well as former Chilean ambassador Orlando
Letelier and his 26-year-old American colleague, Ronni Moffitt, assassinated by a car bomb in downtown
Washington D.C."

In 1986, the human rights group Americas Watch released a report stating that death squads and armed
forces under President José Napoleón Duarte in El Salvador had carried out 240 targeted killings
throughout 1985. The report relied upon figures provided by the Roman Catholic Church and included
allegations of torture and summary executions. Americas Watch and other rights groups reported
"targeted killing" of civilians by the Nicaraguan Sandinista government in the following year during its
campaign against the Contras. Politically motivated targeted killings of trade unionists and activists were
also recorded in Haiti and Colombia during the late 1980s and 1990s. Targeted killings linked to the drug
trade and paramilitary organizations including FARC and the United Self-Defense Forces of Colombia
(AUC) resulted in large numbers of deaths among human rights and political activists, and women and
children, throughout the 1990s.

An early example of American targeted killing is Operation Vengeance during World War II. This
counterattack shot down the plane of Isoroku Yamamoto, the senior planner of the attack on Pearl Harbor.

Figure: The CIA recruited Sam Giancana (pictured), Santo Trafficante and other mobsters to assassinate
Fidel Castro.

During the Vietnam War, the Phoenix Program targeted political leadership of the Viet Cong for
assassination.

During the period 1976–2001, there was an American norm against targeted killing.

The United States has made targeted killing—the deliberate assassination of a known terrorist outside the
country's territory, usually by airstrike—an essential part of its counter-terrorism strategy. Hence, the
United States has justified the killing of terrorists under a war paradigm. "Using the war paradigm for
counter-terrorism enabled government lawyers to distinguish lethal attacks on terrorists from prohibited
assassinations and justify them as lawful battlefield operations against enemy combatants, much like the
uncontroversial targeted killing of Japanese Admiral Isoroku Yamamoto while he was traveling by a
military airplane during World War II."

Further support for the U.S. government's use of drone strike tactics is found in a report found in the
Journal of Strategic Security concerning the surgical nature of drone strikes for use in a populated area.
The author concedes, "Indeed the tactic of using drones promises the ability of eliminating enemies in
complex environments, while minimizing the political implications of resorting to war."
The domestic legislative basis offered to justify drone strikes is the Authorization for Use of Military
Force Against Terrorists (AUMF), a joint resolution of both houses of Congress passed exactly one week
after 11 September 2001. The AUMF permits the President to use "all necessary and appropriate force
against those nations, organizations, or persons he determines planned, authorized, committed, or aided
the terrorist attacks that occurred on 11 September 2001, or harbored such organizations or persons".

A report published in the Journal of Strategic Security focusing on the future of drones in geopolitics
finds the U.S. government's use of drones in targeted killing operations an "indiscriminant and
disproportionate use of force that violates the sovereignty of Pakistan".

Twenty-six members of United States Congress, with academics such as Gregory Johnsen and Charles
Schmitz, media figures (Jeremy Scahill, Glenn Greenwald, James Traub), civil rights groups (i.e. the
American Civil Liberties Union) and ex-CIA station chief in Islamabad, Robert Grenier, have criticized
targeted killings as a form of extrajudicial killings, which may be illegal under both United States and
international law.

In early 2010, with President Barack Obama's approval, Anwar al-Awlaki became the first U.S. citizen to
be approved for targeted killing by the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). Awlaki was killed in a drone
strike in September 2011.

A Reuters report analysing the killing of 500 "militants" by US drones between 2008 and 2010 found that
only 8% of those killed were mid- to top-tier organisers or leaders; the rest were unidentified foot
soldiers.

Figure: Graph of average casualties in drone strikes ordered by the United States in Yemen, 2002–2017.

The Intercept reported, "Between January 2012 and February 2013, U.S. special operations airstrikes [in
northeastern Afghanistan] killed more than 200 people. Of those, only 35 were the intended targets.
During one five-month period of the operation, according to the documents, nearly 90 percent of the
people killed in airstrikes were not the intended targets."

According to analysis by Reprieve, 874 people were killed, including 142 children, in drone strikes in
Pakistan that targeted 24 people successfully and unsuccessfully, and, in numerous failed attempts to kill
Ayman al-Zawahri, 76 children and 29 adults were killed.

Estimates for the total people killed in U.S. drone strikes in Pakistan, range from 2,000–3,500 militants
killed and 158–965 civilians killed. 81 insurgent leaders in Pakistan have been killed. Drone strikes in
Yemen are estimated to have killed 846–1,758 militants and 116–225 civilians. 57 Al-Qaeda in the
Arabian Peninsula leaders are confirmed to have been killed.

In a speech titled "The Ethics and Efficacy of the President's Counterterrorism Strategy" John O.
Brennan, Assistant to the President for Homeland Security and Counterterrorism, outlined on 30 April
2012 at the Wilson Center the use of combat drones to kill members of al-Qaeda by the US Federal
government under President Barack Obama. John Brennan acknowledged for the first time that the US
government uses drones to kill selected members of al-Qaeda.

He justified the use of drones both from domestic law and international law point of view. With respect to
domestic law Brennan stated, "as a matter of domestic law, the Constitution empowers the President to
protect the nation from any imminent threat of attack. The Authorization for Use of Military Force
(AUMF) passed by Congress after the 11 September attacks authorizes the president "to use all necessary
and appropriate force" against those nations, organizations and individuals responsible for 9/11. There is
nothing in the AUMF that restricts the use of military force against al-Qa'ida to Afghanistan." And he
further said: "As a matter of international law, the United States is in an armed conflict with al-Qa'ida, the
Taliban, and associated forces, in response to the 9/11 attacks, and we may also use force consistent with
our inherent right of national self-defense. There is nothing in international law that bans the use of
remotely piloted aircraft for this purpose or that prohibits us from using lethal force against our enemies
outside of an active battlefield, at least when the country involved consents or is unable or unwilling to
take action against the threat."

The speech came a few days after Obama authorized the CIA and the U.S. Joint Special Operations
Command (JSOC) to fire on targets based solely on their intelligence "signatures"—patterns of behavior
that are detected through signals intercepts, human sources and aerial surveillance, and that indicate the
presence of an important operative or a plot against U.S. interests. Under the previous rules the CIA and
the US military were only allowed to use drone strikes against known terrorist leaders whose location
could be confirmed and who appeared on secret CIA and JSOC target lists.

The justification by Brennan built upon remarks by US top officials like the State Department's top
lawyer Harold Hongju Koh, US Attorney General Eric Holder, the US Defense Department general
counsel Jeh Johnson and President Obama himself, who defended the use of drones outside of so-called
"hot battlefields" like Afghanistan.

Figure: John O. Brennan, former director of the Central Intelligence Agency and chief counter-terrorism
advisor to U.S. President Barack Obama.

In 2011/2012, the process for selecting targets outside of warzones was altered so that power was
concentrated in the hands of a group of people in the White House centered around White House
counterterror chief John Brennan. Under the new plan, Brennan's staff compiles the potential target list
and runs the names past agencies such as the State Department at a weekly White House meeting.
According to The New York Times, President Obama has placed himself at the helm of a top secret
process to designate terrorists for kill or capture, reserving the final say on approving lethal action, and
signs off every strike in Yemen, Somalia and Pakistan.

U.S. Congressional oversight over the targeted killing operations increased as the drone program
intensified under the Obama Administration. Once a month, a group of staff members from the House and
Senate intelligence committees would watch videos of the latest drone strikes, review intelligence that
was used to justify each drone strike, and sometimes examine telephone intercepts and after-the-fact
evidence, such as the CIA's assessment of who was hit. The procedure used by House and Senate
intelligence committees to monitor CIA drone strikes was set up largely at the request of Senator Dianne
Feinstein who became determined to ensure that it was as precise as the CIA had been claiming. "That's
been a concern of mine from the beginning," Feinstein said in little-noticed comments after the raid that
killed Osama bin Laden in May 2011. "I asked that this effort be established. It has been. The way in
which this is being done is very careful." Feinstein explained how the oversight works in general. "We
receive notification with key details shortly after every strike, and we hold regular briefings and hearings
on these operations," Feinstein wrote in May in a letter sent in response to a column that ran in the Los
Angeles Times questioning the oversight of drone strikes. "Committee staff has held 28 monthly in-depth
oversight meetings to review strike records and question every aspect of the program including legality,
effectiveness, precision, foreign policy implications and the care taken to minimize noncombatant
casualties." If the congressional committees objected to something, the lawmakers could call CIA leaders
to testify in closed investigative hearings. If unsatisfied, they could pass legislation limiting the CIA's
actions.

Congressional criticism of drone strikes has been rare. However, in June 2012, 26 lawmakers, all but two
of them Democrats, signed a letter to Obama questioning so-called signature strikes, in which the U.S.
attacks armed men who fit a pattern of behavior that suggests they are involved in terrorist activities.
Signature strikes have been curbed in Pakistan, where they once were common, but in 2012 Obama gave
the CIA permission to conduct them in Yemen, where an Al Qaeda affiliate that has targeted the United
States has established a safe haven in the south. The lawmakers expressed concern that signature strikes
could kill civilians. They added: "Our drone campaigns already have virtually no transparency,
accountability or oversight."

While the Bush administration had put emphasis on killing significant members of al Qaeda, the use of
combat drones underwent a quiet and unheralded shift during the Obama Administration to focus
increasingly on killing militant foot soldiers rather than high-value targets according to CNN National
Security Analyst Peter Bergen. Bergen noted: "To the extent that the targets of drone attacks can be
ascertained, under Bush, al Qaeda members accounted for 25% of all drone targets compared to 40% for
Taliban targets. Under Obama, only 8% of targets were al Qaeda compared to just over 50% for Taliban
targets."

Figure: Minneapolis anti-war protest: 'Stop Killer Drones', 5 May 2013

Facing the possibility of defeat in the 2012 Presidential election, the Obama administration accelerated
work in the weeks before the election to develop explicit rules for the targeted killing of terrorists by
unmanned drones, so that a new president would inherit clear standards and procedures. The work to
codify U.S. drone policy began in summer 2011. "There was concern that the levers might no longer be in
our hands," said one unnamed U.S official. With a continuing debate about the proper limits of drone
strikes, Obama did not want to leave an "amorphous" program to his successor, the official said. The
effort, which would have been rushed to completion by January had Mitt Romney won, will now be
finished at a more leisurely pace, the official said. "One of the things we've got to do is put a legal
architecture in place, and we need Congressional help in order to do that, to make sure that not only am I
reined in but any president's reined in terms of some of the decisions that we're making," Obama said and
added "creating a legal structure, processes, with oversight checks on how we use unmanned weapons, is
going to be a challenge for me and my successors for some time to come." U.S. President Obama also
expressed wariness of the powerful temptation drones pose to policy makers. "There's a remoteness to it
that makes it tempting to think that somehow we can, without any mess on our hands, solve vexing
security problems," he said.

In response lawsuits brought by The New York Times and the American Civil Liberties Union seeking to
use the Freedom of Information Act to make public more details about the legal basis for the drone
programs U.S. District Court Judge Colleen McMahon ruled at the end of December 2012 that the U.S.
Government has no legal duty to disclose legal opinions justifying the use of drones to kill suspected
terrorist operatives abroad. While noting that a more detailed disclosure of the administration's legal
rationale "would allow for intelligent discussion and assessment of a tactic that (like torture before it)
remains hotly debated", McMahon came to the conclusion that the Freedom of Information Act did not
permit her to require such transparency.

In a letter dated 22 May 2013 to the chairman of the U.S. Senate Judiciary committee, Patrick J. Leahy,
U.S. attorney general Eric Holder wrote that the United States will use lethal force by combat drones "in a
foreign country against a U.S. citizen who is a senior operational leader of al Qa'ida or its associated
forces, and who is actively engaged in planning to kill Americans, in the following circumstances: (1) the
U.S. government has determined, after a thorough and careful review, that the individual poses an
imminent threat of violent attack against the United States; (2) capture is not feasible; and (3) the
operation would be conducted in a manner consistent with applicable law of war principles." In a
Presidential Policy Guidance entitled "U.S. Policy Standards and Procedures for the Use of Force in
Counterterrorism Operations Outside the United States and Areas of Active Hostilities" from May 2013
the United States government stated that lethal force by combat drones "will be used only to prevent or
stop attacks against U.S. persons, and even then, only when capture is not feasible and no other
reasonable alternatives exist to address the threat effectively". The U.S. government further declared,
"lethal force will be used outside areas of active hostilities only when the following preconditions are
met:

 First, there must be a legal basis for using lethal force.

 Second, the United States will use lethal force only against a target that poses a continuing,
imminent threat to U.S. persons.
 Third, the following criteria must be met before lethal action may be taken:

1. Near certainty that the terrorist target is present;

2. Near certainty that non-combatants will not be injured or killed;
3. An assessment that capture is not feasible at the time of the operation;
4. An assessment that the relevant governmental authorities in the country where action is
contemplated cannot or will not effectively address the threat to U.S. persons; and
5. An assessment that no other reasonable alternatives exist to effectively address the threat to
U.S. persons.

U.S. President Barack Obama touched on the subject of combat drones in a speech on Counterterrorism
delivered on 23 May 2013 at the National Defense University. "It is a hard fact that US strikes have
resulted in civilian casualties," he said, adding, "These deaths will haunt us. But as commander-in-chief I
must weigh these heartbreaking tragedies against the alternative. To do nothing in the face of terrorist
networks would invite far more civilian casualties." Obama said new guidance allowed targeting only
those terrorists posing "a continuing and imminent threat to the American people", which administration
officials said meant only individuals planning attacks on the U.S. homeland or against U.S. persons
abroad. Obama defended the use of drones as just because America "is at war with al Qaeda, the Taliban
and their associated forces". To stop terrorists from gaining a foothold, drones will be deployed according
to Obama, but only when there is an imminent threat; no hope of capturing the targeted terrorist; "near
certainty" that civilians won't be harmed; and "there are no other governments capable of effectively
addressing the threat". Never will a strike be punitive.

A report by Ben Emmerson QC, the UN's special rapporteur on human rights and counter-terrorism, who
identified 33 drone strikes around the world that have resulted in civilian casualties and may have
violated international humanitarian law urged the United States "to further clarify its position on the legal
and factual issues... to declassify, to the maximum extent possible, information relevant to its lethal
extraterritorial counter-terrorism operations; and to release its own data on the level of civilian casualties
inflicted through the use of remotely piloted aircraft, together with information on the evaluation
methodology used". Human Rights Watch said that in Yemen more civilians were killed than admitted by
the Obama administration, while Amnesty International said the same of drone strikes in Pakistan. Caitlin
Hayden, a White House spokeswoman, declined to comment on the reports, but said in an e-mail
statement: "As the President emphasized, the use of lethal force, including from remotely piloted aircraft,
commands the highest level of attention and care."

While the U.S. government is considering whether to kill an American abroad suspected of planning
terrorist attacks and how to do so legally under new stricter targeting policy issued in 2013, The Intercept
reported that the U.S. government is using primarily NSA surveillance to target people for drone strikes
overseas. In its report The Intercept the author details the flawed methods which are used to locate targets
for lethal drone strikes, resulting in the deaths of innocent people. According to The Washington Post,
NSA analysts and collectors (i.e. NSA personnel who control electronic surveillance equipment) use the
NSA's sophisticated surveillance capabilities to track individual targets geographically and in real time,
while drones and tactical units aim their weaponry against those targets to take them out.

NBC News released in February 2014 an undated Department of Justice White paper entitled
"Lawfulness of a Lethal Operation Directed Against a U.S. Citizen who is a Senior Operational Leader of
Al Qa'ida or An Associated Force" in which the Obama Administration concludes that the U.S.
government can order the killing of American citizens if they are believed to be "senior operational
leaders" of al-Qaida or "an associated force"—even if there is no intelligence indicating they are engaged
in an active plot to attack the U.S. However any such targeted killing operation by the United States
would have to comply with the four fundamental law-of-war principles governing the use of force which
are necessity, distinction, proportionality and humanity – i.e., the avoidance of unnecessary suffering.
(Page 8 of). The memo also discusses why targeted killings would not be a war crime or violate a U.S.
executive order banning assassinations:

"A lawful killing in self-defense is not an assassination. In the Department's view, a lethal operation
conducted against a U.S. citizen whose conduct poses an imminent threat of violent attack against the
United States would be a legitimate act of national self-defense that would not violate the assassination
ban. Similarly, the use of lethal force, consistent with the laws of war, against an individual who is a
legitimate military target would be lawful and would not violate the assassination ban."

In 2013, a report on drone warfare and aerial sovereignty proposed that U.S. government drone policy in
Pakistan potentially violated human rights according to the U.N. International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights. The rights in direct question were the right to life; right to a fair trial; the freedom of
association; right to protection of the family; and, less directly, right to highest attainable health
standards; right to education; and right of freedom from hunger.

On 21 April 2014, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit overturned the above-
mentioned December 2012 ruling by U.S. District Judge Colleen McMahon and ruled that the Obama
administration must release documents justifying its drone-killings of Americans and foreigners. The 2nd
U.S. Circuit Court of Appeal released on 23 June 2014 a Juli 2010 memo by then U.S. Justice
Department's Office of Legal Counsel David Barron which outlined the rationale for killing the American
Citizen Anwar al-Aulaqi.

[h]Trump administration position on combat drones

CIA-ordered drone strikes were eventually ended by President Obama, who transferred control entirely to
the U.S. military, under a separate legal authority. President Trump reversed this decision in 2017. A
2016 Obama executive order requiring an annual report of civilian deaths from US airstrikes outside
combat zones was not complied with by the Trump administration for 2017 and was then revoked by an
executive order in 2019. According to the BBC, citing the Bureau of Investigative Journalism, a UK-
based non-profit news organisation, there were 2,243 drone strikes in the first two years of the Trump
presidency, compared with 1,878 in Obama's eight years in office. According to press reports, the Trump
administration has at times employed a missile that deploys blades rather than explosives to kill targets,
because it hoped to decrease non-combatant casualties. The missile is believed to have seen its first
combat action in the 2017 killing of Abu Khayr al-Masri.

According to Ronen Bergman, "since World War II, Israel has used assassination and targeted-killing
more than any other country in the West, in many cases endangering the lives of civilians."

Figure: Memorial to the assassinated Iranian scientists

During the First Intifada Palestinian uprising, the Palestinian human-rights group Al Haq condemned
Israeli soldiers for what they described as "deliberate, cold-blooded... targeted" killings of Palestinians in
the West Bank and Gaza Strip. In 1993, the human rights group, Middle East Watch, alleged that Israeli
soldiers had targeted often unarmed Palestinians, some under the age of 16, for "premeditated
assassinations" or targeted killing, a charge denied by Israeli officials. The allegations included the
execution of Palestinians in custody.

Controversy over targeted killings continued during the Second Intifada. Palestinians stated that
individuals belonging to the group Hamas and shot in targeted killings were being assassinated. Israelis
stated that those killed were responsible for attacks against Israelis. Israeli officials initially accepted
responsibility for only some of the killings, and Israeli media termed the practice a "liquidations policy",
whereas Palestinians called it "state terrorism". In January 2001, Israeli officials confirmed "the practice
of targeted assassinations". Conflict in Israel over the legality of the practice centered on the case of Dr.
Thabet Thabet, assassinated as he left his home on New Year's Eve. Dr. Thabet was alleged by the Israeli
military to be a senior local leader of Fatah and plotting attacks against Israelis in the West Bank. A
dentist, Dr. Thabet was a friend of many Israeli peace activists and considered one himself. Israeli
activists called the killing "a crime", "Mafia-style", and "immoral". Ephraim Sneh, then Israel's Deputy
Prime Minister, described the policy as "effective, precise and just".

The Washington Post wrote that the Israeli policy of targeted killing during the Second Intifada expanded
upon previous policies, targeting not only terrorists but also those thought to direct or coordinate them.
Another controversial killing, which occurred following the George W. Bush administration's
condemnation of the practice, was that of Mahmoud Madani, a leader of Hamas shot while leaving a
mosque in the Balata refugee camp. The Israeli military suspected Madani of plotting bombings in Israel.

At that time, spokesman for the U.S. State Department Richard Boucher condemned both violence by
Palestinians and targeted killings by Israelis during a State Department news briefing. U.S. Secretary of
State Colin Powell registered his opposition to "a policy of targeted killings" and the U.S. State
Department urged Israel to stop them.

Figure: Funeral of Iranian Major General Hassan Shateri, who was assassinated in Syria in February 2013

Then Democratic Party senator Joe Biden criticized the George W. Bush administration for condemning
the targeted killings. The administration continued to oppose them.

Use of targeted killings by Israeli conventional military forces became commonplace after the Second
Intifada, when Israeli security forces used the tactic to kill Palestinian militants.

[h]In Bosnia and Serbia

Referring to human rights abuses during the Bosnian War, the U.S. State Department noted politically or
ethnically motivated "targeted killings" in Bosnia in Section 1a., "Political and Other Extrajudicial
Killing", of its 1993 report on human rights practices in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Targeted killings were
also reported by Serbian and Albanian forces during the Kosovo War. Both wars involved large scale
targeted killings of journalists.

[h]Use by the Russian government

During the First Chechen War, Chechen President Dzhokhar Dudaev was killed on 21 April 1996 by two
laser-guided missiles when he was using a satellite phone, after his location was detected by a Russian
reconnaissance aircraft, which intercepted his phone call.

On 20 March 2002, Ibn al-Khattab, who led his militia against Russian forces in Chechnya during the
First and Second Chechen War, setting up many effective ambushes against Russian forces as well as
managing the influx of foreign fighters and money, was killed when a Dagestani messenger hired by the
Russian Federal Security Service (FSB) gave Khattab a poisoned letter. Chechen sources said that the
letter was coated with "a fast-acting nerve agent, possibly sarin or a derivative".

On 13 February 2004, Zelimkhan Yandarbiyev, who served as acting president of the breakaway Chechen
Republic of Ichkeria between 1996 and 1997, was killed when a bomb ripped through his SUV in the
Qatari capital, Doha. Yandarbiyev was seriously wounded and died in hospital. His 13-year-old son Daud
was seriously injured. The day after the attack, Qatari authorities arrested three Russians in a Russian
embassy villa. One of them, the first secretary of the Russian Embassy in Qatar, Aleksandr Fetisov, was
released in March due to his diplomatic status and the remaining two, the GRU agents Anatoly
Yablochkov (also known as Belashkov) and Vasily Pugachyov (sometimes misspelled as Bogachyov),
were charged with the assassination of Yandarbiyev, an assassination attempt of his son Daud
Yandarbiyev, and smuggling weapons into Qatar. There were some speculations that Fetisov had been
released in exchange for Qatari wrestlers detained in Moscow. On 30 June 2004, both Russians were
sentenced to life imprisonment; passing the sentence, the judge stated that they had acted on orders from
the Russian leadership. But on 23 December 2004, Qatar agreed to extradite the prisoners to Russia,
where they would serve out their life sentences. The agents however received a heroes' welcome on
returning to Moscow in January 2005 but disappeared from public view shortly afterwards. The Russian
prison authorities admitted in February 2005 that they were not in jail, but said that a sentence handed
down in Qatar was "irrelevant" in Russia.

On 10 July 2006 Shamil Basayev, a Chechen militant leader who was alleged to be responsible for
numerous guerrilla attacks on security forces in and around Chechnya and the 2002 Moscow theater
hostage crisis and described by ABC News as "one of the most-wanted terrorists in the world", was killed
by an explosion near the border of North Ossetia in the village of Ali-Yurt, Ingushetia, a republic
bordering Chechnya. According to the official version of Basayev's death, the FSB, following him with a
drone, spotted his car approaching a truck laden with explosives that the FSB had prepared, and by
remote control triggered a detonator in the explosives.

Alexander Litvinenko was poisoned with polonium, which the European Court of Human Rights ruled
Russia was responsible for.

US and UK intelligence agents reportedly say they believe Russian assassins and possibly the Russian
government could have been behind at least fourteen targeted killings on British soil, which were
dismissed as non-suspicious by UK police.

Ukrainian authorities have blamed Russian security services for multiple killings in Ukraine, including
assassination of Colonel Maksym Shapoval.

The Russian government is alleged by the British government of being behind a failed assassination
attempt on Sergei Skripal and his daughter using a Novichok agent.

[h]Use in Ukraine

Since the beginning of the 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine, close to 20 Russian-appointed officials and
Ukrainian collaborators have been killed or injured in targeted killings. Ukrainian hit squads and
saboteurs have gunned down, blown up, hanged and poisoned people who were regarded as collaborators
of the puppet governments of Donetsk and Luhansk people's republics. On 30 August 2022, Meduza
reported that nearly a dozen people had been killed and others injured in assassination attempts and
provided information on every attack recorded by the media in the occupied territories. Some of the
attacks were carried out by Ukrainian partisans who are led and trained by Ukrainian special forces.

On 27 September 2022, the OHCHR documented six killings of suspected "traitors" of Ukraine. The
victims were officials of local authorities, policemen and civilians who were believed to have voluntarily
cooperated with the enemy. According to OHCHR, these killings may have been committed by
government agents or with their acquiescence and may amount to extrajudicial executions and war
crimes.

[h]Legality

While 2(4) of the United Nations Charter prohibits the threat or use of force by one state against another,
two exceptions are relevant to the question of whether targeted killings are lawful: (1) when the use of
force is carried out with the consent of the host state; and (2) when the use of force is in self-defense in
response to an armed attack or an imminent threat, and where the host state is unwilling or unable to take
appropriate action. The legality of a targeted drone strike must be evaluated in accordance with
international humanitarian law (IHL), including the fundamental principles of distinction, proportionality,
humanity, and military necessity.

The part of The Charter of the United Nations that regulates "action with respect to threats to the peace,
breaches of the peace, and acts of aggression" is Chapter VII (s 39–50), which requires that it is the
Security Council that determines any threat to peace and decides on measures to be taken to maintain or
restore peace. 51 mentions the only exception, as being members of the United Nations have "the inherent
right of individual or collective self-defence if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United
Nations, until the Security Council has taken measures necessary to maintain international peace and
security". Targeted killing operations, according to Harvard Law School professors Gabriella Blum and
Philip Heymann, amplify the tension between addressing terrorism as a crime versus addressing terrorism
as an act of war. Governments pursuing a law enforcement strategy punish persons for their individual
guilt, which must be proven in a court of law, where the accused enjoys the protections of due process
guarantees. Governments in the midst of war, on the other hand, may claim a legal obligation to take
advantage of the relaxation of peacetime constraints on the use of deadly force. Enemy combatants may
be targeted and killed not because they are guilty, but because they are potentially lethal agents of a
hostile party. No advance warning is necessary, no attempt to arrest or capture is required, and no effort to
minimize casualties among enemy forces is demanded by law. The tactic raises complex questions as to
the legal basis for its application, who qualifies as an appropriate "hit list" target, and what circumstances
must exist before the tactic may be employed. Opinions range from people considering it a legal form of
self-defense that reduces terrorism, to people calling it an extrajudicial killing that lacks due process, and
which leads to more violence. Methods used have included firing a Hellfire missile from an AH-64
Apache attack helicopter (Israel), or a Predator or Reaper drone (an unmanned, remote-controlled plane),
detonating a cell phone bomb, and long-range sniper shooting. Countries such as the U.S. (in Pakistan and
Yemen) and Israel (in the West Bank and Gaza) have used targeted killing to kill members of groups such
as Al-Qaeda and Hamas.

[h]Legal justifications for targeted killing

The U.S. Army's Law of Land Warfare (Field Manual 27–10) states:

31. Assassination and Outlawry

It is especially forbidden * * * to kill or wound treacherously individuals belonging to the hostile nation
or army.

This is construed as prohibiting assassination, proscription, or outlawry of an enemy, or putting a price

upon an enemy's head, as well as offering a reward for an enemy "dead or alive". It does not, however,
preclude attacks on individual soldiers or officers of the enemy whether in the zone of hostilities,
occupied territory, or elsewhere.

Daniel Reisner, who headed the International Legal Division of the Israeli Military Advocate General's
Office from 1994 to 2005, has stated that although targeted killing is illegal under previous understanding
of international law, "If you do something for long enough, the world will accept it. The whole of
international law is now based on the notion that an act that is forbidden today becomes permissible if
executed by enough countries." Reisner continues, "International law progresses through violations. We
invented the targeted assassination thesis and we had to push it. At first there were protrusions that made
it hard to insert easily into the legal moulds. Eight years later it is in the center of the bounds of
legitimacy." This view is disputed by George Bisharat of the University of California's Hastings College
of the Law, who contends that assassination is not widely regarded as legal.

Georgetown Law Professor and former U.S. Marine, Gary Solis, has argued that under certain conditions,
"Assassinations and targeted killings are very different acts." For Solis, these conditions require that there
is an ongoing military conflict, the targeted individual (civilian or military) has taken up arms, that there
is no reasonable possibility of arrest, and that the decision to kill is made by senior political leaders.

Abraham Sofaer, a former legal advisor to the U.S. State Department and fellow at the conservative
Hoover Institution think tank, has written that targeted killing is "sometimes necessary, because leaders
are obliged to defend their citizens". After the killing of Hamas founder and quadriplegic Ahmed Yassin
by Israeli helicopter gunships, Sofaer argued that targeted killing is not prohibited by American Executive
Order 11905 banning assassination: "killings in self-defense are no more 'assassinations' in international
affairs than they are murders when undertaken by our police forces against domestic killers."

Previously, Sofaer had argued during the First Gulf War that targeted killing was ethical but impractical:
"Targeted killing will also invite revenge against the leaders who order it as well as their citizens and
property. Given the legal, political and moral constraints that limit such activities in democratic regimes,
the United States has a substantial interest in discouraging acceptance of the killing of political leaders as
a routine measure, even in self-defense."

Author and former U.S. Army Captain Matthew J. Morgan has argued, "there is a major difference
between assassination and targeted killing.... targeted killing [is] not synonymous with assassination.
Assassination... constitutes an illegal killing." Amos Guiora, formerly an Israel Defense Forces Lt.
Colonol and commander of the IDF school of military law, now Professor of law at the University of
Utah, has written, "targeted killing is... not an assassination". Steve David, Johns Hopkins Associate Dean
& Professor of International Relations, writes: "there are strong reasons to believe that the Israeli policy
of targeted killing is not the same as assassination." Syracuse Law Professor William Banks and GW Law
Professor Peter Raven-Hansen write: "Targeted killing of terrorists is... not unlawful and would not
constitute assassination." Rory Miller writes: "Targeted killing... is not 'assassination'", and associate
professor Eric Patterson and Teresa Casale write: "Perhaps most important is the legal distinction between
targeted killing and assassination."

American defense department analyst and professor Thomas Hunter has defined targeted killing as the
"premeditated, preemptive, and intentional killing of an individual or individuals known or believed to
represent a present or future threat to the safety and security of a state through the affiliation with terrorist
groups or individuals. Hunter writes that the target is a person who is allegedly taking part in an armed
conflict or terrorism, whether by bearing arms or otherwise, who has allegedly lost the immunity from
being targeted that he would otherwise have under the Third Geneva Convention. Hunter distinguishes
between "targeted killing" and "targeted violence" as used by specialists who study violence.

In response to the terrorist attacks on 9/11, the Authorization for Use of Military Force (AUMF) stated on
14 September 2001, "That the President is authorized to use all necessary and appropriate force against
those nations, organizations or persons he determines planned, authorized, harbored, committed, or aided
in the planning or commission of the attacks against the United States that occurred on 11 September
2001, and to deter and pre-empt any future acts of terrorism or aggression against the United States". This
authorization is still in effect today. There are no restrictions regarding the physical location of where this
law is applied. It only states that the President has the "authority to use all necessary and appropriate
force" this could be interpreted to mean that the President can attack al-Qaeda anywhere in the world.

[h]Legal opposition

During the 1998 bombing of Iraq, The Scotsman reported, "US law prohibits the targeted killing of
foreign leaders... Administration officials have been careful to say they will not expressly aim to kill
Saddam."

Political scientists Frank Sauer and Niklas Schörnig have described targeted killing as a violation of
international law and a contravention of domestic laws, and maintain that the term itself is merely a
legitimized euphemism for assassination.

The American Civil Liberties Union maintains that, "A program of targeted killing far from any
battlefield, without charge or trial, violates the constitutional guarantee of due process. It also violates
international law, under which lethal force may be used outside armed conflict zones only as a last resort
to prevent imminent threats, when non-lethal means are not available. Targeting people who are suspected
of terrorism for execution, far from any war zone, turns the whole world into a battlefield."

Yael Stein, the research director of B'Tselem, The Israeli Information Center for Human Rights in the
Occupied Territories, also states in her 2003 "By Any Name Illegal and Immoral: Response to 'Israel's
Policy of Targeted Killing'":

The argument that this policy affords the public a sense of revenge and retribution could serve to justify
acts both illegal and immoral. Clearly, lawbreakers ought to be punished. Yet, no matter how horrific
their deeds, as the targeting of Israeli civilians indeed is, they should be punished according to the law.
David's arguments could, in principle, justify the abolition of formal legal systems altogether.

In 2001, Ibrahim Nafie criticized the U.S. for agreeing with "the Israeli spin that calls... its official policy
of assassinating Palestinian leaders 'targeted killing'."

In 2013, United Nations Special Rapporteur on human rights and counter terrorism, Ben Emmerson,
stated that U.S. drone strikes may have violated international humanitarian law.

[h]Additional concerns

For drone strikes to be effective, the United States must obtain consent from the host country they are
operating in. The growing chorus of objections from host countries, most notably emanating from
Pakistan, seriously inhibits drones' effectiveness. "Host states have grown frustrated with U.S. drone
policy, while opposition by non-host partners could impose additional restrictions on the use of drones.
Reforming U.S. drone strike policies can do much to allay concerns internationally by ensuring that
targeted killings are defensible under international legal regimes that the United States itself helped
establish and by allowing U.S. officials to openly address concerns and counter misinformation." Micah
Zenko at the Council on Foreign Relations believes the United States should "end so-called signature
strikes, which target unidentified militants based on their behavior patterns and personal networks, and
limit targeted killings to a small number of specific terrorists with transnational ambitions. He wants more
congressional oversight of drone strikes and stricter regulation on armed drone sales. Finally, he
recommends the United States work with international partners to establish rules and norms governing the
use of drones. Zenko believes the U.S. government has not been transparent regarding how non-
battlefield drone strikes are reconciled with broader foreign policy objectives, the scope of legitimate
targets, and their legal framework. While drones may be a critical counterterrorism tool that advances
U.S. interests, their "lack of transparency threatens to limit U.S. freedom of action and risks proliferation
of armed drone technology without the requisite normative framework." Zenko thinks current drone
policy might share the same fate of the Bush-era enhanced interrogation techniques and warrantless
wiretapping, both of which were unpopular, illegal and ultimately ended.

Harvard Law School Professors Gabriella Blum and Philip Heymann cite six potential hazards of targeted
killings: First, the so-called Hydra effect, or the rise of more—and more resolute—leaders to replace
those who were recently "decapitated." Second, drones can drive terrorist leaders into hiding, making the
monitoring of their movements, and subsequent intelligence gathering, extremely difficult. Third, "the
political message flowing from the use of targeted killings may be harmful to the attacking country’s
interest, as it emphasizes the disparity in power between the parties and reinforces popular support for the
terrorists, who are seen as a David fighting Goliath." Fourth, when conducted in a foreign country, drone
strikes run the risk of heightening tensions between the targeting government and the government in
whose territory the operation is conducted. Fifth, targeted killings threaten criticism from local domestic
constituencies against the government allowing strikes within their country. Finally, there is a danger of
over-using targeted killings, both within and outside the war of terrorism. Max Abrahms finds that "more
than the quantity of violence, decapitation reduces its quality," as leadership vacuums in militant groups
are filled by less competent younger members with fewer inhibitions on harming civilians, and that this
effect is most pronounced in the immediate aftermath of a successful decapitation strike.

Daniel Byman, security studies professor at Georgetown University, argues that Washington must clarify
its policies behind extrajudicial and extraterritorial killings, lest a nefarious precedent in international law
is set. Additionally, Byman argues that Washington must "remain mindful of the built-in limits of low-
cost, unmanned interventions, since the very convenience of drone warfare risks dragging the United
States into conflicts it could otherwise avoid." Though Byman recognizes the problems inherent in using
armed UAVs, he believes that they are very effective. "U.S. drones have killed an estimated 3,000 al
Qaeda, Taliban, and other jihadist operatives in Pakistan and Yemen. That number includes over 50
senior leaders of al Qaeda and the Taliban—top figures who are not easily replaced." Drones have also
undercut terrorists' ability to effectively communicate with its target audiences, ultimately straining their
recruitment pools. To avoid attracting drones, al Qaeda operates have avoided gathering in large numbers
and mitigated use of electronic devices. Byman argues that al Qaeda leaders "cannot give orders when
they are incommunicado, and training on a large scale is nearly impossible when a drone strike could
wipe out an entire coupe of new recruits. Drones have turned al Qaeda's command and training structures
into a liability, forcing the group to choose between having no leaders and risking dead leaders."

Audrey Kurth Cronin of George Mason University argues that while drones are tactically savvy, they
have failed to advance the strategic goals of U.S. counter-terrorism policy. Terrorism itself is a tactic,
Cronin notes, but it succeeds on a strategic plane when a shocking event is successfully leveraged for
political gain. "To be effective, counter-terrorism must itself respond with a coherent strategy. The
problem for Washington today is that its drone program has taken on a life of its own, to the point where
tactics are driving strategy rather than the other way around." Cronin agrees with Daniel Byman of
Georgetown University insofar that drones have inflicted real damage upon al Qaeda. However,
"Washington now finds itself in a permanent battle with amorphous and geographically dispersed foe, one
with an increasingly marginal connection to the original 9/11 plotters. In this endless contest, the United
States risks multiplying its enemies and heightening their incentives to attack the country."

[mh] Ethical Frameworks in Warfare

Ethical frameworks provide the moral foundation for assessing the legitimacy of actions undertaken in
warfare. In this discourse, we will examine several key ethical theories that guide military conduct,
including the principles of just war theory, utilitarianism, and virtue ethics. Each theory offers distinct
perspectives on the morality of warfare, addressing issues such as the justification for going to war, the
conduct of combatants, and the treatment of civilians and prisoners.

Just War Theory: Just war theory, rooted in classical and medieval philosophy, outlines criteria for
determining the justice of engaging in armed conflict. Its principles are typically divided into two
categories: jus ad bellum (the justice of war) and jus in bello (justice in war). Jus ad bellum criteria
include just cause, legitimate authority, right intention, probability of success, proportionality, and last
resort. Jus in bello principles encompass discrimination (distinguishing between combatants and non-
combatants), proportionality (the use of force proportional to the military objective), and the principle of
necessity.

Critics of just war theory argue that its application is often subjective, allowing belligerents to interpret its
principles in ways that justify their actions. Additionally, some contend that just war theory's traditional
emphasis on state sovereignty is inadequate in addressing contemporary warfare, particularly conflicts
involving non-state actors and asymmetric warfare.

Utilitarianism: Utilitarianism assesses the morality of actions based on their consequences, aiming to
maximize overall happiness or utility. In the context of warfare, utilitarian ethics prioritize outcomes that
minimize harm and maximize benefits for the greatest number of people. Proponents argue that
utilitarianism provides a pragmatic approach to decision-making in complex military scenarios,
emphasizing the importance of weighing the potential consequences of different courses of action.

However, critics caution that utilitarian calculations can lead to morally dubious conclusions, such as
justifying the sacrifice of innocent lives for the greater good. Moreover, the inherent difficulty in
predicting and quantifying the consequences of military actions poses challenges to applying utilitarian
principles in practice.

Virtue Ethics: Virtue ethics focuses on the character and moral virtues of individuals involved in warfare,
emphasizing traits such as courage, honesty, and justice. Rather than prescribing specific rules or
principles, virtue ethics encourages the cultivation of virtuous dispositions that guide ethical decision-
making in diverse circumstances. In the context of military ethics, virtue ethicists highlight the
importance of developing moral character among soldiers and leaders, promoting integrity, empathy, and
respect for human dignity.
Critics of virtue ethics raise concerns about its potential subjectivity and lack of concrete guidelines for
action. Without clear parameters for determining virtuous conduct, virtue ethics may struggle to provide
practical guidance in morally complex situations, such as those encountered in warfare.

Ethical frameworks play a crucial role in guiding the conduct of warfare and evaluating the morality of
military actions. Just war theory, utilitarianism, and virtue ethics offer distinct perspectives on the ethical
considerations inherent in armed conflict. While each theory has its strengths and limitations, their
application in conjunction with careful moral deliberation can contribute to more ethical decision-making
in warfare. As military technology evolves and the nature of warfare continues to change, ongoing
reflection and debate on ethical principles are essential to ensuring that the conduct of war remains
consistent with fundamental moral values and principles.

Chapter 2: Legal Perspectives on Targeted Killing

[mh] International Laws and Treaties

[h]Definition and conceptual development

The term war crime has been difficult to define with precision, and its usage has evolved constantly,
particularly since the end of World War I. The first systematic attempt to define a broad range of war
crimes was the Instructions for the Government of Armies of the United States in the Field—also known
as the “Lieber Code” after its main author, Francis Lieber—which was issued by U.S. Pres. Abraham
Lincoln during the American Civil War and distributed among Union military personnel in 1863. For
example, the Lieber Code held that it was a “serious breach of the law of war to force the subjects of the
enemy into service for the victorious government” and prohibited “wanton violence committed against
persons in the invaded country,” including rape, maiming, and murder, all of which carried the penalty of
death. More recently, definitions of war crimes have been codified in international statutes, such as those
creating the International Criminal Court and the war crimes tribunals in Yugoslavia and Rwanda, for use
in international war crimes tribunals. In contrast to earlier definitions, modern definitions are more
expansive and criminalize certain behaviours committed by civilians as well as by military personnel.

Immediately following World War I, the victorious Allied powers convened a special Commission on the
Responsibility of the Authors of the War and on Enforcement of Penalties. The commission’s report
recommended that war crimes trials be conducted before the victors’ national courts and, when
appropriate, before an inter-Allied tribunal. The Allies prepared an initial list of about 900 suspected war
criminals and submitted the list to Germany. Although heads of state traditionally had enjoyed immunity
from prosecution, the commission’s main target was Germany’s Emperor (Kaiser) William II, whom
most of the Allies (though not the United States) wished to hold responsible for numerous violations of
the laws of war. William, however, took refuge in the Netherlands, which refused to extradite him, and he
was never tried. Most of the remaining suspected war criminals on the list similarly managed to avoid
prosecution, because Germany was reluctant to turn them over to the Allies. Instead, a compromise was
reached whereby the Allies permitted a small number of suspects to be tried in Germany before the
Supreme Court in Leipzig. These prosecutions resulted in few convictions, with most sentences ranging
from a few months to four years in prison.

[h]The Nürnberg and Tokyo trials

The next major attempt to prosecute war criminals occurred in Europe and Asia after World War II.
Throughout the war, the Allies had cited atrocities committed by the Nazi regime of Adolf Hitler and
announced their intention to punish those guilty of war crimes. The Moscow Declaration of 1943, issued
by the United States, Great Britain, and the Soviet Union, and the Potsdam Declaration of 1945, issued by
the United States, Great Britain, and China (and later adhered to by the Soviet Union), addressed the issue
of punishing war crimes committed by the German and Japanese governments, respectively.

At the war’s conclusion, representatives of the United States, the United Kingdom, the Soviet Union, and
the provisional government of France signed the London Agreement, which provided for an international
military tribunal to try major Axis war criminals whose offenses did not take place in specific geographic
locations. This agreement was supported by 19 other governments and included the Nürnberg Charter,
which established the Nürnberg tribunal and categorized the offenses within its jurisdiction. The charter
listed three categories of crime: (1) crimes against peace, which involved the preparation and initiation of
a war of aggression, (2) war crimes (or “conventional war crimes”), which included murder, ill treatment,
and deportation, and (3) crimes against humanity, which included political, racial, and religious
persecution of civilians. This last category included what is commonly called genocide.

The term genocide was coined by the Polish American legal scholar Raphael Lemkin and first appeared in
print in his work Axis Rule in Occupied Europe: Laws of Occupation, Analysis of Government, Proposals
for Redress (1944). The Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide,
adopted by the General Assembly of the United Nations in 1948, defined genocide as including killing or
inflicting serious physical or mental injury on members of a national, ethnic, racial, or religious group
with the intention of bringing about the group’s destruction, in whole or in part. The convention made
genocide an international crime that could be prosecuted in the court of any country. Because the
Nürnberg trials preceded the convention, however, Nazi war criminals were not prosecuted for genocide.

The International Military Tribunal in Nürnberg, Germany, tried 22 Nazi leaders, including one, Martin
Bormann, who was tried in absentia. The trial was conducted in four languages and lasted nearly 11
months. All but three of the defendants were convicted; 12 were sentenced to death. The remaining
defendants received lengthy prison terms, which they served at Spandau Prison in West Berlin.
Subsequent trials were held under the auspices of Control Council Law No. 10, which was used to
prosecute accused Nazi war criminals whose crimes took place in specific locales.

Japanese defendants accused of war crimes were tried by the International Military Tribunal for the Far
East, which was established by a charter issued by U.S. Army Gen. Douglas MacArthur. The so-called
Tokyo Charter closely followed the Nürnberg Charter. The trials were conducted in English and Japanese
and lasted nearly two years. Of the 25 Japanese defendants (all of whom were convicted), 7 were
sentenced to hang, 16 were given life imprisonment, and 2 were sentenced to lesser terms. Except for
those who died early of natural causes in prison, none of the imprisoned Japanese war criminals served a
life sentence. Instead, by 1958 the remaining prisoners had been either pardoned or paroled.

From their outset, the war crimes trials were dismissed by critics merely as “victor’s justice,” because
only individuals from defeated countries were prosecuted and because the defendants were charged with
acts that allegedly had not been criminal when committed. In support of the trials, the Nürnberg tribunal
cited the Kellogg-Briand Pact (1928), which formally outlawed war and made the initiation of war a
crime for which individuals could be prosecuted.

After the Nürnberg and Tokyo trials, numerous international treaties and conventions attempted to devise
a comprehensive and enforceable definition of war crimes. The four separate Geneva conventions,
adopted in 1949, in theory made prosecutable certain acts committed in violation of the laws of war. The
conventions provided for the protection of wounded, sick, and shipwrecked military personnel, prisoners
of war, and civilians. Like the convention on genocide, however, the Geneva conventions specified that
trials were to be arranged by individual governments. In 1977 two protocols were adopted to clarify and
supplement the Geneva conventions. Recognizing that many conflicts were internal rather than
international in scope, the second protocol afforded greater protection to guerrilla combatants in civil
wars or wars of “self-determination.”

[h]Rwanda and Yugoslavia war crimes tribunals

Figure: Radovan Karadžić

Nearly 50 years passed between the Nürnberg and Tokyo trials and the next formal international
prosecution of war crimes. In May 1993, in an attempt to prevent further acts of “ethnic cleansing” in the
conflict between states of the former Yugoslavia and to restore peace and security to the Balkan region,
the United Nations Security Council established the International Criminal Tribunal for the Prosecution of
Persons Responsible for Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law Committed in the
Territory of the Former Yugoslavia since 1991, commonly known as the ICTY. In November 1994 the
UN responded to charges of genocide in Rwanda by creating the ICTR, formally known as the
International Criminal Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Genocide and Other
Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of Rwanda and
Rwandan Citizens Responsible for Genocide and Other Such Violations Committed in the Territory of
Neighbouring States between 1 January and 31 December 1994.

Both the ICTY and ICTR were international in composition, and neither tribunal sat in the country where
the covered conflict occurred; the ICTY was located in The Hague, and the ICTR was located in Arusha,
Tanzania. The tribunals had nearly identical governing statutes and a common appellate chamber.
Although the Nürnberg and Tokyo tribunals were empowered to impose capital punishment, the ICTR
and ICTY could impose only terms of imprisonment. However, no centralized international prison system
was established to house persons convicted of war crimes before the tribunals.

Figure: gacaca court

The governing statutes of the ICTY and ICTR defined war crimes broadly. The ICTY was given
jurisdiction over four categories of crime: (1) grave breaches of the Geneva conventions, (2) violations of
the laws or customs of war, (3) genocide, and (4) crimes against humanity. Recognizing that crimes
against humanity do not necessarily involve a “nexus to armed conflict” and taking into account
legislation specifically enacted by the Rwandan government, the statute of the ICTR limited the
jurisdiction of the tribunal to Rwandan leaders, while lower-level defendants were to be tried in domestic
courts. In both tribunals rape, murder, torture, deportation, and enslavement were subject to prosecution.
The tribunals thus were among the first international bodies to recognize sexual violence formally as a
war crime.

Figure: Srebrenica massacre

Like the statutes of the Nürnberg and Tokyo tribunals, the ICTY and ICTR statutes did not consider the
official position of an individual, including his position as head of state, to be a sufficient basis for
avoiding or evading criminal culpability. Accordingly, in 1999 the ICTY indicted Slobodan Milošević,
the Serbian (1989–97) and Yugoslav (1997–2000) president, for war crimes, and in 2001 he was arrested
and extradited to The Hague. Likewise, military and civilian leaders who knew or should have known that
their subordinates were committing war crimes were subject to prosecution under the doctrine of
command or superior responsibility. Finally, individuals who committed war crimes pursuant to
government or military orders were not thereby relieved of criminal liability, though the existence of the
order could be used as a mitigating factor. Thus, the rules adopted for the Nürnberg and Tokyo trials
continued to influence later efforts to bring suspected war criminals to justice.

[h]Recent developments

In 1993 the Belgian legislature passed a controversial law giving its courts the right to try any individual
accused of a war crime anywhere in the world. The law, which resulted in lengthy prison sentences for
two Rwandan nuns found guilty of genocide and in judicial complaints against many world leaders
(including Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon, Cuban Pres. Fidel Castro, and Palestinian leader Yasser
Arafat), was invalidated by the International Court of Justice in 2002. The following year the law was
repealed by the Belgian government and replaced by a law requiring that either the victim of the war
crime or the accused be a Belgian citizen or resident.

In 1998 in Rome some 150 countries attempted to establish a permanent international criminal court. The
negotiations eventually resulted in the adoption by 120 countries of the Rome Statute, a treaty
establishing an International Criminal Court (ICC) to be located permanently at The Hague. The statute
provided the ICC with jurisdiction for the crimes of aggression, genocide, crimes against humanity, and
war crimes. The court came into existence on July 1, 2002, and by 2019 the statute had been ratified by
more than 120 countries; three of the permanent members of the UN Security Council (China, Russia, and
the United States), however, had not approved it.

[h]International Criminal Court

International Criminal Court (ICC), permanent judicial body established by the Rome Statute of the
International Criminal Court (1998) to investigate, prosecute, and try individuals accused of genocide,
war crimes, and crimes against humanity and to impose prison sentences upon individuals who are found
guilty of such crimes. On July 1, 2002, after the requisite number of countries (60) ratified the agreement,
the court began sittings. It is headquartered in the Netherlands at The Hague.

The ICC was established as a court of last resort to prosecute the most heinous offenses in cases where
national courts fail to act. Unlike the International Court of Justice, which hears disputes between states,
the ICC handles prosecutions of individuals. The court’s jurisdiction extends to offenses that occurred
after July 1, 2002, that were committed either in a state that has ratified the agreement or by a national of
such a state.

Although the Rome Statute was widely praised (some 140 countries had signed the agreement by the time
it entered into force), few countries in the Middle East or Asia joined. Further, by 2002, China, Russia,
and the United States had declined to participate, and the United States had threatened to withdraw its
troops from United Nations peacekeeping forces unless its citizens (both military and civilian) were
exempted from prosecution by the ICC. Nevertheless, within five years of its first sitting more than 100
countries had ratified the treaty. All member countries are represented in the Assembly of States Parties,
which oversees the activities of the ICC.

The ICC’s first hearing, held in 2006, was to decide whether charges should be brought against Thomas
Lubanga, who was accused of recruiting child soldiers in the Democratic Republic of the Congo.
Lubanga’s trial, the first conducted by the ICC, began in January 2009, and in March 2012 the court
found him guilty and later imposed a 14-year prison sentence.

In May 2007 the court issued arrest warrants for a government minister and a militia leader in Sudan for
their roles in war crimes and crimes against humanity committed by Sudanese forces in Darfur. The ICC
issued a similar warrant in March 2009 for Sudanese Pres. Omar Hassan Ahmad al-Bashir—the first time
the court sought the arrest of a sitting head of state.

In November 2019 the ICC began an investigation into crimes within its jurisdiction allegedly committed
by the armed forces of Myanmar (Burma) against the Rohingya, a Muslim community concentrated in
Myanmar’s Rakhine (Arakan) state.

international criminal law, body of laws, norms, and rules governing international crimes and their
repression, as well as rules addressing conflict and cooperation between national criminal-law systems.
See also international law; conflict of laws.

Criminal law prohibits and punishes behaviour judged to be antisocial. Because each country’s laws are a
reflection of its values, there are often large differences between the national laws of different countries,
both with respect to the nature of the crimes themselves and the penalties considered appropriate. The
term international criminal law refers variously to at least three distinct areas: cooperation between
different national legal systems through extradition and other forms of mutual legal assistance; the
prohibition and punishment of certain behaviour by several countries acting collectively or by the
international community as a whole; and the operation of autonomous international legal systems,
including courts and other mechanisms of enforcement, that exist alongside national criminal law.

[h]Mutual legal assistance

To facilitate the enforcement of their domestic criminal laws, national governments cooperate with each
other in the transfer of offenders from one jurisdiction to another and in a number of other ways relating
to the investigation of crimes and the gathering and production of evidence. Extradition is governed
essentially by a complex web of bilateral treaties by which states agree to the rendition of fugitives from
other jurisdictions so that they can stand trial in the country where the crime took place or, in exceptional
cases, where there are other jurisdictional links, such as the nationality of the offender or of the victim.

Although bilateral extradition treaties vary somewhat, there is a body of generally applicable rules. States
usually agree upon a list of serious crimes for which extradition may be authorized and upon a
requirement that such crimes be recognized as criminal in both the sending and the requesting state.
Extradition is permitted for a specific crime described in an extradition request. Under the rule of
specialty, a requesting state may try a suspect only for the crimes for which the suspect was extradited,
unless this protection is waived by the sending state. Extradition may be refused in cases where the crime
is deemed to be a political offense, though there is greater willingness to grant extradition on this basis
when politically motivated crimes involve violence directed against innocent targets. Political crimes
involving expression and opinion are often prosecuted as sedition or treason. Beginning in the late 20th
century, governments increasingly refused to extradite persons accused of capital crimes unless assured
that capital punishment would not be imposed should the fugitive be convicted.

[h]Categories of international crime

Certain crimes are international by their nature. They may be carried out in more than one country, in
which case they are considered transborder crimes, or they may be committed in international zones such
as the high seas or international airspace. Efforts to repress such crimes become internationalized out of
necessity, reflecting the practicalities of preventing acts that sometimes easily elude national jurisdictions.
Crimes such as trafficking in persons, participating in the slave trade, and committing various terrorist
offenses, such as piracy and airplane hijacking, are governed by both international treaties and customary
legal obligations.

Crimes committed by national governments—or rather by the individuals who control and direct them—
are at the core of international criminal law. The victims of such crimes are sometimes the nationals of
other states (e.g., civilians in an occupied territory during an armed conflict), but more often they are the
criminal state’s own citizens. In this context, international criminal law overlaps considerably with human
rights law, the former attributing blame to individuals mainly in order to impose punishment, the latter
blaming the state and seeking some form of redress or compensation.

The first modern international criminal tribunal was held at Nürnberg, Germany, following World War II
to try military and civilian leaders of Nazi Germany. (A similar tribunal was established at Tokyo to try
alleged Japanese war criminals.) The Nürnberg trials (1945–46) prosecuted three categories of offenses:
crimes against peace, war crimes, and crimes against humanity. The definitions of the crimes were
narrowly crafted and applied only to acts committed in association with international war. More than half
a century later, the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (ICC; 1998) targeted the same three
kinds of crime and added the crime of genocide. During the second half of the 20th century, the
definitions of the crimes that were prosecuted at Nürnberg evolved considerably, so that they came to
cover offenses committed in peacetime or in civil wars.

Crimes against peace consist of acts of aggressive war. Although aggression was defined in a United
Nations (UN) General Assembly resolution (1974) as “the use of armed force by a State against the
sovereignty, territorial integrity or political independence of another State, or in any other manner
inconsistent with the Charter of the United Nations,” the question of how to assign individual
responsibility for acts of aggression committed by states remains unresolved. Although the ICC has
jurisdiction over the crime of aggression, it cannot exercise its authority until there is agreement both on a
definition of aggression suitable for individual criminal prosecutions and on the role that the UN Security
Council should play in determining when aggression has taken place. Such an agreement has proved
elusive, however. There have been no prosecutions for crimes against peace or for aggression since the
post-World War II trials. Virtually no national jurisdictions have introduced this category of crime into
domestic legal codes, in contrast to the widespread acceptance of national laws against genocide, crimes
against humanity, and war crimes. Moreover, the two ad hoc criminal tribunals established by the UN
Security Council for the former Yugoslavia and for Rwanda were given jurisdiction to punish genocide,
crimes against humanity, and war crimes but not aggression.

The concept of war crimes refers to a range of acts judged to be beyond civilized human behaviour, even
in the extreme conditions of warfare. The acts defined as war crimes concern both the methods and the
materials of warfare (e.g., the use of certain weapons that cause unnecessary suffering or the targeting of
noncombatants). At Nürnberg the defendants argued that, whereas states might have culpability for
violations of the laws and customs of war, individuals could not be singled out for criminal prosecution.
Nevertheless, the judges held that “crimes against international law are committed by men, not by abstract
entities, and only by punishing individuals who commit such crimes can the provisions of international
law be enforced.” Although individuals can be held responsible for most kinds of international crimes,
such crimes are almost never committed without the involvement of states or of rebel organizations
striving to take power. At the beginning of the 21st century, the question of whether states themselves can
commit international crimes remained a controversial issue.

In 1949 a narrow list of war crimes committed during international armed conflict, known as grave
breaches, was approved in four Geneva Conventions. When the Geneva Conventions were revised with
additional protocols in 1977, attempts to expand the concept of grave breaches to include acts committed
in non-international, or civil, war did not succeed. States have always been more willing to accept a role
for international norms and standards during international, or interstate, wars than during civil wars.
Nevertheless, by the mid-1990s international views had evolved, partly because of the influence of the
international human rights movement and partly because of outrage at the scale of the atrocities
committed in the early 1990s in the essentially civil conflicts in the former Yugoslavia and in Rwanda. As
evidence of this development in international law, the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court
recognized a broad range of war crimes committed during internal armed conflict.

Although those who prepared the post-World War II prosecutions initially believed that atrocities
committed against civilians within Germany fell outside the scope of international law, the Nürnberg
tribunal was empowered to prosecute such acts under the rubric of crimes against humanity—a concept
that previously had not existed in international law. At about the same time, the closely related concept of
genocide was developed to describe acts aimed at the physical destruction, in whole or in part, of ethnic,
racial, national, or religious groups. The crime of genocide was defined in the Convention on the
Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (1948). Although crimes against humanity were
prosecuted at Nürnberg, a widely accepted definition of this term eluded international law until the
adoption of the Rome Statute in 1998. Crimes against humanity consist of a variety of acts, such as
murder, torture, enforced disappearance, apartheid, and rape, committed as part of a widespread or
systematic attack on a civilian population.

In a general sense, war crimes, crimes against humanity, and genocide all consist of acts, such as murder
and rape, that are criminal under national law. What sets them apart as international crimes is the context
in which the act is committed, be it an international or internal armed conflict (war crime), an attack on a
civilian population (crime against humanity), or the intentional destruction of an ethnic, racial, national,
or religious group (genocide). For a prosecution to succeed, it must be established both that the
underlying criminal act occurred (e.g., the killing of individuals) and that one of these contextual elements
was present.

[h]Prosecution and defense

When ordinary crimes cross the threshold and become international crimes, important consequences
ensue. Most significantly, general legal rules on the exercise of jurisdiction no longer apply. Under
international law, a national criminal-justice system may prosecute crimes committed within the state’s
own territory or by its nationals but not, as a general rule, crimes committed outside its borders by
nonnationals. This rule, however, has been relaxed in the case of war crimes, crimes against humanity,
and genocide. Under what is known as universal jurisdiction, national courts may prosecute these
offenses no matter where or by whom they are committed. Indeed, in the 1990s Belgium adopted
controversial legislation that granted its courts the authority to try anyone—even the leaders of other
countries—for such offenses. In 2001 the International Court of Justice ruled that the Belgian legislation
was invalid because it wrongly assumed that Belgian courts can try foreign heads of state or other senior
officials while they are still in office. Following the judgment, and under pressure from states that
threatened to prohibit official travel to Belgium, the Belgian government modified the legislation. In the
case of grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions and the crime of torture, international treaties make
prosecution not only a right but a duty. Under the principle known as aut dedere aut judicare (Latin:
“either adjudicate or extradite”), national governments must either try offenders or extradite them to a
country that is prepared to do so. The “try or extradite” principle can also be found in treaties dealing with
terrorism, counterfeiting, and the theft of nuclear materials.

Special rules apply to the arguments an accused may raise in defense of his actions. Although a head of
state may benefit from immunity under national law, he cannot invoke this defense in the case of war
crimes, crimes against humanity, and genocide. He may, however, plead immunity from prosecution by
other states for crimes committed while he was in office, as long as they were not committed in a private
context. Nevertheless, heads of state have no such immunity before international courts or tribunals. In
addition, statutory limitations, a common bar to prosecution many years after a crime has taken place in
many national legal systems, are excluded by both treaty and customary law for war crimes, crimes
against humanity, and genocide.

Individuals also may not argue in their defense that they were acting under the orders of a superior,
though this is permitted for soldiers and officers of the peace in most national legal systems. Although
subordinates cannot be exonerated in such circumstances, international criminal law focuses its attention
primarily on commanders. Those with superior authority, be they military or civilian, may be found guilty
of war crimes, crimes against humanity, and genocide when they are committed by those under their
command, even when there is no evidence that they actually ordered the commission of the crime.

[h]World Wars I and II

In 1919 the Treaty of Versailles contemplated the establishment of an international court to prosecute
German Emperor William II “for a supreme offense against international morality and the sanctity of
treaties.” The court was never set up, however, because William obtained asylum in a neutral country, the
Netherlands. The victorious allies at the close of World War II were more successful, establishing by
treaty the tribunal at Nürnberg that judged “the major war criminals of the European Axis.” In all, some
22 leading Nazis were tried by a court composed of eight judges (four judges rendered the verdicts, and
four served as alternates), two each from the United States, the United Kingdom, France, and the Soviet
Union.
Critics of the Nürnberg trials, and of a similar prosecution held in Tokyo, have viewed them as “victor’s
justice,” particularly because the tribunals never considered war crimes committed by their own soldiers,
though in at least one case, concerning submarine warfare, the argument that illegal acts had also been
committed by the other side was accepted as a defense. Despite such flaws, the tribunals represented a
great achievement for those who desired an international system that would prosecute heinous offenses
committed during war.

In 1948 the UN General Assembly assigned the task of preparing a statute for an international criminal
court to the International Law Commission; three years later the commission submitted a draft statute, but
consideration of the proposal was postponed. The issue was revisited periodically, and in 1989 the
General Assembly invited the commission to resume its efforts, which became more urgent following the
atrocities committed in the former Yugoslavia and in Rwanda and the establishment of international
criminal tribunals to prosecute individuals responsible for acts of genocide and ethnic cleansing in those
countries. The eventual draft, as modified by subsequent General Assembly committees, was submitted to
a diplomatic conference (formally the United Nations Diplomatic Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the
Establishment of an International Criminal Court) held in Rome in June–July 1998. The Rome Statute,
adopted at the close of the conference, was signed by nearly 140 countries. It came into force on July 1,
2002, after it had been ratified by the requisite 60 countries. Nevertheless, the failure of the United States,
Russia, China, and several other major countries to join the ICC has compromised its effectiveness.

The ICC, which is based in The Hague, is authorized to prosecute war crimes, crimes against humanity,
and acts of genocide that are committed in the territory, or by a national, of a state that has ratified the
Rome Statute. Prosecution may exceed these jurisdictional limits when authorized by the Security
Council. The court recognizes the primacy of national criminal jurisdictions and, acting as a court of last
resort, can proceed with a case only after it has determined that domestic courts are either unable or
unwilling to prosecute.

The ICC consists of 18 judges elected by the Assembly of States Parties to the Rome Statute; the judges
are divided into Pre-Trial, Trial, and Appeals divisions, each of which is further subdivided into
chambers. Cases are initiated by a prosecutor who is elected by the Assembly of States Parties; the
prosecutor may also act at the request of the UN Security Council or at the request of a government that
has ratified the statute.

The ICC depends upon national justice systems to carry out investigations and to arrest and transfer
suspects. Its procedural regime is a hybrid of the common-law adversarial model and the inquisitorial
approach of civil-law systems such as those of continental Europe. Following the common-law model,
prosecutions at the ICC are directed by an independent prosecutor rather than by an investigating judge,
as would be the practice under civil-law systems. As in civil-law systems, however, the ICC prosecutor is
given special responsibilities to ensure that the rights and interests of the defendant are secured.
Moreover, the ICC prosecutor is subject to close judicial scrutiny by the Pre-Trial Chamber, something
that would not generally be the case in a common-law system. Those convicted by the ICC receive
sentences of up to life imprisonment and serve their terms in national prisons.

[mh] National Legal Approaches

[h]Cambodian genocide

Cambodian genocide, systematic murder of up to three million people in Cambodia from 1976 to 1978
that was carried out by the Khmer Rouge government under Pol Pot.
Immediately after World War II, the Americans and the French fought wars against communism in Korea
and Vietnam, respectively. Cambodia became independent in 1953 when French Indochina collapsed
under the assault of Ho Chi Minh’s Viet Minh communist army. Cambodia’s constitutional monarchy
under Prince Sihanouk remained neutral during the Vietnam War, until he was ousted in 1970 by an
American-backed coup. Forced to seek refuge in Beijing, he became the figurehead for communist Khmer
Rouge insurgents, whose cause was greatly aided when the United States bombed Cambodia in an
attempt to suppress guerrilla activity. Cambodia’s civil war ended in 1975 when capital city Phnom Penh
fell to the Khmer Rouge, who renamed the country Kampuchea.

Pol Pot declared 1975 to be “Year Zero,” when Cambodia was to be isolated and its society remade in
accordance with communist ideals. Civil rights and property rights were immediately eliminated, and any
pubic expression of religious belief was forbidden. Taking the view that Cambodian society had been
corrupted by exposure to the world beyond Cambodia’s borders, the new regime started destroying
evidence of Western influence, emptying cities and force-marching the urban population into the
countryside to engage in hopelessly inadequate agricultural projects. As starvation and disease set in,
these actions alone would have created a significant humanitarian disaster.

The Khmer Rouge also persecuted and killed minorities, particularly ethnic Chinese and Vietnamese, in
large numbers. Other targets included Cham Muslims, of whom 70–80 percent of the population was
exterminated; professionals such as doctors, lawyers, and teachers; and anyone who could remotely be
described as “intellectual,” which included anyone wearing spectacles or who could speak a foreign
language. The Tuol Sleng Prison in Phnom Penh became a centre for mass murder, and there were rural
sites—referred to as the Killing Fields, which is also the title of a 1984 film that brought the plight of
Khmer Rouge victims to worldwide attention—where a huge number of people were executed. As
hundreds of thousands of Cambodians fled into Thailand, the genocide intensified, with the Khmer Rouge
turning on itself and murdering thousands of suspected traitors and spies in its ranks. By November 1978,
when Vietnam invaded and put an end to the Khmer Rouge’s excesses, at least 1.25 million and as many
as 3 million Cambodians had died as a result of Khmer Rouge action; Cambodia’s population had been
7.5 million. Even though the Khmer Rouge kept extensive records, many disappeared into Vietnamese
archives, and so the exact number of victims has not been ascertained; the working consensus is 2 million.

In 1979, following the Khmer Rouge’s defeat at the hands of Vietnamese forces, the movement’s de facto
leader, fled into the jungles on Cambodia’s border with Thailand where he maintained the pretense of
leading a legitimate government. He died in 1998 while under house arrest imposed by rivals within the
Khmer Rouge, which largely disintegrated afterward. Vietnam occupied Cambodia until 1989, and free
elections were held in 1993, inaugurating a democratic government, The Khmer Rouge Tribunal,
formally known as the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia, was established in 2006 as an
effort to bring surviving leaders to justice, and trials held under its auspices secured a number of
convictions. In 2012, Kaing Guek Eav, the commandant of Tuol Sleng Prison, was sentenced to life in
prison for crimes against humanity; he died in 2020. In 2018 Khieu Samphan and Nuon Chea, two high-
ranking Khmer Rouge officials, were convicted of genocide. The Tribunal ceased active litigation in 2022
but has not been decommissioned.

The genocide is a locus of Cambodian memory today. Under the Vietnamese occupation, part of the Tuol
Sleng Prison, also called S-21, was converted into a museum, and today it sees significant visitation from
Cambodians and foreign tourists alike. Signs across the rural countryside mark the sites of former killing
fields. An extensive Cambodian exodus to the United States followed the years of genocide, and
observances by expatriates are held at Chicago’s National Cambodian Heritage Museum & Killing Fields
Memorial and elsewhere in the country.
genocide, the deliberate and systematic destruction of a group of people because of their ethnicity,
nationality, religion, or race. The term, derived from the Greek genos (“race,” “tribe,” or “nation”) and the
Latin cide (“killing”), was coined by Raphael Lemkin, a Polish-born jurist who served as an adviser to the
U.S. Department of War during World War II.

Although the term itself is of recent origin, genocide arguably has been practiced throughout history
(though some observers have restricted its occurrence to a very few cases). According to Thucydides, for
example, the people of Melos were slaughtered after refusing to surrender to the Athenians during the
Peloponnesian War. Indeed, in ancient times it was common for victors in war to massacre all the men of
a conquered population. The massacre of Cathari during the Albigensian Crusade in the 13th century is
sometimes cited as the first modern case of genocide, though medieval scholars generally have resisted
this characterization. Twentieth-century events often cited as genocide include the 1915 Armenian
massacre by the Turkish-led Ottoman Empire, the nearly complete extermination of European Jews,
Roma (Gypsies), and other groups by Nazi Germany during World War II, and the killing of Tutsi by
Hutu in Rwanda in the 1990s.

[h]Defining genocide: the Nürnberg Charter and the genocide convention

In his work Axis Rule in Occupied Europe: Laws of Occupation, Analysis of Government, Proposals for
Redress (1944), Lemkin noted that a key component of genocide was the

criminal intent to destroy or to cripple permanently a human group. The acts are directed against groups
as such, and individuals are selected for destruction only because they belong to these groups.

In contemporary international law the crime of genocide is part of the broader category of “crimes against
humanity,” which were defined by the Charter of the International Military Tribunal (Nürnberg Charter).
The charter granted the tribunal jurisdiction to indict and try the leaders of the Nazi regime for inhumane
acts committed against civilians, as well as for acts of persecution on political, racial, or religious
grounds; in so doing, it also contributed to the international criminalization of other forms of abusive
conduct. The momentum created by the Nürnberg trials and the ensuing revelations of Nazi atrocities led
to the passage by the United Nations (UN) General Assembly of Resolution 96-I (December 1946), which
made the crime of genocide punishable under international law, and of Resolution 260-III (December
1948), which approved the text of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of
Genocide, the first UN human rights treaty. The convention, which entered into force in 1951, has been
ratified by more than 130 countries. Although the United States played a major role in drafting the
convention and was an original signatory, the U.S. Senate did not ratify it until 1988.

[h]Criticisms of the genocide convention

Although the convention has enjoyed near unanimous international support and although the prohibition
of genocide has become, according to the International Court of Justice, a peremptory norm (jus cogens
[Latin: “compelling law”]) of international law, the convention has often been criticized for excluding
political and social groups from the list of possible victims of genocide. The so-called “intentionality
clause” of the convention’s definition of genocide—the part that mentions the “intent to destroy, in whole
or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group”—also is problematic. Two of the most common
objections are that such intent can be difficult to establish and that the attempt to assign such intent to
individuals makes little sense in modern societies, where violence can result as much from anonymous
social and economic forces as from individual choices.
In support of the first objection, some scholars have noted that governments do not openly admit to
committing genocidal acts—a fact that is borne out in history. The Iraqi regime of Saddam Hussein, for
example, portrayed its use of chemical warfare against the Kurds in the 1980s as an effort to reestablish
law and order, and the Ottoman and successive Turkish governments asserted that the Armenians killed in
the massacres were casualties of war. Even Germany’s Nazi regime did not publicize its extermination of
Jews and other groups. In response, defenders of the intentionality clause have argued that “a pattern of
purposeful action” leading to the destruction of a significant part of the targeted group is enough to
establish genocidal intent, irrespective of the reasons the perpetrator regime offers for its actions.

Supporters of the second objection have argued that an approach that focuses solely on intent ignores the
“structural violence” of social systems in which vast political and economic disparities can lead to the
total marginalization and even extermination of particular groups. Defenders of the intentionality clause
respond that it is necessary for differentiating genocide from other forms of mass killings and for devising
effective strategies to prevent genocide.

The debates between supporters and opponents of the genocide convention have important policy
implications, which can be seen in the discussion of the connection between war crimes and genocide.
The two concepts differ principally in how the targeted group is defined and identified. Whereas the
targeted group in the case of war crimes is identified by its status as an enemy, the targeted group in the
case of genocide is identified by its racial, national, ethnic, or religious characteristics. The chief
indication that the targeting is based on enemy status as opposed to racial, ethnic, or religious identity is
primarily the behaviour of the group’s opponent once the conflict has ended. If the attacks against the
targeted group cease, then the (probable) commission of war crimes is the issue at stake. If the attacks
persist, however, the commission of genocide can legitimately be alleged. The importance attributed to
post-conflict conduct reflects the realization that genocide can and does take place during wartime,
usually under cover of war-related activities. The distinction between war crimes and genocide is of the
utmost importance in any discussion of preventive action. In cases of war crimes, the termination of
conflict would suffice, and no additional measures of protection would be necessary. In cases of
genocide, the termination of conflict would necessitate the adoption of protective measures to ensure the
group’s survival.

Although many of the criticisms of the genocide convention are well-founded, they should not obscure its
strengths. The genocide convention was the first legal instrument to disentangle the most heinous of
crimes against humanity from the “war-nexus” requirement, which had limited the jurisdiction of the
Nürnberg tribunal to cases in which a crime against humanity was committed in conjunction with a crime
against interstate peace. Instead, the convention declared that genocide is an international crime “whether
committed in time of peace or in time of war.” Moreover, the convention was the first UN legal
instrument to stipulate that individuals can incur international criminal responsibility whether or not they
act on behalf of a state. The convention can also serve, in accordance with 8, as the legal basis of
enforcement measures ordered by the Security Council (the only UN organ that can authorize the use of
force).

[h]Recent developments

During the first 50 years after its ratification, the genocide convention lacked effective enforcement
mechanisms, despite the fact that it contained provisions to enable the UN to enforce it. Although the
convention stipulated that persons charged with genocide should be tried before an international penal
tribunal or a tribunal of the state in which the crime was committed, no permanent penal tribunal existed
at the international level until the early 21st century, and prosecutions at the domestic level were unlikely
except in the rare case where a genocidal regime was overthrown and its officials were prosecuted by a
successor regime.

The genocide convention was first invoked before an international tribunal in 1993, when the government
of Bosnia and Herzegovina argued before the International Court of Justice that the Federal Republic of
Yugoslavia was in breach of its obligations under the convention. During the 1990s the international
community became more vigorous in prosecuting alleged crimes of genocide. The UN Security Council
established separate tribunals, the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) and
the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR), both of which contributed to the clarification of
the material elements of the offense of genocide as well as of the criteria establishing individual criminal
responsibility for its commission. The Rwandan tribunal, for example, stated that genocide included
“subjecting a group of people to a subsistence diet, systematic expulsion from homes and the reduction of
essential medical services below minimum requirement.” It also ruled that “rape and sexual violence
constitute genocide…as long as they were committed with the specific intent to destroy, in whole or in
part, a particular group, targeted as such”—as was the case in the Rwandan conflict, where the
government, dominated by the Hutu ethnic group, organized the mass rape of ethnic Tutsi women by
HIV-infected men. On the critical issue of intent, the Yugoslav tribunal also ruled that genocidal intent
can be manifest in the persecution of small groups of people as well as large ones. According to the
tribunal, such intent

may consist of desiring the extermination of a very large number of the members of the group, in which
case it would constitute an intention to destroy a group en masse. However, it may also consist of the
desired destruction of a more limited number of persons selected for the impact that their disappearance
would have upon the survival of the group as such. This would then constitute an intention to destroy the
group “selectively.”

On July 1, 2002, the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (ICC), adopted in 1998 in Rome by
some 120 countries, entered into force. The ICC’s jurisdiction includes the crime of genocide, and the
statute adopts the same definition of the offense as found in the genocide convention. The establishment
of the ICC—though without the participation of the United States, China, and Russia—was another
indication of a growing international consensus in favour of vigorous and concerted efforts to suppress
and punish the crime of genocide.

[h]honor killing

honor killing, most often, the murder of a woman or girl by male family members. The killers justify their
actions by claiming that the victim has brought dishonor upon the family name or prestige.

In patriarchal societies, the activities of girls and women are closely monitored. The maintenance of a
woman’s virginity and “sexual purity” are considered to be the responsibility of male relatives—first her
father and brothers and then her husband. Victims of honor killings usually are alleged to have engaged in
“sexually immoral” actions, ranging from openly conversing with men who are not related to them to
having sex outside of marriage (even if they are the victims of rape or sexual assault). However, a woman
can be targeted for murder for a variety of other reasons, including refusing to enter into an arranged
marriage or seeking a divorce or separation—even from an abusive husband. The mere suspicion that a
woman has acted in a manner that could damage her family’s name may trigger an attack; these
assumptions are generally based on men’s feelings and perceptions rather than on objective truth.
Ironically, female relatives often defend the killings and occasionally help set them up.
Although such crimes are widely suspected to be underreported, the United Nations Population Fund
estimates that as many as 5,000 women are killed annually for reasons of honor. These crimes take place
throughout the world and are not limited to one specific religion or faith. However, they have rather
significantly and consistently occurred in various parts of the Middle East and South Asia, with nearly
half of all honor killings occurring in India and Pakistan.

In the 21st century, there was an increased international awareness of honor killing, however, some
countries remained reluctant to take the necessary steps to effectively criminalize it. In the relatively
uncommon event that a man was prosecuted for the killing, the subsequent trial would often focus on the
woman’s alleged behaviour, rather than the violence committed against her. When a man was found
guilty, the defendant could claim that the crime had been committed to restore sullied family honor and
petition the court for a reduced sentence. In India, for example, the government enacted strict penalties for
violence against women during the 1980s. However, honor killings based on intercaste and interreligious
marriages continued to take place in rural areas, where they were largely unreported to police because of
direct or indirect support among village residents. Such murders were often ruled as accidents when
reported. A woman beaten, burned, strangled, shot, or stabbed to death could be ruled a suicide, even if
there were multiple wounds and there was no possibility the woman could have killed herself.

In some countries, such as Jordan, honor killings are either legal or minimally punished. 340 of the
Jordanian Penal Code exempts from punishment those who kill female relatives found “guilty” of
committing adultery, and 76 of the temporary penal code allows defendants to cite “mitigating reasons” in
assault crimes. In 2011 Jordanian legislators attempted to amend 76 to prevent its use by defendants in
honor killings, but pressure from social groups caused those efforts to stall.

assassination, the murder of a public figure. The term typically refers to the killing of government leaders
and other prominent persons for political purposes—such as to seize power, to start a revolution, to draw
attention to a cause, to exact revenge, or to undermine a regime or its critics. Such politically motivated
murders have taken place in all parts of the world and in every period of history.

[h]Etymology of assassination

The word assassination is derived from Nizārī Ismāʿīliyyah, a religio-political movement that arose in the
late 11th century within the Ismāʿīliyyah branch of Shiʿi Islam. The Nizārīs, whose power base was in the
Elburz Mountains, in what is today northern Iran, lacked the military strength to confront regional
opponents such as the ʿAbbasid caliphate and the Seljuq sultanate directly. Instead, they relied on
subterfuge and infiltration to strike at key military and political figures within both empires.

European Crusaders heard and misinterpreted legends about the early Nizārīs and then brought these
stories back to their home countries. Two of these misinterpretations—which likely originated with the
Nizārīs’ enemies—were that the Nizārīs were fanatics under the sway of the mysterious “old man of the
mountain” and that they used hashish to induce visions of paradise before setting out to face martyrdom.
The Arabic term ḥashīshī (“consumer of hashish”), which was used as a derogatory term for the Nizārīs,
became the root of the English term assassin and its cognates in other European languages. Assassin took
on the meaning of a relentless killer.
[h]Targets of assassination

Figure: John F. Kennedy's presidential motorcade in Dallas

Figure: assassination attempt on Ronald Reagan

Heads of state or government, such as presidents, prime ministers, and monarchs, have often been the
target of assassinations. Four United States presidents—Abraham Lincoln, James Garfield, William
McKinley, and John F. Kennedy—have been assassinated. More than a dozen U.S. presidents have been
the targets of unsuccessful assassination attempts, and two—Theodore Roosevelt and Ronald Reagan—
have been wounded. A would-be assassin targeted President-elect Franklin D. Roosevelt in February
1933; Roosevelt escaped injury, but a bullet struck and killed Chicago Mayor Anton Cermak, who had
been riding in Roosevelt’s car.

Figure: Archduke Franz Ferdinand and his wife, Sophie, duchess of Hohenberg
Figure: View historical footage and photographs surrounding Gavrilo Princip's assassination of Archduke
Franz Ferdinand

In 1914 the assassination of Archduke Franz Ferdinand, the heir to the throne of Austria-Hungary, helped
bring about World War I a few weeks later. In the 20th century alone the victims of assassination
included current and former chief executives of Nicaragua (Anastasio Somoza Debayle, 1980), South
Vietnam (Ngo Dinh Diem, 1963), the Dominican Republic (Rafael Trujillo, 1961), South Africa (Hendrik
Verwoerd, 1966), Liberia (William R. Tolbert, 1980), India (Indira Gandhi, 1984), Egypt (Anwar Sadat,
1981), Saudi Arabia (Faisal, 1975), Jordan (Abdullah I, 1951), Israel (Yitzhak Rabin, 1995), Iran
(Mohammad Ali Rajaʾi and Mohammad Javad Bahonar, 1981), Austria (Engelbert Dollfuss, 1934),
Mexico (Venustiano Carranza, 1920), Sweden (Olof Palme, 1986), South Korea (Park Chung Hee, 1979),
and many other countries. Victims of assassination have included ministers, legislators, judges, and other
government officials, members of the military or police, members of political parties and factions, and
religious leaders. Assassins have also killed prominent members of social and political movements, such
as American civil rights leaders Medgar Evers (1963) and Martin Luther King, Jr. (1968), American gay
rights activist and politician Harvey Milk (who was slain along with San Francisco Mayor George
Moscone in 1978), Indian independence leader and social activist Mahatma Gandhi (1948), and South
African anti-apartheid activist Stephen Biko (1977).
Figure: Rafic al-Hariri memorial shrine
While murder was used less frequently as a political tool in the 21st century, there were nevertheless
some notable incidents. In 2003 Serbian Prime Minister Zoran Djindjić was killed by a sniper who had
ties to organized crime and the regime of Slobodan Milošević. Former prime minister of Lebanon Rafic
al-Hariri was killed by a car bomb in 2005; it was widely believed that Syria was responsible for Hariri’s
assassination, and, in the unrest that followed, Syrian troops were forced to end their nearly three-decade
occupation of Lebanon. Former prime minister of Pakistan Benazir Bhutto was killed in a suicide
bombing (2007) carried out by the Pakistani Taliban, and Haitian Pres. Jovenel Moïse was gunned down
in his home (2021) by Colombian mercenaries. In July 2022 former Japanese prime minister Shinzo Abe
was shot and killed at a campaign event for a fellow Liberal-Democratic Party politician.
Chapter 3: Technological Advancements in Drone Warfare

[mh]Pro and Con: International Drone Strikes

Unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), otherwise known as drones, are remotely-controlled aircraft which
may be armed with missiles and bombs for attack missions. Since the World Trade Center attacks on Sep.
11, 2001 and the subsequent “War on Terror,” the United States has used thousands of drones to kill
suspected terrorists in Pakistan, Afghanistan, Yemen, Somalia, and other countries.

The first recorded unmanned air strike occurred on July 15, 1849, when the Habsburg Austrian Empire
launched 200 pilotless balloons armed with bombs against the revolution-minded citizens of Venice.
During the US Civil War, both the Union and Confederate sides sent balloons loaded with explosives and
time-sensitive triggers over the opponents, though the strategy was ineffective.

The modern electronically-controlled military drone traces its origins to the 1930s when the British Royal
Navy developed the Queen Bee, a radio-controlled drone used for aerial target practice by British
pilots. Between Nov. 1944 and Apr. 1945, Japan released more than 9,000 bomb-laden balloons across
the Pacific, intending to cause forest fires and panic in the western United States in operation “Fu-Go.”
Most of the balloons caused minimal damage or fell in the Pacific Ocean, but more than 300 made their
way into the US and Canada. Because the US government, in concert with the American press, kept the
balloons a secret, the Japanese believed the tactic ineffective and abandoned the project.

The two most widely-used weaponized drones are the MQ-1 Predator (which the US military officially
retired on Mar. 9, 2018) and the upgraded MQ-9 Reaper, both developed by military contractor General
Atomics Aeronautical Systems. The Predator drones were first flown in June 1994 and deployed by
NATO in 1995 in the Balkans during the Bosnian Serbian war, while the Reaper was first deployed in
Oct. 2007 in Afghanistan. The Reaper, flown remotely by pilots, can cruise for 27 hours, get close-up
views from 10,000 feet, and carries Hellfire missiles as well as both laser- and GPS- guided bombs.
[h]PRO

 Drone strikes make the United States safer by remotely decimating terrorist networks across the
world.
 Drone strikes are legal under American and international law.
 Americans support drone strikes.
 Drone strikes are carried out with the collaboration and encouragement of local governments, and
make those countries safer.
 Drones limit the scope, scale, and casualties of military action, keeping the US military and
civilians in other countries safer.

[h]CON

 Drone strikes mostly kill low-value targets and create more terrorists.
 Drone strikes terrorize and kill civilians.
 Secretive drone strikes amount to extrajudicial assassination and violate human rights.
 Drone strikes violate the sovereignty of other countries and are extremely unpopular in the affected
countries.
 Drone strikes allow an emotional disconnect from the horrors of war and inflict psychological
stress on drone operators.

[mh]Killer Robots: The Future of War?

Artificial intelligence (AI) will transform our lives. It will touch almost every aspect of society: business,
education, transportation, medicine, even politics. In most places, this will be a good thing, removing
drudgery and improving productivity. But there is one place that I fear its arrival, and that is in the
military.

The world will be a much worse place if, in 20 years’ time, the military are using lethal autonomous
weapons systems (LAWS), for there are no laws about LAWS. The media like to call them “killer
robots.” The problem with calling them “killer robots” is that this conjures up a picture of The
Terminator. But it is not The Terminator that worries me or thousands of my colleagues working in AI. It
is much simpler technologies that are, at best, a decade or so away. Take an existing Predator drone and
replace the human pilot with a computer—this is technically possible today.

The attractiveness of such technologies is obvious. The weakest link in a drone is the radio link back to
base. Drones have been sabotaged by jamming their radio link. Have the drone fly, track, and target for
itself, and you have the perfect weapon from a technological perspective. It will never sleep. It will fight
24/7. It will have superhuman accuracy and reflexes.

There are, however, many reasons why this will be a terrible development in warfare. This will be a
revolution in warfare. The first revolution in warfare was the invention of gun powder. The second was
the invention of nuclear weapons. And this will be the third. Each was a step change in the speed and
efficiency with which we could kill our opponents.

These will be weapons of mass destruction. Previously, if you wanted to do harm, you had to have an
army of soldiers to wage war. Now, you would need just one programmer. Like every other weapon of
mass destruction before it, like chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons, we will need to ban such
weaponry.
These will be weapons of terror. They will fall into the hands of terrorists and rogue states that will have
no qualms about turning them on civilian populations. They will be an ideal weapon with which to
suppress a civilian population. Unlike humans, they will not hesitate to commit atrocities, even genocide.

These will not be more ethical than human soldiers. We don’t know today how to build autonomous
weapons that will follow international humanitarian law and don’t know of any computer systems that
can’t be hacked. And there are plenty of bad actors out there who will override any safeguards that might
be put in place.

These weapons will destabilize an already shaky geopolitical order. It will only take a modest bank
balance to have a powerful army. They will lower the barriers to war. We may even have “flash” wars
when opposing robots get into unexpected feedback loops.

These will be the Kalashnikovs of the future. Unlike nuclear weapons, they will be cheap and easy to
produce. This doesn’t mean they can’t be banned. Chemical weapons are cheap and easy to produce but
have been banned. And we don’t need to develop autonomous weapons as a deterrent against those who
might ignore a ban—we don’t develop chemical weapons to deter those who might sometimes use
chemical weapons. We already have plenty of deterrents, military, economic, and diplomatic, with which
to deter those who choose to ignore international treaties.

Above all, there is a deep moral argument that we give up an essential part of our humanity if we hand
over to machines the decision of whether someone lives or dies.

[mh]Killer drones: how many are there and who do they target?

Drones – remotely piloted craft – first appeared in the 1990s when they were used for military
surveillance by the US. Familiar advances in miniaturisation and cost mean they are now used for all
kinds of purposes – for recreation, filming, monitoring conservation or to deliver vital medicines in
remote areas.

Military technology has also advanced, albeit more slowly, and the principal drones used now are
evolutions of the technology first deployed to spot hidden Serbian positions during the 1999 Kosovo war.
Weapons on drones were first deployed almost immediately after 9/11, their usage since has been bound
up with the so-called “war on terror”.

[h]How many military drones are out there?

The vast majority of the many thousands of military drones are used for surveillance, and defence experts
predict that will continue. Analysts at information group Jane’s estimate that more than 80,000
surveillance drones and almost 2,000 attack drones will be purchased around the world in the next 10
years.

Weaponised drones are not cheap: experts say the starting price for the technology is about $15m (£12m)
per unit, with more for add-ons, on top of the training and the crews needed to pilot them.

It is a world in which the UK is a relatively small but still influential power. The RAF operates nine
missile-bearing Reaper drones, one of which is in repair; it plans to buy 16 next-generation Protector
drones by 2023 at an initial cost of £415m.

In 2019 alone, Jane’s experts expect the world’s 10 biggest drone powers to spend some $8bn on units.
“The wide variety in types of UAV [unmanned aerial vehicles] makes them suitable for both surveillance
and combat missions, with low-cost models able to conduct surveillance operations, opening up the
capability for militaries with a smaller budget,” says Greg Murray, a senior analyst at Jane’s.

[h]Which countries are the main users of drones?

The first phase of drone warfare was dominated by three countries: the US, the UK and Israel. The US
and UK rely on Predator and latterly Reaper drones made by General Atomics, a Californian company
owned by billionaire brothers Neal and Linden Blue. Israel develops its own technology.

Drones rapidly proliferated in a second wave over the past five years, with Pakistan and Turkey
developing their own programmes. Since 2016, Turkey has used drones heavily, against the separatist
Kurdish PKK in its own country, in northern Iraq and more recently against Kurdish groups in Syria.

China, meanwhile, has begun supplying a range of countries with its Wing Loong and CH series drones,
including to the UAE – where they have been used in a string of deadly strikes in Libya – as well as
Egypt Nigeria, Saudi Arabia and Iraq, although not every country has been able to deploy what it has
bought.

Iran was blamed for an attack on Saudi oil installations in September believed to have involved drones as
well as missiles. Proliferation is expected to continue, not least because Russia and India are running
behind.

[h]When did drones turn into weapons?

Weaponisation came almost immediately after 9/11. Predator drones had already observed Osama bin
Laden, the al-Qaida leader, from the skies. But the first strike, in October 2001, missed its intended target,
Taliban leader Mullah Omar. Some of his bodyguards were killed in a vehicle outside the leader’s
compound instead. But this failure did not deter the US.

Predator and Reaper drones have since been deployed by the US in Afghanistan and the northern, tribal
areas of Pakistan in various iterations of the “war on terror”, as well as in Iraq, Somalia, Yemen, Libya
and Syria.

British statistics give some idea of the frequency of contemporary drone strikes (the US does not release
equivalent data). In four years of war against Isis in Iraq and Syria from 2014-2018, Reaper drones were
deployed on more than 2,400 missions – almost two a day.

Drones account for 42% all UK aerial missions against Isis, and 23% of weapon strikes, according to
statistics collected by UK website Drone Wars via freedom of information requests.

[h]Who pilots them?

RAF Reaper drones are piloted from RAF Waddington in Lincolnshire and by UK personnel from Creech
air force base in Nevada, where crews operate in three-hour shifts, although the drones themselves are
based in the Middle East, almost certainly at an air base in Kuwait.

Pilots on rotation control devices that are able to loiter in a conflict zone for about 16 to 20 hours – and
able in theory to hit a target the size of a household pane of glass. Justin Bronk, from military thinktank
the Royal United Services Institute, says “drones are five to six times more efficient than conventional air
missions”.
Figure: SSgt Christopher DeLucia checks a Predator drone at Creech Air Force Base in Indian Springs,
Nevada

But Professor Peter Lee, a drones expert at Portsmouth University, says “drones are a lot more analogue
than people think. Reapers still need human piloting to take off and land”.

[h]Is drone use legal? Ethical?

Drone usage consistently tests legal norms. They have been deployed by Washington in countries with
which the US is not technically at war, using the broad justification that such strikes are part of a “war on
terror”.

That relies on a controversial law passed a week after 9/11. Critics say the Authorisation for Use of
Military Force permits “perpetual war” but despite Democrat opposition, a Republican majority in the US
senate help prevent its repeal. For the US, such drone strikes have become commonplace.

Figure: Satellite image of Aramco’s Abqaiq oil processing facility in Buqyaq, Saudi Arabia after a missile
and drone strike on the kingdom’s oil industry.

The practice began under George W Bush, was expanded under Barack Obama and appears to have
increased further still under Donald Trump, although in March he made analysis harder by signing an
executive order banning reporting of drone casualty details.
In Obama’s first two years in office, 2009 and 2010, 186 drone strikes were launched in Pakistan, Syria
and Yemen, according figures supplied to the Bureau of Investigative Journalism. In Trump’s first year
and 11 months in office 238 drone strikes were launched.

[h]How accurate are the strikes?

The reality is that civilians have been hit in strike after strike as targets are misidentified. Precise figures,
however, are hard to establish as much of the information is classified.

In a rare piece of disclosure, the US said 473 air strikes (from both drones and planes, the figures are not
separated out) had been made against targets outside Afghanistan, Iraq and Syria between January 2009
and December 2015. It acknowledged there had been as many as 116 civilian deaths as a result of those
strikes, 4% of the reported casualties.

But Jennifer Gibson at human rights group Reprieve says the organisation has tracked a high rate of
errors. Research conducted by Reprieve in 2014 “found that in attempts to kill 41 individuals, the US
killed as many as 1,147 other people and that on average the high value targets died three times”.

Figure: A 12-year-old boy in Jalalabad Hospital after he survived a US drone strike that killed his father.
The US military claims it was targeting Isis fighters in Nangarhar province, Afghanistan.

Some disclosures stretch credibility to the limit. The UK says only one civilian was killed or injured from
British drone and air raids in Syria and Iraq, between September 2014 and January 2019. In the those
same raids, Britain said 4,315 fighters were killed.

Press reports tell a different story. Over the past 12 months, a US drone strike was believed to have killed
30 farm workers in Afghanistan; up to 11 civilians were killed in a US drone strike in the south of Libya.

[h]What were the most egregious uses of drones?

The US operates a policy of signature or pattern targeting, in which strikes are launched at places where
targets are believed to gather, although this can easily lead to mistakes. Leaked documents revealed that a
secret US programme, Skynet, had used “metadata” to identify suspicious individuals in Pakistan: top of
its list was in fact a journalist – al-Jazeera’s Pakistani bureau chief, Ahmad Zaidan.
It has also used “double tap” targeting, where a site is hit twice or even three times to target first
responders considered connected with those already attacked. That idea appears to be spreading: the UAE
is accused of operating a double tap strike in Libya this August, which killed 45 people including guests
from a nearby wedding who had come over to help.

Politicians, militaries and intelligence agencies in drone-using countries have drawn up “kill lists” on
which named individuals are intended to be, in effect, assassinated by drone or in other air strikes, a
policy only occasionally publicly acknowledged.

Figure: Reyaad Khan, a British citizen fighting for Isis who was killed in an RAF drone attack in Syria

Reyaad Khan, a British Isis fighter from Cardiff, was killed in Syria aged 21, in an RAF drone strike. The
UK was not at war in Syria at the time, but then-prime minister David Cameron asserted he had the power
to make the decision to target him. “I am not going to contract out our counterterrorism policy to someone
else,” he said.

[h]How will drones change war?

Drones have already changed warfare, providing a more efficient – from the military’s point of view –
alternative to conventional aerial missions. But analysts worry that they make it easier for countries to
embark on wars and undeclared “shadow wars”, and put non-combatants at greater risk. “Simply put, they
transfer risk from combatants to civilians,” says Chris Cole, director of Drone Wars.

The long term question is whether humans will be removed from the loop – the science fiction nightmare
where AI-powered drones will select and lock on to targets with no human oversight. There is no shortage
of speculation about the topic and concern about the idea, but as yet little evidence of the use of drones,
particularly lethal drones, being governed solely by computer.

Chapter 4: Ethical Considerations in Targeted Killing

[mh] Collateral Damage and Civilian Casualties
Collateral damage is any incidental and undesired death, injury or other damage inflicted, especially on
civilians, as the result of an activity. Originally coined to describe military operations, it is now also used
in non-military contexts to refer to any unwanted fallout from an action.

Since the development of precision guided munitions in the 1970s, military forces often claim to have
gone to great lengths to minimize collateral damage.

Critics of use of the term "collateral damage" see it as a euphemism that dehumanizes non-combatants
killed or injured during combat, used to reduce the perceived culpability of military leadership in failing
to prevent non-combatant casualties.

Collateral damage does not include civilian casualties caused by military operations that are intended to
terrorize or kill enemy civilians (e.g., the bombing of Chongqing during World War II).

[h]Etymology

The word "collateral" comes from medieval Latin word collateralis, from col-, "together with" + lateralis
(from latus, later-, "side" ) and is otherwise mainly used as a synonym for "parallel" or "additional" in
certain expressions (e.g. "collateral veins" meaning veins running parallel to each other, or "collateral
security" meaning security additional to the main obligation in a contract).

The oldest known usage of the term "collateral damage" in this context occurred in an written in May
1961 by T. C. Schelling entitled "DISPERSAL, DETERRENCE, AND DAMAGE". The term "collateral
damage" likely originated as a euphemism during the Vietnam War referring to friendly fire or to the
intentional killing of non-combatants and destruction of their property.

[h]Criticism of the phrase

During the 1991 Gulf War, Coalition forces used the phrase to describe the killing of civilians in attacks
on legitimate military targets. According to Scottish linguist Deborah Cameron, "the classic Orwellian
arguments for finding this usage objectionable would be that

 it is jargon, and to the extent that people cannot decode it, it conceals what is actually going on;
 it is a euphemism; abstract, agentless, and affectless, so that even if people succeeded in
associating it with a real act or event, they would be insulated from any feelings of repulsion or
moral outrage".

In 1999, "collateral damage" (German: Kollateralschaden) was named the German Un-Word of the Year
by a jury of linguistic scholars. With this choice, it was criticized that the term had been used by NATO
forces to describe civilian casualties during the Kosovo War, which the jury considered to be an inhuman
euphemism.

[h]International humanitarian law

Military necessity, along with distinction and proportionality, are three important principles of
international humanitarian law, governing the legal use of force in an armed conflict. Offensives causing
collateral damage are not automatically classed as a war crimes. They are war crimes when the objective
is excessively or solely collateral damage.

Luis Moreno-Ocampo, Chief Prosecutor at the International Criminal Court, investigated allegations of
war crimes during the 2003 invasion of Iraq and published an open letter containing his findings. A
section titled "Allegations concerning War Crimes" elucidates this usage of military necessity, distinction,
and proportionality:

Under international humanitarian law and the Rome Statute, the death of civilians during an armed
conflict, no matter how grave and regrettable, does not in itself constitute a war crime. International
humanitarian law and the Rome Statute permit belligerents to carry out proportionate attacks against
military objectives, even when it is known that some civilian deaths or injuries will occur. A crime occurs
if there is an intentional attack directed against civilians (principle of distinction) ( 8(2)(b)(i)) or an attack
is launched on a military objective in the knowledge that the incidental civilian injuries would be clearly
excessive in relation to the anticipated military advantage (principle of proportionality) ( 8(2)(b)(iv).

8(2)(b)(iv) criminalizes intentionally launching an attack in the knowledge that such attack will cause
incidental loss of life or injury to civilians or damage to civilian objects or widespread, long-term, and
severe damage to the natural environment which would be clearly excessive in relation to the concrete
and direct overall military advantage anticipated.

8(2)(b)(iv) draws on the principles in 51(5)(b) of the 1977 Additional Protocol I to the 1949 Geneva
Conventions, but restricts the criminal prohibition to cases that are "clearly" excessive. The application of
8(2)(b)(iv) requires, inter alia, an assessment of:

 the anticipated civilian damage or injury

 the anticipated military advantage
 whether (a) was "clearly excessive" in relation to (b).

[h]U.S. military approach

The USAF Intelligence Targeting Guide defines the term as the "unintentional damage or incidental
damage affecting facilities, equipment, or personnel, occurring as a result of military actions directed
against targeted enemy forces or facilities", stating that "[s]uch damage can occur to friendly, neutral, and
even enemy forces". Another United States Department of Defense document uses "[u]nintentional or
incidental injury or damage to persons or objects that would not be lawful military targets in the
circumstances ruling at the time", which also states that "[s]uch damage is not unlawful so long as it is not
excessive in light of the overall military advantage anticipated from the attack".

In U.S. military terminology, the unintentional destruction of allied or neutral targets is called "friendly
fire".

The U.S. military follows a technology-based process for estimating and mitigating collateral damage.
The software used is known as "FAST-CD" or "Fast Assessment Strike Tool—Collateral Damage".

[h]Non-military uses of the phrase

While not actually invented by the military, this has been common. However, the term has since been
widely adopted for non-military cases, and in particular, the COVID-19 pandemic. A large number of
medical, government sources and media use this term widely in relation to deaths caused indirectly as a
result of government policy such as lockdowns, and not directly by the virus itself. Significant debate on
the pandemic strategy has ensued, with some advocating restrictions such as lockdowns to save lives,
where others claim the 'collateral damage' caused by enforced lockdowns, masks and distancing may in
fact cause more deaths over a longer term. An example is the Great Barrington Declaration, purportedly
signed by 3500 medical and other professionals (and mentioned in UK parliament and media) has a FAQ
page titled 'Lockdowns and collateral damage', and refers to this phrase several times.
The term has also been borrowed by the computing community to refer to the refusal of service to
legitimate users when administrators take blanket preventative measures against some individuals who
are abusing systems. For example, Realtime Blackhole Lists used to combat email spam generally block
ranges of Internet Protocol (IP) addresses rather than individual IPs associated with spam, which can deny
legitimate users within those ranges the ability to send email to some domains.

The related term collateral mortality is also becoming prevalent, and probably derives from the term
collateral damage. It has been applied to other spheres in addition to a military context. Fisheries are an
example of this, where bycatch of species such as dolphins are called collateral mortality; they are species
that die in the pursuit of the legal death of fishing targets, such as tuna.

An acceptable loss, also known as acceptable damage or acceptable casualties, is a military euphemism
used to indicate casualties or destruction inflicted by the enemy that is considered minor or tolerable. In
combat situations, leaders have to often choose between options where no one solution is perfect and all
choices will lead to casualties or other costs to their own troops.

A small scale practical example might be when the advancement of troops is halted by a minefield. In
many military operations, the speed of advancement is more important than the safety of troops. Thus, the
minefield must be "breached" even if this means some casualties.

On a larger strategic level, there is a limit to how many casualties a nation's military or the public are
willing to withstand when they go to war. For example, there is an ongoing debate on how the
conceptions of acceptable losses affect how the United States conducts its military operations.

The concept of acceptable losses has also been adopted to business use, meaning taking necessary risks
and the general costs of doing business, also covered with terms such as waste or shrinkage.

The euphemism is related to the concept of acceptable risk, which is used in many areas such as medicine
and politics, to describe a situation where a course of action is taken because the expected benefits
outweigh the potential hazards.

An accidental death is an unnatural death that is caused by an accident, such as a slip and fall, traffic
collision, or accidental poisoning. Accidental deaths are distinguished from death by natural causes,
disease, and from intentional homicides and suicide. An accidental death can still be considered a
homicide or suicide if a person was the unintentional cause.

For criminal purposes, intentional homicides are usually classified as murder. Exceptions such as self-
defense vary by jurisdiction, and in some cases, persons accused of murder have asserted as a defense that
the deceased was actually the victim of an accidental death, rather than an intentional act. However, a
person who is responsible for the accidental death of another through negligence may still be criminally
liable for manslaughter, and civilly liable for wrongful death. Accidental death and dismemberment
insurance and similar insurance policies pay a benefit in the event of accidental death, With these policies
it must be demonstrated that a given death is in fact an accident, rather than an intentional suicide or
homicide (which might involve insurance fraud).

It has been suggested that the "vast majority of accidents are not really accidents of chance, but rather
accidents of folly, negligence, and blatant human misjudgment". The Centers for Disease Control and
Prevention reports that in the US in 2015, there were 146,571 "unintentional injury deaths" that year, the
fourth leading cause of death. Of those, 47,478 were from unintentional poisoning, 37,757 were from
traffic accidents, and 33,381 were from falls. Approximately 500,000 deaths due to drowning are reported
annually, worldwide.
In a couple of countries, all accidental deaths (or apparently accidental deaths) are investigated by
government bodies, and sometimes a family will do a private investigation. Inquests in England and
Wales, for example, are held into sudden and unexplained deaths, and a fatal accident inquiry is
performed for accidental death in Scotland. A verdict of "accidental death", in such cases, is returned
when there is no contributory factor from an action or omission of the victim ("death by misadventure")
or by another person ("unlawful killing").

Deaths during wartime, due to imprecise or incorrect targeting, maybe euphemistically termed collateral
damage, or the result of friendly fire.

In the social sciences, unintended consequences (sometimes unanticipated consequences or unforeseen

consequences, more colloquially called knock-on effects) are outcomes of a purposeful action that are not
intended or foreseen. The term was popularised in the twentieth century by American sociologist Robert
K. Merton.

Unintended consequences can be grouped into three types:

 Unexpected benefit: A positive unexpected benefit (also referred to as luck, serendipity, or a

windfall).
 Unexpected drawback: An unexpected detriment occurring in addition to the desired effect of the
policy (e.g., while irrigation schemes provide people with water for agriculture, they can increase
waterborne diseases that have devastating health effects, such as schistosomiasis).
 Perverse result: A perverse effect contrary to what was originally intended (when an intended
solution makes a problem worse).

[h]John Locke

The idea of unintended consequences dates back at least to John Locke who discussed the unintended
consequences of interest rate regulation in his letter to Sir John Somers, Member of Parliament.

[h]Adam Smith

The idea was also discussed by Adam Smith, the Scottish Enlightenment, and consequentialism (judging
by results).

The invisible hand theorem is an example of the unintended consequences of agents acting in their self-
interest. As Andrew S. Skinner puts it:

"The individual undertaker (entrepreneur), seeking the most efficient allocation of resources, contributes
to overall economic efficiency; the merchant's reaction to price signals helps to ensure that the allocation
of resources accurately reflects the structure of consumer preferences; and the drive to better our
condition contributes to economic growth."

[h]Marx and Engels

Influenced by 19th century positivism and Charles Darwin's evolution, for both Friedrich Engels and Karl
Marx, the idea of uncertainty and chance in social dynamics (and thus unintended consequences beyond
results of perfectly defined laws) was only apparent, (if not rejected) since social actions were directed
and produced by deliberate human intention.
While discerning between the forces that generate changes in nature and those that generate changes in
history in his discussion of Ludwig Feuerbach, Friedrich Engels touched on the idea of (apparent)
unintended consequences:

In nature there are only blind, unconscious agencies acting upon one another, In the history of
society, on the contrary, the actors are all endowed with consciousness, are men acting with
deliberation or passion, working towards definite goals; nothing happens without a conscious
purpose, without an intended aim. For here, also, on the whole, in spite of the consciously desired
aims of all individuals, accident apparently reigns on the surface. That which is willed happens but
rarely; in the majority of instances the numerous desired ends cross and conflict with one another,
or these ends themselves are from the outset incapable of realization, or the means of attaining
them are insufficient. Thus the conflicts of innumerable individual wills and individual actions in
the domain of history produce a state of affairs entirely analogous to the realm of unconscious
nature. The ends of the actions are intended, but the results which actually follow from these
actions are not intended; or when they do seem to correspond to the end intended, they ultimately
have consequences quite other than those intended. Historical events thus appear on the whole to
be likewise governed by chance. But where on the surface accident holds sway, there actually it is
always governed by inner, hidden laws, and it is only a matter of discovering these laws.

— Ludwig Feuerbach and the End of Classical German Philosophy (Ludwig Feuerbach und der
Ausgang der klassischen deutschen Philosophie), 1886.

For his part, for Karl Marx what can be understood as unintended consequences are actually
consequences that should be expected but are obtained unconsciously. These consequences (that no one
consciously sought) would be (in the same way as it is for Engels) product of conflicts that confront
actions from countless individuals. The deviation between the original intended goal and the product
derived from conflicts would be a marxist equivalent to «unintended consequences.»

This social conflicts would happen as a result of a competitive society, and also lead society to sabotage
itself and prevent historical progress. Thus, historical progress (in Marxist terms) should eliminate these
conflicts and make unintended consequences predictable.

[h]Austrian School

Unintended consequences are a common topic of study and commentary for the Austrian school of
economics given its emphasis on methodological individualism. This is to such an extent that unexpected
consequences can be considered as a distinctive part of Austrian tenets.

[h]Carl Menger

In "Principles of Economics," Austrian school founder Carl Menger (1840 - 1921) noted that the
relationships that occur in the economy are so intricate that a change in the condition of a single good can
have ramifications beyond that good. Menger wrote:

If it is established that the existence of human needs capable of satisfaction is a prerequisite of

goods-character This principle is valid whether the goods can be placed in direct causal connection
with the satisfaction of human needs, or derive their goods-character from a more or less indirect
causal connection with the satisfaction of human needs.
Thus quinine would cease to be a good if the diseases it serves to cure should disappear, since the
only need with the satisfaction of which it is causally connected would no longer exist. But the
 disappearance of the usefulness of quinine would have the further consequence that a large part of
the corresponding goods of higher order would also be deprived of their goods-character. The
inhabitants of quinine-producing countries, who currently earn their livings by cutting and peeling
cinchona trees, would suddenly find that not only their stocks of cinchona bark, but also, in
consequence, their cinchona trees, the tools and appliances applicable only to the production of
quinine, and above all the specialized labor services, by means of which they previously earned
their livings, would at once lose their goods-character, since all these things would, under the
changed circumstances, no longer have any causal relationship with the satisfaction of human
needs.

— Principles of Economics (Grundsätze der Volkswirtschaftslehre), 1871.

[h]Friedrich Hayek and Catallactics

Economist and philosopher Friedrich Hayek (1899 – 1992) is another key figure in the Austrian School of
Economics who is notable for his comments on unintended consequences.

In "The Use of Knowledge in Society" (1945) Hayek argues that a centrally planned economy cannot
reach the level of efficiency of the free market economy because the necessary (and pertinent)
information for decision-making is not concentrated but dispersed among a vast number of agents. Then,
for Hayek, the price system in the free market allows the members of a society to anonymously
coordinate for the most efficient use of resources, for example, in a situation of scarcity of a raw material,
the price increase would coordinate the actions of an uncountable amount of individuals "in the right
direction."

The development of this system of interactions would allow the progress of society, and individuals
would carry it out without knowing all its implications, given the dispersion (or lack of concentration) of
information.

The implication of this is that the social order (which derives from social progress, which in turn derives
from the economy), would be result of a spontaneous cooperation and also an unintended consequence,
being born from a process of which no individual or group had all the information available or could
know all possible outcomes.

In the Austrian school, this process of social adjustment that generates a social order in an unintendedly
way is known as catallactics.

For Hayek and the Austrian School, the number of individuals involved in the process of creating a social
order defines the type of unintended consequence:

1. If the process involves interactions and decision making of as many individuals (members of a
society) as possible (thus gathering the greatest amount of knowledge dispersed among them), this
process of "catallaxy" will lead to unexpected benefits (a social order and progress)
2. On the other hand, attempts by individuals or limited groups (who lack all the necessary
information) to achieve a new or better order, will end in unexpected drawbacks.

[h]Robert K. Merton

Sociologist Robert K. Merton popularised this concept in the twentieth century.

In "The Unanticipated Consequences of Purposive Social Action" (1936), Merton tried to apply a
systematic analysis to the problem of unintended consequences of deliberate acts intended to cause social
change. He emphasized that his term purposive action, " concerned with 'conduct' as distinct from
'behavior.' That is, with action that involves motives and consequently a choice between various
alternatives". Merton's usage included deviations from what Max Weber defined as rational social action:
instrumentally rational and value rational. Merton also stated that "no blanket statement categorically
affirming or denying the practical feasibility of all social planning is warranted."

[h]Everyday usage

More recently, the law of unintended consequences has come to be used as an adage or idiomatic warning
that an intervention in a complex system tends to create unanticipated and often undesirable outcomes.

Akin to Murphy's law, it is commonly used as a wry or humorous warning against the hubristic belief that
humans can fully control the world around them, not to presuppose a belief in predestination or a lack or a
disbelief in that of free will.

[h]Causes

Possible causes of unintended consequences include the world's inherent complexity (parts of a system
responding to changes in the environment), perverse incentives, human stupidity, self-deception, failure
to account for human nature, or other cognitive or emotional biases. As a sub-component of complexity
(in the scientific sense), the chaotic nature of the universe—and especially its quality of having small,
apparently insignificant changes with far-reaching effects (e.g., the butterfly effect)—applies.

In 1936, Robert K. Merton listed five possible causes of unanticipated consequences:

 Ignorance, making it impossible to anticipate everything, thereby leading to incomplete analysis.

 Errors in analysis of the problem or following habits that worked in the past but may not apply to
the current situation.
 Immediate interests overriding long-term interests.
 Basic values which may require or prohibit certain actions even if the long-term result might be
unfavourable (these long-term consequences may eventually cause changes in basic values).
 Self-defeating prophecy, or, the fear of some consequence which drives people to find solutions
before the problem occurs, thus the non-occurrence of the problem is not anticipated.

In addition to Merton's causes, psychologist Stuart Vyse has noted that groupthink, described by Irving
Janis, has been blamed for some decisions that result in unintended consequences.

[h]Unexpected drawbacks

The implementation of a profanity filter by AOL in 1996 had the unintended consequence of blocking
residents of Scunthorpe, North Lincolnshire, England, from creating accounts because of a false positive.
The accidental censorship of innocent language, known as the Scunthorpe problem, has been repeated and
widely documented.

In 1990, the Australian state of Victoria made safety helmets mandatory for all bicycle riders. While there
was a reduction in the number of head injuries, there was also an unintended reduction in the number of
juvenile cyclists—fewer cyclists obviously leads to fewer injuries, all else being equal. The risk of death
and serious injury per cyclist seems to have increased, possibly because of risk compensation, or due to
invisibilisation of cyclists. (the more a transportation method is uncommonly sighted, the likelier it could
be deemed to be accident prone)

Research by Vulcan, et al. found that the reduction in juvenile cyclists was because the youths considered
wearing a bicycle helmet unfashionable. A health-benefit model developed at Macquarie University in
Sydney suggests that, while helmet use reduces "the risk of head or brain injury by approximately two-
thirds or more", the decrease in exercise caused by reduced cycling as a result of helmet laws is
counterproductive in terms of net health.

Prohibition in the 1920s United States, originally enacted to suppress the alcohol trade, drove many
small-time alcohol suppliers out of business and consolidated the hold of large-scale organized crime over
the illegal alcohol industry. Since alcohol was still popular, criminal organisations producing alcohol
were well-funded and hence also increased their other activities. Similarly, the War on Drugs, intended to
suppress the illegal drug trade, instead increased the power and profitability of drug cartels who became
the primary source of the products.

In CIA jargon, "blowback" describes the unintended, undesirable consequences of covert operations, such
as the funding of the Afghan Mujahideen and the destabilization of Afghanistan contributing to the rise of
the Taliban and Al-Qaeda.

The introduction of exotic animals and plants for food, for decorative purposes, or to control unwanted
species often leads to more harm than good done by the introduced species.

 The introduction of rabbits in Australia and New Zealand for food was followed by an explosive
growth in the rabbit population; rabbits have become a major feral pest in these countries.
 Cane toads, introduced into Australia to control canefield pests, were unsuccessful and have
become a major pest in their own right.
 Kudzu, introduced to the US as an ornamental plant in 1876 and later used to prevent erosion in
earthworks, has become a major problem in the Southeastern United States. Kudzu has displaced
native plants and has effectively taken over significant portions of land.

The protection of the steel industry in the United States reduced production of steel in the United States,
increased costs to users, and increased unemployment in associated industries.

[h]Perverse results

In 2003, Barbra Streisand unsuccessfully sued Kenneth Adelman and Pictopia.com for posting a
photograph of her home online. Before the lawsuit had been filed, only 6 people had downloaded the file,
two of them Streisand's attorneys. The lawsuit drew attention to the image, resulting in 420,000 people
visiting the site. The Streisand Effect was named after this incident, describing when an attempt to censor
or remove a certain piece of information instead draws attention to the material being suppressed,
resulting in the material instead becoming widely known, reported on, and distributed.

Passenger-side airbags in motorcars were intended as a safety feature, but led to an increase in child
fatalities in the mid-1990s because small children were being hit by airbags that deployed automatically
during collisions. The supposed solution to this problem, moving the child seat to the back of the vehicle,
led to an increase in the number of children forgotten in unattended vehicles, some of whom died under
extreme temperature conditions.

Risk compensation, or the Peltzman effect, occurs after implementation of safety measures intended to
reduce injury or death (e.g. bike helmets, seatbelts, etc.). People may feel safer than they really are and
take additional risks which they would not have taken without the safety measures in place. This may
result in no change, or even an increase, in morbidity or mortality, rather than a decrease as intended.

According to an anecdote, the British government, concerned about the number of venomous cobra
snakes in Delhi, offered a bounty for every dead cobra. This was a successful strategy as large numbers of
snakes were killed for the reward. Eventually, enterprising people began breeding cobras for the income.
When the government became aware of this, they scrapped the reward program, causing the cobra
breeders to set the now-worthless snakes free. As a result, the wild cobra population further increased.
The apparent solution for the problem made the situation even worse, becoming known as the Cobra
effect.

Theobald Mathew's temperance campaign in 19th-century Ireland resulted in thousands of people vowing
never to drink alcohol again. This led to the consumption of diethyl ether, a much more dangerous
intoxicant—owing to its high flammability—by those seeking to become intoxicated without breaking the
letter of their pledge.

It was thought that adding south-facing conservatories to British houses would reduce energy
consumption by providing extra insulation and warmth from the sun. However, people tended to use the
conservatories as living areas, installing heating and ultimately increasing overall energy consumption.

A reward for lost nets found along the Normandy coast was offered by the French government between
1980 and 1981. This resulted in people vandalizing nets to collect the reward.

Beginning in the 1940s and continuing into the 1960s, the Canadian federal government gave Quebec
$2.25 per day per psychiatric patient for their cost of care, but only $0.75 a day per orphan. The perverse
result is that the orphan children were diagnosed as mentally ill so Quebec could receive the larger
amount of money. This psychiatric misdiagnosis affected up to 20,000 people, and the children are known
as the Duplessis Orphans in reference to the Premier of Quebec who oversaw the scheme, Maurice
Duplessis.

There have been attempts to curb the consumption of sugary beverages by imposing a tax on them.
However, a study found that the reduced consumption was only temporary. Also, there was an increase in
the consumption of beer among households.

The New Jersey Childproof Handgun Law, which was intended to protect children from accidental
discharge of firearms by forcing all future firearms sold in New Jersey to contain "smart" safety features,
has delayed, if not stopped entirely, the introduction of such firearms to New Jersey markets. The
wording of the law caused significant public backlash, fuelled by gun rights lobbyists, and several shop
owners offering such guns received death threats and stopped stocking them. In 2014, 12 years after the
law was passed, it was suggested the law be repealed if gun rights lobbyists agree not to resist the
introduction of "smart" firearms.

Drug prohibition can lead drug traffickers to prefer stronger, more dangerous substances, that can be more
easily smuggled and distributed than other, less concentrated substances.

Televised drug prevention advertisements may lead to increased drug use.

Increasing usage of search engines, also including recent image search features, has contributed in the
ease of which media is consumed. Some abnormalities in usage may have shifted preferences for
pornographic film actors, as the producers began using common search queries or tags to label the actors
in new roles.
The passage of the Stop Enabling Sex Traffickers Act has led to a reported increase in risky behaviors by
sex workers as a result of quashing their ability to seek and screen clients online, forcing them back onto
the streets or into the dark web. The ads posted were previously an avenue for advocates to reach out to
those wanting to escape the trade.

The use of precision guided munitions meant to reduce the rate of civilian casualties encouraged armies to
narrow their safety margins, and increase the use of deadly force in densely populated areas. This in turn
increased the danger to uninvolved civilians, who in the past would have been out of the line of fire
because of armies' aversion of using higher-risk weaponry in densely populated areas. The perceived
ability to operate precision weaponry from afar (where in the past heavy munitions or troop deployment
would have been needed) also led to the expansion of the list of potential targets. As put by Michael
Walzer: "Drones not only make it possible for us to get at our enemies, they may also lead us to broaden
the list of enemies, to include presumptively hostile individuals and militant organizations simply because
we can get at them–even if they aren't actually involved in attacks against us." This idea is also echoed by
Grégoire Chamayou: "In a situation of moral hazard, military action is very likely to be deemed
'necessary' simply because it is possible, and possible at a lower cost."

[h]Perverse consequences of environmental intervention

Most modern technologies have negative consequences that are both unavoidable and unpredictable. For
example, almost all environmental problems, from chemical pollution to global warming, are the
unexpected consequences of the application of modern technologies. Traffic congestion, deaths and
injuries from car accidents, air pollution, and global warming are unintended consequences of the
invention and large scale adoption of the automobile. Hospital infections are the unexpected side-effect of
antibiotic resistance, and even human population growth leading to environmental degradation is the side
effect of various technological (i.e., agricultural and industrial) revolutions.

Because of the complexity of ecosystems, deliberate changes to an ecosystem or other environmental

interventions will often have (usually negative) unintended consequences. Sometimes, these effects cause
permanent irreversible changes. Examples include:

 During the Four Pests Campaign a killing of sparrows was declared. Chinese leaders later realized
that sparrows ate a large amount of insects, as well as grains. Rather than being increased, rice
yields after the campaign were substantially decreased. (The decision to cull sparrows may itself
have been an unintended consequence of silencing intellectuals: "For 3 years after the
establishment of the Communist Government, in 1949, Chinese scientists and intellectuals found
themselves in the midst of turmoil. Many scientists were humiliated and intimidated during the
nationwide program of "thought reform" and political indoctrination".)
 During the Great Plague of London a killing of dogs and cats was ordered. If left untouched, they
would have made a significant reduction in the rat population that carried the fleas which
transmitted the disease.
 The installation of smokestacks to decrease pollution in local areas, resulting in spread of pollution
at a higher altitude, and acid rain on an international scale.
 After about 1900, public demand led the US government to fight forest fires in the American West,
and set aside land as national forests and parks to protect them from fires. This policy led to fewer
fires, but also led to growth conditions such that, when fires did occur, they were much larger and
more damaging. Modern research suggests that this policy was misguided, and that a certain level
of wildfires is a natural and important part of forest ecology.
  Side effects of climate engineering to counter global warming could involve even further warming
as a consequence of reflectivity-reducing afforestation or crop yield reductions and rebound effects
after solar dimming measures with even more accelerated warming.

[mh] Moral Responsibility of Drone Operators

Drone warfare has revolutionized modern military operations, offering unprecedented capabilities for
surveillance, reconnaissance, and targeted strikes. However, the use of drones raises complex ethical
questions, particularly regarding the moral responsibility of operators who remotely engage in lethal
actions. In this discourse, we will examine the ethical dimensions of drone operations, focusing on the
moral agency and accountability of operators in the conduct of warfare.

Understanding Drone Warfare: Drone warfare involves the deployment of unmanned aerial vehicles
(UAVs) equipped with surveillance and weapon systems to conduct military operations. Unlike
conventional aircraft piloted by human operators, drones are controlled remotely, often from thousands of
miles away, through satellite communications and advanced technology. This remote operation
fundamentally alters the dynamics of warfare, allowing operators to engage in combat without directly
risking their lives on the battlefield.

Moral Agency of Drone Operators: The moral agency of drone operators refers to their capacity to make
ethical judgments and decisions regarding the use of lethal force. While operators may not be physically
present on the battlefield, they nonetheless play a pivotal role in the targeting and execution of military
strikes. As such, they bear moral responsibility for the consequences of their actions, including civilian
casualties and collateral damage.

Ethical Considerations in Targeted Killing: One of the primary ethical dilemmas faced by drone operators
is the issue of targeted killing, which involves the deliberate targeting of individuals deemed to pose a
threat to national security or military objectives. While proponents argue that targeted killings can be
justified on grounds of self-defense and the prevention of future harm, critics raise concerns about the
legality and morality of extrajudicial executions conducted without due process or judicial oversight.

Principles of Just War Theory: Just war theory provides a moral framework for evaluating the justice of
military actions, including the use of drones in warfare. According to just war principles, drone operators
must adhere to criteria such as the principle of discrimination (distinguishing between combatants and
non-combatants), proportionality (using force proportional to the military objective), and the principle of
necessity (using force only when necessary to achieve legitimate military objectives). Violations of these
principles may constitute moral wrongdoing on the part of operators.

Psychological Impact on Operators: The psychological impact of drone operations on operators is another
important factor to consider in assessing their moral responsibility. Operating drones remotely can create
a sense of detachment from the reality of warfare, potentially desensitizing operators to the human
consequences of their actions. Moreover, the long hours spent monitoring targets and making life-or-
death decisions can lead to stress, fatigue, and moral injury among operators, raising concerns about their
ability to maintain ethical conduct under challenging conditions.

Accountability and Oversight: Ensuring accountability and oversight of drone operations is essential for
upholding ethical standards and preventing abuses of power. Governments and military organizations
must establish clear rules of engagement, guidelines for target selection, and mechanisms for reviewing
and investigating civilian casualties and other potential violations of international law. Additionally,
transparency in reporting drone strikes and civilian casualties is crucial for holding operators accountable
for their actions and addressing concerns about the legality and morality of targeted killings.

The moral responsibility of drone operators encompasses their capacity to make ethical judgments, adhere
to principles of just war theory, and mitigate the psychological impact of their actions. While operating
drones remotely presents unique challenges and ethical dilemmas, operators must uphold fundamental
moral principles and respect the laws of war in the conduct of military operations. By fostering a culture
of accountability, oversight, and ethical reflection, we can strive to ensure that drone warfare is conducted
with integrity, humanity, and respect for human rights.

Chapter 5: Psychological Impact of Drone Operations

[mh] PTSD Among Drone Operators

Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD) is a mental health condition that can develop in individuals who
have experienced or witnessed traumatic events. While often associated with frontline combat, PTSD also
affects drone operators engaged in targeted killing missions. This examines the unique challenges faced
by drone operators, the factors contributing to PTSD, and the implications for military operations and
mental health support.

Remote Warfare and Psychological Stress: Drone operators conduct military operations from remote
locations, often thousands of miles away from the battlefield. Despite the physical distance, they are
exposed to the psychological stress of combat, including the responsibility of targeting and executing
individuals. The combination of long hours, repetitive tasks, and moral dilemmas inherent in targeted
killing missions can contribute to chronic stress and psychological trauma among operators.

Moral Dilemmas and Moral Injury: Engaging in targeted killing raises profound moral dilemmas for
drone operators, who must reconcile their actions with ethical principles and personal values. The
cognitive dissonance resulting from the discrepancy between their moral beliefs and the demands of their
job can lead to moral injury, a psychological condition characterized by feelings of guilt, shame, and
moral distress. Witnessing the consequences of their actions, including civilian casualties and collateral
damage, can exacerbate these feelings and contribute to the development of PTSD.

Operational Stress and Burnout: The nature of drone operations, characterized by long hours of
surveillance and engagement, can lead to operational stress and burnout among operators. The monotony
of remote work combined with the intensity of combat situations can take a toll on operators' mental and
emotional well-being, increasing their vulnerability to PTSD. Additionally, the lack of physical distance
from the battlefield can blur the boundaries between work and personal life, further exacerbating stress
and fatigue.

Trauma Exposure and Vicarious Trauma: While drone operators are physically removed from the
immediate dangers of combat, they are still exposed to traumatic events through their work. Monitoring
live video feeds of targeted killings, witnessing the aftermath of strikes, and experiencing the loss of
colleagues can result in vicarious trauma, where individuals develop PTSD symptoms as a result of
indirect exposure to trauma. The cumulative impact of repeated exposure to traumatic events can erode
operators' resilience and increase their risk of developing PTSD.

Stigma and Barriers to Care: Despite the prevalence of PTSD among drone operators, stigma and barriers
to mental health care persist within military culture. The perception of seeking help as a sign of weakness,
concerns about career repercussions, and the lack of accessible mental health resources can deter
operators from seeking support for their psychological distress. This reluctance to acknowledge and
address mental health issues can exacerbate PTSD symptoms and undermine the well-being of affected
individuals.

PTSD among drone operators engaged in targeted killing is a significant concern with profound
implications for military operations and individual well-being. Addressing the psychological impact of
remote warfare requires a multifaceted approach that prioritizes prevention, early intervention, and
destigmatization of mental health care. By recognizing the unique challenges faced by drone operators
and providing comprehensive support services, we can mitigate the risk of PTSD and promote the
resilience and readiness of military personnel tasked with remote combat operations.

[mh] Desensitization and Moral Injury

Desensitization and moral injury represent profound psychological challenges faced by drone operators
engaged in targeted killing missions. Delving into these topics in-depth requires a nuanced exploration of
the mechanisms of desensitization, the nature of moral injury, and their interconnectedness within the
context of remote warfare.

Desensitization and moral injury are two interrelated phenomena that have significant implications for the
mental health and moral well-being of drone operators involved in targeted killing. While desensitization
involves a numbing of emotional responses to violence and suffering, moral injury arises from the
violation of deeply held ethical beliefs and values. This discussion aims to explore the complex interplay
between desensitization and moral injury among drone operators, shedding light on the psychological toll
of remote warfare.

Desensitization: Desensitization refers to a process whereby individuals become less sensitive or

responsive to stimuli over time, often as a result of repeated exposure to distressing or traumatic
experiences. In the context of drone operations, operators are routinely exposed to graphic imagery of
violence, including live video feeds of targeted killings and their aftermath. The relentless nature of
remote warfare, characterized by long hours of surveillance and engagement, can contribute to a gradual
blunting of emotional responses to human suffering and death.

Mechanisms of Desensitization: Desensitization can occur through various psychological mechanisms,

including habituation, emotional numbing, and cognitive dissonance. Habituation involves the repeated
exposure to stimuli leading to a decreased response over time, while emotional numbing entails a
reduction in the intensity of emotional reactions to distressing stimuli. Cognitive dissonance arises when
individuals experience a conflict between their beliefs and their actions, leading to a psychological
adjustment to reconcile the discrepancy.

Impact of Desensitization: The impact of desensitization on drone operators can be profound, affecting
their ability to empathize with others, make moral judgments, and maintain psychological well-being. By
attenuating emotional responses to violence and suffering, desensitization may facilitate the execution of
targeted killing missions but can also lead to a sense of detachment from the human consequences of their
actions. This emotional detachment can erode moral sensitivity and increase the risk of moral injury
among operators.

Moral Injury: Moral injury occurs when individuals experience psychological distress resulting from
actions that violate their deeply held moral beliefs and values. In the context of drone warfare, operators
may grapple with the moral implications of targeting and killing individuals from a remote location, often
based on incomplete or ambiguous information. The discrepancy between the moral expectations of their
profession and the reality of their actions can give rise to feelings of guilt, shame, and existential despair.
Sources of Moral Injury: Moral injury among drone operators can stem from various sources, including
the perceived illegitimacy of targeted killing, the unintended harm inflicted on civilians, and the moral
ambiguity of the battlefield. Operators may experience moral distress when confronted with orders that
conflict with their ethical principles or when they witness the human cost of their actions. The absence of
direct accountability and the impersonal nature of remote warfare can exacerbate feelings of moral
dissonance and spiritual anguish.

Interconnection between Desensitization and Moral Injury: Desensitization and moral injury are
intertwined processes that can reinforce each other within the context of drone operations. Desensitization
may serve as a coping mechanism for managing the psychological distress associated with moral injury,
allowing operators to distance themselves emotionally from the ethical dilemmas inherent in their work.
However, this emotional detachment can exacerbate moral injury by further eroding the operators' sense
of moral integrity and moral agency.

Addressing Desensitization and Moral Injury: Addressing desensitization and moral injury among drone
operators requires a multifaceted approach that encompasses prevention, intervention, and support.
Efforts to mitigate desensitization may involve regular debriefings, psychological resilience training, and
mindfulness-based interventions aimed at enhancing emotional awareness and empathy. Addressing
moral injury requires creating a culture of moral reflection, peer support, and access to mental health
resources that validate the moral struggles faced by operators and facilitate their moral repair and
recovery.

Desensitization and moral injury represent significant psychological challenges faced by drone operators
engaged in targeted killing missions. By understanding the mechanisms and interconnection between
these phenomena, we can develop more effective strategies for promoting the psychological well-being
and moral resilience of operators involved in remote warfare. A genuine commitment to addressing
desensitization and moral injury is essential for upholding ethical standards and preserving the humanity
of those tasked with executing lethal actions from a distance.

[mh] Targeted Killings: Contemporary Challenges, Risks and Opportunities

The use of armed Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) (also known as Unmanned Combat Aircraft
Systems (UCAS) or ‘drones’) by the USA to target and kill leaders and commanders of Al-Qaeda, the
Taliban and their affiliates in Pakistan (as well as for covert operations in Yemen and Somalia) has
increased significantly during Obama’s first term as President. According to open sources, up to 3176
people have been killed in 337 drone strikes since 2004, of which nearly 290 took place since 2009.
Targeted killing as a method of warfare and counterterrorism has been used by the USA and its allies post
9/11 in the ‘war on terror’ to target and ‘decapitate’ the leadership and command structure of Al-Qaeda,
the Taliban and their affiliates. These strikes lead to the death of a significant number of leaders and
commanders. US drone strikes killed Al-Qaeda’s deputy leader, Abu Yahya al-Libi, as well as its local
leader in Pakistan, Badar Mansoon. These ‘leadership decapitation’ operations are part of a wider US
anti-terrorism and counterinsurgency strategy against Al-Qaeda, adopted post 9/11 as part of the US
National Security Strategy and supplementing the ongoing combat operations under Operation Enduring
Freedom (OEF). The targeting of terrorist and enemy leaders led to the successful elimination of Osama
bin Laden, the leader of Al-Qaeda, on 2 May 2011, when he was killed after a brief firefight with US
Navy Seals. This operation, codenamed ‘Operation Neptune Spear’, was one of the more prominent
capture and kill operations undertaken by the USA as part of its National Security Strategy aimed at
targeting and eliminating leaders and commanders of Al-Qaeda and its affiliates. According to the USA,
Operation Neptune Spear was the culmination of its successful strategy of decapitating Al-Qaeda’s
leadership, which has sent, ‘al Qaeda into a decline that will be hard to reverse’. The success and outcome
of this raid, however, also refuelled a continuing debate concerning whether targeted killing could ever be
regarded as lawful and overall moral. This debate was spurned by recent critical media reporting, the
release of increasingly critical academic reports on the civilian impact of drone strikes, unsuccessful legal
challenges and finally, the decision by the United Nations UN Counter-Terrorism Expert, Ben Emmerson,
to launch an inquiry into the killing of civilians by drones and other methods of targeted killings.

Targeted killing seems to achieve tangible returns in terms of ‘decapitating’ terrorist networks: recent
reports indicate that Obama’s policy of targeting Al-Qaeda’s top and mid-level leadership has led to
significant losses among the ranks of leadership of the organization. Another emerging field of security
threats where targeted killing may be used in the future, is in response to countering so-called ‘Hybrid
Threats’, which refers to asymmetric threats like terrorism and cyber threats, and which will be discussed
in more detail below. The use of UCAS and Special Forces has other benefits too: it serves as a ‘force
multiplier’, which basically allows achieving more in terms of tangible military objective with less ‘boots
on the ground’. Such considerations matter in times of shrinking defence budgets and an increasing
unwillingness in the West to suffer casualties in combat.

This provides the reader with an updated introduction to targeted killing as a means of warfare with a
focus on the use of UCAS as weapon platforms for the execution of such strikes. It describes the targeting
process as part of an attempt to ensure overall legitimacy by complying with the necessary legal tenets of
humanitarian law. It introduces a new terminus of military risk, so-called Hybrid Threats, and reflects on
its significance for the future use of UCAS borne Targeted Killing. The reflects on some of the legal
questions arising from the use of targeted killing during hostilities and peacetime and also touches on
more recent concerns raised in the context of operational necessity, operational morality and overall
legitimacy. The concludes with a short outlook on the future use of drones on the battlefield.

[h]Targeted Killing as a Method of Warfare

Targeted Killing can be used for the physical elimination of enemy combatants during hostilities in times
of armed conflict but also of suspected terrorists in peacetime. Depending on the circumstances the legal
repercussions differ: targeted killing in times of war may be justifiable as a lawful and legitimate method
of warfare during hostilities, while such an operation outside an armed conflict may qualify as an act of
extrajudicial killing, murder or assassination, unlawful under international and domestic law. Human
Rights Watch highlights this potential difficulty in qualifying and assessing such kinetic action, whereas

‘targeted killing’ has commonly been used to refer to a deliberate lethal attack by government forces
against a specific individual not in custody under the color of law. It is not a technical legal term.
Depending on the circumstances, a particular targeted killing may or may not be lawful under
international law. For instance, a sniper shooting at an enemy general on the battlefield would normally
be a lawful targeted killing. Targeted killings should be considered distinctly from the summary execution
of anyone in custody, which is never lawful.

[h]Definition of Targeted Killing and Some Reflection on its Operational Use

‘Targeted killing’ refers to a method of warfare whereby individuals are selected and confirmed as so
called ‘High Value Targets’, followed by a separate and individual targeting process which ultimately
leads to the execution of an military operation aimed at killing these individuals. This definition is
reiterated in one of the leading academic texts on the subject of armed conflict, the Handbook of
International Law of Military Operations, whereas:
 the term targeted killing refers to military operations involving the use of lethal force with the aim of
killing individually selected persons who are not in the physical custody of those targeting them.

An early example of ‘targeted killing’ in the history of armed conflict can be found in the military tactics
applied mainly by snipers. Prominent and well-documented examples of sniper warfare can be found in
the annals of the Eastern Front during World War II: German and Soviet forces used snipers to annihilate
systematically the enemy’s mid-level military leadership: German losses to Soviet snipers were so severe
during the battle for Stalingrad in autumn of 1942 that officers as well as non-commissioned officers had
to adapt means of camouflage to blend in with their (enlisted) men and in order to avoid being targeted by
enemy snipers.

Operation ‘Neptune Spear’ as well as the alleged Israeli Mossad Operation to kill the Hamas official
Mahmud al-Mabhuh in Dubai in 2011 involved the use of Special Forces on the ground, or intelligence
operatives/assets respectively, constitute commando operations as well targeting operations in the wider
sense. Such tactical capture and kill operations executed by Special Forces assets are not the focus of this
short contribution: its focus is solely on targeted killing, as a means of warfare which is executed by using
remotely piloted aircraft, UAVs or drones respectively, as weapons platform.

Falling outside the scope of targeted killings discussed in this is the continuing use of Improvised
Explosive Devices (IEDs) in Iraq and Afghanistan by the Taliban and other affiliated groups. Targeted
terrorism, involving the use of IEDs, suicide bombings or suicide attack squads as impressively shown in
the 2011 Mumbai attacks, seem to constitute a hybrid form of unconventional warfare which combines
elements of both, assassination and targeted killings in the widest sense. The scope of this is on targeted
killing as a means of warfare and hence does not warrant a further discussion of this form of attacks as a
potential example for targeted killings.

Targeted killing as a means of killing enemies of a state has been employed most frequently by the USA
as part of its overall military strategy against Al-Qaeda and the Taliban. While the USA did not ‘invent’
this form of warfare it has taken the lead in advancing its development and overall design in respect of
targeting processes, command and control as well as the use of increasingly sophisticated technology. The
use of drones for executing kinetic, lethal, strikes against hostile and enemy targets has its tangible
military benefits in terms of operational capabilities, readiness and its overall availability as a defensive as
well as offensive form of warfare. Targeted killing by UCAS can be executed at very short notice and
does not require the deployment of and the presence of substantial own forces in the theatre of operations.
This availability and flexibility of using drones as a platform for the execution of targeted killings makes
this form of warfare (without own casualties) so formidable when responding to present threats at an ad
hoc basis. Consequently, both proliferation and expansion of the use of UCAS are increasing. Examples
hereof are the present discussions in the UK to increase the availability of UAV systems for
reconnaissance and combat, the RAF’s decision to relocate its UAV assets from the US to RAF
Waddington near Lincoln and to establish a new Unmanned Air Systems Capability Development Centre
(UASCDC) there. The overall capabilities of such airborne weapon platform systems has also found
supporters among nations who were initially opposed to this form of warfare, such as Germany which for
historical as well as political reasons has been known to be more reluctant to the use of force and to
participate in combat operations in a more active role.

[h]Targeted Killing by States and International Organizations

Reported cases where targeted killings have been employed against High Profile Targets involve Russia,
Israel, the UK, the USA and NATO. Israel has been using targeted killings as a means of combating
Islamist security threats and has a track record of using targeted killing in its fight against militant
Islamist organizations and their leaders for years. The most recent examples of using drones in the
execution of such operations took place during the Israeli Defence Forces’ (IDF) military operations
during Operation ‘Pillar of Defence’ in Gaza in November 2012. Israel has been employing its own mix
of airborne operations, using both, UCAS as well as attack helicopters and jet fighter aircraft, in addition
to ground forces, including special forces and intelligence operatives. In 2006, the Israeli Supreme Court
ruled on the issue of targeted killings in its so-called ‘Targeted Killing’ case. There the court recognized
the use of targeted killing as a means of warfare, characterized the nature of its conflict with terrorist
actors as ‘armed conflict’ and confirmed the legality of targeting killings of terrorists under certain
circumstances:

Therefore terrorists may be targeted by armed forces if they take a direct part in hostilities. The targeting
of terrorists by armed forces must satisfy the requirements of art. 51(3) ; the terrorists must take a direct
part in hostilities and the targeting of terrorists may be carried out for such time as they do so. The
principle of proportionality in carrying out these attacks should also be observed.

The Israeli court did, however, make it clear that targeted killings were to be regarded as an exceptional
means of warfare and subject to stringent controls and balances: ‘Each case should be examined
prospectively by the military authorities and retrospectively in an independent investigation, and the
findings should be based on the merits of the specific case. These findings will be subject to the scrutiny
of the court.’

Targeted killing has also been used by the USA in theatres of actual combat operations, such as
Afghanistan and Iraq, as well as outside these theatres of war and as part of CIA and US military run
covert operations in Pakistan. The USA is using drone strikes and Special Forces there to conduct pre-
emptive as well as defensive targeted killing operations against Al-Qaeda and the Taliban. The argument
is brought forward that such operations are necessary to protect US forces and its allies in Afghanistan
and to disrupt the existent terrorist infrastructure. The focus of such operations is on the so-called ‘Tribal
Areas’ of Pakistan, Waziristan, where the Taliban have effectively established an autonomous sphere of
influence to the exclusion of the central government in Peshawar. Other such covert operations have seen
CIA operated drone strikes in Yemen, Somalia as well Sudan, where a lack of cooperation and/or relative
capabilities of the respective governments have created areas which are outside effective state control.

Just to clarify: acts of targeted killing, which are carried out of vengeance or other heinous motives, or as
part of an assassination strategy or which are conducted outside the conduct of hostilities or those
executed within the context of hostilities but outside military necessity, may constitute crimes committed
under the veil of war—and may qualify as crimes under national as well as international law.

[h]Targeted Killing in the Context of Political Assassinations and Terrorism

Historical and contemporary terrorism, anti-colonial struggles and revolutionary intra-state war, have
changed the nature of global violence over the last 60 years. The assassinations of political opponents
within the context of intra-state conflict, including cases of internationalized intra-state war, where third
parties intervene, have always been part of irregular warfare. A historical example can be found in the
practices of the Viet Cong during the Vietnam War, whose policy of large-scale assassinations of South
Vietnamese government officials willing to work for the US supported government of the Republic of
Vietnam was so effective that the US military had to counter this threat by the use of targeted killing
operations against the Viet Cong (as well as covert operatives from the North Vietnamese Army, NVA)
under the controversial but successful Phoenix program, which used a mix of both targeted killing and
assassination for the neutralization of threats. Targeted killing operations, executed outside the context of
hostilities and directed against political leaders are often executed by intelligence agents and are usually
referred to as ‘assassinations’. Sometimes, the boundaries between such assassinations and targeted
killing within hostilities are overlapping. Such operations are now prohibited in Western democratic
States. The USA after years of employing such acts changed tack when in the aftermath of a
congressional committee, the Church Committee, investigated and condemned earlier CIA led political
assassinations by the USA. The official US position banning such practices was clarified by President
Ford in 1976 when he issued Executive Order (EO) 11905 which officially banned any USA complicity
in political assassinations and reigned in excessive powers of the CIA. Confirmed and extended under
President Carter, this policy had been used by subsequent US Administrations, including President Bush,
who issued EO 13470 in 2008. While none of these EOs authorize the assassination of political and other
enemies of the USA, it seems as if the ongoing extended targeting of terrorist leaders around the globe
post 9/11 by the USA questions this official caveat on US assassinations, at least in regard to terrorists.
One key distinction between assassinations and targeted killings lies in the difference in terms of
motivation and purpose, namely the former’s nexus to political warfare as part of a politicized irregular
warfare: to annihilate opponents and terrorize for the sake of political objectives. Critics of such forms of
killings compare these with punitive killings and compare the notion of ‘assassination’ with operations
executed solely for ‘vengeance’. The USA tries to avoid such criticism by arguing that targeted
operations against leaders of Al-Qaeda do not fall under this prohibition as its forces were engaged in an
ongoing armed conflict with Al-Qaeda and its targeting of enemy leaders and commanders constituted
acts of combat in execution of state self-defence.

The ongoing strategy by the Taliban in Afghanistan and Pakistan to systematically target and kill
personnel of international and local NGOs involved in health care and social development programmes,
constitutes an own category of ‘targeted terrorism’, ‘assassinations’ or targeted killings in a wider sense.
The deliberate and systematic targeting by the Taliban of coalition forces, associated civil liaison assets as
well as other non-military personnel associated with peacebuilding and post-conflict stability efforts is
increasing. The Taliban campaign of killing such non-military targets has significantly impacted on the
overall success of these efforts in the short and mid term. Recent victims of such terrorist targeting
include personnel working for the World Health Organization and UNICEF, who were involved in
literacy as well as vaccination programmes. As a consequence, both UN and WHO suspended
temporarily some of their vaccination programmes in Pakistan. This targeting of relief and development
workers is perhaps as effective as the Taliban sustained campaign of using more and more sophisticated
IEDs in their attacks against US, NATO, as well as Afghan/Pakistani security forces and government
officials. This terrorist targeting may be part of a wider campaign to force the international community to
‘abandon’ Afghanistan. It is clear that such indiscriminate, often heinous, acts committed by the Taliban
do not comply with international humanitarian law, most notably the criteria of distinction and
proportionality, and therefore such kind of attacks do not fall under the terminology of targeted killing as
discussed in this.

[h]Targeted Killings as a Means of Countering Hybrid and Asymmetric Threats: Some Reflections

The deteriorating security situation in the Maghreb has turned the ‘Arab spring’ into an ‘Arab winter’ of
radicalized Islamist (often failing) states and has created a variety of new, multimodal ‘Hybrid’ Threats:
from failed state scenarios, civil unrest to the threat of proliferation of sophisticated weaponry and even
Weapons of Mass Destruction. In 2010, NATO issued its Lisbon Summit Declaration where general
challenges to the Alliance’s role as well as potential responses were discussed before the backdrop of
falling national defence budgets and the recognition of emerging new threat scenarios, often in the context
of ever-increasing globalization. NATO defined these threats in its Bi-Strategic Command Capstone
Concept as ‘those posed by adversaries, with the ability to simultaneously employ conventional and non-
conventional means adaptively in pursuit of their objectives’ NATO had been working on a
comprehensive conceptual framework, which was to provide a wider framework for identifying and
discussing such threats and possible multi-stakeholder responses. Falling under NATO’s definition of
‘Hybrid Threats’ were a variety of security threats, such as multimodal, low intensity, kinetic as well as
non-kinetic threats to international peace and security including cyber war, low intensity asymmetric
conflict scenarios, global terrorism, piracy, transnational organized crime, demographic challenges,
resources security, retrenchment from globalization and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.
As a consequence, NATO adopted a new Strategic Concept which set out its vision for the immediate
future and calling for ‘NATO’s evolution, so that it continues to be effective in a changing world, against
new threats, with new capabilities and new partners’. Despite these developments, NATO had to decide
in June 2012 to cease work on Countering Hybrid Threats at its organizational level due to operational
constraints but encouraged its Member States and NATO Excellence Centres to continue working on the
idea and concept. It is deemed relevant to reflect on this new concept briefly within the scope of this as it
is quite likely that future challenges to peace and security will have hybrid elements which have the
potential to warrant conventional as well as non-conventional responses.

In essence, Hybrid Threats faced by NATO and its non-military partners require a comprehensive
approach allowing a wide spectrum of responses, kinetic and non-kinetic by military and non-military
actors. The use and exploitation of ‘biohacking’ and nanotechnology for terrorist ends and everything
related cyber are potential and likely future security risks for our Western societies. Particularly worrying
for our security in the West are the threats coming from the proliferation of advanced weapon systems to
non-state actors associated with radical Islam as part of the global advancement of radical Islamism, the
‘Green Menace’. This threat has gained new momentum with the breakup of the old autocratic order in
the Maghreb, which led to a ‘Balkanization’ of Libya and the coming to power of new governments in the
region which question the existing balance of power in the region. The new, hybrid nature of present
security threats has been highlighted in the last Israeli–Gaza conflict of November 2012, when
‘traditional’ military and security threats were supplemented by the use of new communication
technologies, in order to influence global opinion in favour of Hamas. The most recent Gaza conflict is
hence a good example of how multimodal threats, asymmetric terror and warfare is supplemented by
terrorist (dis)information campaigns. Hamas has been employing tools and strategies of disinformation
normally associated with clandestine psychological warfare operations of traditional military state actors:
such as the sending of emails and text messages with hoax news updates as well as propaganda slogans to
Israeli and non-Israeli internet addresses and cell phones, the use of the internet to disseminate their
propaganda. While there is no evidence that these psychological warfare campaigns were successful this
time, their potential has to be acknowledged. In the future, Hybrid and dual purpose, ‘joint’ operations of
non-state actors, terrorist organizations such as Hamas and Hezbollah, Al-Qaeda as well as global
narcotic smuggling syndicates will become more pressing security risks. The example of Mali, where the
northern part has become a de facto independent terrorist state has led not only to the export of terrorism
in the region but also the use of this ‘failed’ state as a smuggling route for narcotics to Europe. These
threats, stemming from terrorism, organized narcotic smuggling syndicates as well as arms traders, are of
a truly hybrid nature with repercussions around the region.

Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction, the ‘export’ of Islamist terrorism across the Maghreb
region and even to Europe, the emergence of new technological threats such as ‘cyber’ warfare and
terrorism with the potential of waging war in the so-called ‘fifth dimension of warfare’, the use of
nanotechnologies as a means of terrorism, have changed the nature of potential threats to Western
democracies. These technological, ecological, economical and scientific threats, including cyber attacks
against strategic infrastructures such as nuclear power stations, air traffic control facilities, the use of bio
weapons, often designed and made at home, have changed traditional perceptions regarding interstate
conflict and hostilities. The necessity to use kinetic options including targeted killings aimed against the
originators of such threats, as well as the necessary support network, make it necessary that law
enforcement and military options can be used holistically in a supplementing way. While the potential of
the use of targeted killings in the context of targeting enemies during hostilities as well as during
peacetime in the context of counterterrorism is documented and recognized as a countermeasure, risk
challenges posed by future hybrid threats warrant an extension of targeting campaigns and the inclusion
of non-terrorist non-state actors who pose threats to national security.

[h]Targeted Killing and the Law

As outlined above, Targeted Killing is being used as means of both combat and counterterrorism.
Targeted killing takes often place within an operational context which is sometimes ‘hybrid’, which
requires responses which combine elements of combat and law enforcement, counterinsurgency or a bit of
both. This potential ‘dual use’ of targeted killing leads to the applicability of different legal standards, as
recognized in a recent statement by Human Rights Watch, whereby

[t]he deliberate use of lethal force against a specific target can be legal in operations against a combatant
on a genuine battlefield, or in a law enforcement situation in which there is an imminent threat to life and
there is no reasonable alternative. We also recognize the challenges faced in trying to address potential
threats that are not in a traditional conflict zone yet are also beyond the reach of any law enforcement.

This observation concurs with an earlier finding by the former UN Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial,
summary or arbitrary executions, Philip Alston, who reflected on targeted killings and the legal
complexities of this form of warfare and counterterrorism in his 2010 report, whereas

In recent years, a few States have adopted policies that permit the use of targeted killings, including in the
territories of other States. Such policies are often justified as a necessary and legitimate response to
‘terrorism’ and ‘asymmetric warfare’, but have had the very problematic effect of blurring and expanding
the boundaries of the applicable legal frameworks ….

The following pages will reflect on the use of targeted killings as Combat during hostilities as well as
Law Enforcement and highlight briefly the legal implications of both.

[h]Targeted Killings as Combat

The Law of Armed Conflict (LOAC), the jus in bello applies from the moment a state of armed conflict
does exist, be it as an international conflict between states or an non-international armed conflict between
a state and non-state armed groups. In instances of a non-international conflict, the existence of an armed
conflict is accepted when the violence reaches a significant threshold in terms of reciprocal ‘protracted
armed violence between governmental authorities and organized armed groups or between such groups
within a State’.

Once this threshold is reached, LOAC applies even in conflict situations where the overall legality of the
use of interstate force, the jus ad bellum, is questionable. That means in cases where legitimate self
defence is doubtful. This distinction is essential for ‘achieving the ultimate objective of maximizing
adherence to the rules of IHL’. The ongoing conflict between Al-Qaeda and the USA constitutes
hostilities between a state and a non-state armed group and as such amounts to an armed conflict. There
exists some controversy whether the nature of this conflict constitutes a non-international armed conflict
or an international armed conflict, both of a transnational and extraterritorial nature. Even if one was to
regard the conflict between the USA and Al-Qaeda as a non-international conflict, one would have to
regard the ongoing combat operations against the Taliban, Al-Qaeda and its affiliates in Afghanistan as an
international armed conflict as they take place in a conflict between occupying forces and insurgents.
Whether this existence of an armed conflict between the USA and Al-Qaeda also authorizes the USA to
conduct drone strikes as hostilities outside its own territory as extraterritorial use of force in Pakistan is a
different question and is discussed below.

In order to be lawful, targeted killing during hostilities has to comply with the rules of international
humanitarian law, or the LOAC. Its legal sources are the Geneva Conventions of 1949, its two Additional
Protocols, the 1907 Hague Regulations, and the customary law principles of armed conflict.
Consequently, any deliberate targeting of designated individuals has to comply with the necessary legal
safeguards of humanitarian law in order to be legitimate: namely compliance with the fundamental
principles of the Law of Armed Conflict, the principles of military necessity, distinction and
proportionality.

The following pages give a brief overlook of how military targeting aims to safeguard compliance with
the above principles in order to be legitimate. In so-called ‘personality strikes’ against High Profile
Targets the targeting process is divided into ‘target development’ and ‘target assessment’. Target
development refers to the process of identifying the location of a previously designated target and to
provide a timely and accurate tracking of it, while target assessment refers to a process of weighting the
tactical success of the strike against the overall damage anticipated, including also a ‘collateral’ damage
estimate. Both phases have to comply with the above legal standards of LOAC. The legality test during
the planning phase requires compliance not only with legal constraints such as distinction and necessity
under the LOAC and the applicable rules of engagement, valid in the particular theatre of operations, but
also with other operational implications, such as the potential impact on relations to other ‘Green’ forces,
friendly, allied local forces. The overall success of an operation is assessed in a post-operational
assessment where overall compliance of the targeting process, the execution of the strike and the damage
is assessed holistically. These requirements also apply in principle to cases of non pre-planned targeting,
so-called time sensitive or window of opportunity targeting where the actual targeting process is
shortened to allow for operational ad hoc decisions. Also known as ‘signature strikes’, this form of
targeting is based on an ‘ad hoc’ target assessment, where behavioural patterns of potential targets are
observed by the drone operator and if falling into a category of predetermined criteria which is linked to
‘militant activity or association’. Such ‘Signature’ strikes in particular have led to recent challenges and
criticism.

In the case of the USA, any targeting process has to comply with the wider legitimacy imperative of the
US targeting policy as set forth in the respective US military doctrinal guidelines, such as the official
Counterinsurgency (COIN) manual as well as the US Air Force guideline on targeting. According to its
Targeting Doctrine of 2006, targeting has to

achieve the effects and objectives outlined in a commander’s guidance and are coordinated and
deconflicted with agencies and activities that might present a conflict with the proposed action. It also
determines whether a target remains a viable element of the target system. During the development effort,
the targets may also require review and approval based on the sensitive target approval and review
process, coordinated through the combatant commander to national authorities.

It is important to remember that the targeting process applicable in the context of targeted killings has to
follow the general rules governing any targeting process in land, air, sea, space and even cyberspace
combat: that is to comply with the basic principles of armed conflict, namely necessity, distinction and
compliance with the proportionality requirements in respect to excessive collateral damage, or the
prohibition of perfidy. The RAF follows these caveats in its Rules Of Engagement (ROE) for air
targeting, which are also applicable for the use of ‘Reaper’ UCAS strikes. The rules applying for weapon
release in UCAS operations are not different to those used for UK manned combat aircraft:
 the weapons are all precision guided, and every effort is made to ensure the risk of collateral damage and
civilian casualties are minimized, this may include deciding not to release a weapon. UK Reaper is not an
autonomous system and does not have the capability to employ weapons unless it is commanded to do so
by the flight crew.

This overview of the targeting process concludes with the observation that a distinct advantage of using
UCAS for executing targeted killings lies in its enhanced surveillance capability and the non-existent
physical threat to its remote operator. This allows for a better tactical target assessment during the
operation and can be used to minimize the probability of non-combatant fatalities. This distinction of
targets can in theory significantly reduce ‘collateral damage’, if applied thoroughly and systematically, an
advantage even recognized by Human Rights Watch, and paramount for any justification of targeted
killing as lawful under LOAC.

[h]Targeted Killing as Law Enforcement

Targeted killing is also employed outside hostilities in instances of law enforcement, where there is no
other option as to kill the ‘targeted’ individual. In such instance, legal limitations other than the above
discussed rules governing the conduct of hostilities under the LOAC have to be considered. Potential
legal sources can be found in international and/or domestic human rights law, domestic criminal law
provisions, and domestic and international anti-terrorism law, both as limitations to a state’s right to
employ such targeted killings as well as legal grounds authorizing the use of lethal force on grounds of
strict necessity, proportionality and/or the right of individual self defence of the personnel tasked with
such an operation.

Targeted Killing outside hostilities and which is not directed against legitimate military targets is
governed by the ‘law enforcement paradigm’ which is primarily governed by international human rights
law, international specialist operational standards and domestic implementing legislation. Outside
hostilities, the use of lethal force is the exception and a ‘choice of last resort’ in law enforcement
operations, when arrest is not possible without endangering other lives and to prevent imminent harm to
life. Melzer provides an authoritative account and overview on the subject: he cautions restraint of using
lethal force. Given the closeness of targeted killing outside hostilities to the above discussed assassination
paradigm and the dangers of constituting ‘extrajudicial killings’ as well, he proposes a three step
safeguard check. Targeted killing as law enforcement should only be admissible as lawful if it ‘(a) aims at
preventing an unlawful attack by the targeted person on human life; (b) is absolutely necessary for the
achievement of this purpose; and (c) is the result of an operation which is planned, prepared, and
conducted so as to minimize, to the greatest extent possible, the recourse to lethal force’. Any possible
legality of such forms of targeted killings as law enforcement is seriously doubted by the UN Special
Rapporteur On Extrajudicial, Summary or Arbitrary Executions, Philip Alston, who questions in general
the possibility to execute such operations as part of a state’s lawful, legitimate and morally justifiable part
of its national policies.

In cases where the operation is directed against terrorists additional difficulties arise from the potential
hybrid nature of the target: the moment counterinsurgency operations and policies single out a terrorist as
a potential target, the line between kinetic actions during hostilities and law enforcement becomes
blurred. The legal challenges for using targeted killings in this context remain. Amnesty International
warns of the danger of adopting such a method of law enforcement, and compared it in the context of
Israel’s kinetic response to threats arising from its occupied territories with ‘an unlawful and deliberate
killing carried out by order of a government or with its acquiescence … which can reasonably be assumed
to be the result of a policy at any level of government to eliminate specific individuals as an alternative to
arresting them and bringing them to justice. These killings take place outside any judicial framework’.
Targeting in the context of the ongoing ‘war on terror’ as well as in the wider context of counterterrorism
has its challenges: it is often rather difficult to determine the exact nature of the threat in question and:
whether it qualifies as hostility in terms of armed conflict, or as an act of terrorism or sometimes a bit of
both. An IED aimed at killing coalition forces in Afghanistan might fall under the first category while the
killing of health workers or school children by the same actor might constitute an act of terrorism.
Lacking a universal criminal prescription (and definition) of terrorism, any response to such
crimes/threats would have to be grounded in the responses available at domestic state and policy level:
from criminal prosecution to self-defence as part of a domestic counterinsurgency strategy.
Understandable that the USA maintain the position that their policies of targeting terrorist targets should
fall under the combat paradigm of its ‘Global War On Terrorism’ which does leave less room for legal
scrutiny regarding the choice of responses. By following the US position, which characterizes the conflict
with Al-Qaeda as an armed conflict as such and its responses like targeted killings as hostilities falling
under its inherent right to state self-defence, one would be able to avoid such legal challenges under the
rubric of ‘lawfare’. Whether this can apply to its covert drone strike programme is however debatable.

[h]Extraterritorial Targeted Killing and Questions of State Sovereignty

Such compliance with the principles of the LOAC does, however, not necessarily imply that the wider
context in which a state is engaging in combat is a state of interstate self-defence and as such does permit
the use of military force against other states. The jus ad bellum is distinct from the jus in bello,
International Humanitarian Law applies ‘equally to all parties to an armed conflict, irrespective of
whether an armed conflict is wages in compliance with, or in violation of, the general prohibition of the
use of force’ as enshrined in 2(4) UN Charter. The last year has seen an increase in US extraterritorial
drone strikes conducted in Pakistan and outside the operational theatre of Afghanistan: ‘Estimates state
that while there were 52 such strikes during George W Bush's time, this number has risen to 282 over the
past three and a half years, with officials justifying it has international “self defence” against a stateless
enemy.’ Two questions may arise from such US military action against the Taliban, Al-Qaeda and
affiliated targets in Pakistan: first, can the US exercise its right to state self-defence after the attacks of
9/11 against Al-Qaeda as a non-state actor and secondly if affirmative, does this right to self-defence also
allow for the extraterritorial use of force on the territory of a sovereign, allied state?

Under 2 (4) of the UN Charter, States ‘shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of
force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state’. 2(4) UN Charter as a
customary law principle on the prohibition of the use of force does not affect a state’s inherent right of
individual or collective self-defence if an armed attack occurs as stipulated in 51 of the Charter. The
question arises whether this right of state self defence does also apply to cases where the ‘aggressor’ is
not a state but a non-state non-governmental organized armed group such as Al-Qaeda. While Art 51 UN
Charter does not specify that the use of force or the threat has to originate from a state (actor), it seems
that prior 9/11 the prevailing view excluded non-state actors as originators of such attacks. This
interpretation of the Charter consequently ignored the raising role of non-state terrorist actors in modern
conflict, which began with the ascent of Islamist fighter networks during the Soviet occupation of
Afghanistan in the mid-1980s. A State’s right to self-defence against such non-state actor violence should
solely reflect on the scale and gravity of the attack or threat and less on formalities. The magnitude and
severity of the attacks of 9/11 by Al-Qaeda allowed the USA to exercise its legitimate right to self-
defence, recognized by the UN SC in its two post 9/11 UN SC Resolutions 1368 and 1373. Consequently,
and in line with UN SC 1368, NATO invoked 5 of the Washington Treaty, the Alliance’s collective
defence clause.

Time will tell whether we witness a definite change in ‘legal boundaries of the battlefield’, recognizing
the new reality of non-state actor aggression, and strengthening the position of States facing an armed
attack launched by non-state actors. While the Israeli operations ‘Change of Direction’ against Hezbollah
in 2006 and ‘Cast Lead’ against Hamas in 2008/9 were accepted as justified acts of Israel’s right to self-
defence under 51 UN Charter, the ICJ Advisory Opinion on the Israeli Wall ICJ Rep 136 seems to
confirm the traditional inter-state concept of armed conflict which limits the scope of defence to state
actors only. Whether this view will eventually change towards an explicit recognition under international
law of an autonomous legal principle of jus ad bellum, remains to be seen.

The next question regarding the legality of executing targeted killings on the territory of Pakistan relates
to the question whether the USA has a right to cross territorial borders in pursuing their right to self-
defence against Al-Qaeda and other non-state terrorist actors. The exercise of transnational and
extraterritorial self-defence may raise questions in regard to the scope of the US’s right to self-defence.
Prior examples for such transnational, extraterritorial, targeting can be found in the ‘Hot Pursuit’ and/or
extraterritorial ‘raid’ operations by the former South African Defence Force (SADF) against cadres and
members of the African National Congress (ANC), its armed wing, Umkhonto we Sizwe (MK) and the
South West Africa’s People’s Organisation (SWAPO). These operations have been mostly condemned as
violations of 2(4) UN Charter, often based on political reasons. As examples may serve the prolonged
phase of African armed opposition against colonial domination by white minority regimes in 1970s and
1980s, where Soviet backed ‘liberation wars’ were regarded as manifestations of peoples’ self-
determination and self-defence in the wider sense and ‘as wars of national liberation were exceptions to
UN Charter’s 2(4) prohibition of the use of force’, thus precluding the argument of self-defence for non-
African opponents. It is questionable whether such a distinction would be upheld today post 9/11 before
the backdrop of the growing recognition of a global terrorist threat; an observation of particular relevance
today in respect to Israel’s frequent use of force against non-state (terrorist) actors, including the
extraterritorial use of force on the territory of third states.

It is not easy to answer the question if the USA can legally use military force on the territory of Pakistan
against Al-Qaeda, the Taliban and affiliated targets. Pakistan’s right as a sovereign state as enshrined in 2
(1) of the UN Charter has to be weighed against the necessity of the USA to exercise its right to self-
defence in terms of 2 (4) UN Charter (if one follows the argument that the USA has a right to self-defence
against Non State Actors post ‘9/11’). Any such deliberations would have to consider the overall position
of Pakistan in this conflict: whether it was unable or unwilling to deny a ‘safe haven’ to terrorists, was
playing an active role as aider and abettor or was simply maintaining a position of ‘neutrality’. Pakistan is
not only an active partner in fighting terrorism and is undertaking genuine efforts to combat Al-Qaeda
and ‘home grown’ Taliban groups, albeit with varying success and changing allegiances, it also supports
ISAF operations by allowing NATO (and the USA) to use its territory for resupplying ISAF in
Afghanistan. Problematic is the growing discontent among the military and political leaders in Peshawar
with the US drone programme within its territorial borders and the rising death toll among Pakistani
civilians. Unless this discontent was to lead to an explicit policy change by the Pakistani government and
to an official request by Peshawar to stop any further drone strikes, the USA will face no serious legal
challenge for its extraterritorial drone programme in Pakistan. Such a development is, however, unlikely
given that the government in Peshawar seems to support silently the US drone programme out of strategic
necessity.

[h]Targeted Killing: Challenges Founded on Combat Morality and Efficiency

Targeted killing by drones has become an increasingly debated subject with criticism not only directed
against its overall legality and legitimacy but also its negative impact on Pakistan as a sovereign state in
cases of extraterritorial strikes, a potential lack of overall efficiency and in general a growing uneasiness
in its overall morality. Generally, it seems that there had been a change in how targeted killing is being
viewed: apart from a growing discomfort with civilian deaths involved, there is also growing concern in
respect to its overall effectiveness as well as a general uneasiness of accepting targeted killing as a new
form or warfare. This was highlighted in a recent statement made by the UN Special Rapporteur on
Human Rights and Counterterrorism, Emmerson, who called for more transparency and accountability
when employing this form of warfare.

Targeted killing may have some direct implications for the overall morality of armed conflict and combat
as such: the evolving drone technology removes the soldier from the actual battlefield and with it the
closeness and ‘intimacy’ of war. UAV technology has created a mechanical and factual distance between
operator and his ‘target’, which acts like a moral distance: targeting killings may have removed any
remnants of ‘humanity of combat’ and produced the factual dehumanization of the enemy. This
dehumanizing distance between the protagonists of this new form of armed conflict, thoroughly
asymmetric in terms of weapon technologies and capabilities, has led to a growing criticism of the Obama
Administration’s use of drones. This concern is aptly summarized by the US Army Chaplain and military
ethics teacher, Keith Shurtleff, when he states ‘that as war becomes safer and easier, as soldiers are
removed from the horrors of war and see the enemy not as humans but as blips on a screen, there is very
real danger of losing the deterrent that such horrors provide’.

Targeted killing and its wider legal, ethical and moral complexities was brought to the attention of the US
public, when Anwar Al-Awlaki, a US citizen of Yemeni descent, and the alleged Al-Qaeda leader in the
Arabian Peninsula was killed by a CIA operated drone on 30 September 2011. His selection as a target,
targeting and subsequent killing had been authorized by President Obama and led to questions regarding
the extent the killing of an individual who once held US citizenship was in compliance with international
and US domestic law.

Linked to these emerging morality concerns is a growing debate in regard to targeting efficiency: whether
target elimination is indeed as efficient as it has been claimed, and whether the rising numbers of
‘collateral’(unintended civilian) casualties during combat, among the effected civilian populations in
Pakistan does not have an overall negative impact on such antiterrorism and counterinsurgency
campaigns.

The number of American drone strikes in Pakistan has significantly increased under Obama since taking
office in 2009: ‘Estimates state that while there were 52 such strikes during George W Bush's time, this
number has risen to 282 over the past three and a half years.’ While the Obama Administration maintains
that its drone programme was ‘achieving’ high efficiency rates (in terms of elimination of ‘High Value
Targets’) and low civilian causalities, new reports show the opposite. The Bureau of Investigative
Journalism (TBIJ) reported ‘that from June 2004 through mid-September 2012, available data indicate
that drone strikes killed 2,562 - 3,325 people in Pakistan, of whom 474 - 881 were civilians, including
176 children. TBIJ reports that these strikes also injured an additional 1,228 - 1,362 individuals’, which
would amount to a ‘collateral’ rate of 20%. Whether such a figure alone does already constitute violations
of the principles of distinction and proportionality of the LOAC and therefore constitutes possible war
crimes has to be seen. It is also alleged that there was a lack in terms of overall effectiveness when
targeting leaders and commanders of Taleban and other affiliated forces. These reports do, however,
contradict any policy announcement by the USA to the contrary. The findings of TBIJ have already found
their way into the public debate and perhaps influenced it negatively towards the USA use of drones for
targeted killing. The figures produced by TBIJ were used in the critical high profile Stanford/NYU Living
Under Drones Report, which calls for a careful re-evaluation of the current use of US targeted killing and
drone strikes. Together with the above cited Columbia Drone Report and the most recent UN decision to
begin an official inquiry into the use of drones, the official US policy announcement, whereas drone
strikes constituted ‘a surgically precise and effective tool that makes the U.S. safer’ is already seriously
contested. And this critique does already take into account that the USA has a right to defend itself
against Al-Qaeda and therefore the official US position, whereas it was in an armed conflict with this
non-state actor. How much harder would it then to justify such ineffective strikes under the above non-
combat paradigm of law enforcement?

The repercussions of the US increasing reliance on drones for executing enemies abroad has seen an
increase in Anti-US hostility, possibly swelled the numbers of the Taliban and other affiliated groups in
the region and led to open criticism by its Ally in the region, Pakistan. These ‘collateral’ damages in the
widest sense do not seem to be taken to seriously by the protagonists of this form of warfare, an omission
which might turn out to question the overall success of the US ‘War on Terror’ in general and OEF in
particular.

[h]Conclusion: An Outlook on the Future Use of Targeted Killing

Current criticism continues to evolve around the following main points: that targeted killing is illegal as
such, that it is inefficient and that it is immoral. The author acknowledges that there is the possibility that
some of this critique might be justifiable and that only strict observance of the existing legal and
operational frameworks, applicable to targeting and outlined above, can avoid instances where targeted
killing might raise such questions. This includes US Targeted Killing, which is executed as a
manifestation of the US right to individual self defence or as a means of warfare used within an existing
UN SC mandate under Chapter VII of the UN Charter. Targeted killing operations which are planned and
executed in accordance with the legitimate targeting process employed by the US military and its allies
(and not the CIA or other Private Military Contractors) as part of hostilities can be considered lawful and
legitimate as long as in compliance with the fundamental LOAC principles of military necessity,
distinction and proportionality and aimed at avoiding ‘collateral damage’. The need to adhere to law is
being acknowledged in recent examples in US military academe. This legality argument is, however,
seriously in doubt when the operations are executed by non-combatants, such as the CIA, not restricted to
‘enemy’ targets alone, as it is the case in instances where civilian non-combatants become ‘collateral’
damage and the affected state as Pakistan is a neutral state which does not consent to such strikes.

This affirmative legal assessment does not cover scenarios outside hostilities and in the context of
implementing existing security strategies, such as counterterrorism operations as part of a national COIN
policy, as well as entwined, hybrid operations as e.g. counternarcotics operations, or hostage release
operations, where legal scrutiny has to be applied. The legality of the above-mentioned signature drone
strikes are also debatable as potential violations of the principles of proportionality, imminence and
proportionality.

This concludes with the prediction that the use of UCAS as a method of warfare (together with Special
Forces capture and kill operations) will increase in the future. The overall potential military benefit of
using drones as a method of warfare on the battlefield of the future is not disputed and with the USA
having become a key player in the use of this form of warfare, other nations are set to follow its lead. The
use of drones and targeted killing operations will remain a means of warfare of first choice to counter
Asymmetric and Hybrid Threats. It seems certain that targeted killing will continue to be an important
element of future US long-term counterterrorism and security strategies. It also seems likely that in light
of defence budget cuts, troop reductions as well as a growing unwillingness to scarify the lives of soldiers
of Western countries, more states will consider turning utilizing armed drones as a means of show of
force in the future. Combat capabilities can be significantly enhanced when the use of UAVs are
available: this reflects directly on the dual use nature of such airborne systems, which allow for an
unarmed use for reconnaissance as well as armed for combat. The recent call by the UN Secretary
General to deploy UAVs to Congo to support the African peacekeeping forces of MONUSCO in their
attempt to fight rebels in the east of the country highlights the potential use of UAVs outside targeted
killing operations. This ‘dual use nature’ of UAVs, unarmed versus armed, has been recognized for the
use in policing and monitoring roles with the potential of further proliferation and use.

The use of drones for executing targeted killing in Afghanistan and Pakistan might well increase in the
next years, a forecast which is partly founded in the fact that the USA is moving already now in a
transitional role in Afghanistan and plans to end major combat operations there this spring. The
withdrawal of combat troops will necessitate the increased use of targeted killing in future, executed by
both drones and special forces, in order to close existing combat capability gaps during and after the
transition of operational control to the Afghan National Army. In addition, Obama’s decision to appoint
John Brennan, his former Security Advisor and key promoter of the use of drones for targeted killing, to
the top job of CIA director may likely result in an increase reliance on this means of warfare by the USA.

The future use of drones will not only affect national security strategies and policies, but eventually also
impact on how we perceive interstate war within its legal contexts of the jus ad bellum as well as the law
of conflict, the jus in bello. These future developments will challenge the international legal fraternity for
some time to come: it will be a key responsibility for the international lawyer to discuss and scrutinize
these developments within their wider political, legal and military context, and to shape this process. This
concludes with a sobering warning that while targeted killing operations may be an effective means of
achieving short-term tactical goals within the scope of a wider operational objective, the unregulated and
increased use of targeting killings by the USA (and others) in the ‘war on terror’ may be both immoral as
well as illegal in the long run.

Chapter 6: Targeted Killing and Counterterrorism

[mh] Effectiveness of Targeted Killing Campaigns

Targeted killing, the deliberate use of lethal force against specific individuals deemed to pose a threat to
national security or military objectives, has become a prominent tactic in contemporary warfare. This
aims to evaluate the effectiveness of targeted killing campaigns, considering their strategic rationale,
operational dynamics, and broader impact on security and stability.
Strategic Rationale: The strategic rationale behind targeted killing campaigns often revolves around
disrupting and degrading the capabilities of hostile actors, including terrorist organizations, insurgent
groups, and high-value targets. By eliminating key leaders, planners, and operatives, targeted killings
seek to weaken adversary networks, disrupt their operational capabilities, and deter future attacks.
Proponents argue that targeted killings can be an effective means of neutralizing imminent threats and
degrading enemy capabilities, thereby enhancing national security and protecting civilian populations.

Operational Outcomes: Assessing the effectiveness of targeted killing campaigns requires evaluating their
operational outcomes, including the precision and accuracy of strikes, the impact on enemy organizations,
and the collateral damage inflicted. While targeted killings can eliminate high-value targets and disrupt
enemy operations in the short term, their long-term effectiveness hinges on factors such as the resilience
of adversary networks, the ability to replace lost leaders, and the unintended consequences of civilian
casualties and collateral damage.

Effectiveness Metrics: Measuring the effectiveness of targeted killing campaigns involves various
metrics, including kill/capture rates, the degradation of enemy capabilities, the frequency and lethality of
enemy attacks, and the broader impact on regional stability and security. However, quantifying the
success of targeted killings can be challenging due to factors such as the difficulty of assessing enemy
intentions, the adaptive nature of adversary tactics, and the limitations of intelligence and surveillance
capabilities.

Challenges and Limitations: Targeted killing campaigns face numerous challenges and limitations that
can affect their effectiveness and legitimacy. These include the risk of civilian casualties and collateral
damage, the potential for backlash and radicalization, the erosion of international norms and legal
frameworks, and the moral and ethical implications of extrajudicial executions conducted without due
process or judicial oversight. Additionally, the overreliance on targeted killings as a counterterrorism
strategy may undermine efforts to address the root causes of violent extremism and promote long-term
stability and peace.

Broader Impact: The broader impact of targeted killing campaigns extends beyond their immediate
tactical objectives, shaping political dynamics, public perceptions, and regional security dynamics. While
targeted killings may disrupt enemy operations and degrade their capabilities, they can also fuel
resentment, anger, and anti-American sentiment among affected populations, potentially undermining
counterterrorism efforts and exacerbating insecurity. Moreover, the proliferation of drone technology and
the normalization of targeted killings raise concerns about their potential misuse by authoritarian regimes
and non-state actors, posing broader challenges to global security and stability.
Assessing the effectiveness of targeted killing campaigns requires a comprehensive analysis of their
strategic rationale, operational outcomes, and broader impact on security and stability. While targeted
killings can disrupt enemy operations and eliminate high-value threats in the short term, their long-term
effectiveness and legitimacy depend on factors such as the precision and accuracy of strikes, the
mitigation of civilian casualties, and the alignment with international law and human rights principles. As
targeted killing continues to evolve as a tactic in modern warfare, ongoing scrutiny, accountability, and
ethical reflection are essential for ensuring that its use is consistent with fundamental moral values and
strategic objectives.

[mh] Blowback and Radicalization

Radicalization (or radicalisation) is the process by which an individual or a group comes to adopt
increasingly radical views in opposition to a political, social, or religious status quo. The ideas of society
at large shape the outcomes of radicalization. Radicalization can result in both violent and nonviolent
action – academic literature focuses on radicalization into violent extremism (RVE) or radicalisation
leading to acts of terrorism. Multiple separate pathways can promote the process of radicalization, which
can be independent but are usually mutually reinforcing.

Radicalization that occurs across multiple reinforcing pathways greatly increases a group's resilience and
lethality. Furthermore, by compromising a group's ability to blend in with non-radical society and to
participate in a modern, national or international economy, radicalization serves as a kind of sociological
trap that gives individuals no other place to go to satisfy their material and spiritual needs.

[h]Definitions

There is no universally accepted definition of radicalization. One of the difficulties with defining
radicalization appears to be the importance of the context to determine what is perceived as radicalization.
Therefore, radicalization can mean different things to different people. Presented below is a list of
definitions used by different governments.
[h]European Union

The European Commission defined and coined the term "radicalization" in the year 2005 as follows:
"Violent radicalisation" is the phenomenon of people embracing opinions, views and ideas which could
lead to acts of terrorism as defined in 1 of the Framework Decision on Combating Terrorism. The term
"violent radicalisation" originated in EU policy circles and was coined after the Madrid bombing of 11
March 2004. It was not widely used in social science as a concept but it obviously refers to a process of
socialisation leading to the use of violence. In an initiating report of the European Commission's Expert
Group on Violent Radicalisation – based on four deepening studies – the research paradigm has been
opened for further scientific research, also flanked by research grants and funding via different security
research programs.

[h]United Kingdom

The UK Home Office, MI5's parent agency, defines radicalisation as "The process by which people come
to support terrorism and violent extremism and, in some cases, then join terrorist groups." The MI5 report
closes by saying that no single measure will reduce radicalisation in the UK and that the only way to
combat it is by targeting the at-risk vulnerable groups and trying to assimilate them into society. This may
include helping young people find jobs, better integrating immigrant populations into the local culture,
and effectively reintegrating ex-prisoners into society.

[h]Canada

The Royal Canadian Mounted Police defines radicalization as "the process by which individuals—usually
young people—are introduced to an overtly ideological message and belief system that encourages
movement from moderate, mainstream beliefs towards extreme views." While radical thinking is by no
means problematic in itself, it becomes a threat to national security when Canadian citizens or residents
espouse or engage in violence or direct action as a means of promoting political, ideological or religious
extremism. Sometimes referred to as "homegrown terrorism", this process of radicalization is more
correctly referred to as domestic radicalization leading to terrorist violence.

[h]Denmark

The Danish Security and Intelligence Service (PET) defines radicalization as "A process by which a
person to an increasing extent accepts the use of undemocratic or violent means, including terrorism, in
an attempt to reach a specific political/ideological objective."

[h]UNESCO

In a UNESCO (United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization) research report on the
impact of the Internet and social media on youth and violent extremism , the difficulty of defining
radicalization is discussed. A distinction is drawn "between a process of radicalization, a process of
violent radicalization (legitimizing the adoption of violence), and acts of violence." For the purposes of
the UNESCO report, radicalization is defined by these three points:

 "The individual person's search for fundamental meaning, origin and return to a root ideology;
 "The individual as part of a group's adoption of a violent form of expansion of root ideologies and
related oppositionist objectives;
 "The polarization of the social space and the collective construction of a threatened ideal 'us'
against 'them,' where the others are dehumanized by a process of scapegoating."
[h]Varieties and commonalities

Despite being composed of multifarious pathways that lead to different outcomes and sometimes
diametrically opposed ideological purposes, radicalization can be traced to a common set of pathways that
translate real or perceived grievances into increasingly extreme ideas and readiness to participate in
political action beyond the status quo. Shira Fishman, a researcher at the National Consortium for the
Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism, wrote "Radicalization is a dynamic process that varies
for each individual, but shares some underlying commonalities that can be explored." Though there are
many end products of the process of radicalization, to include all manner of extremist groups both violent
and nonviolent, a common series of dynamics have been consistently demonstrated in the course of
academic inquiry.

[h]Islamic

Jihadis have a "tried and tested model" of contact with different vulnerable, and extremist individuals
through online messaging services or social media platforms, and then rapidly manipulating them towards
participating in violent action in their name.

It was reported that Raffia Hayat of the Ahmadiyya Muslim Association warned that jailed extremists
attempt to recruit violent criminals into radical groups so they carry out attacks on the public once
released. There have been several notable criticisms of radicalization theories for focusing
disproportionately on Islam.

There have been concerns that converts to Islam are more susceptible to violent radicalization than
individuals born into the faith. Dr. Abdul Haqq Baker developed the Convert's Cognitive Development
Framework that describes how new converts conceptualize Islam and the stages where they are most
vulnerable to radicalization.

[h]Right-wing

Radical right-wing terrorism is motivated by a variety of different right-wing/far-right ideologies, most

prominently neo-fascism, neo-Nazism, white nationalism and to a lesser extent "Patriot"/Sovereign
citizen beliefs and anti-abortion sentiment. Modern radical right-wing terrorism appeared in Western
Europe, Central Europe and the United States in the 1970s, and Eastern Europe following the dissolution
of the Soviet Union in 1991. Groups associated with right-wing radicals include white power skinhead
gangs, right-wing/far-right hooligans, and sympathizers. Examples of right-wing/far-right radical
organizations and individuals include Aryan Nations, Aryan Republican Army (ARA), Atomwaffen
Division (AWD), Army of God (AOG), Anders Behring Breivik, Alexandre Bissonnette, Brenton
Harrison Tarrant, Cesar Sayoc, Cliven Bundy, Dylann Roof, David Koresh, David Lane, Eric Robert
Rudolph, Frazier Glenn Miller, James Mason, James Alex Fields, John T. Earnest, Jim David Adkisson,
Ku Klux Klan (KKK), National Action (NA), National Socialist Underground (NSU), Timothy McVeigh,
Robert Bowers, Thomas Mair, The Order and Wade Michael Page. From 2008 to 2016, there were more
right-wing terror attacks both attempted and accomplished in the US than Islamist and left-wing attacks
combined.

Right-wing populism by those who support ethnocentrism (usually white nationalism) and oppose
immigration creates a climate of "us versus them" leading to radicalization. The growth of white
nationalism in a political climate of polarization has provided an opportunity for both on- and offline
radicalization and recruitment as an alternative to increasingly distrusted traditional mainstream choices.
In 2009, the United States Department of Homeland Security identified economic and political conditions
as leading to a rise in right-wing radicalization and recruitment.

The Anti-Defamation League reports that white supremacist propaganda and recruitment efforts on and
around college campuses have been increasing sharply, with 1,187 incidents in 2018 compared to 421 in
2017, far exceeding any previous year. Far-right terrorists rely on a variety of strategies such as leafleting,
violent rituals, and house parties to recruit, targeting angry and marginalized youth looking for solutions
to their problems. But their most effective recruitment tool is extremist music, which avoids monitoring
by moderating parties such as parents and school authorities. Risk factors for recruitment include
exposure to racism during childhood, dysfunctional families such as divorced parents, physical,
emotional, and sexual abuse, neglect, and disillusionment.

In 2018, researchers from the Data & Society think tank identified the YouTube recommendation system
as promoting a range of political positions from mainstream libertarianism and conservatism to overt
white nationalism. Many other online discussion groups and forums are used for online right-wing
radicalization. Facebook was found to be offering advertisements targeted to 168,000 users in a white
genocide conspiracy theory category, which they removed shortly after being contacted by journalists in
the wake of the 2018 Pittsburgh synagogue shooting. After the March 15, 2019 Christchurch mosque
shootings, Facebook announced that they have banned white nationalist and white separatist content
along with white supremacy.

[h]Left-wing

Left-wing terrorism is terrorism committed with the aim of overthrowing current capitalist systems and
replacing them with Marxist–Leninist or socialist societies. Left-wing terrorism can also occur within
already socialist states as criminal action against the current ruling government.

Most left-wing terrorist groups that had operated in the 1970s and 1980s disappeared by the mid-1990s.
One exception was the Greek Revolutionary Organization 17 November (17N), which lasted until 2002.
Since then, left-wing terrorism has been relatively minor in the Western world in comparison with other
forms, and is now mostly carried out by insurgent groups in the developing world.

According to Sarah Brockhoff, Tim Krieger and Daniel Meierrieks, while left-wing terrorism is
ideologically motivated, nationalist-separatist terrorism is ethnically motivated. They argue that the
revolutionary goal of left-wing terrorism is non-negotiable whereas nationalist terrorists are willing to
make concessions. They suggest that rigidity of the demands of left-wing terrorists may explain their lack
of support relative to nationalist groups. Nevertheless, many on the revolutionary left have shown
solidarity for national liberation groups employing terrorism, such as Irish nationalists, the Palestine
Liberation Organization and the South American Tupamaros, seeing them as engaged in a global struggle
against capitalism. Since the nationalist sentiment is fueled by socio-economic conditions, some separatist
movements, including the Basque ETA, the Provisional Irish Republican Army and the Irish National
Liberation Army, incorporated communist and socialist ideology into their policies.

[h]Role of the Internet and social media

UNESCO explored the role of the Internet and social media on the development of radicalization among
youth in a 2017 research report, Youth and violent extremism on social media: mapping the research. The
report explores violent extremism in the countries within Europe, North America, Latin America, and the
Caribbean; violent radicalization in the Arab world and Africa; and, violent radicalization in Asia. At this
time, more research is available on this issue within Europe, North America, Latin America, and the
Caribbean than is available in the Arab world, Africa, and Asia. The report expresses a need for continued
research on this topic overall as there are multiple types of radicalization (political, religious,
psychosocial) that can be explored in relation to youth and the role the Internet and social media play.
One key conclusion of the report is that "social media constitutes a facilitating environment rather than a
driving force for violent radicalization or the actual commission of violence."

As stated before the authors of the 2017 UNESCO report repeatedly call for the support of more research
into the study of online violent radicalization. Especially as it relates to young people and women as
available research has been gendered. Gaps in research also apply to specific areas of the world. There is
a notable absence of research on this topic when it comes to the Arab world, Africa, and Asia. So much
so, that the authors of this report had difficulty developing specific conclusions about the connections
between the Internet and social media, radicalization, and youth in these three areas of the world. The
authors see these multiple gaps in research as opportunities for future studies, but also admit that there are
specific challenges in carrying out research in this area successfully. They discuss empirical,
methodological, and ethical challenges. For example, if youth and the influence of the Internet and social
media on radicalizing them are to be studied, there are ethical concerns when it comes to the age of the
youth being studied as well as the privacy and safety of these youth. The authors conclude their report
with general recommendations as well as recommendations for government entities, the private sector,
and civil society.

[h]Mutual aid

Eli Berman's 2009 book Radical, Religious, and Violent: the New Economics of Terrorism applies a
rational choice model to the process of radicalization, demonstrating that the presence of mutual aid
networks increase the resilience of radical groups. When those groups decide to use violence, they also
enjoy a heightened level of lethality and are protected from defection and other forms of intervention by
states and outside groups.

All organizations insofar as they include the possibility of free riders by extension experience defection
constraints. Within the context of a violent extremist organization, defection means either defection to a
counterintelligence or security apparatus, or defection to a non-radical criminal apparatus. Both of these
outcomes spoil specific plans to exercise violence in the name of the group at large. The "defection
constraint" is similar to a threshold price-point in that it denotes what rewards would justify the defection
of any one individual within the context of an organization. Berman uses the example of a Taliban
protection racket for convoys of consumer goods moving through Afghanistan: checkpoints are set up at
several points along a trade route, and each checkpoint's team is given a small percentage of the convoy's
total value if it arrives safely at its destination. The incentive for any one checkpoint's team deciding to
simply hijack a convoy as it passes through, sell the goods off, and escape, increases as the value of the
convoy increases. The same dynamic applies to attacks; while an individual in a terrorist group may not
feel drawn by the reward of alerting the police to an impending low level crime, the reward for alerting
the police to an impending high-profile attack, such as a mass bombing, becomes more attractive. While
non-radicalized and criminal organizations can only rely on organizational cohesion through a calculus of
greed, fear, and perhaps familial loyalty, Berman argues that religious radicalization greatly increases the
defection constraints of radical terrorist organizations by requiring outsized demonstrations of
commitment to the cause prior to recruiting operatives.

Mutual aid is the voluntary and reciprocal exchange of goods within an organization. Examples in various
religious antecedents include Judaic Tzedakah, Islamic Zakat, and various Christian institutions of
charity, as described in the Acts of the Apostles. Berman argues that religious organizations experience
economic risks by extending mutual aid to all alleged believers—theological assent is cheap, action can
be costly. By imposing a series of outwardly visible social rules, such as restrictions (or prescriptions) on
dress, diet, language, and social interactions, groups impose a cost on entering into a mutual aid
partnership, diminishing the occurrence of free riding.

These restrictions have a dual effect in radical groups. Not only do they ensure that an individual is
committed to the cause, but they also diminish individual's access to consumption opportunities and social
interaction that might persuade them to distance themselves from the cause. As individuals become more
involved with radical activities, their social circles become more constrained, which diminishes contact
with non-radicalized persons and further entrenches radicalized thinking. For example, when a young
man spends several years in a Yeshiva in order to establish himself within a Haredi community, he
foregoes future earnings that would be accessible should he choose a secular education. To quote Berman
"As consumption opportunities are limited, work for pay becomes less appealing, freeing up even more
time for community activities." This sunk cost figures into future calculations, and raises the defection
constraint in a way that non-radicalized group dynamics cannot. Going back to the Taliban convoy
example, not only have the two footsoldiers in question have been vetted by demonstrating commitment
to the cause, they also have had their exterior options limited such that it would be difficult to blend into a
new environment for lack of skills and cultural understanding. As such, the threshold price point to
defect, as represented by the value of the convoy, increases to include both the price of losing their
existing support network and non-quantifiable factors such as friends, family, safety, and other goods
over the course of their lives.

[h]Leading theories

While the overall arch of radicalization usually involves multiple reinforcing processes, scholars have
identified a series of individual pathways to radicalization.

[h]McCauley and Mosalenko

Clark McCauley and Sofia Mosalenko's 2009 book Friction: How Radicalization Happens to Them and
Us identifies 12 following sociological and psychodynamic pathways:

[h]Personal grievance

This pathway emphasizes revenge for real or perceived harm inflicted upon oneself by an outside party.
This initial offense triggers other psychodynamic mechanisms, such as thinking in more stark in-group
and out-group terms, lowered inhibitions to violence, and lessened incentives to avoid violence. Chechen
"Shahidka" also known as Black Widows, women who have lost husbands, children, or other close family
members in conflict with Russian forces are a good example.

[h]Group grievance

"Group grievance" radicalization dynamics are similar to those that are primed by personal grievances;
the difference is that the subject perceives harm inflicted on a group that she belongs to or has sympathy
for. This pathway accounts for the larger portion of political and ethnic radical violence, in which action
is taken on behalf of the group at large rather than as an act of personal revenge. Radicalization out of
sympathy for an outgroup is rarer, but can be observed in the Weather Underground's attempted
alignment with the Black Panthers and Viet Cong. The tie between radicalization into violent extremism
through group grievance and suicide bombing has also been quantifiably demonstrated: perceived threats
to proximal identity such as the presence of foreign troops or invasion accounts for the majority of suicide
bombings.
Some commentators believe that the anger and suspicion directed toward innocent Muslims living in
Western countries after the September 11 attacks and the indignities inflicted upon them by security
forces and the general public contributes to radicalization of new recruits. Such "us vs. them" hostility
cited by commentators includes political positions such as the Trump travel ban which Donald Trump
initially campaigned for as "a total and complete shutdown of Muslims entering the United States", or
ironically Senator Ted Cruz's call to "patrol and secure Muslim neighborhoods before they become
radicalized".

[h]Slippery slope

The "Slippery slope" represents gradual radicalization through activities that incrementally narrow the
individual's social circle, narrow their mindset, and in some cases desensitize them to violence. This has
also been called the "True Believer" syndrome, as a product of which one becomes increasingly serious
about their political, social, and religious beliefs as a product of "taking the next step". One can begin by
participating in nonviolent activities such as mutual aid, wherein the best way to raise one's in-group
social status is to demonstrate seriousness about the cause and increase the level of commitment in terms
of beliefs and activities. As an individual commits act after act, sunk costs are developed. Even if activity
is initially only ideological or only criminal, the process of radicalization equates the two such that
criminal acts are justified for intellectually radical purposes, and radical purposes are invoked to justify
what are ultimately criminal acts.

[h]Love

Romantic and familial entanglement is often an overlooked factor in radicalization. Several violent
extremist organizations, especially at their origin, owe their structure to a tight-knit group of friends who
share religious, economic, social, and sexual bonds. While this example is evident in more extreme cases,
such as those of Charles Manson's "Family" and other radical cults, it also applies to radicalization in
secular and orthodox religious environments. Love can serve as a connection between influential figures,
connecting their networks of followers through a combination of attraction and loyalty. This particular
force was especially notable in New Left radical groups, such as the American Weather Underground and
the German Red Army Faction. The connections between Bill Ayers and Bernardine Dohrn, or between
Gudrun Ensslin and Andreas Baader served as the organizational and intellectual nucleus of these groups.

[h]Risk and status

Within a radical group, high-risk behavior, if successful, offers a pathway to status insofar as it becomes
re-construed as bravery and commitment to the cause. As such, violence or other radical activity provides
a pathway to success, social acceptance, and physical rewards that might otherwise be out of reach.

Disproportionate involvement in risk taking and status seeking is particularly true of those young men
who come from disadvantaged family backgrounds, have lower IQ levels, are of lower socioeconomic
status, and who therefore have less opportunity to succeed in society along a traditional career path. These
young men are more likely to be involved in gang activity, violent crime, and other high-risk behavior.

James Pugel conducted a study in which Liberian ex-combatants indicated that their radicalization was
motivated by the opportunity to increase their economic and social status within their community. There
was a belief that radicalized individuals lived better than non-radicalized individuals. Specifically,
extremists groups offered compensatory employment, which provided the means for basic needs to be
met such as food and housing. In addition, radicalization provided protection and safety from local
violence (i.e. abductions) for their entire family.
Other researchers such as Alpaslan Ozerdem and Sukanya Podder contend that radicalization "can
become the only route to survival, offering protection from torture, abuse, and politically instigated
killing." Furthermore, individuals that do not join radical groups may be subjected to an indefinite
"insufferable social burden that included demeaning names and labels".

[h]Unfreezing

Loss of social connection can open an individual to new ideas and a new identity that may include
political radicalization. Isolated from friends, family, or other basic needs, individuals may begin to
associate with unlike parties, to include political, religious, or cultural radicals. This is especially noted in
prison radicalization, where individuals bind together over racial, religious, and gang identity to a greater
degree than in the outside world and often bring their newfound radical identity beyond prison to connect
with radical organizations in the populace at large.

[h]Group-level factors

Insofar as a group is a dynamic system with a common goal or set of values it is possible that the group's
mindset as a whole can affect individuals such that those individuals become more radical.

Polarization

Discussion, interaction, and experience within a radical group can result in an aggregate increase in
commitment to the cause, and in some cases can contribute to the formation of divergent conceptions of
the group's purpose and preferred tactics. Within a radical group, internal dynamics can contribute to the
formation of different factions as a result of internal disillusionment (or, conversely, ambitions) with the
group's activities as a whole, especially when it comes to a choice between violent terrorism and
nonviolent activism. The Weather Underground's split with Students for a Democratic Society is one of
many examples. The dynamics of group polarization imply that members of this larger group must either
commit to one faction and demonstrate their loyalty through further radicalization, or leave the group
entirely.

[h]Isolation

Isolation reinforces the influence of radical thinking by allowing serious and or persuasive members of
the group to disproportionately define the body's agenda. When an individual only has access to one in-
group social environment, that group gains a totalizing influence over the individual—disapproval would
be tantamount to social death, personal isolation, and often a lack of access to the basic services that
mutual aid communities fulfill. As an isolated minority, Islamic groups in the West are especially
vulnerable to this form of radicalization. Being cut off from society at large through language barriers,
cultural difference, and occasionally discriminatory treatment, Muslim communities become more
vulnerable to additional pathways of radicalization.

One such additional pathway of radicalization of individuals that feel isolated is the Internet. Utilizing
data compiled by the Internet World Stats, Robin Thompson contends that the rate of Middle East and
North African Internet usage is "above average" in comparison to other countries, yet in countries where
Internet availability is more widespread, individuals are "more likely to be recruited and radicalized via
the Internet." Hence, the Internet, specifically social media sites such as extremists' chat rooms and blogs,
"lures its users with a promise of friendship, acceptance, or a sense of purpose."
[h]Competition

Groups can become radicalized vis-a-vis other groups as they compete for legitimacy and prestige with
the general populace. This pathway emphasizes increased radicalization in an effort to outdo other groups,
whether that increase is in violence, time spent in religious ritual, economic and physical hardship
endured, or all four. Religious movements and the terrorist elements that form in their name display this
characteristic. While in some cases there may be doctrinal or ethnic differences that motivate this kind of
competition, its greatest outward sign is an increased demand by the group for commitment to radical
actions.

[h]Mass radicalization

Figure: Chairman Mao Zedong writing On Protracted War in 1938.

[h]Jiujitsu politics

Also called "the logic of political violence", Jiujitsu politics is a form of asymmetrical political warfare in
which radical groups act to provoke governments to crack down on the populace at large and produce
domestic blowback that legitimates further violent action. The primary purpose of a radical group using
this tactic is not to destroy the enemy outright, but to make the enemy strike at political and ideological
moderates, such that the existing political order loses its claim on legitimacy while the radical group gains
legitimacy. By destroying moderates, radical groups encourage a bifurcated society and use state's
reactions to violence as a justification for further violence. Al-Qaeda's strategy of luring the West,
specifically the United States, into ground wars in Islamic states that polarize the Ummah against the
West while avoiding engagements that would allow the American military to draw on its technical
superiority is an example of jiujitsu politics. David Kilcullen, Counterinsurgency advisor to David
Petraeus during the Iraq Surge, has called this the "accidental guerrilla syndrome".

This tactic is also pillar of Maoist insurgency and serves both the purposes of tactical and ideological
advantage.

[h]Hatred

In protracted conflicts the enemy is increasingly seen as less human, such that their common humanity
does not readily trigger natural inhibitions against violence. This involves "essentializing" both the self
and enemies as respectively good and evil entities. The Islamist use of Takfirism, or (apostasy), to justify
the murder of non-radical Muslims and nonbelievers (kafir: "pagans") is an example of this. Hannah
Arendt, in The Origins of Totalitarianism outlines a similar dynamic that contributed to the ideologies of
pan-slavism, Nazism, and antisemitism, where an in-group constructs an exalted self identity for political
purposes and mobilizes against out-groups in order to solidify that identity. This dynamic of hatred is not
unique to rightist groups. The Weathermen and Red Army Faction often characterized police officers and
government officials as "pigs" worthy of death and subhuman treatment.
[h]Martyrdom

Martyrdom implies that the person in question died for a cause or is willing to die for a cause. The
symbolic impact of martyrdom varies across cultures, but within the field of radicalization the act or
pursuit of martyrdom denotes the absolute value of a radical's way of life.

[h]Barrett

Robert Barrett is one of the leading researchers in field research with Nigerian terrorist groups. Barrett
contributes a unique perspective to this type of research because his studies are conducted with current,
not former, members of insurgent groups. Barrett's 2008 field research study revealed unique typologies
and motivations for radicalization as reported by insurgent groups. For instance, individuals that were
radicalized expressed sentiments of volunteerism, yet extremist recruiters conveyed that their objective
was to make "coercion feel like volunteerism." Barrett asserted that the motivations to become radicalized
can be characterized as: ideologue, combatant, criminals, pragmatist, soldier, and follower.

[h]Ideologues

Ideologues uphold a belief that ethnic supremacy is necessary and violence was the means to achieve this
truth. Ideologues maintain a "readiness to die for the ethnic group if necessary; survival and preservation
of the group or community is more important than survival or preservation of oneself".

[h]Combatants

Combatants' express concerns that their basic survival depends on joining extremist groups. Hence,
combatants are not motivated by ideologies and their primary objective is self-preservation.

[h]Criminals

Criminals are predominantly motivated by their "freedom to carry out activities that would otherwise be
deemed illegal". As such, criminals thrive on instant self-gratification of engaging in violent acts against
their enemies. Criminals thrive on conflict and in a sense believe their actions are heroic.

Pragmatists

Pragmatists are interested in the benefits of economic and social status mobility. Their goals are in
"preserving the structures and environment conducive to either continued success or to newfound
success" in wealth, land ownership, and/or mining rights.

[h]Soldiers

Soldiers believe "injustice and insecurity" are mitigating factors for radicalization. Prominent feelings that
they have a duty to fight against injustices. Soldiers are motivated by a sense that they can instrumentally
affect positive change.

Followers desire a sense of group dependence and attachment to overcome feelings of being an outsider.
They are overwhelmingly concerned with social perception. "Ensuring one's acceptance and preserving or
enhancing one's social status within the community was the most important factor promoting
membership".
[h]Poverty

The association between radicalization and poverty is a myth. Many terrorists come from middle-class
backgrounds and have university-level educations, particularly in the technical sciences and engineering.
There is no statistical association between poverty and militant radicalization. As outlined above, poverty
and disadvantage may incentivize joining a mutual aid organization with radical tendencies, but this does
not mean that poverty proper is responsible for radicalization.

[h]Mental illness

Though personal psychology does play a significant part in radicalization, mental illness is not a root
cause of terrorism specifically or ideological radicalization broadly. Even in the case of suicide terrorism,
psychological pathologies, such as depression and schizophrenia are largely absent.

[mh] Alternatives to Targeted Killing

As targeted killing continues to provoke ethical and legal controversies, exploring alternatives is essential
for policymakers and military planners seeking effective, lawful, and ethical means of addressing security
threats. This will examine a range of alternatives to targeted killing, considering their efficacy, legality,
and broader implications for security and human rights.

Diplomatic Engagement and Conflict Resolution: Diplomatic engagement and conflict resolution offer
non-violent alternatives to targeted killing, focusing on dialogue, negotiation, and mediation to address
underlying grievances and resolve conflicts peacefully. Diplomatic efforts can involve multilateral
negotiations, peace talks, and confidence-building measures aimed at de-escalating tensions and fostering
reconciliation between conflicting parties. By addressing the root causes of conflict and addressing
grievances, diplomatic engagement can help prevent violence and promote long-term stability and peace.

Law Enforcement and Intelligence Cooperation: Law enforcement and intelligence cooperation involve
collaborative efforts between domestic and international agencies to disrupt terrorist networks, dismantle
criminal organizations, and prevent attacks through legal and investigative means. This approach
emphasizes intelligence sharing, surveillance, and targeted arrests of suspected terrorists and criminals,
while adhering to due process and the rule of law. By leveraging law enforcement capabilities and
international cooperation, authorities can mitigate security threats while minimizing the risk of civilian
harm and respecting human rights.

Counterterrorism Capacity Building: Counterterrorism capacity building focuses on strengthening the

capacity of partner nations to combat terrorism through training, equipping, and institutional
development. This approach aims to enhance the capabilities of local security forces and law enforcement
agencies to detect, deter, and respond to terrorist threats effectively. By investing in capacity building
initiatives, such as training programs, intelligence sharing agreements, and border security enhancements,
the international community can help build sustainable counterterrorism capabilities while reducing the
reliance on kinetic military operations.

Community Engagement and Countering Violent Extremism (CVE): Community engagement and CVE
initiatives seek to address the root causes of violent extremism by addressing socio-economic grievances,
promoting social inclusion, and empowering local communities to reject extremist ideologies and
recruitment efforts. These initiatives involve grassroots outreach, education programs, and partnerships
with civil society organizations to build resilience against radicalization and promote alternative
narratives to violent extremism. By fostering community cohesion and addressing underlying
vulnerabilities, CVE efforts can prevent individuals from joining terrorist groups and reduce the appeal of
violent extremism.
Political and Diplomatic Solutions to Conflict: Political and diplomatic solutions to conflict aim to
resolve underlying political grievances and address the root causes of violence through negotiated
settlements, peace agreements, and political reforms. This approach involves addressing issues such as
governance, human rights, and socio-economic inequality through inclusive political processes and
dialogue between conflicting parties. By addressing the structural drivers of conflict and addressing
grievances through peaceful means, political and diplomatic solutions can help prevent violence and
promote reconciliation in conflict-affected regions.

Exploring alternatives to targeted killing requires a multifaceted approach that addresses the underlying
drivers of conflict and insecurity while upholding human rights and international law. Diplomatic
engagement, law enforcement cooperation, counterterrorism capacity building, community engagement,
and political solutions to conflict offer viable alternatives that prioritize dialogue, prevention, and
peacebuilding over the use of lethal force. By adopting a comprehensive and holistic approach to security,
policymakers can effectively address security threats while promoting human rights, justice, and long-
term stability.

Preface

In an age where technological advancements continually reshape the landscape of warfare, the ethical
implications of these innovations become increasingly complex and pressing. This preface introduces the
reader to the critical exploration of drones and the ethics of targeted killing, delving into the moral
dilemmas and societal implications inherent in the use of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) for lethal
purposes. The emergence of drones as a prominent tool in modern military arsenals has transformed the
nature of conflict, offering unprecedented capabilities in surveillance, reconnaissance, and precision
strikes. However, the ethical dimensions of drone warfare extend far beyond tactical considerations,
raising profound questions about the morality of targeted killings conducted from afar. This book seeks to
navigate these ethical complexities, examining the principles, dilemmas, and controversies surrounding
the use of drones for targeted killing. It explores the moral justifications invoked to justify lethal drone
operations, such as the imperative of national security, the principles of just war theory, and the pursuit of
counterterrorism objectives. At the same time, it critically interrogates the legal, moral, and human rights
implications of drone strikes, particularly concerning civilian casualties, collateral damage, and the
erosion of due process. Central to this exploration is the recognition of the human cost of drone warfare,
both on the ground and in the psychological toll it exacts on operators tasked with executing lethal
missions from remote locations. The preface acknowledges the moral agency and responsibility of drone
operators, grappling with the psychological, ethical, and existential challenges they face in navigating the
moral ambiguities of remote warfare. Moreover, this book invites readers to reflect on broader questions
concerning the future of warfare, the ethical limits of technological innovation, and the implications of
drone proliferation for global security and stability. By engaging with these profound ethical questions,
we aim to foster informed dialogue, critical reflection, and ethical awareness in navigating the complex
intersection of drones and the ethics of targeted killing. In presenting this volume, we invite readers on a
journey of ethical inquiry and moral reflection, challenging assumptions, confronting dilemmas, and
grappling with the profound ethical implications of drone warfare. As we embark on this exploration
together, let us endeavor to navigate the complexities of drone technology with wisdom, empathy, and a
commitment to upholding the fundamental values of human dignity, justice, and peace.

About the book

In the contemporary era of warfare, drones have emerged as a defining element, significantly altering the
ethical landscape of military engagements. This preface introduces readers to the intricate ethical
dilemmas associated with employing drones for targeted killings. While drones offer unparalleled
capabilities in surveillance and precise strikes, their utilization prompts profound moral inquiries
regarding the legitimacy, legality, and repercussions of remote lethal operations. This book endeavors to
navigate these moral quandaries by scrutinizing the ethical justifications, legal frameworks, and human
rights ramifications of drone warfare. It acknowledges the ethical responsibility of drone operators and
the emotional strain of executing lethal missions from a distance. Moreover, it prompts readers to
contemplate the broader implications of drone proliferation for global security and stability. As readers
embark on this voyage of ethical exploration, it encourages engagement marked by empathy,
discernment, and a commitment to upholding core principles of human dignity, justice, and peace.
Through thoughtful dialogue and critical contemplation, we aim to confront the ethical complexities
posed by drones and advocate for a more equitable and compassionate approach to modern warfare.