PROVINCE OF CAMARINES SUR, represented by GOVERNOR LUIS RAYMUND F.

VILLAFUERTE,
JR., petitioner, vs. BODEGA GLASSWARE, represented by its owner JOSEPH D. CABRAL, respondent.

The Facts
Petitioner is the registered owner of a parcel of land in Peñafrancia, Naga City. On September
28, 1966, through then Provincial Governor Apolonio G. Maleniza, petitioner donated around 600
square meters of this parcel of land to the Camarines Sur Teachers' Association, Inc. (CASTEA) through
a Deed of Donation Inter Vivos (Deed of Donation). 7 The Deed of Donation included an automatic
revocation clause which states:
That the condition of this donation is that the DONEE shall use the above-
described portion of land subject of the present donation for no other purpose
except the construction of its building to be owned and to be constructed by the
above-named DONEE to house its offices to be used by the said Camarines Sur
Teachers' Association, Inc., in connection with its functions under its charter and by-
laws and the Naga City Teachers' Association as well as the Camarines Sur High School
Alumni Association, PROVIDED FURTHERMORE, that the DONEE shall not sell,
mortgage or incumber the property herein donated including any and all
improvements thereon in favor of any party and provided, lastly, that the
construction of the building or buildings referred to above shall be commenced
within a period of one (1) year from and after the execution of this donation,
otherwise, this donation shall be deemed automatically revoked and voided and
of no further force and effect. 8
CASTEA accepted the donation in accordance with the formalities of law and complied
with the conditions stated in the deed. However, on August 15, 1995, CASTEA entered into a
Contract of Lease with Bodega over the donated property. 9 Under the Contract of Lease, CASTEA
leased the property to Bodega for a period of 20 years commencing on September 1, 1995 and
ending on September 15, 2015. Bodega took actual possession of the property on September 1,
1995. 10
Sometime in July 2005, the Office of the Provincial Legal Officer of the Province of Camarines
Sur wrote Bodega regarding the building it built on the property. The Provincial Legal Officer
requested Bodega to show proof of ownership or any other legal document as legal basis for his
possession. Bodega failed to present any proof. Nevertheless, petitioner left Bodega
undisturbed and merely tolerated its possession of the property. 11
On November 11, 2007, petitioner sent a letter to Bodega, petitioner stated that Bodega's
occupation of the property was by mere tolerance of the petitioner. 13 As it now intended to use the
property for its developmental projects, petitioner demanded that Bodega vacate the property
and surrender its peaceful possession. Bodega refused to comply with the demand. 14 CAIHTE
Petitioner, through its then Provincial Governor Luis Raymund F. Villafuerte, Jr., revoked its
donation through a Deed of Revocation of Donation 15 (Deed of Revocation) dated October 14, 2007.
It asserted that CASTEA violated the conditions in the Deed of Donation when it leased the property to
Bodega. Thus, invoking the automatic revocation clause in the Deed of Donation, petitioner revoked,
annulled and declared void the Deed of Donation. 16 It appears from the record that CASTEA never
challenged this revocation.
 On March 13, 2008, petitioner filed an action for unlawful detainer against Bodega
before the MTC Naga City.
In a Decision 18 dated December 11, 2008, the MTC Naga City ruled in favor of the
petitioner.
Bodega appealed this Decision to the RTC Naga City which reversed it in a Decision
In its assailed Decision, the CA affirmed the ruling of the RTC Naga City that the petitioner
cannot demand that Bodega vacate the property. The CA explained that Bodega's possession of
the property is based on its Contract of Lease with CASTEA. According to the CA, while petitioner
alleges that CASTEA violated the conditions of the donation and thus, the automatic revocation clause
applies, it should have first filed an action for reconveyance of the property against CASTEA.
The CA also found that petitioner's action has already prescribed. According to it, Article
1144 (1) of the Civil Code applies in this case. Thus, petitioner had 10 years to file an action for
reconveyance from the time the Deed of Donation was violated. As the Contract of Lease was
entered into on September 1, 1995, petitioner, thus, had 10 years from this date to file the
action. Unfortunately, the action for unlawful detainer was filed more than 12 years later.
The Issues
The core issue in this case is who between petitioner and Bodega has the right to the actual
physical possession of the property.
The Ruling of the Court
Rule 70 of the Rules of Court covers the ejectment cases of forcible entry and unlawful
detainer. These actions are summary proceedings and are devised to provide for a particular remedy
for a very specific issue. Actions for unlawful detainer and forcible entry involve only the question of
actual possession. 28 In these actions, courts are asked to ascertain which between the parties has
the right to the possession de facto or physical possession of the property in question. 29 Its purpose is
to restore the aggrieved party to possession if he or she successfully establishes his or her right to
possess the property. The essence of an ejectment suit is for the rightful possessor to lawfully recover
the property through lawful means instead of unlawfully wresting possession of the property from its
current occupant. 30 Thus, an action for unlawful detainer or forcible entry is a summary proceeding
and is an expeditious means to recover possession. If the parties raise the issue of ownership, courts
may only pass upon that issue for the purpose of ascertaining who has the better right of
possession. 31 Any ruling involving ownership is not final and binding. It is merely provisional and
does not bar an action between the same parties regarding the title of the property. 32
An action for unlawful detainer must allege and establish the following key
jurisdictional facts:
(1) initially, possession of property by the defendant was by contract with or by tolerance
of the plaintiff;
(2) eventually, such possession became illegal upon notice by plaintiff to defendant of the
termination of the latter's right of possession;
(3) thereafter, the defendant remained in possession of the property and deprived the
plaintiff of the enjoyment thereof; and
(4) within one year from the last demand on defendant to vacate the property, the
plaintiff instituted the complaint for ejectment. 35
 In this case, petitioner alleged that as early as 2005, it had asked Bodega to present proof of its
legal basis for occupying the property. Bodega, however, failed to heed this demand. For several
years, petitioner merely tolerated Bodega's possession by allowing it to continue using its building
and conducting business on the property. Petitioner demanded that Bodega vacate the property in
November 2007. This presents a clear case of unlawful detainer based on mere tolerance.
Petitioner proceeds to argue that its right of possession is based on its ownership. This, in
turn, is hinged on its position that the property reverted back to the petitioner when the donation was
revoked as provided in the automatic revocation clause in the Deed of Donation.
In this case, the Deed of Donation contains a clear automatic revocation clause.
The provision identifies three conditions for the donation: (1) that the property shall be used
for "no other purpose except the construction of its building to be owned and to be constructed by
the above-named DONEE to house its offices to be used by the said Camarines Sur Teachers'
Association, Inc., in connection with its functions under its charter and by-laws and the Naga City
Teachers' Association as well as the Camarines Sur High School Alumni Association," (2) CASTEA shall
"not sell, mortgage or incumber the property herein donated including any and all improvements
thereon in favor of any party," and (3) "the construction of the building or buildings referred to above
shall be commenced within a period of one (1) year from and after the execution." The last clause of
this paragraph states that "otherwise, this donation shall be deemed automatically revoked x
x x." 50 We read the final clause of this provision as an automatic revocation clause which
pertains to all three conditions of the donation. When CASTEA leased the property to Bodega, it
breached the first and second conditions.
Thus, as petitioner validly considered the donation revoked and CASTEA never contested
it, the property donated effectively reverted back to it as owner. In demanding the return of
the property, petitioner sources its right of possession on its ownership. Under Article 428 of
the Civil Code, the owner has a right of action against the holder and possessor of the thing in order
to recover it.
This right of possession prevails over Bodega's claim which is anchored on its Contract of
Lease with CASTEA. CASTEA's act of leasing the property to Bodega, in breach of the conditions
stated in the Deed of Donation, is the very same act which caused the automatic revocation of
the donation. Thus, it had no right, either as an owner or as an authorized administrator of the
property to lease it to Bodega. While a lessor need not be the owner of the property leased, he or she
must, at the very least, have the authority to lease it out. 51 None exists in this case. Bodega finds no
basis for its continued possession of the property. TIADCc
As to the question of prescription, we rule that the petitioner's right to file this
ejectment suit against Bodega has not prescribed.
 HUBERT NUÑEZ, petitioner,vs.SLTEAS PHOENIX SOLUTIONS, INC.,through its
representative, CESAR SYLIANTENG, respondent.

The Facts
The subject matter of the instant suit is a 635.50 square meter parcel of land situated
at Calle Solana, Intramuros, Manila and registered in the name of respondent SLTEAS Phoenix
Solutions, Inc. Despite having acquired the same thru the 4 June 1999 Deed of Assignment executed
in its favor by the Spouses Ong Tiko and Emerenciana Sylianteng, 2 it appears that respondent was
constrained to leave the subject parcel idle and unguarded for some time due to important
business concerns. In October 2003, an ocular inspection conducted by respondent's
representatives revealed that the property was already occupied by petitioner Hubert Nuñez and 21
other individuals. 3 Initially faulting one Vivencia Fidel with unjustified refusal to heed its verbal
demands to vacate the subject parcel, respondent filed complaint for forcible entry before Branch
4 of the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) of Manila. 4
Additionally impleading petitioner and the rest of the occupants of the property, respondent
filed its 9 January 2004 amended complaint, alleging, among other matters, that thru its
representatives and predecessors-in-interest, it had continuously possessed the subject realty,
over which it exercised all attributes of ownership, including payment of real property taxes
and other sundry expenses; that without the benefit of any lease agreement or possessory
right, however, petitioners and his co-defendants have succeeded in occupying the property by
means of strategy and stealth; and, that according to reliable sources, the latter had been in
occupancy of the same parcel since 1999.
Specifically denying the material allegations of the foregoing amended complaint, petitioner
averred that the property occupied by him is owned by one Maria Ysabel Potenciano Padilla
Sylianteng, with whom he had concluded a subsisting lease agreement over the same, and that,
in addition to respondent's lack of cause of action against him, the MeTC had no jurisdiction
over the case for lack of prior demand to vacate and referral of the controversy to
the barangay authorities for a possible amicable settlement.
MeTC went on to render a Decision dated 23 November 2004, 12 resolving the complaint in
the following wise:
Wherefore, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the
plaintiff and against all the defendants and ordering the latter to:

1. vacate the subject premises located at Lot 11, Block 45, Solana St.,Intramuros,
Manila;

2. for each [defendant],to pay Php5,000.00 a month counted from October 2003
until defendants vacate the subject property;

3. to pay Php15,000.00 as and for attorney's fees; and

4. to pay the costs of suit. 13

On appeal, the foregoing decision was affirmed in toto by the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Manila in Civil Case No. 05-112490. 14 Dissatisfied with said Order, petitioner elevated the case to the
Court of Appeals by way of a petition for review filed pursuant to Section 1, Rule 42 of the 1997 Rules
of Civil Procedure. 15 Finding that the allegations in respondent's amended complaint sufficiently
made out a cause of action for forcible entry against petitioner, the Court of Appeals rendered the
herein assailed decision, dismissing said petition for review upon the following findings and
conclusions: HDATCc
Parenthetically, although the dispossession took place more than one year
from the illegal entry of petitioner and his co-defendants, knowledge of the same
was only acquired by petitioner in 2003 when the ocular inspection was made.
While ordinarily, the one-year prescriptive period should be reckoned from the date of
the actual entry on the land, the same however, does not hold true when entry was
made through stealth, in which case, the one year period is counted from the time
the plaintiff learned thereof.

The Issues
I

WHETHER OR NOT THE COURTS HAVE NO JURISDICTION TO TRY THE INSTANT CASE
CONSIDERING THAT THE ELEMENTS OF FORCIBLE ENTRY ARE NOT PRESENT AND
ADDITIONALLY THERE IS A QUESTION OF OWNERSHIP.

The Court's Ruling

The rule is no different in actions for forcible entry where the following requisites are essential
for the MeTC's acquisition of jurisdiction over the case, viz.:
(a) the plaintiffs must allege their prior physical possession of the property;
(b) they must assert that they were deprived of possession either by force, intimidation, threat,
strategy or stealth; and,
(c) the action must be filed within one (1) year from the time the owners or legal possessors
learned of their deprivation of the physical possession of the property. 28
As it is not essential that the complaint should expressly employ the language of the law, it is
considered a sufficient compliance of the requirement where the facts are set up showing that
dispossession took place under said conditions. 29 The one-year period within which to bring
an action for forcible entry is generally counted from the date of actual entry on the land,
except that when the entry is through stealth, the one-year period is counted from the time
the plaintiff learned thereof. 30
Even prescinding from the fact that the parties had admitted the MeTC's jurisdiction, 31 our
perusal of the record shows that respondent's 9 January 2004 amended complaint was able to
make out a cause of action for forcible entry against petitioner. As the registered owner of the
subject parcel, respondent distinctly alleged that, by its representatives and thru its predecessors-in-
interest, it had been in possession of the subject parcel and had exercised over the same all attributes
of ownership, including the payment of realty taxes and other expenses; that an ocular inspection
conducted in October 2003 revealed that petitioner and his co-defendants have succeeded in
occupying the property by means of stealth and strategy; and, that its subsequent demands to vacate
had been unheeded by said interlopers. 32 Considering that the test for determining the sufficiency
of the allegations in the complaint is whether, admitting the facts alleged, the court can render a valid
judgment in accordance with the prayer of the plaintiff, 33 we find that the Court of Appeals correctly
ruled that the MeTC had jurisdiction over the case.
Then as now, petitioner argues that, aside from the admission in the complaint that the
subject parcel was left idle and unguarded, respondent's claim of prior possession is clearly negated
by the fact that he had been in occupancy thereof since 1999. While prior physical possession is,
admittedly, an indispensable requirement in forcible entry cases, the dearth of merit in petitioner's
position is, however, evident from the principle that possession can be acquired not only by material
occupation, but also by the fact that a thing is subject to the action of one's will or by the proper acts
and legal formalities established for acquiring such right. 34 Because possession can also be acquired
by juridical acts to which the law gives the force of acts of possession, e.g., donations, succession,
execution and registration of public instruments, inscription of possessory information titles and the
like, it has been held that one need not have actual or physical occupation of every square inch of the
property at all times to be considered in possession. 35 ATICcS
In this case, the subject parcel was acquired by respondent by virtue of the 4 June 1999
Deed of Assignment executed in its favor by the Spouses Ong Tiko and Emerenciana
Sylianteng. Although it did not immediately put the same to active use, respondent appears to have
additionally caused the property to be registered in its name as of 27 February 2002 36 and to have
paid the real property taxes due thereon 37 alongside the sundry expenses incidental thereto. Viewed
in the light of the foregoing juridical acts, it consequently did not matter that, by the time respondent
conducted its ocular inspection in October 2003, petitioner had already been occupying the land since
1999. Ordinarily reckoned from the date of actual entry on the land, the one year period is counted
from the time the plaintiff acquired knowledge of the dispossession when, as here, the same had
been effected by means of stealth. 38
 LOURDES DELA CRUZ, petitioner,vs.HON. COURT OF APPEALS and MELBA TAN
TE, respondents.

The Facts
The Reyes family, represented by Mr. Lino Reyes, owned the lot located at No. 1332
Lacson Street (formerly Gov. Forbes Street),Sampaloc, Manila. Petitioner Lourdes Dela Cruz was
one of their lessees, and she religiously paid rent over a portion of the lot for well over 40 years.
Sometime in 1989, a fire struck the premises and destroyed, among others, petitioner's dwelling.
After the fire, petitioner and some tenants returned to the said lot and rebuilt their respective houses;
simultaneously, the Reyes family made several verbal demands on the remaining lessees,
including petitioner, to vacate the lot but the latter did not comply. On February 21, 1994,
petitioner was served a written demand to vacate said lot but refused to leave. Despite the setback,
the Reyes family did not initiate court proceedings against any of the lessees.
On November 26, 1996, the disputed lot was sold by the Reyeses to respondent Melba
Tan Te by virtue of the November 26, 1996 Deed of Absolute Sale. Respondent bought the lot in
question for residential purposes. Despite the sale, petitioner Dela Cruz did not give up the
lot. HSIaAT
On January 14, 1997, petitioner was sent a written demand to relinquish the premises
which she ignored, prompting respondent Tan Te to initiate conciliation proceedings at the
barangay level. While respondent attempted to settle the dispute by offering financial assistance,
petitioner countered by asking PhP 500,000.00 for her house. Respondent rejected the counter offer
which she considered unconscionable. As a result, a certificate to file action was issued to Tan Te.
On September 8, 1997, respondent Tan Te filed an ejectment complaint with damages before
the Manila MeTC. The complaint averred that: (1) the previous owners, the Reyeses were in
possession and control of the contested lot; (2) on November 26, 1996, the lot was sold to Tan Te; (3)
prior to the sale, Dela Cruz forcibly entered the property with strategy and/or stealth; (4) the
petitioner unlawfully deprived the respondent of physical possession of the property and continues
to do so; and, (5) the respondent sent several written demands to petitioner to vacate the premises
but refused to do so.
On October 24, 1997, petitioner filed her answer and alleged that: (1) the MeTC had no
jurisdiction over the case because it falls within the jurisdiction of the RTC as more than one
year had elapsed from petitioner's forcible entry; (2) she was a rent-paying tenant protected
by PD 20; 2 (3) her lease constituted a legal encumbrance upon the property; and (4) the lot was
subject of expropriation.
The Ruling of the Manila MeTC
On April 3, 1998, the MeTC decided as follows:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiff
The Ruling of the Regional Trial Court
the RTC rendered its judgment setting aside the April 3, 1998 Decision of the Manila
MeTC and dismissed respondent Tan Te's Complaint on the ground that it was the RTC and not
the MeTC which had jurisdiction over the subject matter of the case. The RTC believed that since
Tan Te's predecessor-in-interest learned of petitioner's intrusion into the lot as early as
February 21, 1994, the ejectment suit should have been filed within the one-year prescriptive
period which expired on February 21, 1995. Since the Reyes did not file the ejectment suit and
respondent Tan Te filed the action only on September 8, 1997, then the suit had become an accion
publiciana cognizable by the RTC.
The Ruling of the Court of Appeals
This time, the CA rendered a Decision in favor of respondent Tan Te reversing the Manila RTC
September 1, 1998 Decision and reinstated the Manila MeTC April 3, 1998 Decision.
The Issues
WHETHER THE METC OR THE RTC HS JURISDICTION OVER THE CASE
The Court's Ruling
On the Issue of Jurisdiction
Section 33 of Chapter III — on Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal
Circuit Trial Courts of B.P. No. 129 6 provides:
original jurisdiction over ejectment proceedings (accion interdictal) is lodged with the first level
courts.
A person who wants to recover physical possession of his real property will prefer an
ejectment suit because it is governed by the Rule on Summary Procedure which allows immediate
execution of the judgment under Section 19, Rule 70 unless the defendant perfects an appeal in the
RTC and complies with the requirements to stay execution; all of which are nevertheless beneficial to
the interests of the lot owner or the holder of the right of possession.
On the other hand, Section 19, of Chapter II of B.P. No. 129 on Regional Trial Courts provides:
Section 19. Jurisdiction in civil cases.— Regional Trial Courts shall exercise
exclusive original jurisdiction:
xxx xxx xxx
(2) In all civil actions which involve the title to, or possession of, real property, or
any interest therein, except actions for forcible entry into and unlawful detainer of
lands or buildings, original jurisdiction over which is conferred upon Metropolitan Trial
Courts, Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts.
Two (2) kinds of action to recover possession of real property which fall under the jurisdiction
of the RTC are: (1) the plenary action for the recovery of the real right of possession (accion publiciana)
when the dispossession has lasted for more than one year or when the action was filed more than
one (1) year from date of the last demand received by the lessee or defendant; and (2) an action for
the recovery of ownership (accion reivindicatoria) which includes the recovery of possession. TCaADS
These actions are governed by the regular rules of procedure and adjudication takes a longer
period than the summary ejectment suit.
To determine whether a complaint for recovery of possession falls under the jurisdiction of the
MeTC (first level court) or the RTC (second level court), we are compelled to go over the allegations of
the complaint. The general rule is that what determines the nature of the action and the court that
has jurisdiction over the case are the allegations in the complaint. These cannot be made to depend
upon the defenses set up in the answer or pleadings filed by the defendant. 8
This general rule however admits exceptions. In Ignacio v. CFI of Bulacan, it was held "that while
the allegations in the complaint make out a case for forcible entry, where tenancy is averred by way of
defense and is proved to be the real issue, the case should be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction as the
case should properly be filed with the then Court of Agrarian Relations." 9
Undeniably, the aforequoted allegations of the complaint are vague and iffy in revealing the
nature of the action for ejectment.
The allegations in the complaint show that prior to the sale by Lino Reyes, representing
the estate of his wife Emerlinda Reyes, he was in possession and control of the subject lot but
were deprived of said possession when petitioner, by means of stealth and strategy, entered
and occupied the same lot. These circumstances imply that he had prior physical possession of the
subject lot and can make up a forcible entry complaint. ECcTaH
On the other hand, the allegation that petitioner Dela Cruz was served several demands to
leave the premises but refused to do so would seem to indicate an action for unlawful detainer since
a written demand is not necessary in an action for forcible entry. It is a fact that the MeTC complaint
was filed on September 8, 1997 within one (1) year from the date of the last written demand upon
petitioner Dela Cruz on January 14, 1997.
As previously discussed, the settled rule is jurisdiction is based on the allegations in the
initiatory pleading and the defenses in the answer are deemed irrelevant and immaterial in its
determination. However, we relax the rule and consider the complaint at bar as an exception in view
of the special and unique circumstances present. First, as inIgnacio v. CFI of Bulacan, 13 the defense of
lack of jurisdiction was raised in the answer wherein there was an admission that petitioner Dela Cruz
was a lessee of the former owners of the lot, the Reyeses, prior to the sale to respondent Tan Te. The
fact that petitioner was a tenant of the predecessors-in-interest of respondent Tan Te is
material to the determination of jurisdiction. Since this is a judicial admission against the interest
of petitioner, such admission can be considered in determining jurisdiction. Second, the ejectment
suit was filed with the Manila MeTC on September 8, 1997 or more than nine (9) years ago. To dismiss
the complaint would be a serious blow to the effective dispensation of justice as the parties will start
anew and incur additional legal expenses after having litigated for a long time. Equitable justice
dictates that allegations in the answer should be considered to aid in arriving at the real nature of the
action. Lastly, Section 6, Rule 1 of the Rules of Court clearly empowers the Court to construe Rule 70
and other pertinent procedural issuances "in a liberal manner to promote just, speedy, and
inexpensive disposition of every action and proceeding."
Based on the complaint and the answer, it is apparent that the Tan Te ejectment
complaint is after all a complaint for unlawful detainer. It was admitted that petitioner Dela Cruz
was a lessee of the Reyeses for around four (4) decades. Thus, initially petitioner as lessee is the legal
possessor of the subject lot by virtue of a contract of lease. When fire destroyed her house, the
Reyeses considered the lease terminated; but petitioner Dela Cruz persisted in returning to the lot
and occupied it by strategy and stealth without the consent of the owners. The Reyeses
however tolerated the continued occupancy of the lot by petitioner. Thus, when the lot was
sold to respondent Tan Te, the rights of the Reyeses, with respect to the lot, were transferred
to their subrogee, respondent Tan Te, who for a time also tolerated the stay of petitioner until
she decided to eject the latter by sending several demands, the last being the January
14, 1997 letter of demand. Since the action was filed with the MeTC on September 8, 1997, the
action was instituted well within the one (1) year period reckoned from January 14, 1997. Hence, the
nature of the complaint is one of unlawful detainer and the Manila MeTC had jurisdiction over the
complaint.
 Thus, an ejectment complaint based on possession by tolerance of the owner, like the
Tan Te complaint, is a specie of unlawful detainer cases.
From the foregoing jurisprudence, it is unequivocal that petitioner's possession after she
intruded into the lot after the fire — was by tolerance or leniency of the Reyeses and hence, the
action is properly an unlawful detainer case falling under the jurisdiction of the Manila MeTC.
The issue of jurisdiction settled, we now scrutinize the main issue.
Petitioner fully knows that her stay in the subject lot is at the leniency and
magnanimity of Mr. Lino Reyes and later of respondent Tan Te; and her acquiescence to such
use of the lot carries with it an implicit and assumed commitment that she would leave the
premises the moment it is needed by the owner. When respondent Tan Te made a last, written
demand on January 14, 1997 and petitioner breached her promise to leave upon demand, she lost
her right to the physical possession of the lot.
Petitioner raises the ancillary issue OF EXPRPRIATION. Even granting for the sake of argument
that we entertain the issue, we rule that the intended expropriation of respondent's lot (TCT No.
233273) by the city government of Manila will not affect the resolution of this petition. For one thing,
the issue can be raised by petitioner in the appropriate legal proceeding. Secondly, the intended
expropriation might not even be implemented since it is clear from the ordinance that the City Mayor
will still locate available funds for project, meaning the said expense is not a regular item in the
budget.
 CORAZON D. SARMIENTA, JOSE DERAMA, CATES RAMA, JOSIE MIWA, TOTO NOLASCO,
JESUS OLIQUINO, NORBERTO LOPEZ, RUBEN ESPOSO, BERNARDO FLORESCA,
MARINA DIMATALO, ROBLE DIMANDAKO, RICARDO PEÑA, EDUARDO ESPINO,
ANTONIO GALLEGOS, VICTOR SANDOVAL, FELICITAS ABRANTES, MERCY CRUZ,
ROSENDO ORGANO, RICKY BARENO, ANITA TAKSAGON, JOSIE RAMA and PABLO
DIMANDAKO, petitioners, vs. MANALITE HOMEOWNERS ASSOCIATION, INC.
(MAHA), respondent.

FACTS:
The case stemmed from a complaint 6 for "Forcible Entry/Unlawful Detainer" filed by respondent
Manalite Homeowners Association, Inc. (MAHA) against AMARA W. CIGELSALO Association (AMARA)
and its members. The complaint was raffled to the MTCC of Antipolo City
MAHA alleged that it is the registered owner of a certain parcel of land with an area of
9,936 square meters situated in Sitio Manalite, Phase I, Barangay Sta. Cruz, Antipolo City. 8 Through
force, intimidation, threat, strategy and stealth, petitioners entered the premises and
constructed their temporary houses and an office building. 9 Petitioners likewise even filed a civil
case to annul MAHA's title on September 2, 1992, but said case was dismissed by the trial court. After
said dismissal, MAHA demanded that petitioners vacate the land. Petitioners pleaded that
they be given one year within which to look for a place to transfer, to which request MAHA
acceded. The said one-year period, however, was repeatedly extended due to the benevolence of
MAHA's members. Later on, petitioners came up with a proposal that they become members of
MAHA so they can be qualified to acquire portions of the property by sale pursuant to the Community
Mortgage Program (CMP). 10 MAHA again agreed and tolerated petitioners' possession, giving
them until December 1999 to comply with the requirements to avail of the CMP benefits.
Petitioners nonetheless failed to comply with said requirements. Thus, on August 9, 2000, MAHA
sent formal demand letters to petitioners to vacate the property. Upon the latter's refusal to heed the
demand, MAHA filed the complaint for "Forcible Entry/Unlawful Detainer."
In their Answer with Counterclaims, 11 petitioners denied the said allegations and averred
that they are the owners of the subject lot, having been in actual physical possession thereof
for more than thirty (30) years before MAHA intruded into the land. They claimed that as the
years went by, they established the AMARA and bought the subject property from Julian
Tallano. The property later became known as the Tallano Estate and registered under TCT No. 498.
They likewise argued that the allegations in the complaint do not confer jurisdiction upon the court
acting as an ejectment court, and that the complaint was irregular and defective because its
caption states that it was for "Forcible Entry/Unlawful Detainer." MAHA, additionally, had no
legal capacity to sue and was guilty of forum shopping. Its officers were likewise
fictitious. CacHES
On May 19, 2005, the MTCC of Antipolo City rendered a decision dismissing the case for lack of
cause of action. The MTCC held that the complaint filed was one of forcible entry, but MAHA failed to
establish the jurisdictional requirement of prior physical possession in its complaint. 12 Also, the trial
court held that MAHA's failure to initiate immediate legal action after petitioners unlawfully
entered its property and its subsequent declaration of benevolence upon the petitioners
cannot be construed as tolerance in accordance with law as to justify the treatment of the case as
one for unlawful detainer. 13
 MAHA appealed the decision to the RTC. The RTC rendered a Decision dated January 10,
2006, reversing the decision of the MTCC. The RTC held that the lower court erred in dismissing
the case by considering the complaint as one of forcible entry which required prior physical
possession. The RTC found that MAHA was able to allege and prove by preponderance of evidence
that petitioners' occupation of the property was by mere "tolerance." MAHA tolerated the occupation
until all those who wanted to acquire MAHA's rights of ownership could comply with
membership obligations and dues. 14 Petitioners, however, failed to comply with said
obligations within the given period; thus, their occupation became illegal after MAHA demanded
that they vacate the property.
Aggrieved, petitioners filed a petition for review with the CA assailing the decision of the RTC.
In a Decision dated October 19, 2007, the CA affirmed the decision of the RTC. The CA held that
while the complaint in the beginning alleged facts which make out a case for forcible entry,
the rest of the averments therein show that the cause of action was actually for unlawful
detainer. The CA noted that the complaint alleged supervening events that would show that what
was initially forcible entry was later tolerated by MAHA thereby converting its cause of action into one
for unlawful detainer. Accordingly, the complaint was filed within the required one-year period
counted from the date of last demand. The CA further held that the fact that the complaint was
captioned as both for forcible entry and unlawful detainer does not render it defective as the
nature of the complaint is determined by the allegations of the complaint.
ISSUES:
(1) whether or not the allegations in the complaint are sufficient to make up a case of forcible
entry or unlawful detainer; and
(2) whether or not the CA was correct in affirming the RTC's decision finding a case of unlawful
detainer.
We deny the petition.
Well settled is the rule that what determines the nature of the action as well as the
court which has jurisdiction over the case are the allegations in the complaint. 19 In ejectment
cases, the complaint should embody such statement of facts as to bring the party clearly
within the class of cases under Section 1, Rule 70 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as
amended.
In the present case, a thorough perusal of the complaint would reveal that the
allegations clearly constitute a case of unlawful detainer:
A complaint sufficiently alleges a cause of action for unlawful detainer if it recites the following:
(1) initially, possession of property by the defendant was by contract with or by tolerance of the
plaintiff; (2) eventually, such possession became illegal upon notice by plaintiff to defendant of the
termination of the latter's right of possession; (3) thereafter, the defendant remained in possession of
the property and deprived the plaintiff of the enjoyment thereof; and (4) within one year from the last
demand on defendant to vacate the property, the plaintiff instituted the complaint for ejectment. 22
Likewise, the evidence proves that after MAHA acquired the property, MAHA tolerated
petitioners' stay and gave them the option to acquire portions of the property by becoming
members of MAHA. Petitioners' continued stay on the premises was subject to the condition that
they shall comply with the requirements of the CMP. Thus, when they failed to fulfill their
obligations, MAHA had the right to demand for them to vacate the property as their right of
possession had already expired or had been terminated. The moment MAHA required petitioners
 to leave, petitioners became deforciants illegally occupying the land. 23 Well settled is the rule that a
person who occupies the land of another at the latter's tolerance or permission, without any contract
between them, is necessarily bound by an implied promise that he will vacate upon demand, failing
which, a summary action for ejectment is the proper remedy against him. 24 Thus, the RTC and the
CA correctly ruled in favor of MAHA.
As to petitioners' argument that MAHA's title is void for having been secured fraudulently, we
find that such issue was improperly raised. In an unlawful detainer case, the sole issue for
resolution is physical or material possession of the property involved, independent of any
claim of ownership by any of the parties. 25 Since the only issue involved is the physical or material
possession of the premises, that is possession de facto and not possession de jure, the question of
ownership must be threshed out in a separate action.

JUANITA ERMITAÑO, represented by her Attorney-in-Fact, ISABELO

ERMITAÑO, petitioner, vs. LAILANIE M. PAGLAS, respondent.

FACTS:

On November 5, 1999, herein respondent and petitioner, through her representative, Isabelo R.
Ermitaño, executed a Contract of Lease wherein petitioner leased in favor of respondent a 336 square
meter residential lot and a house standing thereon located at No. 20 Columbia St., Phase 1, Doña Vicenta
Village, Davao City. The contract period is one (1) year, which commenced on November 4, 1999, with a
monthly rental rate of P13,500.00. Pursuant to the contract, respondent paid petitioner P27,000.00 as
security deposit to answer for unpaid rentals and damage that may be caused to the leased unit.

Subsequent to the execution of the lease contract, respondent received information that
sometime in March 1999, petitioner mortgaged the subject property in favor of a certain Charlie
Yap (Yap) and that the same was already foreclosed with Yap as the purchaser of the disputed lot
in an extra-judicial foreclosure sale which was registered on February 22, 2000. Yap's brother later
offered to sell the subject property to respondent. Respondent entertained the said offer and
negotiations ensued. On June 1, 2000, respondent bought the subject property from Yap for
P950,000.00. A Deed of Sale of Real Property was executed by the parties as evidence of the contract.
However, it was made clear in the said Deed that the property was still subject to petitioner's
right of redemption. STADIH

Prior to respondent's purchase of the subject property, petitioner filed a suit for the
declaration of nullity of the mortgage in favor of Yap as well as the sheriff's provisional certificate
of sale which was issued after the disputed house and lot were sold on foreclosure.

Meanwhile, on May 25, 2000, petitioner sent a letter demanding respondent to pay the rentals
which are due and to vacate the leased premises. A second demand letter was sent on March 25, 2001.
Respondent ignored both letters.

On August 13, 2001, petitioner filed with the Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC), Davao City, a
case of unlawful detainer against respondent.

In its Decision dated November 26, 2001, the MTCC, Branch 6, Davao City dismissed the case
filed by petitioner and awarded respondent the amounts of P25,000.00 as attorney's fees and
P2,000.00 as appearance fee.

Petitioner filed an appeal with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Davao City.
 On February 14, 2003, the RTC rendered its Decision, the dispositive portion of which reads as
follows:

WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, the assailed Decision is AFFIRMED with

MODIFICATION. AFFIRMED insofar as it dismissed the case for unlawful detainer but
modified in that the award of attorney's fees in defendant's [herein respondent's] favor is
deleted and that the defendant [respondent] is ordered to pay plaintiff [herein petitioner]
the equivalent of ten months unpaid rentals on the property or the total sum of
P135,000.00.

The RTC held that herein respondent possesses the right to redeem the subject property and that,
pending expiration of the redemption period, she is entitled to receive the rents, earnings and income
derived from the property. IEDaAc

Aggrieved by the Decision of the RTC, petitioner filed a petition for review with the CA.

On September 8, 2004, the CA rendered its assailed Decision disposing, thus:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the assailed Decision of the Regional Trial

Court, Branch 16, 11th Judicial Region, Davao City is AFFIRMED with
the MODIFICATIONS

Quoting extensively from the decision of the MTCC as well as on respondent's comment on the
petition for review, the CA ruled that respondent did not act in bad faith when she bought the
property in question because she had every right to rely on the validity of the documents
evidencing the mortgage and the foreclosure proceedings. ADaECI

ISSUE: who is entitled to the physical possession of the premises, that is, to the possession de
facto and not to the possession de jure.

It does not even matter if a party's title to the property is questionable. 7 In an unlawful detainer
case, the sole issue for resolution is the physical or material possession of the property involved,
independent of any claim of ownership by any of the party litigants.

In the instant case, pending final resolution of the suit filed by petitioner for the declaration of
nullity of the real estate mortgage in favor of Yap, the MTCC, the RTC and the CA were unanimous in
sustaining the presumption of validity of the real estate mortgage over the subject property in favor of
Yap as well as the presumption of regularity in the performance of the duties of the public officers who
subsequently conducted its foreclosure sale and issued a provisional certificate of sale. Based on the
presumed validity of the mortgage and the subsequent foreclosure sale, the MTCC, the RTC and
the CA also sustained the validity of respondent's purchase of the disputed property from Yap.
The Court finds no cogent reason to depart from these rulings of the MTCC, RTC and CA. Thus, for
purposes of resolving the issue as to who between petitioner and respondent is entitled to
possess the subject property, this presumption stands.

In the instant petition, petitioner's basic postulate in her first and second assigned errors is that
she remains the owner of the subject property. Based on her contract of lease with respondent,
petitioner insists that respondent is not permitted to deny her title over the said property in accordance
with the provisions of Section 2 (b), Rule 131 of the Rules of Court. cEaDTA

The Court does not agree.

It is clear from the abovequoted provision that what a tenant is estopped from denying is the
title of his landlord at the time of the commencement of the landlord-tenant relation. 13 If the
title asserted is one that is alleged to have been acquired subsequent to the commencement of
that relation, the presumption will not apply. 14 Hence, the tenant may show that the landlord's title
has expired or been conveyed to another or himself; and he is not estopped to deny a claim for rent, if he
has been ousted or evicted by title paramount. 15 In the present case, what respondent is claiming is her
supposed title to the subject property which she acquired subsequent to the commencement of the
landlord-tenant relation between her and petitioner. Hence, the presumption under Section 2 (b), Rule
131 of the Rules of Court does not apply.

The foregoing notwithstanding, even if respondent is not estopped from denying petitioner's
claim for rent, her basis for such denial, which is her subsequent acquisition of ownership of the disputed
property, is nonetheless, an insufficient excuse from refusing to pay the rentals due to petitioner. TEAcCD

There is no dispute that at the time that respondent purchased Yap's rights over the subject
property, petitioner's right of redemption as a mortgagor has not yet expired. It is settled that during
the period of redemption, it cannot be said that the mortgagor is no longer the owner of the
foreclosed property, since the rule up to now is that the right of a purchaser at a foreclosure sale
is merely inchoate until after the period of redemption has expired without the right being
exercised. 16 The title to land sold under mortgage foreclosure remains in the mortgagor or his grantee
until the expiration of the redemption period and conveyance by the master's deed.

In the instant case, there is neither evidence nor allegation that respondent, as purchaser
of the disputed property, filed a petition and bond in accordance with the provisions of Section 7
of Act No. 3135. In addition, respondent defaulted in the payment of her rents. Thus, absent
respondent's filing of such petition and bond prior to the expiration of the period of redemption,
coupled with her failure to pay her rent, she did not have the right to possess the subject
property. EHSADa

VELIA J. CRUZ, petitioner, vs. SPOUSES MAXIMO and SUSAN CHRISTENSEN, respondents.

The prior service and receipt of a demand letter is unnecessary in a case for unlawful
detainer if the demand to vacate is premised on the expiration of the lease, not on the non-
payment of rentals or non-compliance of the terms and conditions of the lease.
FACTS:
Cruz alleged that she was the owner of a parcel of land located at A. Santos Street, Balong
Bato, San Juan City, which she acquired through inheritance from her late mother, Ruperta D. Javier
(Javier). She further alleged that Susan Christensen (Susan) had been occupying the property
during Javier's lifetime, as they had a verbal lease agreement. 6
Cruz claimed that ever since she inherited the property, she tolerated Susan's occupancy of
the property. However, due to Susan's failure and refusal to pay rentals of P1,000.00 per month,
she was constrained to demand that Susan vacate the property and pay all unpaid rentals. 7
The matter was referred to barangay conciliation in Barangay Balong Bato, San Juan, despite
the parties being residents of different cities. The parties, however, were unable to settle into a
compromise. As a result, the Punong Barangay issued a Certificate to File Action 8 on August 11,
2005. 9
 Three (3) years later, or on August 5, 2008, Cruz, through counsel, sent Susan a final demand
letter, 10 demanding that she pay the unpaid rentals and vacate the property within 15 days from
receipt. 11
Cruz alleged that despite receipt of the demand letter, Susan refused to vacate and pay the
accrued rentals from June 1989 to February 2009 in the amount of P237,000.00, computed at
P1,000.00 per month. Thus, Cruz was constrained to file a Complaint 12 for unlawful
detainer 13 on April 27, 2009.
In her Answer, 14 Susan admitted to occupying a portion of the property since 1969 on a
month-to-month lease agreement. However, she denied that she failed to pay her rentals since 1989
or that she refused to pay them, attaching receipts of her rental payments as evidence. She alleged
that Cruz refused to receive her rental payments sometime in 2002. Susan likewise denied receiving
any demand letter from Cruz and claims that the signature appearing on the registry return
card of the demand letter 15 was not her signature. 16
On June 3, 2010, Branch 58, Metropolitan Trial Court, San Juan City rendered a
Decision 17 dismissing Cruz's Complaint. It found that for the registry receipts and registry
return cards to serve as proof that the demand letter was received, it must first be
authenticated through an affidavit of service by the person mailing the letter. It also found that
Cruz failed to prove who received the demand letter and signed the registry return receipt,
considering that Susan denied it. 18
Cruz appealed to the Regional Trial Court. 19 Regional Trial Court, Pasig City rendered a
Decision 20 reversing the Metropolitan Trial Court Decision. It found that the bare denial of
receipt would not prevail over the registry return card showing actual receipt of the demand
letter
The Spouses Christensen appealed to the Court of Appeals, 23 arguing that Cruz was
unable to prove Susan's actual receipt of the demand letter. 24 They likewise alleged that Cruz's
late filing of her Memorandum before the Regional Trial Court should have been ground to
dismiss her appeal. 25 ETHIDa
On October 11, 2012, the Court of Appeals rendered a Decision 26 reversing the Regional
Trial Court Decision and reinstating the Metropolitan Trial Court Decision. It likewise
concurred with the Metropolitan Trial Court's finding that registry receipts and return cards
are insufficient proof of receipt.
Cruz filed a Motion for Reconsideration 30 but it was denied by the Court of Appeals in a
Resolution 31 dated January 21, 2013. Hence, this Petition 32 was filed.
Petitioner submits that other than respondent Susan's bare denial of signing the registry
return card, respondents did not deny receipt of the demand letter at their known address or the
authority of the signatory on the registry return card to receive registered mail. 35 She argues that
notice by registered mail is considered service to the recipient, and this cannot be overcome simply
by denying the signature appearing on the registry return card. 36
Petitioner likewise submits that a prior demand is not required in an action for unlawful
detainer since prior demand only applies if the grounds of the complaint are non-payment of rentals
or non-compliance with the conditions of the lease. She points out that where the action is grounded
on the expiration of the contract of lease, as in this instance where the lease was on a month-to-
month basis, the failure to pay the rentals for the month terminates the lease. She argues that a
notice or demand to vacate would be unnecessary 38 since "nothing in the law obligates . . . [the]
 owner-lessor to allow [the lessees] to stay forever in the leased property without paying any
reasonable compensation or rental." 39
Respondents counter that the Court of Appeals did not err in finding that the Regional Trial
Court should have dismissed her appeal since petitioner admitted that she belatedly filed her
memorandum of appeal before the trial court. They maintain that petitioner has not shown any
justifiable reason for the relaxation of technical rules. 40 They insist that the demand to pay or to
vacate is a jurisdictional requirement that must be complied with before an ejectment suit may be
brought. 41
Respondents maintain that registry receipts and registry return cards are not sufficient
to establish that respondents received the demand letter considering that they must first be
authenticated to serve as proof of receipt. They argue that the denial of receipt is sufficient since
petitioner had the burden of proving that respondents actually received the demand letter. 42 They
further contend that petitioner's complaint was grounded on the non-payment of lease rentals and
not, as petitioner belatedly claims, on the expiration lease; thus, petitioner must still comply with the
jurisdictional requirement of prior demand. 43

ISSUES:
First, whether or not the Regional Trial Court should have dismissed the appeal considering
that petitioner Velia J. Cruz's Memorandum of Appeals was not filed within the required period; and
Finally, whether or not petitioner Velia J. Cruz was able to prove Spouses Maximo and Susan
Christensen's receipt of her demand letter before filing her Complaint for unlawful detainer. In order
to resolve the second issue, however, this Court must first address whether or not a demand was
necessary considering that Maximo and Susan Christensen had a month-to-month lease on the
property.
COURTS RULING:
Petitioner admits that her Memorandum of Appeal was filed nine (9) days beyond the 15-day
period but that the Regional Trial Court opted to resolve her case on its merits in the interest of
substantial justice. 44
The rule requiring the filing of the memorandum within the period provided is mandatory.
Failure to comply will result in the dismissal of the appeal
Rule 40, Section 7 is likewise jurisdictional since the Regional Trial Court can only resolve errors
that are specifically assigned and properly argued in the memorandum. 48 Thus, dismissals based on
this rule are premised on the non-filing of the memorandum. A trial court does not acquire jurisdiction
over an appeal where the errors have not been specifically assigned. cSEDTC
In this instance, a Memorandum of Appeal was filed late but was nonetheless given due
course by the Regional Trial Court. Thus, the jurisdictional defect was cured since petitioner
was able to specifically assign the Municipal Trial Court's errors, which the Regional Trial Court
was able to address and resolve. This Court also notes that all substantial issues have already been
fully litigated before the Municipal Trial Court, the Regional Trial Court, and the Court of Appeals.
II
Possession of a property belonging to another may be tolerated or permitted, even
without a prior contract between the parties, as long as there is an implied promise that the
occupant will vacate upon demand. 53 Refusal to vacate despite demand will give rise to an action
for summary ejectment. 54 Thus, prior demand is a jurisdictional requirement before an action
for forcible entry or unlawful detainer may be instituted.
Under Rule 70, Section 1 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, an action for unlawful detainer may be
brought against a possessor of a property who unlawfully withholds possession after the termination
or expiration of the right to hold possession. Rule 70, Section 2 of the Rules of Civil
Procedure requires that there must first be a prior demand to pay or comply with the conditions of
the lease and to vacate before an action can be filed
The property in this case is owned by petitioner. Respondents had a month-to-month lease
with petitioner's predecessor-in-interest. Petitioner contends that no prior demand was necessary in
this case since her Complaint was premised on the expiration of respondents' lease, not on the failure
to pay rent due or to comply with the conditions of the lease.
The jurisdictional requirement of prior demand is unnecessary if the action is premised
on the termination of lease due to expiration of the terms of contract. The complaint must be
brought on the allegation that the lease has expired and the lessor demanded the lessee to vacate,
not on the allegation that the lessee failed to pay rents. 55 The cause of action which would give
rise to an ejectment case would be the expiration of the lease. Thus, the requirement
under Rule 70, Section 2 of a prior "demand to pay or comply with the conditions of the lease
and to vacate" would be unnecessary. 56
Admittedly, the Complaint 60 in this case alleges that petitioner's verbal consent and tolerance
was withdrawn due to respondents' "continuous failure and adamant refusal to pay rentals" 61 and
allegations of accrued unpaid rentals from June 1989 to February 2009. 62 The demand letter dated
August 5, 2008 also specifies that it was premised on respondents' non-payment of the "reasonable
compensation verbally agreed upon." 63 This would have been enough to categorize the complaint
for unlawful detainer as one for non-payment of rentals, not one for expiration of lease.
However, respondents' Answer 64 to the Complaint is telling. Respondents admit that they
only had a month-to-month lease since 1969. They contend that they had been continuously
paying their monthly rent until sometime in 2002, when petitioner refused to receive
it. 65 Thus, as early as 2002, petitioner, as the lessor, already refused to renew respondents'
month-to-month verbal lease. Therefore, respondents' lease had already long expired before
petitioner sent her demand letters.
Respondents cannot feign ignorance of petitioner's demand to vacate since the matter
was brought to barangay conciliation proceedings in 2005. The barangay certification issued on
August 11, 2005 shows that no compromise was reached between the parties. 66
Therefore, respondents' insistence on the non-receipt of the demand letter is misplaced. Their
verbal lease over the property had already expired sometime in 2002. They were explicitly told
to vacate in 2005. They continued to occupy the property until petitioner sent her final
demand letter in 2008. The demand letter would have been unnecessary since respondents'
continued refusal to vacate despite the expiration of their verbal lease was sufficient ground
to bring the action.
 ROSA DELOS REYES, petitioner, vs. SPOUSES FRANCISCO ODONES and ARWENIA
ODONES, NOEMI OTALES, and GREGORIO RAMIREZ, respondents.

The Facts
This case emanated from a complaint for Unlawful Detainer with Preliminary Injunction 6 filed
by petitioner Rosa delos Reyes (petitioner) against respondents spouses Arwenia and Francisco
Odones, Noemi Otales, and Gregorio Ramirez (respondents) before the MTC of Camiling, Tarlac, on
July 12, 2005. The complaint alleged these material facts:
3. That [petitioner] is the owner of a parcel of land

4. That even before the document upon which the title was based,
[petitioner] has long been the owner thereof;

5. That [respondents] are staying on the said property with a

house/improvements therein, with the mere tolerance of [petitioner] only without
any contract whatsoever and for which there is an implied understanding to vacate
upon the demand;

6. That [petitioner] previously demanded verbally upon [respondents] to

vacate which they refused and for which a written notice was sent advising them
to vacate the said property within fifteen (15) days from receipt of the letter to
vacate . . . .;

7. That the said letter was sent by registered mail on June 17, 2005, which was
duly received . . . . 7

In their Answer with Counterclaim, 8 respondents claimed that they are the owners of the
lot, having purchased the same by virtue of an Extrajudicial Succession of Estate and
Sale 9 dated January 29, 2004, executed by the heirs of Donata Lardizabal, the land's original
owner. Respondents denied that their occupancy of the property was by virtue of petitioner's
tolerance. 10
Respondents further argued that the basis of petitioner's Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT),
which is a Deed of Absolute Sale dated April 18, 1972, 11 was a forgery because the purported
vendors therein, Donata Lardizabal and Francisco Razalan, died on June 30, 1926 12 and June 5,
1971, 13 respectively. Incidentally, the said TCT and Deed of Absolute Sale are the subject of a
pending case for annulment of title before the RTC, Branch 68, Camiling, Tarlac. 14 SaICcT
In a decision dated March 28, 2006, the MTC ruled in favor of petitioner, and ordered
respondents to vacate the property and to pay rent for the use and occupation of the same, plus
attorney's fees.
Respondents appealed 15 to the RTC, arguing that since the complaint failed to allege how
respondents entered the property or when they erected their houses thereon, it is an improper action
for unlawful detainer, and the MTC had no jurisdiction over the same. 16
In its June 20, 2006 decision, the RTC set aside the MTC's judgment and dismissed the
complaint. The RTC held that the complaint failed to aver acts constitutive of forcible entry or
unlawful detainer since it did not state how entry was effected or how and when the
dispossession started. Hence, the remedy should either be accion publiciana or accion
reivindicatoria in the proper RTC.
 On February 19, 2007, the CA affirmed the judgment of the RTC, adding that, as
pronounced in Go, Jr. v. Court of Appeals, 19 in order to justify an action for unlawful detainer,
the owner's permission or tolerance must be present at the beginning of the possession.
ISSUE: WON METC HAS JURISDICTION OVER THE SUBJECT MATTER OF THE CASE
COURT RULING:
Contrary to the findings of the RTC and the CA, petitioner's allegations in the complaint clearly
makes out a case for unlawful detainer, essential to confer jurisdiction over the subject matter on the
MTC.
The CA misapplied the ruling in Go 29 that tolerance must be present right from the
start of possession, which possession is sought to be recovered. The CA, in affirming the RTC,
likewise erroneously applied the rule that jurisdictional facts must appear on the face of the
complaint for ejectment, such that when the complaint fails to faithfully aver facts
constitutive of unlawful detainer, as where it does not state when and how entry was effected,
or how and when dispossession started, the remedy should either be accion
publiciana or accion reivindicatoria in the proper RTC.
Based on the foregoing, the MTC validly acquired jurisdiction over the complaint and we
agree with its conclusion that petitioner is entitled to the physical possession of the lot, she
having been able to prove by preponderance of evidence, through the TCT registered in her
name, that she is entitled to possession of the property as owner. The countervailing evidence
presented by respondents that sought to dispute the authenticity of petitioner's TCT cannot be given
weight in this case. Settled is the rule that the validity of a certificate of title cannot be attacked
in an action for ejectment. 32
 ABIGAIL L. MENDIOLA, petitioner, vs. VENERANDO P. SANGALANG, respondent.

The Antecedent Facts

The property subject of the instant controversy is a parcel of land located at No. 104
Maginhawa Street, Brgy. Teachers Village East, Diliman, Quezon City, on which a residential
house and a four-door, one-storey commercial building were built. Said property was originally
registered in the name of Honorata G. Sangalang (Honorata). 7
Honorata had two siblings, Sinforosa and Angel. Sinforosa had three children, petitioner
Abigail Mendiola, Vilma Aquino (Vilma) and Azucena De Leon; while Angel begot four children,
respondent Venerando, Ma. Lourdes, Angelino and Fernando, all surnamed Sangalang. Sinforosa
and Angel predeceased Honorata, and on May 31, 1994, Honorata herself died intestate
without any issue. 8
While Honorata was still alive, one-half of the residential house of the subject property
was being used by petitioner and the other half by Vilma's son. The commercial building, on
the other hand, was being leased to third persons. This set-up continued until after Honorata's
death. 9
In 2003, respondent and his siblings discovered that the subject property was already
registered in the names of petitioner and Vilma. Upon verification, they discovered that the title
over the property had been transferred in favor of petitioner and Vilma by virtue of a Deed of
Sale dated January 29, 1996 purportedly executed by Honorata in their favor. Consequently, a
new title, TCT No. N-148021, 10 was issued in the names 11 of petitioner and Vilma.
It was around this time, or in July 2003, after Vilma's son left the residential house, that
respondent, allegedly without asking permission from the petitioner or Vilma and with the use
of force and violence upon things, broke open the door of the unit and had since detained the
same. 12
On April 11, 2005, petitioner and Vilma demanded that respondent vacate the unit but
the latter refused to do so. 13 The dispute was referred to the barangay for conciliation but no
settlement was reached. 14 Consequently, on October 18, 2005, petitioner and Vilma
commenced their complaint 15 for accion publiciana against respondent for the latter to return
the illegally occupied unit and to pay reasonable rental therefor.
In his Answer, 16 respondent claimed that as heirs of Honorata, they all have become co-
owners in equal undivided shares of the subject property. Respondent further disputes the Deed
of Sale through which ownership over the property was transferred to the petitioner and Vilma,
since the same was executed only in 1996 after Honorata died in 1994. cSEDTC
The Ruling of the RTC
On November 15, 2007, the RTC rendered its Decision 17 dismissing the complaint. The trial
court noted that since respondent raised the defense of co-ownership, the case was converted
from accion publiciana to accion reivindicatoria. It further noted that since it is undisputed that
the parties are all heirs of Honorata, then they all have an equal right thereto. Finally, the trial
court noted that the resolution of the criminal complaint for falsification lodged by respondent
against the petitioner and Vilma constitutes a prejudicial question to the complaint. 18
The Ruling of the CA
 The CA denied the appeal. 22 While the appellate court disagreed with the trial court
when it converted the complaint to accion reivindicatoria, it nevertheless agreed with the trial
court when it dismissed the complaint for accion publiciana, for failure to prove the better right
of possession. In provisionally passing upon the issue of ownership to resolve the issue of
possession, the CA held that the parties, being co-owners pro indiviso of the subject property, have
equal right to possess the same.
The Issue
The point of inquiry is whether the petitioner has the better right of possession over the
subject property as to successfully evict respondent.
The Ruling of this Court
The petition is devoid of merit.
In arriving at its identical pronouncement that petitioner failed to prove her better right of
possession, the RTC and the CA passed upon the parties' respective claim of ownership, a procedure
that is sanctioned under Section 16, 26 Rule 70. It is settled that the issue of ownership may be
resolved only to determine the issue of possession.
To prove their right of possession, petitioner and Vilma harp on their claim as registered
owners while respondent claims entitlement thereto as a co-heir. We find no error when the RTC
and the CA decided the case in favor of respondent.
In this case, it is undisputed that the Deed of Sale, through which ownership over the property
had been purportedly transferred to the petitioner and Vilma, was executed in 1996. However, it is
perfectly obvious that Honorata could not have signed the same as she passed away as early
as 1994. If any, Honorata's signature thereon could only be a product of forgery. This makes the
Deed of Sale void and as such, produces no civil effect; and it does not create, modify, or
extinguish a juridical relation.
The Court cannot simply close its eyes against such patent defect on the argument that
registered owners of a property are entitled to its possession.
While it is true that petitioner and Vilma have in their favor a Torrens title over the property, it
is nonetheless equally true that they acquired no right under the void Deed of Sale. Indeed,
when the instrument presented is forged, even if accompanied by the owner's duplicate certificate of
title, the registered owner does not thereby lose his title, and neither does the assignee in the forged
deed acquire any right or title to the property.
Neither can the argument that a certificate of title is not subject to collateral attack
would persuade Us to rule otherwise. With the determination that petitioner and Vilma's title is
void, the issue as to whether it is subject to direct or collateral attack is no longer relevant. Settled is
the rule that an action to declare the nullity of a void title does not prescribe and is susceptible
to direct, as well as to collateral attack. 30 Hence, respondent is not precluded from questioning
the validity of the petitioner and Vilma's title in the accion publiciana. 31
A necessary and logical consequence of the foregoing pronouncements is that, title over the
property remained in the name of Honorata as original registered owner thereof. By theory of
succession, petitioner and respondent are co-owners of the property and equally entitled to
possession thereof, either de facto or de jure. As such, petitioner and Vilma had no right to
exclude respondent from enjoying possession thereof through a possessory action.
 RURAL BANK OF STA. IGNACIA, INC., petitioner, vs. PELAGIA DIMATULAC, GLORIA
DIMATULAC, NORA M. VDA. DE GRACIA AND ANTONIO NUQUI, respondents.

FACTS:

Before the MTC, petitioner had filed what appeared to be a simple ejectment case, but as
found out by the Court of Appeals, the parcel of land subject of the dispute has a long and convoluted
history, to wit:
Back in August 17, 1965, Prudencia Reyes purchased from the now defunct Rural Progress
Administration (RPA), an 800-square meter parcel of land identified as Lot 11, Block 8 of the
Subdivision Plan located in Barrio Suizo and Barrio San Rafael, Tarlac, Tarlac. As a result of the
purchase, TCT No. 65765 was issued in her favor. However, the deed of sale in favor of Reyes was
later cancelled by the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) by reason of her non-occupancy of
said property, and made the land available for distribution to the landless residents of San
Rafael.
In 1971, respondents took possession of the property and were allocated portions of 200
square meters each. They paid the purchase price and awaited their Emancipation Patent titles.
Despite her knowledge that the land had reverted to the government, Reyes sold the
property to the spouses Maximo Valentin and Retina Razon in a Deed of Sale dated April 4,
1973. The spouses thereafter obtained TCT No. 106153 thereon. On finding, however, that
respondents were in possession of the property, Valentin and Razon filed a complaint for
recovery and damages against respondents with the Regional Trial Court of Tarlac, Tarlac. The
Republic of the Philippines intervened in said case and along with respondents, contending
that the title of the spouses was null and void, because the sale by Reyes was in violation of
the terms and conditions of sale of the lot by the RPA to Reyes.
The trial court decided in favor of the spouses Maximo Valentin and Retina Razon. But
on appeal, the appellate court reversed the judgment, cancelled the title of the spouses, and
decreed the reversion of the property to the government for disposition to qualified
beneficiaries. The decision of the Court of Appeals attained finality on September 22, 1990.
Meanwhile, on February 15, 1987, or during the pendency of CA-G.R. CV No. 14909, Razon,
through her attorney-in-fact, mortgaged the property to petitioner rural bank to secure a loan
of P37,500.00. The property was subsequently extra-judicially foreclosed when Razon failed to
pay the loan and on October 20, 1987, petitioner purchased the property. TCT No. 330969 dated
May 11, 1989 was accordingly issued to herein petitioner.
On March 4, 1997, petitioner filed a complaint for unlawful detainer and damages with
the MTC of Tarlac, Tarlac, Petitioner alleged that respondents were occupying the property by
mere tolerance as they had no contract of lease with it, nor right or claim annotated on its
title. It also averred that it had advised respondents of its purchase of the property and had
demanded that respondents vacate the same, but its notice went unheeded.
Respondents in their Answer claimed that they had been occupants of the land since
1971 and had been awarded as beneficiaries by the government after the titles of Reyes and
Razon were nullified. They also maintained that the lots had been reverted to the government by
virtue of the final and executory judgment in CA-G.R. CV No. 14909. 4
 In dismissing the complaint, the MTC found that the possession of respondents was not
by mere tolerance but as lawful beneficiaries. It also declared that it had no jurisdiction over
the case as it involved the issue of ownership. The court noted that the respondents were lawful
beneficiaries of a government land grant while petitioner was not a purchaser in good faith
and hence, could not avail of the protective mantle of the indefeasibility of Torrens Title. It
concluded that its competence to decide the case was limited only to addressing the question of
ownership in order to determine the issue of de facto possession. 6
In affirming the judgment of the municipal court, the RTC ruled that petitioner could
not eject respondents from said property as:
(1) there was no legal relationship, e.g., such as a lease agreement or otherwise, between them
that has expired or terminated;
(2) respondents' possession was not through the tolerance of petitioner;
(3) respondents were in possession of the lot as lawful/rightful possessors, vis-a-vis their status
as occupants-beneficiaries of the DAR, previously RPA. Therefore, respondents had a better right to
possession as against petitioner rural bank. 8
Petitioner then filed a petition for review on certiorari with the Court of Appeals, The appellate
court, however, dismissed the petition and ruled that the possession of respondents was not by mere
tolerance but by lawful mandate of the law and by virtue of its final judgment in CA-G.R. CV No. 14909,
thus:
ISSUE: Did the Court of Appeals commit a reversible error when it dismissed the petition of the
bank?

COURT RULING:
In our view, it did not err when it sustained the judgment of the regional trial court
which earlier also sustained that of the municipal trial court.
Petitioner contends that as the absolute and registered owner of the subject land as a
mortgagee-purchaser in a foreclosure sale it is entitled to possession of the land as an attribute of
ownership. Petitioner further argues that it cannot be faulted for relying on the validity of Valentin
and Razon's title as it had checked and verified the status of said title on file with the Register of
Deeds and found that it was free from any lien and encumbrance. 14 Further, petitioner submits that
the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No. 14909 cannot defeat its right to eject respondents
as it is not bound by the said judgment because petitioner was not impleaded as a party therein.
Moreover, according to petitioner when the decision in CA-G.R. No. 14909 nullifying Razon's title
became final, said title was already cancelled and another title already issued in favor of petitioner.
For this reason, petitioner insists the CA decision could not comprehend within its ambit petitioner's
title to the land.
Respondents contend that petitioner could not properly raise in issue the question of
ownership in an action for unlawful detainer under the Rule on Summary Procedure. Petitioner
should seek the proper remedy through an ordinary civil proceeding. Moreover, they argue that
petitioner was totally negligent in its duty to determine the propriety of accepting the property for a
mortgage by the Valentin and Razon spouses. Thus, it is estopped from claiming good faith. Further,
respondents add that since the title of Razon was declared null and void, petitioner as the successor-
in-interest acquired no rights of ownership over the land it purchased through public auction.
 In ejectment cases the question is limited to which party among the litigants is entitled
to the physical or material possession of the premises, that is to say, who should have
possession de facto. 15 Settled is the rule, however, that in an ejectment case, the assertion by a
defendant of ownership over the disputed property does not serve to divest an inferior court
of its jurisdiction. 16 When the defendant raises the defense of ownership and the question of
possession cannot be resolved without deciding the issue of ownership, the issue of ownership shall
be resolved for the purpose only of determining the issue of possession. 17 Said judgment shall be
conclusive with respect to the possession only, and shall in no wise bind the title of the realty,
or affect the ownership thereof. It shall not bar an action between the same parties respecting title
to the real property.
Petitioner's contention that the final and executory judgment of the Court of Appeals in CA-
G.R. CV No. 14909 does not bind the bank, in our view, is devoid of merit. Having derived little from
the Spouses Valentin and Razon, whose title was nullified by the final and executory decision
of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 14909, the petitioner cannot escape the effect of the
appellate court's judgment in said case. The rural bank as purchaser at an auction sale does
not have a better right to said property than their predecessors-in-interest, namely the
Valentin and Razon couple.
The rule that persons dealing with registered lands can rely solely on the certificate of title
does not apply to banks. 23 The degree of diligence required of banks is more than that of a
good father of a family; in keeping with their responsibility to exercise the necessary care and
prudence in dealing even with a registered or titled property. The business of a bank is affected
with public interest, holding in trust the money of the depositors, which the bank should guard
against loss due to negligence or bad faith. For this reason, the bank is not allowed to rely merely
on the protective mantle of the land registration law, which is normally accorded only to
purchasers or mortgagees for value and in good faith. 24
To capitulate, we find no reversible error in the decision of the Court of Appeals sustaining
those of the lower courts that the possession of respondents is not by mere tolerance. Respondents'
possession springs from their right as lawful beneficiaries of a government program, pursuant
to law. Certainly, the decision of the appellate court in CA G.R. CV No. 14909 binds not just the
beneficiary but also the bank as claimant of the land. In contrast, petitioner's claim to possession
of the land emanates from a nullified and non-existing title of its predecessors-in-interest, from which
it cannot rely to eject the respondents from the premises.
 RUBEN MANALANG, CARLOS MANALANG, CONCEPCION GONZALES AND LUIS
MANALANG, petitioners, vs. BIENVENIDO AND MERCEDES BACANI, respondents.

FACTS:
Antecedents
Petitioners Ruben Manalang, Amado Manalang, Carlos Manalang, Concepcion M.
Gonzales, Ladislao Manalang and Luis Manalang were the co-owners of Lot No. 4236 with an area
of 914 square meters of the Guagua Cadastre, and declared for taxation purposes in the name of
Tomasa B. Garcia. The land was covered by approved survey plan Ap-03-004154. Adjacent to Lot
4236 was the respondents' Lot No. 4235 covered by Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. N-
216701.
In 1997, the petitioners caused the relocation and verification survey of Lot 4236 and the
adjoining lots, and the result showed that the respondents had encroached on Lot No. 4236 to
the extent of 405 square meters. A preliminary relocation survey conducted by the Lands
Management Section of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR)
confirmed the result on the encroachment. When the respondents refused to vacate the
encroached portion and to surrender peaceful possession thereof despite demands, the petitioners
commenced this action for unlawful detainer on April 21, 1997 in the MTC of Guagua
On September 17, 1998, the MTC (Branch 2) dismissed lack of jurisdiction based on its finding
that the action involved an essentially boundary dispute that should be properly resolved in
an accion reivindicatoria. 4 It stated that the complaint did not aver any contract, whether
express or implied, between the petitioners and the respondents that qualified the case as one
for unlawful detainer; and that there was also no showing that the respondents were in
possession of the disputed area by the mere tolerance of the petitioners due to the latter
having become aware of the encroachment only after the relocation survey held in 1997.
On appeal, however, the RTC reversed the MTC (Branch 2), and remanded the case for
further proceedings, 5 holding that because there was an apparent withholding of possession
of the property and the action was brought within one year from such withholding of
possession the proper action was ejectment which was within the jurisdiction of the MTC; and
that the case was not a boundary dispute that could be resolved in an accion reivindicatoria,
considering that it involved a sizeable area of property and not a mere transferring of boundary. 6
Upon remand, the MTC, Branch 1, 7 ultimately dismissed the complaint and counterclaim
for lack of merit through the decision rendered on August 31, 2000, 8 ruling that the petitioners
failed to adduce clear and convincing evidence showing that the respondents had encroached on
their property and had been occupying and possessing property outside the metes and bounds
described in Bienvenido Bacani's OCT No. N-216701; that the preponderance of evidence was in favor
of the respondents' right of possession; and that the respondent's counterclaim for damages should
also be dismissed, there being no showing that the complaint had been filed in gross and evident bad
faith. 9
Once more, the petitioners appealed to the RTC.
At that point, the RTC ordered the petitioners to conduct a relocation survey to determine their
allegation of encroachment, and also heard the testimony of the surveyor, Engr. Emmanuel Limpin,
then Acting Chief of the Survey Section of the CENR-DENR.
 On September 19, 2001, 10 the RTC rendered its judgment whereby it reversed and set
aside the MTC's decision of August 31, 2000, observing that the respondents had encroached
on the petitioners' property based on the court-ordered relocation survey, the reports by Engr.
Limpin, and his testimony; 11 that the respondents could not rely on their OCT No. N-216701,
considering that although their title covered only 481 square meters, the relocation survey
revealed that they had occupied also 560 square meters of the petitioners' Lot No. 4236;
The respondents appealed.
On October 18, 2002, the CA promulgated its assailed decision, 15 viz.:
WHEREFORE, the appealed RTC decision is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE,
and the decisions of the MTC of Guagua, Pampanga, Branches 1 and 2, are REINSTATED.

The CA concluded that the RTC, by ordering the relocation and verification survey "in aid of its
appellate jurisdiction" upon motion of the petitioners and over the objection of the respondents, and
making a determination of whether there was an encroachment based on such survey and testimony
of the surveyor, had acted as a trial court in complete disregard of the second paragraph of Section
18, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court. It declared such action by the RTC as unwarranted because it
amounted to the reopening of the trial, which was not allowed under Section 13 (3) Rule 70 of
the Rules of Court.
The CA held that considering that the petitioners' complaint for unlawful detainer did not
set forth when and how the respondents had entered the land in question and constructed
their houses thereon, jurisdiction did not vest in the MTC to try and decide the case; that the
complaint, if at all, made out a case for either accion reivindicatoria or accion publiciana, either
of which fell within the original jurisdiction of the RTC;
Issues: won the RTC erred in ordering the conduct of the relocation and verification of the
survey
Won the case was an ejectment case within the jurisdiction of the mtc
Ruling of the Court
The appeal has no merit.
To start with, the RTC, in an appeal of the judgment in an ejectment case, shall not conduct a
rehearing or trial de novo.
Hence, the RTC violated the foregoing rule by ordering the conduct of the relocation and
verification survey "in aid of its appellate jurisdiction" and by hearing the testimony of the
surveyor, for its doing so was tantamount to its holding of a trial de novo. The violation was
accented by the fact that the RTC ultimately decided the appeal based on the survey and the
surveyor's testimony instead of the record of the proceedings had in the court of origin.
Secondly, on whether or not Civil Case No. 3309 was an ejectment case within the original and
exclusive jurisdiction of the MTC, decisive are the allegations of the complaint.
Given the foregoing allegations, the case should be dismissed without prejudice to the
filing of a non-summary action like accion reivindicatoria. In our view, the CA correctly held that a
boundary dispute must be resolved in the context of accion reivindicatoria, not an ejectment case. The
boundary dispute is not about possession, but encroachment, that is, whether the property
claimed by the defendant formed part of the plaintiff's property. A boundary dispute cannot be
settled summarily under Rule 70 of the Rules of Court, the proceedings under which are limited to
unlawful detainer and forcible entry.
Thirdly, the MTC dismissed the action because it did not have jurisdiction over the case.
The dismissal was correct. It is fundamental that the allegations of the complaint and the
character of the relief sought by the complaint determine the nature of the action and the
court that has jurisdiction over the action. However, the allegations of the petitioners' complaint
did not show that they had permitted or tolerated the occupation of the portion of their property by
the respondents; or how the respondents' entry had been effected, or how and when the
dispossession by the respondents had started. All that the petitioners alleged was the respondents'
"illegal use and occupation" of the property. As such, the action was not unlawful detainer.
Lastly, the conclusion by the MTC that the petitioners failed to show by clear and convincing
evidence that the respondents had encroached on the petitioners' property was also warranted.
 ERMINIA ACBANG, petitioner, vs. HON. JIMMY H.F. LUCZON, JR., PRESIDING JUDGE,
REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 01, SECOND JUDICIAL REGION, TUGUEGARAO
CITY, CAGAYAN, and SPOUSES MAXIMO LOPEZ and HEIDI L. LOPEZ, respondents.

Antecedents
Respondent Spouses Maximo and Heidi Lopez (Spouses Lopez) commenced an ejectment
suit against the petitioner, her son Benjamin Acbang, Jr. and his wife Jean (Acbangs) in the
Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of Alcala, Cagayan (Civil Case No. 64). The defendants did not file their
answer. Thus, the MTC rendered its decision on January 12, 2004 in favor of the Spouses Lopez
The petitioner appealed to the RTC.
In the meantime, the Spouses Lopez moved for the execution of the decision pending
appeal in the RTC, 3 alleging that the defendants had not filed a supersedeas bond to stay the
execution. The Acbangs opposed the motion for execution pending appeal, 4 insisting that the failure
of the Spouses Lopez to move for the execution in the MTC constituted a waiver of their right to the
immediate execution; and that, therefore, there was nothing to stay, rendering the filing of
the supersedeas bond unnecessary. aASEcH
In his assailed order dated March 31, 2004, Judge Luczon granted the motion for
immediate execution
The petitioner moved for reconsideration, 6 stressing that the filing of the supersedeas bond
was for the purpose of staying the execution; and that she as a defendant would not be placed
in a position to stay the execution by filing a supersedeas bond unless she was first notified of
the filing of the motion for immediate execution.
The RTC denied the petitioner's motion for reconsideration on April 26, 2004
The petitioner then brought the petition for prohibition directly in this Court on July 2,
2004, submitting that Judge Luczon thereby committed grave error in granting the motion for
immediate execution of the Spouses Lopez without first fixing the supersedeas bond as prayed
for by the Acbangs.
It appears that the RTC rendered its decision in Civil Case No. 6302 on July 30, 2004, 9 finding
that the petitioner had not received the summons, and that the sheriff's return did not show the
steps taken by the server to insure the petitioner's receipt of the summons, like the tender of the
summons to her; that the non-service of the summons on her resulted in the MTC not acquiring
jurisdiction over her; and that the MTC's decision in Civil Case No. 64 dated January 14, 2004 was
void as far as she was concerned.
In the petition, the petitioner insists that the Spouses Lopez's motion for execution
pending appeal should be filed before she posted a supersedeas bond. She argues that even if the
MTC's decision was immediately executory, it did not mean that a motion for execution was
dispensable; and that the Spouses Lopez waived their right to the immediate execution when they did
not file a motion for execution in the MTC.
On the other hand, the Spouses Lopez claim that the issuance of a writ of execution was
ministerial because of the defendants' failure to file a supersedeas bond prior to or at the time
of the filing of their notice of appeal in the MTC.
Ruling
 Here, there was no indication of the date when the petitioner filed her notice of appeal.
Her petition stated simply that she had filed a "timely notice of appeal which was given due
course without the respondents filing a motion for execution in the Municipal Trial Court of
Alcala, the court a quo." 11 On the other hand, the Spouses Lopez filed in the RTC their motion for
execution pending appeal on February 19, 2004. caAICE
The ruling in Chua v. Court of Appeals 12 is instructive on the means of staying the immediate
execution of a judgment in an ejectment case, to wit:
As a general rule, a judgment in favor of the plaintiff in an ejectment suit is
immediately executory, in order to prevent further damage to him arising from the loss
of possession of the property in question. To stay the immediate execution of the said
judgment while the appeal is pending the foregoing provision requires that the following
requisites must concur: (1) the defendant perfects his appeal; (2) he files a supersedeas
bond; and (3) he periodically deposits the rentals which become due during the pendency
of the appeal. The failure of the defendant to comply with any of these conditions is a
ground for the outright execution of the judgment, the duty of the court in this respect
being "ministerial and imperative."
In short, a judgment in favor of the plaintiff in an ejectment suit is immediately
executory, but the defendant, to stay its immediate execution, must: (1) perfect an appeal; (2)
file a supersedeas bond; and (3) periodically deposit the rentals becoming due during the
pendency of the appeal.
Although the petitioner correctly states that the Spouses Lopez should file a motion for
execution pending appeal before the court may issue an order for the immediate execution of
the judgment, the spouses Lopez are equally correct in pointing out that they were entitled to
the immediate execution of the judgment in view of the Acbangs' failure to comply with all of
the three abovementioned requisites for staying the immediate execution. The filing of the
notice of appeal alone perfected the appeal but did not suffice to stay the immediate
execution without the filing of the sufficient supersedeas bond and the deposit of the accruing
rentals. ACETID
The foregoing notwithstanding, the decision of the RTC favored the petitioner because it
declared the judgment of the MTC void as far as she was concerned for lack of jurisdiction over
her person. The RTC thus directed the MTC to cause the service of the summons on her and to
conduct further proceedings without any delay. In effect, the supervening declaration of the
nullity of the judgment being sought to be executed against her has rendered moot and
academic the issue in this special civil action as far as she was concerned.
 FEDERICO S. ROBOSA, ROLANDO E. PANDY, NOEL D. ROXAS,
ALEXANDER ANGELES, VERONICA GUTIERREZ, FERNANDO EMBAT, and
NANETTE H. PINTO, petitioners,vs.NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS
COMMISSION (First Division),CHEMO-TECHNISCHE MANUFACTURING,
INC. and its responsible officials led by FRANKLIN R. DE LUZURIAGA,
and PROCTER & GAMBLE PHILIPPINES, INC., respondents.

Factual Background
Federico S. Robosa, Rolando E. Pandy, Noel D. Roxas, Alexander Angeles,
Veronica Gutierrez, Fernando Embat and Nanette H. Pinto (petitioners) were
rank-and-file employees of respondent Chemo-Technische Manufacturing,
Inc. (CTMI),the manufacturer and distributor of "Wella" products. They were officers
and members of the CTMI Employees Union-DFA (union). Respondent Procter and
Gamble Philippines, Inc. (P & GPI) acquired all the interests, franchises and
goodwill of CTMI during the pendency of the dispute.
Sometime in the first semester of 1991, the union filed a petition for
certification election at CTMI. On June 10, 1991, Med-Arbiter Rasidali Abdullah of
the Office of the Department of Labor and Employment in the National Capital
Region (DOLE-NCR) granted the petition. The DOLE-NCR conducted a consent
election on July 5, 1991, but the union failed to garner the votes required to be
certified as the exclusive bargaining agent of the company.
On July 15, 1991, CTMI, through its President and General Manager Franklin
R. de Luzuriaga, issued a memorandum 4 announcing that effective that day:
(1) all sales territories were demobilized;
(2) all vehicles assigned to sales representatives should be returned to the
company and would be sold;
(3) sales representatives would continue to service their customers through
public transportation and would be given transportation allowance;
(4) deliveries of customers' orders would be undertaken by the warehouses;
and
(5) revolving funds for ex-truck selling held by sales representatives should be
surrendered to the cashier (for Metro Manila) or to the supervisor (for Visayas and
Mindanao), and truck stocks should immediately be surrendered to the
warehouse. SHTcDE
 On the same day, CTMI issued another memorandum 5 informing the
company's sales representatives and sales drivers of the new system in the
Salon Business Group's selling operations.
The union asked for the withdrawal and deferment of CTMI's directives,
branding them as union busting acts constituting unfair labor practice. CTMI ignored
the request. Instead, it issued on July 23, 1991 a notice of termination of
employment to the sales drivers, due to the abolition of the sales driver
positions. 6
On August 1, 1991, the union and its affected members filed a complaint for
illegal dismissal and unfair labor practice, with a claim for damages, against
CTMI, De Luzuriaga and other CTMI officers. The union also moved for the issuance
of a writ of preliminary injunction and/or temporary restraining order (TRO).
The Compulsory Arbitration Proceedings
The labor arbiter handling the case denied the union's motion for a stay order
on the ground that the issues raised by the petitioners can best be ventilated during
the trial on the merits of the case. This prompted the union to file on August 16, 1991
with the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC), a petition for the issuance of a
preliminary mandatory injunction and/or TRO. 7
On August 23, 1991, the NLRC issued a TRO. 8 It directed CTMI, De Luzuriaga and
other company executives to (1) cease and desist from dismissing any member of the
union and from implementing the July 23, 1991 memorandum terminating the
services of the sales drivers, and to immediately reinstate them if the dismissals have
been effected; (2) cease and desist from implementing the July 15, 1991
memorandum grounding the sales personnel; and (3) restore the status quo ante prior
to the formation of the union and the conduct of the consent election.
Allegedly, the respondents did not comply with the NLRC's August 23, 1991
resolution. They instead moved to dissolve the TRO and opposed the union's
petition for preliminary injunction.
On September 12, 1991, the NLRC upgraded the TRO to a writ of
preliminary injunction. 9 The respondents moved for reconsideration. The union
opposed the motion and urgently moved to cite the responsible CTMI officers in
contempt of court.
On August 25, 1993, the NLRC denied the respondents' motion for
reconsideration and directed Labor Arbiter Cristeta Tamayo to hear the motion
for contempt. In reaction, the respondents questioned the NLRC orders before this
Court through a petition for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction. The
Court dismissed the petition for being premature. It also denied the respondents'
motion for reconsideration, as well as a second motion for reconsideration, with
finality.
Meanwhile, the NLRC heard the contempt charge. On October 31, 2000, it
issued a resolution 10 dismissing the charge. It ordered the labor arbiter to
proceed hearing the main case on the merits.
The CA Decision
The CA saw no need to dwell on the issues raised by the petitioners as the
question it deemed appropriate for resolution is whether the NLRC's dismissal
of the contempt charge against the respondents may be the proper subject of
an appeal. It opined that the dismissal is not subject to review by an appellate court.
Accordingly, the CA Special Sixth Division dismissed the petition in its resolution of
February 24, 2006. 11
The Petition
The petitioners charge the CA with grave abuse of discretion in upholding
the NLRC resolutions, despite the reversible errors the labor tribunal committed
in dismissing the contempt charge against the respondents. They contend that
the respondents were guilty of contempt for their failure (1) to observe strictly
the NLRC status quo order; and (2) to reinstate the dismissed petitioners and to
pay them their lost wages, sales commissions, per diems, allowances and other
employee benefits. They also claim that the NLRC, in effect, overturned this Court's
affirmation of the TRO and of the preliminary injunction.
The petitioners assail the CA's reliance on the Court's ruling that a contempt
charge partakes of a criminal proceeding where an acquittal is not subject to appeal.
They argue that the facts obtaining in the present case are different from the facts of
the cases where the Court's ruling was made. They further argue that by the nature of
this case, the Labor Code and its implementing rules and regulations should apply,
but in any event, the appellate court is not prevented from reviewing the factual basis
of the acquittal of the respondents from the contempt charges.
The Court's Ruling
Issues
The parties' submissions raise the following issues:
(1) whether the NLRC has contempt powers;
(2) whether the dismissal of a contempt charge is appealable; and
(3) whether the NLRC committed grave abuse of discretion in dismissing the
contempt charge against the respondents.
 On the first issue, we stress that under Article 218 22 of the Labor Code,the
NLRC (and the labor arbiters) may hold any offending party in contempt,
directly or indirectly, and impose appropriate penalties in accordance with law.
The penalty for direct contempt consists of either imprisonment or fine, the
degree or amount depends on whether the contempt is against the Commission
or the labor arbiter. The Labor Code, however, requires the labor arbiter or the
Commission to deal with indirect contempt in the manner prescribed under Rule
71 of the Rules of Court. 23
Rule 71 of the Rules of Court does not require the labor arbiter or the
NLRC to initiate indirect contempt proceedings before the trial court. This mode
is to be observed only when there is no law granting them contempt powers. 24 As is
clear under Article 218 (d) of the Labor Code,the labor arbiter or the Commission is
empowered or has jurisdiction to hold the offending party or parties in direct or
indirect contempt. The petitioners, therefore, have not improperly brought the
indirect contempt charges against the respondents before the NLRC. ESHcTD

The second issue pertains to the nature of contempt proceedings, especially

with respect to the remedy available to the party adjudged to have committed indirect
contempt or has been absolved of indirect contempt charges. In this regard, Section
11, Rule 71 of the Rules of Court states that the judgment or final order of a
court in a case of indirect contempt may be appealed to the proper court as in a
criminal case. This is not the point at issue, however, in this petition. It is rather the
question of whether the dismissal of a contempt charge, as in the present case,
is appealable. The CA held that the NLRC's dismissal of the contempt charges against
the respondents amounts to an acquittal in a criminal case and is not subject to
appeal.
The CA ruling is grounded on prevailing jurisprudence.
In Yasay, Jr. v. Recto, 25 the Court declared:
A distinction is made between a civil and [a] criminal contempt. Civil
contempt is the failure to do something ordered by a court to be done for the
benefit of a party. A criminal contempt is any conduct directed against the
authority or dignity of the court. 26

The Court further explained in Remman Enterprises, Inc. v. Court of

Appeals 27 and People v. Godoy 28 the character of contempt proceedings, thus —
The real character of the proceedings in contempt cases is to be
determined by the relief sought or by the dominant purpose. The proceedings
are to be regarded as criminal when the purpose is primarily punishment
and civil when the purpose is primarily compensatory or remedial.
 Is the NLRC's dismissal of the contempt charges against the respondents
beyond review by this Court? On this important question, we note that the
petitioners, in assailing the CA main decision, claim that the appellate court
committed grave abuse of discretion in not ruling on the dismissal by the NLRC of the
contempt charges. 31 They also charge the NLRC of having gravely abused its
discretion and having committed reversible errors in:
(1) setting aside its earlier resolutions and orders, including the writ of
preliminary injunction it issued, with its dismissal of the petition to cite the
respondents in contempt of court;
(2) overturning this Court's resolutions upholding the TRO and the writ of
preliminary injunction;
(3) failing to impose administrative fines upon the respondents for violation of
the TRO and the writ of preliminary injunction; and
(4) failing to order the reinstatement of the dismissed petitioners and the
payment of their accrued wages and other benefits.
In view of the grave abuse of discretion allegation in this case, we deem it
necessary to look into the NLRC's dismissal of the contempt charges against the
respondents. As the charges were rooted into the respondents' alleged non-
compliance with the NLRC directives contained in the TRO 32 and the writ of
preliminary injunction, 33 we first inquire into what really happened to these
directives.
We find no grave abuse of discretion in the assailed NLRC ruling. It rightly
avoided delving into issues which would clearly be in excess of its jurisdiction for they
are issues involving the merits of the case which are by law within the original and
exclusive jurisdiction of the labor arbiter. 38 To be sure, whether payroll reinstatement
of some of the petitioners is proper; whether the resignation of some of them was
compelled by dire economic necessity; whether the petitioners are entitled to their
money claims; and whether quitclaims are contrary to law or public policy are issues
that should be heard by the labor arbiter in the first instance. The NLRC can inquire
into them only on appeal after the merits of the case shall have been adjudicated by
the labor arbiter.
The NLRC correctly dismissed the contempt charges against the
respondents. The CA likewise committed no grave abuse of discretion in not
disturbing the NLRC resolution.
In light of the above discussion, we find no need to dwell into the other issues
the parties raised.SATDHE
 LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. HEIRS OF
SEVERINO LISTANA, respondents.

The Facts
Severino Listana (Listana) owned a 246.0561-hectare parcel of land in
Inlagadian, Casiguran, Sorsogon, Listana voluntarily sold the property to the
government, through the Department of Agrarian Reform, under Republic Act (RA) No.
6657, otherwise known as the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988.
The Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB) of Sorsogon
commenced summary administrative proceedings to determine the amount of
just compensation for the property. In its 14 October 1998 Decision, the DARAB
set the amount at P10,956,963.25 and ordered petitioner Land Bank of the
Philippines (LBP) to pay Listana the same.
On 18 June 1999, the Provincial Agrarian Reform Adjudicator (PARAD)
issued a writ of execution ordering Land Bank Manager and Agrarian
Operations Center Head Alex A. Lorayes (Lorayes) to pay Listana P10,956,963.25.
Lorayes refused. Thus, on 2 September 1999, Listana filed with the PARAD a
motion for contempt against Lorayes.
On 6 September 1999, LBP filed with the Regional Trial Court, Judicial
Region 5, Branch 52, Sorsogon City, acting as special agrarian court (SAC), a
petition for judicial determination of the amount of just compensation for the
property. LBP challenged the amount set by the DARAB and prayed that the
amount be fixed at P5,871,689.03. ESITcH

The PARAD granted Listana's motion for contempt. In its 20 August 2000
Order, the PARAD cited Lorayes for indirect contempt and ordered his
imprisonment until he complied with the DARAB's 14 October 1998 Decision.
In its 25 October 2000 Order, the SAC dismissed LBP's petition for judicial
determination of the amount of just compensation for the property. LBP
appealed the 25 October 2000 Order.
In its 27 November 2000 Resolution, the PARAD ordered the issuance of an
alias writ of execution, ordering LBP to pay Listana P10,956,963.25. On 3 January
2001, the PARAD issued a warrant of arrest against Lorayes.
LBP filed with the RTC a petition for injunction with application for the
issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction enjoining PARAD from implementing
the warrant of arrest against Lorayes. In its 29 January 2001 Order, the RTC
enjoined the PARAD from implementing the warrant of arrest pending final
determination of the amount of just compensation for the property. LBP posted
a P5,644,773.02 cash bond.
LBP filed with the Court a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of
the Rules of Court. In Land Bank of the Philippines v. Listana, Sr., 7 the Court set aside
the 11 December 2001 Decision of the Court of Appeals and reinstated the 29 January
and 2 April 2001 Orders of the RTC enjoining the PARAD from implementing the
warrant of arrest pending final determination of the amount of just
compensation for the property.
The Court declared void all proceedings that stemmed from Listana's motion for
contempt. The Court held that:
Hence, the contempt proceedings initiated through an unverified "Motion
for Contempt" filed by the respondent with the PARAD were invalid for the
following reasons: First, the Rules of Court clearly require the filing of a verified
petition with the Regional Trial Court, which was not complied with in this case.
The charge was not initiated by the PARAD motu proprio, rather, it was by a
motion filed by respondent. Second, neither the PARAD nor the DARAB have
jurisdiction to decide the contempt charge filed by the respondent. The issuance
of a warrant of arrest was beyond the power of the PARAD and the DARAB.
Consequently, all the proceedings that stemmed from respondent's "Motion
for Contempt," specifically the Orders of the PARAD dated August 20, 2000
and January 3, 2001 for the arrest of Alex A. Lorayes, are null and void. CIETDc

On 26 May 2004, LBP filed with the RTC a motion 9 to withdraw the
P5,644,773.02 cash bond.
The RTC's Ruling
In its 4 August 2005 Order, the RTC denied LBP's motion to withdraw the
P5,644,773.02 cash bond. The RTC held that:
The Court finds the Land Bank's Motion without merit inasmuch as the
arguments raised therein are specious. Contrary to Land Bank's conclusion,
this Court holds otherwise that the cash bond did not become moot and
academic upon the finality of the Supreme Court's decision dated August 5,
2003. This is so because the underlying reason for the posting of the cash
bond still remains despite the decision of the Supreme Court upholding the
unconstitutionality of the order of arrest issued by PARAD. And that reason is
the distinctive fact that the cash bond was put up in order to secure any damages
that the private respondent Listana may incur by reason of the issuance of the
injunction order. The damages being referred to, that is — the legal right of
Mr. Listana to be justly and promptly paid of his expropriated property — was not
effectively extinguished by the mere decision of the Supreme Court declaring the
illegality of the order of arrest issued by the PARAD against Mr. Alex Lorayes. In
fact, the Court's ruling did not in any way, expressly or impliedly, ordered [sic] the
 release of the cash bond in Land Bank's favor despite that the latter's petition was
upheld with finality by the Supreme Court.

LBP filed a motion for reconsideration. In its 18 October 2005 Order, the RTC
denied the motion. LBP filed with the Court of Appeals a
petition 12 for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.
The Court of Appeals' Ruling
In its 30 January 2008 Decision, the Court of Appeals dismissed LBP's petition
and affirmed in toto the RTC's 4 August and 18 October 2005 Orders.
Issue
LBP raises as issue that the Court of Appeals erred in not allowing the
withdrawal of the P5,644,773.02 cash bond.
The Court's Ruling
The petition is unmeritorious.
The dispositive portion of the 29 January 2001 Order of the RTC clearly states
that "the respondent Provincial Adjudicator of the DARAB . . . is enjoined . . . from
enforcing its order of arrest against Mr. Alex A. Lorayes pending the final
termination of the case before RTC Branch 52, Sorsogon upon the posting of a
cash bond by Land Bank." Thus, LBP cannot withdraw the bond pending final
determination of the amount of just compensation for the property.
In its 14 October 1998 Decision, the DARAB set the amount of just
compensation for the property at P10,956,963.25 and ordered LBP to pay Listana the
amount. On 18 June 1999, the PARAD issued a writ of execution ordering Lorayes to
pay Listana the amount. Lorayes refused and, later, LBP filed with the RTC a
petition for injunction with application for the issuance of a writ of preliminary
injunction.
An applicant for preliminary injunction is required to file a bond executed to the
party or person enjoined, to the effect that the applicant will pay to such party or
person all damages which he may sustain by reason of the injunction.
As correctly ruled by the lower courts, the P5,644,773.02 bond shall answer for
the damages Listana may sustain if the courts finally uphold the P10,956,963.25 just
compensation set by the DARAB. In Republic v. Caguioa, 16 the Court held that, "The
purpose of the injunction bond is to protect the defendant against loss or damage by
reason of the injunction in case the court finally decides that the plaintiff was not
entitled to it, and the bond is usually conditioned accordingly." 17
Thus, as a rule, the DARAB's decision setting the amount of just compensation is
merely preliminary and not executory if challenged before the SAC. Execution pending
"appeal" of the DARAB decision is allowed only on meritorious grounds. 21 Even then,
it is the SAC, not the DARAB, that can grant execution pending "appeal" because the
SAC has original and exclusive jurisdiction over just compensation cases. The
determination of the amount of just compensation is a judicial function that cannot
be usurped by administrative agencies. In Apo Fruits Corporation v. Court of
Appeals, 22 the Court held that:
It is now settled that the valuation of property in eminent domain is
essentially a judicial function which is vested with the RTC acting as Special
Agrarian Court. The same cannot be lodged with administrative agencies and may
not be usurped by any other branch or official of the government. 23

In the present case, LBP filed with the SAC a petition for determination of the
amount of just compensation on 6 September 1999. The PARAD issued the alias writ
of execution and warrant of arrest on 27 November 2000 and 3 January 2001,
respectively. The writ of execution an warrant of arrest were invalid because the 14
October 1998 Decision of the DARAB setting the amount at P10,956,963.25 was
merely preliminary and not executory.
In any event, the Court has reinstated the 29 January 2001 Order of the
RTC enjoining the PARAD from implementing the warrant of arrest pending final
determination of the amount of just compensation for the property. Land Bank
of the Philippines v. Listana, Sr. has long become final and executory and can no
longer be disturbed. Consequently, LBP cannot withdraw the P5,644,773.02 cash
bond which is a condition for the issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction.
REMEDIAL LAW 1 | A.Y. 2023-2024 | JUSTICE MORENO

Bayot, Ariel Jieno

ATTY. HERMINIO HARRY L. ROQUE, JR., Petitioner, v. ARMED FORCES OF THE

PHILIPPINES (AFP) CHIEF OF STAFF, GEN. GREGORIO PIO CATAPANG, BRIG. GEN.
ARTHUR ANG, CAMP AGUINALDO CAMP COMMANDER, AND LT. COL. HAROLD
CABUNOC, AFP PUBLIC AFFAIRS OFFICE CHIEF, Respondents.
G.R. No. 214986, February 15, 2017, Second Division, LEONEN, J.:

DOCTRINE OF THE CASE

“Contempt power is not designed to insulate a lawyer from any publicity he may deem undesirable. It is exercised to
ensure the proper administration of justice and maintain order in court processes, and it should be invoked only to ensure or
promote the proper administration of justice. Accordingly, when determining whether to declare as contumacious alleged violations
of the confidentiality rule, a restrictive interpretation should be applied.”

FACTS:
- Jennifer Laude was allegedly killed at a motel in Olongapo City by 19-year-old US Marine Private
Joseph Scott Pemberton.
- Pemberton had been flown into Camp Aguinaldo and was detained there.
- Respondents state that Petitioner Harry Roque, with his clients (the family of the slain Jennifer
Laude), forced their way inside Pemberton’s detention facility and gained entry despite being
instructed by Military Personnel not to enter the compound, and even though the gates were closed.
- As narrated by Respondents, Petitioner caused disorder by inciting his clients to scale the perimeter
fence, to see Pemberton.
- Respondents allege that the foregoing events are of public knowledge, having been subject of various
national television, radio, internet, and print media publications.
- Because of these events, Respondents released a press statement that they were considering filing
disbarment proceedings against Petitioner. Subsequently, Respondents filed a disbarment
complaint against Petitioner before the IBP.
- On the same day, a conference was called at Camp Aguinaldo, and it was publicly announced that a
disbarment complaint had been filed against Petitioner. A press statement was also distributed,
which reads: “Press Statement: AFP files disbarment complaint against Atty. Harry Roque”
- Petitioner alleges that this press statement was reported on, and generously quoted from, by media.
- Petitioner asserts that Respondents' acts are violated the Rule that proceedings against
attorneys shall be private and confidential. Petitioner claims this put his reputation to question.
- Respondents argue that they should not be cited for contempt. The subject of the disbarment case
pertains to a serious breach of security of a military zone. The statements were official statements
made in the performance of a public function to address a public concern. The circumstances, which
led to the filing of the disbarment complaint and the acts alleged therein were witnessed by the public
and duly reported by the media. The filing of the disbarment case was not meant to malign
petitioner as a lawyer but rather was a response to the events that transpired at Camp
Aguinaldo.
- Respondents also claim the issue is a matter of public interest, which is a defense in contempt
proceedings such as this.
REMEDIAL LAW 1 | A.Y. 2023-2024 | JUSTICE MORENO

- With the Laude Murder case being of public concern, Petitioner has attained the status of a public
figure, susceptible of public comment in connection with his actions on the case.
- In any case, Respondents instituted the disbarment complaint against Petitioner in good faith. They
are laymen, and are not familiar with the confidentiality rule.

ISSUE: Whether Respondents should be cited for contempt (NO)

RULING:
No. Citing Respondents in contempt would be an unreasonable exercise of the Court's
contempt power. Contempt power is not designed to insulate a lawyer from any publicity he may deem
undesirable. It is exercised to ensure the proper administration of justice and maintain order in court
processes, and it should be invoked only to ensure or promote the proper administration of justice.
Accordingly, when determining whether to declare as contumacious alleged violations of the confidentiality
rule, a restrictive interpretation should be applied.

Petitioner assails two acts as violating the confidentiality rule: first, Respondents' supposed public
threats of filing a disbarment case against him, and second, Respondents' public statement that they
had filed a disbarment complaint. Where there are yet no proceedings against a lawyer, there is nothing to
keep private and confidential.

Respondents' threats were made when there was no proceeding to keep private. As for the Press
Statement, a close examination reveals that it does not divulge anything that merits punishment for contempt.
The Press Statement just declared that Respondent AFP filed a disbarment complaint against Petitioner, that
Petitioner is a lawyer, and thus, must conduct himself according to the standards of the legal profession, and
that Petitioner's "unlawful conduct" is prohibited by the Code of Professional Responsibility. The Press
Statement's coverage of the disbarment complaint was a brief, unembellished report that a complaint had
been filed, and no particulars were given about the content of the complaint or the actual charges filed. The
statements were official statements made in the performance of respondents' official functions to address a
matter of public concern. It was the publication of an institutional action in response to a serious breach of
security. Respondents, in the exercise of their public functions, should not be punished for responding
publicly to such public actions. Where freedom of speech and press is involved, a restrictive interpretation
must be applied as to what constitutes contempt.

DISPOSITIVE PORTION: WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.

REMEDIAL LAW 1 | A.Y. 2023-2024 | JUSTICE MORENO

Castillo, Mark

P/SUPT. HANSEL M. MARANTAN vs. ATTY. JOSE MANUEL DIOKNO

G.R. No. 205956, February 12, 2014

DOCTRINE

Freedom of speech should not be impaired through the power of contempt unless the
statements pose a serious and imminent threat to the administration of justice.

FACTS

In 2005, Marantan and police officers shot dead Cu-Unjieng's son and two others (Ortigas
incident). Marantan was charged with murder, later downgraded by the Ombudsman to
homicide. In 2011, Cu-Unjieng filed a petition asking SC to upgrade the charges back to murder.
The case remained pending.

In 2013, Marantan was involved in the Atimonan encounter where 13 men died.
Cu-Unjieng and her counsel Diokno then held a televised press conference criticizing how SC
and courts have failed to punish Marantan for the Ortigas killings, saying Marantan murdered
their loved ones. They hoped the President would intervene.

Marantan filed this indirect contempt petition arguing the respondents influenced the
merits by declaring he murdered victims, and impaired SC's authority through criticisms.

ISSUE
Whether Diokno and Cu-Unjieng are guilty of indirect contempt for their statements in
the press conference. (NO)

RULING

The Supreme Court ruled in the negative. The power of contempt aims to protect courts'
duty to impartially administer justice, but utterances must pose a serious, imminent threat before
contempt sanctions apply to restrict free speech.

Here, Diokno and Cu-Unjieng merely rehashed their belief that the Ortigas victims were
murdered, consistent with their 2011 petition arguments to upgrade charges to murder. Calling
for presidential intervention lacks malice against SC's integrity and independence.
REMEDIAL LAW 1 | A.Y. 2023-2024 | JUSTICE MORENO

The comments, on their face, do not show clear intent to obstruct justice nor seriously or
proximately endanger the case decisions. Though disagreeable to Marantan, they are
constitutionally protected opinions. Hence, contempt power should not be exercised as
statements pose no imminent threat to impede justice.
 Prosecutor Baculi v. Judge Belen
A.M. No. RTJ-09-2179, September 24, 2012
VELASCO, J.

Doctrine of the Case

Administrative complaints cannot substitute for judicial remedies against contempt

decisions. Utterances must show serious threat to administration of justice to warrant
contempt sanctions.

Facts: Baculi filed two separate contempt cases against Judge Belen. The first stemmed
from pleadings Baculi filed in a qualified theft case. Judge Belen initiated direct and
indirect contempt proceedings in 2006, convicting Baculi in both. Baculi questioned the
proceedings and convictions through manifestations and motions, and not appeals.

The second case arose from pleadings Baculi submitted in another case. Judge Belen
again initiated direct and indirect contempt cases in 2006 with identical convictions as the
first case. Baculi filed motions assailing the rulings but did not appeal.

Baculi filed the present administrative cases, claiming the convictions showed Judge
Belen's malice and prejudgment. Judge Belen argued the decisions were already final.

Issue: Whether or not Judge Belen committed grave abuse of authority or ignorance of
the law in citing Baculi in contempt?. (NO)

Ruling: NO. The Supreme Court ruled in the negative and held that Judge Belen cannot
be held administratively liable for the contempt convictions absent fraud, ill motives or
gross ignorance.

For direct contempt, the Rules states:

Sec. 2. Remedy therefrom.––The person adjudged in direct contempt by any court may
not appeal therefrom, but may avail himself of the remedies of certiorari or prohibition.
The execution of the judgment shall be suspended pending resolution of such petition,
provided such person files a bond fixed by the court which rendered the judgment and
conditioned that he will abide by and perform the judgment should the petition be decided
against him.

In indirect contempt proceedings, the Rules states:

Sec. 11. Review of judgment or final order; bond for stay.––The judgment or final order
of a court in a case of indirect contempt may be appealed to the proper court as in criminal
cases. But execution of the judgment or final order shall not be suspended until a bond is
filed by the person adjudged in contempt, in an amount fixed by the court from which the
appeal is taken, conditioned that if the appeal be decided against him he will abide by
and perform the judgment or final order.

Digest-Maker: Cheng, Kennelyn

1
The remedies provided for in the above-mentioned Rules are clear enough. The
complainant could have filed an appeal under Rule 41 of the Rules of Court on the
Decisions in the indirect contempt cases. For the direct contempt citations, a petition for
certiorari under Rule 65 was available to him. He failed to avail himself of both remedies.
He chose instead to question the proceedings and the judgments in the form of motions
and manifestations, and administrative complaints. Due to the failure of the complainant
here to avail himself of these remedies, Judge Belen correctly ruled that the assailed
judgments have become final and executory. They cannot anymore be reviewed by this
Court.

Baculi did not present proof that Judge Belen initiated the contempt proceedings out of
hatred. Judges are presumed to act in lawful exercise of jurisdiction absent evidence
otherwise.

The initiation of proceedings was prompted by Baculi's own pleadings. Baculi was given
an opportunity to present defense but opted not to answer the charges. Thus, Judge
Belen observed proper contempt procedure.

Digest-Maker: Cheng, Kennelyn

2
REMEDIAL LAW 1 | A.Y. 2023-2024 | JUSTICE MORENO

Daytia, Dane

RIZAL COMMERCIAL BANKING CORPORATION v. FEDERICO A. SERRA, SPOUSES

EDUARDO and HENEDINA ANDUEZA, ATTY. LEOMAR R. LANUZA, MR. JO VITO· C.
SORIANO, ATTY. EDWIN L. RANA, ATTY. PARIS G. REAL, ATTY. PRUDENCIO B. DENSING,
JR., HON. JUDGE MAXIMINO R. ABLES, and ATTY. ERWIN S. OLIV
G.R. No. 216124, 19 July 2017, SECOND DIVISION, (Carpio, J.)

DOCTRINE OF THE CASE

There are two (2) kinds of contempt of court, namely: direct and indirect. Indirect contempt or constructive contempt is that which is
committed out of the presence of the court. A person who is guilty of disobedience or of resistance to a lawful order of a court or who commits any
improper conduct tending, directly or indirectly, to impede, obstruct, or degrade the administration of justice may be punished for indirect contempt.
In this case, RCBC accuses respondents of committing indirect contempt under Section 3, paragraphs (b) and (d), Rule 71 of the
Rules of Court. The SC held that respondents are guilty of committing indirect contempt.

FACTS
RCBC sought to execute the RTC-Makati's Order dated 5 January 1989, which directed respondent Federico A.
Serra (Serra) to sell to RCBC a parcel of land in Masbate covered by Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. 0-232 on
which the Masbate Business Center of RCBC is located (subject property).

During the pendency of Civil Case No. 10054, Serra mortgaged the subject property to respondent Spouses
Eduardo M. Andueza and Henedina V. Andueza (Spouses Andueza).
In an Order dated 16 February 2012, the RTC-Makati denied RCBC's motion for execution for lack of basis. The
RTC-Makati found that it had been almost 18 years after the 5 January 1989 Order had become final and executory that
RCBC filed the motion for execution. Neither did RCBC file an action to revive judgment within ten years from the date
the Order became final.
On 11 October 2012, RCBC filed a petition for review with this Court assailing the RTC-Makati's Orders
docketed as G.R. No. 203241. RCBC prayed for the issuance of a TRO to prevent any attempt to remove it from the
subject property, since Serra and Atty. Gina Besa-Serra had already caused the service of a notice to vacate and demand
for the payment of accrued back rentals, dated 6 September 2012, on RCBC. The Court issued a TRO. The TRO became
permanent in in G.R. No. 203241.
Meanwhile, Andueza filed a petition for extrajudicial foreclosure of real estate mortgage.

Pursuant to the Decision in G.R. No. 203241, RCBC filed on 27 February 2014 a new motion for execution
before the RTC-Makati. Andueza, a non-party to the case, filed an opposition to the motion for execution with affirmative
reliefs. In an order issued by the RTC-Makati, the motion for execution was granted and since Andueza did not file a
motion for reconsideration nor did he file an appeal before the Court of Appeals, Order of 14 May 2014 became final.

On 23 June 2014, the RTC-Makati issued a writ of execution.

Based on his Report,13 Sheriff Roberto V. Harina (Sheriff Harina) of the RTC-Makati attempted to serve on
Serra a copy of the Notice to Comply and a copy of the Writ of Execution. However, Serra was not in his office so Sheriff
Harina left with Serra's caretaker copies of the Notice to Comply and the Writ of Execution, who returned such copies by
leaving them at the information table of the Bulwagan ng Katarungan, Masbate City.
Meanwhile, acting on the petition for extrajudicial foreclosure, respondents Atty. Leomar R. Lanuza (Atty.
Lanuza), Clerk of Court and Ex-Officio Provincial Sheriff of the RTC-Masbate, and Jovito C. Soriano (Soriano), Sheriff
of the RTC-Masbate, scheduled the public auction of the subject property on 26 June 2014 at 2:00 in the aftemoon.

On 14 June 2014, RCBC filed a petition for injunction before the RTC-Masbate. Judge Ables as Executive Judge
of the RTC Masbate, issued a 72-hour TRO on 25 June 2014.
REMEDIAL LAW 1 | A.Y. 2023-2024 | JUSTICE MORENO

In the meantime, RCBC filed before the RTC-Makati a motion to divest Serra of his title, invoking Section 10(a),
Rule 39 of the Rules of Court.
On 25 September 2014, a Certificate of Sale was issued by Soriano, noted by Atty. Lanuza and approved by Judge
Ables. The certificate of sale showed that the subject property was sold to Andueza.
In an Order dated 26 September 2014, the RTC-Makati granted RCBC's motion to divest Serra of his title.
In his Comment dated 7 October 2014, Serra asserted that due to the public auction sale on 24 September 2014,
where the subject property was sold to Andueza for being the highest bidder, he could no longer sell the subject property
to RCBC.
In a motion dated 10 December 2014, Spouses Andueza pleaded that the RTC-Makati vacate its 26 September
2014 Order. Spouses Andueza claimed that the RTC-Makati erred in cancelling the real estate mortgage without the trial
court conducting any full-blown hearing.1âwphi1 They also alleged that they were not parties in Civil Case No. 10054;
thus, they are not bound by whatever decision or order the trial court issued in the case. RCBC opposed the motion.

On 27 January 2015, Andueza, through his counsels respondents Atty. Paris G. Real (Atty. Real) and Atty.
Prudencio B. Densing, Jr. (Atty. Densing) filed before the RTC-Masbate an ex-parte motion for issuance of writ of
possession, which was granted by Judge Ables in an Order dated 28 January 2015.27
On 29 January 2015, respondent Atty. Edwin L. Rana (Atty. Rana), Clerk of Court of RTC-Masbate, Branch 47
and Assistant Provincial Sheriff of RTC-Masbate, issued a writ of possession, directing the provincial sheriff to place
Andueza in possession of the subject property, and to eject all persons claiming rights under Serra.

On the same day, Atty. Rana issued a Notice to Vacate, directed against Serra and RCBC, and all persons claiming
any right under Serra. The Notice to Vacate was served on RCBC on 30 January 2015
On 4 February 2015, RCBC filed the present petition for indirect contempt with prayer for a TRO to enjoin
respondents from enforcing the Notice to Vacate and the Writ of Possession issued by RTC-Masbate, and to enjoin the
respondent Register of Deeds from annotating on OCT No. 0-232 the Notice to Vacate and Writ of Possession. RCBC
pleaded that respondents be declared guilty of indirect contempt for disregarding the Court's decisions in G.R. Nos.
103338, 182478, 182664, and 203241, as well as the permanent restraining order in G.R. No. 203241.

ISSUE
Whether or not respondents are liable for indirect contempt.

RULING
YES. Serra and Spouses Andueza are guilty of indirect contempt. Contempt of court has been defined as a
willful disregard or disobedience of a public authority. In its broad sense, contempt is a disregard of, or disobedience to,
the rules or orders of a legislative or judicial body or an interruption of its proceedings by disorderly behavior or insolent
language in its presence or so near thereto as to disturb its proceedings or to impair the respect due to such a body. In its
restricted and more usual sense, contempt comprehends a despising of the authority, justice, or dignity of a court.

There are two (2) kinds of contempt of court, namely: direct and indirect. Indirect contempt or constructive
contempt is that which is committed out of the presence of the court. A person who is guilty of disobedience or of
resistance to a lawful order of a court or who commits any improper conduct tending, directly or indirectly, to impede,
obstruct, or degrade the administration of justice may be punished for indirect contempt.
In this case, RCBC accuses respondents of committing indirect contempt under Section 3, paragraphs (b) and
(d), Rule 71 of the Rules of Court, to wit:
Section 3. Indirect contempt to be punished after charge and hearing. After a charge in writing has been filed,
and an opportunity given to the respondent to comment thereon within such period as may be fixed by the court
and to be heard by himself or counsel, a person guilty of any of the following acts may be punished for indirect
contempt: xx xx
REMEDIAL LAW 1 | A.Y. 2023-2024 | JUSTICE MORENO

(b) Disobedience of or resistance to a lawful writ, process, order, or judgment of a court, including. the act of a
person who, after being dispossessed or ejected from any real property by the judgment or process of any court
of competent jurisdiction, enters or attempts or induces another to enter into or upon such real property, for the
purpose of executing acts of ownership or possession, or in any manner disturbs the possession given to the
person adjudged to be entitled thereto; xx xx
(d) Any improper conduct tending, directly or indirectly, to impede, obstruct, or degrade the administration of
justice;
As a party in G.R. No. 203241, Serra cannot feign ignorance of the Court's decision and restraining order in that
case. The TRO was issued on 3 December 2012 while the decision was promulgated on 10 July 2013. By virtue of the
TRO, which was made permanent, Serra was enjoined to perform any act to remove RCBC from the subject property.
Yet, by defaulting on his loan obligation with Andueza, and Andueza's foreclosure of the real estate mortgage, Serra in
effect allowed the removal of RCBC from the subject property. Serra's conduct tended to impede the administration of
justice by effectively allowing RCBC to be removed from the premises of the subject property, in contravention of the
clear directive in the decision and restraining order in G.R. No. 203241. Therefore, Serra is guilty of indirect contempt and
accordingly fined ₱30,000.

Serra also claims that "he can no longer execute a Deed of Absolute Sale in favor of [RCBC] because the subject
property was already foreclosed and sold in public auction in favor of Spouses Eduardo and Dina Andueza x x x. In other
words, Serra alleges that a supervening event - the foreclosure sale in favor of Spouses Andueza - occurred precluding the
execution of the Court's decision in G.R. No. 203241.
The Court is not convinced that a supervening event occurred which would effectively prevent the execution of
the decision in G.R. No. 203241. While the foreclosure sale proceeded on 24 September 2014, after the finality of the
decision in G.R. No. 203241, the real estate mortgage in favor of Spouses Andueza was executed on 21 September 2011
while G.R. No. 203241 was pending. Serra could not possibly be unaware that a foreclosure sale would likely transpire
since he was the mortgagor who defaulted on his loan obligation. Clearly, Serra performed acts intended to defeat and
circumvent the conclusive effects of the final decision in G.R. No. 203241.

Despite being non-parties in G.R. No. 203241, Spouses Andueza have notice of the pendency of such action.
On 14 February 2013, RCBC had the TRO issued by this Court annotated on OCT No. 0-232 under Entry No.
2013000087. Therefore, Spouses Andueza have actual knowledge of the Court's TRO in G.R. No. 203241 prior to their
filing of the petition for extrajudicial foreclosure of the subject property on 13 August 2013. Further, the decision in G.R.
No. 203241 was promulgated prior to the Spouses Andueza's initiation of foreclosure proceedings. Spouses Andueza
cannot therefore invoke lack of knowledge of RCBC's interest over the subject property when they filed the petition for
extrajudicial foreclosure.
In other words, the Spouses Andueza's act of instituting the petition for extrajudicial foreclosure, which would
ultimately result in removing RCBC from the subject property, obviously tended to impede the administration of justice
and thus constitutes indirect contempt of court. Accordingly, the Spouses Andueza are likewise adjudged guilty of indirect
contempt and fined ₱30,000.
The other respondents, namely the counsels of the Spouses Andueza, merely acted to protect the interests of
their clients over the subject property while the public respondents simply acted pursuant to their ministerial duties and
responsibilities in foreclosure proceedings. These acts do not constitute indirect contempt of court absent any clear and
convincing evidence that they willfully disobeyed the decision and restraining order in G.R. No. 203241 or committed any
act which tended to impede the administration of justice.
REMEDIAL LAW 1 | A.Y. 2023-2024 | JUSTICE MORENO

Dela Cruz, Geriel

CAPITOL HILLS GOLF AND COUNTRY CLUB INC AND PABLO B. ROMAN JR. vs.
MANUEL O. SANCHEZ
G.R. No 182738 | February 24, 2014 | Peralta, J:

Doctrine:

A person guilty of disobedience of or resistance to a lawful order of a court or commits any improper conduct tending,
directly or indirectly, to impede, obstruct, or degrade the administration of justice may be punished for indirect contempt

As far as the proceedings for indirect contempt is concerned, the case of Baculi v. Judge Belen is instructive:

. . . Under the Rules of Court, there are two ways of initiating indirect contempt proceedings: (1) motu proprio
by the court; or (2) by a verified petition.

Facts:

In June 2002 Manuel Sanchez , a stockholder of Capitol Hills, filed a petition for nullification of the
annual meeting of stockholders in May 2002, and the special meeting of stockholder in April 2002
before the RTC Quezon City.

Sanchez filed a Motion for Production and Inspection of Documents. The motion was granted in
September 2002. In October 2002, Sanchez filed an Omnibus Motion to immediately allow him to inspect
and photocopy the documents and to compel petitioners to deposit with the court the documents
subject of the September 10, 2002 Order. The same was granted.

Capitol Hills and Roman Jr. assailed the orders granting the motions of Sanchez via petition for certiorari
with the CA. The CA denied the petition for certiorari. On appeal with the SC, the appeals was also denied.
(In February 2005)

Sanchez sought to enforce the order granting the production and inspection of documents several times
(to no avail): the first supposed inspection was not held, the second supposed inspection was not also held as
petitioners moved for deferment; third, the corporate secretary was out of town and Roman Jr was not willing
to comply. These instances were reported to the court where they were duly noted.

Due to a motion for clarification, and the subsequent inhibition of judges to who the case was raffled, and to
an agreement to hold pre-trial conference until actual conduct and inspection of records, the inspection was
held only in January 2007.

In the January 2007 inspection, the only document produced was the stock and transfer book. They alleged
that they could not find from the corporate records the copies of the proxies submitted by the
stockholders, including the tape recordings taken during the stockholders' meetings, and that they needed
more time to locate and find the list of stockholders as of March 2002, which was in the bodega of the
Corporation.

This prompted Sanchez to file a manifestation and motion praying that an order be issued in actions with
Section 3 paragraphs a to d of Rule 29 (other consequence of refusal to produce for inspection).

The RTC then issued a resolution which gave the parties one last chance to comply with the oder of
September 2002. Failure to comply will result in citing in contempt of court.
REMEDIAL LAW 1 | A.Y. 2023-2024 | JUSTICE MORENO

Petitioners questioned the resolution via Petition for Certiorari (Rule 65) with the CA. The CA rule that there
was no grave abuse of discretion as the resolution was issued pursuant to the interim ruled, and that the RTC
only warned

Issue: Whether or not the threatened citation for contempt is a grave abuse of discretion

Ruling: NEGATIVE.

In this case, the proceedings for indirect contempt have not been initiated. To the Court's mind, the
September 3, 2007 Resolution could be treated as a mere reiteration of the September 10, 2002 Order. It
is not yet a "judgment or final order of a court in a case of indirect contempt" as contemplated under
the Rules. The penalty mentioned therein only serves as a reminder to caution petitioners of the
consequence of possible nonobservance of the long-overdue order to produce and make available for
inspection and photocopying of the requested records/documents. In case of another failure or refusal
to comply with the directive, the court or respondent could formally initiate the indirect contempt proceedings
pursuant to the mandatory requirements of the Rules and existing jurisprudence.

NOTE: The topic “How contempt proceedings commenced” were only discussed in passing.

As far as the proceedings for indirect contempt is concerned, the case of Baculi v. Judge Belen is
instructive:

. . . Under the Rules of Court, there are two ways of initiating indirect contempt proceedings:
(1) motu proprio by the court; or (2) by a verified petition.

MOTU PROPRIO: In contempt proceedings, the prescribed procedure must be followed. Sections 3 and 4,
Rule 71 of the Rules of Court provide the procedure to be followed in case of indirect contempt.

1. First, there must be an order requiring the respondent to show cause why he should not be cited for
contempt.
2. Second, the respondent must be given the opportunity to comment on the charge against him.
3. Third, there must be a hearing and the court must investigate the charge and consider respondent's
answer.
4. Finally, only if found guilty will respondent be punished accordingly.

VERIFIED PETITION: As to the second mode of initiating indirect contempt proceedings, that is, through
a verified petition, the rule is already settled in Regalado v. Go:

In cases where the court did not initiate the contempt charge, the Rules prescribe that a verified
petition which has complied with the requirements of initiatory pleadings as outlined in the heretofore
quoted provision of second paragraph, Section 4, Rule 71 of the Rules of Court, must be filed.
REMEDIAL LAW 1 | A.Y. 2023-2024 | JUSTICE MORENO

Dela Cruz, Nuvi Maecy H.

SPOUSES JOSE AND CORAZON RODRIGUEZ vs. HOUSING AND LAND USE
REGULATORY BOARD (HLURB), ET.AL.
G.R. No. 183324 & 206667, 19 June 2019, SECOND DIVISION, (CAGUIOA, J.)

DOCTRINE OF THE CASE

SEC. 12. Contempt against quasi-judicial entities. — Unless otherwise provided by law, this Rule shall apply to
contempt committed against persons, entities, bodies or agencies exercising quasi-judicial functions, or shall have suppletory
effect to such rules as they may have adopted pursuant to authority granted to them by law to punish for contempt. The
Regional Trial Court of the place wherein the contempt has been committed shall have jurisdiction over such charges as
may be filed therefor.

In this case, the Spouses Nicolas alleged that there is a case for indirect contempt against the Spouses Rodriguez and
Manlulu as the latter supposedly disobeyed and resisted the lawful order of a quasi-judicial body, i.e., the HLURB., and
provides in its prayer that the Court conduct a fact-finding hearing to determine if there was indirect contempt committed.
However, there is no basis to support the former’s allegation that the Court has jurisdiction over a case for indirect
contempt allegedly committed against a quasi-judicial body just because the decision of the said quasi-judicial body is
pending appeal before the Court. Neither can it be entertained by the Supreme Court as it is not a trier of facts. Thus,
the petition for Indirect Contempt is dismissed.

FACTS
On October 2004, the Spouses Balbino and Spouses Nicolas filed a Verified Complaint against Spouses
Rodriguez before the Regional Field Office III of the HLURB. Pursuant to an Order by the HLURB, a Writ
of Preliminary Injunction/Cease and Desist Order was issued by the said board against the Spouses Rodriguez.
Another complaint was thereafter filed by Spouses Santiago, Rogano and Spouses Gamboa before the HLURB-
RFO III which the latter issued a Temporary Restraining Order against the Spouses Rodriguez.
Eventually, the two cases were them consolidated by the Court. The said Complaints deal with the
Ruben San Gabriel Subdivision (subject subdivision), which is located at Barangay Wakas, Bocaue, Bulacan.
The subject subdivision consists of two (2) blocks with a total of twenty (20) residential lots and one (1) road
lot (subject road lot) which served as an access of the inner lots to the MacArthur Highway. In 1978, Ruben
San Gabriel (San Gabriel), the owner of the subdivision, sold nine (9) lots to one Renato Mendoza (Mendoza).
Sometime in 1995, the Spouses Rodriguez acquired these nine (9) lots from Mendoza. When San Gabriel and
Mendoza executed an assignment of right transferring their right to the Spouses Rodriguez, interest in the
subdivision road lot was assigned and transferred in favor of the Spouses Rodriguez. The separate titles of the
lots, including that of the subject road lot, were cancelled and a new TCT covering an area of 4,865 square
meters was issued in the name of the Spouses Rodriguez.
The HLURB-RFO III rendered its decision finding merit to the Complaint and ordering the Spouses
Rodriguez to cease and desist from further including the road lot in the consolidation of their title. It held that
there is no consolidation of the road lot with the other properties of the Spouses Rodriguez.
The Spouses Rodriguez filed a reconsideration with the HLURB Board of Commissioners. The latter
overturned the earlier ruling of the HLURB-RFO III on the basis that the closure of a road lot in a subdivision
is not absolutely prohibited. When the same is done with or pursuant to an Alteration Plan approved by this
Board as required under Section 22 of PD 957, the same is allowable. Without filing an appeal with the Office
of the President, Spouses Rodriguez filed a Petition for Certiorari, Prohibition, and Mandamus under Rule 65
REMEDIAL LAW 1 | A.Y. 2023-2024 | JUSTICE MORENO

before the Court of Appeals. The CA dismissed the Rule 65 Petition for the failure of the Spouses Rodriguez
to exhaust all available administrative remedies.
Consequently, on November 2013, Spouses Nicolas filed a Petition for Indirect Contempt against
Spouses Rodriguez and Manlulu alleging that the Spouses Rodriguez, despite the injunction issued by the
HLURB, maliciously and feloniously dumped filling materials which block the road lot leading to the inner lots
of the subdivision. In April 20164, the Court consolidated the two cases.

ISSUE:

1. Whether or not the CA erred in dismissing the Spouses Rodriguez’ Rule 65 petition outright. (NO)
2. Whether or not the Petition for Indirect Contempt filed by Spouses Nicolas was meritous. (NO)

RULING:

1. NO. The Court of Appeals did not err in dismissing the Spouses Rodriguez’ Rule 65 Petition.
As held time and time again by the Court, for a writ of certiorari to issue, a petitioner must not only prove
that the tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions has acted without or in excess
of jurisdiction. He must also show that there is no plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary
course of law against what he perceives to be a legitimate grievance. An available recourse affording
prompt relief from the injurious effects of the judgment or acts of a lower court or tribunal is considered a
plain, speedy and adequate remedy.
The special civil action of certiorari cannot be used as a substitute for an appeal which petitioner has
lost. Certiorari lies only when there is no appeal nor any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary
course of law.
In this case, the Spouses Rodriguez did not dispute that they failed to appeal the assailed Resolutions of the
HLURB Board before the Office of the President prior to filing its Rule 65 Petition before the CA. Neither did
they provide any information to justify their failure to seek prior recourse before the OP, as provided in the
Rules of Procedure of the HLURB.
Consequently, the contention of the Spouses Rodriguez that HLURB does not have jurisdiction over the
subject lot cannot be given weight considering that the Spouses Rodriguez themselves filed a Motion and
Manifestation before the HLURB praying that they be allowed to construct and introduce developments with
respect to the subject road lot.
2. NO. The Petition for Indirect Contempt filed by Spouses Nicolas should be dismissed.

Section 12, Rule 71 of the Rules of Court is clear and unequivocal in stating that, with respect to contumacious
acts committed against quasi-judicial bodies such as the HLURB, it is the regional trial court of the place where
the contemptuous acts have been committed, and not the Court, that acquires jurisdiction over the indirect
contempt case.

In this case, the Spouses Nicolas alleged that there is a case for indirect contempt against the Spouses Rodriguez
and Manlulu as the latter supposedly disobeyed and resisted the lawful order of a quasi-judicial body, i.e., the
HLURB. Its prayer asks the Court to conduct a fact-finding hearing to determine if there was indirect contempt
committed. However, there is no basis to support the former’s allegation that the Court has jurisdiction over a
case for indirect contempt allegedly committed against a quasi-judicial body just because the decision of the
said quasi-judicial body is pending appeal before the Court. Neither can it be entertained by the Supreme Court
as it is not a trier of facts. Thus, the petition for Indirect Contempt is dismissed.