Principio Precauçao
Principio Precauçao
Principio Precauçao
© UNESCO 2005
Printed in France
(SHS-2005/WS/21 cld/d 20151)
Foreword
In today’s environment of rapid scientific research and technological development, different ways to apply new
knowledge and innovations are constantly being engendered that present us with ever more possibilities and
challenges. We stand to benefit from the greater range of options this progress brings. However, with more
choice also comes more responsibility. Conscious of our roles as stewards of the world in which we live, notably
on behalf of future generations, we must therefore take care in exercising these options.
This need to proceed in an ethical manner is expressed in debates concerning the precautionary
principle. Although the concept of precaution is not a new one, understanding of the precautionary principle
has, with time, come to mean different things to different people and application of the precautionary principle
has proven controversial on occasion.
Born of environmental considerations, the precautionary principle has since matured into an ethical
principle with a far broader scope and the potential value of the precautionary principle as a policy guide should
be envisaged.
Given its mandate in ethics of science and technology, UNESCO has a role to play here in fashioning
the precautionary principle into a form that Member States can properly use in making ethical assessments of
the choices science and technology present.
In conformity with the mandate received from the Member States (31 C/5), UNESCO, together with
its advisory body, the World Commission on the Ethics of Scientific Knowledge and Technology (COMEST), has
brought together a group of experts to propose a clear definition of the precautionary principle and provide clari-
fication of the possible uses of this principle, aiming at offering an ethical platform to ensure proper risk manage-
ment and correct information to the public and to policy makers, in view of the impact of new technologies.
We are pleased to present this report of COMEST’s expert group on the precautionary principle,
which provides Member States with a solid base for discussion and clarifies the principle in a pragmatic way.
This is part of a wider effort UNESCO is making to promote capacity and raise awareness in the field of ethics
of science and technology.
We wish to thank the group of experts for bringing to this task their intellect, enthusiasm and effort,
which has resulted in this work of quality.
1. Introduction 7
1.1 General introduction to the Precautionary Principle 7
1.2 History of the Precautionary Principle 9
Box 1. The example of asbestos 10
1.3 Concepts and defi nitions 12
Box 2. Precautionary Principle, a working definition 14
Box 3. Plausibility versus probability 15
2. Precaution as ethical responsibility and legal norm 17
2.1 Precaution as ethical responsibility 17
2.2 Legal issues 21
Box 4 Article 38 of the Statute
of the International Court of Justice 23
3. Complexity, risk and cost benefit analysis 25
3.1 Complex systems, robustness and resilience 25
3.2 Multiple dimensions of uncertainty in scientific assessment 27
3.3 Risk 28
3.4 Considering costs and benefits 30
3.5 Conclusions 31
Box 5. Conditions under which the Precautionary Principle
applies: the example of xenotransplantation 32
4. Application issues 35
4.1 Implications for science 35
4.2 Implications for policy and governance 38
4.3 Implications for industry and trade 41
4.4 Social and cultural implications 42
References and further reading 45
Annex 1. Practical guidance: frequent questions
about the precautionary principle 49
Annex 2. Comest Expert Group Members 53
1. Introduction
Rio Declaration ‘In order to protect the environment, the Includes qualifying language such as
(United Nations 1992) precautionary approach shall be widely ‘according to their capabilities’ and
applied by States according to their ‘…postponing cost-effective measures’.
capabilities. Where there are threats
of serious or irreversible damage, lack
of full scientific certainty shall not be
used as a reason for postponing cost-
effective measures to prevent environ-
mental degradation.’
When human activities may lead to morally unacceptable harm that is scientifically
plausible but uncertain, actions shall be taken to avoid or diminish that harm.
Morally unacceptable harm refers to harm to humans or the environment that is
쏆 threatening to human life or health, or
쏆 serious and effectively irreversible, or
쏆 inequitable to present or future generations, or
쏆 imposed without adequate consideration of the human rights of those
affected.
The judgement of plausibility should be grounded in scientific analysis. Analysis
should be ongoing so that chosen actions are subject to review.
Uncertainty may apply to, but need not be limited to, causality or the bounds of
the possible harm.
Actions are interventions that are undertaken before harm occurs that seek to
avoid or diminish the harm. Actions should be chosen that are proportional to
the seriousness of the potential harm, with consideration of their positive and
negative consequences, and with an assessment of the moral implications of both
action and inaction. The choice of action should be the result of a participatory
process.
When we judge that one hypothesis is plausible but another is not, we are not
saying that the plausible hypothesis is more probable than the implausible,
although we are saying the plausible hypothesis is more of a serious possibility
than the other. We can only judge the relative probability when we have sufficient
evidence to make this determination. When we lack sufficient evidence about
both hypotheses, we should suspend our judgement about which hypothesis
is true because we are ignorant about that. But we should not suspend our
practical judgement, because we still must decide how to act with respect to
these possible hypotheses. Thus, if I spot a new growth on my skin and my two
hypotheses are ‘it’s cancerous’ and ‘it’s benign’, I do not have to determine that
the growth is probably cancerous in order to go to the doctor and have it tested.
I can regard the cancer hypothesis as a serious possibility even though I do not
regard it as true or even minimally probable.
In this section the ethical basis and legal status of ethical theories, if applied consistently to a given
the PP will be reviewed. In section 2.1 the notion of case, might even yield contradicting moral obliga-
ethical responsibility, equity issues, environmental tions or moral prohibitions. This plurality seems to
protection, and democracy and the moral right to contradict the universal appeal of ethics and to the
have a say will be discussed respectively. The role principle of universalism in ethics itself.
of ethical and legal principles in law, the issue of Yet, people who tend to disagree on
legally binding versus guiding, the relevance of a abstract principles of moral thought, on religion,
distinction between Precautionary Principle and or ethical theory, very often manage to come to an
precautionary approach, the ways in which the PP is agreement on the moral rightness or wrongness of
introduced in international agreements and national particular actions for specific cases. This is because
legislation and the issue of liability and burden of moral judgements are less subject to plurality and
proof are discussed in section 2.2. rest on a firmer basis than the ethical theories that
one adheres to. This indicates that in spite of the
plurality of ethical theories, ethical relativism is not
the only option. In fact, the convergence of many
2.1 Precaution moral judgements on specific problem-cases may be
as ethical responsibility seen to reveal that there is a universal basis for eth-
ics that is as yet only partially revealed by current
The PP has an ethical basis, and applications of academic theories of ethics.
the PP are value-sensitive. The working definition When ethics is integrated into political
of the PP given in Box 2 talks about ‘morally unac- and legal thinking, one should be careful to, on the
ceptable harm’. Morality refers to beliefs and prac- one hand, acknowledge the diversity and plurality
tices about good and evil that guide our behaviour. of ethical thinking and, on the other hand, strive
Ethics is the explicit, philosophical reflection on for as much practical consensus on moral judge-
moral beliefs and practices. ments as is possible. One way to do this is to deflect
One of the features of ethics that many our thinking away from ethical theory and rather
people regard as problematic is the apparent great focus on more specific ethical principles and ethi-
variety of ethical theories available. Some of these cal values.
precaution, in general principle is employed as the agreements). Despite its wide recognition in inter-
philosophical basis of the precaution and approach national treaties, international courts (ICJ, ITLOS,
as its practical application. Therefore in most cases WTO Appellate Body, ECHR) have nevertheless
the terms will be closely related. Certainly, the remained reluctant to accept the PP as such.
phrase ‘precautionary approach’ has often been used The PP is frequently introduced in frame-
in international settings to refer to the PP. The Rio work conventions. Although this strategy is widely
Declaration, for instance, uses the word ‘approach’ used in international environmental law, it is merely
in the English version, and the word ‘principio’ in a first step in elaborating more precise rules at
the Spanish version. Where the PP has reached the the international level fleshing out that principle.
status of a general principle of law or a customary Furthermore, in a number of international agree-
rule of international law, those that prefer the term ments, the PP is worded in such a way that it is
‘approach’ sometimes deny such status to it. deprived of immediate and autonomous applicabi-
lity. Use of terms such as ‘form a basis for’, ‘inspire’,
PP in international agreements ‘endeavour’, etc. imply that the principle is merely
and national legislation intended to prepare States to implement their inter-
national obligations. Only the repeated use of State
Nowadays, the PP abounds in declarations, resolu- practice and consistent opinio juris are likely to
tions and guidelines enacted in different international transform precaution into a customary norm.
settings. Recently, international lawmakers have been Many EU policy programmes, politi-
endorsing the PP in most major agreements related to cal statements, strategy documents and White and
environmental protection (more than 60 international Green Papers refer to the PP. Given the non-binding
The PP applies to a special class of problems that is conditions today may bear little resemblance to
characterized by: (1) complexity in the natural and conditions of the immediate past.
social systems that govern the causal relationships In these complex systems, then, periods
between human activities and their consequences of relative stasis (conditions remaining largely the
and (2) unquantifiable scientific uncertainty in the same) can suddenly give way, and the system can
characterization and assessment of hazards and ‘lurch’ towards another fundamentally different
risks. The existing decision-support tools to cope state. Some examples include the large-scale ocean
with risks in a rational way, such as probabilistic circulation that currently transports heat on the
risk assessment and cost benefit analysis, have Northern hemisphere from the mid latitudes to the
limited value under these conditions. Some of these high latitudes (known as the “Thermohaline Cir-
issues may be well-known to scientists, but one culation”), which geological analysis and model
cannot assume that all relevant decision- experiments suggest can be on or off, with drastic
makers recognize the implications of them for changes for the environmental conditions of West-
the PP. Therefore a brief excursion into the basic ern Europe between the two states. To give another
characteristics of these issues will follow. example, cultures can be open to external influ-
ences, or more insular and can, on long time scales,
oscillate back and forth between these two states.
Systems that can suddenly cross thresh-
3.1 Complex systems, olds or flip to a new state give rise to different policy
robustness and resilience and management challenges than do systems that
respond more gradually to changes (always return-
There is a growing awareness that the behaviour ing to the same stable configuration each time they
of natural and social systems is more complicated are perturbed away from it), not the least because
than scientists had previously believed. In parti- care must now be exercised to avoid states of the
cular, the dynamics of these systems may not be system that are undesirable, or to access or remain
regular (with conditions today following closely in states that are desirable. At the same time, it
upon the conditions of yesterday), but character- must be recognized that systems that are character-
ized by thresholds or non-linear behaviour where ized by these non-linear behaviours can be, at times,
Further ground for concern arises from the scientific theory of zoonosis, which is
widely known as one of the theories used to explain the origin of the HIV virus.
According to this theory, HIV-infections have developed by zoonosis: viruses from
apes became able to reproduce themselves in the human body after some initial
contact with the animal, and were then spread to other humans through human
contact.
Conditions (a)–(g) can be seen as general conditions for applying the Precautionary
Principle. Thus, precautionary measures might be indicated in this case.
The introduction of the PP in risk governance and of policy-relevant quantitative information on risks
national and international law has implications for together with the essential warnings about its uncer-
several institutions and actors. In the following, the tainties, limitations and pitfalls. The PP imposes a
implications for science (4.1), policy and governance clear need to improve communication and reflec-
(4.2), industry and trade (4.3) and finally, social tion on various levels and types of uncertainty in
and cultural implications (4.4) will be discussed. scientific assessment.
Recommendations are given to promote effective
implementation of the PP. Enhance the role of vulnerability
science: systematic search for surprises
and ways to constrain them
4.1 Implications for science The Late Lessons form Early Warnings study
(Harremoës et al., 2001) has shown many examples
The PP asks for a number of changes in scientific of unanticipated adverse effects of new technolo-
culture and in the way in which risk assessment is gies. Given the absence of adequate methodology
performed. These are discussed below. to assess surprise, a systematic search for examples
of surprises and non-linear system behaviour from
Coping with uncertainty the past might be the prelude to a search for pos-
The PP requires a science that better reflects uncer- sible future surprises. Other strategies that can help
tainty and complexity in the assessment of risks. us to anticipate surprise include focusing on the
Both qualitative and quantitative dimensions of underlying principles of surprise and systematically
uncertainty need explicit treatment. Uncertainties ‘thinking the unthinkable’ by imagining unlikely
along with the key assumptions on which knowledge (undesirable) future events or future states of the
claims on risks are conditioned need to be made environment, followed by the construction of plausi-
explicit and communicated clearly to the various ble scenarios by which they might be realized.
actors involved in the discourses on these risks. From such an analysis it may be possible
This requires the further development and dissemi- to identify precautionary interventions that constrain
nation of multidisciplinary and multidimensional the possibilities of the system developing towards
uncertainty analysis, which enables the delivery potential undesired states. For instance, the global
ANDORNO, R. (2004), The Precautionary Principle: A New Legal Standard for a Techno-
logical Age, Journal of International Biotechnology Law, (1), p. 11-19.
BEDER, S. (1996), The Nature of Sustainable Development, 2nd ed., Scribe Publications,
Melbourne.
BEDER, S. (1997), ‘The Environment Goes to Market’, Democracy and Nature, 3 (3),
pp. 90-106.
BUNDESMINISTERIUM DES INNERN, Dritter Immissionsschutzbericht, 1984, Drucksache
Bonn 10/1345.
CARPENTER, S.C, WALKER, B.H., ANDERIES, M. and ABEL, N. (2001), From metaphor to
measurement: Resilience of what to what? Ecosystems 4, 765–781.
COONEY, R. (2003), The Precautionary Principle in Natural Resource Management
and Biodiversity Conservation: Situation Analysis, IUCN (www.pprinciple.net/
publications/sa.pdf).
DAVIS, M. (2003), “Whistleblowing”, in: The Oxford Handbook of Practical Ethics,
Hugh LaFollette (ed.), Oxford University Press: Oxford, New York, pp. 539-563.
DE SADELEER, N. (2002), Environmental Principles, Oxford University Press, 433 pp.
DOUGLAS, M. and WILDAVSKY, A. (1982), Risk and Culture: An Essay on the Selection
of Technological and Environmental Dangers, University of California Press,
Los Angeles, 1982, 221 pp.
HARREMOËS, P., GEE, D., MACGARVIN, M., STIRLING, A., KEYS, J., WYNNE, B., and
GUEDES VAZ, S. (eds.) (2001), Late lessons from early warnings: the precautionary
principle 1896–2000, Environmental issue report no. 22. Copenhagen: European
Environment Agency.
EU (2000), Communication from the commission on the precautionary principle COM 1.
Brussels: Commission of the European Communities.
EU (2001), Directive 2001/18/Ec of the European Parliament and of the Council of
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Practical guidance:
frequent questions about
the precautionary principle
What is the goal of the PP?
The goal of the PP is to protect humans and the environment against uncertain risks of
human action by means of pre-damage control (anticipatory measures). The PP provides
a rational approach to the satisfactory and ethically justified management of uncertain
risks to public health, society or environment. It aims to use the best of the ‘systems
sciences’ of complex processes to make wiser decisions. The PP is to supplement, but not
necessarily replace, other management strategies that fall short of being able to handle
large-scale scientific uncertainty and ignorance: ‘When human activities may lead to
morally unacceptable harm that is scientifically plausible but uncertain, actions shall be
taken to avoid or diminish that harm’.
Generally speaking, the PP applies when there is plausible evidence of possible harm
but scientific uncertainty and ignorance makes it impossible to reliably quantify and
characterize the risks. More specifically, one needs to check whether:
✦ there exist considerable scientific uncertainties or even ignorance about the anticipa-
ted harm;
✦ there exist scenarios (or models) of possible harm that are scientifically reasonable
(that is, based on some scientifically plausible reasoning);
✦ it is currently impossible to reduce the uncertainties without at the same time increasing
ignorance of other relevant factors by higher levels of abstraction and idealization;
✦ the potential harm is indeed sufficiently serious or even irreversible for present or
future generations or otherwise morally unacceptable;
✦ there is a need to act now, since effective counter-action later will be made significantly
more difficult or costly at any later time.
The PP calls for measures that either are likely to prevent the possible harm from occur-
ring or are likely to contain or reduce the possible harm should it occur. In principle,
there will always be a range of possible strategies that would satisfy this requirement.
One may impose certain constraints on the range of such measures. One may, for example,
require that the actions be:
(a) non-discriminatory in their application, i.e. similar situations are treated similarly,
(b) consistent in scope and nature with comparable measures from equivalent areas,
(c) proportional to the chosen level of protection and the scope of the harm,
(d) chosen with due consideration of positive and negative consequences (including
non-monetary costs and benefits) and with an assessment of the moral implications
of both action and inaction,
(e) subject to continuous review and monitoring, and that the main burden of providing
evidence for safety rests on the proposers of a new technology or activity.
Even under these conditions a variety of possible precautionary actions may remain,
ranging from simple restrictions upon a practice, strengthening the resilience of the
system, the development of effective controlling (remediating) technologies, to a total
ban of the activity. The final choice will always be value-based.
Since the application of the PP involves the explicit consideration of values that are
affected by it, since values differ in society, the processes leading up to a final choice
of action should be largely participatory and inclusive. The cultural plurality in risk
attitudes varying from risk-aversion to willingness to take risks implies that the question
of how society ought to deal with risks can only be answered in public debate – a debate
in which people will necessarily discuss their perception of risks and risk management
from different points of view and different conceptual and ethical frameworks. Only if
decisions can acquire some robustness in terms of social and political acceptability do
they stand a chance of being effective over time.
A mere fantasy or crude speculation that an activity or new technology causes harm is
not enough to trigger the PP. Grounds for concern that can trigger the PP are limited
to those concerns that are plausible or scientifically tenable (that is, not easily refuted).
Generally speaking, there are three classes of cases where the PP should not be used.
The first class is when the scientific uncertainties can be overcome in the short term
through more research, or when the uncertainties are simply understood as low proba-
bility of harm (in that case it is only a question of the chosen level of protection).
However, in some cases the potential consequences can be of a nature and magnitude that
makes them morally unacceptable even if the probability is very low, for instance, extinc-
tion of mankind. The second class is when the potential harm is not morally unacceptable,
e.g. when the harm is restricted to individuals who voluntarily engage in the activity and
are informed about the possible consequences. The third class of cases is when the harm
is reversible and it is likely that effective counter-action is not becoming more difficult or
costly, even when one waits until the first manifestations of the harm eventually occur.
In this case a ‘wait and see’ strategy might be used.
The PP provides a rational framework for managing uncertain risks. However, the PP
in itself is not a decision algorithm and thus cannot guarantee consistency between cases.
Just as in legal court cases, each case will be somewhat different, having its own facts,
uncertainties, circumstances, and decision-makers, and the element of judgement cannot
be eliminated. In this respect it resembles other ethical and legal principles. Principles of
law constitute important tools for crystallization of new concepts and values. A strength
of the PP being a principle is its open-endedness and flexibility, which creates a possi-
bility and an incentive for social learning. Different areas of application and different
legal frameworks may lead to more specific guidance and regulations. The repeated use of
State practice and consistent opinio juris are likely to transform the PP into a customary
norm. Among the principles emanating from international declarations, the PP is legally
COMEST
Expert Group Members
Acknowledgements
We thank Nicolas de Sadeleer and Rosie Cooney for valuable inputs and text contributions to
this report.