ASE DIGEST: PIMENTEL VS. LEB G.R. NO.

230642 &
242954. SEPTEMBER 10, 2019
FACTS:

Petitioners in this case assail the unconstitutionality of R.A. 7662 or the Legal
Education Reform Act of 1993 which creates the Legal Education Board.
Petitioners particularly seek to declare as unconstitutional the creation of LEB
itself, LEB issuances and memorandums establishing law practice internship
as a requirement for taking the bar based on Sec. 7 (g) of RA 7662, adopting a
system of continuing legal education based on Sec. 2 (2) and Sec. 7 (h) of RA
7662, and establishing and implementing the nationwide law school aptitude
test known as the Philippine Law School Admission Test or the PhilSAT
pursuant to LEB’s power to “prescribe the minimum standards for law
admission” under Sec. 7 (e) of RA 7662. Petitioners principally grounded the
petitions on LEB’s alleged encroachment upon the rulemaking power of the
Court concerning the practice of law, violation of institutional academic
freedom, and violation of law school aspirant’s right to education under the
Constitution.

ISSUES:

1. Whether the regulation and supervision of legal education belong to the

Court.
2. Whether the requirement of internship for admission to Bar Examination
embodied in LEB Memorandum pursuant to Sec. 7(g) of RA 7662 is
unconstitutional.
3. Whether the adoption of system of continuing legal education embodied in
LEB Memorandum pursuant to Sec. 2(2) and Sec. 7(h) of RA 7662 is
unconstitutional.
4. Whether the establishment of PhilSAT embodied in LEB Memorandum
pursuant to Sec. 7(e) of RA 7662 is unconstitutional.

RULING:

1. NO. Regulation and supervision of legal education had been historically and
consistently exercised by the political departments. The historical
development of statutes on education unerringly reflects the consistent
exercise by the political departments of the power to supervise and regulate all
levels and areas of education, including legal education. Legal education is but
a composite of the entire Philippine education system. It is perhaps unique
because it is a specialized area of study. This peculiarity, however, is no reason
in itself to demarcate legal education and withdraw it from the regulatory and
supervisory powers of the political branches.

Two principal reasons militate against the proposition that the Court has the
regulation and supervision of legal education:

First, it assumes that the court, in fact, possesses the power to supervise and
regulate legal education as a necessary consequence of its power to regulate
admission to the practice of law. This assumption, apart from being manifestly
contrary to the history of legal education in the Philippines, is likewise devoid
of legal anchorage.

Second, the Court exercises only judicial functions and it cannot, and must
not, arrogate upon itself a power that is not constitutionally vested to it, lest
the Court itself violates the doctrine of separation of powers. For the Court to
void RA 7662 and thereafter, to form a body that regulates legal education and
place it under its supervision and control, as what petitioners suggest, is to
demonstrate a highly improper form of judicial activism.

As it is held, the Court’s exclusive rule making power under the Constitution
covers the practice of law and not the study of law. The present rules
embodied in the 1997 Rules of Court do not support the argument that the
Court directly and actually regulates legal education, it merely provides
academic competency requirements for those who would like to take the Bar.
Furthermore, it is the State in the exercise of its police power that has the
authority to regulate and supervise the education of its citizens and this
includes legal education.

2. YES. This requirement unduly interferes with the exclusive jurisdiction of

the Court to promulgate rules concerning the practice of law and admissions
thereto. The jurisdiction to determine whether an applicant may be allowed to
take the bar examinations belongs to the Court. Under Sec. 7(g), the power of
the LEB is no longer confined within the parameters of legal education but
now dabbles on the requisites for admissions to the bar. This is direct
encroachment upon the Court’s exclusive authority to promulgate rules
concerning admissions to the bar and should, therefore, be struck down as
unconstitutional.

3. YES. By its plain language, the clause “continuing legal education” unduly
give the LEB the power to supervise the legal education of those who are
already members of the bar. Inasmuch as the LEB is authorized to compel
mandatory attendance of practicing lawyers in such courses and for such
duration as the LEB deems necessary, the same encroaches upon the Court’s
power to promulgate rules concerning the Integrated Bar which includes the
education of Lawyer-professors as the teaching of law is considered the
practice of law.

4. YES. Accordingly, the Court recognizes the power of the LEB under its
charter to prescribe minimum standards for law admission. The PhilSAT,
when administered as an aptitude test to guide law schools in measuring the
applicant’s aptness for legal education along with such other admissions policy
that the law school may consider, is such minimum standard. However, the
PhilSAT presently operates not only as a measure of an applicant’s aptitude
for law school. The PhilSAT, as a pass or fail exam, dictates upon law schools
who among the examinees are to be admitted to any law program. When the
PhilSAT is used to exclude, qualify, and restrict admissions to law schools, as
its present design mandates, the PhilSAT goes beyond mere supervision and
regulation, violates institutional academic freedom, becomes unreasonable
and therefore, unconstitutional.
Oscar B. Pimentel, et. al. v. Legal Education Board [LEB]/Francis Jose Jean L. Abayata, et. al. versus Hon.
Salvador Medialdea and LEB G.R. Nos. 230642-242954 | September 10, 2019 Penned by: J. Reyes, Jr.

The Case: These are consolidated cases for Certiorari and Prohibition under Rule 65 of the Rules of
Court. They assail as unconstitutional RA 7662 (Legal Education Reform Act of 1993), which created the
Legal Education Board (LEB), on the principal grounds of: • encroachment upon the rule-making power
of the Court concerning the practice of law; • violation of institutional academic freedom; and •
violation of a law school aspirant’s right to education. On the same grounds, these petitions also seek to
declare as unconstitutional the LEB issuances establishing and implementing the nationwide law school
aptitude test known as the Philippine Law School Admission Test (PhilSAT).

Facts of the Case: On December 23, 1993, Congress passed RA 7662 for the improvement of the system
of legal education on account of poor performance in the bar examinations. It was declared the policy of
the State to uplift the standards of legal education.

For this purpose, RA 7662 created the Legal Education Board (LEB), an executive agency made separate
from DECS, but attached thereto for budgetary purposes and administrative support. The Chairman and
regular members are appointed by the President for a five-year term, without reappointment, from a list
of at least three nominees prepared by the JBC, with prior authorization from the Supreme Court. In
2001, the Court’s Committee on Legal Education and Bar Matters (CLEBM) noted several objectionable
provisions of RA 7662 which go beyond the ambit of education of aspiring lawyers and into the sphere
of education of persons duly licensed to practice the law profession. CLEBM proposed amendments to
the foregoing provisions. These were approved by the Supreme Court in a September 4, 2001
Resolution, and Congress was furnished with a copy of the same. Nevertheless, RA 7662 remained
unaltered.

Despite the passage of its enabling law in 1993, the LEB became fully operational only on June 2010.
Since then, the LEB has issued several orders, circulars, resolutions, and other issuances which are made
available through their website. Among the orders issued was Memorandum Order No. 7, Series of 2010
(LEBMO

No. 7-2016), pursuant to its power to prescribe the minimum standards for law admission. The policy
and rationale is to improve the quality of legal education by requiring all those seeking admission to the
basic law course to take and pass a nationwide uniform law school admission test, known as the PhilSAT.

The PhilSAT is essentially an aptitude test measuring the examinee’s communications and language
proficiency, critical thinking, verbal and quantitative reasoning. It was designed to measure the
academic potential of the examinee to pursue the study of law. Exempted from the PhilSAT were honor
graduates who were granted professional civil service eligibility and who are enrolling within two years
from their college graduation.

Days before the first ever scheduled PhilSAT on April 16, 2017, the petitions for Certiorari and
Prohibition were filed and consolidated. The petitioners consist of lawyers, taxpayers, law professors,
citizens intending to take up law, current law students who failed to take the PhilSAT, and the like.

Argument of the Petitioners: RA 7662 and the PhilSAT are offensive to the Court’s Power to regulate and
supervise the legal profession pursuant to Sec. 5(5), Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution, and that
Congress cannot create an administrative office that exercises the Court’s power over the practice of
law.

Petitioners also question the constitutionality of the LEB’s powers to prescribe the qualifications and
compensation of faculty members, and the LEB’s power to adopt a system of continuing legal education
as being repugnant to the Court’s rule-making power. This and PhilSAT violate the academic freedom of
law schools and the right to education. The LEB cannot issue penal regulations, and the consequent
forfeiture of school fees and the ban on enrollment for those who failed to pass the PhilSAT violate due
process.

Comments of the OSG: The Court’s power to regulate admission to the practice of law does not include
regulation of legal education. The PhilSAT is the minimum standard for entrance to law schools pursuant
to the State’s power to regulate education. It is no different from the National Medical Admission Test
(NMAT), which the court already upheld as a valid exercise of police power in Tablarin v. Gutierrez1.

Neither the PhilSAT nor RA 7662 violate academic freedom because the standards for entrance to law
school, the standards for accreditation, the prescribed 1

236 Phil. 768 (1987).

qualifications of faculty members, and the prescribed basic curricula are fair, reasonable, and equitable
admission and academic requirements.

Argument of the Respondents: RA 7662 enjoys the presumption of constitutionality. The study of law is
different from the practice of law. The right of the citizens to accessible education means that the State
shall make quality education accessible only to those qualified enough, as determined by fair,
reasonable, and equitable admission and academic requirements.

THE ISSUES: I.

II.

Procedural Issues:

a. Remedies of certiorari and prohibition; and

b. Requisites of judicial review and the scope of the Court’s review in the instant petitions.

Substantive Issues;

a. Jurisdiction over legal education;

b. Supervision and regulation of legal education as an exercise of police power;

i. Reasonable supervision and regulation

ii. Institutional academic freedom

iii. Right to education

c. LEB’s powers under RA 7662 vis-à-vis the Court’s jurisdiction over the practice of law; and

d. LEB’s powers under RA 7662 vis-à-vis the academic freedom of law schools and the right to education.

THE RULING OF THE COURT The petitions are partially granted. Resort to the remedies of certiorari and
prohibition are proper, and the case meets the requisites for judicial review. The Court has no primary
and direct jurisdiction over legal education. The jurisdiction of the LEB over legal education is upheld.
However, the Court declared the following provisions of RA 7662 as UNCONSTITUTIONAL:

1. Section 2, paragraph 2 of RA 7662 insofar as it unduly includes “continuing legal education” as an

aspect of legal education which is made subject to executive supervision and control.

2. Section 3(a)(2) of RA 7662 and Section 7(2) of LEBMO No. 1-2011 on the objective of legal education
to increase awareness among members of the legal profession of the needs of the poor, deprived and
oppressed sectors of society.

3. Section 7(g) of RA 7662 and Section 11(g) of LEBMO No. 1-2011 insofar as it gives the LEB the power
to establish a law practice internship as a requirement for taking the bar. 4. Section 7(h) of RA 7662 and
Section 11 (h) LEBMO No. 1-2011 insofar as it gives the LEB the power to adopt a system of mandatory
continuing legal education and to provide for the mandatory attendance of practicing lawyers in such
courses and for such duration as it may deem necessary. The following were also declared
UNCONSTITUTIONAL for being ultra vires:

1. The act and practice of the LEB of excluding, restricting, and qualifying admissions to law schools in
violation of the institutional academic freedom on who to admit (particularly that applicants to law
schools are required to pass the PhilSAT).

2. The act and practice of the LEB of dictating the qualifications and classification of faculty members,
dean, and dean of graduate schools in violation of institutional academic freedom on who may teach.

3. The act and practice of LEB of dictating the policies on the establishment of legal apprenticeship and
legal internship programs in violation of academic freedom on what to teach.

RATIO DECIDENDI I. Procedural Issues I-a. Remedies of certiorari and prohibition Petitioners availed of
the proper remedies. A Rule 65 petition, as a procedural vehicle to invoke the Court’s expanded
jurisdiction, has been allowed. After all, there is grave abuse of discretion when an act is done contrary
to the Constitution, the law, or jurisprudence, or is executed whimsically, capriciously, or arbitrarily, out
of malice, ill will, or personal bias. In Spouses Imbong v. Ochoa, Jr.2 the Court emphasized that
certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus are appropriate remedies to raise constitutional issues.

That it is a legislative act which is being assailed is not a ground to deny the present petition. First, the
Constitution enumerates under Sec. 5(2)(a), Article VIII, the Court’s irreducible powers which expressly
include the power of judicial review, or the power to pass upon the constitutionality or validity of any
treaty, international or executive agreement, law, presidential decree, proclamation, order, instruction,
ordinance, or regulation.

Second, the Court’s expanded jurisdiction, when invoked, permits a review of acts not only by a tribunal,
board, or officer exercising judicial, quasi-judicial, or ministerial functions, but also by any branch or
instrumentality of the Government. This necessarily includes the Legislative and Executive branches,
even if they are not exercising the aforementioned functions. As such, the Court may review and/or 2

732 Phil. 1, 121 (2014).

prohibit or nullify, when proper, acts of legislative and executive officials, there being no plain, speedy,
or adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.

I-b. Requisites of judicial review The power of judicial review is tritely defined as the power to review
the constitutionality of the actions of the other branches of the government3. For a proper exercise of
its power of review in constitutional litigation, certain requisites must be satisfied: • An actual case or
controversy calling for the exercise of judicial power; • The person challenging the act must have
“standing” to challenge; • The question of constitutionality must be raised at the earliest possible
opportunity; and • The issue of constitutionality must be the very lis mota of the case.

An actual case or controversy is one which involves a conflict of legal rights and an assertion of opposite
legal claims susceptible of judicial resolution. The case must not be moot or academic, or based on
extra-legal or other similar considerations not cognizable by a court of justice. Closely associated with
the requirement of a justiciable case is the ripening seeds for adjudication. Ripeness for adjudication has
a two-fold aspect: first, the fitness of the issues for judicial decision; and second, the hardship to the
parties entailed by withholding court consideration. To stress, a constitutional question is ripe for
adjudication when the challenged governmental act has a direct and existing adverse effect on the
individual challenging it4.

The petitions raise an actual controversy insofar as they allege that specific provisions of RA 7662
infringe upon the Court’s power to promulgate rules regarding the practice of law and upon institutional
academic freedom and the right to quality education.

As for legal standing, jurisprudence requires a personal and substantial interest in the case such that the
petitioner has sustained, or will sustain, direct injury as a result of the violation of its rights5. The rule on
standing admits of recognized exceptions: the overbreadth doctrine, taxpayer suits, third-party standing,
and the doctrine of transcendental importance. Legal standing may be extended to petitions for having
raised a “constitutional issue of critical significance.”6 Without a doubt, the delineation of the Court’s
rule3

Garcia v. Executive Secretary, 602 Phil. 64, 73 (2009). See also Angara v. Electoral Commission, 63 Phil.
139, 158 (1936). 4 ABAKADA Guro Partylist v. Purisima, 584 Phil. 246, 266 (2008). 5 BAYAN v. Zamora,
396 Phil. 623, 646 (2000) and Kilosbayan, Inc. v. Morato, 316 Phil. 652, 695-696 (1995). 6 Funa v. Villar,
686 Phil. 571, 585 (2012).

making power vis-à-vis the supervision and regulation of legal education and the determination of the
reach of the State’s supervisory and regulatory power in the context of academic freedom and the right
to education are novel issues with farreaching implications that deserve the Court’s immediate
attention.

II. Substantive Issues II-a. Jurisdiction over legal education The Court has no primary and direct
jurisdiction over legal education. Neither the history of the Philippine legal education nor the Rules of
Court invoked by petitioners support their argument. The supervision and regulation of legal education
is an Executive function.
Regulation and supervision of legal education had been historically and consistently exercised by the
political departments. The full text of the Supreme Court decisions provides a detailed look into the
history of legal education in the Philippines. The 1935 Constitution expressed in no uncertain terms that
“all educational institutions shall be under the supervision and subject to regulation by the State.”7 The
regulation of law schools, in particular, was undertaken by the Bureau of Private Schools through a
special consultant who acted as supervisor of the law schools and as a national coordinator of the law
deans. Meanwhile, the 1973 Constitution remained consistent in mandating that all educational
institutions shall be under the supervision of and subject to regulation by the State.8

With the passage of BP 232 (Education Act of 1982), a Ministry of Education, Culture and Sports (MECS)
was organized to supervise and regulate educational institutions. Accordingly, MECS was given the
authority over public and private institutions of higher education, as well as degree-granting programs,
in all postsecondary public and private educational institutions. MECS later became DECS in 1987, but its
power to supervise all educational institutions remained unchanged.

Pursuant to its mandate under BP 232, DECS promulgated, in close coordination with the Philippine
Association of Law Schools, the Philippine Association of Law Professors, and the Bureau of Higher
Education, an order specifically outlining the policies and standards for legal education, prescribed the
preferred qualifications and functions of a law dean and faculty members, etc. It was made clear that
the administration of a law school shall be governed primarily by the law school’s own policies, and the
provisions of the Order applied only suppletorily. Applicants for a law course are required to comply
only with the specific requirements for admission by the Bureau of Higher Education and the Court. Such
was the state of the regulation of legal education until the enactment of RA 7662.

78

CONSTITUTION (1935), Art. XIII, Sec. 5. CONSTITUTION (1974), Art. XV, Sec. 8(1).

Legal education is a mere composite of the educational system. It is perhaps unique because it is a
specialized area of study, but this peculiarity is not reason in itself to demarcate legal education and
withdraw it from the regulatory and supervisory powers of the political branches. The petitioners
profess that they are not against the creation of an administrative body that will supervise and regulate
law schools, only that such body should be placed under the Court’s supervision and control. Two
principal reasons militate against such provision:
First, it assumes that the Court possesses the power to supervise and regulate legal education as a
necessary consequence of its power to regulate the admission to the practice of law. This assumption is
devoid of legal anchorage.

Second, the Court exercises only judicial functions and it cannot, and must not, arrogate unto itself a
power that is not constitutionally vested to it, lest the Court itself violates the doctrine of separation of
powers. For the Court to void RA 7662 and thereafter form a body that regulates legal education and
place it under its supervision and control is to demonstrate a highly improper form of judicial activism.

The Court’s exclusive rule-making power covers the practice of law and not the study of law. The
practice of law has a settled jurisprudential meaning: “The practice of law is not limited tot the conduct
of cases or litigation in court… Practice of law under modern conditions consists in no small part of work
performed outside of any court and having no immediate relation to proceedings in court. It embraces
conveyancing, the giving of legal advice on a large variety of subjects, and the preparation and execution
of legal instruments covering an extensive field of business and trust relations and other affairs.”9 This
definition of the practice of law, no matter how broad, cannot be further enlarged as to cover the study
of law.

The Court exercises judicial power only. Sec. 12, Art. VIII of the 1987 Constitution clearly provides that
the Members of the Supreme Court and of other courts established by law shall not be designated to
any agency performing quasijudicial or administrative functions. Neither may the regulation and
supervision of legal education be justified as an exercise of the Court’s “residual” power. A power is
residual if it does not belong to either of the two co-branches. Regulation and supervision of legal
education is primarily exercised by the Legislative and implemented by the Executive, thus it cannot be
claimed by the Judiciary.

It is with studied restraint that the Court abstains from exercising a power that is not strictly judicial, or
that which is not expressly granted to it by the Constitution.

Cayetano v. Monsod, 278 Phil. 235, 242-243 (1991).

This judicial abstention is neither avoidance nor dereliction – there is simply no basis for the Court to
supervise and regulate legal education.
II-b. Reasonable supervision and regulation of legal education as an exercise of police power Enactment
of education laws is an exercise of police power. The State has a high responsibility for the education of
its citizens and has an interest in prescribing regulations to promote the education, and consequently,
the general welfare of the people. The exercise of such police power, however, is not absolute.

Supervisory and regulatory exercise, not control. The responsibility to educate lies with the parents and
guardians as an inherent right, over which the State assumes a supportive role. Withholding from the
State the unqualified power to control education also serves a practical purpose – it allows for a degree
of flexibility and diversity essential to the very reason of education to rear socially responsible and
morally upright youth and to enable them to come into contact with challenging ideas. In this sense,
when the Constitution gives the State supervisory power, it is understood that what it enjoys is a
supportive power, that is, the power of oversight over all educational institutions. It includes the
authority to check, but not to interfere.

Academic freedom. The reasonable supervision and regulation clause is not a stand-alone provision, but
must be read in conjunction with the other Constitutional provision relating to education which include,
in particular, the clause on academic freedom10. Apart from the academic freedom of teachers and
students, the academic freedom of the institution itself is recognized and constitutionally guaranteed.
The influential language of Justice Frankfurter’s concurring opinion in Sweezy v. New Hampshire11
describes it as the “business of the university” to provide a conducive atmosphere for speculation,
experimentation, and creation where the four essential freedoms of the university prevail: the right of
the university to determine for itself on academic grounds (a) who may teach; (b) what may be taught;
(c) how it shall be taught; and (d) who may be admitted to study.

Right to education is subject to fair, reasonable, and equitable admission and academic requirements.
Article 26(1) of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights provides that technical and professional
education shall be made generally available and higher education shall be equally accessible to all on the
basis of merit. There is uniformity in jurisprudence holding that the authority to set the admission and
academic requirements used to access the merit and capacity of the individual to be admitted and
retained in higher educational institutions lie with the institutions themselves in the exercise of their
academic freedom. 10 11

CONSTITUTION (1987), Art. XIV, Sec. 5(2). 354 U.S. 234, 263 (1957)

II-c. LEB’s powers under RA 7662 vis-à-vis the Court’s jurisdiction under Art. VIII, Sec. 5(5) of the
Constitution The Supreme Court declared the following provisions as unconstitutional: Sec. 3(a)(2) on
increasing awareness among members of the legal profession. One of the general objectives under RA
7662 is to “increase awareness among members of the legal profession of the needs of the poor,
deprived, and oppressed sectors of society.” This provision goes beyond the scope of RA 7662
(improvement of the quality of legal education) and delves into the training of those who are already
members of the bar. This is a direct encroachment on the power of the Court to promulgate rules
concerning the practice of law and legal assistance to the underprivileged and should thus be voided on
this ground.

Sec. 2, par. 2 and Section 7(g) on legal apprenticeship and law practice internship as a requirement for
taking the bar. RA 7662 mandates the State to require legal apprenticeship and continuing legal
education. It is clear from the plain text that another requirement, i.e. completion of a law internship
program, is imposed by law for taking the bar examinations. This requirement unduly interferes with the
exclusive jurisdiction of the Court to promulgate rules concerning the practice of law and admissions
thereto. This should be struck down as unconstitutional.

Sec. 2, part. 2 and Section 7(h) on continuing legal education of practicing lawyers. By its plain language,
the clause containing “continuing legal education” unduly gives the LEB the power to supervise the legal
education of those who are already members of the bar. Inasmuch as the LEB is authorized to compel
mandatory attendance of practicing lawyers in such courses and for such duration as the LEB deems
necessary, the same encroaches upon the Court’s power to promulgate rules concerning the Integrated
Bar which includes the education of “lawyer-professors” as teaching of law is practice of law. The
mandatory continuing legal education is in fact covered by B.M. No. 850 (Rules on Mandatory
Continuing Legal Education) dated August 22, 2000.

II-d. LEB’s powers vis-à-vis institutional academic freedom and the right to education

PhilSAT. The PhilSAT, when administered as an aptitude test, is reasonably related to the State’s
unimpeachable interest in improving the quality of legal education. This aptitude test, however, should
not be exclusionary, restrictive, or qualifying as to encroach upon institutional academic freedom.

In the exercise of their academic freedom to choose who to admit, the law schools should be left with
the discretion to determine for themselves how much weight the results should carry in relation to their
individual admission policies.

PhilSAT, when administered as an aptitude test, passes the test of reasonableness, thus there is no
reason to strike it down in its entirety. Instead, the Supreme Court took a calibrated approach and
partially nullified LEBMO No. 7-2016, insofar as it absolutely prescribes the passing of the PhilSAT and
the taking thereof within two years as a prerequisite for admission to any law school which, on its face,
run directly counter to institutional academic freedom. The rest of LEBMO No. 72016, being free from
any taint of unconstitutionality, should remain in force and effect, especially in view of the separability
clause therein contained.