59

M A RC H 2019

THE CHANGING GLOBAL ORDER

AND ITS IMPLICATIONS FOR THE EU

Katja Creutz, Tuomas Iso-Markku,

Kristi Raik and Teija Tiilikainen
 59
MARCH 2019
THE CHANGING GLOBAL ORDER
AND ITS IMPLICATIONS FOR THE EU

Katja Creutz, Tuomas Iso-Markku,

Kristi Raik and Teija Tiilikainen
 59
M A RC H 2019

This publication is the final report of a research project conducted by

the Finnish Institute of International Affairs entitled Finland and the
Tightening Competition in Global Politics. The project is part of the
implementation of the Government Plan for Analysis, Assessment
and Research.

Reports can be ordered from the Finnish Institute of International Affairs.

+358 9 432 7707 [email protected]

All FIIA reports and other publications are also available on our website at
www.fiia.fi

Language editing: Lynn Nikkanen

Graphic design: Mainostoimisto SST Oy
Layout: Kaarina Tammisto
Printed by Punamusta Oy, 2019
ISBN (print) 978-951-769-596-1
ISBN (web) 978-951-769-597-8
ISSN 2323-5454

The Finnish Institute of International Affairs is an independent research institute that produces
high-level research to support political decisionmaking and public debate both nationally and in-
ternationally. All manuscripts are reviewed by at least two other experts in the field to ensure the
high quality of the publications. In addition, publications undergo professional language checking
and editing. The responsibility for the views expressed ultimately rests with the authors.
CONTENTS

List of abbreviations 8
Acknowledgements 11
1. Introduction 15

1.1 Presentation of research questions and key concepts 17

2. The changing international system 27
2.1 Introduction 27
2.2 Transitions of political power 28
2.3 Diffusion of power 37
2.4 Global governance 42
2.5 Chapter conclusions 59
3. The EU in the context of the changing global order 65
3.1 Introduction 65
3.2 The EU’s worldview and position in the changing global order 66
3.3 Internal trends in the EU 71
3.4 The EU’s external relations and security 77
3.5 Chapter conclusions 87
4. The changing international system: Implications for Finland 93
4.1 Introduction 93
4.2 What are the implications for Finland and its international
position? 97
4.3 Finland’s international strategy in a new environment 105

References 111
Attachment: Publications published in the framework of the project 119
About the contributors 121
Previously published in the series 123
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

AIIB Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank

BRI (China’s) Belt and Road Initiative
BRICS Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa (bloc of countries)
C40 Cities Climate Leadership Group
CARD Co-ordinated Annual Review on Defence
CEDAW Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of
Discrimination Against Women
CETA EU-Canada Comprehensive Economic and Trade
Agreement
CICA Conference on Interaction and Confidence Building
Measures in Asia
CSDP Common Security and Defence Policy
EBCG European Border and Coast Guard
EGS European Global Strategy
EII European Intervention Initiative
EMU Economic and Monetary Union
EP European Parliament
EPP European People’s Party
EUGS European Union Global Strategy
FARC Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia
(Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia)
FSM Financial Stability Mechanism
FTA Free trade agreement
ICANN Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers
ICC International Criminal Court
ICSID International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes
ILO International Labour Organization
IMF International Monetary Fund
ISIL Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant
ITU International Telecommunications Union
NAFTA North American Free Trade Agreement
NDB New Development Bank
OBOR One Belt, One Road (see BRI)

8 MARCH 2019
OSCE Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe
P5 Permanent members of the United Nations Security
Council (China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom,
and the United States)
PESCO Permanent Structured Cooperation
RCEP Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership
S&D Socialists and Democrats
TPP Trans-Pacific Partnership
TTIP Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership
UNESCO United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural
Organization
WTO World Trade Organization

MARCH 2019 9
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

This report is the outcome of a research project funded by the Government

Plan for Analysis, Assessment and Research (VN-TEAS). The project en-
titled Finland and the Tightening Competition in Global Politics was
planned and carried out by a group of researchers at the Finnish Institute
of International Affairs (FIIA) with the support of a number of FIIA col-
leagues, as well as external experts who contributed during the course
of the project term of 2.5 years.
The FIIA group of researchers includes senior research fellows Katja
Creutz and Kristi Raik (currently director of the Estonian Foreign
Policy Institute), research fellow Tuomas Iso-Markku and director Teija
Tiilikainen. The group would like to extend its gratitude firstly to all those
numerous FIIA colleagues who provided support and expertise for the
project in various forms. Warm thanks are also due to the external experts
who contributed to the project either in the form of a separate publica-
tion or by addressing one of the seminars or workshops organised in the
framework of the project. All the publications that emerged as a part of
the project are listed at the end of this report.
The group would also like to extend its gratitude to the external funders
of the project and to the steering group that was established to take care of
it. A beneficial and constructive dialogue with the steering group helped
to keep the project on track, ensuring that it corresponded with the in-
formation goals that were pursued at the outset.
Last but not least, the research group would also like to express its
gratitude to Eeva Innola and Maija Salonen, who provided valuable ad-
ministrative support for the project.

MARCH 2019 11
1
1. INTRODUCTION

Global power structures are experiencing a deep transition, which takes

various forms. The phenomenon of globalisation is driven by technological
development and the demands of key economic and financial actors. Their
functional logic is not compatible with the Westphalian world, which re-
volves around state power and the notions of sovereignty and territoriality.
Globalisation, which for many decades was argued to be the dominant
force with an ability to challenge the key role of the state as the leading
actor in world politics, has recently faced a powerful return of the state,
and the battle about actorness in world politics seems to be far from over.
The forms of global political transition also contradict each other in
many respects. When it comes to the traditional structures of state pow-
er, the Western leadership of the world seems to be in decline, with the
US political and military hegemony being challenged and global power
structures evolving towards a more multipolar direction. An increasingly
assertive China is demonstrating a willingness to consolidate its leadership
not only in Asia-Pacific but also in Central Asia and many other parts of
the world. China, together with other rising powers, is strengthening its
grip on post-war institutions of global governance built on Western values.
It is a common understanding that the liberal world order, originating in
Western political leadership, is gradually eroding.
At the same time, however, there are increasing signs of a diffusion of
state power – a phenomenon that affects the balance of power between
states in a multifaceted manner. It firstly involves a growing group of
non-state actors challenging state power in very different forms and dif-
ferent capacities. It also implies the empowerment of individuals, which

MARCH 2019 15
is taking on stronger dimensions as the new information technologies
seem to enable powerful individuals, at times, to seize the global agenda
and affect the direction of global politics. It has become obvious by now
that it is not necessarily the open societies of the Western states that are
the most vulnerable to the trends of this diffusion of state power. States
with more authoritarian regimes are in some cases even more vulnera-
ble to changing forms of actorness due to their poor capacity to tolerate
political opposition and alternative forms of power.
The diffusion of state power and the increasingly complex global power
structures challenge the existence of global power hierarchies with a more
general scope. The idea of a multipolar world must thus be understood in
a very general sense, with its more detailed meaning determined by issue
area. The distinction between the domestic and international spheres is
becoming even more blurred as the number of non-state actors and actors
with a global arena is increasing.
The present report concludes the findings of a multi-annual research
project focusing on key trends in world politics and their implications
for Europe and Finland. To this end, the project addresses the transition
taking place in the key structures of state power in parallel with the dif-
fusion of state power. By first drawing conclusions about the key forms
of change taking place in the global system of power, the project aims at
analysing in particular how the EU has been affected by these forms, both
in terms of its international actorness and its internal rules and cohesion.
When it comes to the transition within the system of states, the project
focuses on the axis of state power considered the most important in terms
of its global implications, namely the relationship between the US and
China. Different dimensions of this relationship are studied with the aim
of assessing how the mutual interdependencies are evolving, and what
the goals of the two actors look like in respect of their own global role.
The implications of this power transition in the key fields of global gov-
ernance – also covering the simultaneous diffusion of power to non-state
actors – forms another relevant topic under review in the global context.
The study then analyses how the EU contends with these forms of pow-
er transition and safeguards its own influence in this changing environ-
ment. Finally, the project addresses the international role and influence
of one of the northernmost EU members, Finland. It investigates how the
changes in the global and regional setting should be understood from the
Finnish point of view and how Finland should act in order to consolidate
its international role in economic as well as political terms.

16 MARCH 2019
1.1 PRESENTATION OF RESEARCH QUESTIONS AND
KEY CONCEPTS

The present research project builds on the assumption according to which

global power structures have become increasingly complicated.
The common perception about two opposing trends, globalisation
with the diffusion of state power, and the return of geopolitics implying
a strengthening of state power, is too simplistic.
First, there are cases where a state can be empowered by the forces
of globalisation. This applies to Western powers as well as to emerging
powers such as China or Brazil, whose economic rise depends on a func-
tioning globalised economy.
Second, the emergence of non-state actors, usually linked to the dy-
namics of globalisation, doesn’t imply a group of like-minded actors with
coherent interests in respect of state power. This highly heterogeneous
group consists of actors such as powerful intergovernmental organisa-
tions for instance, whose power builds on the strength of its constitutive
member states, as well as those whose powers depend on declining state
power, such as transnational criminal networks or terrorist groups.
The first assumption of this study consequently has to be that we are
living in a world with a set of highly diverse actors whose mutual rela-
tions differ in character. The concept of a multiplex world has been used
by Amitav Acharya, according to whom the non-state actors challenging
state authority and international security form a highly diverse crowd
with complex goals and roles. “In many cases the groups are challeng-
ing the state; in others they are cooperating and colluding with state
structures; in some, the state is a passive by-stander while they fight
one another.”1
The key argument behind theories of a multifaceted structure of world
politics is that even if states are still the key actors, they are currently far
from being the only important actors defining the agenda and outcomes
of world politics. Actors ranging from multilateral enterprises to inter-
governmental or non-governmental organisations, international terrorist
groups and various types of networks can be equally influential by having
even a relatively long-standing position in certain cases.
The emergence of a more heterogeneous structure of actors implies,
first and foremost, the lack of an overarching power hierarchy. In other
words, references to a world of poles, meaning power hierarchies between
states in a unipolar, bi- or multipolar world, capture only a part of the
factual power structures and may even be misleading in their simplicity.

1 Acharya 2018a, 15.

MARCH 2019 17
According to some scholars, one could conclude that the significance
of state power varies between different fields of international relations.
Joseph Nye, for instance, argues that whilst state power is still the dom-
inant structure within the field of military power (US hegemony) and
economic power (multipolar structure), in the rest of the political fields
the power structures are much more heterogeneous.2 Others, however,
take the view that state power is equally exposed to the set of different
actors throughout the global political agenda.
The geographical scope of these power structures is also assumed to
vary, which compounds the complexity. The idea that world politics is
organised in line with a set of universal power structures is being increas-
ingly challenged in arguments emphasising the different geographical
range of existing power structures. Factors affecting world politics may
be regional or even local. According to the ongoing discussion about the
post-Cold War American hegemony, even this dominant power structure,
which is frequently perceived as universal, is argued to have had a much
more limited scope. John Ikenberry and Joseph Nye, for example, argue
that American hegemony was never a truly global order, but was rather
limited to a group of like-minded states, whereas Henry Kissinger points
out that no truly global world order has ever existed.3
Hence, when this study addresses the relationship between the US
and China as one of the key axes of the global balance of power, it is not
assumed, however, that the relationship that emerges will affect world
politics accordingly, irrespective of the more detailed context or policy
field. The concept of a multiplex world means in this respect that the
outcomes of power relations – even in the most important great-power
relationship – are dependent on the overall set-up of actors with the more
nuanced structure of power resulting from it.
Before moving onto the presentation of the research questions in more
detail, the key concepts behind the present study, and the way the au-
thors understand them, will be addressed in the subsections that follow.

1.1.1 The concept of power

In very basic terms in the social sciences, power refers to the ability of
an actor to get another actor to do something it wouldn’t otherwise do.4
According to this conceptualisation, power is an attribute an actor pos-
sesses, and which works through interactions. This is a concept commonly
used in the study of international relations when approaching state power

2 Nye 2015, 97; Ikenberry 2018, 17.

3 Nye 2015, 11; Ikenberry 2018, 11; Kissinger 2014, 2.

4 Dahl 1957.

18 MARCH 2019
through the various instruments a state possesses, be they economic,
political or military. The balance of power between different states is thus
usually defined by comparing their key resources.
As well as the various instruments at a state’s disposal, the manner
of affecting an actor in international relations also varies based on the
distinction between hard power and soft power.5 This distinction stems
from the level of coercive action involved, as soft power refers to an ability
to affect an actor without the use of force or coercion. Soft power conse-
quently includes the use of positive attraction or persuasion to achieve
foreign policy objectives. All the above-mentioned instruments may be
involved in the exertion of soft power which, however, tends to revolve
around economic, political and even cultural instruments rather than
military ones.
Still relying upon the aforementioned concept of power, the use of
power in international relations can be divided into different categories
based on how direct the use of power between different actors is. In the
case of the indirect use of power between actors, one often refers to the
role of formal or informal institutions as intermediaries between the
actors. In such cases of a more indirect relationship between the actors,
the use of power can take the form of affecting the rules or agenda of the
institutions.
There is, however, another definition of power crucially different from
conceiving of it as working in an interaction and taking the form of an
attribute possessed by an actor. This alternative definition approaches
power as being constitutive of social actors, thereby seeing it to function
at a deeper level of social constitution. If the first form of power is un-
derstood as power over an actor, this second form conceptualises power
as power to an actor.6
In international relations, power can thus be seen to work within
those very basic rules and norms that are constitutive of actors and their
identities and interests. Those who have access to these rules and can
affect them in one form or another can be seen to have power. Viewed in
this way, power is working, for instance, in the structures maintaining
state sovereignty or territoriality, or in the norms shaping state identities
and interests in a state-centric or confrontational direction. With such
a concept of power, it is much more difficult to identify power relations,
and the set-up of the most powerful actors undoubtedly looks different
from that brought to the fore by the first concept.

5 Nye 2015.

6 Wendt 1998, 105.

MARCH 2019 19
 This report is based on the assumption that power works both in in-
teraction and in social construction, so the two concepts are not mutually
exclusive. State actors exert power in international relations, and are also
outcomes of the use of power. Both perspectives need to be considered
when analysing the complexities of power relations in world politics.

1.1.2 The concepts of order and governance

When studying changing power structures in world politics, the concept
of international order and its relationship with the notion of an interna-
tional system is also significant. How does the present study relate to the
ongoing debate about the end of the liberal world order, and how should
the concept of global governance be defined in relation to the concept of
international order?
A good way of describing ‘order’, and distinguishing it from a system
or structure, is to define it as signalling something purposive.7 According
to J. G. Ruggie, orders should be understood as the coming together of
power and legitimate social purpose, such that these elements are fused
to project political authority into the international system.8 International
orders should thus be understood as broad sets of ideas, or ideational
structures or narratives rather than physical embodiments. According
to John Ikenberry, liberal internationalism, for instance, offers a vision
of order in which sovereign states – led by liberal democracies – coop-
erate for mutual gain and protection within a loosely rules-based global
space.9 Kissinger defines world order as the concept held by a region or
civilisation about the nature of just arrangements and the distribution of
power applicable to the entire world.10
For the purposes of the present study, an international order is there-
fore understood as having a dual relationship with state power. A domi-
nant international order is firstly a reflection of global power structures in
that it reflects the vision of the just order held by the leading powers. The
reasons for questioning the liberal world order thus lie in the weakening
political and military power of the West, and of the US in particular.11
However, as Ikenberry states, international orders seem, to some extent,
to have a life of their own, independent of the power of their immediate
authors. The liberal international order, for instance, has taken various

7 Duncombe & Dunne 2018, 26.

8 Ruggie 1982, 380.

9 Ikenberry 2018, 12.

10 Kissinger 2014, 9.

11 Ikenberry (2018, 18–19), however, rightly points out that changes in power structures are not the only reason
for a particular international order being challenged, as the coherence and broader legitimacy of another also
affect its political role.

20 MARCH 2019
forms in the course of history, with varying direct connections to the
US power.
Secondly, as the vision of a group of states, a particular international
order is also supportive of the power of its promoters, and hence the
liberal world order naturally strengthens the role of the Western world.
This argument is eloquently defended by Charles A. Kupchan, who shows
how the nature of different hegemonies reflects not only their material
premises but also the normative dimensions of order.12 He further argues
that normative preferences as well as social and cultural orientations affect
the character of hegemony and work in tandem with material incentives
to shape hegemonic rule. Norms informing hegemonic world orders are
said to be derivative of the hegemon’s own domestic order. They are the
sources of order and strength in the hegemon (or in the metropole as
Kupchan puts it) and are deemed appropriate to serve the same function
in the international sphere.
The changing international balance of power studied in this project is
therefore important also with respect to the transformation of the inter-
national order. One of the main questions addressed in this study is conse-
quently how the key tenets of the liberal international order are currently
viewed by the key actors, and how the diffusion of state power affects its
forms and universal scope. It is an important question, not least due to
the observation made by Kupchan according to which a transformation
between two international orders can be expected to be more peaceful
the smaller the ideological distance between the old and new orders.
Whilst a transformation from a Western into a Chinese order clearly has
its risks in this respect, there are many things in the current international
set-up that function in favour of a regionalisation of the system being the
next phase after the Western more universalist tendencies.13 This would
soften the clash between the two different orders and steer the current
international system towards regional systems of power.
The concept of global governance refers here to the institutional em-
bodiment of the current international order with all the key norms and
institutions it entails. As a concept, global governance is built on two
constitutive ideas. The first is the idea according to which an international
order consists of cooperation and common rules and norms between the
key global actors rather than a plain balance of power. And second, that
global governance reflects the idea of multilateralism according to which
institutionalised cooperation between international actors comprises a
vast majority of actors affected by the policy field, and not just the most

12 Kupchan 2014, 24–26.

13 Kupchan 2014, 58–60; Acharya 2018a, 99–131.

MARCH 2019 21
powerful ones. Various parts of global governance duly vary when it comes
to their more specific actor structure, and the extent to which non-state
actors are involved.

1.1.3 Research questions

The first question to be addressed in this study deals with the key forms of
the ongoing global transition of power. The first of these key forms deals
with the relationship between the two most important state actors, China
and the US. The question concerns the extent to which China is currently
able to challenge the US in terms of economic, political and military power
and, on the other hand, to what extent it aims to do so. The relationship
between these two leading great powers is approached as one of the most
important axes of power globally, with implications for the international
system at large. In parallel with this study, another study was carried out
addressing the relationship between China and Russia on the one hand,
and the US and Russia on the other. Both of these studies have been funded
by the Finnish Government Plan for Analysis, Assessment and Research,
and the conclusions of this report will draw on both of them.
Following the conceptual background of the study, changes in power
relations between states form only a part of the global transition, and
hence the forms of the diffusion of state power will also be addressed
as another important dimension of the ongoing global power transition.
After shedding light on both of the key forms of power transition at a
general level, their effects on the current international order with its
institutions and governance will be analysed.
The second research question addresses the implications of the forms
of transition for Europe and the EU in particular. The way in which the
contours of change affect the EU as an actor in the international arena
will be analysed, as well as its internal rule and cohesion. This part of the
study assesses the consequences of the trends outlined in the first part,
starting with the EU as a whole, and subsequently by analysing some key
fields of its external relations and internal policies. The EU’s actorness
is approached at a more conceptual level by trying to find out how the
Union’s hybrid actorness – being itself a mix of state and international
organisation – has affected its ability to accommodate to the transition.
The analysis is then extended to the more practical implications in the
key policy fields, such as the common security and defence policy and
the Union’s relations with Russia.
In the final part of the study, the conclusions drawn in the first two
parts will be analysed from the point of view of Finland and its interna-
tional position in economic, political and security political terms. The key

22 MARCH 2019
question to be addressed is how the changing global balance of power and
the more multifaceted set-up of actors and power hierarchies will affect
Finland’s possibilities to safeguard its key interests in the international
arena. The EU plays a crucial role in filtering some of the effects of global
change, so the developments on the regional stage will form a key pillar
of this analysis.

MARCH 2019 23
2
2. THE CHANGING INTERNATIONAL
SYSTEM

2.1 INTRODUCTION

The early post-Cold War period, in which ideological rifts were deemed to
have been overcome for the benefit of liberalism and democracy, turned
out to be temporary rather than ‘the end of history’.1 The optimistic
prophecies that characterised much of the global economic and political
thinking in the 1990s indicated a bright future, where economic and
political liberalisation would go hand in hand and end up curbing geo-
political rivalry. This vision nevertheless came up against a broad range
of challenges, starting from the interventionist policies of the 1990s to
the economic and financial crisis of 2008–2009. The revival of trust in
international institutions and rules in the 1990s, which was demonstrated,
for example, by the creation of the International Criminal Court (ICC) and
the launch of the Responsibility to Protect doctrine, had to slowly yield
to the complexities of the new millennium.
Today, the rules-based international order is increasingly being
challenged. The United States is no longer in the driver’s seat, and the
European Union is struggling with both internal and external challenges.
The relative decline of the West has opened a window of opportunity for
major powers seeking to benefit from the situation. China has, along with
Russia, been at the forefront in challenging the US-dominated liberal
international order, and both are keen to change the world order so that
it better reflects their values and interests. The effects of globalisation
have bred contestation at national and local levels in both the South and

1 Fukuyama 1992.

MARCH 2019 27
the North, calling into question interdependence and progressivism in
favour of identity politics and protectionism.
The transition of political power between states has been accompanied
by another dominant power trajectory, namely the diffusion of power
from states to non-state actors. This vertical power shift has influenced
the global governance agenda, necessitating a multidimensional and
multilevel approach to global issues. At the same time, the governance
of global affairs is confronted by the need to adjust to power politics with
the rise of alternative powers and their priorities at a time that is char-
acterised by a reduced consensus on foundational norms for the inter-
national community.
The aims of this chapter are twofold: first, it explores the transitions in
power that have occurred at the global level both when it comes to shifts
between states, and away from them. The former task will be instructed
particularly by the rise of China and its relations with the United States.
Second, the chapter analyses the effects of the aforementioned power
trajectories upon global governance from the perspective of contesting
agents and developments, as well as a number of issue areas.

2.2 TRANSITIONS OF POLITICAL POWER

2.2.1 The relative decline of the West

The international order is currently witnessing a period of transformation
in which the profoundness of the change and the end-results are still
open. Two separate but interconnected developments have soured the
age of liberal internationalism, namely developments within the West
itself and the rise of non-Western states. The global architecture around
multilateral institutions, economic openness, security cooperation and
democratic solidarity was constructed by the West. To a large extent, it
has always relied on American leadership, and the broader ‘crisis of au-
thority’2 that characterises the international system has deepened even
further since the election of President Trump. The US administration
has been reluctant to attest to liberal hallmarks, both rhetorically and in
practice, which has led to uncertainty about the future of multilateralism,
and ultimately the international liberal order itself.
The ‘America first policy’ has not totally disrupted the international
liberal order thus far, but the combined effect of single events, such as
the withdrawals from the Trans-Pacific Partnership, the Paris Climate
Agreement, the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, and the UN Human

2 Ikenberry 2018, 10.

28 MARCH 2019
Rights Council point to the fact that the international liberal order is in
the descendant. The significance of the United States is noticeable even
in its retreat, as its non-participation in global politics and economics is
a crucial determinant of the global order.3
The challenges faced by the international liberal order are broader than
the retreat of the US. Democracy is weakening globally as there is wide-
spread decline in political and civil liberties around the world.4 Traditional
democracy champions are not maintaining standards; promising de-
velopments in some states, such as Turkey, Poland and Myanmar have
deteriorated; and autocratic states with Russia in the vanguard have taken
advantage of the system failure through methods such as disinformation
campaigns, as well as cultural and financial ties with far-right parties.5
Europe is struggling with Brexit, the rise of far-right parties, migration,
and the consolidation of populist leaders in several member states. The
presumption is that the waning of the Anglo-American-dominated world
order and the respective rise of the rest will profoundly change liberal
internationalism, or even pave the way for illiberalism, as the design of a
future world order remains uncluttered.6

2.2.2 China’s model: from economic to global power

China has replaced Russia as the prime contender for US power at the in-
ternational level. This rise is based on China’s indisputable economic pow-
er. It constitutes the second largest economy in the world after the United
States, and it has been one of the foremost beneficiaries of globalisation,
which has enabled it to greatly alleviate widespread poverty in only a few
decades. After China’s accession to the World Trade Organization (WTO) in
2001, Chinese exports have increased almost tenfold in 15 years, making
it the biggest exporting country.7 The Chinese model of development,
which unlike the liberal model is not based on a combination of economic
and political liberalisation but on restricted capitalism accompanied by
political suppression, has duly proven highly successful.

3 Foot & Walter 2011, 1.

4 Abramowitz 2018.

5 Ibid.

6 Duncombe & Dunne 2018.

7 Mattlin 2017, 8.

MARCH 2019 29
1,000 bn USD Goods exports

2.50

2.25

2.00
China joined the
1.75 WTO in Dec 2001

1.50

1.25

1.00

0.75

0.50

0.25

0.00
95 96 97 98 99 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17

Japan United States

Germany China

Figure 1: China’s unprecedented rise to become the largest exporter. Source: Nordea Markets and
Macrobond.

China uses its economic weight to connect with the world, and its
importance as an external funder is increasing. It has lent a total of more
than 350 billion USD between 2000 and 2014, and its infrastructure loans
in particular have created dependencies in many regions of the world,
but with fewer political conditions than loans from the IMF or the World
Bank. The level of debt owed to China is so high at times that countries
are unable to repay the loans, which China then exploits in other ways,
such as writing off debt for strategic concessions. One example of this
‘debt-trap diplomacy’ is Sri Lanka, whose debt to China was so extensive
that it handed over Hambantota Port – a strategically situated port at the
intersection of multiple trading routes – to the Chinese for 99 years. East
African Djibouti represents a similar case, where China is predicted to
take over the country’s main port due to unpaid debts.
The lending function has been institutionalised in the establish-
ment of the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) and the New
Development Bank (NDB), both of which finance development and in-
frastructure projects. The creation of new international financial insti-
tutions has been complemented by China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI,
formerly known as One Belt, One Road [OBOR] ), which aims to increase
the connectivity between Europe and Asia, both via land and sea. Over
80 countries and international organisations have signed agreements

30 MARCH 2019
 under the initiative, displaying increasing willingness to participate in the
BRI, despite the initiative being China’s most publicised tool for outward
power projection.8
Yet, at this stage, China is neither able nor willing to become the “lead-
ing economic power by default”.9 China’s commitment to open markets
is ambiguous as it advances free trade when it comes to its exports, while
restricting the access of imports to Chinese markets. The growing rate of
China’s self-sufficiency in production, as well as its hesitance towards
allowing international investments in certain sectors, leaves other coun-
tries less likely to benefit from its economic growth.10 China clearly places
its own financial security ahead of international financial stability as it
constitutes a crucial element of its domestic political stability.11
Another salient feature of Chinese economic power is the strong inter-
dependence between China and the United States. Over 7% of US debt is
owed to Chinese creditors, and American companies have ploughed huge
investments into China, which has led not only to increased financing and
export channels, but to greater Chinese productivity due to technological
spillover inside China.12 Despite the tight economic links between the two
biggest economies in the world, the unbalanced trade in combination with
prospects of slowing growth in world trade has caused fractures in the
trade relations between China and the US, resulting in the imposition of
mutual trade restrictions verging on a full-blown trade war.
China’s economic leverage is reflected in its political ambitions and in-
fluence at the global level. The country does not shy away from admitting
that it seeks to establish itself as one of the world’s leading powers by 2049
“in terms of composite national strength and international influence”.13
It is noteworthy that China does not seek to replace US hegemony with
its own, but rather to create an international system in which its values
and interests are better taken into account.14
The path towards great-power status also requires military capability,
as this element of power has traditionally constituted one of the hallmarks
of great-power standing. The trend in military power increasingly sug-
gests that China is the closest in potentially becoming the peer competitor

8 Raik, Aaltola, Kallio & Pynnöniemi 2018, 35.

9 Mattlin 2017, 26.

10 Koivu 2017, 6.

11 Mattlin 2017, 26.

12 Koivu 2017, 7.

13 Xi 2017, 25.

14 Naarajärvi 2017, 3.

MARCH 2019 31
of the United States also in military terms in the long run.15 China’s eco-
nomic growth has allowed it to continuously increase its military spending
during the last twenty years,16 and it rates second in the world after the
United States in military expenditure. However, in absolute terms, the
gap in military expenditure and the existing arsenal (including nuclear
weapons) is still extremely wide in the US’s favour.

bn USD

250

200

150

100

50

0
2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017

Figure 2: China’s Military Expenditure in USD. Figures are SIPRI estimates, in USD at
constant 2016 prices and exchange rates. Source: SIPRI, Data for all countries 1988–2017.

The modernisation of China’s armed forces has proceeded faster than

expected due to defence cooperation with Russia, as well as development
of the domestic defence industry.17 This is visible, for instance, in China’s
naval powers, in which the country has made huge investments during
recent years. The country’s naval powers have traditionally been consid-
ered weak as China lacks ‘a blue-water navy’,18 namely a maritime force
that is capable of operating in the deep waters of open oceans, and which
is paramount when it comes to displaying credible power in distant seas.
Lately China has, however, demonstrated robust naval power in maritime
parades and exercises in the South China Sea and beyond. The importance
of maritime power stems from Chinese commercial interests in securing
shipping lines,19 but is also due to energy security, territorial claims,
foreign policy and the projection of regional leadership.20

15 Marcus 2018.

16 SIPRI 2018.

17 Sinkkonen 2018, 5.

18 Naarajärvi 2017, 4.

19 Sinkkonen 2018, 7.

20 Mukherjee 2018.

32 MARCH 2019
 Although the rise in military expenditure can be explained in part by
international missions to protect maritime rights, peacekeeping and hu-
manitarian relief efforts, the bulk of the expenditure has been devoted to
developing an army with increasing capabilities, also offensively.21 What
is more, the official Xi Jinping military development doctrine is geared
towards turning the People’s Liberation Army into a “world-class force”
by 2050.22 The message from Beijing is clear: China is increasingly mili-
tarily influential, a fact that chimes with the country’s aim to become a
leading global power within the next few decades. The military strategy
stresses regional dominance, however, rather than global dominance.
The South China Sea is the arena where China has sought to effectively
challenge US dominance by, for example, questioning freedom of navi-
gation and strengthening its territorial claims.23 Its military capabilities
are nonetheless moving in the direction of a global power projection.24
There are nevertheless factors that downplay the role of China in be-
coming a leading world power. One such feature is China’s non-alliance
policy. It has few close partnerships, and the country lacks strategic sup-
port on a par with the US, which has over 60 treaty-based alliances. A
world leader requires alliances with other states and institutions in order
to advance broader geopolitical visions,25 but many countries in the region
see China as a threat rather than an ally to be supported. The long-stand-
ing Chinese position nonetheless rejects the importance of allies, and the
country has pursued a policy of strategic partnerships instead. The aim
of these partnerships is to build mutual trust and co-operation, focusing
on converging interests and win-win situations.26 Since the end of the
Cold War, China has employed the strategic partnership policy with an
increasing range of states in the world in order to secure Chinese core
interests and to foster a more China-friendly international environment.
But there are limits to partnership diplomacy; it has not been con-
sidered an adequate tool in managing the diplomatic relations of a major
power striving to become great.27 As a result, the non-alliance policy
has increasingly been questioned and there are signs of deeper coop-
eration with some countries. For example, although it is unlikely that
China’s relationship with Russia would eventually transform into a real

21 Office of the Secretary of Defense 2018.

22 Xi 2017, 16.

23 Aaltola, Salonius-Pasternak, Käpylä & Sinkkonen 2018, 95.

24 Brands 2018.

25 Raik et al. 2018, 19; Naarajärvi 2017.

26 Zhongping & Jing 2014, 8.

27 Ibid., 15–16.

MARCH 2019 33
military alliance, China’s strategic partnership with Russia is the most
comprehensive and includes a general plan for bilateral military coop-
eration.28 The global ramifications of this bilateral cooperation remain
limited, however.
A second conspicuous stumbling block on China’s route to becoming a
global power is the country’s internal, autocratic model, which stands in
clear opposition to the liberal and open West. The decision taken during
the Communist party conference in 2017 to abolish the two-term limit on
the presidency, effectively keeping Xi Jinping in power indefinitely, has
generated scepticism among Western states towards the Chinese model.
As an authoritarian state, China struggles with soft power; its political
system is considered unattractive, in addition to which its concepts and
ideas are difficult to grasp for Western societies.29 Still, China’s interna-
tional appeal is in the ascendant. For example, China is challenging the
position of the United States as the most influential and popular devel-
opment model in Africa,30 and global attitudes are also demonstrating a
shift in popularity from the US to China.31 In 2017, President Xi Jinping
declared in his speech for the first time that the great national transfor-
mation based on socialism with Chinese characteristics may constitute
a path to modernisation for other developing states as well. Although
this was not an official endorsement of the export of its political model,
China seems to have abandoned its low-profile policy of self-promotion.

2.2.3 Chinese strategies towards a multipolar world

China’s role in the world order is evolving and different understandings
prevail over whether the country is aiming for a retention of the sta-
tus quo or a revision of the international system. What is nonetheless
clear is the occurrence of a foreign policy shift in China: President Xi
Jinping has taken the country from its policy of ‘keeping a low profile’
(taoguangyanghui) to increasing proactivity with an explicit ‘striving for
achievement’ ( fenfayouwei ).32 The stated aim of national rejuvenation is,
according to President Xi Jinping’s speech in October 2017, to first achieve
socialist modernisation, followed by making China a leading global power
by the time of the centennial of the People’s Republic of China in 2049.

28 Sinkkonen 2018, 3.

29 Sørensen 2017.

30 Lekorwe, Chingwete, Okuru & Samson 2016.

31 Vice 2017.

32 de Graaff & van Appeldoorn 2018, 117.

34 MARCH 2019
 China’s continuous development still requires a stable international
environment, particularly where other major powers are concerned.33
Its further development is thus grounded in greater international par-
ticipation in international institutions, as noted by former President Hu
Jintao in 2007 when he stated: “China cannot develop in isolation from
the rest of the world”.34 In recent years, China has indeed expressed
its preparedness to ‘participate more proactively’ in reshaping global
governance and resolving international crises. It appears willing to take
the lead in a number of issues, such as climate change and free trade. To
this end, China has employed a dual strategy in its pursuit of becoming a
global power. On the one hand, it has activated itself within the existing
international institutions, and sought to create alternative institutions of
governance marked by Chinese dominance, on the other. This so-called
‘pick-and-choose’ strategy has been condoned by the West, with some
states even seeking to participate in Chinese governance institutions.
China has traditionally been apprehensive about international insti-
tutions because they have been unhelpful, or even hostile towards its
agenda and goals. In recent years, it has reversed its position, however,
and activated itself in the UN by actively contributing to international
peacekeeping, for example. It is the second largest contributor to the UN
budget after the US, and the political momentum has led China to push its
own agenda in the global organisation harder than before. The establish-
ment of new international institutions has also been pivotal for China. In
the field of international economic governance, China has established the
AIIB, and the New Development Bank together with the BRICS. In addition
to economic reasons, such as gaps in Asian infrastructure investment,
the institutions project Chinese power and the country’s search for more
influence in international economic governance as changes within the
Bretton Woods organisations have been slow. In the field of security, China
has elevated the role of the old Conference on Interaction and Confidence
Building platform in Asia (CICA), which indicates the country’s desire to
dominate the security dialogue as well as to keep security co-operation in
the hands of “Asians themselves”.35 This reinvigoration of an old platform
can also be seen as a measure of institutional balancing and an act directly
challenging the US-dominated security order in the region.36

33 Cheng 2015, 17.

34 Hu 2007.

35 Feng & He 2017, 41.

36 Feng & He 2018, 181.

MARCH 2019 35
2.2.4 Power competition and contested global leadership
The United States and China are the two most significant states in the
international system.37 But the future of global leadership is not only de-
pendent on Chinese foreign policy. What the US does and how it reacts to
China plays an equally important role, especially as it has become clearer
during recent years that China is on a fast track towards becoming the
global peer competitor of the US in many dimensions of power, despite
predictions to the contrary.38
The United States recognises that China is the other most influential
country in the world. Its strategy towards China is nevertheless torn; on
the one hand, it wishes to keep the door to Chinese markets open but,
on the other hand, this openness should not allow China to strengthen
its global position to such an extent that it replaces the US-dominated
international order.39 The US has long upheld a policy of continuity where
it has sought to embrace China within international multilateral institu-
tions, while at the same time strengthening its own position in East Asia in
order to limit Chinese expansion. This so-called constructive engagement
approach was aimed at the two countries sharing responsibility for global
governance. The Obama administration even launched the concept of G-2,
which China nonetheless failed to embrace.40
With the Trump administration, the US policy on China has changed
from strategic optimism to strategic pessimism.41 China is increasingly
seen as a revisionist power and a ‘strategic competitor’,42 as Washington
recognises that China, together with Russia, now poses a threat to US
interests.43 The predominant dangers are China’s autocratic model of
governance, which threatens democratic governance around the world,
and the modernisation of the Chinese military, which according to the
US can take place only at the expense of the sovereignty of other states
in the region.
Despite some inconsistencies in the US position on China, it appears
clear that the US is reluctant to cede its own power through institutional
reform in international organisations.44 Similarly, the US has resisted
Chinese alternative institutions, such as the AIIB. The US is still the most

37 Foot & Walter 2011, 1.

38 Nye 2011, 185–186.

39 de Graaff & van Apeldoorn 2018, 125.

40 Kaczmarski 2018.

41 Jost 2017.

42 US National Defense Strategy 2018, 1.

43 US National Security Strategy 2017.

44 Layne 2018, 107.

36 MARCH 2019
important country in military, economic and political terms, but its recent
hesitancy to back the rules-based order effectively calls into question its
desire to be the foremost global power. As Europe seems unable to per-
suade the Trump administration of the benefits of multilateralism, China,
Russia and India are seizing the opportunity to demonstrate leadership as
the US seems to be abdicating its global leadership role bit by bit,45 leaving
the EU to assume the mantle of “the sole liberal idealist”.46
The future of global governance will increasingly rest with states other
than the US, which means that they need to step up to the plate to man-
age global problems. While the transatlantic relationship is experiencing
difficulties, the Sino-Russian relationship is deepening and is poised to
fill the leadership gap. But it remains to be seen which actors, if any, are
capable of making use of the relinquished power; the disunity of rising
powers may well hinder them from replacing the US as global leaders
or acting together with it, and the EU seems hesitant to carry the torch
for the international liberal order. As a result, the multipolar world may
turn out to be truly multipolar, a world in which no single power wants
to take the lead.47

2.3 DIFFUSION OF POWER

2.3.1 The rise of non-state actors

The competition for power exceeds nation states, and there are more
players dealing with issues at the global level than before. Globalisation,
privatisation and the fragmentation of states have all brought to the fore
a number of actors that are detached from the state, but that still affect
international affairs.48 These non-state actors may operate at the sub-
or supranational level, but they have all been empowered by the loss of
national power, as well as the information revolution.49 Technological
advancement and decreased costs of computing and communication have
lowered the threshold for engaging in world politics.50 The challenging
effect of non-state actors upon the state-centric world order is widely
accepted, but the degree to which actors beyond states are complementing
or replacing the state-centric international order remains contentious.

45 Stewart 2018.

46 Raik et al. 2018, 64.

47 Tapio 2018, 130–131.

48 Clapham 2006, 3.

49 Sassen 2004.

50 Nye 2011, 114.

MARCH 2019 37
 Either way, a qualitative shift in actorness has occurred; non-state actors
no longer remain outsiders to global politics, and concomitantly states
exercise less control over world affairs.
The range of non-state actors defies neat categorisation, and they may
be classified in terms of their means and motives in international politics,
based upon their ties with the state, or on the basis of their impact in
specific issue areas, such as climate change or human rights. There are
longstanding non-state actors that have amplified numerically or regained
importance, but new groupings have also emerged. Transnational corpo-
rations, religious movements and civil society organisations belong to the
former category, whereas more loosely structured network organisations,
such as terrorist or criminal organisations, are characteristic of the new
information era. In addition, epistemic communities, intergovernmental
organisations, insurgent movements, global cities and even individuals
are a resolute part of today’s crowded landscape of international players.
Their relevance for international relations varies, however, according to
“size, constituency, formal recognition and political impact”.51
Much attention in global politics has been devoted to the category of
violent non-state actors, which includes terrorist and criminal networks
and organisations, warlords, militias and paramilitary forces, as they have
all come to present significant challenges to the nation state, and even
to a certain degree to the international system. Warlords in Afghanistan,
terrorist networks such as Al Qaeda, Boko Haram or ISIL in the Middle
East and Africa, as well as drug cartels in Mexico, all pose a significant
threat to the state as the leading political unit exercising a monopoly over
the use of force. They operate in spaces where state governance may be
absent or lack legitimacy,52 at times with political and military agendas
as well as governance structures. In spite of the variety of violent non-
state actors, they ride on the deficiencies of the state as a provider of
collective goods, such as security, healthcare and education, which in
turn may have implications for the international security environment
and lead to larger geopolitical competition if they align with comparable
groups or rogue states.
But it is not only actors beyond the state that challenge the state-cen-
tredness of international relations. Different levels of the state are increas-
ingly prominent, as witnessed by California’s lead in climate change issues,
or the humane role played by sanctuary cities, such as San Francisco, that
seek to protect all of their residents. The loss of power at the national
level has opened the door for sub-state actors in multiple ways, be it

51 Arts 2003, 5; Morss 1991.

52 Williams 2008.

38 MARCH 2019
constituent units of federal states, regions or so-called global cities.53 For
example, when states fail to act with respect to global problems, global
cities go further than trying to influence national foreign policies: they
directly assume the responsibilities of the state. This is a visible trend
in the fight against climate change, which has seen networks such as
C40 develop, but it also figures in other areas, such as human rights. By
way of illustration, networks of American cities are seeking to imple-
ment the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination
against Women (CEDAW), as the US has failed to ratify the convention thus
far. American cities have also pledged to follow the 2015 Paris Climate
Agreement irrespective of the withdrawal decision by the federal state.
Transactions between localities can thus create strategic transnation-
al networks that partly sidestep nation states.54 Cities and cyberspace
have become more concrete spaces for social struggles than the national
political system, which excludes certain individuals and groups from
national politics.55

2.3.2 Diversity in power and its exercise

Non-state actors have manifested themselves as players in global gov-
ernance that cannot be set aside from decision-making procedures in
specific issue areas, irrespective of whether they are acting on their own
or in collaboration with states. States and international institutions rely
on non-state actors for expertise, provision of services, compliance mon-
itoring as well as stakeholder representation.56 It is generally accepted
that non-state actors exercise different forms of power, but their au-
thority to preside over fundamental change in global politics is, however,
still contested.57
Much of the power that non-state actors exercise is traditionally either
decisional or discursive, and to a lesser degree regulatory.58 They have
the capacity to influence decision-making and to change discourses,
but to make rules only to a lesser degree. Non-state actors contribute to
decision-making with their knowledge,59 but they also bring legitimacy,
support and reputation to the table, providing that they have access to

53 Sassen 2004.

54 Sassen 2004, 662.

55 Ibid.

56 Tallberg & Jönsson 2010, 1.

57 Arts 2003, 10.

58 Arts 2003.

59 Haas 1992.

MARCH 2019 39
policy-makers.60 Their leverage varies in different policy stages ranging
from agenda-setting to norm implementation, but they have been crucial
in promoting new issues to the international agenda.61 This holds true
for several issue areas, such as environmental issues, human rights, and
disarmament, where examples such as the Anti-Personnel Landmine
Convention and the Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the
Ozone Layer can be found, not to mention the adoption of the Rome
Statute for the International Criminal Court. Non-state actors also play
an important role in norm implementation, where civil society organisa-
tions in particular act as watchdogs. This monitoring function exercised
by non-state actors is both important and effective, as governments and
institutions do not wish to be seen as non-compliant.
Norm creation has traditionally been the prerogative of states, but
the trend towards hybrid and even private rule-making is strengthening.
Non-state actors, such as corporations or international standard-set-
ters, increasingly participate in norm creation, relegating states to the
role of law-takers, not law-makers.62 Despite the enormous diversity
in private regulation, as it covers a continuum from self-regulation to
industry-specific standards, it is considered fast and effective in compar-
ison to norm-making by states. The diminishing number of multilateral
conventions in the new millennium also attests to this.63
The exercise of the various forms of power requires access to deci-
sion-makers, which may often take more formalised forms than lobbying
in the corridors. The role of non-state actors, most notably civil society
organisations and transnational corporations, may at times be formalised
into existing intergovernmental structures. Non-state actors may pos-
sess voting rights, as is the case in the International Labour Organization
(ILO), they may have observer status or even participatory rights before
international organisations, or even directly vindicate their rights as is
the case with companies before the International Centre for Settlement
of Investment Disputes (ICSID). The access of non-state actors to inter-
national institutions has steadily increased from the 1980s onwards,64
reflecting the transnational turn in global governance.

60 Arts 2003.

61 Finnmore & Sikkink 1998.

62 Noortmann & Ryngaert 2010.

63 Pauwelyn, Wessel & Wouters 2012.

64 Tallberg & Jönsson 2010, 5.

40 MARCH 2019
2.3.3 The future of non-state actors in a multipolar world
The world order is facing two notable developments at the same time, both
of which may profoundly affect the future governance system, namely the
rise of non-Western powers and the diffusion of power to non-state actors.
Each development is the opposite of the other: one serves to strengthen
state power in the international system, as many of the rising powers
are not democracies and stress state sovereignty, while the other moves
power away from the traditional state activity sphere.65 One of the fore-
most questions in the operating environment of states will then be how
this contradiction will play out in world politics.
The assumption that the rise of autocratic states, such as China and
Russia, undermines transnational governance and its actors is based on
the differing nature of political systems. The expectation is that the re-
stricted operating environment will undermine transnational governance
and its actors,66 whereas liberal democracies that build upon a separation
of state and society leave space for transnational relations among non-
state actors.67 For example, experience shows that in the UN human rights
machinery, China has pursued policies aimed at excluding civil society
from resolutions, as well as harassed and ousted members of civil society
from participation in human rights monitoring. The civil society space
is also shrinking more generally worldwide; governments in all regions
are increasingly resorting to legal and administrative measures in order
to weaken and discredit civil society organisations.
However, the re-strengthening of states cannot undo the power dif-
fusion, which has widened and deepened in recent years. New forms of
governance and sites of authority are emerging because of dissatisfaction
with existing structures and actors.68 State-based solutions are simply un-
able to be specific and effective enough. The functional logic thus supports
the prevalence and breadth of non-state actors in world politics; they are
capable of bringing something to the table that states fail to do. As a result,
the world order will continue to consist of “two worlds of world poli-
tics”, namely one interstate system, whose epitome is states, and another
multi-centric system composed of diverse collectives and authorities.69
The fact that power is eluding nation states has triggered claims that
the state is disaggregating from fragmented decision-making,70 or that

65 Florini 2011.

66 Breslin & Nesadurai 2018, 191.

67 Risse 2013, 437.

68 Breslin & Nesadurai 2018, 198.

69 Rosenau 2006, 218.

70 Alston 1997, 441.

MARCH 2019 41
the state has outlived its role in making the world function.71 However,
theories and practices of global interaction are changing in ways where-
by the power shifts are not construed as a ‘zero-sum game’ where one
actor replaces another.72 Innovative and hybrid governance frameworks
have been created that seek to diminish the dichotomy between states
and non-state actors.73 The state may not disappear as such, but its op-
erative logic is changing. The different functional parts of the state, such
as courts and legislative bodies, are assuming more responsibilities and
connecting with their counterparts abroad, duly creating issue-specific
transnational networks.74 Another embodiment of the reinvention of
the state is the increasing importance of public-private partnerships,
which also features at the global level, especially in issues of health and
the environment. This hybrid form of authority points to collaborative
governance between public and non-state actors, the aim of which is to
recast the intergovernmental system in order to produce outcome-ori-
ented collective action with non-state actors that extends beyond lob-
bying or consultation.75 There are also ideas about global interaction
that combine the heightened importance of new actors, such as cities,
with the crucial role of technology by declaring connectivity as the new
paradigm for ordering.76

2.4 GLOBAL GOVERNANCE

2.4.1 The complexities of global governance

Global governance refers to the collective management of shared problems
at the international level. It is an ongoing process involving both public
and private actors, through which diverse interests are being accom-
modated either in formal or informal arrangements.77 It comprises all
governance-related activities, rules and mechanisms that exist at different
levels.78 Hence, global governance is not equivalent to top-down-level
hierarchical authority; rather, it is characterised by the lack of world
government, as ‘governance’ indicates that a state-based approach is

71 Khanna 2016.

72 Slaughter 1997, 184.

73 Thiel & Maslanik 2017, 12.

74 Slaughter 1997, 184.

75 Andonova 2010, 25–26.

76 Khanna 2016.

77 Commission on Global Governance 1995.

78 Karns & Mingst 2010, 4.

42 MARCH 2019
insufficient for solving global problems.79 ‘Global’ here should be under-
stood as multi-scalar; it takes place not only at the global level, but also at
the national and sub-national level.80 Global governance thus challenges
the state-based international system in terms of actorness and arenas as
well as forms for resolving collective problems.
The main distinctive feature of global governance is the proliferation
of actors capable of having a say in resolving collective problems trans-
nationally.81 Next to states, there are a range of actors that influence
not only what is governed, but also how and where.82 These non-state
actors include traditional international organisations, but more notably
different forms of non-state authority, such as transnational corporations,
non-governmental organisations, industry associations, and international
experts and epistemic communities. Their rise indicates that state-based
solutions to collective problems are inadequate, and that governance
can be handled more efficiently in alternative fora and through other
mechanisms. To this end, a parallel development is the emergence of
new forms and fora of governance in conjunction with the proliferation
of non-state actors.83
In addition to traditional intergovernmental organisations, new forms
of international and global cooperation are proliferating. Formal inter-
national organisations have been slow to adapt to the ongoing power
shifts, in addition to which they have been inefficient in managing global
problems.84 To overcome these problems, states and other actors have
resorted to informal organisations and networks, such as the G20 or BRICS.
Diversification and informality have also spread to law-making process-
es, which feature soft law, industry standards and multi-stakeholder
initiatives. Consequently, the range of actors that participate in global
norm-making is broadening, and the distinction between law and non-
law is becoming blurred. The demands for effective governance have also
generated new spaces for governance beyond the territorial state, where
functional logic drives new coalitions of actors and interests.85
Another defining characteristic of global governance is the constant
increase in governance problems and their level of severity. New pol-
icy issues are emerging on the international agenda and international

79 Keohane & Nye 2000, 208.

80 Sassen 2003, 5.

81 Dingwerth & Pattberg 2009, 42.

82 Breslin & Nesadurai 2018, 188.

83 Ibid.

84 Creutz 2017, 4.

85 Breslin & Nesadurai 2018, 199.

MARCH 2019 43
cooperation is needed on various topics relating to the protection of global
commons, such as outer space, cyber space, biotechnology, artificial in-
telligence, the maritime domain, and the Arctic.86 Yet institutions have
not been able to adapt to these new challenges. Another feature com-
plicating the governance of global problems is their interconnectedness,
where one problem exacerbates another. Conflicts generate migration
and diseases; climate change causes famine and instability, which in
turn breeds conflict. The urgency of global problems has also intensified
in recent years. Climate change, for instance, affects the survival of the
whole planet, as may the use of weapons of mass destruction, as well as the
loss of biodiversity and ecosystems. Pandemics also threaten populations
worldwide, and the lack of regulation on artificial intelligence is said to
pose a global danger. However, most of the global problems can only be
managed, not resolved as such.
Besides the inherent complexities of actors, fora and issues of global
governance, the weakening of the rules-based international order has
further complicated the governance of collective policy issues. The UN-
led network of international organisations as well as international rules
and norms grounded in political and economic liberalisation, still forms
a central part of global governance structures,87 but is under considerable
pressure. Its central tenets, such as the practice of multilateralism and
the idea that national interests have been best promoted by international
cooperation,88 are being called into question. Staunch supporters, such as
the United States and its European allies, who have traditionally promoted
the international order and its values, appear divided over its future as
the new millennium has gradually exposed the weaknesses of the system.
Issues of legitimacy, equity and self-confidence have slowly eroded the
current order in spite of the fact that no clear competing international
system exists.89 Arguably, the Western states pushed liberalisation and
their transformative agenda too far, generating dissatisfaction not only
among rival states, but also among their own electorates.90

2.4.2 Norms, institutions and agents of contestation

Global governance is under strain because of its complex nature and many
components, but also due to uncertain times. Global institutions and
the norms they uphold are increasingly being challenged from multiple

86 Stewart 2014.

87 Rosenau 1995, 13.

88 Mazarr 2018, 3.

89 Chatham House 2015.

90 Dworkin & Leonard 2018.

44 MARCH 2019
directions and by multiple actors, while strong leaders put their “nations
and values first”.91 The principal challengers are liberal states themselves,
rising and resurgent states, regionalism and non-state actors. Yet it seems
that while states are strengthening there is no concomitant increased
commitment to deal with global problems. No state can, however, with-
draw completely from global issues and developments, and all must bear
some minimum responsibility for global well-being.92 The extent to which
actors are prepared to undertake (responsible) governance for the global
good remains unclear, however.

States
To start with, global governance is suffering from the withdrawal of the
United States from global governance institutions and structures. The
main founder and supporter of many global institutions is thus creating
uncertainties as regards their operation and credibility, if not direct-
ly undermining them. The United States has withdrawn from several
international fora and multilateral agreements, with President Trump
even declaring globalism a threat to the United States.93 The US has duly
left the Trans-Pacific Partnership, the 2015 Paris Climate Agreement,
UNESCO, the Human Rights Council, and the Joint Comprehensive Plan of
Action. The Trump administration has also threatened to withdraw from
the WTO system. Moreover, it has denounced the ICC, and plans to leave
all treaties giving international courts mandate over the US. In line with
this declaration, the United States withdrew from the Optional Protocol
on the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, an international legal
tool the country has itself relied on in defending its own diplomats and
embassies.94 Hence, there is a clear decline in the US global leadership,
and the long-held American suspicion of international legal institutions
and multilateralism as a practice has intensified.
Although the United States seems to be standing behind its commit-
ments in the security sphere, and the real departures in economic and
financial governance seem small to date, as demonstrated by the con-
clusion of a renegotiated NAFTA, a waiting game is ongoing.95 However,
the urgency of many governance issues, such as climate change, makes
waiting unsustainable. Moreover, much of multilateralism relies on the
financial support of the United States; the country is in absolute terms

91 Vasconcelos Vilaça 2018, 53.

92 Klabbers 2018, 13.

93 White House 2018a.

94 Bellinger 2018.

95 Aaltola et al. 2018, 59, 129.

MARCH 2019 45
by far the biggest funding donor to multilateral institutions, the bulk of
which goes to the UN system.96 Although the political commitment to
multilateralism has already suffered a blow, substantial cuts in funding
for multilateral institutions would further jeopardise the bedrock of the
international order. Thus far, the United States still has “the largest single
aggregation of power”,97 and cannot be overlooked.
There have been states, as well as other actors, that have been willing to
step into the breach and pick up the pieces after the American withdrawal.
Rising and resurgent powers have attempted to fill the governance void,
which has emerged partly because of the American withdrawal, but also
because new collective problems have arisen for which no institutions
and rules ostensibly exist. This complicates global governance not only
because of the increased number of actors wishing to participate, but also
because these rising actors contest (at least some elements of) the cur-
rent international order. The rising powers nevertheless lack a common
vision of a prospective world order; many of the BRICS states suffer from
economic and political distress,98 there are tensions between China and
India, while Russia, which is less active in global governance than China,
seems mostly engaged in creating instability.99 Although rising and re-
surgent powers do not share a concrete understanding of an alternative
world order capable of replacing the international liberal order, they find
common ground in their disapproval of liberal values, as well as efforts to
weaken state sovereignty.100 Another shared factor is the aim to discredit
American authority.
There is seemingly a convergence of interests in global governance
and its policy issues between China and Russia. Both share a conviction
of great-power status and a sense of entitlement to a special position in
international politics.101 Both states are also members of key global insti-
tutions and even possess privileged membership, for example, in the UN
Security Council, through which they are able to exercise decision-mak-
ing power, at least in issues of international peace and security. Formally
they stress, together with the rest of the BRICS, namely India, South Africa
and Brazil, the primacy of the UN and the importance of international law.
This is visible in the fact that both China and Russia allocate their largest

96 McArthur & Rasmussen 2017, 4.

97 Haass 2008, 45.

98 Acharya 2017, 275.

99 Kaczmarski, Katz & Tiilikainen, 2018, 56.

100 Ibid., 51.

101 Ibid., 50.

46 MARCH 2019
share of multilateral funding to UN peacekeeping operations.102 Indeed,
a noticeable aspect of Chinese engagement in the UN is its investment in
peacekeeping, which has recently been characterised by rapid ascend-
ency. The country has increased its financial and personnel support for
classic UN peacekeeping operations at times when the United States has
declared its reductions. In fact, the Chinese contribution in troops to
UN peacekeeping has exceeded the combined contributions of all of the
other P5 members since 2012, including high-risk missions such as those
in Mali and South Sudan.103
As regards the Chinese and Russian commitment to the international
legal system, the countries expressly limit themselves to a classic un-
derstanding of international law, which is grounded in respect for “the
independence, sovereignty, unity and territorial integrity of each na-
tion”.104 They reject interference in the allegedly domestic affairs of states
by criticising interventionist policies, be they in the form of condemning
resolutions by the Human Rights Council, military intervention under the
banner of the Responsibility to Protect doctrine, or judicial intervention
under the ICC. The concrete results of their non-interventionist policies
have been numerous vetoes in the Security Council concerning, for exam-
ple, Syria and the ousting of the al-Assad regime. Western interpretations
of human rights are resolutely rejected, and it has even been claimed that
China and Russia are fighting a war on human rights.105 The sovereigntist
agenda is gaining ground again.
But whereas Russia has bred instability and remained important pri-
marily in the field of arms control, China is ultimately the country that is
projecting itself as capable of taking over responsible global leadership.106
In policy issues relating to climate change, free trade and conflict resolu-
tion, China has declared and demonstrated leadership. The country has
gradually activated itself within global institutions and especially in the
UN; it has increased its participation in peacekeeping missions, filled top
positions, as well as increased its economic leverage in the world organi-
sation with US fund withdrawals. At the same time, its anti-human rights
project has peaked, which many states seem prepared to disregard in
exchange for having a new sponsor for international cooperation.107 China
is now seen as the “staunchest supporter of globalization and the classical

102 McArthur & Rasmussen 2017, 7.

103 Pauley 2018.

104 BRICS Sanya Declaration 2011, §9.

105 Piccone 2018; Lynch 2018.

106 Kaczmarski et al. 2018.

107 Gowan 2018, 4; Lynch 2018.

MARCH 2019 47
liberal idea that trade brings peace and mutual prosperity”.108 It is worth
noting, however, that although China is the second largest contributor to
the UN’s regular budget as of 2019,109 China and Russia provide per capita
financing below many small and mid-sized states, and hence lag way be-
hind the US in the overall funding scheme of multilateral institutions.110
China’s divisive track record as regards fundamental components of
the international liberal order, and international law in particular, can
be traced back to its domestic viewpoint on private and public law val-
ues.111 China has to a large extent adopted Western values when it comes
to trade, commerce and foreign investment, but when it comes to public
law values such as sovereignty, authority and social ordering, it takes a
different route. This division is also visible in international dispute set-
tlement where China has prioritised arbitration over third-party dispute
settlement in non-commercial issues. Overall, China seems to prefer
politics over law, and bilateralism rather than third-party application
of the law. Instead of establishing institutions and enforcing clear-cut
legal rules, China embraces a “highly political, contextual and flexible
way of ordering international relations”.112 This approach, which has
been dubbed ‘relational governance’, takes precedence over rules-based
governance and Western-based individualism.113

Regionalism
Another challenge to global solutions within the current institutional
and normative framework stems from the rise of regions. Today there
are hundreds of regional and sub-regional organisations and networks
that play a role in managing transnational affairs. UN peacekeeping, for
instance, relies heavily on support from regional organisations, most
notably the African Union. Many of the rising powers, such as Brazil,
South Africa, China and Japan, have invested in regional arrangements
in order to consolidate their leadership as well as to manage their diverse
economic and political interests.114 Regionalism has enabled non-Western
states to voice their concerns about hegemonic policies in global politics

108 Vasconcelos Vilaça 2018, 53.

109 United Nations General Assembly 2018.

110 McArthur & Rasmussen 2017, 5.

111 Vasconcelos Vilaça 2018, 62.

112 Ibid., 67.

113 Ibid.

114 Behr & Jokela 2011, 45.

48 MARCH 2019
as it provides a more immediate political environment, which is more
accessible than global institutions.115
This trend may be strengthening due to the inability of international
institutions to deal adequately with global problems and issues of rep-
resentation. The slow pace of reform may trigger the creation of alter-
native international institutions.116 For instance, the delay by the US
Congress in approving the IMF quotas made Asian states seek regional
options. In the same vein, the Asian financial crisis of 2008–09 trig-
gered Asian states to seek options outside global institutions, which led
to the creation of the AIIB and the BRICS bank, whereas in Europe, the
EU created the financial stability mechanism (FSM). Although the Asian
Infrastructure Investment Bank has a regional focus, it demonstrates
China’s rising power and constitutes in itself a counter-hegemonic pro-
ject.117 For the first time in history, there are international financial in-
stitutions in which the US does not participate.
Although regionalism has always formed a crucial and complementary
part of the international system and global governance,118 it may end up
increasingly challenging the coherence and stability of the system and
its global institutions.119 Trade is one policy issue where regional trade
agreements have been particularly strong and can even end up undermin-
ing the primacy of the global institution of the WTO.120 Another example
can be found in global refugee governance, where Australia together with
its Pacific Islands neighbours, for example, has created its own mecha-
nisms for dealing with refugees and migrants. Another debilitating factor
of regionalism is that region-to-region cooperation has not generally
been considered effective in resolving problems of global governance.121
Climate change, for example, illustrates how regional approaches are in-
adequate for managing many global problems. Moreover, regional projects
have developed unevenly, which raises concerns about equity for global
governance.122 It may also give rise to competing regional blocks that
increase global fragmentation.

115 Acharya 2018b, 22, 155.

116 Acharya 2016, 457.

117 Ikenberry & Lim 2017.

118 Behr & Jokela 2011, 1; Acharya 2018b, 30.

119 Kahler 2016, 3.

120 Acharya 2016, 456.

121 Behr & Jokela 2011, 51.

122 Kahler 2016, 4.

MARCH 2019 49
Non-state actors
Global governance both thrives on and is affected by the diffusion of pow-
er; non-state actors, such as corporations and civil society organisations,
are an inherent and vital part of global governance today, despite their
diversity. They do, however, challenge the state-based international
system on several counts mainly by pointing to the undemocratic and
illegitimate nature of the global governance architecture, but also by
demanding more global governance. Transnational stakeholders conse-
quently contest the current global governance framework both in terms
of substance and process.
The rise of non-state actors and governance institutions has not altered
the fact that international institutions remain the core sites of global gov-
ernance. They are important from the perspective of bringing together
states and non-state actors for regular interaction and information ex-
change.123 It is also within these that non-state actors demand broadened
participation and a more pluralised and inclusive global governance in all
policy fields and across all regions, as many global governance institutions
lack support from those whom they seek to govern.124 Civil society or-
ganisations in particular are seen as guarantors of connectivity between
world society and governance institutions.125 They seek to change global
governance in the direction of more democratic governance by working
for more direct citizen involvement.126Although non-state actors such as
civil society organisations are not inherently legitimate themselves and at
times may even seek to delegitimise global governance institutions, their
legitimating power is apparent.127
But non-state actors may not only contest governance institutions and
their decision-making by focusing on governance forms and processes.
They may also initiate change by calling for more and increased global
governance128 in the form of new regulations or institutions. This has been
particularly visible in policy fields such as human rights, atrocity crimes
and cyberspace,129 but also within climate change, where non-state actors
have been vociferous in calling for the intensification of climate action.
There are also situations in which non-state actors not only act as part
of global governance networks, but increasingly take on functions and

123 Risse 2013, 435.

124 Tallberg & Jönsson 2010, 2.

125 Stephen & Zürn 2014, 14.

126 Bexell, Tallberg & Uhlin 2010.

127 Scholte 2007, 310.

128 Acharya 2016, 457; Stephen & Zürn 2014, 8.

129 Acharya 2016, 457.

50 MARCH 2019
services in environments where governments or international organisa-
tions either will not or cannot operate,130 including the provision of public
goods. The weakening of many states has led to problems in exercising full
domestic sovereignty in terms of possessing a monopoly over the use of
force and being capable of enforcing decisions.131 A large number of states
have difficulties in enforcing central government decisions throughout
their national territory, in addition to which the central government
may be violently challenged. In extreme cases, no state apparatus exists
at all. Although limited statehood does not affect their status as interna-
tional legal sovereigns, it means that non-state actors may be involved in
the provision of goods and security, such as clean water, public security
and health.
Besides legitimate actors, such as NGOs, religious movements, or de-
velopment organisations, there are also non-legitimate non-state actors
that may take advantage of power vacuums or ungoverned spaces, and
exercise territorial and political authority over areas where the state is
weakened. Non-state actors – even violent ones – can at times prove more
capable than the national government when it comes to providing polit-
ical stability and citizen security,132 especially in border areas between
different states, but also in countries where non-state actors have tradi-
tionally enjoyed considerable power, such as Nigeria. This is noticeable,
for example, in the Afghanistan-Pakistan border regions, in Somalia,
Southern Lebanon and Colombia-Ecuador.133 This patently contradicts
the international community’s common assumption that the provision
of public goods should be in the hands of the government because the
exercise of political authority by non-state actors would be inherently
bad.134 However, the current security environment is more complex
and nuanced than that, as ISIL, Hezbollah and FARC have demonstrated.
Private authority is thus both complementing and re-configuring state
authority.135 The limits of transnationalism should, however, be kept in
mind. Non-state actors are hardly able to manage geopolitical competition
or to resolve climate change, poverty or mass atrocities.136 There remains
no viable alternative model of political organisation to the sovereign state,

130 Kelly 2007, 92.

131 Krasner & Risse 2014, 549.

132 Idler & Forest 2015.

133 Idler & Forest 2015.

134 Ibid., 4.

135 Green 2014.

136 Plesch & Weiss 2015, 202.

MARCH 2019 51
which will maintain its position as the main player in world politics.137
Sovereign power continues to attract separatist movements worldwide in
addition to which both consolidated and authoritarian states will guard
their turf and limit the ability of non-state actors to have a say in address-
ing global problems. What is nonetheless clear is the need to open up the
international system to broader representation,138 in order to achieve a
more legitimate, if not democratic, and accountable governance system.

2.4.3 Sectoral overviews

Human rights
Human rights governance is one of the issue areas in which actor-
ness, formality, and institutional fora have constantly evolved. Multi-
stakeholderism is a prevalent feature, and several institutional innovations
have taken place in recent decades, some of which even embody cosmo-
politan elements. At the same time, power shifts have markedly affected
human rights governance, and not always for the better.
The normative and institutional development in human rights was
immense in the 1990s following instances of widespread human rights
violations and even genocide. While several multilateral conventions
were being concluded to protect the rights of vulnerable groups, the most
notable development was seen in issues of responsibility. The creation of
two ad hoc international criminal tribunals for the former Yugoslavia and
Rwanda that were built on individual criminal responsibility was followed
by the adoption of the International Criminal Court statute in 1998. This
court’s mandate permeated state sovereignty in numerous ways, leaving
major powers outside of its structures in spite of widespread acceptance
by mid-sized and small states. There were also other normative innova-
tions taking place at the turn of the new millennium that attempted to
re-conceptualise state sovereignty, with the Responsibility to Protect
doctrine being articulated and ultimately approved by consensus by all
UN member states in the 2005 World Summit Outcome document. Soon
thereafter, the UN Human Rights Council was created to ensure an im-
proved human rights machinery, despite its meagre policy options limited
to naming and shaming.
The normative and institutional proliferation has been accompanied by
the inclusion of non-state actors in human rights governance in multiple
ways. The creation of the Universal Periodic Review at the UN Human
Rights Council allows civil society organisations to exercise leverage in

137 Chatham House 2015, 7.

138 Ibid., 8.

52 MARCH 2019
monitoring state behaviour; the UN Global Compact is a voluntary ini-
tiative between the UN and businesses; and John Ruggie’s UN Guiding
Principles on Business and Human Rights of 2011 represent yet another
effort to guarantee that universal human rights principles do not go unim-
plemented in a world where power is increasingly being shared between
states and non-state actors. The relevance of private actors for human
rights protection is also visible in the proliferation of corporate social
responsibility, namely private business self-regulation.
This ostensibly greater commitment to human rights across the whole
field of actors has, however, become a matter of concern partly due to
power shifts between states. China and other rising states are not only
critical of interference in the domestic affairs of states, but have more
openly challenged existing international human rights law of late by in-
troducing their so-called own human rights agenda.139 In addition, China
and Russia have sought to reduce financing for UN human rights pro-
grammes, particularly in peacekeeping missions. The withdrawal of the
US from the Human Rights Council has further highlighted the negative
effect of power shifts upon effective human rights protection. The signs of
declining commitment to the existing norms and institutions of human
rights are accumulating,140 and the future of human rights governance
structures may be increasingly uncertain. There is an ongoing backlash
against the expansive human rights agenda, which seeks to dislodge
human rights from the centre of the international order.141

Cyberspace and internet governance

Cyberspace is a relatively new issue area of global governance that has
become increasingly important and generated fierce controversies, not
least due to election tampering and cyberattacks. The regulation of cy-
berspace is fragmented in the sense that a universal comprehensive reg-
ulatory framework is lacking. Instead, governance is marked by differ-
ent sets of rules, institutions and actors that are loosely connected.142
The regime complex includes intergovernmental organisations, such as
the International Telecommunications Union (ITU), as well as general
and specific international legal rules, but also corporate decisions, in-
dustrial standards and independent commissions, such as the Global
Commission on the stability of cyberspace. Whereas the technical function
of connectivity is rather coherently regulated, the broader range of cyber

139 Stephen 2018, 7.

140 Ibid.

141 Dworkin & Leonard 2018, 6.

142 Nye 2014, 7.

MARCH 2019 53
governance issues is not.143 Although a global approach to cyber govern-
ance would be needed due to the increasing complexity of cyberspace as
well as risk mitigation, it remains unclear as to what sort of rules should
be created and through which fora.
There are many divisions hindering the formation of mutual under-
standing on cyberspace regulation. In fact, internet governance, which
forms a central part of cyberspace, reflects broader global power strug-
gles.144 Rising states seek to seize more power at the cost of the United
States, as well as to shift regulation in a sovereignty-based direction
where national interests reign. The foremost rift exists between liberal and
authoritarian approaches to controlling internet content.145 The question
of who should control internet regulation – the UN specialised agency,
ITU, or the more private and multi-stakeholder organ, ICANN – has been
a central concern. In the 2012 Dubai World Conference on International
Telecommunications, the Western states lost out to authoritarian and
developing states, which posited that regulation should be grounded in
state-based politics at ITU in contrast to the market-dominated devel-
opment of the internet and cyberspace.146
States are faced with the dilemma that while they want to benefit
from the internet, their societies might need to be protected from what
flows out of it.147 But equally, the internet may be used for censorship
and surveillance.148 For authoritarian states, the desire for state control
of the internet derives from the need for regime stability. The US and the
EU, in particular, are worried about Chinese illiberalism spreading to cy-
berspace. The Great Fire Wall is China’s system for exerting control over
both internet content and access to it, and China seeks to take its so-called
cyber sovereignty model global. Many states are signing up to elements
of the Chinese position, whereas the US is mostly missing in action.149
This heightens the risk of the further fragmentation of cyber governance.
Not only states but also non-state actors are competing for power in
managing cyberspace. While ideological rivalry exists between states,
private actors seem more inclined and able to cooperate.150 Indeed, cy-
berspace governance is to a large degree multi-stakeholder, involving

143 Ibid.

144 DeNardis 2014.

145 Nye 2014, 9.

146 Walden 2013, 261; Nye 2014, 7.

147 Nye 2014, 7.

148 DeNardis 2013.

149 Hass 2017.

150 Keller 2015.

54 MARCH 2019
private corporations as well as new global institutions. This is also re-
flected in the unique feature of ITU, which includes the private sector in
decision-making.151 The distinctive characteristics of cyberspace, namely
that it transcends territorial and legal boundaries and remains partly
controlled by private actors, makes states dependent on cooperative
models of governance.

International security
Security governance is an issue area that is still dominated by states even
though non-state actors have become important players in the policy
field since they both challenge and contribute to international security.
Whereas the United States is still by far the foremost military power in the
world, China’s rise is reflected in its increasing role in conflict resolution.
Within the primary international security institution, namely the Security
Council of the UN, power shifts have affected the handling of specific
threat situations, but have also created concerns about legitimacy. At the
same time, the perception of what constitutes a threat to international
peace and security has constantly expanded, as inter-state wars are in-
creasingly rare and civil wars proliferate. In addition, terrorist networks,
transnational organised crime and potential lone wolves pose serious
threats to international security, but so do pandemics, the proliferation of
weapons of mass destruction, and widespread human rights violations.152
When dealing with these threats, international security institutions
suffer from great-power competition as well as rivalling perceptions of
sovereignty and interference. This is evidenced by the stalemate in the UN
Security Council on the Syrian and Ukrainian conflicts, and the diplomatic
deadlock in the OSCE following the Russian aggression against Ukraine.
The veto rights of the permanent members of the Security Council have
effectively hindered intervention measures in conflicts that the great
powers have interests in, and which would require state sovereignty to
be sidestepped. The number of vetoes cast has steadily increased since
the early 1990s, and in the last ten years the Middle East has divided
great powers the most; Russia and China have blocked the adoption of
resolutions pertaining to Syria, whereas US vetoes relate to the Palestinian
question.153 The decisions and actions on Syrian chemical weapons as well
as calls for temporary ceasefires to allow safe passage of humanitarian aid
nevertheless provide a glimmer of hope.154

151 Walden 2013, 271.

152 See e.g. UNSC Res. 2177 (2014) declaring the infectious disease Ebola a threat to international peace and
security in accordance with Art. 39 of the UN Charter.

153 UN Security Council 2018.

154 Stephen 2018, 6.

MARCH 2019 55
 But in spite of deadlocks in high-politics conflicts, the Security Council
continues to play a meaningful role in civil conflicts in Africa, which make
up the majority of the items on the Council’s agenda.155 In particular,
China has increased its investment in peacekeeping despite its traditional
reluctance to interfere in other states’ affairs either by voting on peace-
keeping resolutions or by financing such operations.156 It provides 2,441
personnel and is the second largest financial contributor to UN peace-
keeping.157 Maintaining international stability is important for China not
only because of soft power projection, but also for economic reasons in
keeping trade and commerce routes open.158 Its participation in highly
intrusive and complex missions nevertheless reveals a contradiction be-
tween reality and rhetoric when it comes to China’s commitment to the
equal sovereignty of states, and non-intervention.159
The Security Council also plays a key role in the fight against inter-
national terrorism160 and non-proliferation issues – topics that great
powers have so far united on. But systematic and widespread human
rights violations divide the permanent members, with China and Russia
rejecting interference in the internal affairs of states. Thus, for example,
the Security Council has been able to decide on tough sanctions for North
Korean regime members in response to the country’s nuclearisation and
missile testing, whereas it has failed to adopt any measures in response
to North Korea’s human rights situation.
Power shifts between states have nevertheless not only affected the
handling of thorny conflicts threatening international peace and securi-
ty, they have also highlighted the outdated composition of the Security
Council. Countries such as Brazil, India, Japan, Nigeria, South Africa and
Germany have strengthened their calls for reform of the Security Council’s
composition in order to expand their power. Saudi Arabia even formally
rejected its seat in the UN Security Council in 2013 due to the lack of
reform. However, neither the working of the Security Council, nor the
governance of international security more generally, will improve as long
as the great powers by their own actions disregard or cast doubt on the
foundational rules on the use of force. The illegal annexation of Crimea by
Russia in 2014 has been followed by Chinese claims to disputed islands in

155 Ibid.

156 Fung 2016.

157 As of 31 December 2018, see United Nations Peacekeeping 2018.

158 Institute for Security & Development Policy 2018.

159 Suzuki 2011.

160 Stephen 2018, 6.

56 MARCH 2019
the South China Sea, and the US bombing of Syria in 2017 in contravention
of international law.161
Global security governance is complemented by regional organisations
that have played an important role in conflict resolution. On the one hand,
they have urged the Security Council to act, while on the other hand,
they have been the ones empowered to act on behalf of the Council, as
was the case, for example, with the African Union in the UN’s mission to
Somalia. In addition, they may be the most appropriate actors in regional
conflicts, as demonstrated by the renewed relevance of the OSCE with
regard to the Ukraine conflict. Private actors are on the rise as security
providers as well. Private security and military companies hunt down
pirates, protect UN operations, and guard persons and properties even
in the theatre of war.162 As a result, states have been forced to consider
how to keep the privatisation of security within the boundaries of both
national and international law. This has necessitated innovative forms
of governance, such as the International Code of Conduct for Private
Security Providers multi-stakeholder initiative, which is built around
the participation of states, private security companies and civil society
organisations. Security governance has become increasingly pluralised as
various types of actors besides states not only generate security threats,
but also procure and provide security.163

Trade
Trade is the policy field in which power shifts are most noticeable.164 It is
influenced especially by tensions between developing and non-developing
states, as well as the creation of trade agreements that form an alternative
to the WTO. The deteriorating US-China relationship affects global trade
relations overall and may even imperil the existence of the WTO altogether.
The greatest beneficiary of globalisation and accession to the WTO has
been China, whose economic upsurge has made it central to international
trade and one of the core powers along with the US and the EU. Yet trade
relations between the two largest economies in the world, namely the US
and China, are characterised by disappointment with the fact that Chinese
membership of the WTO has not changed China’s own market rules to a
satisfactory degree. The US has accused China of “policies inconsistent
with free and fair trade, including tariffs, quotas, currency manipulation,
forced technology transfer, intellectual property theft and industrial

161 Schmitt & Ford 2017.

162 Francioni & Ronzitti 2011.

163 Caparini 2006, 264.

164 Stephen 2018, 3; Stephen & Parízek 2018.

MARCH 2019 57
subsidies”.165 In response, China is playing by the WTO rulebook, and
advancing its interests increasingly before the organisation’s dispute set-
tlement bodies, in contrast to the Trump administration’s protective and
retaliatory measures against China. The WTO remains caught in the middle
of the trade war between the US and China, which it failed to prevent to
begin with. US discontent with the organisation’s dispute settlement
mechanisms as well as the WTO’s incapacity to deal with Chinese subsidies
may end up taking the confrontation from the multilateral trading system
to power politics.166 Whether this will lead to a revision of the WTO itself
or not remains contested, and strongly rejected by the rising powers.
But China is not the only rising power challenging the multilateral
trade system. Other larger states, such as Brazil, Russia and India have
become increasingly important due to their market sizes, trade volumes
and institutional activity.167 Together with several developing states,
these rising powers have resisted further international regulation on
Western priorities related to investment, services and intellectual proper-
ty. Instead, rising powers desire regulation on agriculture and other more
traditional trade sectors. The disparity between Western states and many
of the rising powers that reserve a central role for the state in organising
the economy168 is constantly being accentuated. The disagreement over
further trade rules impedes multilateral trade negotiations and will ham-
per trade growth in the long run.
In response, many states, both Western and rising, have sought to con-
clude free trade agreements (FTA), the increase in which has been expo-
nential.169 In recent years, the trend has shifted towards mega FTAs, such
as the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP), the Trans-
Pacific Partnership (TPP), and the Regional Comprehensive Economic
Partnership (RCEP). These agreements would enable deepening trade
liberalisation rules with a large number of countries, ultimately setting
trade governance on different tracks. Such practices may constitute a
threat to the global trade regime and its principles of universalism and
non-discrimination.170 The risk of trade governance fragmentation is real
despite the immediate preferential trade benefits.

165 White House 2018b.

166 Beattie 2018.

167 Stephen 2018, 4.

168 Stephen 2014.

169 Aggarwal & Evenett 2013.

170 Stephen 2018, 4.

58 MARCH 2019
2.5 CHAPTER CONCLUSIONS

In light of all the political contestation of institutions as well as norms

that form the bedrock of global governance, it is unsurprising that the
international liberal order is said to be in crisis. Still, there are factors
that increase the current order’s resilience and make it likely that it will
survive in one form or another. One salient feature of the international
liberal order has been the high degree of institutionalisation, which has
contributed to its longevity.171 The UN, the Bretton Woods institutions,
and the WTO all comprise the many layers of rules and institutions that
make it difficult for rising states to overturn the present order. Moreover,
the classical mechanism of overturning international orders, namely
great-power war, seems unlikely due to the even distribution of nuclear
weapons among the great powers. Additionally, liberal democracy has
spread to such an extent that it is deeply rooted in the global system.172
The complexity of the international order makes it difficult for contesting
powers to categorically reject it; in some issue areas cooperation may be
feasible, whereas in others it can more easily be opposed.173
The construction of the new international order will be characterised
by pluralisation of agency.174 The rise of non-Western states, particularly
China, is pivotal for power politics and global governance. China is increas-
ingly at the heart of many global problems together with the US. In many
issues, China has portrayed itself as a protector of Western values, such as
internet freedom and free trade. What is more, its global leadership efforts
gain traction as a result of US withdrawal. China uses a policy of diversion
by criticising the West for online mass surveillance or human rights viola-
tions, while its own actions are highly questionable. Despite using familiar
parlance, China plays by a different playbook and its objectives seem to
differ from the norm. The world order in which non-Western states hold
a more prominent place is likely to be more sympathetic to the concerns
of developing states, as well as respectful of sovereignty and security,175
as already witnessed in issue areas such as cyber governance.
The implications of China’s rise and the uncertainty surrounding the
international order created by the Trump-led US are often understood as
leading to multi-polarity. Indeed, an increasing number of powerful states
are on the rise, pointing to the formation of a multipolar world order.

171 Ikenberry & Lim 2017, 5.

172 Ibid.

173 Ibid.

174 Acharya 2018b.

175 Acharya 2018b, 31.

MARCH 2019 59
A polar world order is nonetheless based on stable and fixed alliances,
which fails to correspond to the present situation, where power con-
stellations vary and overlap depending on the policy issue.176 Countries
are not divided between different bloc-like poles where alternative poles
are categorically rejected. Instead, “different actors can have legitimacy
and take leadership in different issue areas”.177 For example, traditional
comprehensive alliances have weakened, as witnessed by Japan and the
United Kingdom joining the AIIB, or the EU seeking global leadership with
China in trade and environmental issues. The international system will be
increasingly diffuse and several authorities will be in place.178 The power of
non-state actors to engage in effective governance also demonstrates that
the multipolar world actually thrives on “multiple sites of authority”.179
Another important site of agency in the construction of the new world
order will be regionalism, which may both complement and fragment
the international system.
For the Western defenders of the international liberal order, this not
only means that the commitment to international fora must be increased,
but also that one must realise the deep opposition to interventionist rules
and policies that has hitherto been at the heart of the order. Norms must
be re-evaluated; a choice must be made between resisting or embrac-
ing alternative approaches to handling collective problems.180 How the
Western states deal with contesting powers will be of the utmost impor-
tance; it should be recognised that all states must do their share of global
governance irrespective of how the West feels about their interests and
preferences. To reconcile this conundrum, one needs to accept the dif-
ferences and compromise. The question is to what extent the supporters
of the international liberal order should adjust their positions, and on
what issues compromise is feasible.
At the international level, re-evaluation and accommodation have
already taken place to a certain extent. For example, the Responsibility
to Protect doctrine has been geared towards capacity-building and inter-
national assistance, instead of maintaining its original content aimed at
enabling international military interventions with humanitarian purpos-
es.181 Western states themselves have even turned away from hard-core
interventionism. Similarly, expectations about what the ICC can achieve

176 Breslin 2017, 496.

177 Ibid., 503.

178 Ikenberry 2011, 280; Breslin 2017.

179 Breslin 2017; see also Womack 2016; Acharya 2018b.

180 Dworkin & Leonard 2018; Chatham House 2015.

181 Creutz 2018.

60 MARCH 2019
have also become more realistic. What is needed is nevertheless a dis-
cussion on what a potentially revised world order wants to achieve and
by what means,182 on top of the issue of who gets to participate in deci-
sion-making – even if a clear single ordering moment might be missing.183

182 Chatham House 2015.

183 Breslin 2017.

MARCH 2019 61
3
3. THE EU IN THE CONTEXT OF THE
CHANGING GLOBAL ORDER

3.1 INTRODUCTION

Ongoing shifts in the global distribution of power and uncertainty about

the future shape of the global order are making it ever more complicated
for the European Union and its member states to defend their values and
interests in the world. At the same time, the EU’s unity is more crucial
than ever. As competition between major powers, most notably the US
and China, increasingly dominates global politics, the EU needs to define
and pursue a common strategy. Unity is also needed in order to counter
deliberate efforts by other actors, especially Russia and China, to di-
vide Europe.
External challenges interact with internal ones: increased global un-
certainty about the liberal order is reflected in the EU’s internal devel-
opments. The EU’s ability to define and promote its strategic goals in
the global arena is weakened by the departure of the UK and increased
political polarisation in the remaining member states. The rise of populist
radical right-wing parties in many European states undermines the value
basis of the Union and has concrete policy implications, having con-
tributed, for example, to the difficulties to formulate a shared approach
to migration.
This chapter looks firstly at the EU’s position in the changing global
order and its attempts to cope with contradictory changes such as the
rise of power politics and simultaneous diffusion of power. It then turns
to major internal challenges and the EU’s responses to these, notably the
rise of populism, the Eurozone crisis and the migration crisis. The third

MARCH 2019 65
section examines some key areas of the EU’s external relations and foreign
and security policy, focusing on trade policy, defence cooperation and
relations with Russia.

3.2 THE EU’S WORLDVIEW AND POSITION IN THE CHANGING

GLOBAL ORDER

The notion of rules-based order has a central place in the EU’s vision of
itself – as formulated by Tocci, multilateralism and the rule of law “con-
stitute the very moral and ideational bedrock of the European project”.1
The EU has tried to project the same liberal worldview beyond its borders,
in its neighbourhood and in the world at large. The EU’s view of inter-
national order is liberal in its emphasis on institutions and shared norms
that constrain state behaviour and foster cooperation. Furthermore, it
is liberal in the sense of relying on respect for freedom, the rule of law,
and the openness of society and government. Both of these aspects are
currently under strain due to the rise of non-Western powers and the
return of power politics.

3.2.1 From the post-Cold War era to the return of power politics
The EU’s international actorness developed rapidly during the post-Cold
War era. It was shaped by the spread of liberal norms in Europe as well
as globally, and a relatively favourable regional security environment.
The 1990s was a period without major challenges to the Western US-led
hegemony and the liberal political and economic model. The reunifica-
tion of Europe was a major strategic goal shared by the EU and the US. In
the 1990s, and a good part of the 2000s, the EU pursued deepening and
widening, built on European norms and values as a largely unquestioned
ideal. The launch of the Eastern enlargement process, Common Foreign
and Security Policy (1993) and Common Security and Defence Policy (1999)
had a strongly value-oriented and idealist flavour. The EU’s agenda was
driven by the belief in the supremacy and attractiveness of its own model.
Since the optimism of the 1990s and early 2000s, the EU has been
surrounded by a gradually deteriorating security environment, while
building up its own security and defence policy in an effort to address the
growing concerns. The major trends over the last quarter of a century have
moved the EU from expansion to introversion, from exporting security to
importing insecurity, from transforming the neighbourhood and even the
world to protecting itself, and from idealism to pragmatism. In the face of

1 Tocci 2017, 9.

66 MARCH 2019
external events often evolving along undesired paths, the EU has had to
scale down its belief in its own ability to shape developments in its neigh-
bourhood and beyond. The shift towards pragmatism and self-protection
has entailed adaptation to the revival of the relevance of military power.
In recent years, the return of geopolitical tensions and the rise of
zero-sum competition among major powers has made it increasingly
difficult, but also more important for the EU to strengthen its foreign
and security policy. These are particularly challenging developments for
the EU, which is not well-suited to be a major actor in a world of power
politics; indeed, historically, its very purpose has been to tame power
politics. The EU is not a state and not a major power in the traditional
sense, not least due to its very limited ability to project military force.
The EU’s nature as a unique entity that ‘vacillates between a state iden-
tity and that of a different actor’ has inspired a rich academic discussion
where this uniqueness has been seen as a source of both weakness and
strength.2 From a realist perspective, it has been characterised as a small
or medium power.3
Despite the EU’s efforts to move towards a post-Westphalian or
post-sovereign conception of external affairs,4 foreign and security policy
remains a realm where member states hold onto their sovereignty. The
common foreign and security policy of the EU is complementary to the
policies of its individual member states. The EU’s foreign policy perfor-
mance has often been constrained by the lack of political unity, strategic
thinking, and common strategic culture.5
The rise of new actors, notably China, gives increased prominence to
(geo)political competition between major powers along the lines of realist
IR theory. World politics seems to be moving towards a multipolar order.
The global shift to increased great-power competition overshadows the
possibility for the EU to be a ‘different kind of actor’ in world politics.
The rising powers, and perhaps increasingly some Western actors as well,
uphold rather traditional understandings of statehood and sovereignty.
In order to be able to respond to the global tensions and protect its in-
terests, the EU is expected to act, by its partners and its own citizens, in
a more state-like manner, showing unity and developing the full range
of foreign policy resources, including military capability. Within the
EU, the debate on a post-sovereign Europe has been replaced by calls for
European sovereignty, portrayed as part of the EU’s response to the new

2 Tiilikainen 2014, 131; Whitman 2011.

3 Toje 2011.

4 Spence & Batora 2015.

5 de France & Whitney 2013.

MARCH 2019 67
global challenges.6 Yet these calls are not easily accommodated to the
above-mentioned wish of member states to retain their formal sover-
eignty, especially in the field of foreign and security policy.
Europe’s internal divisions are exploited and deliberately exacerbated
by major powers such as Russia and China. While the impact of China
is more subtle and largely based on its increasing economic presence in
Europe, Russia is intervening more directly via hybrid measures such as
disinformation and support for radical populist groups, instrumentalising
existing social and political divisions in order to deepen cleavages with-
in and between EU member states. The US has traditionally supported
European integration and unity (albeit not without disruptions, such as
the division into ‘new’ and ‘old’ Europe instigated by President George W.
Bush during the Iraq war). However, the strategic value of a united Europe
as an ally of the US has been called into question by President Trump. Even
before the Trump era, there were signs that US attention was increasingly
focused on China and Asia, while the relevance of Europe was declining.

3.2.2 Networks, values and resilience

The state-centric trend of the return of realist geopolitics is challenged by
another dimension of change: the implosion of connections and diffusion
of power. Borders are porous and state sovereignty is in many ways an
illusion, as we are connected together by flows of people, goods, mon-
ey, data and energy. Expanding networks of actors are enabled by new
forms of physical connectivity that link together different parts of the
world. Some go as far as to argue that this makes territories and borders
irrelevant7 – a claim that is hard to sustain in light of territorial conflicts
over Crimea and the South China Sea, to name just a few. Yet it is hard to
deny that governing has become more difficult, and an increasing variety
of actors can shape global events.8 States are embedded in webs of inter-
dependencies like never before. The chessboard and the web co-exist, as
Anne-Marie Slaughter puts it.9
These two dimensions of change are in conflict with each other, and
yet they are simultaneously challenging the liberal, rules-based order.
The norms and institutions that have regulated international relations
since the end of the Second World War are under strain. The geopolitical
tensions between great powers are not taking us back to the 19th century,
but they are playing out in new ways in today’s networked world. Europe,

6 Fogarty 2018.

7 E.g. Khanna 2016.

8 National Intelligence Council 2017; see also Naím 2013.

9 Slaughter 2017.

68 MARCH 2019
 among others, is puzzled about how to address the new uncertainties and
reassess its own place in the world.
The EU has embraced, at least rhetorically, the global trend of diffusion
of power and the vision of a less state-centric global order. The idea of
global networks that encompass and empower various non-state actors
seems to make more space for a quasi-state actor such as the EU and has
indeed been endorsed in the European Global Strategy (EGS). The strategy
conveys an explicitly network-based understanding of world politics and
the EU’s role in it. The EU sets out to act as an “agenda-shaper, a con-
nector, coordinator and facilitator within a networked web of players”.10
The EU is a network actor by its very nature, with its member states and
citizens tied together by a uniquely dense web of connections and inter-
dependencies. A great number and broad variety of actors are involved in
its policy-making through a multi-level system of governance. The EU’s
own vision of its place in the world presents this feature of the Union as
a ‘unique advantage’ that should enable Europeans to shape global de-
velopments in the era of an ‘unprecedented degree of global connectivity’
and ‘exponential spread of webs’.11
The EU’s vision of global networks is tied to the values of freedom,
openness and the rule of law.12 In the EGS, civil society actors are singled
out among other partners, and the EU makes a commitment to protect
and empower human rights defenders in particular. However, the EU’s
rhetoric on values has acquired a more inward-looking and defensive
dimension. The EGS stresses ‘adherence to our values’ and the need to
‘foster the resilience’ of democracies in the member states. It rejects the
earlier tendency to juxtapose values and interests, and formulates the
promotion of ‘our values’ globally as an interest of the EU. Although the
EGS is still a distinctly liberal strategy, the pendulum has swung from
outward-looking idealism in the direction of defensive realism.13
Upheavals in the neighbourhood, including wars in Libya, Syria and
eastern Ukraine, provoked a debate on whether EU foreign policy should
become more realist and ‘geopolitical’ in order to accommodate to the
rise in power politics.14 The EU had often neglected security problems in
the neighbouring regions, which transformed into direct threats to the
Union itself. The European Neighbourhood Policy duly shifted from its
earlier emphasis on supporting transformation (political and economic

10 European Union 2016, 43.

11 European Union 2015.

12 Raik 2018

13 Tocci 2017, 55, 61.

14 Youngs 2017.

MARCH 2019 69
 reforms) and extending European norms and values towards increased
attention to security.
The new approach shifts the focus to improving the ‘resilience’ of
neighbours and helping them build up the necessary capabilities for im-
proving their security. Yet perhaps the change is not so radical after all
– the continued importance of norms and values is reflected in the EU’s
understanding of resilience. The EGS claims that a “resilient society fea-
turing democracy, trust in institutions, and sustainable development lies
at the heart of a resilient state”. The EU continues to shy away from hard
security issues in nearby regions and tries to develop a distinct approach
to regional security, now defined through the notion of resilience.

3.2.3 Defending the rules-based order

Globally, the EU has been left as the only major actor still firmly commit-
ted to the rules-based order. With the declining ability and willingness of
the US to sustain international norms and institutions, it is not clear who,
if anyone, will take on the role of global leadership. Calls for Europe (or
Germany) to do this have been met with caution and doubt.15 More opti-
mistic voices argue that the rising powers may become constructive pillars
of a new and different, but still rules-based world order.16 Alternatively,
the rise of new powers that do not share Western understandings of order
has given rise to the notion of multipolarity, but also ‘nonpolarity’, ‘no
one’s world’ or a ‘multi-order world’ – a world without a clear leader or
a shared order.17
There is, however, a number of mid-sized powers and smaller actors
that share the EU’s commitment to multilateralism, and that look to
Europe for partnership, if not leadership in efforts to preserve and, where
necessary, reform the current order. The EU can reach out to like-minded
countries such as Japan, Canada, Australia and South Korea that also have
a strong interest in preserving global rules on trade, human rights and
climate, for instance. To some degree, a shared interest in multilateralism
can also be found in countries such as India, Brazil and South Africa, al-
though these belong to the BRICS group, which aims at counterbalancing
the West.
Furthermore, the EU can build on its understanding and experience
of network agency and make a more comprehensive strategic effort to
think and act as a network power in a densely interconnected world.
This means a proactive approach to engaging partners inside and outside

15 E.g. Leonard 2017; Carnegie Europe 2017.

16 Stuenkel 2016; Acharya 2016.

17 Haass 2008; Kupchan 2012; Flockhart 2016.

70 MARCH 2019
Europe, including state and non-state actors that share the EU’s interests.
Faced with the return of great-power competition and exclusive forms
of nationalism, the EU should foster and make use of open networks, but
also defend its key networks and make them more resilient.
One can distinguish between various types of network strategies, such
as networks aimed at strengthening one’s own resilience, networks built
for carrying out specific tasks, and networks developed for addressing
large-scale global problems.18 All of these are relevant with a view to
pursuing the EU’s foreign policy goals, such as countering hybrid threats
(a case of strengthening resilience), managing conflicts in the neighbour-
hood (a case of specific tasks) or curbing climate change (a prime example
of a large-scale global problem). In order to make progress in any of these
fields, the EU needs to coordinate among a number of actors inside and
outside the Union and address the importance of connectivity among
these actors. The EU cannot place itself above other actors and exercise
leadership in a top-down manner, but it can pursue a well-connected
position within networks in a manner that enables it to shape events and
influence others. The strategic use of networks can help the EU counter
power politics and sustain rules-based order together with actors that
share similar interests.
The scale of global challenges requires the EU to adopt a selective ap-
proach to the task of preserving rules-based order. The grand rhetoric on
global order needs to be translated into work on priority areas that are
particularly vital for Europe (such as regional security) and where the EU
has relatively strong influence (such as trade). Some of the priority areas
are examined later in this report (section 3.4).

3.3 INTERNAL TRENDS IN THE EU

The EU’s unity and even its survival have been tested by a number of crises
during the past decade. The rise of populist parties, the Eurozone crisis
and migration crisis have contributed to political polarisation within and
cleavages among member states. The EU has overcome these shocks and
has taken a number of measures to cope with each crisis. Furthermore,
it has introduced reforms aimed at improving its ability to handle similar
challenges in the future. On the other hand, dissatisfaction in the political
margins has grown and polarisation increased. The measures taken to
reform the Eurozone have been criticised by many experts as insufficient.
The migration issue has proved to be even more difficult to tackle.

18 Slaughter 2017.

MARCH 2019 71
 The prevailing view in Europe is that the EU is needed more than ever
to address these and other common challenges. A strong majority of EU
citizens continue to support European integration. Global instability
plays a role in the EU’s internal cleavages, but it also necessitates joint
European responses.

3.3.1 Political polarisation and Euroscepticism

The rise of populism and authoritarianism is a global trend that has not left
Europe untouched. External trends have been interwoven with internal
crises within the EU, with a visible effect on the European political land-
scape. EU-related matters have become politicised to a stronger degree
than in the past – in other words, they have become both more visible
and more contested in national political debates. The Eurozone crisis in
particular had a clear impact on public opinion: between 2007 and 2012,
the EU’s image diminished while the popularity of Eurosceptic parties
increased in many member states.19
In Southern Europe, criticism towards the EU was above all levelled
at austerity policies and economic hardship and translated into increased
support for radical left-wing parties. In Northern parts of Europe, by
contrast, Euroscepticism was mostly linked with the agenda of the pop-
ulist radical right, including an anti-immigration and anti-globalisation
stance. Furthermore, in many Eastern member states, there was also a
notable surge in the populist radical right, although in these countries
it did not oppose the EU as such but called for a stronger role for nation
states within the Union.
The populist parties, Eurosceptics and radical right make up diverse
and only partly overlapping groupings that lack a common agenda. The
rise of the populist radical right in many member states, either in an
anti-EU or merely EU-critical form, is a particular cause for concern, as
it poses a challenge to the core values that underpin both the national
political systems and the integration project. The populist parties build
their agenda on dividing society into two antagonistic groups, the ‘pure
people’ versus the ‘corrupt elite’, and claim to represent the will of the
‘ordinary people’.20 They tend to oppose not only the elite, but also lib-
eralism, pluralism and cosmopolitanism.
The Brexit vote of June 2016 was the most fateful expression of polari-
sation and the rise of Euroscepticism. Contrary to initial fears of contagion
or a domino effect, it actually contributed to stronger unity among the
EU27 and higher levels of public support for the EU.

19 Iso-Markku & Jokela 2017, 27–28.

20 Mudde 2004.

72 MARCH 2019
 One of the most crucial tests of the popularity of the radical right
was the French presidential election of 2017, in which the liberal pro-EU
candidate Emmanuel Macron eventually beat the populist, nationalist,
anti-EU contender, Marine Le Pen, with 66% of the vote. At the same time,
populist right-wing parties have been in power in Hungary and Poland
for several years, where they have gradually introduced restrictions on
the rule of law and freedom of expression. These developments under-
mine the functioning of the rule of law in the EU as a whole, and pose a
fundamental challenge to the EU’s external identity and credibility.21 A
coalition of populist parties came to power in Italy in June 2018 and was
soon on a collision course with the European Commission over budgetary
rules. Furthermore, right-wing populists belong to coalition governments
in Greece, Finland and Austria.
The populists have had an impact on politics, especially at the national
level, but far less at the EU level. Political fragmentation and polarisation
have made governing more difficult, and it has become harder to put to-
gether effective government coalitions. Respect for political adversaries
has been replaced to some extent by fearmongering and hate-speech.
Migration has gained a prominent place on the agenda, underscoring di-
visions within societies, even though the situation with regard to arrivals
of new asylum-seekers stabilised in 2017–2018. The positions of many
centre-right mainstream parties, and in some cases also the centre-left,
have moved closer to the populist radical right regarding migration issues
and overall positioning vis-à-vis the EU.
Mainstream parties have taken different approaches vis-à-vis the
populist contenders. In some countries, notably Germany and Sweden,
the radical right has been excluded from power. Such a ‘cordon sani-
taire’ approach has its downsides: it can lead to weak or dysfunctional
governments, feed a sense of lack of alternatives among the electorate,
and allow the populists to portray themselves as victims. The inclusion
of the radical right in government may soften its positions, as happened
in the case of Finland, with the result that the Finns Party split into two.22
Populist and Eurosceptic parties have also been represented at the
EU level, but their influence there has been limited. Decision-making
in the European Parliament is largely dominated by the two largest
political groups, the European People’s Party (EPP) and Socialists and
Democrats (S&D). The populist parties have not formed a single group
in the EP, but have been scattered among several mutually competing
groups. If populists of different shapes make gains in the next European

21 Grabbe & Lehne 2017.

22 Iso-Markku & Jokela 2017.

MARCH 2019 73
Parliament elections in 2019 and organise themselves more efficiently,
their influence may increase, possibly even with a paralysing effect on
EP decision-making.

3.3.2 Economic crisis and reform of the Eurozone

The global financial crisis reached Europe in 2008 and subsequently
evolved into a crisis of the Eurozone. These developments exposed sig-
nificant differences among the member states’ economies, notably with
regard to competitiveness, productivity and financial sustainability. The
crisis was preceded by a period of high growth and a significant conver-
gence of per capita income levels, due to particularly strong growth in the
Eastern and Southern member states. The financial crisis revealed that a
substantial part of the convergence was unsustainable. In many countries,
increased spending was financed largely by growing debt, while cost
competitiveness weakened. This led to exceptionally deep recessions.23
The crisis involved a rapid increase in public debt, especially in the
case of Greece. In addition to Greece, Ireland and Portugal were able to
continue to serve their public debt and finance deficit only with the sup-
port of other member states (and the IMF). Spain and Cyprus also needed
financial assistance. Furthermore, Italy was under considerable market
pressure.24 The assistance programmes involved harsh requirements to
cut public expenditure, which came with painful social costs and political
ramifications, such as increased distrust towards power holders, and the
rise of Euroscepticism and populism.
The crisis put a severe strain on the banking sector. In many cases,
banks incurred heavy credit losses and had to be bailed out by govern-
ments in order to sustain the stability of the financial system. It became
evident that the dependencies between financial institutions and sover-
eigns posed high risks to public economies and taxpayers.
This led to important political steps to create new stability mechanisms
for extreme financial crises that endangered the Eurozone as a whole.
EU institutions gained enhanced capacities to supervise and demand
corrections to member states’ budgetary policies. The European Stability
Mechanism established in 2012 was to provide a permanent solution by
replacing the initial ad hoc rescue packages. The regulation and super-
vision of banks and other financial actors was tightened considerably
through the creation of the Banking Union, which includes the Single
Supervisory Mechanism, responsible for banking supervision, and the
Single Resolution Mechanism, dealing with problem banks.

23 Lehmus, Tiilikainen & Vihriälä 2017, 72.

24 Ibid., 75

74 MARCH 2019
 These measures meant a de facto increase in mutual responsibility
and solidarity among Eurozone members. At the same time, the issue
of solidarity was a major dividing line between the northern and south-
ern member states. Germany and other northern members emphasised
national responsibility, conservative budgetary policies and more strin-
gent control over compliance with agreed rules. Many southern member
states, by contrast, prioritised the need to strengthen mechanisms of
mutual solidarity and complement the monetary union with a political
and fiscal union.25
The need to bridge this division resulted in compromises and cautious
reforms. The discussions on Eurozone reform gained new momentum
with the election of Emmanuel Macron as president of France in 2017.
However, the North-South divide persisted, blocking any major steps
towards institutional deepening or the introduction of new fiscal means.
Insofar as deepening integration of the Eurozone did take place, it
meant increased differentiation within the EU. The Euro summits were
institutionalised under a permanent presidency, and the Eurogroup prac-
tices were consolidated at the ministerial level. Further reforms have been
envisaged in order to unify the external representation of the Eurogroup
in the IMF. Ways to strengthen democratic control of the Eurozone in the
framework of the European Parliament and through cooperation between
the EP and national parliaments have also been discussed.26
Possible more far-reaching reforms of the Eurozone would further
increase differentiation between Eurozone members and non-members,
posing a challenge to the EU’s unity. Hence, questions about maintaining
the Union’s normative and institutional unity will have to be addressed
in the context of further steps to strengthen the Eurozone.

3.3.3 The migration crisis

The number of people seeking international protection has increased
worldwide due to conflicts and instability. The war in Syria has been the
single most significant cause of increasing numbers of refugees arriving
in the EU, but migration pressure is also high from several other countries
of the wider Middle East and Africa. The causes of migration vary, but
the focus in the context of the EU’s migration crisis has been on people
applying for asylum.
In 2015, an unprecedented number of asylum-seekers entered the
EU, causing the so-called migration crisis.27 The large number of arrivals

25 Ibid., 86.

26 Ibid., 92–93.

27 The total number of asylum applicants in the EU in 2015 was over 1.3 million, which was more than double in
comparison to 2014.

MARCH 2019 75
overwhelmed the established system of receiving and processing asylum
applications. Furthermore, the refugee crisis exerted heavy pressure on
the Schengen system, which allows free movement of people within most
of the EU without internal border controls. During the crisis, several
Schengen countries reintroduced temporary border controls.28
The migration flow was very unevenly distributed among the member
states. The majority of migrants entering the EU did not stay in the coun-
try where they first arrived. Germany has been, by far, the most popular
destination country, whereas some member states have received almost
no asylum applicants at all.
The actual number of arrivals has only partly correlated with the po-
litical implications of the crisis, such as the salience of the issue on the
national political agenda, the rise in popularity of the radical right, and
positions on EU migration policy. The Visegrad countries, with the ex-
ception of Hungary, have received very small numbers of refugees, and
yet the issue of migration has been prominent in their domestic politics,
and the radical right-wing agenda has gained in popularity.
All over the EU, the migration crisis has been one of the reasons behind
the increased popularity of radical right-wing parties in many member
states. National immigration policies have been tightened in many coun-
tries, including Germany and the Nordic countries, which were initially
more open.
The tightening measures aimed at preventing migrants from entering
the EU or staying there have been criticised by international organisa-
tions and civil society organisations for contravening human rights and
international commitments. Hungary in particular has been accused
of violating human rights with its dismal treatment of refugees. When
Hungary became a major transit state in 2015, it launched a number of
controversial measures to deter refugees from staying in the country,
including government-funded anti-refugee campaigns stoking fear and
hatred, preventing refugees from obtaining asylum, and minimising
any help.29
The EU’s responses can be broadly divided into external and internal
measures. The Union has been fairly consensual and efficient when it
comes to the external measures, and has focused on working with third
countries for better control of migration flows through border, asylum
and readmission policies. In particular, the EU-Turkey resettlement
agreement concluded in March 2016, combined with tighter border con-
trol, led to a considerable reduction in migration flows along the Eastern

28 Austria, Denmark, France, Germany, Norway, and Sweden.

29 Den Hertog & Innola 2017.

76 MARCH 2019
Mediterranean route. While politically effective, the Turkey deal is also
problematic from the perspective of international law, similarly to sev-
eral other measures taken by the EU and the member states in order to
reduce migration.
Another important measure has been the strengthening of the European
Border and Coast Guard (EBCG). The EBCG has received stronger oper-
ational capabilities, a supervisory role over the national capacities of
member states, and a stronger role in expulsions and readmission. In
addition, an emergency mechanism has been introduced, which foresees
the possibility of intervention by the EBCG in a situation where a member
state is unable to cope with controlling the EU’s external border. However,
the intervention has to be approved by the member state in question.30
Internally, the EU’s progress in developing a common approach has
been far more limited. The development of a common asylum policy,
including reform of the Common European Asylum System, has been
hindered by deep cleavages between member states. In particular, the
issue of relocation schemes has been a major source of controversy among
the member states. Countries that have received the largest numbers of
asylum-seekers per capita, notably Germany and Sweden, as well as front
states such as Italy and Greece, have been strongly promoting relocation
in order to divide the burden more evenly among the member states.
The Czech Republic, Hungary, Slovakia and Romania have been fiercely
against relocation.31 Their opposition was, however, overturned in the
Council, where the relocation plan was adopted without consensus.32
Thus, the East-West division within the EU resurfaced strongly in the
context of migration.

3.4 THE EU’S EXTERNAL RELATIONS AND SECURITY

The above-described external and internal challenges to the liberal order

have had a visible impact on different areas of the EU’s external relations
and security and defence policy. The EU needs to identify priority areas
in its efforts to shape the global and regional order. The priority areas ex-
amined below are trade policy, security and defence policy, and relations
with Russia, but this is by no means an exhaustive list. The chosen areas
include one core field of EU competence, which has become globally more

30 Den Hertog & Innola 2017, 118–120

31 Den Hertog & Innola 2017.

32 European Commission 2015.

MARCH 2019 77
controversial (external trade) and two crucial issues for Europe’s security
(defence capabilities and relations with Russia).

3.4.1 Trade policy

Europe’s relative weight in the global economy is gradually declining. Yet
for the time being, the EU’s unity in trade matters makes Europe a global
heavyweight in this area. Trade policy is an area of the EU’s exclusive
competence where the Commission has the leading role in developing
and implementing common positions. Member states have delegated
the task of negotiating trade agreements to the Union. EU trade policy
has been strongly oriented towards free trade and has developed in the
framework of economic globalisation, regulated by institutions such as
the WTO, IMF and World Bank.
In recent years, economic globalisation has faced a backlash from
several directions, which has changed the ramifications of EU trade pol-
icy. First, there has been significant criticism inside Western societies (in
both Europe and the US) against the negative implications of globalisation
in areas such as job security and environmental standards. Second, the
trade policy of the US has shifted under President Trump in the direction
of protectionism, undermining multilateral rules and even taking steps
towards trade wars. Third, the most important rising power and global
contender vis-à-vis the US and the West, namely China, is undermining
certain aspects of free trade with its own protectionist measures, although
it also benefits from and wishes to maintain the stability and predicta-
bility provided by the existing global order.33 All in all, and for a number
of reasons, the multilateral trading system based on the WTO has been
facing serious challenges.
The EU has sought to respond to the changing environment by defend-
ing and extending rules-based free trade, on the one hand, while taking
measures to protect its citizens against the negative effects of globalisation,
on the other. As formulated by President of the European Commission
Jean-Claude Juncker, “we are not naïve free traders”.34 Due to the dif-
ficulties faced by the multilateral framework, the EU has invested in a
network of bilateral agreements.
During 2017–2018, the EU stepped up negotiations on free trade agree-
ments with a number of countries, including Japan, Singapore, Vietnam,
the Mercosur countries (Brazil, Argentina, Paraguay and Uruguay) and
Mexico. Increased global uncertainty caused by changes in US policy
made the EU a more attractive negotiating partner and helped to speed

33 Koivu 2017.

34 Juncker 2017.

78 MARCH 2019
up talks with a number of partners. The EU’s position as an economic
giant and guardian of rules-based global trade is a significant asset. The
new agreements allow the Union to counterbalance aggressive measures
by the US and increase predictability. However, the EU’s relative weight
is decreasing and the rise of protectionism is making the global environ-
ment less favourable for Europe. The current window of opportunity to
move ahead swiftly with extending the network of free trade agreements
between the EU and its partner countries might not be open for long.35
The failure of the TTIP agreement underscores changes in the global
environment. Initially, the agreement was seen by both sides as a way
to ensure that the EU and US would be able to shape the rules of global
trade amidst the rise of China and uncertainty about its intentions. The
agreement provided an opportunity to strengthen Europe’s position,
which has been lost for the time being. On the other hand, the new in-
ward-looking and at the same time aggressive approach of the US has
helped to strengthen the EU’s attractiveness as a trading partner in the
eyes of many other countries.
At the same time, the EU’s trade policy has also shifted towards a
slightly more protectionist mode. This shift is a reaction to both inter-
nal pressure from public opinion in Europe and external changes, most
notably protectionist measures taken and/or threatened by other major
players starting from the US and China. Furthermore, Brexit changes the
political balance in the Union and reduces the weight of member states
with a strongly pro-free trade agenda such as Germany, the Netherlands
and the Nordic countries. The influence of countries with a more pro-
tectionist agenda, notably France and some other Southern European
member states, has grown.
One of the biggest challenges for the EU is addressing the imbalance in
its trade relationship with China. The latter imposes several restrictions
on foreign companies wishing to enter the Chinese market, while the EU
market is conversely very open, and the presence of Chinese companies
in Europe has grown rapidly. This imbalance has placed the question of
how to protect the European market high on the political agenda. The
increasing Chinese presence raises questions not just about fair treatment
of companies, but also about China’s geopolitical goals and implications
for the rules-based order.
Negotiations over the TTIP with the US and CETA with Canada ex-
posed the increase in bottom-up opposition to globalisation and free
trade among EU citizens. Opponents of these agreements and of free
trade more broadly still represent a minority; opinion polls indicate that

35 Turtiainen 2018.

MARCH 2019 79
the TTIP was supported by a majority of citizens.36 However, there is a
broader concern about the negative implications of globalisation for job
security, social equality, environmental and food standards. These issues
have gained a visible place on the EU agenda (‘l’Europe qui Protège’).
Human rights, work conditions and environmental protection are in-
cluded on the agenda of free trade talks. In order to respond to critics
and alleviate suspicions, the EU has also increased the openness of its
trade negotiations. All in all, EU trade policy has become more focused
on protecting European interests, while accommodating to the decline
of multilateralism and universal values.

3.4.2 Security and defence

Since 2014, the EU has experienced a number of internal and external
shocks, which have boosted efforts to strengthen common security and
defence policy. The annexation of Crimea and the rise of ISIL in 2014 ex-
posed the threats emanating from instability in the Eastern and Southern
neighbourhood. A couple of years later, the Brexit vote weakened the
EU as a security actor, but at the same time removed some of the earlier
obstacles to stronger defence cooperation in the EU framework. As the EU
will lose its most significant military power due to Brexit, closer coopera-
tion among the remaining member states becomes all the more necessary
in order to reduce fragmentation and put the existing resources to more
effective use. Furthermore, Donald Trump’s election as president of the US
introduced a period of unprecedented uncertainty over the transatlantic
security arrangements, prompting Europeans not just to do more for their
own defence but to actually “prepare to be left alone”.37
During the 2000s, the EU’s security and defence policy concentrated
almost exclusively on external crisis management. In recent years, the
European debate has broadened from the CSDP to defence cooperation
(the latter being broader than the CSDP), and from the management of
external crises to protection of the Union, its member states and citizens.
The shift began even before the shocks mentioned above. In December
2013, the European Council proposed measures for increasing the effec-
tiveness, visibility and impact of the CSDP; enhancing the development
of capabilities; and strengthening the defence industry.38 This agenda in-
dicated a gradual move towards a more comprehensive view of European
defence and the EU’s role in it.39 The process also helped to establish the

36 Turtiainen 2018.

37 Ischinger 2018.

38 European Council 2013, 1–10.

39 Tiilikainen 2016.

80 MARCH 2019
European Commission as a central player in the defence field, notably in
matters related to the defence industry, market and research.
Defence cooperation gained a prominent place in the implementation
of the EU’s Global Strategy. In November 2016, the Council agreed on a list
of implementation proposals,40 and the Commission unveiled its Defence
Action Plan.41 The Global Strategy lists three core tasks for the EU security
and defence policy: responding to external conflicts and crises; building
the capacities of partners; and protecting the Union and its citizens.
The task of protecting the EU and its citizens is a significant new ad-
dition to the agenda. The practical meaning and content of this task is to
be developed further. There is broad consensus in the EU that, at least for
the foreseeable future, the Union will not aim to take over NATO’s task
of territorial defence. The terms of the debate have changed, however.
Traditionally, the trans-Atlanticist EU member states, especially the UK
and Baltic and Central European countries, were suspicious about any
move by the EU towards collective defence, fearing that this would un-
dermine NATO and weaken the US commitment to European security. On
the other hand, some of the EU’s militarily non-allied countries, namely
Ireland and Austria, were concerned that extending the remit of the EU’s
security and defence policy to ‘defence proper’ would question the fun-
dament of their defence policy solution.
In recent years, the debate has focused on how the EU can and should
contribute to Europe’s security and defence – not by taking over the core
task of NATO, for which it lacks the necessary capabilities and structures,
but by complementing NATO in different ways. Cooperation between the
EU and NATO has experienced a sea change, from almost no cooperation
at all to close political and practical ties.42
So how does the EU contribute to protecting the Union and its citizens?
First, the EU has introduced several new initiatives to advance practical
defence cooperation among member states:

• The Co-ordinated Annual Review on Defence (CARD) is to provide a

permanent mechanism to coordinate the procurement and capability
development plans of the member states. The systematic exchange of
information is designed to help member states identify joint needs
and possible redundancies, as well as to initiate collaborative projects.
• The European Commission’s Defence Action Plan aims to create
an open, integrated and effective European defence market and an

40 Council of the European Union 2016a.

41 European Commission 2016a.

42 European Union and NATO 2016.

MARCH 2019 81
 integrated and competitive European defence industry. This is sup-
ported by the newly established European Defence Fund, consisting of
two separate elements. First, the ‘research window’ funds collabora-
tive research projects on innovative defence technologies. Second, the
‘capability window’ provides support for joint capability development
projects conducted by the member states.
• Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO) was introduced into the
Lisbon Treaty as an instrument for deeper defence cooperation within
a smaller group of member states. In December 2017, 25 member states
agreed to join PESCO, which entails binding commitments to joint
projects for developing defence capabilities and enhancing operational
readiness. The participating member states also signed up to “regularly
increasing defence budgets in real terms in order to reach agreed ob-
jectives”.43 The inclusion of almost all member states in PESCO resulted
from a wish expressed by Germany in particular to prioritise the EU’s
unity in security and defence matters. The inclusive nature of PESCO
has raised doubts about its effectiveness, however.

Second, the EU’s activities in crisis management and capacity-building,

the ‘traditional’ sphere of the CSDP, contribute to the stability of Europe’s
neighbourhood and thus indirectly to the protection of the EU and its
citizens. CSDP operations and missions can also serve to guarantee sta-
ble access to global commons, as exemplified by the EU’s long-running
anti-piracy operation off the coast of Somalia. The EU has established a
Military Planning and Conduct Capability unit, which is an outcome of
long discussions over a possible EU headquarters. However, the unit was
not called a ‘headquarters’, and its tasks are limited to the planning and
implementation of non-executive military missions, such as training
missions. The EU’s role in responding to external conflicts continues to
be limited due to a number of factors, such as a lack of political will and
mutual trust, diverging strategic priorities, different strategic cultures,
and concrete questions related to the funding and planning of operations
as well as missing capabilities.
Third, the task of protecting the EU and its citizens also refers to EU
activities ‘along the nexus of internal and external security’,44 involving
actors such as the European Border and Coast Guard. The Sophia maritime
operation in the Mediterranean provides one practical example.45 The
main task of this military CSDP operation is to combat people-smuggling

43 Council of the European Union 2017.

44 Council of the European Union 2016a, 5.

45 Tardy 2016.

82 MARCH 2019
in the Mediterranean and thereby contribute to the management of the
EU’s external borders.
Furthermore, member states agree that the EU can contribute to pro-
tecting Europe by countering hybrid threats. According to the EU’s own
definition, hybrid threats represent a “mixture of coercive and subver-
sive activity, conventional and unconventional methods (i.e. diplomatic,
military, economic, technological), which can be used in a coordinated
manner by state or non-state actors to achieve specific objectives while
remaining below the threshold of formally declared warfare”.46 A number
of EU policies contribute to important aspects of resilience, including
energy, cyber, border and maritime security, thus being relevant for
countering hybrid threats. However, linking these policies together from
the viewpoint of hybrid security and resilience remains a challenge. The
European Centre of Excellence for Countering Hybrid Threats operating
in Helsinki is making an important contribution in this regard.
Last but not least, the renewed focus on defence cooperation has re-
vived discussion about the meaning of the mutual assistance clause (42.7
TEU). The French government’s request to activate Article 42.7 after the
terrorist attacks in Paris in November 2015 serves as an important prec-
edent. At the moment, Article 42.7 foresees action by the member states
only, meaning that the exact form of assistance is to be agreed bilaterally
between the country in need and each of its EU partners. There is scope for
improving the EU’s readiness to implement the Article. This could involve
defining a role for the EU institutions in the implementation process or the
creation of other joint structures. In the context of the implementation of
the EUGS, HR Mogherini suggested that the EU could explore how CSDP
operations could contribute to mutual defence under Article 42.7,47 but
the Foreign Affairs Council watered down this proposal.48
In addition to the activities undertaken in the EU framework, a num-
ber of smaller cooperation formats are ongoing among groups of member
states. It is worth highlighting the French-led European Intervention
Initiative (EII), launched in June 2018, which aims at more ambitious co-
operation among a smaller group of countries willing and able to develop
operational readiness and a shared strategic culture.49 The EII provides a
way to engage Denmark and the UK, which do not participate in PESCO,
in European defence cooperation. It is important to coordinate among

46 European Commission 2016b.

47 High Representative 2016, 16.

48 Council of the European Union 2016a.

49 Participating states: Belgium, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, the Netherlands, Portugal,
Spain, the UK.

MARCH 2019 83
the smaller groups and link them to the broader framework of the EU
and NATO.
The strategic goal of the above-described activities is to increase the
EU’s strategic autonomy, and hence Europe’s capability to take care of its
own security. While Europe has to prepare for being left alone, the com-
mitment by the US to European security remains irreplaceable for many
years to come. In other words, maintaining a unique strategic partnership
with the US is necessary for European defence. Building a stronger, more
capable EU can hopefully contribute to a more balanced transatlantic
partnership in the future.

3.4.3 Relations with Russia

The EU’s relationship with Russia is one of the key issues for European
security, especially for countries located close to the country. In 2014, EU-
Russia relations shifted from cold to frosty due to the conflict in and over
Ukraine. The sources of the conflict lie deeper, notably in incompatible
understandings of the EU and Russia about the European security order
and Russia’s status as a great power. The EU-Russia tensions serve as an
example of the kind of instability that can arise from increased region-
alisation or a multi-order world, where regional centres of power lack a
shared normative framework.50
Russia’s strategic outlook stresses its aspiration to achieve the status
of one of the great powers, motivated by a vision of a multipolar world
order.51 Russia seeks to maximise its position in the competition between
major powers, where the global dominance of the US and its allies con-
stitutes the key obstacle to Russia’s goals. According to Russia’s security
strategy, the US and its allies seek to ‘contain Russia’ by exerting ‘political,
economic, military and informational pressure on it’.52 The geographical
scope of Russia’s strategic interests is mainly focused on the post-Soviet
space and other immediate neighbours, but its aspiration for the status
of a ‘leading power’ requires it to display force in other parts of the world
as well.53
The EU is not perceived by Russia as an independent global actor due
to its dependence on the US for its own security. However, the EU has
played an increasingly important role in the post-Soviet space, which
has been a major source of tensions between the EU and Russia. The EU’s
own understanding of its engagement in Ukraine and elsewhere in the

50 See Chapter 2 on power competition.

51 Makarychev 2016.

52 Russian National Security Strategy, Article 12, referred to in Raik et al. 2018.

53 Raik et al. 2018.

84 MARCH 2019
Eastern neighbourhood stresses European norms and values. The core
issue for the EU in the Ukraine conflict is to defend the existing European
security order.
The case of Ukraine is the most dramatic example of Russia’s efforts
to impose its vision of Eurasian integration on a number of neighbouring
countries, using a range of instruments including military force, economic
pressure and extensive propaganda. In Ukraine, Russia violated the core
principles of the UN Charter and the OSCE Helsinki Final Act, includ-
ing sovereignty and the territorial integrity of states, the inviolability of
borders, and the peaceful settlement of disputes. This inspired several
Western commentators to declare the end of the post-Cold War or even
the post-WWII order.54 The Western, including the EU, response to the
violations in Ukraine succeeded in taking a principled position in defence
of the existing order. At the same time, however, Western actors have
failed to bring an end to the violations and restore the territorial integrity
of Ukraine (and Georgia and Moldova). The ongoing conflicts in the EU’s
Eastern neighbourhood cast a shadow over European security at large.
The EU Global Strategy defines Russia as a ‘key strategic challenge’.55
Russia is by no means the only challenge to the liberal world order, but
it is the only major actor actively and aggressively seeking to revise the
European security order. The EU has responded to Russia’s actions against
Ukraine via sanctions as well as diplomatic efforts to resolve the conflict.
The importance of the norms of territorial integrity and national self-de-
termination has been a key issue in generating member states’ support
for the sanctions.56 The EU has not been directly involved as an actor in
the diplomatic process, however, but it has supported the participation
of Germany and France, alongside Russia and Ukraine, in the ‘Normandy
format’ that negotiated the Minsk II agreement.
The Minsk agreements, although not negotiated or formally approved
by the EU, gained a central place in the EU’s approach to the conflict
through the linkage of sanctions to the implementation of the agreements.
Minsk II quelled the fighting and defined a set of measures to be taken
towards settlement, but it has been subject to conflicting interpretations
by the different sides. Expectations with regard to the implementation
of the agreements have generally been low, although they have become
the main reference point in the diplomatic process.
The Ukraine crisis has exposed the limits of the EU’s ability to engage
in conflict resolution in a situation where member states’ positions differ

54 See e.g. Carnegie Europe 2015.

55 European Union 2016, 33.

56 Sjursen & Rosén 2017.

MARCH 2019 85
considerably, while the stakes are high. The limitations of EU diplomacy
have also been evident in the case of Syria, where the Union has failed to
make a notable contribution to the settlement process. Hence, the Union
has been rather helpless with regard to the two most critical and bloody
conflicts in its neighbourhood, Syria and Ukraine. Both conflicts have
served as reminders of the relevance of military power in international
relations, showing the gains, even if only short-term, of considerable use
of force in a conflict situation. Russia, relying on its military force and
other instruments, has been the key actor in Ukraine and has become one
of the key players in Syria more recently.
As noted above, the EU’s transformative agenda has run into difficulties
more broadly in recent years, while the Union has become preoccupied
with protecting itself rather than shaping its environment. However, in
the context of the Ukraine conflict, the EU has stepped up its support for
domestic reforms in Ukraine.57 The success of the reforms is crucial for
Ukraine’s ability to maintain domestic stability and to withstand Russia’s
aggression. The results have been mixed and fragile, as the old corrupt and
oligarchic system has proved quite resilient.58 Again, there is more than
Ukraine at stake: this case is seen to provide a strong example for other
countries in the post-Soviet space, including Russia. The Kremlin has
viewed the ‘colour revolutions’ in the post-Soviet countries with great
suspicion, if not paranoia, and has developed a set of counter-measures.59
The EU’s support for reforms is thus more than a technocratic exercise;
it has major political and geostrategic implications, which the EU was
unprepared to address when launching the Eastern Partnership policy
in 2009.
In spite of the high level of tensions, the EU and member states con-
tinue to seek positive engagement and cooperation with Russia in areas
where common interests can be identified.60 Economic interaction re-
mains high; the impact of sanctions on trade has been limited. The fight
against terrorism appears to be a natural shared interest, highlighted in
the security strategies of both sides. Cooperation in this field was pursued
strongly by France in particular, following the attacks in Paris in January
and November 2015. However, hopes of mutually beneficial cooperation

57 During 2007–2015, Ukraine received 1.6 billion euros of EU assistance in grants, and 3.4 billion euros in
macro-financial loans. In March 2014, the Commission launched a new support package of 11.2 billion euros
(including up to 8 billion euros of loans from the EBRD and EIB) for the years 2014–2020. See European Court
of Auditors 2016.

58 European Court of Auditors 2016; Emerson & Movchan 2016.

59 Saari 2014.

60 Siddi 2018.

86 MARCH 2019
were soon dashed by Russia’s military actions in Syria, which conflicted
with the EU and French positions.61
The above-described aspects of the EU’s approach to Russia are
brought together in the five guiding principles agreed in March 2016:
the implementation of the Minsk Agreements, strengthening relations
with the EU’s Eastern Partners, strengthening the resilience of the EU,
selective engagement with Russia, and fostering people-to-people con-
tacts.62 These principles embrace both hard-line views, which emphasise
the first points, and more Russia-friendly voices within the EU, which
call for active efforts to increase engagement and dialogue. In the fore-
seeable future, however, the unresolved security issues remain a major
obstacle to normalisation of EU-Russia relations. The tensions boil down
to the clash between the EU’s emphasis on a rules-based global order
and multilateralism, and Russia’s aspirations for a great-power status in
a multipolar world.

3.5 CHAPTER CONCLUSIONS

A rules-based order and multilateralism remain at the core of the EU’s

worldview, but major players such as China, Russia and most notably the
US display at best selective commitment to international norms and insti-
tutions. The EU’s ability to preserve the rules-based international order is
of key importance for Europe’s security, wellbeing and global influence
in the future. The global context highlights the need for European unity.
The external challenges are interwoven with internal ones. The rise of
populism, the financial and economic crisis, and the migration crisis are
all part of broader global developments. These crises have posed major
tests for the EU’s unity over the past decade. The internal dividing lines
have appeared dramatic during the 2010s, but the EU has shown consid-
erable resilience and ability to cope with internal divisions.
Power is not only being re-distributed among major states, but it is
also transferring beyond the state, to transnational networks of a variety
of non-state actors. The diffusion of power beyond the state is a trend that
the EU might be well placed to accommodate and utilise, both internally
and externally. This requires consistent efforts. In order to protect its
interests and values in the unstable global context, the EU needs to work
with like-minded partners among smaller and medium-sized states across
the world, non-state actors and civil society.

61 On French views, see Cadier 2018, 41–55.

62 Council of the European Union 2016b.

MARCH 2019 87
 The EU also needs to define priority areas that are particularly impor-
tant with a view to preserving and shaping the international rules-based
order. This report has explored some issues where the EU can and should
make a difference.
Trade policy is an area where the EU has relatively strong international
influence and where it is actively defending and shaping the rules-based
order. However, the EU’s relative weight in the global economy is slowly
weakening. Europe needs to advance swiftly with regard to strengthening
its network of free trade agreements across the globe, in order to mitigate
the effects of aggressive US trade policy and the rise of China.
In the field of security and defence, the EU is responding to the in-
creased relevance of power politics, great-power competition and un-
precedented uncertainty about the transatlantic alliance by stepping up
its efforts to strengthen European capabilities and defence cooperation.
This is a slow process, with Europe’s strategic autonomy as a distant goal.
Meanwhile, the EU is developing close cooperation with NATO and has
little choice but to try to preserve its unique partnership with the US.
Europe will remain relatively weak in military terms for years to come. It
is therefore crucial to work on constraining the use of force in internation-
al relations via multilateral cooperation, diplomacy and conflict resolution.
The EU’s relationship with Russia is framed by principled differences
between the two sides’ understandings of the European security order,
which are unlikely to be resolved in the short term. These disagreements
are most strongly displayed in the conflict in and around Ukraine, but
are also visible in Russia’s policies vis-à-vis the EU and its member states.
Nonetheless, the EU continues to pursue cooperation in areas where
shared interests can be identified.

88 MARCH 2019
4
4. THE CHANGING INTERNATIONAL
SYSTEM: IMPLICATIONS FOR FINLAND

4.1 INTRODUCTION

The main conclusions to be drawn from this study thus far emphasise
the fundamental character of the ongoing transition of the international
system. The most visible change is undoubtedly the weakening of the
Western dominance over this system, which is reflected both in the glob-
al balance of power and in the structures of global governance with its
norms and institutions.
The reasons for this change are varied, however, and are not only
linked to the declining role of the US as the post-Cold War hegemonic
power. There is strengthened rivalry between values globally, causing
a re-definition of what is at stake and, consequently, constructing new
dividing lines in global politics. These new dividing lines revolve around
social, economic and environmental issues as well as issues of identity and
human security, and have far-reaching consequences, not only for the
balance of power between states but also within states. Moreover, they
are tightly connected to the emergence of new actors and new coalitions
among the existing ones. Actors as different as religious communities and
large multilateral enterprises are empowered by, and capitalise on, the
emerging dividing lines between conservative and liberal values at the
global level, allying themselves both with governments and with non-
state actors that share their values. The key constituents of state power
such as sovereignty and nationalist tenets form another dividing line,
pitting nationalist political forces against liberals and numerous forms
of civil society actors.

MARCH 2019 93
 The way in which the dividing lines of world politics extend beyond
states also captures the phenomenon of the diffusion of state power,
which plays a key role in the global transformation, as emphasised in this
report. The key longer-term trend in world politics, where conflicts no
longer revolve exclusively or even primarily around strategic commodities,
such as territory, or other material resources, such as energy, but increas-
ingly around values and identities also affects the structure of actors and
constantly fuels the emergence of new players in the global arena. The
latter range from key economic actors to terrorist organisations, as well
as different non-governmental organisations focusing on value issues.
In light of the changing constellation of actors and the new sources of
conflict in world politics, the concept of power has to be understood in
a broader sense. In the study of international relations, power that has
mostly been approached as an attribute of the state to be measured in
terms of economic, political and military capabilities has to be seen as a
more multifaceted phenomenon to better capture its dynamic nature in
an environment with multiple actors and political dividing lines. Apart
from working in social interaction, power also has to be approached as a
discursive practice working in social construction. This study provides
examples of how different formal and informal rules and norms empower
new actors and affect their interests and identities. The set-up in global
climate policy, for instance, was shown to empower cities or regions and
sometimes pit them against their own governments.
The decline of US hegemony and the emergence of a multipolar world
thus represents only one part of a broader transition of power, which
involves a much larger set of dividing lines and actors. However, as the
leading actors with respect to territoriality and military force, and in
the key formal structures of international governance and law, states
still matter, and the change in the balance of power between states was
also well documented in this report. The report shows how the Chinese
power potential has been constantly growing, with its ambitions turning
global and Chinese interests being identified all over the world. A char-
acteristic of the current Chinese great-power policy is its willingness
to increasingly balance its rivalries, be it by allying itself with Russia to
challenge the US or by seeking to establish relationships with smaller
groups of EU members to weaken the unity of the EU. This study also
confirms the assumption according to which the Chinese willingness to
support the current Western-led system of global governance is becom-
ing compartmentalised. China supports those normative frameworks
that are compatible with its own values and interests, while challenging
others. Whilst China shows more responsibility for the common global

94 MARCH 2019
agenda than Russia, and asserts an identity of a responsible great power,
these two rivals of the Western-led order are unified through common
vulnerabilities related to their authoritarian political system. This places
limitations on their international engagement, as they have to constantly
protect themselves against Western values to ensure regime survival.
One common outcome of all of the ongoing transitions is the weaken-
ing of the universal character of the international order and its norms and
institutions. In the face of a more diverse set of actors and the changing
balance of power between states, an international order of a universal
nature becomes increasingly difficult to achieve and uphold. This study,
like many other studies,1 suggests that one consequence is most likely
the gradual move towards regional orders revolving around regional
systems of power and regional institutions. The nature and strength of
these regional orders, and their relationship to each other and to global
institutions, will therefore be crucial determinants of the shape and sta-
bility of the future international order.2
In practice, the character of the regional orders is likely to vary widely
from one region to another. Most (although not all) regional orders in the
world are likely to be decisively shaped by – or built around – a leading
regional power, whose approach towards its respective region and the
world at large is therefore of key importance. At best, regional orders
are founded on (largely) shared interests, mutually acceptable rules and
inclusive decision-making structures. However, regional orders can also
be forged through coercion and with the sole aim of serving the interests
of the leading regional power.3 Mutually beneficial and broadly supported
regional orders can make a contribution to global governance, promot-
ing multilateralism both within and beyond their respective regions.
However, the growing importance of regional orders can also result in
further fragmentation of the international system, increasing regional
divergence as well as political and economic competition between the
individual regions and their leading powers.4 Especially the borderlines
between different regional orders face the risk of being exposed to tension
and conflicts. If the trend towards a system of regional orders were to
accelerate, it would be of the utmost importance to be able to define the
key fields of international cooperation where universal governance and
rules will still prevail. These would need to include, but not be limited to,

1 Acharya 2018a, 99; Grevi 2018.

2 Grevi 2018, 17–23.

3 Ibid., 19–21.

4 Ibid., 24–25.

MARCH 2019 95
matters of peace and security, the management of global commons and
the fight against climate change.
When it comes to the role of the EU, this study shows that the Union
has its obvious strengths and weaknesses in facing the comprehensive
global transformation. Due to its own hybrid character, the EU is more
flexible than state actors in coping with an environment shaped by new
political dividing lines and multiple actors. Being a multilayered actor
itself, the EU can more easily reach out to non-state actors and create
coalitions or cooperation on issues of common interest. The key short-
comings of the EU were firstly found to be related to how its own values
are being challenged as the cornerstones of the international order. The
different takes of the EU and the United States on values and the future
of the international order is what increasingly separates the EU from its
key international ally across the Atlantic. At the same time, the EU’s core
values have been called into question at home as well, bringing about
significant divisions both within and between the EU’s member states,
and thereby challenging the Union’s unity and coherence as a political
community and actor.
Secondly, the strengthening of great-power politics has constrained
the EU’s external policies, as the use of military force and increasing geo­
political rivalry have emphasised the EU’s traditional weaknesses. These
weaknesses can be seen to stem from the Union’s hybrid political identity,
which vacillates between a state identity and an identity constructed on
the notion of being different from a state. This study highlights how most
of the recent crises that the EU has faced have brought questions about
the Union’s identity to the fore, demanding it to find political solutions
to disputes over the extent and forms of mutual solidarity, or the lack of
respect for common values.
The EU has consequently been forced to respond to the changing global
environment by prioritising its own survival: by safeguarding the key
pillars of European integration and its own internal unity. Its possibili-
ties to advance its core values internationally have become much more
limited, as these values have become increasingly controversial in many
parts of the world. Indeed, the rise of great-power politics has led to a
confrontation over these values with Russia and China, but also increas-
ingly with the US, as exemplified by the case of the Joint Comprehensive
Plan of Action with Iran.
Against the backdrop of the forms of global transition described above,
it is likely that the EU will have to continue along this path of protecting
its own system and security, which by necessity means deepening the
integration and enlarging the competences of the EU in critical policy

96 MARCH 2019
fields. In many of these policy fields, this process has already been in-
itiated with the aim of strengthening the Union’s values and integrity.
Examples can be found in the EMU and the efforts to deepen it within
the realm of economic and fiscal policies, in various fields of internal
and external security ranging from border security policies to defence
cooperation and, lastly, in energy cooperation that seeks to decrease the
Union’s energy dependence.
The EU’s main response to a more challenging external environment
is duly taking the Union in a more state-like, centralised direction. This
trend, however, is likely to face difficulties and generate resistance in
several member states. Nevertheless, the phenomenon of differentiated
integration, which the pressures towards deepening were generally as-
sumed to fuel, has stayed within clear limits. Thus far, and irrespective
of the significant dividing lines on key values that have emerged between
EU member states, the EU has not faced major risks of more far-reaching
divisions, which would affect its institutional and legal unity. By far the
most serious case of disintegration to date, Brexit, has served to strength-
en the unity of the remaining 27 member states, rather than serve as an
example to political forces elsewhere in Europe to follow suit.
All in all, it can be argued that the selfsame challenges that weaken the
EU’s values and power in the international context constrain its action
internally. The EU is therefore in a highly vulnerable position in navi-
gating between these challenges. At the same time, greater awareness
of the EU’s importance has started to emerge in its member states and
among EU citizens.

4.2 WHAT ARE THE IMPLICATIONS FOR FINLAND AND ITS

INTERNATIONAL POSITION?

This report has thus far progressed from the global level to the regional
one, highlighting the major global shifts and explaining how they manifest
themselves at the regional level and, above all, in the internal dynamics
and external action of the EU. This section, for its part, turns the focus
onto Finland and aims to clarify what the global and regional shifts look
like from Finland’s point of view. The analysis covers Finland’s whole
operating area, which extends from the country’s immediate strategic
environment (most notably the Baltic Sea region, but increasingly the
Arctic as well) to the EU and the broader European space, all the way up
to the existing and emerging sites of global governance. As in the report
as a whole, any analytical distinctions made between the different ‘levels’

MARCH 2019 97
of Finland’s operating environment – and the causal relationships es-
tablished between them – should be treated with caution, as they often
remain arbitrary.
Finland, as a small state in terms of population size, economic weight
and military capabilities, has decidedly benefited from the Western-
dominated and US-led rules-based international order and its European
manifestation, the post-Cold War European security order, with the EU
and NATO at its heart. This order has helped to create the conditions under
which Finland has been able to thrive as a liberal democracy and an open
economy. However, the changes in the international system described in
this report will profoundly affect and alter the environment within which
Finland pursues its economic, political and security objectives.
The implications of these changes for Finland, as for any state, are hard
to gauge with any degree of certainty. It is also clear that they will be both
complex and multi-faceted. They will reach Finland through multiple
channels and unfold in various ways and to varying degrees in different
policy areas and at the different ‘levels’ of Finland’s operating environ-
ment, ranging from its immediate surroundings to the broader areas in
which it has an interest and presence, either as a state, as a member of
the EU, or some other community or organisation.
First, a changing global balance of power will affect Finland’s immedi-
ate strategic environment in various ways. A weakening of the Western-
led international order and its rules will put growing emphasis on the role
of great powers and leading regional actors. The changing global power
structure is already reflected in the reduced possibilities and willingness
of the US to invest in European security, as an increasingly assertive and
powerful China draws US attention to the Asia-Pacific region. Hence, the
long predicted and purported US ‘pivot’ to Asia is no longer a strategic
choice but more of a strategic necessity, as the US increasingly recognises
China as a peer competitor.
This change of US policy has been, and will continue to be, maximal-
ly utilised by Russia, which has emerged as a major challenger of the
Western-dominated rules-based system, both globally and especially
in Europe, where its actions and rhetoric have specifically targeted the
security order. This has been most evident with regard to Russia’s role
in the conflict in and around Ukraine, but has also reverberated in the
Baltic Sea region, which has seen a clear rise in political tensions and
military activity.
Russia’s room for manoeuvre in its neighbourhood, including the
Baltic Sea region and Europe as a whole, will certainly grow if the world,
as hinted in this report, moves towards regional systems of power.

98 MARCH 2019
Europe’s current security order is, in many ways, an extension of the
liberal world order, guaranteed through the long-standing US com-
mitment to defending it both politically and militarily. However, the
simultaneous weakening of the international rules-based order globally,
and the growing reluctance of the US to stand up for this order in Europe,
suggest that Europe may indeed become a more isolated space. As a re-
sult, the European security order would increasingly be built around the
European Union, while the boundaries of this order would be managed in
interaction (that is, cooperation and, potentially, conflict) with the other
leading regional actor of the European continent, Russia, which aims at
creating and maintaining a regional order of its own.
At a global level, a world order in which the acceptance and scope of
international norms and rules becomes more limited – and in which they
may eventually be replaced by “minimal rules of coexistence between
great powers with different political visions”5 – also certainly comes
closer to meeting Russia’s longer-term strategic aims, providing it with
ever greater freedom of action and corresponding with its minimalist
reading of international law and cooperation.
China’s role in the emerging European security order is also important,
but for the most part indirect. China shapes the European order in two
ways: firstly, it does so by affecting the US strategic approach and US en-
gagement in Europe and, secondly, by influencing the Russian room for
manoeuvre. Thus far, the Sino-Russian political dynamics and the deep-
ened bilateral cooperation between the two countries have strengthened
Russia’s possibilities to assert its powers in its European neighbourhood,
with China remaining conspicuously silent about the Russian aggression
in Ukraine. However, the different approaches of the two great pow-
ers towards the international order at large might create constraints for
Russia in the long run. China undoubtedly has the upper hand in the
Sino-Russian cooperation and will be able to exert an influence on Russia’s
international action. If this action were to challenge key Chinese interests
with regard to economic stability for instance, China would be likely to
try to change the Russian course.
For Finland, the prospect of a move towards an international system
based on regional systems of power and order entails certain obvious risks,
especially due to Finland’s geographic location at the intersection of two
potentially competing regional orders, that of the European Union and
that of Russia. If the world moves towards tightening geopolitical com-
petition between the emerging regional orders, it will become increas-
ingly important from Finland’s – or any small state’s – point of view to

5 Dworkin & Leonard 2018, 6.

MARCH 2019 99
universally consolidate the role of the key international norms regulating
the use of force and confirming the inviolability of the territorial integrity
of states and their borders. In an international system largely based on
regional systems of power and order, stability can be safeguarded only
by agreeing on a set of norms that is non-negotiable, and that serves the
core interests of any human communities.6
In view of the arguments presented in this report, it is likely that the
US role in European security will be more limited in the future. This puts
increasing pressure on the members of the European Union and/or NATO.
The European Union has in recent years struggled with the growing geo-
political competition (and the prospect thereof), both within and beyond
Europe. At the same time, the developments and trends both globally and
in Europe have led to more serious attempts by the EU to adapt both its
strategic outlook and its instruments to the challenges posed by the more
complex and competitive regional and global setting.
Partnerships will be crucially important for the EU in this new envi-
ronment. The Union will need like-minded states and non-state actors
alike as partners to defend and uphold its ideals of multilateral cooperation
and a rules-based order, be it in the framework of existing international
organisations or, if need be, in smaller constellations. At the same time,
partnerships will continue to be essential for the EU in the military realm
as well, as the Union’s development as a (more) strategically autonomous
security and defence actor is a medium- to long-term objective at best.
As argued in this report, in terms of security and defence, the EU will
have little choice but to try to maintain its unique and currently fragile
partnership with the US, which will be more difficult due to the shifting
US focus. Here, the EU’s character as a multilevel actor might, however,
be helpful, as different networks (bilateral, minilateral or multilateral)
may provide the opportunity to tie the US into European security in a
more flexible and resource-saving manner, which seems more feasible
in an era when the main interests and challenges of the US lie outside
Europe. Networks may also provide a way to organise the post-Brexit
security and defence partnership with the UK, whose future relationship
with the EU seems to be very much in the air at the time of writing. At
the same time, the EU could ideally play a crucial role as a political hub,
coordinating Europe’s multifaceted security and defence platforms and
cooperation formats.
If the world moves towards increasing great-power rivalry, (compet-
ing) regional orders as well as a more fragmented and issue-based take
on global governance, Finland’s international role will be increasingly

6 For similar arguments, see Dworkin & Leonard 2018.

100 MARCH 2019

dependent on its ability to ally itself with like-minded actors, be they
state or non-state actors. The EU is by far the most important commu-
nity of values for Finland and will play an important role in softening the
effects of the global transition and providing stability. The Union will
be of crucial importance for Finland in economic, political and security
terms, forming a bulwark against the global uncertainties. The Union
and its member states will continue to be Finland’s key reference group
within the international organisations of which they are all members.
Moreover, the EU is Finland’s most important channel for having a say
in the more complex and contested global political arena in both ex-
isting and emerging sites of global governance. However, this does not
mean that the EU in its current state would be particularly well placed to
face the changing international environment or to respond to the needs
emerging from the tightening global competition. Instead, as this report
indicates, the EU as an actor is grappling with many aspects of the global
shifts that profoundly challenge its worldview, which is firmly rooted in
the primacy of multilateralism, international rules and universal values.
Moreover, the EU as a political community is cross-cut by several deep
divisions that run between different groups of member states as well as
within European societies themselves.
As a consequence, it is essential for Finland to realise that in order to
have the kind of EU that is able to cope with the changes taking place in all
key spheres of its international environment, Finland will need to actively
work towards creating (and maintaining) that Union. In this regard, four
objectives appear to be of utmost importance:

1. to safeguard and, if possible, strengthen the unity of the EU as a

political community;
2. to protect liberal democracy and the rule of law within the Union itself;
3. to enhance the EU as an international actor by developing both its
foreign policy component and its security and defence capabilities, as
well as its other main instruments of external action, and
4. to ensure that the EU maintains its commitment to multilateralism
and a rules-based international order by actively promoting them
and their value together with other like-minded actors (state and
non-state alike).

At best, these objectives can be mutually reinforcing, but there is also the
possibility that one will have to prioritise, or even choose between them,
at least in the short or medium term. There may, for example, be inevita-
ble trade-offs between maintaining unity and advancing the integration

MARCH 2019 101

process in key policy fields or, in a similar vein, between maintaining
unity and fighting against potential breaches of the EU’s values and rules
within the community itself, as exemplified by the cleavages that have
already emerged between Hungary and Poland on the one hand, and most
of the other EU member states on the other. Thus, Finland may have to set
its priorities on a case-by-case basis, depending on the situation at hand.

4.2.1 Safeguarding and strengthening the unity of the EU as a

political community based on liberal democracy, human rights
and the rule of law
As far as the EU’s unity is concerned, it has been under strain due to the
different crises that the Union has faced in recent years, as well as the
divisions within European societies, which have created a fertile breeding
ground for populist and Eurosceptic forces. Moreover, external actors –
Russia and China in particular, but most recently even the US – have tried
to weaken the EU’s unity or take advantage of the existing or potential
divisions within the Union. While the Brexit process represents the most
concrete example of disintegration, fragmentation and disunity within
the EU, it has also turned unity into a key objective among the remaining
member states. At the time of writing, unity seems to have prevailed
over the ambitions to advance the integration process through means of
differentiated integration.
However, within the EMU, deepening has already progressed relatively
far, acquiring an increasingly institutionalised character. For Finland, this
presents the challenge of positioning itself on a different side of the insti-
tutional divide compared to one of its most important partners, Sweden.
Thus far, Finland has therefore sought to emphasise that the EMU needs to
be developed in an inclusive manner. This strategy seems apt also for the
future and is currently being emphasised by the tightening cooperation
between several small and mid-sized member states from both within
and outside the Eurozone – the so-called New Hanseatic League – on
questions related to the EMU.
The cooperation within this group of states points to another key trend
affecting the EU, namely the increasing importance of minilateral formats,
which has been particularly notable in view of Brexit.7 In terms of the
unity and coherence of the EU, this trend has both positive and negative
potential. On the one hand, minilateral groups can offer new impulses for
the EU agenda, make it easier to reach agreements by aggregating mem-
ber states’ interests and giving small and mid-sized member states, like

7 de Gruyter 2018.

102 MARCH 2019

Finland, a stronger say.8 On the other hand, they can also breed feelings of
disunity, exclusion and marginalisation, and strengthen the use of infor-
mal decision-making processes within the EU, which is traditionally not
in the interests of smaller member states like Finland. Moreover, informal
groups can be strategically used by external actors to create divisions
within the EU.9 Hence, while it is beneficial for Finland to strengthen EU-
related coordination with its Nordic and Baltic partners, Finland would
do well, by and large, to continue its long-term approach of letting the
issue in question define its main partners and preferred coalition.10 This
way, Finland would build bridges across the EU and contribute to its
unity. Such a strategy would also prove beneficial for Finland in an EU in
which it is increasingly likely that the core group of member states varies
from one policy area to another.11 Furthermore, it would allow for the
involvement of influential non-state actors in the policy process, where
necessary or useful.
The more the EU’s core values become challenged globally, the more
vulnerable these values become also within the EU itself. Safeguarding
these values and consolidating them further via the systems of both law
and politics will therefore be a necessary precondition for the Union’s
internal legitimacy and external power. Finland consequently has every
reason to continue with its consistent policy of supporting – and de-
manding support for – the cornerstones of the Union’s legal and political
order. From the perspective of a small member state, the objective and
impartial case-by-case application of this order has formed one of the key
justifications for the extension and execution of supranational powers,
and there is hardly any change in sight concerning the legitimacy and
rationale of this approach.

4.2.2 Enhancing the EU as an international actor and

its commitment to a rules-based international order
As far as the EU’s international role is concerned, Finland has strongly
supported most measures taken by the Union to enhance its foreign, se-
curity and defence policy capabilities and actorness. Unlike most other
member states, Finland has also consistently underlined the role of the
EU member states’ mutual security and defence commitments in the form
of the mutual assistance clause and the solidarity clause. Nevertheless, in
terms of security, Finland has relied not only, or even mainly, on the EU,

8 Lang & Ondarza 2018, 5–7.

9 Ibid.

10 Iso-Markku & Jokela 2014, 29–32.

11 Leonard 2017, 7.

MARCH 2019 103

but on a broad network of relationships, including intensified cooper-
ation with Sweden, a close partnership with NATO, closer cooperation
with the US both bilaterally and together with Sweden, as well as other
mini- and multilateral formats. Moreover, Finland, alongside many other
member states, has sought to advance cooperation between the EU and
NATO. As argued earlier, these networks will continue to be of great im-
portance and could also help to tie Europe’s indispensable partner, the
US, to European defence, at least for now. However, as emphasised, the
main strategic interests of the US already lie outside Europe, and the
US is likely to increase its engagement in Asia-Pacific at the expense of
its European commitments. This is a long-term trend to which Finland,
alongside other EU/NATO members, will have to adapt. This development
also emphasises the importance of European solutions regardless of the
framework in question.
Apart from its security and defence policy capabilities, the EU should
also invest more in its foreign policy component, which has often suf-
fered from the EU member states’ inability and unwillingness to align
their positions and work toward common objectives. In order to address
these traditional shortcomings, proposals to extend the use of qualified
majority voting in the EU’s Common Foreign and Security Policy have
been put forward recently, but this is unlikely to take place in the short
or medium term.12 Instead, it is possible that the EU will simply move to-
wards more flexibility in its foreign and security policy-making, allowing
bigger or smaller groups of member states to speak and act either formally
or informally on behalf of the EU.13 From Finland’s point of view, such a
development entails concerns and risks, as it will put emphasis on infor-
mal decision-making, and is likely to underline the role of the biggest and
most capable member states. However, as institutional innovations or the
emergence of a more strategically unified EU seem unlikely at the moment,
Finland may have little choice but to accept the increasing flexibility, as
long as it can be effected in a way that increases the EU’s possibilities to
shape and react to individual foreign policy issues, and avoids creating
significant divides within the EU. Finland should, however, try to work
towards making the decision-making processes as inclusive as possible.
Trade policy is the area of external action where the EU currently seems
to have the greatest potential and power. However, due to the difficul-
ties the global trade regime is facing, the emphasis in this policy area
has mostly shifted towards free trade agreements with individual part-
ners. Apart from trade-related questions, these give the EU a potentially

12 Bendiek, Kempin & von Ondarza 2018, 5.

13 Ibid.

104 MARCH 2019

powerful possibility to advance a broad agenda of different global issues,
including key issues related to climate, environmental protection, hu-
man rights and labour standards. However, using trade agreements as a
geographically limited alternative to global governance incurs significant
risks, as it renders the negotiations increasingly complex and lengthy. This
is not in the EU’s interests, as its declining share of the global economy
and trade, and the current protectionist tendencies in the global economy
suggest that the EU needs to act rather swiftly. Thus, the EU will have to
strike a balance between its different, and at times competing, objectives.
While Finland as an open economy benefits from expanding the EU’s
network of free trade agreements, the Finnish economy is also highly
dependent on both China and the US,14 with whom any comprehensive
free trade agreements seem unlikely at the moment. Therefore, it would
be in Finland’s interests if the EU were able to breathe new life into the
global trade regime.
The idea of a rules-based international order is a quintessential part of
the EU. The Union’s success as an international actor therefore depends
on the strength of this rules-based order in the broader global context.
The more the power of might dominates on the international stage, with
elements linked to politico-military power gaining the upper hand, the
more vulnerable the EU becomes both internally and externally. Hence,
it is also in Finland’s interests to use the EU’s potential to promote an
international order based on rules rather than on a politico-military bal-
ance of power. If the scope of such an order is narrowing, as anticipated
in this report, the EU’s efforts should be concentrated on those fields
of global politics where the existence of universal rules and global gov-
ernance are of most importance. This applies above all to the prevention
of conflicts and consolidation of peace and security as well as the fight
against climate change.

4.3 FINLAND’S INTERNATIONAL STRATEGY IN

A NEW ENVIRONMENT

In conclusion, it seems that Finland will have to get used to a new and
once again more demanding international environment. While it is im-
possible to predict the exact shape that the international order will take,
the major transitions analysed in this report suggest that global politics
will be both more complex and more competitive. Even if parts of the
liberal international order may prove surprisingly resilient, a return to

14 Ali-Yrkkö, Rouvinen, Sinko & Tuhkuri 2016.

MARCH 2019 105

the kind of Western-led rules-based order that has characterised the
post-Cold War era is not on the cards. Particularly for a small state like
Finland, the ongoing changes in the international order and the resulting
uncertainties are a cause for concern. However, this time Finland is not
alone, but faces the new situation as a part of an EU that is characterised
by deep interdependencies between its members. It is in Finland’s inter-
ests to further strengthen these interdependencies and contribute to the
resilience and vitality of the EU. It is equally in its interests to enhance the
EU’s ability to take advantage of its own hybrid character by looking for
partners among the wide group of state and non-state actors in order to
strengthen its power in the policy fields most important for it.
Finland should also be prepared for the possibility of the political sit-
uation around its borders becoming even more complicated, if the weak-
ening of the rules-based order advances fast and the world moves towards
competing regional orders. This implies that the current confrontation
between the EU and Russia will be of a more long-standing character and
may even be aggravated as the common normative framework between
them becomes narrower. Apart from the EU’s unity, cooperation with
like-minded countries is key in such a situation, together with the clar-
ification of Finland’s own international role and values. It goes without
saying that Finland’s location in the interface between two regional orders
stresses its need to ensure the existence of, and full respect for, at least a
minimal level of common rules safeguarding the co-existence of the orders.
Finally, Finland should make efforts to contribute to decreasing the
dividing lines and conflict potential between great powers, or the regional
orders, making use of the multifaceted structure of actors in world politics.
To this end, Finland should also look for possible partners among non-
state actors worldwide and contribute to the establishment of networks
of like-minded actors in the various issue areas of global politics. If done
successfully, this could strengthen positive interdependencies and fa-
cilitate the construction of a common agenda among state actors as well.

106 MARCH 2019

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ATTACHMENT:
PUBLICATIONS PUBLISHED IN THE
FRAMEWORK OF THE PROJECT

Alternative Ways of Global Governance: Informal

institutions and the role of small states, Katja
Creutz, FIIA Briefing Paper 215 (2017).
Trade liberalization at a crossroads: The US
and China play key roles, Tuuli Koivu, FIIA
Briefing Paper 221 (2017).
The EU’s choice: Perspectives on deepening and
differentiation, Tuomas Iso-Markku, Juha
Jokela, Kristi Raik, Teija Tiilikainen & Eeva
Innola (eds.), FIIA Report 50 (2017).
China as a leading economic power: Could China
stabilise the global economic system in times
of crisis?, Mikael Mattlin, FIIA Working Paper
97 (2017).
A superpower in the making? China’s paths to
global influence, Teemu Naarajärvi, FIIA
Briefing Paper 230 (2017).
China-Russia security cooperation: Geopolitical
signalling with limits, Elina Sinkkonen, FIIA
Briefing Paper 231 (2018).
EU member states and Russia: National
and European debates in an evolving
international environment, Marco Siddi (ed.),
FIIA Report 53 (2018).
EU:n kauppapolitiikka koetuksella? Kompastuuko
unioni omiin jalkoihinsa?, Saila Turtiainen,
FIIA Briefing Paper 236 (2018).
The security strategies of the US, China, Russia
and the EU: Living in different worlds,
Kristi Raik, Mika Aaltola, Jyrki Kallio & Katri
Pynnöniemi, FIIA report 56 (2018).
EU Foreign Policy in a Networked World: Webs
against power politics, Kristi Raik, FIIA
Analysis 9 (2018).
Will International Institutions Fail Again?
International power shifts and the future of
global cooperation, Matthew D. Stephen, FIIA
Briefing Paper 249 (2018).

MARCH 2019 119

ABOUT THE CONTRIBUTORS

Dr Katja Creutz is a Senior Research Fellow at the Finnish Institute of

International Affairs. Her research interests include internation-
al law and global governance, particularly issues of responsibility.
Before joining the Institute she worked at the Erik Castrén Institute
of International Law and Human Rights at the University of Helsinki.

Tuomas Iso-Markku is a Research Fellow at the Finnish Institute of

International Affairs. His research focuses on the EU’s Common
Security and Defence Policy, German politics, Finnish EU policy and
the European Parliament.

Dr Kristi Raik is the Director of the Estonian Foreign Policy Institute at

the International Centre for Defence and Security in Tallinn. She is
also an Adjunct Professor at the University of Turku. Kristi has pre-
viously served, inter alia, as a Senior Research Fellow at the Finnish
Institute of International Affairs in Helsinki; an official at the General
Secretariat of the Council of the European Union in Brussels; and a
Visiting Fellow at the Centre for European Policy Studies in Brussels,
and the International Centre for Policy Studies in Kyiv. She has pub-
lished, lectured and commented widely on European foreign and se-
curity policy and Eastern Europe.

Dr Teija Tiilikainen is the Director of the Finnish Institute of International

Affairs. Previously, Dr Tiilikainen was the Director of the Network
of European Studies at the University of Helsinki (2003–2009).
She also served as Secretary of State at the Ministry for Foreign
Affairs of Finland from 2007 to 2008. Dr Tiilikainen was the Special
Representative of the Prime Minister of Finland in the Convention on
the Future of Europe in 2002–2003. Currently, she is also Editor-in-
Chief of Ulkopolitiikka – the Finnish Journal of Foreign Affairs.

MARCH 2019 121

PREVIOUSLY PUBLISHED IN THE SERIES

Arkady Moshes, András Rácz (eds.) Mika Aaltola, Christian Fjäder, Eeva Innola,
What has remained of the USSR: Exploring the Juha Käpylä, Harri Mikkola
erosion of the post-Soviet space Huoltovarmuus muutoksessa:
FIIA Report 58 (2019) Kansallisen varautumisen haasteet
Marcin Kaczmarski, Mark N. Katz and kansainvälisessä toimintaympäristössä
Teija Tiilikainen FIIA Report 49 (2016)
The Sino-Russian and US-Russian Juha Pyykönen
relationships: Current developments Nordic Partners of NATO:
and future trends. How similar are Finland and Sweden
FIIA Report 57 (2018) within NATO cooperation?
Kristi Raik, Mika Aaltola, Jyrki Kallio and FIIA Report 48 (2016)
Katri Pynnöniemi Kristi Raik & Sinikukka Saari (eds.)
The security strategies of the US, China, Russia Key Actors in the EU’s Eastern
and the EU: Living in different worlds. Neighbourhood: Competing perspectives
FIIA Report 56 (2018) on geostrategic tensions
Harri Mikkola, Mika Aaltola, Mikael Wigell, FIIA Report 47 (2016)
Tapio Juntunen ja Antto Vihma Toivo Martikainen, Katri Pynnöniemi,
Hybridivaikuttaminen ja demokratian Sinikukka Saari & Ulkopoliittisen
resilienssi: ulkoisen häirinnän mahdollisuudet instituutin työryhmä
ja torjuntakyky liberaaleissa demokratioissa. Venäjän muuttuva rooli Suomen lähialueilla:
FIIA Report 55 (2018) Valtioneuvoston selvitys- ja
Mika Aaltola, Charly Salonius-Pasternak, tutkimustoiminnan raportti
Juha Käpylä and Ville Sinkkonen (eds.) Mika Aaltola & Anna Kronlund (eds.)
Between change and continuity: Making sense After Rebalance: Visions for the future of US
of America’s evolving global engagement. foreign policy and global role beyond 2016
FIIA Report 54 (2018) FIIA Report 46 (2016)
Marco Siddi (ed.) Katri Pynnöniemi & András Rácz (eds.)
EU member states and Russia: national and Fog of Falsehood: Russian Strategy of
European debates in an evolving international Deception and the Conflict in Ukraine
environment FIIA Report 45 (2016)
FIIA Report 53 (2018) Niklas Helwig (ed.)
Elina Sinkkonen (ed.) Europe’s New Political Engine:
The North Korean Conundrum: International Germany’s role in the
responses and future challenges EU’s foreign and security policy
FIIA Report 52 (2017) FIIA Report 44 (2016)
Mika Aaltola and Bart Gaens (eds.) András Rácz
Managing Unpredictability Russia’s Hybrid War in Ukraine:
Transatlantic relations in the Trump era Breaking the Enemy’s Ability to Resist
FIIA Report 51 (2017) FIIA Report 43 (2015)
Tuomas Iso-Markku, Juha Jokela, Kristi Katri Pynnöniemi, James Mashiri
Raik,Teija Tiilikainen, and Eeva Innola (eds.) Venäjän sotilasdoktriinit vertailussa:
The EU’s Choice Nykyinen versio viritettiin
Perspectives on deepening and differentiation kriisiajan taajuudelle
FIIA Report 50 (2017) FIIA Report 42 (2015)

MARCH 2019 123

Andrei Yeliseyeu Teija Tiilikainen & Kaisa Korhonen (eds.)
Keeping the door ajar: Norden – Making a Difference?
Local border traffic regimes Possibilities for enhanced Nordic cooperation
on the EU’s eastern borders in international affairs
FIIA Report 41 (2014) FIIA Report 29 (2011)
Mika Aaltola, Juha Käpylä,Harri Mikkola, Timo Behr (ed.)
Timo Behr Hard Choices:
Towards the Geopolitics of Flows: The EU’s options in a changing Middle East
Implications for Finland FIIA Report 28 (2011)
FIIA Report 40 (2014) Jyrki Kallio
Juha Jokela, Markku Kotilainen, Tradition in Chinese politics:
Teija Tiilikainen, Vesa Vihriälä The Party-state’s reinvention of the past and
EU:n suunta: Kuinka tiivis liitto? the critical response from public intellectuals
FIIA Report 39 (2014) FIIA Report 27 (2011)
Juha Jokela (ed.) Steven Parham
Multi-speed Europe? Controlling borderlands?
Differentiated integration in the external New perspectives on state peripheries
relations of the European Union in southern Central Asia and northern
FIIA Report 38 (2013) Afghanistan
Sean Roberts FIIA Report 26 (2010)
Russia as an international actor: Mari Luomi
The view from Europe and the US Managing Blue Gold:
FIIA Report 37 (2013) New Perspectives on Water Security
Rosa Balfour, Kristi Raik in the Levantine Middle East
Equipping the European Union for the 21st FIIA Report 25 (2010)
century: National diplomacies, the European Tapani Paavonen
External Action Service and the making A New World Economic Order:
of EU foreign policy Overhauling the Global Economic Governance
FIIA Report 36 (2013) as a Result of the Financial Crisis, 2008–2009
Katri Pynnöniemi (ed.) FIIA Report 24 (2010)
Russian critical infrastructures: Toby Archer, Timo Behr, Tuulia Nieminen (eds)
Vulnerabilities and policies Why the EU fails
FIIA Report 35 (2012) – Learning from past experiences
Tanja Tamminen (ed.) to succeed better next time
Strengthening the EU’s peace mediation FIIA Report 23 (2010)
capacities: Leveraging for peace through Louise Wiuff Moe
new ideas and thinking Addressing state fragility in Africa:
FIIA Report 34 (2012) A need to challenge the established ‘wisdom’?
Harri Mikkola, Jukka Anteroinen, Ville FIIA Report 22 (2010)
Lauttamäki (eds.) Tarja Cronberg
Uhka vai mahdollisuus? Nuclear-Free Security:
Suomi ja Euroopan puolustus- ja Refocusing Nuclear Disarmament and
turvallisuusmarkkinoiden muutos the Review of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation
FIIA Report 33 (2012) Treaty
Touko Piiparinen & Ville Brummer (eds.) FIIA Report 21 (2010)
Global networks of mediation: Kristian Kurki (ed.)
Prospects and avenues for Finland The Great Regression?
as a peacemaker Financial Crisis in an Age of Global
FIIA Report 32 (2012) Interdependence
Mia Pihlajamäki & Nina Tynkkynen (eds.) FIIA Report 20 (2009)
Governing the blue-green Baltic Sea: Anna Korppoo & Alex Luta (ed.)
Societal challenges of marine eutrophication Towards a new climate regime?
prevention Views of China, India, Japan, Russia and the
FIIA Report 31 (2011) United States on the road to Copenhagen
Arkady Moshes & Matti Nojonen (eds.) FIIA Report 19 (2009)
Russia-China relations:
Current state, alternative futures,
and implications for the West
FIIA Report 30 (2011)

124 MARCH 2019

Minna-Mari Salminen & Arkady Moshes
Practise what you preach
– The prospects for visa freedom
in Russia-EU relations
FIIA Report 18 (2009)
Charly Salonius-Pasternak (ed.)
From Protecting Some to Securing many:
Nato’s Journey from a Military Alliance
to a Security Manager
FIIA report 17 (2007)
Toby Archer & Tihomir Popovic
The Trans-Saharan Counter-Terrorism
Initiative:
The US War on Terrorism in Northwest Africa
FIIA Report 16 (2007)

MARCH 2019 125

 MARCH 2019 59

THE CHANGING GLOBAL ORDER

AND ITS IMPLICATIONS FOR THE EU

The forms of global political transition contradict each other. The Western leadership of
the world seems to be in decline, with the US political hegemony being challenged by
the rise of China and other emerging powers and with global power structures evolving
towards multipolarity. At the same time, however, there are increasing signs of a dif-
fusion of state power. It involves a growing group of non-state actors challenging state
power in very different forms and different capacities.
This report focuses on the axis of state power considered the most important in terms
of its global implications: the relationship between the US and China. This relationship is
studied with the aim of assessing how the mutual interdependencies are evolving, and
what the goals of the two actors look like in respect of their own global role. The im-
plications of this power transition in the key fields of global governance – also covering
the simultaneous diffusion of power to non-state actors – forms another relevant topic
under review in the global context.
Lastly, the report analyses how the EU contends with these forms of power transition
and safeguards its own influence in this changing environment. The project also addresses
the international role and influence of one of the northernmost EU members, Finland.
It investigates how the changes in the global and regional setting should be understood
from the Finnish point of view and how Finland should act in order to consolidate its
international role in economic as well as political terms.

ISBN (print) 978-951-769-596-1

ISBN (web) 978-951-769-597-8
ISSN 2323-5454