SECOND DIVISION

[G.R. No. 143951. October 25, 2005.]

NORMA MANGALIAG AND NARCISO SOLANO, petitioners, vs.

HON. EDELWINA CATUBIG-PASTORAL, Judge of the Regional
Trial Court, 1st Judicial Region, San Carlos City,
(Pangasinan), Branch 56 and APOLINARIO SERQUINA, JR.,
respondents.

DECISION

AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J : p

Before us is a petition for certiorari, with a prayer for the issuance of a

temporary restraining order, to set aside the Order dated April 17, 2000 of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 56, San Carlos City in Civil Case No. SCC-
2240, which denied petitioners' motion to dismiss; and the Order dated June 13,
2000, which denied petitioners' motion for reconsideration.
The factual background of the case is as follows:

On May 10, 1999, private respondent Apolinario Serquina, Jr. filed before
the RTC a complaint for damages against petitioners Norma Mangaliag and
Narciso Solano. The complaint alleges that: on January 21, 1999, from 9:00 to
10:00 a.m., private respondent, together with Marco de Leon, Abner Mandapat
and Manuel de Guzman, was on board a tricycle driven by Jayson Laforte; while
in Pagal, San Carlos City, a dump truck owned by petitioner Mangaliag and
driven by her employee, petitioner Solano, coming from the opposite direction,
tried to overtake and bypass a tricycle in front of it and thereby encroached the
left lane and sideswiped the tricycle ridden by private respondent; due to the
gross negligence, carelessness and imprudence of petitioner Solano in driving
the truck, private respondent and his co-passengers sustained serious injuries
and permanent deformities; petitioner Mangaliag failed to exercise due
diligence required by law in the selection and supervision of her employee;
private respondent was hospitalized and spent P71,392.00 as medical
expenses; private respondent sustained a permanent facial deformity due to a
fractured nose and suffers from severe depression as a result thereof, for which
he should be compensated in the amount of P500,000.00 by way of moral
damages; as a further result of his hospitalization, private respondent lost
income of P25,000.00; private respondent engaged the services of counsel on a
contingent basis equal to 25% of the total award. 1
On July 21, 1999, petitioners filed their answer with counterclaim denying
that private respondent has a cause of action against them. They attributed
fault or negligence in the vehicular accident on the tricycle driver, Jayson
Laforte, who was allegedly driving without license. 2
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 Following pre-trial conference, trial on the merits ensued. When private
respondent rested his case, petitioner Solano testified in his defense.
Subsequently, on March 8, 2000, petitioners, assisted by a new counsel,
filed a motion to dismiss on the ground of lack of jurisdiction over the subject
matter of the claim, alleging that the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) has
jurisdiction over the case since the principal amount prayed for, in the amount
of P71,392.00, falls within its jurisdiction. 3 Private respondent opposed
petitioners' motion to dismiss. 4 On March 24, 2000, petitioners filed a
supplement in support of their motion to dismiss. 5

On April 17, 2000, the respondent RTC Judge, Edelwina Catubig-Pastoral,

issued the first assailed Order denying petitioners' motion to dismiss, 6 relying
upon the mandate of Administrative Circular No. 09-94, paragraph 2 of which
reads:
2. The exclusion of the term "damages of whatever kind in
determining the jurisdictional amount under Section 19 (8) and Section
33 (1) of B.P. Blg. 129, as amended by R.A. No. 7691, applied to cases
where the damages are merely incidental to or a consequence of the
main cause of action. However, in cases where the claim for damages
is the main cause of action, or one of the causes of action, the amount
of such claim shall be considered in determining the jurisdiction of the
court.

The respondent RTC Judge also cited the 1999 case of Ong vs. Court of
Appeals, 7 where an action for damages due to a vehicular accident, with
prayer for actual damages of P10,000.00 and moral damages of
P1,000,000.00, was tried in a RTC.
On May 19, 2000, petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration 8 but it
was denied by the respondent RTC Judge in her second assailed Order, dated
June 13, 2000. 9
Hence, the present petition for certiorari, with prayer for the issuance of a
temporary restraining order. 10
On August 9, 2000, the Court resolved to issue the temporary restraining
order prayed for by petitioners. Consequently, the respondent RTC Judge
desisted from hearing further Civil Case No. SCC-2240. 11
Petitioners propound this issue for consideration: In an action for recovery
of damages, does the amount of actual damages prayed for in the complaint
provide the sole test for determining the court's jurisdiction, or is the total
amount of all the damages claimed, regardless of kind and nature, such as
moral, exemplary, nominal damages, and attorney's fees, etc., to be computed
collectively with the actual damages to determine what court — whether the
MTC or the RTC — has jurisdiction over the action? CHATEa

Petitioners maintain that the court's jurisdiction should be based

exclusively on the amount of actual damages, excluding therefrom the
amounts claimed as moral, exemplary, nominal damages and attorney's fee,
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 etc. They submit that the specification in Administrative Circular No. 09-94 that
"in cases where the claim for damages is the main cause of action . . . the
amount of such claim shall be considered in determining the jurisdiction of the
court" signifies that the court's jurisdiction must be tested solely by the amount
of that damage which is principally and primarily demanded, and not the
totality of all the damages sought to be recovered.
Petitioners insist that private respondent's claim for actual damages in
the amount of P71,392.00 is the principal and primary demand, the same being
the direct result of the alleged negligence of petitioners, while the moral
damages for P500,000.00 and attorney's fee, being the consequent effects
thereof, may prosper only upon a prior finding by the court of the existence of
petitioners' negligence that caused the actual damages. Considering that the
amount of actual damages claimed by private respondent in Civil Case No. SCC-
2240 does not exceed P200,000.00, which was then the jurisdictional amount
of the MTC, the jurisdiction over the case clearly pertains to the MTC, and not to
the RTC. Therefore, the RTC should have dismissed the case for lack of
jurisdiction. Petitioners cite as relevant the case of Movers-Baseco Integrated
Port Services, Inc. vs. Cyborg Leasing Corporation 12 wherein the Court, in
disposing of the jurisdictional issue, limited its consideration only to the actual
or compensatory damages.

Furthermore, while admitting that the defense of lack of jurisdiction was

only raised during the trial, petitioners nevertheless contend that jurisdiction
may be raised anytime, even after judgment, but before it is barred by laches
or estoppel. They submit that they seasonably presented the objection to the
RTC's lack of jurisdiction, i.e ., during the trial stage where no decision had as
yet been rendered, must less one unfavorable to them.

At any rate, they argue that when the jurisdictional flaw is evident from
the record of the case, the court may, even without the urgings of the parties,
take judicial notice of such fact, and thereupon dismiss the case motu proprio.
Thus, even if lack of jurisdiction was not initially raised in a motion to dismiss or
in the answer, no waiver may be imputed to them.

Private respondent, on the other hand, submits that in an action for

recovery of damages arising from a tortious act, the claim of moral damages is
not merely an incidental or consequential claim but must be considered in the
amount of demand which will determine the court's jurisdiction. He argues that
the position taken by petitioners is a misreading of paragraph 2 of
Administrative Circular No. 09-94. The clear and explicit language of said
circular leaves no room for doubt; hence, needs no interpretation.

He further submits that petitioners' reliance on Movers-Baseco Integrated

Port Services, Inc . is misplaced since that case is for recovery of the value of
vehicle and unpaid rentals on the lease of the same. He contends that Section
18, paragraph 8 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, as amended by Republic Act No.
7691, upon which petitioners anchor their stand, refers to all the demands
involving collection of sums of money based on obligations arising from
contract, express or implied, where the claim for damages is just incidental
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 thereto and it does not apply to actions for damages based on obligations
arising from quasi-delict where the claim for damages of whatever kind is the
main action. TcaAID

Private respondent also contends that, being incapable of pecuniary

computation, the amount of moral damages that he may be awarded depends
on the sound discretion of the trial court, not restrained by the limitation of the
jurisdictional amount. Should the Court follow petitioners' line of reasoning,
private respondent argues that it will result in an absurd situation where he can
only be awarded moral damages of not more than P200,000.00 although he
deserves more than this amount, taking into consideration his physical
suffering, as well as social and financial standing, simply because his claim for
actual damages does not exceed P200,000.00 which amount falls under the
jurisdiction of the MTC.

Lastly, he asserts that it is too late in the day for petitioners to question
the jurisdiction of the RTC since they are estopped from invoking this ground.
He contends that after actively taking part in the trial proceedings and
presenting a witness to seek exoneration, it would be unfair and legally
improper for petitioners to seek the dismissal of the case.

At the outset, it is necessary to stress that generally a direct recourse to

this Court is highly improper, for it violates the established policy of strict
observance of the judicial hierarchy of courts. Although this Court, the RTCs and
the Court of Appeals (CA) have concurrent jurisdiction to issue writs of
certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, habeas corpus and injunction,
such concurrence does not give the petitioner unrestricted freedom of choice of
court forum. This Court is a court of last resort, and must so remain if it is to
satisfactorily perform the functions assigned to it by the Constitution and
immemorial tradition. 13

Thus, this Court, as a rule, will not entertain direct resort to it unless the
redress desired cannot be obtained in the appropriate courts, and exceptional
and compelling circumstances, such as cases of national interest and of serious
implications, justify the availment of the extraordinary remedy of writ of
certiorari, calling for the exercise of its primary jurisdiction. 14 Such exceptional
and compelling circumstances were present in the following cases: (a) Chavez
vs. Romulo 15 on the citizens' right to bear arms; (b) Government of the United
States of America vs. Purganan 16 on bail in extradition proceedings; (c)
Commission on Elections vs. Quijano-Padilla 17 on a government contract on the
modernization and computerization of the voters' registration list; (d) Buklod ng
Kawaning EIIB vs. Zamora 18 on the status and existence of a public office; and
(e) Fortich vs. Corona 19 on the so-called "Win-Win Resolution" of the Office of
the President which modified the approval of the conversion to agro-industrial
area of a 144-hectare land.

Be that as it may, the judicial hierarchy of courts is not an iron-clad rule. It

generally applies to cases involving warring factual allegations. For this reason,
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 litigants are required to repair to the trial courts at the first instance to
determine the truth or falsity of these contending allegations on the basis of
the evidence of the parties. Cases which depend on disputed facts for decision
cannot be brought immediately before appellate courts as they are not triers of
facts. 20 Therefore, a strict application of the rule of hierarchy of courts is not
necessary when the cases brought before the appellate courts do not involve
factual but legal questions.

In the present case, petitioners submit a pure question of law involving

the interpretation and application of paragraph 2 of Administrative Circular No.
09-94. This legal question and in order to avoid further delay are compelling
enough reasons to allow petitioners' invocation of this Court's jurisdiction in the
first instance.

Before resolving this issue, the Court shall deal first on the question of
estoppel posed by private respondent. Private respondent argues that the
defense of lack of jurisdiction may be waived by estoppel through active
participation in the trial. Such, however, is not the general rule but an
exception, best characterized by the peculiar circumstances in Tijam vs.
Sibonghanoy. 21 I n Sibonghanoy, the party invoking lack of jurisdiction did so
only after fifteen years and at a stage when the proceedings had already been
elevated to the CA. Sibonghanoy is an exceptional case because of the
presence of laches, which was defined therein as failure or neglect for an
unreasonable and unexplained length of time to do that which, by exercising
due diligence, could or should have been done earlier; it is the negligence or
omission to assert a right within a reasonable time, warranting a presumption
that the party entitled to assert has abandoned it or declined to assert it. 22
As enunciated in Calimlim vs. Ramirez, 23 this Court held:
A rule that had been settled by unquestioned acceptance and
upheld in decisions so numerous to cite is that the jurisdiction of a
court over the subject matter of the action is a matter of law and may
not be conferred by consent or agreement of the parties. The lack of
jurisdiction of a court may be raised at any stage of the proceedings,
even on appeal. This doctrine has been qualified by recent
pronouncements which stemmed principally from the ruling in the
cited case of Sibonghanoy. It is to be regretted, however, that the
holding in said case had been applied to situations which were
obviously not contemplated therein. The exceptional circumstances
involved in Sibonghanoy which justified the departure from the
accepted concept of non-waivability of objection to jurisdiction has
been ignored and, instead a blanket doctrine had been repeatedly
upheld that rendered the supposed ruling in Sibonghanoy not as the
exception, but rather the general rule, virtually overthrowing
altogether the time honored principle that the issue of jurisdiction is
not lost by waiver or by estoppel. CHDAEc

xxx xxx xxx

It is neither fair nor legal to bind a party by the result of a suit or

proceeding which was taken cognizance of in a court which lacks
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 jurisdiction over the same irrespective of the attendant circumstances.
The equitable defense of estoppel requires knowledge or
consciousness of the facts upon which it is based. The same thing is
true with estoppel by conduct which may be asserted only when it is
shown, among others, that the representation must have been made
with knowledge of the facts and that the party to whom it was made is
ignorant of the truth of the matter (De Castro vs. Gineta, 27 SCRA 623).
The filing of an action or suit in a court that does not possess
jurisdiction to entertain the same may not be presumed to be
deliberate and intended to secure a ruling which could later be
annulled if not favorable to the party who filed such suit or proceeding.
Instituting such an action is not a one-sided affair. It can just as well be
prejudicial to the one who file the action or suit in the event that he
obtains a favorable judgment therein which could also be attacked for
having been rendered without jurisdiction. The determination of the
correct jurisdiction of a court is not a simple matter. It can raise highly
debatable issues of such importance that the highest tribunal of the
land is given the exclusive appellate jurisdiction to entertain the same.
The point simply is that when a party commits error in filing his suit or
proceeding in a court that lacks jurisdiction to take cognizance of the
same, such act may not at once be deemed sufficient basis of
estoppel. It could have been the result of an honest mistake or of
divergent interpretations of doubtful legal provisions. If any fault is to
be imputed to a party taking such course of action, part of the blame
should be placed on the court which shall entertain the suit, thereby
lulling the parties into believing that they pursued their remedies in the
correct forum. Under the rules, it is the duty of the court to dismiss an
action "whenever it appears that court has no jurisdiction over the
subject matter." (Section 2, Rule 9, Rules of Court) Should the Court
render a judgment without jurisdiction, such judgment may be
impeached or annulled for lack of jurisdiction (Sec. 30, Rule 132, Ibid),
within ten (10) years from the finality of the same (Art. 1144, par. 3,
Civil Code). 24

In the present case, no judgment has yet been rendered by the RTC. 25 As
a matter of fact, as soon as the petitioners discovered the alleged jurisdictional
defect, they did not fail or neglect to file the appropriate motion to dismiss.
Hence, finding the pivotal element of laches to be absent, the Sibonghanoy
doctrine does not control the present controversy. Instead, the general rule that
the question of jurisdiction of a court may be raised at any stage of the
proceedings must apply. Therefore, petitioners are not estopped from
questioning the jurisdiction of the RTC.

In any event, the petition for certiorari is bereft of merit.

Section 1 of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7691, which took effect on April 15,
1994, provides inter alia that where the amount of the demand in civil cases
exceeds P100,000.00, 26 exclusive of interest, damages of whatever kind,
attorney's fees, litigation expenses, and costs, the exclusive jurisdiction thereof
is lodged with in the RTC. Under Section 3 of the same law, where the amount
of the demand in the complaint does not exceed P100,000.00, exclusive of
interest, damages of whatever kind, attorney's fees, litigation expenses, and
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 costs, the exclusive jurisdiction over the same is vested in the Metropolitan
Trial Court, MTC and Municipal Circuit Trial Court. The jurisdictional amount was
increased to P200,000.00, 27 effective March 20, 1999, pursuant to Section 5 28
of R.A. No. 7691 and Administrative Circular No. 21-99.
In Administrative Circular No. 09-94 dated March 14, 1994, the Court
specified the guidelines in the implementation of R.A. No. 7691. Paragraph 2 of
the Circular provides:
2. The exclusion of the term "damages of whatever kind in
determining the jurisdictional amount under Section 19 (8) and Section
33 (1) of B.P. Blg. 129, as amended by R.A. No. 7691, applied to cases
where the damages are merely incidental to or a consequence of the
main cause of action. However, in cases where the claim for
damages is the main cause of action, or one of the causes of
action, the amount of such claim shall be considered in
determining the jurisdiction of the court. (Emphasis supplied)

The well-entrenched principle is that the jurisdiction of the court over the
subject matter of the action is determined by the material allegations of the
complaint and the law, irrespective of whether or not the plaintiff is entitled to
recover all or some of the claims or reliefs sought therein. 29 In the present
case, the allegations in the complaint plainly show that private respondent
seeks to recover not only his medical expenses, lost income but also damages
for physical suffering and mental anguish due to permanent facial deformity
from injuries sustained in the vehicular accident. Viewed as an action for quasi-
delict, the present case falls squarely within the purview of Article 2219 (2), 30
which provides for the payment of moral damages in cases of quasi-delict
causing physical injuries. CAaSED

Private respondent's claim for moral damages of P500,000.00 cannot be

considered as merely incidental to or a consequence of the claim for actual
damages. It is a separate and distinct cause of action or an independent
actionable tort. It springs from the right of a person to the physical integrity of
his or her body, and if that integrity is violated, damages are due and
assessable. 31 Hence, the demand for moral damages must be considered as a
separate cause of action, independent of the claim for actual damages and
must be included in determining the jurisdictional amount, in clear consonance
with paragraph 2 of Administrative Circular No. 09-94.
If the rule were otherwise, i.e ., the court's jurisdiction in a case of quasi-
delict causing physical injuries would only be based on the claim for actual
damages and the complaint is filed in the MTC, it can only award moral
damages in an amount within its jurisdictional limitations, a situation not
intended by the framers of the law.
It must be remembered that moral damages, though incapable of
pecuniary estimation, are designed to compensate and alleviate in some way
the physical suffering, mental anguish, fright, serious anxiety, besmirched
reputation, wounded feelings, moral shock, social humiliation, and similar injury
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 unjustly caused a person. 32 Moral damages are awarded to enable the injured
party to obtain means, diversions or amusements that will serve to alleviate the
moral suffering he/she has undergone, by reason of the defendant's culpable
action. Its award is aimed at restoration, as much as possible, of the spiritual
status quo ante; thus, it must be proportionate to the suffering inflicted. Since
each case must be governed by its own peculiar circumstances, there is no
hard and fast rule in determining the proper amount. 33
The petitioners' reliance in the case of Movers-Baseco Integrated Port
Services, Inc. vs. Cyborg Leasing Corporation 34 is misplaced. The claim for
damages therein was based on a breach of a contract of lease, not a quasi-
delict causing physical injuries, as in this case. Besides, there was no claim
therein for moral damages. Furthermore, moral damages are generally not
recoverable in damage actions predicated on a breach of contract in view of
the provisions of Article 2220 35 of the Civil Code.
In view of the foregoing, the Court is convinced that the respondent RTC
Judge committed no grave abuse of discretion in issuing the assailed Orders
dated April 17, 2000 and June 13, 2000.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition for certiorari is DISMISSED for lack of
merit. The temporary restraining order issued by this Court on August 9, 2000
is LIFTED.
The Regional Trial Court, Branch 56, San Carlos City is DIRECTED to
continue with the trial proceedings in Civil Case No. SCC-2240 and resolve the
case with dispatch.
Costs against petitioners.
SO ORDERED.

Puno, Callejo, Sr. and Tinga, JJ., concur.

Chico-Nazario, J., is on leave.

Footnotes
1. Records, pp. 3-4.

2. Id., p. 25.
3. Id., p. 219.
4. Id., p. 232.
5. Id., p. 237.
6. Id., p. 251.
7. G.R. No. 117103, January 21, 1999, 301 SCRA 387.
8. Id., p. 199.
9. Id., p. 214.
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 10. Rollo , p. 3.
11. Id., p. 63.
12. G.R. No. 131755, October 25, 1999, 317 SCRA 327.

13. Ouano vs. PGTT International Investment Corporation, G.R. No. 134230, July
17, 2002, 384 SCRA 589, 593; Vergara, Sr. vs. Suelto , G.R. No. L-74766,
December 21, 1987, 156 SCRA 753, 766.
14. Zamboanga Barter Goods Retailers Association, Inc. vs. Lobregat, G.R. No.
145466, July 7, 2004, 433 SCRA 624, 629; Yared vs. Ilarde, G.R. No. 114732,
August 1, 2000, 337 SCRA 53, 61; People vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No.
128297, January 21, 1999, 301 SCRA 566, 569-570; Aleria, Jr. vs. Velez, G.R.
No. 127400, November 16, 1998, 298 SCRA 611, 618-619; Tano vs. Socrates,
G.R. No. 110249, August 21, 1997, 278 SCRA 154, 172-174.
15. G.R. No. 157036, June 9, 2004, 431 SCRA 534.
16. G.R. No. 148571, September 24, 2002, 389 SCRA 623.

17. G.R. No. 151992, September 18, 2002, 389 SCRA 353.
18. G.R. Nos. 142801-802, July 10, 2001, 360 SCRA 718.
19. G.R. No. 131457, April 24, 1998, 289 SCRA 624.
20. Agan, Jr. vs. Philippine International Air Terminals Co., Inc., G.R. Nos.
155001, 155547 and 155661, January 21, 2004, 420 SCRA 575, 584. Cf. Liga
ng mga Barangay National vs. Atienza, Jr., G.R. No. 154599, January 21,
2004, 420 SCRA 562, 573; Santiago vs. Vasquez , G.R. Nos. 99289-90,
January 27, 1993, 217 SCRA 633, 652.
21. G.R. No. L-21450, April 15, 1968, 23 SCRA 29. See Metromedia Times
Corporation, et al. vs. Pastorin, G.R. No. 154295, July 29, 2005.
22. Id., p. 35.
23. G.R. No. L-34362, November 19, 1982, 118 SCRA 399.

24. Id., pp. 406-408.

25. See Binay vs. Sandiganbayan, G.R. Nos. 120681-83 and G.R. No. 128136,
October 1, 1999, 316 SCRA 65, 100; Uy vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No.
119000, July 28, 1997, 276 SCRA 367, 379.
26. P200,000.00 in Metro Manila.

27. P400,000.00 in Metro Manila.

28. SEC. 5. After five (5) years from the effectivity of this Act, the jurisdictional
amounts mentioned in Sec. 19 (3), (4), and (8); and Sec. 33 (1) of Batas
Pambansa Blg. 129 as amended by this Act, shall be adjusted to Two
hundred thousand pesos (P200,000.00). Five (5) years thereafter, such
jurisdictional amounts shall be adjusted further to Three hundred thousand
pesos (P300,000.00): Provided, however, that in case of Metro Manila, the
abovementioned jurisdictional amounts shall be adjusted after five (5) years
from the effectivity of this Act to Four hundred thousand pesos
(P400,000.00).
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 29. Laresma vs. Abellana , G.R. No. 140973, November 11, 2004, 442 SCRA
156, 169; Hilado vs. Chavez , G.R. No. 134742, September 22, 2004, 438
SCRA 623, 641; Cruz vs. Torres, G.R. No. 121939, October 4, 1999, 316 SCRA
193.
30. Art. 2219. Moral damages may be recovered in the following and analogous
cases:
xxx xxx xxx
(2) Quasi-delicts causing physical injuries; . . .

31. Ong vs. Court of Appeals, supra, Note No. 7, p. 402.

32. Article 2217 of the Civil Code.
33. Pleyto vs. Lomboy, G.R. No. 148737, June 16, 2004, 432 SCRA 329, 342;
Samson, Jr. vs. Bank of the Philippine Islands, G.R. No. 150487, July 10, 2003,
405 SCRA 607, 612; Kierulf vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. Nos. 99301 & 99343,
March 13, 1997, 269 SCRA 433, 448-449.
34. G.R. No. 131755, October 25, 1999, 317 SCRA 327.

35. Art. 2220. Willful injury to property may be a legal ground for awarding
moral damages if the court should find that, under the circumstances, such
damages are justly due. The same rule applies to breaches of contract where
the defendant acted fraudulently or in bad faith.

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