Cambridge A2 Level

History (9489)
____________________

Notes and past paper questions for:

Stalin’s Russia 1924-41

by kg
 9489 History
(Cambridge A2 Level)
European option

Stalin’s Russia 1924-41

kg
Notes by kg

1
 Content - ‘Stalin’s Russia 1924-41’

Why did Stalin gain power from 1924?

LENIN’S LEGACY AND PROBLEMS OF LEADERSHIP

The government of Russia by 1924 and key problems/issues

● Differences in the party key aspects of policy
● The problems caused by Lenin’s failing health
● Lenin’s views of Stalin
● The suppression on Lenin’s testament

Key question: How far was Lenin responsible for Stalin’s rise to power?

Lenin’s failures

It was Lenin who promoted Stalin to the vital role of Party Secretary which was critical to Stalin’s
rise. He used Stalin to face down Trotsky in the disputes in 1921. He had hoped to be replaced by a
joint Stalin / Trotsky leadership without considering the likelihood and implications of such an
alliance. However, his later months in power were marred by illness – the effects of an assassination
attempt and a stroke. The factional struggles within the party were allowed to grow as a result.
kg
Lenin knew he was seriously ill and that he needed to make provision for the future of the revolution
and neglecting to do so was inevitably damaging. He was well aware that there were many
competing individuals and factions who had ambitions other than simply advancing the revolution.
He made no effort to deal with what might happen on his retirement or death.

He also seemed to have been well aware of Stalin’s tendencies and attitude, and the dangers he
represented, but seemed reluctant to take any action to deal with it until it was too late. His failure
to do much about his concerns over Stalin’s many failings and ambitions and remove him from his
potential power base is a factor.

Lenin’s Testament made it clear just how much he saw Stalin as a threat and saw him as a danger
to the future of the Revolution, and that he must take responsibility. It was not as if Stalin, in his
various incompetent roles in Poland and as Commissar for Nationalities, had real achievements to
his credit. There was plenty of other talent around which had much better records in the
revolutionary and post-revolutionary period. Lenin felt Stalin was ‘too crude’ and he had broken off
personal relations with him after his disloyalty and attack on Krupskaya.

His untimely death and failure to sort out a succession issue allowed Stalin to survive the
will/testament episode well and potential rivals were reluctant to take advantage of it. Lenin had
clearly identified Stalin as preeminent (surpassing) over Trotsky which helped as well.

Lenin left not only a divided hierarchy but internal problems and contradictions. Internal
disturbances had led to a retreat with NEP, however ingenious the political justification and the
world revolution had had to be shelved. So, Lenin’s legacy was not just a failure to establish one
group with a clear line of succession but to leave a gap between the ideology and the practical
needs to build up food supplies and to allow enough industrial goods to fulfil basic demands.

2
Other factors as to Stalin’s rise to power:

● Trotsky
● Failures of other leading Bolsheviks (Stalin’s rivals)
● Stalin’s clever planning
● Stalin’s opportunism
● Genuine support in Russia for radical change

kg
3
 Why did Stalin gain power from 1924?
STALIN’S RELATIONS WITH TROTSKY AND OTHER SOVIET LEADERS

● Key figures in the Politburo (Trotsky, Bukharin, Kamenev, Zinoviev, Rykov, etc.) and the background of
each person, and their involvement in the Power struggle
● How far each individual was responsible for Stalin’s rise to power.

Key question: How far does Bukharin’s comment ‘we underestimated him’ account for
Stalin’s rise to power?

Failings of Trotsky

The way in which Stalin managed to isolate, discredit and then exile his most dangerous rival,
Trotsky, is an important factor. Trotsky himself, while not having the same ruthless ambition of
Stalin, made errors of judgement.

Russians were suspicious of him because of his Jewish heritage and his late conversion to
Bolshevism, and there was a suspicion that he might attempt to assume dictatorship. Trotsky, unlike
Stalin, did not have proletarian roots or was a long serving member, having only joined the
Bolsheviks in 1917.

Trotsky adhered to a belief in the need to establish the true rule of the party-led proletariat, but that
proletariat hardly existed. However much he wanted a world revolution, the failures of revolutions in
kg
Germany, Hungary and the establishment of the cordon sanitaire round the USSR made this
unachievable. His key idea of ‘permanent revolution’ also did not endear him to war-weary Russians.
To many in the party it was Trotsky who seemed to pose more of a threat of domination and of
undermining the gains of NEP.

Trotsky’s protracted illness in 1922–23 enabled Stalin to build up support through patronage. The
formation of the ‘troika’ gave Stalin a strong basis of support against Trotsky. He did not establish
himself as an effective replacement for Stalin. He was seen as aloof and his intellectual arrogance
compared unfavourably to Stalin’s image as a man of the people. He simply was not as sophisticated
a politician as Stalin and lacked political skills, and had not taken care to build up a support base.

In addition, the failure to attend Lenin’s funeral by Trotsky gave Stalin an edge. He was isolated
from decision-making as army head so did not build up the networks of support needed for an
effective leadership challenge after Lenin’s death, as such he could not exploit his potential popular
appeal.

Trotsky was arrogant and conceited, and good at making enemies. He also did not disguise his
ambitions and was reluctant to compromise on major ideological views, or at least disguise his views
in the interests of making friends and allies. These factors alienated his potential supporters.
Trotsky, always keen on party unity, failed to take on Stalin and intervene when he was most
vulnerable, over the Georgian Question or on Lenin’s Testament. Trotsky and those who feared
Stalin’s influence could not make use of the warnings made by Lenin or mount a concerted
opposition to Stalin’s rise to power by denouncing him at the 12th Party Congress as per Lenin’s
instructions. He also failed to publish Lenin’s wishes upon his death.

He failed to notice in the 24th Party Congress just how much Stalin controlled the whole party and
the nature of the game that Stalin was playing in the whole NEP/Socialism in One Country debate.
Stalin’s canny control of the GPU and the way in which it was carefully utilised to get Trotsky first

4
into exile and then out of Russia was clever from Stalin’s part.

Failings of other leaders

The inability of the other key members of the Politburo to see the threat that Stalin represented and
their willingness to be manipulated and outmanoeuvred by him was another factor. Some had their
own selfish aspirations and ambitions which he manipulated cleverly.

They also had a tendency to think that Stalin could be ‘managed’ to enable them to achieve their
own goals. It was only when facing execution that men like Bukharin realised what Stalin was up to.
This lack of awareness was also evidenced by men like Rykov who were willing to be utilised by
Stalin against his opponents on the left of the party.

Equally, both Kamenev and Zinoviev initially protected Stalin when Lenin’s testament was read out
and urged its suppression, losing an opportunity to remove Stalin early on. He could have been
stopped at this point had Lenin’s opinions on him become more widely known. As such, the
supporters of NEP like Bukharin and the political and personal enemies of Trotsky ensured that there
were divisions at the top of the party which could be exploited by Stalin. The best example to utilise
is the removal of Trotsky, as that demonstrated so well the mixture of planning, opportunism and
‘opponent error’, as well as sheer ruthlessness on his part that enabled Stalin to get to the top.

Stalin always took care, as Westwood says, to let rivals dig their own graves, just lending them a
spade occasionally. Stalin’s manipulation of others and his development of shifting alliances and
rivalries were excellent, for example the use of Kamenev and Zinoviev against Trotsky, and then his
use of Bukharin against them.
kg
Other factors as to Stalin’s rise to power:

● Lenin’s failures
● Stalin’s clever planning
● Stalin’s opportunism
● Genuine support in Russia for radical change

5
 Why did Stalin gain power from 1924?
STALIN’S POSITION IN THE PARTY
STALIN’S CONTROL AND MANIPULATION WITHIN THE PARTY

Role of the Bolshevik party in the period 1914-1924 and the part it played in those years.
● Structure of the Party and the centres of power in it
● Stalin’s role in the Party in 1924
● Ways in which Stalin utilised his role in the Party to acquire power, and built up his power base within
the Party
● Stalin’s strengths as a candidate for the leadership, and how each of the following led to his rise to
power:
○ Control of the party
○ Policies
○ Character and political skills
○ Weakness of opponents
○ Good fortune

Key question: How important was Stalin’s position in the party in his rise to power?

Stalin’s clever planning and opportunism, power as General Secretary

Stalin’s own skills were a mix of his opportunism and careful planning. His sheer ruthlessness and
ambition, coupled with a totally pragmatic approach to attaining dictatorship, was clever.
kg
Lenin’s death, and the cult of Lenin propagated by Stalin.

The way Stalin overcame the possible damage done to his career in Lenin’s will was remarkable, and
details like seeing that Trotsky did not come to the funeral also helped. Stalin used Lenin’s funeral to
advance his own position, by acting as a pallbearer before making a speech designed to present
himself as Lenin’s disciple. The way in which he utilised the funeral to create just the right image of
himself, limit the influence of Lenin’s wife, and start the isolation was very clever.

This also allowed for Stalin to present himself as a ‘no-nonsense leader’, using his military
experience from the Civil War. He was able to gloss over failures such as the Polish campaign easily
for instance.

Stalin’s creation of the cult of Lenin with him as its chief disciple was clever. He exploited this cult
and managed to evade the opprobrium of Lenin’s criticisms of him in the Political Testament. By
seeming to carry on the policy of NEP he gained the support of the party’s right and managed by
skilful means to isolate Trotsky and his supporters, even though these included party figures who
had been of greater importance than himself in the Revolution and the Lenin era.

Stalin’s use of the Party

Stalin’s exceptionally effective use of his role as party secretary is also a crucial factor. He quietly
took over the whole party role and used it with enormous skill and used his powers of advancement
and patronage in the party. His protégés were to dominate the vital Central Committee; men like
Molotov, and their votes were there for him when it mattered throughout the 1920’s. He dominated
the Party agenda from the early days through this role.

His planting of docile supporters and loyalists in key roles in the Party and elsewhere was critical at
regional and local levels, and he was an excellent judge of other men’s weaknesses through his key
appointments. The care he took to ensure that a right degree of support at Party Congresses and

6
within the security services shows careful planning. His supervision of the ‘Lenin Enrolment’ led to
an influx of young urban workers who were less interested in ideological debate and more attracted
by Stalin’s policies.

Through Stalin’s knowledge of the membership and organisation, he was also adept as the ‘comrade
card index’ or ‘the grey blur’, in solidifying his base of support and his usage and exploitation of the
police state that the Bolsheviks had created to win the civil war and party discipline of the previous
Lenin period. He was also prepared to take on administrative positions, which allowed him to build
up a strong power base. He skilfully used his position as Party Secretary in order to control Politburo
meetings.

The way he managed the party Conference in 1924 to ensure the discrediting of Trotsky and
endorsement of policies which damaged Trotsky was vital. He deliberately sidelined Trotsky,
accusing him of factionalism. Stalin’s alliance with Bukharin and the way in which he defeated the
United Opposition is a very good example of his devious and opportunist, and highly successful,
approach.

After the 15th Party Congress in 1927, which saw the end of the Left Opposition and the expulsion
of critical opponents such as Trotsky and Zinoviev. It also enabled him to control much of the
agenda of both the Politburo, the planning organisations, and the entire system of government in
the USSR. This enabled him to place supporters in key positions in all parts of the state, such as the
police, the Comintern, the military, and the security systems.

Stalin’s manipulation/utilisation of the divisions and weaknesses of his rivals

kg
Stalin was also politically very skilful and cunning. He remained in the background and played the
role of a moderate peacemaker. He played his opponents off against each other very effectively in
the power struggle.

Stalin did not appear to be a rival or threat until it was much too late. It was his ability to convince
his rivals and potential rivals that he was not after power and could disguise his ambitions well. He
simply outclassed all opponents and they invariably failed to realise what he was, and the dangers
posed by him. Many allowed Stalin to manipulate him and he was able to utilise their weaknesses to
his own advantage.

Stalin managed to utilise the divisions between the NEP supporters and the ‘communists’, and the
‘socialism in one country’ versus the ‘world revolutionaries’, as well as divisions in foreign trade very
effectively. The manipulation of the whole NEP issue is always seen as the perfect example of
Stalin’s manipulation of an issue to his own advantage, and the way he utilised the whole ‘Socialism
in One Country’ issue to divide, then isolate, and then destroy possible opponents and rivals was
vital for his rise. The OGPU for example, carefully infiltrated with his own supporters, was carefully
used to break up loyal Trotsky supporters’ groups. As such he was totally unscrupulous and brutal in
his actions. He then advocated rapid industrialisation to see off the right. Party members generally
approved of his policies.

Factional rivalry also played a huge role and Stalin’s ability to build support while obviously lacking
the more threatening intellectual and leadership abilities of his rivals was key. Much of this can be
seen as pragmatic opportunism.

Stalin’s influence in the Republics, and the work with the Nationalities is important. The way he
managed regions remote from Moscow, such as the Ukraine and Kazakhstan was brutal, but
effective. Stalin had also witnessed the value of establishing links with regional parties as
Commissar for Nationalities. After establishing complete control over the USSR, he also placed allies

7
in other regions, such as Beria in Georgia and Khrushchev in Ukraine.

Summary

In this sense Stalin made skilful use of the tools at his disposal and demonstrated ruthlessness in
his removal of rivals. This reflected Stalin’s realisation that in order to progress at all, there had to
be a dominant and authoritarian government, which is what Russia had been used to for centuries.
He often quoted the saying of Peter the Great that ‘What the Russian peasant needs is a good taste
of the knout.’ There were also his remarkable political skills, his ability to manipulate and attract
total support and his propaganda. Underlying it all was the use of terror and the killing of all those
who opposed and who might oppose.

Other factors as to Stalin’s rise to power:

● Trotsky
● Failures of other leading Bolsheviks (Stalin’s rivals)
● Lenin’s failures
● Genuine support in Russia for radical change

Genuine support in Russia for radical change (additional point)

There was a tradition in Russia of autocracy that went back for centuries. In many respects Stalin
was a natural descendant from Tsars like Alexander III who ran a brutal autocracy in Russia with
few daring to oppose. There was no tradition of any form of rule by consent or legitimate opposition
kg
in Russia at all. He was just another autocrat in a long line of them. Lenin had firmly set a precedent
by crushing opposition, as the Kronstadt affair and the closing of the Constituent Assembly had
shown. Unions had been subordinated to the needs of the State as well.

There was also widespread support within Russia for radical change and less theoretical debate, and
Stalin represented the former. Evidence would also suggest that he took enormous care from an
early stage to ensure support within the CHEKA, which proved to be a great asset. His theoretically
communist message was popular amongst many and his regime did attract tremendous loyalty and
support as the early stages of industrialisation and collectivisation showed. There was a genuine
desire and enthusiasm to see socialism established and radical change to occur which was well
utilised and taken advantage of by Stalin.

The rise of the ‘nomenklatura’ who were rewarded for their support with the luxuries that were
unattainable by most, helped, but it was the fear of a bullet in the back of the neck and the gulags
for their families that might be seen as the main factor. There seemed to be no viable alternative.
No one wanted a return to the days of the Tsars. Stalin played successfully on the strong
nationalistic feelings of the great majority of the Russian people.

The policy of Socialism in One Country seemed the only practical way forward as the world
revolution had not happened, and the USSR needed to focus on the considerable domestic problems
it faced after the Civil War. The inheritance of repression and the calls for party discipline in the war
meant that the scope for open discussion was far less, and Stalin was able to exploit this to make
his critics seem disloyal.

8
 How was the USSR governed under Stalin?
STALIN’S AIMS IN GOVERNMENT AND ADMINISTRATION

Areas covered under ‘domestic policy’ - a broad overview of:

● Structure and organisation of the CPSU
● Party Congress meetings
● Politburo powers
● General Secretary powers
● Administrative hierarchy
● Party cells
● An opposition-free party

Notes (recommended by the Scheme of Work)

Structure and organisation of the Party

The structure and organisation of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) was generally
designed and implemented by Lenin and his Bolsheviks after the 1918 Revolution. The Bolshevik
Party was built up on what was called the principles of democratic centralism, whereby authority for
direction was vested by their membership and the members voluntarily accepted the discipline of
their chosen leader to ensure unity in action.

Under Stalin, the general form of the CPSU was continued and left well on its own; however, Stalin’s
kg
role, the General Secretary of CPSU, became much more powerful than Lenin had previously
theorised. In fact, the term “Gen. Sec of CPSU” became synonymous with the ‘leader of the Party’
during Stalin’s regime.

The lower units of the Party elected delegates to congresses of districts and the Congresses of the
Union. The Congress of the Union elected the Central Committee. This was the highest authority
between sessions of Congress. The Central Committee elected the Political Bureau, which was the
highest authority between Central Committee meetings. All lower organs of the Party carry out the
decisions of the higher. The Political Bureau was therefore the most important body, carrying the
authority of the Congress, and in short actually led the Party.

Party congress meetings

The governing body of the CPSU was called the Party Congress which would hold a meeting between
anywhere from 1 to 5 years. The most significant job of the Party Congress was to elect a Central
Committee, made up of delegates elected at a Party Congress, which would theoretically make
decisions for the Party between congresses.

The Central Committee’s primary job was to elect the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of
the CPSU (Politburo), composed of the top members of the Central Committee.

Politburo powers

Even though the Politburo’s role was theoretically to direct the Party with a mandate only concerning
the Party, in reality it made all the major decisions and oversaw all the operations of the Party,
through the Central Committee, Supreme Soviet, and the Party Congress. Stalin’s main aim was to
simplify the activity in the party and to coordinate easier than party activity in his own interest. So,
his main aim was to control everything.

9
General secretary powers

Although, in theory, the Politburo was elected from below, in practice, the leading members of the
Politburo and, of course, Lenin were highly influential in determining the body’s composition which,
in the end, reflected the weight and competing influence of various individuals within the party, their
allies within the Politburo and supporters outside of it.

Under Stalin, arguably the most powerful General Secretary of the CPSU, both the composition of
the Politburo and the Central Committee was left to the Gen. Sec. (which was what ultimately
helped Stalin to become the leader of USSR after Lenin’s death – Stalin was able to fill the Party
with his lackeys).

Administrative hierarchy

Any organisational hierarchy lower than the previous higher structures of the CPSU (and various
other administrative structures) was managed by Party Committees (“partkoms”), which was
headed by the elected “partkom bureau secretary.” Partkoms were called as such in enterprises and
institutes, obkoms in zone levels, raikoms in district levels, gorkoms at city levels.

Party cells

The lowest organisational hierarchy of the CPSU was called the “primary party organisation” or the
“party cell”, whose condition for existence was the gathering of at least three communists.

A party cell was managed by the party bureau, spearheaded by the bureau secretary. Large party
cells were headed by the “exempt secretary”, while smaller cells would be composed of employees
kg
at the respective institution.

An opposition-free party

With the ending of the great purge Stalin had achieved one of the most important of his aims. Ever
since he became General Secretary of the Bolshevik Party, he had determined that it should become
a “united party free from all factional struggles”. This had now been achieved.

For the first time in its history the Party was free from oppositional groups. Lenin had striven for the
same from the time of his entrance into the Russian Social Democratic Labour Movement, both he
and Stalin referring to the unity ad “monolithic”, by which term they meant a party united in aim,
principles, methods, and actions.

10
 How was the USSR governed under Stalin?
‘BUILDING SOCIALISM IN ONE COUNTRY’

Decision to strive for socialism in one country.

● What this policy meant
● The possible impact of this policy on Russia
○ Impact on the workers
○ Appeal of policy
○ The impact of the flexibility of the doctrine

Key questions: Why did Stalin decide to ‘build socialism in one country’?
How ‘socialist’ were his outcomes of his policies were in political, social, and economic terms?

Aims of ‘building socialism in one country’:

His aims were to focus on the Soviet Union, to strengthen her industrial base and military might
before spreading revolution throughout the world. To this end, he rejected the New Economic Policy
and introduced Collectivisation in agriculture as a precursor to the Five-Year Plans, which would
focus on the development of heavy industry and the Soviet Union’s economic power base.

YES, Stalin was successful in ‘building socialism in one country’

The 1936 Constitution said socialism in one country had been achieved. Furthermore, 95% of
kg
agricultural land was collectivised and the Five-Year Plans had been imposed on the USSR by the
central government – including the Asian territories. Russia had been industrialised and in theory
there was equality for all.

There had also been massive spending on health and education and there was state ownership of all
the means of production and distribution. There was full employment, total state control of all labour
and social policy. Agriculture was a support service to industry, providing cheap food for the
industrial workers and controlling the peasantry, whom Stalin never trusted.
The founding of the Stakhanovite movement involved new industrial cities such as Magnitogorsk,
the relocation of factories eastward behind the Urals, and the application of military discipline to the
work force.

NO, he failed

There was an absence of any individual contribution to decision making at any level. Theory at the
time suggested that this should be integral to any socialist society. It was also a totalitarian system
of government with absolute social control, even down to deciding on the appropriate nursery
rhymes for children. Stalin’s aims were also imposed and maintained by Terror which did not reflect
socialist principles.

Socialism was only present in theory, not in practice. Private plots of land produced more food than
state-owned collective farms. There was a flourishing black market and blatant inequality for the
Nomenklatura. There was also endemic corruption, mismanagement and cronyism, which
undermined the principle of socialism.

The Five-Year Plans - Stalin felt that the Soviet Union was fifty to one hundred years behind the
West, and must make up this gap in ten years or be crushed. He was very anxious of a Western

11
invasion, and so the First and Second Five Year Plans focused on heavy industry and later chemicals.
The consumer sector was disregarded with no attempt to produce a balanced economy. Production
increases in iron, steel, and coal production were remarkable, but they came at a huge human cost.

The Third Five Year Plan was focused on military production, and despite its achievements, the
Soviet Union did need additional supplies from the US during World War Ⅱ. The purges of the officer
corps hampered military advances.

Summary

Ultimately, Stalin had great success in building ‘socialism in one country’ but at massive human
cost. It could also be argued that Collectivisation and the nationalisation of the means of production
all moved the Soviet Union from the mixed economy of the New Economic Policy to a more socialist
economy and society.
kg
12
 How was the USSR governed under Stalin?
CAUSES AND IMPACT OF THE GREAT TERROR AND USE OF PURGES AND
SHOW TRIALS

● Nature and extent of the repressive systems used by Tsars and Lenin - the ‘Russian tradition’
● Nature and extent of the repressive system created by Stalin with a focus on the NKVD, the show
trials, the Gulags and the Purges
○ Impact of the Kirov murder
○ Who was purged, and why were they purged?

Causes of the Great Terror / Purges, and its impact

There is no definite consensus as to why Stalin embarked on the Great Purge, however most
historians agree that it was a combination of factors. Some argue that it was never his intention to
let terror go so far and that it got out of hand with enthusiastic supporters, but that view has been
increasingly discredited.

1. Terror had been used before, used now to strengthen Stalin’s goals of power

Terror had been utilised by the Tsars as the pogroms against the Jews earlier in the century during
the Russification process and anti-Jewish pogroms, and the treatment of ‘subject’ peoples like the
Kazakhs showed. Lenin, always seen as Stalin’s mentor, had deliberately utilised terror to establish
the Bolshevik regime where ‘wreckers’ had to be punished in the 1920s, and what Stalin did,
kg
arguably, was just building on that precedent.

The scale, however, was different now. The economy needed extensive slave labour supplies and
Stalin felt that an efficient Soviet state needed total subservience and this was the way to get it. He
wanted to dominate the Party, the Military and the State as a whole and this was the way in which
he felt he could attain it. Stalin could be seen as the expert in every field because of the fear
generated for those who might be critical and the cult of Stalin which was an essential element for
ruling could be maintained. In this analysis the goals of power and the means to achieve them are
more emphasised than fear.

2. Terror as policy

Within the Party there was also a strong belief in terror as policy. The vision of a more developed
socialist economy and the state was very strong, and activists often urged terror as a means of
driving this quickly. The model of a top down terror has been challenged but the main debate may
be between explanations which stress fear at the very top and those which see terror more as a
means to an end – whether driven by Stalin’s vision and linked to his cult of personality or more
widely shared by the Party. The transformation caused by economic policies of peasant
collectivization and industrialization were seen as essential for the defence of the Soviet Union and
its development as a Communist state. Terror was needed to cement the gains of the revolution and
ensure that communism stood a chance of getting embedded in Russia and that all the ‘old order’,
be it aristocratic or bourgeois as well as Bolshevik, had to be eliminated for this to happen.

The purges were designed to enable Stalin to be able to deflect any responsibility for any failures
onto others and the ‘confessions’ were useful propaganda opportunities. The purges also became
self-perpetuating and took the focus away from anything else because they terrified opponents and
proved to be a real deterrent to any possible challenge.

13
 3. Dissatisfaction of the leadership, paranoia and suspicions of Stalin

Stalin had always reacted savagely towards others, but on a smaller scale, when he felt threatened.
He did feel, probably correctly, that his leadership was threatened by the many grumblings in 1934
at the Seventeenth Party Congress, at the lack of progress towards the model state which had been
promised as the outcome of the Revolution. There was a feeling that both the First Five-Year Plan
and collectivisation had been partly failures, and there needed to be someone to blame. Increasingly
isolated after the death of his wife, Stalin has been seen as a paranoid dictator aware of previous
jealousies and opposition within the party.

Stalin and other leaders had doubts about the loyalty of many and this was a way of stamping out
disloyalty and ensuring support through fear. An element of the fear of opposition existed – peasant
unrest was widespread after 1928 and there was always the danger in a time of disruptive change
that old nationalism such as that in the Ukraine might surface.

This led to the purges of many high-ranking and influential men, such as Zinoviev, Kamenev,
Bukharin, Rykov and Tomsky, in the show trials of the 16, 17 and 21. These show trials were state
managed with predetermined outcomes and held in public to demonstrate Stalin’s power. The role
that Kirov (who was the main reason for the start of the Terror) played is not clear, but clearly he
was seen as a potential threat and was probably eliminated on Stalin’s orders. Previous groups
within the party like those who admired Bukharin were destroyed as were those close to Lenin. Even
those like Molotov close to Stalin were kept in check by control of family members; Stalin personally
oversaw lists of arrests. Those like Kamenev and Zinoviev, who had disagreed with him in the past,
kg
had to be destroyed. There was a revenge element to it all, and it seemed as if Stalin was paranoid
and aware of jealousies and opposition within the party. Those Old Bolsheviks who were aware that
Stalin’s role in the Revolution and Civil War was neither heroic nor substantial also joined the ranks
of those purged.

The sheer size and scale of the purges had an enormous impact on both Russia and the subject
nations. They targeted opponents but also potential enemies and anyone who was deemed a likely
threat. This meant that no-one was safe and therefore the population was primarily concerned with
the survival of themselves and their families and little else.

Quite why the army was purged to the extent that it was has never been identified. Motives might
include removing rivals to fulfil Stalin’s suspicions and his paranoia, subduing the population,
providing cheap slave labour for the Five-Year Plans and the gulags, but also the character of Stalin
and the nature of the Soviet State. This also leads on the degree of centralised control or local
excess by the NKVD and local party bosses.

4. Economic reasons

Economic difficulties and the use of gulags was instrumental to Stalin's regime. Downturn in the
Soviet economy after 1936 as a result of technical problems which was Stalin’s management of the
economy and the bad harvest. Stalin needed to find a solution to this and by condemning vast
numbers of people to the Gulags through the use of the purges, the terror provided slave labour to
carry out dangerous work such as logging and gold-mining in inhospitable regions. Even though it
was brutal, It was highly efficient and provided a great assistance to the industrialisation of the
USSR.

The Yezhovshchina starting in 1936 was a mass and indiscriminate use of terror orchestrated by
Yezhov, who had in turn replaced Yagoda, who was later executed. These purges involved wholesale
murder and involved the general population and were designed to subdue the population. In 1938

14
Yezhov was replaced by Beria, who continued terror and made the Gulags part of the economic
system of the Soviet Union. Yezhov was executed to show that no one was safe and indeed, he was
publicly blamed for the excesses of the Yezhovshchina.

Other factors as to how Stalin retained power (other than his use of terror)

The effectiveness of propaganda played a huge part in his survival, as did indoctrination. The cult of
personality and selling himself as the ‘heir’ of Lenin and of the revolution was important, and as
there was a lack of any tradition of a ‘loyal’ opposition as it had been an autocracy for centuries, this
made it easier. The terror was not actually thus needed, and Stalin weakened his position and
Russia by purging many educated citizens. For example, the army was so weakened in 1941 that it
nearly led to the end of the regime. While there was resentment by other politicians at his power,
few disagreed with his broad objectives for Russia.

There was genuine support for many communist ideas, and a desire to obtain the social justice and
equality that had been promised earlier in the Russian Revolution. A general consensus existed that
socialism ought to be given a chance to work and that radical measures such as collectivisation (of
which there was support among the youth to carry out) and the massive industrialisation
programmes were necessary and inevitable. There was a fear of Nazism and of being crushed by
capitalism, and his aim to make Russia a major power and secure from its enemies was popular and
supported, and it was again accepted that this needed a tough approach.

Stalin also managed the Nomenklatura very well and ensured there were many privileges for the
few. Stalin played the ‘patriotic’ card exceptionally well, and was seen as the benevolent version of
the previous autocrats. He also had an ability to outmanoeuvre his opponents and identify those
kg
who might oppose him. There were also real improvements for many in areas such as health
provision, education and careers open to talent.

15
 How was the USSR governed under Stalin?
AIMS AND IMPACT OF FOREIGN POLICY

Stalin’s foreign policy

● Aims and achievements
● How far foreign policy aims changed during the period.
● What impacts the rise of Hitler had on Soviet foreign policy
● Did Stalin achieve his aims?

Key question: How far did Stalin achieve his aims in foreign policy by 1941?

The tension in Soviet policy was between the promotion of world revolution and the undermining of
capitalism and the practical needs of the USSR for security from invasion and outside intervention
while creating a socialist economy and society.

In the 1920s, Stalin shifted foreign policy away from the promotion of world socialist revolution,
which was espoused by Lenin and Trotsky, towards ‘Socialism in One Country. He argued that the
Comintern would not achieve revolution elsewhere and that it was not necessary to foment world
revolution for socialism to be successfully built in the Soviet Union. Stalin was, therefore, changing
the focus of the Comintern to protecting the security of the Soviet state, rather than aiming to
achieve world revolution. Stalin’s preferred policy was consistently that of collective security against
Nazi Germany.

As such, he had little choice except to follow the policy of Socialism in One Country, which was
kg
based on a realistic estimate of the state of the USSR’s military resources and the failures of
revolutionary movements after the First World War, together with the need to create enough
industry to develop the proletariat in whose name the Bolsheviks had taken power. The post-war
settlements had hemmed Russia in with various buffer states mostly hostile to communism. The
pre-war alliances had gone, leaving the USSR isolated. Thus, it was important to establish what links
were possible with other European powers through arrangements like those established with
Germany in the Treaty of Rapallo and with trade agreements such as those made with Britain in
1924.

The economic weaknesses left it vulnerable and Russia’s interests lay with overcoming isolation and
making the country less vulnerable to possible attacks. Ideological interests lay in promoting
communism through the Communist International but without provoking further isolation and
hostility. The German communists were destroyed by Hitler without any interference from Moscow.

There was some inconsistency in Stalin’s attitude to both China and Japan. Conflict with China in
1929 over the Manchurian Chinese Eastern Railway and in 1934 with the Soviet Invasion of Xinjiang
gave way to a Non-Aggression Pact in 1937 supplemented by military and financial aid for China.
This was influenced by the deteriorating relationship with Japan, following the 1931 Invasion of
Manchuria and, particularly, the Anti-Comintern Pact signed between Germany and Japan in 1936.
This might be said to have partially influenced the signing of the Nazi-Soviet Pact in 1939. The
policy of forming united fronts had ended in failure in China with the Kuomintang nearly destroying
the Chinese Communists, and there was little attempt to support the beleaguered Chinese
communists.

The massive economic changes from 1928 to 1934 isolated the USSR even more and preoccupied
the attention of the Politburo. However, the Great Crash did seem to suggest the imminent collapse
of capitalism, and Stalin saw Nazism as an indication of that collapse.

16
The rise of the right-wing dictators changed the situation and made isolation dangerous, but the
promotion of united fronts with left wing groups in Europe promoted by Litvinov was problematic in
terms of results even though it was a less fatalistic approach – with the Soviet Union joining the
League of Nations in 1934 and signed mutual assistance pacts with France and Czechoslovakia in
1935. The Comintern no longer denounced social democratic and Labour parties as ‘social fascists’
and aimed to create anti-fascist popular fronts, for example in France and Spain. In France
the Popular Front did not secure a very strong alliance in 1935, but this was enough to intensify
isolation and Soviet foreign policy changed course with the appointment of Molotov. This was to
increase security in the face of the rise of Hitler. Intervention in Spain, on the other hand, caused
unrest and fed into the Fascist propaganda machine of a Soviet threat.

It was only with the Munich Conference in 1938 that it became apparent that the Soviet Union
could not expect support from Britain and France and that appeasement showed that collective
security had failed. The aim was to increase security against a rapidly rearming Germany with
stated aims of colonising Russian territory, and better relations with the democracies proved
impossible so a volte face in terms of the Nazi Soviet pact was made as a new policy was required.

This led to the signing of the Nazi-Soviet Pact in 1939. Good relations between Germany and the
Soviet Union continued until 1934. It was Hitler rather than Stalin who departed from this stance.
There was continued contact between the Soviet Union and Germany and negotiations between the
nations continued between 1933 and 1937.

Molotov was an advocate of improved relations with Germany rather than collective security. Stalin
kg
had no clear preference, was flexible and was prepared to reach whichever agreement was most
beneficial to the Soviet Union. An agreement with Germany would allow the Soviet Union to carry
out an aggressive foreign policy by expanding territory and sphere of influence into Poland and the
Baltic States. So, a clear aim was to regain the land and power lost as a result of the Treaty of Brest
Litovsk and the hostility of the victors of World War I to the new Soviet state.

The aim of bringing about worldwide ideological change remained more a pious hope than a guide to
actual policy, pursued by covert underground activities rather than a clear and open foreign policy
and specifically rejected in 1939 when exiled German communists were handed over to Hitler and a
pact linking the Communist state to its most bitter ideological foe for reasons of realpolitik was
adopted.

However, by 1939, these policies had had limited success. The Communists in Spain backed by
Stalin had only served to divide the Spanish Republicans and helped to bring about Franco’s victory.
Communist support for Blum weakened the resolve of the Third Republic to stand against Hitler with
a Russian alliance. In China, the Communists were reduced to hiding out in a remote northern area
against heavy opposition from the Nationalists. Membership of the League yielded little and Stalin
was excluded from the Munich conference, and his support was not sought by either France or the
Czechs.

In summary, it could be argued that aims changed, or it could be argued that security against
western attack after the trauma of allied intervention and the overturning of the Paris settlement
remained constant.

17
 How effective were Stalin’s economic policies?
STALIN’S AIMS FOR THE ECONOMY

● Economic problems facing Russia in 1929

● Stalin’s economic policy and how far it addresses the above

Motivation behind Stalin’s economic policies

Ideology played a role

From a strictly socialist perspective, Collectivisation was certainly ‘Marxist’ in its approach, with
state ownership of land being the dominant feature and then state direction of agriculture following,
whereby it needed to be made to serve the interests of the state and the people as a whole, and not
be used as a means of making a profit by a few. Russia had the potential to not only feed its own
people well but had the ability to produce a surplus to earn valuable foreign currency and allies.

Industry was state owned and directed by the state; in that respect it was ideologically driven.
There was good sense seen in that there were serious threats from the ‘West’, as the Civil War had
shown, and after 1933 there was a real danger obviously coming from Germany, which had to be
counteracted. Russia needed to develop its heavy industry in order to survive.

State ownership could also mean that economies of scale could be introduced, land utilised more
effectively, and mechanisation could improve productivity. Old fashioned methods could go and the
standard of living of all, both in rural and urban areas, could rise. There would be enough food to
kg
feed a growing urban population which could expand industry. Manpower would be freed from the
countryside to work in factories. There was ample theory to justify collectivisation. The only ones
who might oppose on theoretical grounds were those whose investment and property would be lost,
and those who felt that there was no evidence anywhere that state control of agriculture might
actually work.

How much good sense there was there is arguable. The NEP had started to raise agricultural output
to pre-1914 levels and the actual process of collectivisation led to famine, mass murder, the
slaughter of livestock and meant that Russia was not able to feed itself. It also became exposed to
the lunacies of Lysenko: hardly good sense in terms of outcome, whatever the intention was.

Stalin’s desire to increase his power

The thinking behind so many of Stalin’s policies, both before and after 1929, can easily be attributed
to personal ambition and the destruction of both actual and imagined opponents. They were so
often vehicles for his ambition and paranoia. The elimination of the Kulaks would mean the ending
of both an actual and a potential threat to his power. It could lead to an increase in living standards
for all which could only reflect well on his leadership and enable him to embark on rapid
industrialisation which could also increase his authority and status.

The obsessive focus on the Kulak ‘enemy’ and the obvious and appalling damage done by
collectivisation (he was well aware of the terrible impact the policy had on the Ukraine, for example)
suggest that personal factors were predominant. Good advice from loyal supporters all indicated
that slowing the pace would achieve his objectives – this was ignored.

18
 How effective were Stalin’s economic policies?
THE FIVE-YEAR PLANS

Development of industry in the USSR (Magnitogorsk, for example)

● What were the aims of each Plan?
● How far were the plans a success?
● What were the limitations of the Plans?

What were the five-year Plans?

There were three Five-Year Plans. The first two are seen as the most important, but the Third needs
to be considered as well. They are:

● The First Five-Year Plan (1928-1932). The focus was to be on heavy industry and agriculture.
● The Second Five-Year Plan (1933-1938). The focus again was on heavy industry, but there
was also emphasis on communications of all types, and rail in particular, as well as oil and
electrification.
● The Third Five-Year Plan (1938-41). This was curtailed by war, but the focus was on
armaments.

Reasons for the introduction of the five-year Plans

Fear of invasion played a part in the change of direction. Prior to 1928, the Soviet Union had
kg
followed a policy of War Communism to win the Civil War and then took a step backwards and
adopted the New Economic Policy, which allowed a mixed economy and was a temporary measure.

By1927 the New Economic Policy was failing, and Stalin had eliminated all leadership rivals apart
from Bukharin. There were political and economic motives for the change of economic policy. Stalin
had the need to assert his control over the Communist Party and dictate policy, and the need to
eliminate Bukharin.

The first five-year plan was to build Stalin’s ideological desire of ‘socialism in one country’. This
meant building up the industrial base of the country and its military might and in addition move
towards real socialism and away from the mixed economy that the New Economic Policy had
allowed.

First five-year Plan

The first five-year plan introduced Collectivisation to make sure that agriculture supported industry
and any peasant resistance was overcome. This policy was largely disastrous. On the Industrial side
there was a focus on heavy industry, including iron, steel, and coal to build up the economic
strength of the country. The first five-year plan also allowed class war to be unleashed, the
liquidation of the Kulaks to begin and the removal of the NEPMEN.

Second five-year Plan

The second five-year plan continued to focus on heavy industry, but it also included some efforts to
develop consumer industries. This led to some improvements in the availability of consumer goods,
but shortages and rationing of basic goods continued to be a problem.

19
Third five-year Plan

The third five-year plan included some efforts to develop consumer industries, but the outbreak of
World War II in 1939 halted its development. The focus was on armament and preparing for war.

Was the five-year Plans a failure?

YES, it was a failure

● There was a high human cost, as well as the dependence on slave labour. The system of
quotas and punishments was unsustainable, and it was funded largely by borrowing once
grain prices fell. Catastrophe in the countryside – famine and decline of food production.
Quantity always seemed to be much more important than quality.

● There were major failings in central planning, especially with tractors, with chronic fuel
shortages, spare part shortages as well as use by untrained workers. The disaster caused by
Lysenko is also another factor.

● Real wages fell. Living and working conditions were appalling, leading to Russia having a
much lower life expectancy than many other countries with modern economies.

NO, it was a success

● There was a rapid transformation from a peasant economy to a modern one in a remarkably
kg short period of time, and there was consistent, and a very high, rate of growth, throughout
the entire period. Grain exports grew so Russia could afford to buy, for example, a Ford motor
plant. It funded improved health and education for all.

● Whole new industries were created, as well as industrial centres like Magnitogorsk, and the
industrial economy was able to absorb the surplus labour from the countryside. The economy
grew to enable it to build thermonuclear weapons and put the first man into space within a
very short period of time.

● The five-year Plans met Stalin's objectives of state control, imposing a command economy,
attaining power for himself, and developing an industrial economy capable of standing up to
the Nazis. State ownership of land grew – c.95% by 1939. Expertise was developed to enable
state control of the whole economy, which was essential for defeating the Nazis.

20
 How effective were Stalin’s economic policies?
REASONS FOR, AND IMPACTS OF, COLLECTIVISATION

Reasons for the introduction of collectivisation

● What were Stalin’s political, economic and social aims for this policy?
● What was the process of collectivisation?
● What were the immediate consequences of collectivisation?
● What were the longer-term impacts of this policy?

Collectivisation at a glance:

War Communism had not worked, and the NEP arguably was little more than a short-term solution.
It might have led to a return to 1913 levels, but that was insufficient for any industrial growth, and
it was not an efficient method of farming. Russian agriculture had barely moved on in methods from
mediaeval times; the wooden plough was the order of the day.

Collectivization resumed the revolution after the compromise of NEP and was linked to a drive for
industrialization and to provide capital for broader economic growth. It was intended to solve
problems in grain distributions and also create surpluses for export. Begun on a large scale in 1928
and part of a general five-year plan it intensified after 1929 and by the mid-1930s 90% of land was
in some form of collective, whether a Kolkhoz or a more centrally directed Sovkhoz.

Stalin felt that the Kulak was a threat to socialism and that the state was losing control of the
countryside with the growth of peasant unions and reaction in the countryside. Collectivisation gave
kg
the ability of the state to direct and own agriculture and manage it so it could benefit all and not
just a few rich ‘kulaks’ made some sense. The ‘Kulaks’ were thus eliminated, although how much of
an actual threat they presented is arguable.

Key question: Were the gains worth the cost?

YES, collectivisation was successful

Collectivisation, potentially, could have brought many benefits to the Russian people. The USSR had
become much more of a ‘Marxist’ state, at least in theory. The State did dominate and Stalin’s
personal power certainly increased.

Russia had highly fertile land and had a lot of hungry people. It needed the foreign currency that its
grain could provide. A system that encouraged the economies of scale made a lot of sense. State
grain collection rose from 10.8 metric tonnes in 1928-29 to 22.8 metric tonnes in 1931-32. The vast
bulk of agricultural land in Russia was fully collectivised. By 1931/2 virtually all the land utilised for
cereal crops was collectivised and could now be used less wastefully.

There was now a surplus of wheat etc. to export, which enabled the purchase of foreign
engineering. This allowed for a better scope for education in agricultural methods and techniques.
Scientific methods could now be utilised. Mechanisation was possible and with it a greatly increased
level of output and productivity elsewhere. Farming for the benefit of all by way of mechanisation,
as opposed to just making a personal profit, was now possible. The ability to provide a healthy diet
for all and support a growing urban population as well as end rural poverty made collectivisation a
sensible decision.

The serious underemployment and unemployment in rural areas was ended and there was now
much more labour available for industrial production. As such, there was substantial industrial

21
growth which had a considerable effect on the Soviet people in terms of lifestyle, urban growth,
opportunities, and some might argue ultimate survival in the Second World War.

NO, collectivisation was a failure

Through collectivisation, prices might stabilise and get controlled, productivity should increase and
much needed labour would be released for industrial development. After all, the ‘mir’ had always
had a ‘communal’ basis. By 1941, 98% of land had been collectivised, but the most productive parts
of the countryside were the peasants’ private plots. The idea might have been sound, in theory, but
the practice was disastrous.

The political results of the struggle for Collectivisation might be seen in the greater repression and
the Purges. It was so badly managed that it made the system more dependent on terror. In this
life-or-death economic struggle, there had to be no dissent and utter control by the party which
meant a terror and repression of hitherto unknown ferocity and scale. It alienated support and was
to prove one of the many factors which led to the downfall of the USSR. Political and ideological
considerations now dominated to the detriment of agricultural considerations.

The loss of millions of agricultural workers and their experience.

One of the largest man-made famines of all time, the even more terrifying implications for outer
regions such as Kazakhstan are only just becoming known and ‘0’s are being added to the total
death toll. Food production went down resulting in the famine which killed millions.

Some of the best agricultural land in the USSR was destroyed by incompetent management. Private
kg
plots produced as much as or more than the much greater state-owned units in some regions. Black
markets flourished. A huge amount of money and manpower had to be used to police
collectivisation.

As Kulaks were a small minority in fact the definition was widened to include better off peasants so
successful farmers were punished, expropriated, and suffered land seizures, and more than 20 000
deaths by execution as class warfare accompanied enforced collectivisation. The reaction of
peasants to requisitioning and then collectivization brought about a virtual war in many areas,
causing hardships in both rural areas and in urban areas struggling with the disruptive effects of
mass industrialization and there were widespread food shortages.

The disruption caused by such a rapid and often inefficient transition reduced production and
productivity. Probably productivity did not recover until 1940. The USSR did not achieve pre-1913
levels of food output by 1941. A large potential labour force was decimated or used inefficiently as
slave labour. The only reason why productivity did not decline even more comprehensively in the
longer term was because of the good harvests of 1928-30 because of very good weather conditions.

The loss of huge amounts of livestock.

Livestock farming was hit by the peasants slaughtering animals rather than surrendering them and
the ‘fundamental idiocy’ of it took decades to recover from. Richer farming areas such as the Volga
suffered most. But the principal burden of the policy fell on Ukraine, Northern Caucasus, Volga
Region and Kazakhstan, the South Urals, and West Siberia. Later experiments like Khrushchev’s
virgin lands policy showed that political control, especially when it has an ideological underpinning,
can be disastrous.

The loss of a substantial amount of skills.

The new collectives often did not have the necessary equipment, expertise, or transport. The policy
was defended as necessary to create an industrial base that would prevent the USSR becoming an

22
overwhelmingly peasant country unable to defend itself.

The mechanisation programme was a disaster for years as few knew how to use tractors effectively
and there was often a critical shortage of fuel and spares. The vast majority of those who ran
collectivisation in the localities as well as those involved in the central planning lacked relevant
knowledge and experience and caused chaos. Incompetent use of the wrong type of fertiliser and
pesticides could now happen on a wide scale.

kg
23
 How effective were Stalin’s economic policies?
REASONS FOR, AND IMPACTS OF, INDUSTRIALISATION

Impact of industrialisation
● The ways in which the USSR changed as a result of industrialisation

Effectiveness of industrialisation

Successful / effective policy

The goal to increase self-sufficiency was linked to the search for security.

There was a huge expansion of economic output. Coal production increased from 60 million tons in
1930 to 150 million in 1940. Steel production went up from 5 million tons to 18 million tons in the
same period. Oil production also increased significantly. Between 1928 and 1932 production of oil,
coal and pig iron doubled. The massive increase took place in the middle to late 1930s. Output was
massively up by 1941. Production of electricity rose by over 400% in the decade. These were
genuine achievements of a modern economy.

Russia modernised and there were huge gains in the sense that whole new industries were created
and massive employment opportunities were created. It did generate income and enable massive
investment in infrastructure. Electrification was a real asset for all as were the changes in rail and
roads. There were some successes in the late 1920s such as the Dnieper Hydro project and the
Stalingrad Tractor Factory.
kg
Stalin wanted to increase the Soviet Union’s military strength to provide security for the world’s only
socialist state, surrounded by enemies. Stalin talked of the Soviet Union being fifty to a hundred
years behind the advanced western countries and failure to catch up would lead the Soviet Union to
being ‘crushed’. Industrialisation was successful in transforming heavy industry and would ultimately
lay the foundations for the survival of the Soviet Union in World War II – by then it was a major
industrial power by then and in a position to take on and withstand the Wehrmacht (Nazi armed
forces) attack due to the five-year Plans.

There were some improvements, in areas such as education and basic health care, and also there
was a degree of social mobility as well as increasing opportunity for women in areas such as
education and medicine.

Failure / ineffective policy

From the planning point of view there was limited success. Evidence from both the 1920s and the
1930s showed the many flaws in a purely command economy, particularly one which was
commanded by men with primarily social and political objectives and little knowledge of either
economics or industry.

Methods used were inefficient

The methods used were often highly inefficient, and the lack of incentives and consumer goods
together with an appalling housing situation could be seen to be lacking in sense. The economy had
a reliance on foreign technology and there was a lot of wastages.

The economy was badly imbalanced. Modern techniques were not always employed, and resources
were squandered, for example on projects such as the White Sea Canal. Another example is the

24
building of the massive Gorki automobile plant, which ignored the fact that it might need an energy
supply. The fact that no one had thought about the need for spares for tractors was a typical flaw in
the policy, for example.

Impact on living standards

The obvious failure of the industrialisation programme was in its impact on living standards. This
was the particularly the case during the first Five Year Plan, when consumer goods were very
limited, and food was rationed. Arguably this neglect of consumer goods did not benefit the people
and in the vast majority of cases living and working conditions were appalling and unhygienic. A
massive housing shortage, together with huge overcrowding, was a permanent feature of the
regime. Real wages dropped and consumer goods were ignored and neglected throughout in the
dash for primary industrial growth.

The utilisation of women in the workforce made economic sense, but killing or sending millions to
the camps did not. At the same time, some attention might be paid to improved opportunities for
women, although they are usually less well-paid, likely to be promoted and often juggled work with
family responsibilities.

The way in which quantity was seen as more important than quality and the often-strange priorities
could limit the benefits. Between 1928 and 1932 production of oil, coal and pig iron doubled, while
the quality of the latter was poor and often the wrong type of coal was sent to industrial users.

Stalin wanted to establish his own authority/prestige

kg
Stalin also aimed to move towards a more socialist and proletarian society, increasing the size and
influence of the urban working class. He also wanted to establish his own authority and personal
prestige. It can be argued that despite the huge increase in the size of the proletariat, the creation
of the so-called ‘quicksand society’ meaning the rapid turnover of workers, led to the introduction of
wage differentials, bonuses and other privileges, which limited to extent of equality to be expected
in such a society. The creation of a command economy would, alongside repression, enhance both
state, and Stalin’s own personal control. The successful economic transformation of the Soviet Union
allowed Stalin to position himself as an equal and worthy successor to Lenin.

25
 How far did society change because of Stalin’s regime?
IMPACT OF POLICIES TOWARDS WOMEN AND FAMILIES

Key developments in social policy and their impact on women and families, including:
● policies on marriage and childcare
● policies towards children and on education
● housing and welfare policies
● The Great Retreat.

Key question: How far did Stalin’s policies towards women offer them more freedom?

Policies offered women and families more benefits

The revolution had brought about a radical change in social attitudes and women were great
beneficiaries of this change. In employment, women had traditionally been found mainly in
agriculture, textiles, and services. Their position improved considerably under the Bolsheviks, and
even more so under Stalin’s rule. Women gained rights they had never had before and were to play
a major role in many aspects of Russian life, such as medicine.

Legal equality

Lenin had been anti-family, seeing it as a bourgeois construct and allowing easier divorces and
abortions. Divorce was legalised and women had the same rights as men in this respect. Abortion
was available on demand in the 1920s and contraception was not illegal (if usually unavailable).
kg
In 1926, a new Family Code consolidated earlier rights, and gave women in ‘common law’ marriages
the same rights as those in registered marriages. There was to be no automatic obedience to
husbands. Legal equality was retained under Stalin, and this was made clear in the 1936
Constitution. Women benefited from new welfare reforms introduced under Stalin – a free health
service, accident insurance at work and paid holidays for many workers. Women had the vote and
the same rights to employment and education as men.

Women in the workforce

Lenin had wanted to increase the number of women in the workforce, and between 1920 and 1930
the number had risen from c.500 000 to 1 million. Under Stalin, women became nearly 50% of the
workforce. Large numbers of women were employed in areas such as education and healthcare
(doctors as well as nurses), but also many became engineers and technicians as well.

Women were actively encouraged to play their part in the economic development of Soviet Russia.
By 1939, a third of all engineers and 79% of doctors were women. In 1928, the number of women
listed as ‘workers–employees’ was 2 795 000. By 1939, this had risen to just over 13 million. By
1933, women made up 33% of the industrial workforce, rising to 43% by 1940. Women were
increasingly required to support the industrialisation drive as such. 13 million women were
employed in the industrial workforce in 1940 compared to 3 million in 1928.

There were many women ‘hero-workers’ in the Stakhanovite movement, though in a smaller
proportion than men; by 1936, a quarter of all female trade unionists were classified as workers
who had exceeded their production targets.

Child support

The later 1930s also brought in child maintenance, bonuses and rewards for women who had more
than 6 children, and crèches became a requirement in most factories and collective farms. Maternity

26
leave and pay became a right as well. State nurseries and workplace crèches and canteens were
provided to enable mothers to work outside the home. The birth rate, which had been falling, did
rise from under 25 to 1000 in 1935 to almost 31 in 1940.

In addition, in order to encourage bigger families and so raise the birth rate, tax exemptions were
given to families with large numbers of children. During the Second World War, medals were
awarded to mothers with large families and unmarried people were taxed more heavily.

Educational reforms

Stalin needed a better educated and disciplined workforce to carry out his economic reforms. There
was state control of all aspects of education, which focused on the needs of the state being
predominant over everything, this was a return to traditional ideas following the liberalisation of the
1920’s.

Education was made free for all (including men and women) for ten years, with fees for education of
15-18 year olds, limiting the extent of egalitarianism somewhat. This was based around
indoctrination and vocational training with a core curriculum. Examinations, homework, textbooks
and rote learning were reintroduced, with a renewed emphasis on teachers’ authority. Increased
numbers of students attended school and literacy rates rose massively and were as high as 88% by
1940. Engineering training was also given an enormous boost and enjoyed a high status. Careers
were, at least in theory, open to talent and class distinctions gradually disappeared. Healthcare
improved for all, especially children.

Policies were disadvantageous towards women and families

kg
Stalin was much more conservative than Lenin in social matters, and the evidence suggests he was
personally quite vicious in his treatment of women. There was extensive control over the family and
there was a considerable change in attitudes from Lenin’s days over abortion, contraception, and
divorce.

His primary concern was to increase the workforce and its productivity. His concern was with
control, and he also needed a stable society with lots of children for the army and workforce.

‘Traditional family values’ - Family Code of 1936 and its effects

Under Stalin some of these reforms and benefits by Lenin were reduced or removed. Fear of war
was growing following Hitler’s rise to power in Germany in 1933, and Soviet population growth was
in decline. For these reasons, from 1935 Stalin decided on policies to promote ‘traditional’ family
values to increase the Soviet population.

Although most of the rights established by the 1926 Code remained intact, a new family law was
introduced in 1936. This made divorce more difficult, with a rising fee for each divorce, and
restricted abortion to those required for medical reasons only. As such, abortion was effectively
made illegal in the 1930s and divorce became much more difficult, and child support payments were
increased. Both divorce and marriage rates declined, and many women continued to be deserted as
they had in the 1920s.

From 1944, only registered marriages were recognised, children born outside marriage were no
longer allowed to inherit property from their father, and divorce became even more difficult and
expensive.

Inequality for women

However, access to the higher administrative posts was unequal and the patriarchal tradition was

27
still widespread in society, leaving many working women with the bulk of household chores. Women
invariably had lower pay and never attained the higher ranks of any profession.

Women also dominated in professions such as medicine and teaching. This meant that women often
carried the double burden of bringing up families and of contributing to the modernisation of the
Soviet Union. Women’s role in the party was diminished by the lapsing of the Zhenotdel in 1930 and
creation of the Housewives’ Movement in 1936.

Effect of purges

Stalin was fully prepared to kill women during the purges and also to use them as a means of
ensuring the reliability of their husbands. Beria was known to torture women in front of their
husbands to secure the latter’s ‘confessions’. Over 100 000 women were ‘purged’ and unknown
numbers died in the camps.

Famines

The lack of investment in consumer products and housing inevitably hit women exceptionally hard.
The artificially created famines in areas such as the Ukraine and Kazakhstan, for example, killed
more women than men. The provision of sufficient and adequate housing continued to be a problem
as well.

Summary

Women also came very much under state control. In theory they had many rights, but it was clear
kg
that they were just as much a part of the workforce as men. Similarly, the family still remained a
central social unit, and the role of women ultimately changed little.

28
 How far did society change because of Stalin’s regime?
POLICIES TOWARDS NON-RUSSIAN NATIONALITIES

Diversity in the USSR under Stalin

● Stalin’s policies towards non-Russian nationalities

Stalin’s policies towards non-Russian nationalities

In Muslim regions, where feudal forms of social structure remained, women were a subject class.
The communists raised the minimum age of marriage in these regions to 16 (it was 18 in the
European parts of Soviet Russia), and polygamy and bride money were banned. They also organised
mass political activity, known as the khudzhum, to mobilise women to oppose traditional practices.

kg
29
 How far did society change because of Stalin’s regime?
IMPACT OF ECONOMIC CHANGES ON WORKERS

● Positive impacts on living standards and working conditions.

● Negative impacts on living standards and working conditions.
● Did life get better for the workers?

The two principal ‘economic’ policies to be considered are the collectivisation and industrialisation
policies of the late 1920s and 1930s. The two could be considered separately but there is no issue if
they are treated together. The social impact of both was vast.

Key question: To what extent did the workers benefit from Stalin's policies?

Positive impacts on living standards and working conditions

Russia went from a largely rural to an urban population in a decade, a process that in many other
countries had taken a century. Class structures in both town and country changed radically with the
emergence of a new ruling elite. This change from depressed rural areas work in industrial areas of
the service industries presented better opportunities and conditions for some.

Education improved and illiteracy rates dropped rapidly. Access to radio and the cinema also were
by-products of industrialisation and electrification. Infrastructure such as mass housing and
transport facilities, free universal primary education (1930) and more equality between men and
kg
women with improved welfare did mean better conditions. The state provided key industrial workers
with housing, welfare, education and training and cheap food.

While the family structure still remained in theory, the overall status of women changed little except
that they were expected to work for the State as well as run a home and family.

Negative impacts on living standards and working conditions

The traditional societies and communes in the countryside and in places like Kazakhstan were
systematically destroyed, while the purges killed millions and the infamous ‘dekulakisation’ process
destroyed the traditional elite and whole communities. A way of life which had existed for centuries
was destroyed in less than a decade, a rural society was largely destroyed and an urban one created
in a decade. This had a profound social impact.

Over 5 million died in ‘Russia’ alone, and what happened in more distant (from Moscow) territories
such as Kazakhstan is still in many cases just guesswork. The Ukraine underwent what modern
writers call genocide. In some areas, a strongly matriarchal society emerged as a result of the killing
of men, while in others there were huge changes in society as peoples were simply dumped
thousands of kilometres from their homes. These mass deportations changed social structures in
both the areas which lost populations and those that gained them.

The vast economic upheaval in both urban and rural areas led to inevitable social change. Similarly,
the vast increase in mobility and state control of labour meant men and women had to go and work
where ordered. Unemployment was a crime and there was total direction of all aspects of life, and
the influence of the Church was virtually eliminated and was destroyed. The standard of living of
most Russians deteriorated, and the old Tsarist policy of Russification was also extended with
remarkable brutality to all parts of the USSR.

30
As millions of rural workers moved to industries there was adjustment to new conditions. Mass
urbanisation created new communities and slave labour and the abolition of trade unions had a
highly damaging effect on attitudes to individualism. Urbanisation raised issues over housing and
health. Factories were built but often not the housing for their workers. The disruption of food
supplies by Collectivisation meant shortages. Government stores were often bare, and workers
depended often on the black market. Much depended on individual factories and the nature of the
workforce. The rapid changes of this initial period produced considerable strains for workers and
economic conditions in terms of wages, consumption and working conditions probably did not see an
improvement from the days of NEP.

The workforce also included prisoner labour and foreign labour and a change from working in small
units to much larger units or on public works projects. For many, work was long and dangerous. As
the pace of industrialisation proceeded a 6-day week in which days were numbered so that factories
and sites worked continuously was the norm. Ambitious targets put pressure on managers and
workforces. The introduction of internal passports and the loss of a free labour market meant
compulsion and a high level of discipline. Imprisonment and even death for ‘sabotage’ and the
threat of the gulags had to be balanced against an improvement in wages and consumption from
1935 when Stalin announced, ‘Life is joyful’.

Consumption did increase by 20% from the 1929 level by 1938 but was at a lower level than in
1913. Output however rose 50% 1913-1940 suggesting that progress was achieved by economic
exploitation of the workforce.
kg
31
 How far did society change because of Stalin’s regime?
IMPACT OF PROPAGANDA AND THE PERSONALITY CULT

Propaganda and the personality cult, usage and impact.

● Examples of propaganda
● Consideration of the different ways in which Stalin was portrayed, and methods by which the cult of
personality was developed
● Reasons for the development of the cult of personality.
● Impact of propaganda and the personality cult on the Soviet Union.

Key question: What was the importance of the personality cult to the Soviet Union?

EXAMPLES OF PROPAGANDA

From the start the party had understood the importance of using a variety of methods to convey its
message to gain and retain support. With mass illiteracy in many areas, many forms of propaganda
were deployed. Images often connected the party with historic Russian images and traditions. Stalin
used extensive propaganda throughout his period in office to buttress (strengthen) his own power
and to create a Soviet Society that he wanted.

The media (e.g., Pravda, Izvestiya, Red Sport), speeches, radio announcements, and military
parades, and all forms of communication were tightly controlled and only dictated messages could
go out on them. Social controls were rigid, and a peculiar conservatism was imposed on Russian life
and all aspects of art and culture were managed by the state. Russian History was also completely
kg
re-written.

Control of all aspects of the arts and culture was crucial via Glavlit and the development of Socialist
Realism. Literature, art, architecture, and music all had to represent the Soviet Union as Stalin
wished, and cultural activities had to serve the state’s ends. The state decided what people could
read, publish, and listen to. There were even controls on permitted official nursery rhymes which
had to be told to children and not the traditional ones.

The arts were deployed as instruments of persuasion – not just the visual arts which employed
socialist realism and traditional formats very different from the artistic ethos of the immediate
post-revolutionary period.

Music celebrated Russian traditions and the diversity of the USSR, portraying some key themes –
even factories and railways or forest shames. Prokofiev returned to Russia and produced an ode to
Stalin. Other composers were equally or even more sycophantic and obliging. Even Shostakovich
withdrew his Avant guard 4th Symphony to produce work more likely to inspire the ordinary people
to support the march to socialism. Film was a potent means of persuasion showing Stalin’s heroic
past and leadership strengths. Poetry and even architecture were employed to spread the message.

Propaganda was also used to disgrace rivals, for example, airbrushing Trotsky out of history or the
Show Trials of the 1930s, as these were stated to portray a predetermined outcome. Certain
projects were also undertaken to show the strength of the Soviet Union, for example, the building of
the Moscow Metro. Attacks on the Orthodox Church also sought to portray the church as the enemy
of the people, except during World War Two when it was asked to preach for war and mobilise the
people. During the war, Stalin was shown as a great military leader and even shown as liberating
Berlin, albeit he was in Moscow.

32
CONSIDERATION OF THE DIFFERENT WAYS IN WHICH STALIN WAS PORTRAYED, AND
METHODS BY WHICH THE CULT OF PERSONALITY WAS DEVELOPED

Stalin’s use of terror and extensive propaganda – particularly the development of the cult of
personality and his claim to be the ‘heir’ of Lenin, is a factor - portraying Stalin as a benign father of
the nation, family man, military leader as needed. The cult of personality was very deeply
embedded, and it lasted. The almost religious focus on Stalin as leader and guide towards ‘socialism
in one country’ was reinforced by constant use of symbolism and its hold over Soviet society was
very strong.

Stalin also wanted to sell his policies, so posters and art were mobilised to support Collectivisation
and the Five-Year Plans and heroes created such as Alexis Stakhanov and the Stakhanovite
movement to urge workers to work ever harder for Socialism in One Country. Once Stalin introduced
The Great Retreat as a policy, he began to use propaganda to encourage family values and the value
of children. The Komsomol was created to indoctrinate the young and the May Day parades in Red
Square were a symbol of all the things that the Soviet Union valued, with young, women, workers,
farmers, and military power on display. Propaganda could also be used to manufacture statistics as
to how successful Collectivisation and the Five-Year Plans were.

Propaganda was also employed widely to push forward huge social and economic change with
collectivisation and industrialisation. It showed people overcoming enemies and engaging in heroic
struggles. Industrialisation especially was portrayed as a massive communal undertaking similar to
a war.
kg
THE REASONS FOR THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE PERSONALITY CULT

There was a lack of any tradition of a ‘loyal’ opposition and of any apparent alternative, and it was
made clear that Marxist-Leninism was both inevitable in Russia and that Stalin was the right person
to implement it together with generally greater social mobility. His control over the Party was
profound and there was a strong tradition of authoritarian control of the country by a single
individual. The idea of legitimate opposition was alien to Russia. His own ability to identify possible
opposition and likely acolytes was also exceptional and helped to facilitate his control. The way in
which he eliminated all opposition and potential opposition, demonstrating the sheer skill and
ruthlessness of Stalin is also notable.

The portrayal of Stalin as the leader above the whole fray enabled him to avoid blame for his own
catastrophic errors, ranging from collectivisation, the massacre of most of his best military leaders
to the refusal to heed the warnings of Hitler’s invasion.

There was also genuine enthusiasm for many of his communist policies – Collectivisation was fully
endorsed at central party levels and imposed by large numbers of youthful enthusiasts. Similarly,
the Five-Year Plans and industrialisation were quite popular and well supported and there was also
widespread support for the whole idea of equality of opportunity and many of the changes which
helped women. Furthermore, Stalin’s anti-Nazi ideas and aggressive nationalism were popular and
in accord with deep rooted patriotic ideas while the improvements to health provision and education
were equally popular. There was broad support for the actual ideas, if not in the methods of
implementation.

33
IMPACT OF THE PERSONALITY CULT AND PROPAGANDA ON THE SOVIET UNION

Undoubtedly, the Soviet Union was a totalitarian single party state and propaganda was there to
buttress the regime, but people were still aware of the hardships they endured including the terror
and lack of freedom. As it was a closed society, people became accustomed to the nature and ideas
of Stalinist Russia, but did they really change their mindset? People had to conform in public to
survive and thrive in this society and there were no open revolts against Stalin’s regime. Censorship
used widely to silence or discredit political opponents was used in education to control what the next
generation were taught. Many were genuinely inspired by industrial growth and even in the camps
many believed in the wisdom of Stalin’s leadership due to the personality cult and propaganda.

Propaganda must be seen in the context of fear as an explanation of control and the massive
opposition in the countryside to requisition and collectivization reveals its limitations. Propaganda
usually reinforces what is already accepted and many did see that urban and industrial growth and
protection against overseas enemies was necessary. However, when it came to the confiscation of
lands and the destruction of the richer peasants and the man-made famine, then propaganda was
less important in taking policies forward than force and the use of a very developed repressive
system which culminated in the great terror and the creation of a formidable network of gulags.

There was also a substantial destruction of elites through the purges. New ones emerged and men
rose from the peasantry to the Politburo. However, one autocracy just replaced another. The
Nomenklatura replaced the aristocracy, with their access to the ‘Court’ and a privileged existence.
kg
34
 9489 History
(Cambridge A2 Level)
European option

Stalin’s Russia 1924-41

kg
Past paper compilation by kg

1
 Stalin’s Russia, 1924-41

Total: 51 questions (Specimen 2015/2021, June 2015 - June 2023). 10 questions

from 9389 removed to fit the 9489 syllabus.

1 Why did Stalin gain power from 1924?

LENIN’S LEGACY AND PROBLEMS OF LEADERSHIP

1. How far was Lenin responsible for Stalin’s rise to power? - May 2016 / 41

2. ‘Stalin came to power because Lenin failed to plan for his succession.’
Assess this view. - 9489 May 2022 / 43

STALIN’S RELATIONS WITH TROTSKY AND OTHER SOVIET LEADERS

1. To what extent was Trotsky responsible for Stalin’s rise to power? - May
2019 / 41
kg
2. Analyse the reasons why Trotsky was unable to win the struggle for power
with Stalin. - October 2019 / 43

3. ‘He was underestimated by his opponents.’ How far does this explain
Stalin’s rise to power? - October 2020 / 42

STALIN’S POSITION IN THE PARTY

STALIN’S CONTROL AND MANIPULATION WITHIN THE PARTY

1. To what extent does Stalin’s use of his position as General Secretary of the
Communist Party explain his rise to power by 1928? - May 2015 / 42

2. ‘Brilliant opportunism rather than careful planning.’ To what extent does

this explain Stalin’s rise to power? - October 2016 / 42

3. How far was Stalin’s rise to power in Russia dependent on his skillful
planning? - October 2018 / 41

4. Evaluate the reasons why Stalin was able to establish his dictatorship in
Russia - Specimen 2021 9489 / Specimen 2015 9389

5. Analyse the reasons for Stalin gaining power by 1929. - 9489 October 2021 /
41

6. Analyse the view that Stalin’s political skill was the main reason for his rise
to power by 1929. - 9489 May 2023 / 42

2
7. Analyse the reasons why Stalin had gained control of the Communist Party
in the USSR by 1928. - 9489 March 2022 / 42

2 How was the USSR governed under Stalin?

STALIN’S AIMS IN GOVERNMENT AND ADMINISTRATION

1. Assess the reasons why Stalin was able to accumulate so much power - May
2017 / 42

‘BUILDING SOCIALISM IN ONE COUNTRY’

1. How far had Stalin achieved his aim of ‘socialism in one country’ by 1941? -
October 2021 / 42

2. Assess the extent to which Stalin was successful in ‘building socialism in

one country’. - 9489 May 2021 / 41

CAUSES AND IMPACT OF THE GREAT TERROR AND

kg USE OF PURGES AND SHOW TRIALS

1. ‘The main reason why Stalin remained in power was because of his use of
terror.’ Discuss this view. - October 2015 / 42

2. Evaluate Stalin’s reasons for embarking on the Great Purge. - May 2016 / 42

3. ‘The main reason for the purges was to remove Stalin’s rivals for power.’
How far do you agree? - October 2018 / 43

4. ‘The purges were the most important reason why Stalin retained power.’
How far do you agree? - May 2021 / 41

5. Evaluate the causes of the Great Terror. - 9489 March 2021 / 42

6. ‘Stalin’s fear of opposition was the main cause of the Great Terror.’ Discuss
this view. - 9489 October 2022 / 43

AIMS AND IMPACT OF FOREIGN POLICY

1. Assess the aims of Soviet foreign policy in the period 1924-41. - 9489 May
2022 / 42

2. ‘Stalin’s main aim in foreign policy was to defend the Soviet Union from
attack.’ Discuss. - 9489 May 2023 / 41

3
 3 How effective were Stalin’s economic policies?

STALIN’S AIMS FOR THE ECONOMY

1. ‘Motivated more by ideology than by practical considerations.’ Discuss this

view of Stalin’s economic policies. - May 2018 / 42

2. To what extent was a desire to increase his own power the reason for
Stalin’s collectivisation policy? - May 2019 / 43

THE FIVE-YEAR PLANS

1. ‘Stalin’s Five-Year Plans failed.’ How far do you agree? - May 2020 / 42

2. Assess the reasons for the introduction of Stalin’s first five-year plan in
1928. - 9489 May 2021 / 42

REASONS FOR, AND IMPACTS OF, COLLECTIVISATION

1. ‘Collectivisation was a disastrous policy for the USSR.’ How far do you
kg agree? - May 2015 / 43

2. To what extent had collectivisation achieved its aims by 1941? - October 2019
/ 41

3. To what extent did collectivisation improve Russian agriculture? - May 2020 /

41

4. Assess the impact of collectivisation on the people of the Soviet Union. -

9489 May 2022 / 41

5. Access the extent to which Stalin’s policy of agricultural collectivisation

achieved its aims. - 9489 May 2023 / 44

REASONS FOR, AND IMPACTS OF, INDUSTRIALISATION

1. Assess the effectiveness of Stalin’s industrialisation policy. - October 2015 /

41

2. ‘Industrialisation benefitted both the Soviet state and the Soviet people.’
How far do you agree? - May 2017 / 43

3. Analyse the extent to which Stalin’s industrialisation policies were

successful. - 9489 March 2023 / 42

4
 Related past paper questions (OLD SYLLABUS 9389)

1. How successful were Stalin’s economic policies? - May 2017 / 41

2. How far did Stalin modernise the Soviet economy? - May 2018 / 41

3. ‘Russia gained little and lost much.’ Assess this view on the results of
Stalin’s economic policies. - October 2021 / 41

4 How far did society change because of Stalin’s regime?

IMPACT OF POLICIES TOWARDS WOMEN AND FAMILIES

1. How far did Stalin’s social policies benefit women? - October 2018 / 42

2. Assess the impact that the Soviet regime had on families. - 9489 October 2021
/ 42
kg
3. ‘Stalin’s policies towards women and children improved their lives.’ Discuss.
- 9489 May 2023 / 43

POLICIES TOWARDS NON-RUSSIAN NATIONALITIES - N/A

IMPACT OF ECONOMIC CHANGES ON WORKERS

1. Assess the social impact of Stalin’s economic policies. - October 2017 / 43

2. Assess how far the economic conditions of workers improved in the Soviet
Union in the period 1928-41. - 9489 October 2022 / 42

IMPACT OF PROPAGANDA AND THE PERSONALITY CULT

1. How far did Stalin’s control over the Soviet Union depend on propaganda? -
May 2020 / 43

2. To what extent was Stalin’s rule based on popular support? - May 2021 / 43

3. Assess the importance of the cult of personality to Stalin’s control of Russia.

- October 2021 / 43

4. Assess the extent to which the use of propaganda by Stalin’s regime

changed Soviet society. - 9489 May 2021 / 43

5. Evaluate the importance of propaganda in the Soviet Union in the period

1928-41. - 9489 October 2022 / 41

5
 Related past paper questions (OLD SYLLABUS 9389)

1. Assess the social impact of Stalin’s rule - October 2016 / 41

2. How far did a social revolution take place under Stalin? - October 2020 / 43

3. ‘The years 1929 to 1941 saw limited social change in Russia.’ How far do
you agree? - May 2021 / 42

kg
6