21 01 31 Long - Intl - Analysis - of - Concurrent - Delay - On - Construction - Claims

Analysis of
Concurrent Delay on
Construction Claims
Richard J. Long, P.E., P.Eng.
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Analysis of Concurrent Delay on Construction Claims
Table of Contents
1. INTRODUCTION ............................................................................................................................... 1
2. CONCURRENT DELAY DEFINED ................................................................................................ 2
3. TREATMENT OF CONCURRENT DELAY IN VARIOUS LEGAL
JURISDICTIONS ............................................................................................................................... 5
3.1 THE U.S. BENCHMARK ............................................................................................................................ 5
3.2 ENGLISH LAW ......................................................................................................................................... 13
3.3 SCOTS LAW .............................................................................................................................................. 15
3.4 CANADIAN LAW ...................................................................................................................................... 15
3.5 HONG KONG LAW ................................................................................................................................... 15
3.6 AUSTRALIAN LAW ................................................................................................................................. 15
3.7 OTHER SOURCES OF GUIDANCE REGARDING THE COST IMPLICATIONS OF
CONCURRENT DELAY ........................................................................................................................... 16
3.8 CONCLUSION .......................................................................................................................................... 17
4. ALLOCATION OF DELAY RESPONSIBILITY WHEN CONCURRENT
DELAY OCCURS ............................................................................................................................. 18
4.1 AACE INTERNATIONAL’S RECOMMENDED PRACTICE NO. 29R-03 FORENSIC
SCHEDULE ANALYSIS........................................................................................................................... 20
4.2 THE SOCIETY OF CONSTRUCTION LAW DELAY AND DISRUPTION PROTOCOL ..................... 23
5. FACTORS THAT INFLUENCE THE IDENTIFICATION AND
QUANTIFICATION OF CONCURRENT DELAY ...................................................................... 25
5.1 FUNCTIONAL OR LITERAL CONCURRENCY.................................................................................... 25
5.2 CAUSE OF DELAY VS. EFFECT OF DELAY ....................................................................................... 27
5.3 FREQUENCY, DURATION AND PLACEMENT OF ANALYSIS INTERVALS .................................. 30
5.4 ORDER OF INSERTION OR EXTRACTION OF DELAY EVENTS ..................................................... 32
5.5 HINDSIGHT VS. “BLIND-SIGHT” ........................................................................................................ 32
6. PACING VS. CONCURRENT DELAY ......................................................................................... 36
7. PRACTICAL GUIDELINES ........................................................................................................... 41
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Table of Contents
(continued)
List of Tables
Table 1 Concurrent Delay Scenarios and Net Effect ............................................................................ 21
Table 2 Concurrent Delay Combinations and Net Effect ..................................................................... 22
Table 3 Net Effect of Pacing Delays .................................................................................................... 39
List of Figures
Figure 1 Illustration of Concurrent Delays .............................................................................................. 3
Figure 2 Concurrent Delays Affecting Activities with Different Float Values ..................................... 20
Figure 3 Illustration of Functional Concurrent Delays .......................................................................... 26
Figure 4 Illustration of Literal Concurrent Delays ................................................................................ 27
Figure 5 Illustration of Delay-Cause Analysis....................................................................................... 28
Figure 6 Illustration of Delay-Effect Analysis....................................................................................... 29
Figure 7 Blind-Sight Method for Determining Remaining Durations of Activities in
Progress at each Schedule Update ........................................................................................... 33
Figure 8 Hindsight Method for Determining Remaining Durations of Activities in
Progress at each Schedule Update ........................................................................................... 34
Figure 9 Illustration of Direct Pacing .................................................................................................... 37
Figure 10 Illustration of Indirect Pacing .................................................................................................. 38
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1. INTRODUCTION
Concurrent delay is a vexed and complex technical and legal issue. The challenge is to equitably
determine: 1) the contractor’s entitlement to a time extension as a result of an owner-responsible
delay event (liability) and recovery of the contractor’s extended time-related costs (damages) that
result from such delays; and 2) the owner’s recovery of its actual delay or liquidated damages
when the contractor fails to complete its work by a contractual stipulated completion date as a
result of a contractor-responsible delay event that is concurrent to the owner-responsible
delay event.
Construction contracts often do not expressly provide direction as to the parties’ agreement when
there is concurrent delay. Most simply require the contractor to provide notice and specifics when
an owner-responsible delay event occurs. The owner then must determine the appropriate time
extension, if any, to which the contractor is entitled. However, the owner may be reluctant to grant
the contractor an extension of time if the contractor had caused its own delay during the same
period. The owner also must consider its position with respect to its actual or liquidated damages
as a result of the contractor-caused delay. A dispute may then occur as to whether the contractor is
entitled to any extension of time if he also caused delay in the same period.
Legal jurisdictions around the world differ as to the treatment of the liability and damages aspects
of concurrent delay. To help unravel the complexities of this issue, the following topics are
discussed in this article:
 Concurrent Delay Defined;

 Treatment of Concurrent Delay in Various Legal Jurisdictions;
 Allocation of Delay Responsibility when Concurrent Delay Occurs;
 Factors that Influence the Identification and Quantification of
Concurrent Delay;
 Pacing vs. Concurrent Delay; and
 Practical Guidelines.

2. CONCURRENT DELAY DEFINED
The term “concurrent delay” is commonly used to describe circumstances where different causes
of delay overlap during a period of time or schedule window.1 As such, concurrent delay could
occur during a window if a delay that was caused by the owner2 is on the same activity path or a
parallel activity path as a delay that was caused by the contractor.3 If the owner-caused delay and
contractor-caused delay affect the same activity or affect different activities on parallel activity
paths which are equally critical,4 and as such the owner-caused delay and contractor-caused delay
would each have delayed the completion date of the project, the delays are said to be concurrent.
For example, as shown in Figure 1, two parallel activity paths are each delayed by five work days
during the same window by separate causes, one delay was caused by the owner and the other
delay was caused by the contractor, and both affected activities have the same float value. The two
5-work day delays are concurrent.
1
The term “window” refers to a period of time between two dates in the schedule. The date that define the start
or end of a window is called a data date, which is the date on which the schedule is updated for progress.
2
The term “owner” is applied generically throughout this article for the analysis of issues applicable to the owner
or employer of a project.
3
The term “contractor” is applied generically for the analysis of issues applicable to the contractor of a project.
4
If the parallel activity paths are not equally critical, then the duration of each party’s delay and the float value of
the affected activities would need to be examined to determine the amount of concurrent delay, if any.

Figure 1
Illustration of Concurrent Delays
This situation is of significance when one cause of the delay is at the owner’s risk, while the other,
competing cause of delay is at the contractor’s risk, and where both causes may be regarded as
having caused or contributed to the delay on the project.
His Honour Judge Seymour Q.C., in Royal Brompton Hospital NHS Trust v. Frederick A
Hammond (No.1), states:
However, it is, I think, necessary to be clear what one means by events operating
concurrently. It does not mean, in my judgment, a situation in which, work
already being delayed, let it be supposed, because [the Contractor] has had
difficulty in obtaining sufficient labour, an event occurs which is a [Employer’s
time risk event] and which, had [the Contractor] not been delayed, would have
caused him to be delayed, but which in fact, by reason of the existing delay, made
no difference. In such a situation although there is a [Employer’s time risk
event], ‘the completion of the works is [not] likely to be delayed thereby beyond
the completion date’. The [Employer’s time risk event] simply has no effect upon
the completion date. This situation obviously needs to be distinguished from a

situation in which, as it were, the works are proceeding in a regular fashion and
on programme, when two things happen, either of which, had it happened on its
own, would have caused delay, and one is a [Employer’s time risk event], while
the other is not. In such circumstances there is a real concurrency for causes of
the delay.5
5
See Royal Brompton Hospital NHS Trust v. Frederick A Hammond (No.1), [2000] EWHC technology 39 at 31.

3. TREATMENT OF CONCURRENT DELAY IN VARIOUS LEGAL
JURISDICTIONS
In this section, the common legal practices regarding the treatment of concurrent delay is
summarized in the following jurisdictions:
 U.S. law;
 English law;
 Scots law;
 Canadian law;
 Hong Kong law; and
 Australian law.
3.1 THE U.S. BENCHMARK
A primary tenet of construction contracts is that there is an implied warranty in every contract that
neither party can delay or hinder the timely performance of the other party.6 In the case of
concurrent delay, it is argued that both parties have delayed or hindered the timely performance of
the contract.
U.S. courts and arbitration proceedings offer three approaches to the handling of concurrent delay:
time but no money; apportionment; or responsibility based on a critical path delay analysis.
One author writes that the “time but no money” principle traces back to early 1900s U.S. cases
when a strict rule against apportionment applied.7 In one case, the courts could not apportion “with
any degree of certainty.”8 In another case, the court found that “where both parties to a contract
are responsible for delay in its performance the court will not undertake to apportion the
responsibility for delays.”9
The rule against apportionment was later abandoned because of the frequent use of liquidated
damages clauses, the complexity of the contractual relationships, and a belief that the older rule
6
See L.L. Hall Construction Company v. United States, 379 F.2d 559, 564 (Ct.Cl. 1966); Gasparini Excavating
Company v. Pennsylvania Turnpike Commission, 187 A. 2d 157 162 (Pa. 1963); Felhaber Corporation v. New
York, 410 N.Y.S. 2d 920, 924, 927 (App. Div. 1978); J.A. Jones Constr. Co. v. City of Dover, 372 A.2d 540
(Del. Super. Ct.) aff’d, 377 A.2d 1(1977); Luria Bros. & Co. v. United States, 369 F.2d 701,707 177 Ct.Cl. 676
(1966); J. D. Hedin Constr. Co. v. United States, 347 F.2d 235, 258, 171 Ct.Cl. 70 (1965).
7
See Cocklin, Matthew, “International Approaches to the Legal Analysis of Concurrent Delay: Is there a
Solution for English Law?,” Society of Construction Law, April 2013, p. 9.
8
See Jefferson Hotel Co v. Brumbaugh, 168 F 867 (4th Cir 1909).
9
See Greenfield Tap & Die Corp v. US 167, Ct.Cl. 529, 338 F2d 81 (1964) pp. 87 and 90.

was too harsh in its application.10 Thus, U.S. courts will apportion delay damages when evidence
permits the segregation of costs resulting from each party’s causes.11 However, courts will not find
for apportionment if the segregation of delay costs is impossible.12
Critical path delay analysis offers an alternative to apportionment in that it offers the best evidence
of cause-effect analysis of time impacts, as explained in Section 4 herein.
Several cases are instructive as to U.S. law with respect to concurrent delay.
The contractor in Blinderman13 was seeking additional expenses and a time extension in respect of
delays to the completion date. The contract provided that an adjustment should be made to the
contract price for any increase in costs caused by suspension, delay, or interruption by the
government, except where the works would have been suspended, delayed or interrupted by any
other cause, including the fault or negligence of the contractor. The court found that the contractor
contributed to the delays and held that:
Where both parties contribute to the delay “neither can recover damage, unless
there is in the proof a clear apportionment of the delay and the expense
attributable to each party.” Coath & Goss Inc. v. United States, 101 Ct.C1.702,
714-15 (1944); Commerce International v. United States, 167 Ct.C1.529, 338
F.2d.81, 90 (1964).
Generally, courts will deny recovery where the delays are “concurrent or
intertwined” and the contractor has not met its burden of separating its delays
from those chargeable to the Government.
The ruling in Blinderman means that neither prolongation costs nor liquidated damages are
recoverable where apportionment is not possible, so an extension of time will be granted in such
a case.
In Beckman Construction Company,14 the contractor sought costs associated with delay. There
were concurrent delays. It was held:
Where delays for which the Government bears responsibility are concurrent with
other delays due to non-compensable causes, a contractor may not recover delay
10
See Calumet Construction v. Metropolitan Sanitary District of Greater Chicago, 178 Ill. App. 3d 415 N.E.2d
(1988) p. 420.
11
See Coath & Goss Inc. v. U.S., 101 Ct.Cl. 702 (1944) pp. 714-715.
12
See PCL Construction Services v. U.S., 47 Fed.Cl. 745 (2000).
13
See Blinderman Construction Co v. The United States, 695F.2d 552 (10 December 1982).
14
See Appeal of Beckman Construction Company, ASBCA No. 24725 (8 February 1983).

costs where the non-compensable delays cannot reasonably be separated from
those delays for which it is entitled to receive compensation.
It was determined that the contractor bears the burden of proving, with a reasonable degree of
accuracy, the extent of delay caused by the compensable actions of the government.
In Cline Construction Company,15 also involving a claim for delay costs where there were
concurrent delays, it was held:
Concurrent delay does not bar extensions of time, but it does bar monetary
compensation for daily fixed overhead costs of the type claimed by Cline because
such costs would be incurred on account of the concurrent delay even if the
Government responsible delay had not occurred.
This ruling is consistent with Blinderman; on the facts of the case, the delay events took place at
the same time (i.e., there was “true concurrent delay”) and it does not appear that the compensable
and non-compensable delays could be separated. It is for this reason that an extension of time
would be due. If the compensable and non-excusable delays could have been separated,
Blinderman would have required that there be no extension of time for the non-excusable delay,
and the owner would have been entitled to damages for the contractor’s non-excusable delay.
This finding was held to be the case in Toombs.16 The contractor sought remission of the
liquidated damages deducted from monies otherwise due to him on the ground that when both
parties are at fault and responsible for the delay, liquidated damages cannot be recovered from the
contractor. It was held that the contractor:
…paints with too broad a brush. When it is reasonably possible to apportion the
delay among the various causes, liquidated damages may be assessed
notwithstanding concurrent causes attributable to both parties.
In William F. Klingensmith Inc.,17 the contractor sought a contract time extension plus impact costs
where there were concurrent delays. It was held:
The general rule is that “[w]here both parties contribute to the delay, neither can
recover damage[s], unless there is the proof of a clear apportionment of the delay
and expense attributable to each party.” Blinderman, 695 F.2d at 559, quoting
Coath & Goss. Inc. v. United States, 101 Ct.C1.702, 714-715 (1944). Courts will
15
See Appeal of Cline Construction Company, ASBCA No. 28600 (23 August 1984).
16
See Toombs v. the United States, 4 Cl.Ct. 535 (1984).
17
See William F. Klingensmith Inc. v. United States, 731 F.2d 805 (19 March 1984).

deny recovery where the delays are concurrent and the contractor has not
established its delay apart from that attributable to the government.
In Rivera General Contracting,18 there was a claim for delay allegedly caused by the government.
There were competing causes for the delay. The contract contained an adjustment of price clause
similar to that in Blinderman. It was held:
Where Government caused delays are concurrent or intertwined with other delays
for which the Government is not responsible, the contractor cannot recover delay
damages. This principle applies equally to delays attributable to a change as to
ordinary damages for delays.
Again, this is not inconsistent with Blinderman. On the facts, the delay events took place at the
same time (i.e., there was “true concurrent delay”) and although the government admitted that it
may have been partially responsible for some of the delays experienced, there was no evidence to
demonstrate that the contractor had incurred any increased cost as a result of the government-
caused delay. Therefore, there was no issue of separating the compensable from the non-
compensable delay.
In Hood Plumbing,19 claims were made for delay costs and remission of liquidated damages.
There were concurrent delays. It was held in relation to the claim for additional costs:
In order to recover for alleged compensable delay by the Government, a

contractor must demonstrate, with a reasonable degree of accuracy, both the
extent and cause of such delay. … When delays by the Government are
intertwined or concurrent with delays that are not compensable, neither the
Government nor the contractor may recover unless the delays can be separated or
apportioned.
With regard to the remission of liquidated damages, it was held that the contractor’s delay
exceeded the period of delay caused by the government and on that basis, liquidated damages
could be assessed. This is not inconsistent with the principle that liquidated damages are not
recoverable if delay cannot be apportioned; the assessment made in this case did amount to an
apportioning of the delay.
CG Norton Co. Inc.20 was another case in which the contractor claimed delay costs plus the return
of liquidated damages deducted by the government. There were several reasons, attributable to
both the contractor and the government, underlying the sub-contractor’s failure to perform on time,
18
See Appeal of Rivera General Contracting, ASBCA No. 25888 (30 April 1985).
19
See Appeal of Hood Plumbing, AGBCA No. 84-181-1 (28 October 1987).
20
See Appeal of C.G. Norton Co. Inc., ENG BCA No. 5182 (19 January 1988).

which caused delay to completion. It was found that the reasons were “substantially chargeable”
to the contractor’s conduct, whilst the government’s interference was “minimal” and a direct result
of confusion fostered by the contractor’s actions. On that basis, it was concluded that the
additional costs claimed did not flow from the government’s conduct.
Despite this finding on the facts, it was held that there was a concurrent delay and with regard to
the assessment of liquidated damages, the court referred to the judgment in AMEC Processing
Equipment Co. v. United States,21 which provided:
[W]here delays are caused by both parties to the contract the court will not
attempt to apportion them but will simply hold that the provisions of the contract
with reference to liquidated damages will be annulled.
It was held:
Liquidated damages may not be assessed for periods encompassed by concurrent

delays…
This decision appears to be in conflict with Toombs. However, the decision can be distinguished
on the ground that it involved a single delay event to which both the contractor and the owner had
contributed, as compared with concurrent delay involving two distinct delay events, each with a
separate cause. Therefore, it did not really involve a “concurrent delay” scenario. Further, the
delay experienced could not in any event be apportioned and so liquidated damages were
impossible to assess.
In Calumet Construction Corporation v. Metropolitan Sanitary District of Greater Chicago,22 the

contractor, Calumet, brought a suit for breach of contract and return of liquidated damages. It was
agreed that there had been “mutual delay”. Calumet argued that because the owner, MSD, had
contributed to the delays in the work and fault could not be apportioned under the liquidated
damages clause of the contract, the entire amount of liquidated damages should be returned to
Calumet. MSD argued that, pursuant to the terms of the contract, it had granted day-to-day
extensions to Calumet for the delays it had caused, that there was a question of fact concerning
who was responsible for the additional alleged delays, and that, contrary to Calumet’s contention,
the liquidated damages clause could be apportioned on the basis of fault under the terms of the
contract and was, thus, enforceable. It was held:
Specifically, the issue presented on appeal here concerns whether courts can
apportion fault for mutual delay between two contracting parties pursuant to a
21
See AMEC Processing Equipment Co. v. United States, 171 Ct.C1. 324, 347 F.2d 509 (1965).
22
See Calumet Construction Corporation v. Metropolitan Sanitary District of Greater Chicago, 178 Ill.App.3d
415,533 N.E.2d 453 (30 December 1988).

liquidated damages clause. This issue has never been squarely addressed by
Illinois courts, and courts of other jurisdictions presented with this issue
generally follow either the so-called more “modern rule” of apportionment
[FN2] concerning liquidated damages, or the “older view” which prohibits
apportionment under such provisions. (See Sobel, Owner Delay Damages
Chargeable to Performance Bond Surety (1984), 21 Cal.W.L.Rev.128,133-34).
The older view is that, in construction contracts, if the owner contributed to the
delay at all, the owner could not recover any liquidated damages, and the
liquidated damages clause would be abrogated in those circumstances. (See
General Insurance Co. of America v. Commerce Hyatt House (1970), 5
Cal.App3d 460,85 Cal.Rptr.317; State v. Jack B. Parson Construction (1969), 93
Idaho 118, 456 P.2d 762; L.A. Reynolds Co. v. State Highway Commission
(1967), 271 N.C. 40, 155 S.E.2d 473; Lee Turzillo Contracting Co. v. Frank
Messer & Sons, Inc. (1969), 23 Ohio App.2d 179, 261 N.E.2d 675.) The older
rule of non-apportionment, however, is now being abandoned by a growing
number of courts in favour of the more modern rule of apportionment because of
the increasing popularity of liquidated damages clauses, in part, due to the
increasing complexity of contractual relationships, and, in part due to the fact
that the older rule is too harsh in its application. (See E.C. Ernst, Inc. v.
Manhattan Construction Co. (5th Cir. 1977), 551 F.2d 1026, cert denied sub nom,
Providence Hospital v. Manhattan Construction Co. (1978), 434 U.S., 1067, 98
S.Ct.1246, 55 L.Ed.2d 769.) This trend in favour of apportionment is similar in
nature to the trend in the courts to apply a comparative negligence standard in
tort cases, i.e., recovery is based on apportionment of the responsibility of the
parties rather than on the disqualification of a party merely because he was guilty
of some fault. (See Sobel, 21 Cal.W.L.Rev. 128, 133). Under the modern rule
concerning liquidated damages, courts (including the Supreme Court of the
United States, as noted) will determine the amount of fault attributable to each
party, and, as long as the owner has not delayed in bad faith, they then award
liquidated damages according to that finding. Robinson v. United States (1923),
261 U.S. 486, 43 S.Ct. 420, 67 L.Ed 760; E.C. Ernst, Inc. v. Manhattan
Construction Co. (5th Cir.1977), 551 F.2d 1026; U.S. ex rel. Thorleif Larsen &
Son, Inc. v. B.R. Abbot Construction Co. (7th Cir.1972), 466 F.2d 712; Aetna
Casualty & Surety Co. v. Butte-Meade Sanitary Water District (D.S.D.1980), 500
F.Supp.193; Nomellini Construction v. State of California (1971), 19 Cal.App.3d
240, 96 Cal.Rptr.682.
FN2. Although we refer to the rule of apportionment as the “modern rule”, we

note that in 1923, the United States Supreme Court applied the rule of
apportionment under a liquidated damages clause. (Robinson v. United States
(1923), 261 U.S. 486, 43 S.Ct.420,67 L.Ed. 760.) Other courts and commentors,

nevertheless, refer to the rule as the “modern rule” because it is only recently
that more jurisdictions have begun to apply the rule.
…
We agree with the MSD that the proper rule to be applied is the modern rule of
apportionment. …
…
Further, we find no merit in Calumet’s contention that it is too difficult to
apportion fault under a liquidated damages clause. (See Robinson v. United
States (1923), 261 U.S. 486, 43 S.Ct. 420, 67 L.Ed. 760, where the Supreme Court
found no difficulty in apportioning fault under a liquidated damages provision.)
A court would have no more difficulty ascertaining proportional fault under a
liquidated damages clause than it would in a case of comparative negligence
involving actual damages. Hence, we conclude that the older rule of non-
apportionment is too harsh, and not in accord with current policy in cases
concerning a valid liquidated damages clause. We, therefore, hold that the
modern rule of apportionment should be applied here.
However, while we adopt the modern rule of apportionment, we find that just as
the rule should not apply in those situations where the owner has acted in bad
faith, the rule also should not apply in situations where the owner … has
substantially contributed to the delay, i.e., where the owner has made it
practically impossible for the contractor to complete the work as scheduled. This
limitation on the rule is necessary because if the evidence shows that the owner
substantially contributed to the delay to such an extent, then its delay effectively
alter the terms of the contract, and in such a case, the owner’s act must be held to
have rendered the clause providing that “time is of the essence” to be void, and of
no effect.
… the parties must, therefore, present evidence to show whether there was mutual
delay, and to whom the delay was attributable. If the evidence shows that that the
MSD substantially contributed to the delay so as to render the provision of the
contract providing that time is of the essence void, the court must then abrogate
the liquidated damages clause, and the parties may only then seek any actual
damages that they are able to prove. If, however, the evidence does not show that
the MSD substantially contributed to the delay, the court may apportion fault
under the clause and award liquidated damages accordingly.
This case did not refer to “concurrent delay,” nor did it address the other authorities on the subject.
However, it confirmed that where there is concurrent delay in the wider sense, the owner does not
automatically lose the right to liquidated damages. In the case of such delay, the court should seek
to apportion the same based on the evidence presented to it. Although the court will not apportion

the delay when the owner has “substantially contributed” to it (akin to “prevention”), and
liquidated damages will not be recoverable in that case, general damages may still be sought.
In Volpe-Head (Joint Venture),23 the court reiterated the rule set out in Commerce International v.
United States,24 that “there can be no recovery where the (owner’s) delay is concurrent or
intertwined with other delays.” The contractor’s claim for delay damages was denied because it
would not have been able to carry out the works anyway because of its own default,
notwithstanding the owner’s failure to give access to the worksite.
In Wilner Construction Co.,25 the contractor was seeking delay damages where there were
concurrent delays. It was held:
Determining responsibility for delay is essential. A contractor typically may not

recover if government-caused delays concurrent with additional delay not caused
by the Government such as weather or contractor delays.…This rule is less rigid
than it may appear.
The court then confirmed the general rule as stated in Klingensmith above.
In B.D. Collins Construction Company,26 the contractor was seeking compensation for delay in
respect of which an extension of time had already been granted. There were excusable and non-
excusable delays that were held to be inextricably intertwined with government caused delays. It
was held that because these delays were inextricably intertwined, the whole period of concurrent
delay became non-compensable.
JBL Construction Company Inc.27 was another case involving concurrent delay where the
contractor sought compensation for delay. It was held:
When the delays result from a combination of causes, and both parties are at fault
to such extent that it is not possible to determine the degree of guilt of each, the
Government loses its right to assess liquidated damages and the contractor loses
the right to collect delay costs.
Such was found to be the case there.
23
See Appeal of Volpe-Head (Joint Venture), ENG BCA No. 4726 (14 July 1989). Again, the contract contained
an adjustment of price clause similar to that in Blinderman.
24
See Commerce International v. United States, 167 Ct.C1.529, 338 F.2d.81, 90 (1964).
25
See Wilner Construction Co. v. The United States, 23 Cl.Ct. 241 (1991).
26
See Appeal of B.D. Collins Construction Company, ASBCA No. 42662 (17 December 1991).
27
See Appeal of JBL Construction Company Inc., VABCA No, 1799 (7 November 1985).

In Appeal of Coffey Construction Company Inc. VABCA No. 3661 (11 February 1993),28 the
general rule stated in Klingensmith Inc. v. United States 731 F.2d 805 (referred to in Wilner above)
was adopted. It was held:
Where the delay is prompted by inextricably intertwined concurrent Government

and contractor causes, the delay is not compensable nor are liquidated damages
assessable.
In Smith v. The United States,29 the government terminated a supply contract for failure to deliver
in accordance with the same. The contractor complained that its failure to perform was the result
of delay and disruption caused by the government. However, the court found that the contractor
had made no attempt to recognize and apportion the amount of delay, for which it was responsible.
It was held:
A contractor may not collect damages from the government due to delay where
that contractor was itself in a state of concurrent delay. “Generally, courts will
deny recovery where the delays are ‘concurrent or intertwined’ …” [FN22] Even
where both parties are responsible for delay, a contractor may not recover unless
it is able to apportion the delay and expense attributable to each party. [FN23]
The burden of apportioning delay falls on the plaintiff. “Courts will deny
recovery where delays are concurrent and the contractor has not established its
delay apart from that attributable to the government.” [FN24] Plaintiff’s delay
claims require analysis as to the validity of plaintiff’s cited examples of
government caused delay, and analysis of plaintiff’s state of readiness at those
times.
FN22. Blinderman Constr. Co v. United States, 695 F.2d 552, 559 (Fed.Cir.1982).
FN23. Coath & Goss, Inc. v. United States, Ct.Cl. 702, 714-15, 1944 WL 3694 (1944).
FN24. William F. Klingensmith, Inc. v. United States, 731 F.2d 805, 809 (Fed.Cir.1984).
…Accordingly, (the contractor’s) claim fails because (it) cannot clearly apportion
the alleged delay caused by the government from its own delay.
3.2 ENGLISH LAW
Under English law, the “Prevention Principle” applies to the determination of liability and damages
resulting from concurrent delay. Unless contractually provided otherwise, which is rare,
“the essence of the prevention principle is that the promisee cannot insist upon the performance of
28
See Appeal of Coffey Construction Company Inc., VABCA No. 3661 (11 February 1993).
29
See Smith v. The United States, 34 Fed.Cl. 313 (25 October 1995).

an obligation which he has prevented the promisor from performing.”30 The but-for test may also
apply, wherein the owner argues that the owner-responsible event relied upon by the contractor in
fact caused no delay because the contractor had caused delay to the completion of the works. The
defense is that the contractor cannot prove that it would have completed on time “but-for” the
owner’s delay.
The Dominant Cause approach to resolving the concurrent delay issue suggests that when
concurrent delay occurs, one an owner risk event and the other a contractor risk event, only one of
the delays is the dominant cause for the delay to the project and prevails over the other cause of
delay.31 Difficulties with this approach include 1) the triers of fact must make a decision as to
which of the delays is dominant, which may be inherently difficult; 2) requires the relaxation of the
but-for test; and 3) may conflict with the prevention principle.
The most significant English case regarding concurrent delay was Henry Boot Construction v.
Malmaison in 1999.32 The court found that:
If there are two concurrent causes of delay, one of which is a Relevant Event [an
employer risk event], and the other is not, then the contractor is entitled to an
extension of time for the period of delay caused by the Relevant Event
notwithstanding the concurrent effect of the other event.
The finding became known as the “Malmaison” approach. The Malmaison approach took no
account of concurrent contractor delays and was harsh on owners. Editors of Keating describe
Malmaison as “the now accepted approach to resolving issues of true concurrency in the context
of extension of time claims where one of the competing causes of delay cannot be said to be the
dominant cause.”33 The approach supports the proposition that the trier of fact, when determining
the delaying effect of an owner risk event is not permitted to consider the effects of other events.
The Malmaison approach is adopted by the Society of Construction Law:
Where Contractor Delay to Completion occurs concurrently with Employer

[Owner] Delay to Completion, the Contractor’s concurrent delay should not
reduce any EOT [Extension of Time] due;34
30
See Multiplex Constructions (UK) Ltd. v. Honeywell Control Systems Ltd., [2007] EWHC 447 (TCC), [2007]
BLR 195, 111 Con LR 78, [2007] CILL 2458, para. 47.
31
See H. Fairweather & Co Ltd. v. London Borough of Wandsworth, (1987) 39 BLR 106 (OR).
32
See Henry Boot Construction (UK) Ltd. v. Malmaison Hotel (Manchester) Ltd., (1999) 70 Con LR 32 (TCC).
33
“Keating on Construction Contracts,” 9th Edition, Sweet & Maxwell, 2012, paras. 9-062 – 9-066.
34
The Society of Construction Law Delay and Disruption Protocol, Oxford, October 2002, Section 1.4.1.

3.3 SCOTS LAW
In a departure from the Malmaison approach, the position under Scots law stems from the City Inn
litigation.35 The court apportioned delay between the relevant (owner risk) events and the
contractor-caused delays considering their relative importance and degree of responsibility for each
delay. It granted the contractor, Shepherd, a nine-week extension of time out of a claim of 11
weeks delay. Thus, City Inn may allow apportionment based on the contractual requirement to be
“fair and reasonable.”
English courts are not bound by Scots law, and continue their preference for the Malmaison
approach.
3.4 CANADIAN LAW
According to one author, “Canadian courts do not recognize an all or nothing approach,” and
unlike U.S. courts, “the Canadian system does not place a high evidentiary burden on a claimant
as a prerequisite to apportionment.”36 Thus, Canadian courts tend to favor apportionment and “do
the best they can.”
3.5 HONG KONG LAW
Hong Kong courts have typically applied the Malmaison approach to issues of concurrent delay,
although more recent decisions suggest a movement towards the apportionment approach.37
3.6 AUSTRALIAN LAW
Australian standard forms of contract have attempted to provide a solution to the concurrent delay
issue without success because not all forms are consistent or clear. In fact, one contract provides
no time extension when the contractor is responsible for concurrent delay.38 Other forms, such as
clause 34.4 in AS 4000-1997 and AS 4902-2000, provide for apportionment in the event of
concurrent delays. Absent a contractual provision, it has been suggested that the “position under
Australian law would reflect the approach of English law by reverting to the common law.”39
However, one author suggests that apportioning delays would be preferable.40
35
See City Inn Ltd. v. Shepherd Construction Ltd., [2007] CSOH 190, [2008] BLR 269, (2008) 24 Constr LR 590;
and on appeal [2010] CSIH 68, 2011 SC 127, 2011 SCLR 70, [2010] BLR 473, 136 Con LR 5.
36
See Cocklin, p. 11.
37
Id. at 13.
38
See Australian Standards (AS) 2124-1992, clause 35.3.
39
See Cocklin, p. 16. Also see W. Hing Construction Co. Ltd. v. Boost Investments Ltd., [2009] BLR, High Court
of Hong Kong.
40
See Tobin, Paul, “Concurrent and Sequential Causes of Delay,” 2007, 24 ICLR 142.

3.7 OTHER SOURCES OF GUIDANCE REGARDING THE COST IMPLICATIONS

OF CONCURRENT DELAY
Other industry commentators have suggested guidelines regarding the assessment of cost
responsibility in situations where concurrent delay occurs:
In cases where it is not possible to apportion the loss, because for example, the
costs flowing from the compensable Owner-caused delay event and the non-
compensable Contractor-caused event are inseparable, the loss should lie where
it falls. In such cases, the Owner is precluded from claiming its delay damages as
it is concurrently responsible for the delay. Similarly, the Contractor is unable to
claim for the cost consequences of the delay, as it would have been exposed to
these costs in any event as a result of its own delays.41
Where they have had the opportunity to rule on the issue, the courts and tribunals
in the UK, Hong Kong and the US have tended to adopt a similar approach, in
regard to extensions of time: in situations of true concurrency, the developer’s
time risk event carries the day and [the Contractor] should be granted an
extension of time for its effect on completion. As [the Owner] is conversely
denied liquidated damages from [the Contractor], this approach can be regarded
as the default position of leaving the losses where they fall. The prevention
principle, the doctrine of penalties, burden of proof considerations and the
contractual status of construction programmes have all been cited in justification
of such an approach.42
In relation to concurrent delay the protocol suggests that the Contractor should
be entitled to an extension of time but only to any costs caused by the Employer’s
delay over and above those caused by the Contractor’s concurrent delay.43
…as for money, it even explains that the awarding of extensions of time for
concurrent delay does not automatically run up a prolongation claim.44
41
See Pickavance, Keith, Delay and Disruption in Construction Contracts, 3rd ed., T&F Informa (UK) Ltd,
London, 2005, pp. 644-645, paragraph 16.91.
42
Id. at p. 624, paragraph 16.19.
43
Barnes, R, 2003, Easing the Agony, 14 April 2008. See http://www.building.co.uk/
story.asp?sectioncode=57&storycode=1025760.
44
Bingham, T., Getting in Early, 14 April 2008, See
http://www.building.co.uk/story.asp?sectioncode=57&storycode=1014742.

3.8 CONCLUSION
Thus, the international construction industry has primarily adopted the principle that, for periods of
concurrent delay, the contractor would not have entitlement to recover its delay costs and, likewise,
the owner would not have entitlement to recover its liquidated damages or actual delay costs.
However, some affinity for apportionment has been adopted in certain jurisdictions. As will be
demonstrated in the following sections of the article, the use of CPM scheduling provides an
analytical tool to fairly apportion delay responsibility and allocate delay damages when concurrent
delay exists.

4. ALLOCATION OF DELAY RESPONSIBILITY WHEN CONCURRENT DELAY
OCCURS
In situations of concurrent delay, the Contracts between the parties must first be examined to
determine whether they provide an answer to how the allocation of liability for any concurrent
delay should be considered without sophisticated analysis.
The contract between the parties may provide no direct guidance as to the treatment of concurrent
delay. However, certain contracts may be more explicit, stating that neither party is to receive
compensation when delays are concurrent. Some contracts go further and state that when
concurrent delay occurs, not only is no delay compensation available to either party, but the
contractor is not entitled to a time extension. The latter would be an unusual provision for which
the contractor may be accepting significant risk if liquidated damages also apply in the event of
delay to the project. Legal opinion should be sought in this case.
Notwithstanding the aforementioned problem, if no contractual provision states otherwise, the

most commonly applied principle applied in the international construction industry is that, if the
owner-caused and contractor-caused delays are concurrent and of equal duration, and if they
equally affected the critical path to project completion or another milestone date, the contractor
would not be entitled to compensable delay damages and the owner would not be entitled to its
actual delay or liquidated damages.
In such cases, there is usually no requirement that concurrent delays be equally critical. In
addition, it also follows that non-critical delays can be used to offset compensable delay on a
day-for-day basis after the calculation of relative float is determined for the critical and near critical
paths. This practice is part of the recommended practice set forth by AACE International,
which states:
Concurrency analyses should always be consistent with the contract’s definition

of criticality. While it is beyond the scope of this document to catalogue the
variations in contractual specifications, one relatively common definition is worth
mentioning. Namely, some contracts include in the definition of concurrent delay
that it cause a critical path delay. The requirement that the concurrent delay be
critical, in effect, excludes other delay events with float values greater than the
critical path from being evaluated for offsets against compensable delays. This
view comports with the Literal Theory. It can be argued that absent such contract
definition, non-critical delays can be used to offset compensable delay on a day-
for-day basis after the expenditure of relative float against the critical path. This
view comports with the Functional Theory.45
45
AACE International Recommended Practice No. 29R-03 Forensic Schedule Analysis, 25 April 2011, Section
4.2.D.2, p. 106. Also see Section 5.1 herein.

This practice is commonly applied in the evaluation of concurrent delay.
Thus, if one delay occurs on an activity path, and a parallel activity path experiences another delay,
but the two activity paths have different float values, then the number of concurrent delay days is
calculated after the float difference between the two activities is considered.
This concept is shown conceptually in Figure 2 on the next page. In this example, the owner
caused 5 work days of delay to an activity during a window, and the As-Built Calculation
Schedule46 shows that activity to have minus 30 work days of float (negative float equals 30 work
days). During the same window, the documentation shows that the contractor caused 3 work days
of delay to a different activity, and the As-Built Calculation Schedule shows that activity has minus
28 work days of float (negative float equals 28 work days). Because of the difference in float
values, 2 work days of the overall 5 work days of delay must first be subtracted from the overall
delay because of the 2 work day difference in float value for the two parallel activity paths that are
affected by two different delays. The remaining 3 work days of delay are concurrent, and the 2
work days of delay to Activity C is a non-concurrent delay. The responsibility for the 2 work day
delay is attributed to the owner, and the contractor receives 2 work days of compensable delay.
The contractor receives a 5-work day time extension, but no compensation for the 3 work days of
concurrent delay.
46
As-Built Calculation Schedules can be developed for use in the performance of an As-Built But-For analysis of
owner-caused impacts. When actual dates are used to update a schedule for work that started and/or finished
during a window, the actual dates override the schedule logic, and the start and finish dates of the activities are
fixed regardless of the logic. Therefore, the as-built critical path and float values for the work performed during
the window, which can only be determined from the schedule logic, are not provided by the software
calculations for the work that was performed during a window. Only the critical path and float values are
determined for work yet to be performed after the end of the window. However, the early/late start and
early/late finish dates in an As-Built Calculation Schedule are driven by the schedule logic and the original or
remaining durations of the schedule activities. The as-built logic and driving lag values are programmed into
the As-Built Calculation Schedule such that it generates the same early start and early finish dates for activities
that actually started and finished during each window. The As-Built Calculation Schedules also contain the
same forecasted start and finish dates for activities beyond the end of the windows that are contained in the
statused schedules for each window.

Figure 2
Concurrent Delays Affecting Activities with Different Float Values
Several respected international construction industry sources have provided guidance regarding the
allocation of liability when concurrent delay occurs. Guidance from the following two of these
sources is summarized in the paragraphs that follow:
1. AACE International, and

2. The Society of Construction Law (SCL).
4.1 AACE INTERNATIONAL’S RECOMMENDED PRACTICE NO. 29R-03

FORENSIC SCHEDULE ANALYSIS
AACE International’s Recommended Practice for forensic schedule delay analysis states the
following:
In the absence of any contractual language or other agreements, the conventional

rule governing compensability is that the claimant must first account for
concurrent delays (see subsection 4.2) in quantifying the delay duration to which
compensation applies. That is, the contractor is barred from recovering delay
damages to the extent that concurrent contractor-caused delays offset owner

caused delays, and the owner is barred from recovery liquidated or actual delay
damages to the extent that concurrent owner-caused delays offset contractor-
caused delays.
The evaluation proceeds in two distinct steps. First, the liability for each delay
event is individually analyzed.47 The classification is made primarily according
to the responsibility for the cause of the delay, but may also consider the
contractual risk allocation of the delay event regardless of the party who caused
such delay. The second step consists of evaluating whether each delay event is
concurrent with other types of delays to arrive at the final conclusion of
compensability, excusability or non-excusability.48
The various permutations of concurrent delay are summarized by AACE International in Table 1:49
Table 1
Concurrent Delay Scenarios and Net Effect
Delay Event Concurrent With Net Effect

Owner Delay Another Owner Compensable to Contractor,
Delay or Nothing Non-excusable to Owner
Contractor Delay Another Contractor Non-Excusable to Contractor,
Delay or Nothing Compensable to Owner
Force Majeure Another Force Majeure Excusable but Not
Delay Delay or Nothing Compensable to Either Party
Owner Delay Contractor Delay Excusable but Not
Compensable to Either Party
Owner Delay Force Majeure Delay Excusable but Not
Contractor Delay Force Majeure Delay Excusable but Not
AACE International also sets forth its Recommended Practice with respect to concurrent
combinations of delay, as shown in Table 2:50
47
AACE International notes that “the forensic scheduling analyst may not possess the skill, knowledge, or
experience to independently determine the legal liability for an event. In such a case, the first step consists of
making a reasoned assumption of liability subject to verification by those with the requisite expertise.”
48
4.1.B, p. 99.
49
Id., adapted from Figure 12- Net Effect Matrix-Concurrent Delay, p. 100.

Table 2
Concurrent Delay Combinations and Net Effect
Force Majeure Delay Contractor-Caused Delay Excusable

• Time • No Time • Time/No Compensation
• No Compensation for • No Compensation for for Extended Overhead
Extended Overhead Extended Overhead • No Liquidated/stipulated
• No Liquidated/stipulated • Liquidated/stipulated Damage Assessment
Damage Assessment Damage Assessment
Force Majeure Delay Owner-Caused Delay Excusable

• Time • Time • Time
• No Compensation for • Compensation for • No Compensation for
Extended Overhead Extended Overhead Extended Overhead
• No Liquidated/stipulated • No Liquidated/stipulated
Contractor-Caused Delay Owner-Caused Delay Excusable

• No Time • Time • Time
• No Compensation for • Compensation for • No Compensation for
Extended Overhead Extended Overhead Extended Overhead
• Liquidated/stipulated • No Liquidated/stipulated
AACE International also states the following with respect to compensability when concurrent
delay occurs:
Thus entitlement to compensability, whether it applies to the contractor or the

owner, requires that the party seeking compensation shows a lack of concurrency
if concurrency is alleged by the other party. But for entitlement to excusability
without compensation, whether it applies to the contractor or the owner, it only
requires that the party seeking excusability show that a delay by the other party
impacted the critical path.
50
Adapted from AACE International Recommended Practice No. 29R-03 Forensic Schedule Analysis, 25 April
2011, Figure 15- Net Effect of Potential Concurrent Delay Combinations, p. 111.

Based on this symmetry, contractor entitlement to a time extension does not
automatically entitle the contractor to delay compensation. The contractor would
first have to show that an owner delay impacted the critical path, and then if the
owner defends alleging concurrent delay, the contractor would have to show the
absence of concurrent delays caused by a contractor delay or a force majeure
delay in order to be entitled to compensation.
A contractor delay concurrent with many owner delays would negate the
contractor’s entitlement to delay compensation. Similarly, one owner delay
concurrent with many contractor delays would negate the owner’s entitlement to
delay compensation, including liquidated/stipulated damages. While in such
extreme cases the rule seems draconian, it is a symmetrical rule that applies to
both the owner and the contractor and hence ultimately equitable.51
Thus, AACE International states that the owner is not entitled to delay damages for the period of
compensable delay.
4.2 THE SOCIETY OF CONSTRUCTION LAW DELAY AND DISRUPTION

PROTOCOL
The Society of Construction Law (the SCL) published a protocol on delay and disruption, dated
October 2002 (the Protocol).52 The Protocol aims to provide useful guidance on issues that arise
on construction contracts in order to provide a means by which the parties can resolve issues and
avoid disputes. It is not intended, nor does it purport, to take precedence over the express terms of
a contract or be a statement of law.53
In relation to concurrent delay, the Protocol includes the following guidance:
1. True concurrent delay is the occurrence of two or more delay events at the
same time, one an Employer Risk Event, the other a Contractor Risk Event,
and the effects of which are felt at the same time. True concurrent delay will
be a rare occurrence. A time when it can occur is at the commencement date
(where for example, the Employer fails to give access to the site, but the
Contractor has no resources mobilised to carry out any work), but it can
arise at any time.54
51
Id., Section 4.1. C, pp. 100-101.
52
The Society of Construction Law Delay and Disruption Protocol, Oxford, October 2002.
53
Id. at p. 3 (B).
54
Id. at Section 1.4.4.

2. Where Contractor Delay to Completion occurs concurrently with Employer
[Owner] Delay to Completion, the Contractor’s concurrent delay should not
reduce any EOT [Extension of Time] due;55
3. Where Employer Risk Events and Contractor Risk Events occur sequentially
but have concurrent effects, here again the Contractor Delay should not
reduce the amount of EOT due to the Contractor as a result of the Employer
[Owner]Delay;56
4. If the Contractor incurs additional costs that are caused both by

Employer[Owner]Delay and Contractor Delay, then the Contractor should
only recover compensation if it is able to separate the additional costs
caused by the Employer [Owner] Delay from those caused by the Contractor
Delay;57 and
5. If it would have incurred the additional costs in any event as a result of

Contractor Delays, the Contractor will not be entitled to recover those
additional costs.58
Thus, the SCL Protocol is consistent with AACE International, and provides that in the event of
concurrent delay, the contractor is entitled to a time extension for the amount of delay caused by
the owner despite the contractor-caused concurrent delay, but the contractor is not entitled to delay
costs for the period of concurrent delay. This approach is consistent with a legal system which
applies a strict rule of causation to damages claims generally, and has been applied, for example, in
the U.S. and England.59
55
56
57
58
59
In England, simply stated, the delay event attributable to the owner must be the effective, dominant cause of the
delay for the contractor to be entitled to compensation. See Furst, Q.C., Stephen and The Honorable Sir Vivian
Ramsey, M.A., Keating on Construction Contracts, 8th Edition, Sweet & Maxwell Limited, 2006, paragraph
8−019.

5. FACTORS THAT INFLUENCE THE IDENTIFICATION AND
QUANTIFICATION OF CONCURRENT DELAY
Factors that influence the identification and quantification of concurrent delay include the
following:
 Whether concurrency is determined literally or functionally;

 Whether concurrency is determined on the cause or the effect of delay;
 The frequency, duration and placement of the analysis interval;
 The order of delay insertion or extraction in a stepped implementation; and
 Whether the analysis is done using full hindsight or based on knowledge-at-
the-time.
These factors are discussed in the following sections.
5.1 FUNCTIONAL OR LITERAL CONCURRENCY
Functional concurrency occurs when the separate network paths, on which the delays reside,
concurrently impact the Completion of Work date, as shown in Figure 3.

Figure 3
Illustration of Functional Concurrent Delays
Literal concurrency occurs when two or more delay-causing events occur at the same time, as
shown in Figure 4. Literal concurrency is an unachievable definition because time is infinitely
divisible.

Figure 4
Illustration of Literal Concurrent Delays
The functional theory is “closely attuned to delay methodologies that use modeled CPM schedules
as their basis and utilize some form of time period analysis. Since these analyses measure delay at
the end of time periods [typically the status updates] it makes sense to measure concurrency under
this methodology at the same points, rather than trying to develop a separate concurrency
analysis. Accordingly, the functional application of concurrent delay theory does not necessarily
require the delay events to occur at the same time. In addition, the functional theory allows that
CPM schedules, even if properly maintained, are not perfect, and near critical delays may in fact
be concurrent.”60
5.2 CAUSE OF DELAY VS. EFFECT OF DELAY
There is a distinction between concurrent causes of delay and the concurrency of the effects of
delay. Likewise, there is a distinction between sequential events which cause concurrent delay and
coincident events which cause concurrent delay.
60
4.2.D.1, p. 105.

The delay-cause approach is based on the identification of delay as independent of the planned
duration for an activity, and is driven by the nature of the event. The delay-cause analysis is
portrayed in Figure 5.
Figure 5
Illustration of Delay-Cause Analysis
In this example, Activity A, Piping Isometrics, was planned to take 30 work days. A change order,
however, was issued 15 work days after the start of Piping Isometrics and required 45 work days of
additional Piping Isometric work. The cause of the delay was the change order. By adding the
45-work day delay at the time that the change order was identified, the resultant schedule
Completion of Work date can be forecasted.
The delay-effect approach is premised on the basis that there is no ‘delay’ until the planned
duration of an activity that has been affected by a delay has been exhausted. The delay-effect
analysis is portrayed in Figure 6.

Figure 6
Illustration of Delay-Effect Analysis
Again, Activity A, Piping Isometrics, was planned to take 30 work days. The effect of the change
order, as measured when the change order work was actually completed, was to extend the
completion of Piping Isometrics by 45 work days for additional Piping Isometric work. A further
effect of the delay was to delay the planned finish date for Activity C, Piping Installation, by 45
work days.
If there are no discrete events that cause a schedule activity to exceed its planned duration, the
delay analysis would have to fall back to the delay-effect method of identifying the delay.
Conversely, in cases where the delay was a result of a series of discrete events, the delay-effect
method of chronological placement of delay would often be at odds with contemporaneous
documentation of such discrete events.
A schedule analysis that incorporates both the “cause of delay” and “effect of delay” may have
merit. The “cause” approach looks at discretely identifiable delay causes or impacts based on the
contemporaneous project records. Discrete causes of delay may include drawing delivery delays,
Change Order impacts, etc. The “effect of delay” is quantified by the delay variances in Duration

Variance and Lag Variance Tables61 that are prepared at the start and finish of each schedule
window. This approach aligns the delay causes with the effects, based on the available
documentation, to understand both the cause and the effect of delay. This approach is consistent
with AACE International’s Recommended Practice, which states:
There are two solutions to reconcile this potential dichotomy between the static
and dynamic methods. One solution is to use the cause theory where discrete
delay events are identifiable and to use the effect theory where there are no
identifiable discrete events that led to the delay. But note that in many cases the
identification of discrete causes is a function of diligence in factual research,
which is in turn dictated by time and budget allowed for the analysis. The second
solution is to review the delay on an activity basis and not to review the events on
a daily basis within the event. This solution comports with the reality that delays
that occur at the outset of an activity may be made up during the performance of
that activity.62
The distinction between delay-cause and delay-effect is more important when using the literal
theory of concurrency. If delays are concurrent only when they occur on the exact same day, then
it is important to establish that the cause (not effect) of both concurrent delays occurred on the
same day. If the functional theory of concurrency is used, where delays are concurrent if they both
have the same effect of delay to the completion date, it is not necessary to establish that two
concurrent delays were both caused on the same day, or to carry it further, the same hour, the same
minute, etc.
5.3 FREQUENCY, DURATION AND PLACEMENT OF ANALYSIS INTERVALS
Analysis intervals are the individual time periods, or windows, used in analyzing the schedule.
The frequency, duration, and placement of the analysis intervals are the most significant technical
factors that influence the determination of concurrency.63
Frequency refers to the number of windows during which the overall project is divided for
analysis.
Duration refers to the number of days that comprise the window. Schedule delay analysis are often
based on each window having a duration of approximately one-month, which is consistent with
61
The Duration Variance Table identifies the change in the activity durations at the end of the window compared
to the planned durations of activities at the start of the window. The Lag Variance Table identifies the change
in the activity relationship values at the end of a window compared to the activity relationships at the start of the
window.
62
4.2.D.3, p. 107.
63
Id. at Section 4.2.D.4.a, p. 107.

industry practice of updating the schedule monthly and eliminates any subjectivity caused by
irregular window cut-off dates.
AACE International discusses the reliability of the result based on the chronological placement of
the boundaries of the windows, or the cut-off dates:
There are two main ways that the analysis intervals are placed. The first method
is to adopt the update periods used during the project by using the data dates of
the updates, which are usually monthly or some other regular periods dictated by
reporting or payment requirements. The other is the event-based method in which
the cut-off dates are determined by key project events such as the attainment of a
project milestone, occurrence of a major delay event, change in the project
critical path based on progress (or lack thereof), or a major revision of the
schedule. Event-based cut-off dates may not necessarily coincide with any update
period.
The most distinguishing feature of the event-based placement of cut-off dates is

that there is significant independent judgment exercised by the forensic analyst in
choosing that time period. Because the cut-off date is equivalent to the data date
used for CPM calculation, it heavily influences the determination of criticality
and float, and hence the identification and quantification of concurrent delays.
Also, as stated above, the placement of cut-off date plays a major role in how the
canceling effect operates.64
According to AACE International, the windows analysis is influenced by the functional or literal
theory of concurrency:
Concurrency is evaluated discretely for each analysis interval. That is, at the end
of each period, accounting of concurrency is closed, and a new one opened for
the next period. This is especially significant when analysis proceeds under the
functional theory of concurrency in cases where two functionally concurrent
delay events, one owner delay and the other a contractor delay, are separated
into separate periods. If those delay events were contained in one period, they
would be accounted together and offset each other. When they are separated, they
would each become compensable to the owner and the contractor respectively.
The analyst is recommended to analyze multiple-period events in both separate
periods and combined periods to achieve the most accurate results.
64
Id. at Section 4.2.D.4.b, p. 108.

However, the distinction between the functional and the literal theories does not
disappear automatically with the use of multiple analysis intervals. Two delay
events separated by time within one analysis interval will still be treated differently
depending on which theory is used. The distinction becomes virtually irrelevant
only when the duration of the analysis interval is reduced to a single day.
When multiple analysis intervals are used an additional dimension is added to the
canceling effect that was discussed in the comparison of the literal theory to the
functional theory. As stated above, the separation of two potential concurrent
delay events into different analysis intervals causes the functional theory to
behave like the literal theory. Because the change from one period to another
closes analysis for that period and mandates the identification and quantification
of excusable, compensable and non-excusable delays for that period, it is only
after all the analysis intervals, covering the entire duration of the project, are
evaluated that reliable results can be obtained by performing a “grand total”
calculation. In other words, the ultimate conclusion cannot be reached by
selective evaluation of some, but not all, analysis intervals.65
5.4 ORDER OF INSERTION OR EXTRACTION OF DELAY EVENTS
The order of the insertion or extraction of the delays will affect the identification of potentially
concurrent delays and the quantification of such concurrency. A common practice in the
application of a Time Impact Analysis is to first insert the delay events that occurred in the first
window, and then proceed to each successive window through to the completion of the Project
through each successive window, to the last window. The delay events are inserted using a global
basis or stepped basis in each successive schedule window.66 In the application of a As-Built But-
For Analysis, the delay events are typically extracted in reverse chronological order starting with
the last window, and then proceed to each previous window through to the start of the Project. The
delay events are extracted using a global basis or stepped basis in each schedule window.
5.5 HINDSIGHT VS. “BLIND-SIGHT”
Prospective determination of concurrency during the project may be correct at the time, but may
be incorrect in hindsight using retrospective information. Thus, in the context of schedule delay
analysis, a difference may occur when reconciling the results utilizing full hindsight with results
made “blind-sight” during the project when the actual start and finish dates of activities
were unknown.
Figure 7 illustrates the Remaining Duration of an activity using the Blind-Sight method.
65
Id. at Section 4.2.D.4.a, pp. 107-108.
66
Id. at Section 1.4.E.2, p. 108.

Figure 7
Blind-Sight Method for Determining Remaining Durations
of Activities in Progress at each Schedule Update
In this example, Activity A has an original duration of 21 work days, starts several days after the
first Monthly Status Update, and has been in progress 20 work days at the time of the second
Monthly Status Update. Using the Blind-Sight method, and not knowing that any delay had
occurred during the first 20 work days of progress, the remaining duration could be said to be only
one work day at the time of the second Monthly Status Update. It would not be known until the
activity was complete after the second Monthly Status Update that its as-built duration was
25 work days.

Figure 8 illustrates the Remaining Duration of an activity using the Hindsight method.
Figure 8
Hindsight Method for Determining Remaining Durations
of Activities in Progress at each Schedule Update
In this example, the same Activity A, which had an original duration of 21 work days, starts
several days after the first Monthly Status Update, and based on the as-built data, finishes with an
actual duration of 25 work days. The second Monthly Status Update occurs after 20 work days of
progress on Activity A have occurred. Therefore, Activity A is 80 percent complete at the second
Monthly Status Update, and would have a Remaining Duration of 5 work days at that time.
This difference becomes technically relevant in the development of schedule updates at the
beginning and end of each window. The assignment of the Remaining Duration to each partially
progressed activity is highly dependent on whether the approach is hindsight or blind-sight.
Because CPM calculations of the activity float values in the schedule updates depends, in part, on
the value of the Remaining Durations of activities at the data date, the difference in approach will
affect the identification and quantification of concurrent delays.67
Upon examination of the schedule networks on most projects, there are periods during which
delays that were caused by either party would have delayed Project Completion. Thus, concurrent
delay often occurs. Under a dominant cause argument, the contractor would have to prove that the
owner-caused delays were the dominant cause of delay and that the contractor-caused delays were
minor and not dominant, or that the concurrent contractor-caused delays were pacing delays, for
67
There is no prevailing practice, let alone agreement, on which practice for determining remaining durations,
hindsight or blind-sight, ought to be used in the reconstruction of schedule updates.

which there is evidence of intentional slowing down of the other work by the contractor because of
owner-caused delays.
Because certain work must be performed in a given sequence on an engineering and construction
project, and often more than one predecessor activity must be completed before a successor
activity can be performed, the dominant cause theory is of little benefit when work on each
predecessor activity must be completed before the successor activity can proceed. Thus, if both
predecessor activities have delays, one caused by the owner and one caused by the contractor, the
use of the dominant cause theory is subjective and does not adequately consider physical
requirements of sequencing engineering and construction work.

6. PACING VS. CONCURRENT DELAY
Pacing delay occurs when the delay in one activity occurs, and a conscious and contemporaneous
decision is made by the contractor to pace progress in a second and independent activity, or several
activities. Thus, the contractor deliberately slowed down its work. However, concurrent delay
results when the work in a second and independent activity, or several activities, is involuntarily
delayed by factors independent of any problems arising from the delay in another activity.
Pacing is typically manifested in two distinct circumstances.
1. One situation, called direct pacing, is where the duration of a successor

schedule activity is extended due to a delay in a predecessor activity on which
the progress of the successor activity is directly dependent. As shown in
Figure 9, the duration of the wire pulling work is extended in duration because
the installation of conduit work is taking longer due to the lack of conduit
material. While this is pacing, it is not considered a concurrent delay – the
cause of one delay is the result of the other delay. Examination of activity
relationships in the schedule, usually in the form of finish-to-finish ties, will
provide the information to determine if direct pacing has occurred.

Figure 9
Illustration of Direct Pacing
2. In the second situation, called indirect pacing, the paced activity has no
dependency on the other activity. As shown in Figure 10, the contractor
deliberately slows down its piping installation work in Unit B because of
the owner’s delay in equipment delivery in Unit A. The equipment delivery
delay creates68 available float to be consumed by the piping installation in
Unit B activity.
68
The term “creation” should not be interpreted to mean that total float is increased. In fact, the opposite is true.
The parent delay adversely impacts the overall critical path of the project, thereby decreasing total float. What
it creates (increases) is relative total float on the path of the paced activity relative to the total float on the path
carrying the parent delay.

Figure 10
Illustration of Indirect Pacing
If proper documentation exists, pacing can be a defense to a potential concurrent delay and it is not
a distinct delay event. Therefore, the pacing issue is relevant only to the extent that concurrency of
delays is an issue.

The contractor enjoys the right to pace its work along with the view that float is a shared resource
that is to be used by the party who first needs the float. However, lack of resources69 which should
have been provided by the contractor, or poor productivity that was caused by the contractor and
which caused other independent activities to be delayed, are not considered pacing delays. These
are contractor-caused problems, and the contractor is responsible for the delay and disruption that
are caused by these problems.
Pacing may alter the net effect of the compensability of a concurrent delay situation, as shown in
Table 3 below:
Table 3
Net Effect of Pacing Delays
Owner Delay Contractor Pacing Compensable to Contractor,

Non-excusable to Owner
Owner Pacing Another Contractor Non-excusable to Contractor,
Delay or Nothing Compensable to Owner
In its evaluation of potential concurrent delay vs. a pacing delay, the following generally accepted
international construction industry guidelines apply,70 in order of importance, as follows:
1. A predecessor dependent parent delay must precede a pacing delay;
2. The contractor needs to demonstrate that it could resume progress at an

un-paced rate; and
3. The contractor needs to provide evidence that a conscious and deliberate

decision was made at the time to pace the work as a result of the other delay.
Pacing can be contentious because it can be used to excuse delay which is otherwise unaffected by
a change in scope or variation. Thus it can be said that:
69
In some analyses, lack of resources could be considered a pacing delay if the amount of resources caused by
owner-caused change orders is significantly greater than the resources required for the base scope of work.
70
4.2.G, p. 113. It does not appear that the SCL has addressed pacing.

Pacing arguments are most often made at the end of a project, when an as-built
programme analysis reveals that activities which were not affected by any
employer instructed variations or other excusable events appear to have been
delayed. When pacing is argued with hindsight, it should be treated with both
caution and skepticism, especially when the assertion is unsupported by
contemporaneous records.”71
If no documentation is made available to justify a pacing delay, then consistent with the AACE
International recommended practice, concurrent delays by the contractor should not be regarded as
pacing delays, and instead are delays for which the contractor is responsible.
71
See Keane, P.J. and A.F. Caletka, Delay Analysis in Construction Contracts, Wiley-Blackwell, 2008, Section
5.3.7, p. 213.

7. PRACTICAL GUIDELINES
The parties must first be guided by the provisions in their contract or referenced documents
regarding the handling of time extensions, concurrent delay, excusable delay, compensable delay,
and liquidated damages. If specific provisions regarding these issues are not included in the
contract or referenced documents, the following practical guidelines with respect to dealing with
these issues are provided:
1. Use a windows-based CPM schedule analysis to determine if the contractor is

entitled to a time extension as a result of excusable delays to the then critical
path of the project at the time that the excusable delays occurred.
2. If the actual project delay is greater than the amount of time extension to which
the contractor is entitled, then the owner may be entitled to receive liquidated or
actual damages if no liquidated damages are stated in the contract for the
additional contractor-caused delays.
3. Use a windows-based CPM schedule analysis to determine if the contractor is

entitled to additional compensation for time-related costs as a result of
compensable delays to the then critical path of the project at the time that the
compensable delays occurred.
4. If the contractor can demonstrate that it was effectively delayed by an owner

responsible event and the owner can demonstrate that the project was also
concurrently delayed by an event which was caused by the contractor or actions
for which the contractor is responsible, the contractor may nevertheless be
entitled to an extension of time for the full amount of such owner responsible
delay unless otherwise stated in the contract between the parties.
5. In considering whether owner responsible events have also “caused” the project
delay, the principles of causation should be examined, and certain causes of
delay, that while sequential or parallel are not of equal causative persuasion,
may need to be excluded. If the occurrence of an owner event is merely
coincidental and simply provides a slippage to minor work rather than the true
cause for the project delay, there may be no extension of time entitlement and
the owner may be entitled to liquidated or actual damages.
6. In considering whether contractor-caused events or actions for which the

contractor is responsible have also “caused” the project delay, the principles of
causation should also be examined, and certain causes of delay, that while
sequential or parallel are not of equal causative persuasion, may need to be
excluded. If the occurrence of a contractor-caused event is merely coincidental

and simply provides a slippage to minor work rather than the true cause for the
project delay, there may be no liquidated damages entitlement and the
contractor may be entitled to its time-related costs for the period of delay.
7. If it is established that the cause of the delay is attributable to owner (i.e., there
is no true concurrent delay or after considering the effect of concurrent delay),
and if the contractor has complied with the notice provisions and the duty to
mitigate any delay, the amount of time extension and/or the reimbursement of
the contractor’s time-related costs should be dealt with pursuant to the Change
Orders clause or other contractual provisions, and if not agreed, dealt with
pursuant to the Dispute Resolution and Arbitration clause.
8. If functional or literal concurrent delay arises, subject to a CPM schedule

analysis to otherwise allocate delay, the contractor may be entitled to a time
extension for the period of the concurrent delay, but no time-related costs for
that period unless otherwise stated in the contract.

About the Author
Richard J. Long, P.E., P.Eng., is Founder of Long International, Inc. Mr. Long
has over 50 years of U.S. and international engineering, construction, and
management consulting experience involving construction contract disputes
analysis and resolution, arbitration and litigation support and expert testimony,
project management, engineering and construction management, cost and
schedule control, and process engineering. As an internationally recognized
expert in the analysis and resolution of complex construction disputes for over
35 years, Mr. Long has served as the lead expert on over 300 projects having
claims ranging in size from US$100,000 to over US$2 billion. He has presented
and published numerous articles on the subjects of claims analysis, entitlement
issues, CPM schedule and damages analyses, and claims prevention. Mr. Long
earned a B.S. in Chemical Engineering from the University of Pittsburgh in 1970 and an M.S. in Chemical
and Petroleum Refining Engineering from the Colorado School of Mines in 1974. Mr. Long is based in
Littleton, Colorado and can be contacted at [email protected] and (303) 972-2443.

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Richard J. Long, P.E., P.Eng.

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 Concurrent Delay Defined;

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3.1 THE U.S. BENCHMARK

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In order to recover for alleged compensable delay by the Government, a

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Liquidated damages may not be assessed for periods encompassed by concurrent

In Calumet Construction Corporation v. Metropolitan Sanitary District of Greater Chicago,22 the

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FN2. Although we refer to the rule of apportionment as the “modern rule”, we

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Determining responsibility for delay is essential. A contractor typically may not

Such was found to be the case there.

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Where the delay is prompted by inextricably intertwined concurrent Government

3.2 ENGLISH LAW

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The Malmaison approach is adopted by the Society of Construction Law:

Where Contractor Delay to Completion occurs concurrently with Employer

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3.3 SCOTS LAW

3.4 CANADIAN LAW

3.5 HONG KONG LAW

3.6 AUSTRALIAN LAW

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3.7 OTHER SOURCES OF GUIDANCE REGARDING THE COST IMPLICATIONS

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Notwithstanding the aforementioned problem, if no contractual provision states otherwise, the

Concurrency analyses should always be consistent with the contract’s definition

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1. AACE International, and

4.1 AACE INTERNATIONAL’S RECOMMENDED PRACTICE NO. 29R-03

In the absence of any contractual language or other agreements, the conventional

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Delay Event Concurrent With Net Effect

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Delay Event Concurrent With Net Effect

Force Majeure Delay Contractor-Caused Delay Excusable

Force Majeure Delay Owner-Caused Delay Excusable

Contractor-Caused Delay Owner-Caused Delay Excusable

Thus entitlement to compensability, whether it applies to the contractor or the

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4.2 THE SOCIETY OF CONSTRUCTION LAW DELAY AND DISRUPTION

In relation to concurrent delay, the Protocol includes the following guidance:

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4. If the Contractor incurs additional costs that are caused both by