Advocating Transitional Justice in Africa - The Role of Civil Society (PDFDrive)
Advocating Transitional Justice in Africa - The Role of Civil Society (PDFDrive)
Advocating Transitional Justice in Africa - The Role of Civil Society (PDFDrive)
Jasmina Brankovic
Hugo van der Merwe Editors
Advocating
Transitional
Justice in Africa
The Role of Civil Society
Springer Series in Transitional Justice
Series Editor
Dr. Olivera Simic
Senior Lecturer with the Griffith University Law School
Queensland, Australia
Advocating Transitional
Justice in Africa
The Role of Civil Society
Editors
Jasmina Brankovic Hugo van der Merwe
University of Cape Town Centre for the Study of Violence
Centre for the Study of Violence and Reconciliation
and Reconciliation Cape Town, South Africa
Cape Town, South Africa
v
vi Foreword
anchored in particular unarguable universal standards. They all agree that transi-
tional justice is a project of hope and an indispensable tool in the hands of reform-
ers. Nevertheless, they plead for the complexity of the continent and ask for
rethinking transitional justice to indigenise the concept.
This volume will serve as a timely and thought-provoking guide for activists,
thinkers and policy makers—as well as students of transitional justice—interested
in the tension between the universal and the particular in the arduous struggle for
liberation. Often, civil society actors in Africa have been accused of consuming the
ideas of others, but not producing enough, if any, of their own. This volume makes
clear the spuriousness of this claim and firmly plants an African flag in the field of
ideas. The arc of transitional justice has been long and uneven. Its effectiveness and
success in Africa are the subject of intense debate. I view that debate as a healthy
one. The authors here agree and take that debate a notch higher. None of them is a
naysayer. However, they are all interested in the project of transitional justice as a
key experiment for social recovery.
I recommend this rich volume to all those concerned with the human condition.
In these pages, dedicated and introspective social actors who span the diversity of
religion, region, culture, gender and national origin unite in affirming transitional
justice while at the same time pushing its frontiers. It is a work of enormous vitality
and reach. If transitional justice has a future, then I urge those working and thinking
in it to embrace the lessons offered herein.
Makau Mutua
SUNY Distinguished Professor
Floyd H. & Hilda L. Hurst Scholar
SUNY Buffalo Law School
State University of New York
Buffalo, NY, USA
Editors’ Preface
Transitional justice is a constantly evolving field of theory and practice. It has been
challenged and contested since its influence began to spread through replication and
the diffusion of global normative frameworks and mechanisms. One key area of
contestation is the relevance of the ideas and tools provided by this field to local
activists and advocates pursuing peace and justice agendas in their local communi-
ties and countries. This collected volume seeks to engage directly with the questions
this raises: How does local civil society pursue transitional justice? How useful do
civil society organisations (CSOs) find the avenues for social change that transi-
tional justice processes provide? And to what extent do they influence them?
The question of civil society’s role in transitional justice does not simply relate
to the relevance of global ideas for local practice. Transitional justice seeks to
respond to local needs. Local traction, victim-centredness and community partici-
pation are all buzz phrases in the field. It is the practice of transitional justice that
will shape our future understanding of the boundaries of the field, its goals, its strat-
egies and its definition.
Whether the field is able to respond to local experiences is however another mat-
ter. Generally it remains dominated by North-based scholars, donors, policy makers
and transitional justice professionals who have instrumentalised and institution-
alised the field in ways that sometimes appear unresponsive to outsider voices. A
key challenge remains the absence of these voices from critical debates and particu-
larly the transitional justice literature. While practitioners speak eloquently at tran-
sitional justice workshops and conferences, they seldom document their experiences
and present their reflections in writing.
The motivation for this book is essentially to address that absence and to high-
light the experiences of local practitioners, largely in their own voices. For us as
editors, it represents an attempt to bridge the gap between our practitioner col-
leagues and our academic colleagues and contribute to correcting the imbalance in
the academic and policy literature.
vii
viii Editors’ Preface
African civil society has been a prominent player in regional and national transi-
tional justice policy debates. A number of African CSOs have played major roles in
shaping their countries’ transitional justice mechanisms. The South African Truth
and Reconciliation Commission, for example, was designed in large part by civil
society through a process of behind-the-scenes policy discussions and big policy
conferences (Boraine et al. 2014). Civil society was also central to finalising the
legislation that established the commission and then in the implementation of its
work (Van der Merwe et al. 1999).
This process of civil society engagement with national transitional justice pro-
cesses has been replicated in many countries on the continent. In some cases the
lack of state capacity meant that CSOs were directly responsible for drafting transi-
tional justice legislation, and in most cases truth commissions and other measures
relied particularly on civil society’s ability to access victims and marginalised com-
munities. This capacity and local legitimacy—built during conflict or in the midst of
ongoing state repression—has given civil society unusual leverage in shaping
interventions. At the same time it has moulded particular transitional justice agen-
das that often put civil society at odds with the state.
Editors’ Preface ix
Civil society in Africa has also been vocal in relation to the global transitional
justice debates. While sometimes caught between the narrowly framed international
normative approach and national elite politics, CSOs have managed to articulate a
unique approach. They have challenged both international and national policy makers,
pushing for transitional justice processes that resonate with local needs and priorities
and that speak to broad social concerns regarding peace, democratisation and local
conceptions of justice. There are numerous examples of African CSOs that simply
jump on the global transitional justice bandwagon or are cowed by the demands of
authoritarian regimes. But the voices of civil society in dealing with local community
processes, national debates and global arenas provide an encouraging picture of a field
characterised by vibrant intellectual debate and innovative interventions.
In this book we have sought to offer local practitioners space to reflect on the devel-
opment and effectiveness of their strategies in promoting transitional justice, to
identify the theoretical and contextual influences on their work and to present les-
sons learnt over two decades of transitional justice interventions on the continent.
Given our years of experience working with practitioners on documenting their
experiences and ideas, we realised that this endeavour would be a challenge. While
practitioners are more than capable of documenting their experiences, engaging in criti-
cal self-reflection and participating actively in theoretical discussions of transitional
justice challenges, they do not prioritise writing in their day-to-day work. Our efforts to
solicit inputs from our network of colleagues across the continent produced numerous
rich inputs, but finding time to revise and edit work within the timeframe of an edited
volume meant that many of these inputs could not be included in the book. We remain
grateful to those practitioners who participated in the workshops and exchanges, which
enriched the reflections and insights that inform the ideas shared in this volume.
Rather than just rely on practitioners’ inputs on civil society, we decided to
broaden our circle of contributors and invite other researchers who have extensive
experience working in collaboration with African CSOs and local academics who
have done serious empirical work on these issues. We also sought to address par-
ticular gaps that we identified in the collection, such as issues of gender and the role
of regional mechanisms. Again, our efforts were only partially successful.
This volume was born out of many years of engagement among a range of CSOs
on the African continent, which have collaborated on joint advocacy projects,
engaged in knowledge exchange and helped to build mutual capacity to pursue tran-
sitional justice initiatives in their local contexts and through regional bodies such as
the African Union. Both the editors of this volume, Jasmina Brankovic and Hugo
van der Merwe, work with the Centre for the Study of Violence and Reconciliation
(CSVR), which has been one of the central partners in these collaborations. The
joint initiatives were developed through the African Transitional Justice Research
x Editors’ Preface
Network (ATJRN),1 which brought together key CSOs and African researchers and
practitioners to share knowledge and coordinate advocacy efforts.
ATJRN regularly highlighted the need to document local CSO experiences, to
facilitate critical reflection and to build local conceptualisations of transitional jus-
tice. These engagements led to the establishment of peer review processes among
partners (Mncwabe 2011), the establishment of an Institute for African Transitional
Justice (convened by the Refugee Law Project at Makerere University), facilitated
writing retreats and capacity building among partners to contribute to international
advocacy and scholarly platforms (e.g. through the International Journal of
Transitional Justice, which is managed by CSVR).
A key link between these various forums and this book is a 2010 workshop
hosted by CSVR under the auspices of ATJRN: “Advocating Justice: Civil Society
and Transitional Justice in Africa”. This workshop brought together 18 transitional
justice practitioners from across the continent to share their experiences of pursuing
transitional justice processes in their respective countries. It produced rich case
studies,2 a workshop report (Brankovic 2010) and a wealth of information that
inspired us to explore other channels to make sure that these types of perspectives
are more effectively captured and disseminated in academic circles.
Transitional justice is fundamentally about both the politics of justice and the cultural
conceptions of justice. Writing about the African continent addresses a unique subset
of cases that differ from how transitional justice is conceived and pursued in other
regions. Africa has been a particularly prominent subject of the field in the last two
decades. This is the result of a confluence of factors, such as the political shifts and
democratisation following the end of the Cold War, the regional influence of the South
African Truth and Reconciliation Commission’s reputation, and the prominence of
international bodies which have promoted transitional justice through their interven-
tions across the continent. In many of these situations, transitional justice is presented
as an externally defined idea. While local actors often see the relevance of the promises
made relating to justice, reconciliation and accountability, the practice of transitional
justice tends to be presented as the implementation of predesigned templates. This
power differential between transitional justice proponents and local “consumers” has
become one of the defining features of the African experience of transitional justice.
1
The African Transitional Justice Research Network Steering Committee consisted of representa-
tives from CSVR (South Africa), the Refugee Law Project (Uganda), the Campaign for Good
Governance (Sierra Leone), the Center for Democratic Development (Ghana) and the Zimbabwe
Lawyers for Human Rights (Zimbabwe).
2
Centre for the Study of Violence and Reconciliation, “Advocating Justice: Civil Society and
Transitional Justice in Africa”, http://www.csvr.org.za/publications/latest-publications/2724-advo-
cating-justice-civil-society-and-transitional-justice-in-africa2 (Accessed 26 July 2017).
Editors’ Preface xi
Civil society has played a key role in reversing this power dynamic, particularly by
formulating local transitional justice agendas and partnering with each other to promote
more locally responsive approaches, and more recently by working with the African
Union on the development of an African Union Transitional Justice Policy. In a similar
vein, civil society has worked closely with the African Commission on Human and
Peoples’ Rights to develop a strategy for engagement with transitional justice. Rather
than rejecting transitional justice as yet another externally imposed agenda, African
institutions are articulating their own values and norms that draw on African human
rights frameworks and reflections on national experiences within the continent.
While there may be some danger of creating a new generic model that presents a
regional rather than a global template, this critical psychological and political shift
means that transitional justice is seen as something that can be redefined and repur-
posed for a different agenda. This volume seeks to feed into African transitional jus-
tice ownership by providing an up-to-date regional perspective on the field. The
chapters speak to the specific local contexts that need to be negotiated by practitioners
and provide considerable pause to those who would impose generic frameworks.
In the introductory chapter, Jasmina Brankovic examines ways in which civil society
theory affects practitioners’ approaches to transitional justice in Africa. Brankovic
outlines the intersections of mainstream and alternative conceptions of civil society
and transitional justice, given their parallel rise in the post-Cold War context. Through
a close reading of the case studies, she explores the main tensions that characterise
these intersections, namely, the validity of positioning (human rights) NGOs as the
most legitimate form of civil society, the significance of associational life based on
sectarian ties, the role of “uncivil” collective action and the marginalisation of vari-
ous local, regional and global dynamics with the centring of the state implied by the
state–civil society binary. Brankovic suggests that the practice of transitional justice
on the continent is constrained by mainstream conceptions of civil society.
Turning the book’s focus to civil society strategies, Andrew Songa analyses the role
of the Kenya Transitional Justice Network (KTJN) in shaping Kenya’s transitional jus-
tice agenda in the context of democratisation. After discussing the dynamics and evolu-
tion of Kenyan civil society since independence, Songa zeroes in on KTJN’s engagement
with the Truth, Justice and Reconciliation Commission, namely, advocating for its
establishment, playing both an advisory and a watchdog role during the commission’s
tenure and then following up on its recommendations. Evaluating KTJN’s agenda devel-
opment and the effectiveness of its strategies, the chapter suggests critical lessons in
terms of substantive issues such as ensuring victim participation and promoting gender
justice, as well as operational issues such as governance structures and sustainability.
Editors’ Preface xiii
account for its misdeeds, and the struggle for a more just society that deals with
inequality and oppression across many social dimensions, including gender. While
the contributors offer some lessons they have learnt, drawing out recommendations
for transitional justice practice from this complex landscape and painful struggle
would seem somewhat trite. What the chapters in fact highlight is the need for con-
stant critical reflection and for innovation. While drawing on international inspiration,
and norms and mechanisms that tilt the power balance in critical ways, transitional
justice is a field that requires localised solutions. African civil society is an important
resource, bringing together as it does a global knowledge base and a localised aware-
ness of resources, needs and priorities.
References
Boraine, A., Levy, J., & Scheffer, R. (Eds.). (1994). The healing of a nation? Cape Town: Justice
in Transition.
Brankovic, J. (2010). Advocating justice: Civil society and transitional justice in Africa. Cape
Town: African Transitional Justice Research Network and Centre for the Study of Violence
and Reconciliation.
Mncwabe, N. (2010). African transitional justice research network: Critical reflections on a peer
learning process. International Journal of Transitional Justice, 4(3), 497–508.
Van der Merwe, H., & Schkolne, M. (2017). The role of local civil society in transitional justice.
In C. Lawther & L. Moffett (Eds.), Research handbook on transitional justice. Edward Elgar:
Cheltenham.
Van der Merwe, H., Dewhirst, P., & Hamber, B. (1999). Non-governmental organizations and the
truth and reconciliation commission: An impact assessment. Politikon: South African Journal
of Political Studies, 26(1), 55–79.
Contents
xvii
xviii Contents
Index������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������ 227
Contributors
xix
About the Contributors
Noha Aboueldahab is visiting fellow at the Brookings Doha Center, where she
researches transitional justice in the Arab region. Her book, Transitional Justice and
the Prosecution of Political Leaders in the Arab Region: A Comparative Study of
Egypt, Libya, Tunisia and Yemen (Hart 2017), challenges mainstream transitional
justice practice and scholarship using original material from almost 50 in-depth
interviews she conducted in Egypt, Libya, Tunisia and Yemen between 2011 and
2017. Additionally, she has worked for several United Nations agencies and NGOs
in New York, Lebanon and Qatar. She has been interviewed by various media out-
lets, including Al Jazeera, BBC, Bloomberg, CNN, MSNBC, Sky News, and the
Washington Post.
xxi
xxii About the Contributors
theses. She is the author of Bodies of Truth: Law, Memory, and Emancipation in
Post-Apartheid South Africa (Stanford University Press 2016). Kesselring was a
research affiliate at the Department of Social Anthropology, University of Cape
Town, and at the Human Rights Institute, University of Connecticut. Her current
book project looks at social life in a new mining town in Zambia.
Shastry Njeru (MA) is programme manager for transitional justice and conflict
transformation at the Zimbabwe Human Rights NGO Forum, with a focus on the
campaign for victim-centred dealing with the past. Njeru is an academic and practi-
tioner with research interests that include dealing with the past, evaluation and post-
conflict recovery.
Zukiswa Puwana is a researcher and facilitator based in Cape Town. She holds a
BA in Psychology and English from the University of the Western Cape, South
Africa, and has worked in the NGO sector for the past 15 years. As a human rights
activist, she joined Khulumani Support Group in 2000 as a volunteer and went on to
be part of the Provincial Executive Committee as secretary and then treasurer until
leaving the organization in 2017.
Andrew Songa is a lawyer and human rights advocate with over 6 years of experi-
ence in the areas of legal research, policy formulation and analysis, domestic and
international policy advocacy and civic education. His work has centred on the the-
matic areas of indigenous peoples’ rights, forced migration, land rights and transi-
tional justice. He is currently programme manager for transformative justice for the
Kenya Human Rights Commission and sits on the board of the Constitution and
Reform Education Consortium. Songa is a member of the Steering Committee of
the Kenya Transitional Justice Network, the Advisory Committee for the Study of
Transitional Justice in Africa currently being undertaken by the African Commission
on Human and Peoples’ Rights, and the Reference Group assisting the African
Commission to draft a General Comment on the Right to Redress for Victims of
Torture and Other Ill-Treatment.
Jasmina Brankovic is a senior researcher with the Centre for the Study of Violence
and Reconciliation and the associate editor of the International Journal of
Transitional Justice. She is a PhD candidate in Political Studies at the University of
Cape Town. Brankovic conducts research on comparative transitional justice, civil
society and victims’ groups, and the intersection of transitional justice and social
transformation. She is co-author of The Global Climate Regime and Transitional
Justice (Routledge 2018).
Hugo van der Merwe is director of research, knowledge and learning at the Centre
for the Study of Violence and Reconciliation. Since joining CSVR in 1997, he has
developed and managed numerous research advocacy and intervention projects
relating to transitional justice, reconciliation and peacebuilding in South Africa
and the African continent. Hugo is the co-editor in chief of the International
Journal of Transitional Justice. His publications include Assessing the Impact of
Transitional Justice (USIP 2009) and Truth and Reconciliation in South Africa:
Did the TRC Deliver? (University of Pennsylvania Press 2008). Van der Merwe
received his doctorate in conflict analysis and resolution from George Mason
University (1999).
xxv
Chapter 1
Introduction: Civil Society in African
Transitional Justice—Comparing Theory
and Practice
Jasmina Brankovic
Introduction
J. Brankovic (*)
University of Cape Town; Centre for the Study of Violence and Reconciliation,
Cape Town, South Africa
e-mail: [email protected]
below, were met with critiques from the start and accompanied by the parallel devel-
opment of other approaches. These “alternative” approaches broadly sought to
describe and respond to realities on the ground in postcolonial states and were posi-
tioned as alternatives to the Eurocentrism of mainstream thinking. This chapter
examines how civil society theory affects transitional justice practitioners’ thinking
on and practice of transitional justice. While many variables influence transitional
justice in African postcolonial states, the chapter looks specifically at the role of
civil society theory. I argue that although most of the case studies are aligned with
alternative thinking on transitional justice, and demonstrate the presence and value
of alternative conceptions of civil society, they also suggest that the practice of tran-
sitional justice in these contexts is constrained by mainstream thinking.
With a focus on Africa, the chapter begins with a brief description of mainstream
civil society theory, its critiques and a variety of alternative approaches, acknowl-
edging the multidisciplinarity of the topic. It then outlines the links between civil
society theory and mainstream understandings of transitional justice, namely,
through democratisation, before describing alternative approaches and examining
the literature on civil society and transitional justice. The chapter goes on to provide
a close reading of the case studies in this book through the tensions between main-
stream and alternative conceptions of civil society, identifying common themes
amid the great diversity of the contexts. These tensions concern the nature of the
relationship between the state and civil society, the validity of positioning (human
rights) nongovernmental organisations (NGOs) as the most legitimate form of civil
society and the significance of associational life based on sectarian ties. They also
concern the role of “uncivil” collective action, the extent of the divide between pri-
vate and public, and the possible marginalisation of various local, regional and
global dynamics with the centring of the state implied by the state–civil society
binary. The chapter closes with reflections on the implications of civil society theory
for transitional justice practice in Africa.
through voluntary association and commerce under the protective structures of the
state. In his critique of liberalism, Hegel introduced the notion that modern society is
split between the private and the public, contrasting the private individual in the
realm of family (initial sociability and ethics) to the citizen in the realm of civil soci-
ety (self-interested voluntary association, including through the market) and the state
(curbing competition and conflict in civil society to enable universal solidarity),
while at the same time reifying the separation between civil society and the state
(Hann 1996; Khilnani 2001).
This brief summary already suggests the key elements of the contemporary
mainstream approach to civil society. It assumes the stratification of society into the
idealised, autonomous and usually vertically aligned realms of family, civil society
and state, often with the market as an additional sphere. It preserves the distinction
between “modern” and “premodern” forms of association, dismissing those based
on kinship, ethnicity and other “primordial” or “traditional” ties as involuntary and
irrational. Finally, it emphasises “civility” in civil society, with order, propriety and
the use of formal channels and associations trumping disorderly and informal social
action (Kasfir 1998). While this understanding of civil society is historically spe-
cific to the rise of anti-absolutist liberal capitalism in Europe and attendant theoris-
ing on social order and legitimate forms of association, in the late twentieth century
it became a “metaphysical truth” in analyses of colonial and postcolonial societies
(Kaviraj 2001: 297).
“Civil society” became a catchword in the 1980s and 1990s, amid the economic
crises facing states in the global South, the critiques of state-run economic modernisa-
tion, and the rollback and decentralisation of the state demanded by international
financial institutions providing loans to struggling governments (Shivji 2007). Western
donors promoted civil society as crucial both to holding states to account and to pro-
viding services that the state previously provided, but presumably less efficiently and
responsively (Bukenya and Hickey 2014). Civil society became viewed “as a hitherto
missing key to sustained political reform, legitimate states and governments, improved
governance, visible state-society and state-economy relationships, and prevention of
the kind of political decay that undermined” postcolonial governments in the past
(Harbeson 1994: 1–2). As this oft-cited quote on civil society in Africa demonstrates,
the discourse on civil society in the 1990s was explicitly linked to the “wave” of
democratisation that accompanied the close of the Cold War.
With the crisis of socialism and the global rise of neoliberalism, liberal concep-
tions were distilled into the mainstream approach to civil society. In Africa, civil
society was increasingly promoted as central to democratisation (Diamond 1994),
understood to entail both political and economic liberalisation. To counter the totalis-
ing tendencies of postcolonial states, civil society is required to be autonomous from
the state (Bayart 1986), alternating between adversarial watchdog and informed aide
to a newly rationalised, mechanistic state engaged in “good governance”, but never
seeking to capture state power and even defined as nonpolitical (Putnam 1993). It
eschews “uncivil” action, ranging from protest to overtly sectarian demands, in
favour of formal channels and processes (Linz and Stepan 1996). It thus embodies a
new form of associational life, most effectively represented by the professional NGO
(Chazan 1992). Democratisation, and particularly democratic consolidation, is
4 J. Brankovic
understood to require a civil society that presumably was absent in African countries
before their transitions. The mainstream approach thus both seeks to describe civil
society and promotes a normative framework for societies in transition.
As applied to Africa, the mainstream approach to civil society has been exten-
sively critiqued since the 1990s. The chief critique is that it is Eurocentric, univer-
salising ideologies emerging from Europe’s seventeenth-century transition to
capitalism, foregrounding its (neo)liberal emphasis on the “autonomous agentic
individual” (Seligman 1992: 5) over other forms of subjectivity and collective
action, and promoting a specific form of democracy through development (Mamdani
1995; Shivji 2007). Critics have questioned the separation of society into idealised
autonomous realms, particularly in reference to civil society and the state, arguing
that this masks the interpenetration of these realms and the pluralistic associational
life present in Africa since precolonial times (Osaghae 2005; Comaroff and
Comaroff 1999). They note that by sidelining “uncivil” strategies as well as collec-
tive action emerging from kinship and ethnic ties, the mainstream concept of civil
society does not reflect realities on the ground (Kasfir 1998; Chabal and Daloz
1999). Here, the project of describing civil society is presented as primarily norma-
tive and as an imposition of Western frameworks onto postcolonial societies. Linked
to critiques of neoliberalism, critiques of the mainstream conception of civil society
posit it as at best inapplicable and at worst a prop of neocolonialism.
The mainstream thinking on civil society developed in parallel with a number of
alternative approaches. These emerged from questions concerning the degree of
interpenetration among the realms of family, civil society, the state and the market,
as well as evolving thinking concerning citizenship and collective action in the Cold
War and post-Cold War periods. Regarding the relationship of civil society and the
state, it must be noted that even liberal thinkers had different views, with Locke, for
example, presenting the state as a manifestation of civil society and voluntary asso-
ciation, rather than as a separate sphere. Hegel put forward the notion of the state as
a bureaucratic mechanism that holds and enables association in the public sphere,
even while acknowledging that the state in this formulation is an idealised “true
state” (Kaviraj 2001). Marx critiqued this approach as glossing over the likelihood
that elites would use the state machinery to further their own interests, to the extent
that the distinction is questionable. Gramsci similarly highlighted the porousness of
state and civil society, arguing that the state encompasses both political society,
which imposes elite interests through coercion, and civil society, which ensures the
hegemony of these interests through persuasion and consent, although elements in
civil society can play a counterhegemonic role (Mamdani 1995; Hann 1996).
In the 1960s and 1970s, disaffection with authoritarianism revitalised thinking
around civil society in Eastern Europe and Latin America. Drawing on Gramsci, left-
ists posited social movements as a counter-option to established civil society institu-
tions, such as trade unions and professional associations, viewed as co-opted by the
state and as denying the plurality of views and interests in society (Khilnani 2001).
Through to the 1990s, particularly throughout the global South, thinking around a
more socially responsive civil society ranged from disengagement with the state and
a focus on self-rule; to valorisation of pluralism and identity- or issue-based collective
action over action through established institutions; to calls for radical democracy with
1 Introduction: Civil Society in African Transitional Justice… 5
emancipatory politics as a bond among diverse groups, in some cases with inclusivity
guaranteed through broad participation (Baker 2002; Mouffe 1993; Dagnino 2007).
While Habermas and other theorists on the left have deployed the concept of civil
society as a nursery of new ideas and self-reflexivity in the public sphere, poststruc-
turalist thinkers such as Foucault have problematised the notion of autonomous
social realms like civil society and the state while wrestling with what this means for
possibilities for resistance and counterhegemonic practice. These questions come to
the fore in various discussions of “everyday” politics, or the ways in which margin-
alised people individually or collectively, “defensively” or “offensively”, through
necessity or conscious mobilisation, engage in resistance and effect social change
(Scott 1985; Bayat 1997; Chatterjee 2001). Often responding to the totalising post-
colonial state, these would be considered “uncivil” actions in the mainstream
approach. Much of this thinking does not hinge on the distinction between public and
private, rather highlighting the interpenetration between the two, and in some cases
reflecting feminist theory on how what is perceived as private is public and on the
multiplicity of ways and public spaces in which contestations of power occur, includ-
ing by women (Tripp 1998; Howell 2007). Much of it also does not privilege urban
over rural associational life, as does mainstream thinking (Howell 2000).
Critiques of mainstream conceptions of civil society as applied to Africa emerge
mainly from these alternative approaches. They underline the plurality and heteroge-
neity of associational life, the porousness or even lack of distinction between state and
civil society, and the blurred line between private and public, while also rejecting the
(neo)liberal dichotomy of modernity and tradition for its implication that the former
is universal and normal while the latter is residual and pathological (Mamdani 1995).
In particular, theorists posit that kinship- and ethnicity-based associational life, along
with other forms of sectarian organisation, is an established aspect of civil society on
the continent that cannot be dismissed (Ndegwa 1997; Kasfir 1998). Another relevant
critique is of the state-centrism of the mainstream conception, given the weak (colo-
nial) roots of the state in Africa, the impact of regional population flows and politics,
and the influence of large diasporas on notions of c itizenship, along with the interac-
tion of local and global norms (Gallagher 2014; Obadare and Adebanwi 2009).
Finally, critics point to the range of “uncivil” collective action occurring on the conti-
nent in response to increasing socio-economic inequality and exclusion in the context
of economic liberalisation as examples of vibrant civil society (Bond 2014).
Despite the long-standing critiques and the wealth of alternative thinking in civil
society theory, the fact is that the mainstream conception of what civil society is and
should be remains dominant in practice. In Africa, as elsewhere, international
donors, policy makers and experts, along with their counterparts at the domestic
level, continue to support the (neo)liberal approach to civil society, most effectively
by channelling funding into this global project. Attempts have been made to respond
to certain critiques, for example by funding local over international organisations or
by fostering citizen participation and state–civil society partnerships, but the profes-
sionalised NGO that follows “the rules” remains the most legitimised form of asso-
ciational life (Bukenya and Hickey 2014). This reality in Africa led Kasfir (1998) to
critique mainstream civil society as a normative project with little analytical or
descriptive value.
6 J. Brankovic
Scholars and practitioners of transitional justice will notice the parallels between
the rise, and the critiques, of their field and the mainstream approach to civil society.
The following section outlines these parallels, examines how civil society is dis-
cussed in relation to transitional justice, and asks how mainstream definitions of
civil society came to affect alternative thinking on transitional justice.
Like the concept of civil society, transitional justice has roots in antiquity, but
emerged as a discrete field in the 1980s and 1990s, in tandem with democratisation
in Latin America and Eastern Europe (Elster 2004). The potential of transitional
justice, and international justice more broadly, to contribute to democratisation and
nation building is what fuelled its speedy evolution into a globally accepted field
(Teitel 2003). Like its parent discourse, human rights, transitional justice came to
the fore with the crisis of socialism and attempts to articulate new forms of collec-
tive action and responsibility, as well as with the rise of neoliberalism, with its focus
on individual agency in the context of economic liberalisation and state rationalisa-
tion through rapid institutional reform (Arthur 2009; Laplante 2008). The main-
stream approach entails a set of legal and quasi-legal state-sponsored
mechanisms—short-term and with narrow, “achievable” mandates—designed to
ensure accountability for past gross human rights violations, primarily civil–politi-
cal ones, and to prevent their recurrence by promoting democratic nation building
and institutional reform. These “standard practices” (Subotić 2011), born out of
transitions from authoritarianism to democracy, are now applied in transitions from
conflict to (democratic) peace, in countries that have not undergone regime change,
and in long-standing (mainly settler-colonial) democracies.
One of the chief critiques of mainstream transitional justice, particularly in
Africa, is that it is a European concept exported as a one-size-fits-all solution to
contexts whose political, social and cultural histories make it an ill fit (Okello 2010).
The field is seen as overly concerned with retributive responses to violence perpe-
trated by individuals, sidelining restorative approaches that focus on collective
responsibility and repair, which in African contexts may be more culturally relevant.
Critics question the “top-down” nature of mainstream transitional justice, which
favours state-sponsored mechanisms run by international and local elites and side-
lines grassroots or rural participation and local approaches (Shaw and Waldorf
2010; Gready and Robins 2014). They critique its bundling with political and eco-
nomic liberalisation, noting that it may contribute to instability by deepening social
divisions with its focus on accountability, establishing institutions with little local
legitimacy, and both ignoring socio-economic inequality and increasing it in the
long term (Sriram 2007; Mutua 2009; Kagoro 2012). As with civil society, many of
these arguments posit mainstream transitional justice as a form of neocolonialism.
Alternative approaches to transitional justice broaden the parameters of the field.
While diverse, they generally aim to be “bottom-up” and holistic, incorporating
measures from the global South as well as from other fields, such as memory studies
1 Introduction: Civil Society in African Transitional Justice… 7
and development. Many eschew the mainstream preoccupation with the state, fore-
grounding community- and civil society-run mechanisms and local or traditional
processes, which often have a more restorative orientation even when they include
retributive elements (Fletcher and Weinstein 2002). Emphasising repair, they push
for transitional justice to be more victim centred, shifting the focus away from per-
petrators and nation building towards victims’ demands, everyday needs and par-
ticipation. Some move the lens from elites to ordinary people affected by past
violations, which in transitional contexts often includes shifting the lens from urban
to rural areas. A number of these approaches also foreground accountability for past
socio-economic injustices, often with the aim of addressing contemporary inequal-
ity, including its greater impact on women or marginalised groups (Okello et al.
2012; Ní Aoláin 2012). Some buck the connotations of linear progress and short-
term solutions suggested by the term “transitional”, arguing for “transformative jus-
tice” (Gready and Robins 2014), “distributive justice” (Bergsmo et al. 2010) or
“integral justice” (Mani 2014). These alternative approaches are positioned as theo-
retical responses to evidence on the ground.
A number of transitional justice practitioners in Africa have offered strident cri-
tiques of the mainstream approach and attempted to elaborate a more contextually
relevant transitional justice in practice (Okello et al. 2012), both in response to local
evidence and, perhaps less so, in dialogue with transitional justice theorists. This is
exemplified by the pointed name (and content) of the annual Institute for African
Transitional Justice, organised in Uganda by the Refugee Law Project and the African
Transitional Justice Research Network. Practitioners argue that African civil society
shapes transitional justice processes on the continent (Brankovic 2010). Transitional
justice theorists largely support this assertion, as it relates to Africa and elsewhere
(Crocker 1998; Rangelov and Teitel 2011; Hovil and Okello 2011). Yet, critical anal-
yses of the relationship between civil society and transitional justice are few.
While transitional justice scholars highlight the diversity and plurality of civil
society, noting the complex history and ambiguity of the concept and nodding
towards forms of associational life such as social movements and sectarian groups,
most then focus on the role of formal, professional NGOs, which are posited as “the
main civil society role players in transitional justice” (Van der Merwe and Brankovic
2016: 228; Simić and Volčič 2013). The literature offers a number of typologies of
NGO engagement with transitional justice, both in relation to the state and to inter-
national regimes. For example, David Backer (2003) outlines civil society activities
in transitional contexts, such as “data collection and monitoring” and acting as a
“parallel authority”, and then offers scenarios ranging from “strength and symbio-
sis” to “hands off the wheel” that describe the relationship between civil society and
the state in transitional justice. Aaron Boesenecker and Leslie Vinjamuri (2011)
suggest four roles that civil society plays in engaging with international norms
in local contexts, namely, as norm makers, norm adaptors, norm facilitators and
norm reflectors. Hugo van der Merwe and Jasmina Brankovic (2016) similarly offer
a typology of roles that civil society plays in relation to international norms—imple-
menters, opponents, reframers, alternatives and mediators—while also noting that
organisations’ approaches differ according to the stages of transition, ranging from
“active conflict” to “after transitional justice processes”. While these works offer
8 J. Brankovic
insight into NGO strategies and the way that alternative approaches to transitional
justice interact with the mainstream one, they do not give an account of associa-
tional life in transitional contexts.
Some work has been done on what alternative approaches to transitional justice
may mean for civil society. For example, Béatrice Pouligny (2005) argues that the
socio-political transformations required in transitions, especially in postconflict
contexts, are better effected through the diverse existing forms of associational life,
knowledge and resources of the “social base”, as opposed to imported notions of
legitimate civil society (in the form of “mushrooming” NGOs), transitional pro-
cesses and state institutions, which promote homogeneity and lack local content.
Hovil and Okello (2011) note the reduction of civil society considered legitimate to
human rights NGOs that have a facility with global discourses and donor require-
ments. They also note the disconnect between local NGOs and their “constituency”,
which in the absence of “accountability mechanisms … that promote self-reflection”
leads to NGOs “projecting their own perceptions onto their compatriots” and at
times to harmful outcomes (334–335). Such contributions deny the separation of
state and civil society, and particularly the notion that they are in opposition, critiqu-
ing the valorisation of civil society as always “good”, noting that state and civil
society representatives often switch from one to the other or play multiple roles, and
highlighting the influence of international and regional actors in addition to state
actors (Andrieu 2010; Rangelov and Teitel 2011). Clearly, critiques of mainstream
understandings of civil society and transitional justice share many elements, not
least in drawing on critiques of neoliberalism.
Beyond the focus on NGOs, the interesting thing about how transitional justice
scholars and practitioners think about civil society is that even when they articulate
a critique of mainstream transitional justice and imply an alternative approach to
civil society, they often deploy mainstream definitions of civil society. In an edito-
rial for a special issue on civil society for the leading academic journal on transi-
tional justice, Lucy Hovil and Moses Okello use Helmut Anheier’s (2004) definition:
“Civil society is the sphere of institutions, organisations and individuals located
among the family, the state and the market, in which people associate voluntarily to
advance common interests” (Hovil and Okello 2011: 333). In this volume, practitio-
ner Andrew Songa uses Larry Diamond’s (1994: 5) definition of civil society as
“autonomous from the state, and bound by a legal order or set of shared rules”. Also
here, scholar James Dhizaala defines civil society as “distinct from the state, the
family and the market”, borrowing a World Bank (2006: 2) definition. All of these
authors’ contributions suggest a distinctly un-mainstream thinking on civil society,
based on their reflections on the practice of transitional justice on the continent. This
begs the question of why they use mainstream definitions.
The next section discusses the extent to which the practices described in this
book hold with the mainstream approach, to what extent they differ, and what this
suggests about civil society’s role in shaping transitional justice on the continent. It
does so by examining the contributions to the volume through the main binaries
constructed by the mainstream approach and questioned in African contexts: civil
society in relation to the state, tradition, religion, the family and the market.
1 Introduction: Civil Society in African Transitional Justice… 9
A close reading of the case studies demonstrates the plurality and complexity of
associational life on the continent. The chapters indicate that alternative approaches
to civil society more accurately describe the realities on the ground than the main-
stream approach. This comes through all the more strongly as the normative bias of
civil society theory is somewhat bypassed by the book’s focus on transitional justice
in practice. This section examines the case studies through the main tensions
between mainstream and alternative thinking on civil society—outlining common
themes despite the significant historical and socio-political differences of the coun-
tries under study. Despite being a short overview, it suggests a different way of
reading the chapters in the volume.
The interpenetration of state and civil society is evident in the case studies, with
the state acting through civil society and civil society pursuing explicitly political
aims, including taking state power. Regarding state control, Noha Aboueldahab
notes that Libyan state representatives occupied senior positions in civil society
organisations before transition. Discussing contemporary Burundi, Wendy
Lambourne suggests that a number of organisations, termed nyakuri, are understood
to be acting politically on behalf of the state, in addition to noting the presence of
army and political party representatives in an influential transitional justice group.
Andrew Songa mentions retired diplomats and military generals as members of the
Concerned Citizens for Peace, a network involved in Kenya’s transitional justice
efforts. The case studies of the North African countries and Burundi and Uganda
discuss the extent of state regulation of civil society, with registration and the threat
of closure keeping many groups in line.
With regard to politicised civil society, Shastry Njeru discusses Zimbabwe’s
National Constitutional Assembly, an umbrella NGO originally aligned with the
political opposition that recently became an independent political party in the con-
text of constitutional reform. Aboueldahab notes that in transitional Egypt, several
civil society groups announced plans to form political parties, before the return of
dictatorship. James Dhizaala argues that the civil society formations which advo-
cated reform in prewar Liberia considered themselves political organisations. They
formed the base of the postwar Transitional Justice Working Group, a human rights
group that managed to secure seats for civil society representatives in the transi-
tional government by influencing the peace agreement. Andrew Iliff, meanwhile,
highlights the porousness between state and civil society at the community level,
noting that local state authorities, like other local authorities, can play multiple
roles, including as NGO proxies.
These examples mainly refer to situations before or during political transition.
While this is due in part to the ongoing nature of these specific transitions, it also
appears to fit the mainstream conception that civil society is only legitimate if it is
separate from the state in the wake of democratisation (Diamond 1994). Yet,
Dhizaala’s discussion suggests the continuities in civil society actors and agendas
before and after democratisation, particularly as members of civil society continue
10 J. Brankovic
may be put into perspective by the divisions sown by local human rights NGOs through
their interactions with the Kenyan and Liberian truth commissions.
Another striking aspect of the case studies is the prominent role played by vari-
ous faith-based organisations. These are largely considered “good” civil society
based on the assumption that they are founded on private faith and the pursuit of a
“common good” (apparently unlike traditional associations) (Shankar 2014).
Importantly, however, the chapters suggest that faith-based organisations in Kenya,
Zimbabwe, South Africa, Burundi and Liberia played a role in peacebuilding efforts,
in several cases actively participating in peace negotiations, but had less of a role in
transitional justice efforts and their aftermaths. This can be ascribed to divisions
regarding whether to privilege peace efforts over accountability, the territorial rifts
between the fields of peacebuilding and transitional justice, and possibly concerns
over some faith-based groups’ political alignment with the state. However, it may be
more of a function of dominant human rights NGOs sidelining faith-based organisa-
tions in transitional justice, particularly in the implementation phase. Here Njeru’s
evidence of outreach participants requesting a Church-run truth commission can be
contrasted with Lambourne’s implication that religious representatives are not civil
society in her discussion of the commissioner selection process in Burundi (which
may be the implication of her source, the international NGO Impunity Watch).
In line with considerations of what makes “good” civil society is the question of
where “uncivil” collective action fits in. Among several examples in the case studies
is Dhizaala’s description of Liberian women from the Buduburam refugee camp
holding a 2-month sit-in by the venue where peace talks were held and using their
bodies to block people and supplies from entering the building until a ceasefire was
signed. Another example is Puwana and Kesselring’s discussion of the apartheid
survivors’ organisation, Khulumani Support Group, marching on parliament in
South Africa to push for adequate reparations. The former action contributed to the
signing of the peace accord, and the latter, while not resulting in the reparations
programme the survivors demanded, raised awareness of survivors’ issues and led
to collaboration between Khulumani and a range of other civil society groups.
Both of these actions were run by victims, who, while presumably most affected
by transitional justice efforts, play a small role in the case study narratives. The
chapters on Kenya, Liberia and Libya discuss NGOs organising victims, but the
case studies of Zimbabwe, South Africa, Burundi and also Kenya describe the mar-
ginalisation of victims in transitional processes and specifically by NGOs. This is
acknowledged as a learning point, for example, with Songa reflecting that the main
transitional justice coalition in Kenya could have more effectively advanced gender
justice if it had worked not only with mainstream, national NGOs but also with
smaller “victim-led” organisations.
This all points to a similar and certainly in some cases interlinked marginalisa-
tion of victims’ and community-based women’s collective action as “uncivil” and as
not belonging to “good” civil society, except perhaps as a prop for the more “impor-
tant” work of NGOs. It may also point to an unspoken sense that this collective
action is an expression of private pain in a form that is outside the parameters of
commonly accepted forms of expression (Madlingozi 2010; Kesselring 2016).
There is little overt discussion of the private in the case studies, except in Puwana
12 J. Brankovic
and Kesselring’s chapter, where they note that Khulumani, which is made up pri-
marily of women, advocates for reparations payments to individual victims (rather
than collective compensation) because the “women have learnt through experience
that they are the best managers of a household budget” (Chap. 5). This comment
provides a glimpse of the blurred line between private and public, and its relation-
ship to “uncivil” civil society, that is largely absent from NGO strategies and analy-
ses of these strategies (Howell 2007). It also points to the centrality of economic
concerns, linked to historical and contemporary socio-economic exclusion, to those
engaged in “uncivil” action (Robins 2013), which is similarly acknowledged but not
discussed in any depth in the chapters.
The final point that should be made about the case studies is that they show that
the state-centric view of civil society is too narrow, not simply in the discussions of
local organisations’ interactions with international norms but also, more impor-
tantly, in terms of the multiple sites in which the contestation of power occurs—
local, regional and global. In addition to a number of examples above, Iliff’s chapter
notes the complexity of local dynamics in relation to community and traditional
practices outside the state. The case studies of Liberia, Burundi and Libya discuss
the influence of civil society in the diaspora on international, regional and domestic
state responses to transitional justice efforts. The chapters on Liberia and Zimbabwe
mention the influence of—and advocacy aimed at—regional economic communi-
ties, and the chapter on Kenya mentions the influence of the African Union. The
chapters on Kenya, Liberia, Uganda, Libya, Tunisia and especially Burundi discuss
the impact of the United Nations. Puwana and Kesselring describe Khulumani’s liti-
gation using the United States Alien Tort Statute against international corporations
accused of aiding the security forces under apartheid. Lambourne’s contribution
mentions organisations being co-opted by “business interests” to undertake activi-
ties that indirectly support state actors. The chapters on Kenya, Liberia, Burundi and
Egypt note the influence of traditional and social media in raising awareness and
prompting collective action at the local and global levels. These and other examples
go far beyond the mainstream focus on state–civil society relations, even though
most of the chapters’ explicit concern is NGOs’ efforts with the state.
The next section concludes the chapter with reflections on what the tensions
between mainstream and alternative approaches to civil society in the case studies
suggest for transitional justice practice, particularly in Africa.
A close reading of the case studies—and particularly what is written outside the
main focus of the chapters—suggests that the nature of African associational life in
the context of transitional justice better fits alternative approaches in civil society
theory. The chapters show the porousness between state and civil society, a hetero-
geneous civil society with (human rights) NGOs as but one influential actor, and the
significance of associational life based on sectarian ties to effective processes. They
1 Introduction: Civil Society in African Transitional Justice… 13
show the links between “uncivil” civil society and those most affected by violations
and transitional justice efforts, the blurring between private and public in the con-
testations of power that mark transitions, and the reductionism of the focus on the
state required by the state–civil society binary in light of the influence of local,
regional and global dynamics. In more ways than outlined above, there is evidence
of state, human rights NGO, faith-based, traditional, grassroots, victim, labour,
diaspora, international agency and other actors interacting with each other in every
constellation, including switching between roles.
This alignment with alternative understandings of civil society seems to make
sense, given that most of the contributors support alternative approaches to transi-
tional justice, which aim to be more context specific, holistic, “bottom-up” and
sensitive to the ongoing effects of historical injustices (political, social, economic)
in the present, foregrounding community-based solutions and victims’ demands.
Yet, these manifestations of alternative thinking about civil society are peripheral in
the case studies. Although it was not a requirement of the call for chapters, the stated
focus of the majority of the case studies is NGOs and their activities in relation to
the state. Traditional groups, community-based groups and even victims’ groups
play a minor role in almost all the narratives. Faith-based groups are discussed in
relation to peace negotiations, but mostly disappear in the descriptions of transi-
tional justice mechanisms and their aftermaths. While there is direct discussion of
international norms, the plurality and complexity of various local, regional and
global actors is mentioned only in passing. All of this begs questions similar to the
one I asked about why some contributors use mainstream definitions of civil society
when their chapters suggest other inclinations.
I argue that the mainstream conception of civil society guides transitional justice
practice in the diverse case studies here, and generally across the continent, in subtle
ways. This tendency is due in part to the guidance of international donors, agencies
and organisations, as discussed by Quinn, Lambourne and Songa. However, practi-
tioners have noted that the influence of international actors can be overstated
(Brankovic 2010) and that local civil society may not be “gullible but rather view
their international partners as ‘useful idiots’ to be deployed at whim, whose ideals
can be dispensed with after their inevitable departure” (Hovil and Okello 2011: 339).
The relationship of local civil society to international partners is characterised by
agency as much as dependency and is shaped by too many variables to paint with the
same brush. A more likely explanation is norm diffusion and the simple fact of main-
stream conceptions being mainstream and thus dominant. Critiques of the main-
stream approaches to transitional justice and civil society abound, particularly in
theory, but the practice of both remains heavily circumscribed by established ways of
doing, even when some elements of practice counter the norm. At the same time, as
the number of studies of civil society’s role in transitional justice increases, it is pos-
sible that these constrained approaches will appear as “best practice” learnt on the
ground, thereby reifying the civil society theory biases in transitional justice.
In addition, mainstream thinking describes how civil society is expected to look
after democratisation, when the “irrational” elements involved in bringing down the
old regime are sidelined so as to prevent their undue and supposedly regressive influ-
ence on the newly established democratic state. As liberal democracies, postcolonial
14 J. Brankovic
states foreground political sovereignty over popular sovereignty and locate legiti-
mate efforts at social change solely in the realms of electoral representation and
mainstream civil society. This may be one cause of the challenges NGOs face in
following up on transitional justice mechanisms after they close—the marginalisa-
tion of “alternative” forms of civil society narrows the scope for contestation and
legitimate political action, with NGOs undermining themselves by contributing to
this marginalisation. Another challenge is that transitional justice, which gained its
legitimacy by contributing to democratisation and nation building, is now applied in
contexts far different from the transitions from authoritarianism to democracy that
frame its origins. In these contexts, particularly the now increasingly common case
of transitional justice processes being used in the absence of political transition or in
partial transitions, the mainstream approach to civil society may constrain those parts
of civil society that otherwise would contribute to regime change. In this light,
NGOs’ efforts to position themselves as nonpolitical or “above” politics, as Iliff and
Dhizaala describe in their chapters, appear self-defeating, at least in terms of meeting
their transitional justice goals, even if not in terms of ensuring their own longevity.
These aspects of the intersections of theory and practice with civil society and transi-
tional justice call for more research. They also suggest the wisdom for practitioners—
including for us as the editors of this volume and as practitioners ourselves—of Issa
Shivji’s reflections that “every practice gives rise to theory and that every action is based
on some theoretical or philosophical premise or outlook”, but that among NGOs “theory
is written off as ‘common sense’ and therefore not interrogated” (2007: 36). This chapter
supports his call “to integrate intellectual and activist discourse” and for NGOs to “fun-
damentally re-examine their silences and their discourses” in order to “truly play the role
of catalysts of change rather than catechists of aid and charity” (46–47).
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Chapter 2
Locating Civil Society in Kenya’s Transitional
Justice Agenda: A Reflection
on the Experience of the Kenya Transitional
Justice Network with the Truth, Justice
and Reconciliation Commission
Andrew Songa
Introduction
This chapter outlines the origins of Kenya’s transitional justice agenda and the role of
civil society in shaping it, with a focus on Kenya’s Truth, Justice and Reconciliation
Commission (TJRC) process. It argues that Kenyan civil society played a critical role
in the truth, justice and reconciliation process by assuming various roles that include (1)
advocacy for the establishment of a truth commission; (2) sensitisation and mobilisa-
tion of victim groups to participate in the TJRC; (3) acting as monitors and watchdogs
to the process; (4) serving as technical experts advising the TJRC; and (5) advocating
for the implementation of the findings and recommendations of the TJRC report.
While there are a variety of coalitions, collaborations and individual initiatives by
various civil society organisations (CSOs) with regard to the TJRC process, the chap-
ter focuses on the experiences of the Kenya Transitional Justice Network (KTJN) as
a dominant coalition whose interventions traversed all the aforementioned roles. It
explores the origins and motivations for the establishment of KTJN, together with the
development and implementation of the KTJN agenda, while noting the major deci-
sion points for the network that significantly influenced engagement among coalition
members and their engagement with state actors. It reflects on lessons learnt thus far.
While there is a significant literature on Kenya’s transitional justice processes and the
impact of civil society on some of these processes, this is an attempt to document the
particular experiences of KTJN from my perspective as a representative of the Kenya
Human Rights Commission (KHRC) and a member of its leadership since 2012.
It relies on records of KTJN’s activities, output documents and interviews with key
KTJN members and stakeholders, who shall remain anonymous.
A. Songa (*)
Kenya Human Rights Commission, Nairobi, Kenya
e-mail: [email protected]
A primary conclusion is that civil society in Kenya has played not only a pivotal
role in shaping Kenya’s transitional justice agenda but also the role of vanguard,
seeking to sustain the impetus for implementation of the transitional justice process
and accentuating the voices of victims within public debate. Kenya has an expansive
transitional justice agenda informed by a motivation to complete Kenya’s process of
democratisation alongside delivering justice for the victims of the 2007–2008 post-
election violence (PEV). The formulation of civil society networks such as KTJN
has been a response to the challenge of developing a comprehensive approach to
monitoring and actively participating in the implementation process.
In assessing KTJN’s experience, a series of key questions emerge with respect to
the operations of civil society networks. What governance structures should net-
works put in place to advance victim-centred and responsive transitional justice
processes? How should networks be resourced to ensure that they are sustainable?
Finally, how should networks empower victims and contribute to the goal of self-
representation in shaping and participating in transitional justice processes?
The chapter begins by providing the historical context of Kenya from the advent
of colonialism to the violence witnessed in the aftermath of the 2007 general elec-
tions and how this informed the current transitional justice agenda. It then focuses
on the actual formulation of the transitional justice agenda as part of a mediated
settlement to end the violence. The chapter commences the discussion of civil soci-
ety’s involvement in shaping Kenya’s interaction with transitional justice before
narrowing in on the specific experience of KTJN and its engagement with the
TJRC. The chapter finally reflects on KTJN’s approach and highlights its challenges
and the lessons learnt so far.
The unjustified use of force and serious crimes by the police and other security
agents were also identified as prominent features of the violence (CIPEV 2008).
This historical background reveals a catalogue of gross human rights violations
and a series of missed opportunities to remedy harms suffered by victims. The fail-
ure to break away from our colonial legacy has seen some define the Kenyan state
as predatory and illiberal, with its orientation being that of political repression to
facilitate economic exploitation (Task Force 2003). A compounded sense of griev-
ance among communities and the non-responsiveness of the state evolved into his-
torical injustices and a culture of impunity within the ruling elite. It is this prevailing
environment that led to the unprecedented PEV and a political settlement to end the
conflict, which finally compelled the political leadership and the public at large to
confront the legacy of political despotism and societal inequity through a transi-
tional justice agenda.
among the youth; consolidating national cohesion and unity; undertaking land reforms;
and addressing transparency, accountability and impunity (AU Commission 2014).
The KNDR also resulted in the signing of three agreements on March 4, 2008,
that established the implementing institutions to be utilised in this endeavour. One
was the Independent Review Commission (IREC), established to assess the elec-
toral infrastructure after the 2007 election results. Another was the Commission of
Inquiry into the Post-Election Violence (CIPEV), established as a nonjudicial body
to investigate facts and circumstances leading to the PEV, investigate alleged crimes
by state security agencies and recommend legal, political or administrative mea-
sures that would bring those criminally responsible to account. The third was an
agreement on the structure for constitutional review, which included a referendum
to enact the new constitution. Finally, the KNDR saw the parties agree to an imple-
mentation matrix for long-term issues and solutions.
The KNDR had a number of notable outcomes. First, the grand coalition govern-
ment resuscitated the constitutional review process. Promulgated on August 27,
2010, the constitution’s notable highlights are an expansive bill of rights that recog-
nises economic, social and cultural rights and the introduction of a devolved system
government to enhance the public’s participation in governance and the articulation
of the developmental agenda. The process also consisted of reforms to the judiciary
and police, including vetting procedures.
Second, CIPEV recommended the establishment of a Special Tribunal for Kenya
for crimes against humanity. CIPEV stated that it would submit a list of names of
those most responsible for the PEV to the International Criminal Court (ICC) if the
Special Tribunal failed to materialise, which proved prudent as the political class
was unable to enact the necessary legislation for the establishment of the tribunal.
The ICC’s chief prosecutor eventually initiated investigations proprio motu on the
basis of the CIPEV information, which resulted in charges against William Samoei
Ruto and Joshua Arap Sang in Case One and Uhuru Muigai Kenyatta and Francis
Muthaura in Case Two. The cases were withdrawn or dropped by 2016, although
not before Uhuru Kenyatta and William Ruto utilised their indictments to mobilise
their Kikuyu and Kalenjin communities, which were at the epicentre of the PEV, in
order to come to power in 2013 as president and deputy president, respectively, and
thereby control government policy on the ICC cases (Hansen 2011).
Third, the grand coalition government enacted the Truth, Justice and
Reconciliation Act No. 6 of 2008, which established the TJRC and saw its commis-
sioners sworn in on August 3, 2009. The mandate of the TJRC was to inquire into
gross human rights violations and historical injustices that occurred in Kenya from
December 12, 1963 (independence), to February 28, 2008 (signing of the National
Accord). The TJRC issued its final report on May 3, 2013. The implementation of
its recommendations remains an ongoing concern, as is discussed below.
The KNDR’s process of mediation and its resultant power-sharing agreement
significantly influenced the environment for and the scope of Kenya’s transitional
justice framework and it has been propounded that mediation should be seriously
considered as a transitional justice issue, since it establishes the basis for a negoti-
ated sense of justice while also detailing or preempting the manner in which transi-
22 A. Songa
tional justice is carried out (Musila 2010). The developments within the ambit of
criminal accountability and the TJRC process, however, reveal the challenges inher-
ent in relying on a mediation agreement that confers significant powers on the polit-
ical elite to control the justice process (Hansen 2013). The reality of a reluctant
political class in a transitional justice context requires an external element that plays
the role of vanguard, namely civil society.
This chapter identifies with Larry Diamond’s definition of civil society “as the
realm of organized social life that is voluntary, self-generating, (largely) self-
supporting, autonomous from the state and bound by a legal order or set of shared
rules” (cited in Bodewes 2013: 4). In addition it recognises civil society to be a
heterogeneous space with a polarised nature due to the rules set by the state and the
state’s tactic of simultaneously incorporating and disengaging with different seg-
ments of civil society (Ngunyi 2008).
With regard to transitional justice in particular, civil society has been recognised
as playing a critical role by influencing those responsible for shaping, developing
and implementing the processes while also being directly involved in implementa-
tion (Van der Merwe and Brankovic 2016). It is thus important to appreciate the
evolution of civil society’s role in Kenya’s historical context. During the Kenyatta
era, civil society was largely a partner in development with the state, rather than a
watchdog. During the Moi era it was an agent of democratisation, with the impetus
shifting to restoring political pluralism and putting an end to autocratic rule. During
the Kibaki era, its role was institutionalising democracy by advocating for constitu-
tional and institutional reforms, as well as elaborating the notion of transitional
justice by calling for the establishment of the TJRC (Lasseko 2009).
As noted above, the KNDR served as the critical facilitator for Kenya’s transi-
tional justice framework, and it is well documented that civil society played a major
role in shaping the KNDR. The office of the AU Panel summarised the role of civil
society in the process as follows:
Civil society organizations made an immense contribution to the mediation process. Their
submissions and meetings with the Panel contextualized the crisis and helped it to formulate
appropriate corrective measures. They described the extent of the crisis, the atrocities com-
mitted, and the probable outcomes if the negotiations failed. (AU Commission 2014: 30)
Civil society input into the KNDR has also been characterised as effectively
utilising a mediation process to advocate for human rights and a transitional justice
agenda (Hansen 2013). This input was however provided by a divergent and hetero-
geneous civil society that applied different approaches in line with their core values
and political alignments, as they were not neutral (Kanyinga 2011). The divide in
civil society was characterised as between the “conservatives/moderates” or “peace
2 Locating Civil Society in Kenya’s Transitional Justice Agenda… 23
The KTJN began as an umbrella body referred to as the Multi-Sectoral Task Force
(MSTF), formed in 2008. MTSF’s primary focus was the establishment of the TJRC,
with its stated mission being to push for a people-centred, effective and credible com-
mission (MSTF 2008a). An appreciation for the true extent of the transitional justice
agenda as revealed by the KNDR agreements would see MSTF in 2009 transform into
the KTJN, with an expanded mission: “To collaborate towards the realization of tran-
sitional justice programmes (components) in Kenya comprising Truth-telling, Criminal
Justice, Constitutional Changes, Administrative Changes, Public Capital, Public Land,
Gender Justice, Historical Injustices and Victims’ Coalition” (KTJN 2009a: 1).
According to KTJN, “truth-telling” entailed focusing on the TJRC and any other
judicial processes, public inquiries and historical narrative and documentation pro-
cesses that resulted in accountability for the gross human rights violations that linked
the past to the present. “Criminal justice” would be the avenue for retribution against
persons deemed responsible for gross human rights violations, whether in their own
capacity or by following “orders from above” and breaking the law with impunity.
24 A. Songa
grammes or other activities; obtaining common funding for joint endeavours or the
furtherance of the mission; creating new social value; and strengthening members’
common identities and interests in the long term (Ashman et al. 2005). The next
sections interrogate the extent to which KTJN managed to achieve these objectives,
and specifically by engaging with the TJRC process.
in the KNDR, the political elite who had been identified as responsible for the PEV
were wary of any process that might lead to their indictment (Musila 2009). This
resulted in two failed attempts to establish the Special Tribunal in 2009, as the presi-
dent and prime minister failed to achieve the two-thirds threshold in parliament to
pass the required law (“Kenyan MPs Reject Violence Court” 2009).
With regard to the ICC cases, these were terminated amid accusations of non-
cooperation against the Kenyan Government by the ICC prosecutor, as well as allega-
tions of interfering with witnesses that led to two ICC warrants of arrest being issued
with respect to persons deemed responsible for influencing witnesses (Maliti 2015a).
The Kenyan Government repeatedly challenged the admissibility of the ICC cases
and engaged in diplomacy aimed at having the cases either deferred or terminated
(Hansen 2011). As of September 19, 2016, the ICC had referred Kenya to the
Assembly of State Parties to the Rome Statute on account of its non-cooperation
(ICC 2016). Throughout all this, KTJN pursued its agenda on criminal justice through
interventions characterised as complementary rather than mainstream, as they were
undertaken by some KTJN members who were simultaneously members of an inde-
pendent ICC Working Group established by KPTJ. These organisations were essen-
tially holding the brief for KTJN on this matter and included AfriCOG, COVAW,
ICJ-K and KHRC. This was informed by the need to maximise on available resources
and to avoid duplication. This chapter cannot offer a detailed account of the initia-
tives undertaken by these organisations with respect to criminal justice but will rather
provide illustrative examples of work done thus far.
KTJN undertook field-based research to ascertain the status of PEV victims and
their perspectives on justice (ICJ-K and KHRC 2012), as well as research on prevailing
proposals regarding criminal justice in Kenya and other country experiences with a
view to prescribing a framework for Kenya’s Special Tribunal (KHRC and KPTJ 2013).
With the entry of the ICC, organisations such as the KHRC embarked on disseminating
information about the court to the public in the face of numerous distortions by the
political elites (FIDH and KHRC 2008).
Some KTJN members found themselves taking up the role of diplomacy on
international platforms to rebut attempts by the Kenyan Government to have the
cases deferred or terminated. The government’s request in 2013 to have the ICC
cases deferred under Chapter VII of the UN Charter saw AfriCOG, COVAW, ICJ-K
and KHRC issue a memorandum to the UN Security Council (“Why the UN
Security Should Reject the Application for a Deferral” 2013). KTJN members regu-
larly attended ASP sessions and provided counternarratives to the government’s
representations on the state of the country and its characterisation of the ICC cases
as a threat to peace and security. At the 2015 ASP after the termination of Uhuru
Kenyatta’s case members circulated a brief outlining what they referred to as a for-
mula for impunity to frustrate the ICC cases (KPTJ 2014).
Finally, various KTJN members came together to bring civil cases at the domes-
tic level aimed at realising the objective of reparations for victims and compelling
the state to commence investigations and prosecutions related to the PEV. For
example, FIDA-K, KHRC and ICJ-K filed a case along with 25 other petitioners on
behalf of internally displaced persons (IDPs) affected by electoral violence in
2 Locating Civil Society in Kenya’s Transitional Justice Agenda… 27
1992–2008. The case seeks to compel the state to provide reparations in addition
to prosecuting those deemed responsible (FIDA-K and others v. A.G. and others,
HC Petition 273 of 2011). Another case, filed by COVAW, IMLU, ICJ-K and
Physicians for Human Rights (PHR) along with eight other petitioners, focuses on
victims of sexual and gender-based violence (SGBV) during the PEV and seeks to
compel the state to provide reparations and prosecute these crimes (COVAW and
others v. A.G. and others, HC Petition 122 of 2013). Both cases were ongoing at
the time of writing.
Institutional reforms targeting the judiciary, police service and land sector were
also translated into a complementary agenda, where KTJN deferred to specialised
networks such as the National Council on the Administration of Justice (NCAJ), the
Police Reforms Working Group (PRWG) and the Land Non-State Actors (LNSA).
KTJN members within these networks would revert to KTJN with updates so as to
provide a holistic understanding on the status of state compliance with Agenda 4.
On this basis, KTJN’s approach to criminal justice and institutional reform
largely became one of an information network that harnessed experiences from the
interventions of its respective members in different platforms. A significant output
from this approach was a KTJN policy brief that assessed Kenya’s challenges and
options in realising criminal justice and institutional reform in the justice sector,
along with truth-seeking processes (KTJN 2013a). It is engaging with the TJRC that
crystallised as the focal substantive agenda for KTJN in terms of a programmatic
agenda for all its members.
In its origins as MSTF, the network was at the heart of the legislative process that
established the TJRC. MSTF identified critical standards for establishing the TJRC,
including in-built mechanisms to shield the TJRC from political manipulation; a
clearly defined mandate with links to judicial and other accountability processes;
in-built mechanisms to support survivors and provide witness protection in line with
international standards; clarity on the provision of amnesty with an explicit under-
taking that it would not apply to international crimes; a definitive timeline within
which the commission would be required to undertake its work; a clearly outlined
structure for the commission, including the qualities expected of prospective com-
missioners and modalities for its financing and the safeguarding of its indepen-
dence; and an outline of the implementation phase once the commission completed
its work (MSTF 2008a).
MSTF embarked on a robust advocacy campaign for the enactment of TJRC
legislation. This entailed convening dialogue forums as stakeholders and with vic-
tim groups while also mounting a media campaign to put pressure on the principles
of the coalition government. When the Truth Justice and Reconciliation (TJR) Bill
28 A. Songa
was finally tabled, MSTF spearheaded civil society efforts to critique the proposed
legislation and recommend amendments. MSTF convened two public dialogues in
April 2008 and prepared a memorandum to parliament and a civil society draft of
the TJR Bill highlighting its proposed amendments (Omondi 2008). MSTF suc-
ceeded in obtaining a raft of amendments to the TJR Bill, the most notable being the
insertion of a preamble contextualising the legislation and a narrowing of the appli-
cation of amnesty provisions (Mue 2008). The TJR Act became operational on
March 17, 2009, and the TJRC commissioners were appointed on July 22, 2009.
With the TJRC in place, MSTF transitioned into KTJN and shifted its focus to sup-
porting the operationalisation of the commission and mobilising victim groups and
the wider public to engage with the process. KHRC, KLA and FIDA-K undertook a
joint monitoring, training, documentation and advocacy project aimed at aiding the
TJRC process (KHRC 2011b). The project trained over 800 monitors in July–
October 2009, with 100 engaged in January–December 2010 to strengthen the doc-
umentation and research element of strategically engaging the emerging transitional
justice process under KNDR, such as the TJRC (KHRC 2011b). The monitors were
to encourage communities and victim groups to engage with the TJRC and other
processes, as well as document the violations they suffered for presentation to the
TJRC. CRECO (2012) similarly monitored TJRC hearings across the country.
In addition, KTJN mobilised victims and survivors of gross violations as a move-
ment to engage directly with Kenya’s transitional justice processes and shape their
outcomes. This was enshrined in the establishment of the National Victims and
Survivors Network (NVSN). The idea of NVSN stemmed from a 2008 national
convention for survivors of historical injustices convened by MSTF and KNCHR to
discuss the prospects for transitional justice under KNDR (MSTF 2008b). A subse-
quent convention in October 2009 saw NVSN officially established, with a mandate
to create a forum for victims to share ideas, information and strategies and to pro-
vide collective support for a victim-centred and rights-based TJRC (KTJN 2009b).
While the aforementioned arrangements demonstrated a clear willingness to
engage with the TJRC, the commencement of TJRC operations would compel
KTJN to reconsider its position while also calling into question the degree of its
common purpose, cohesion and decision-making structures. At the inception of the
TJRC’s work, concerns were raised as to the suitability of its chairperson,
Ambassador Bethuel Kiplagat. Ambassador Kiplagat faced allegations pertaining to
his previous employment in President Moi’s government, which his detractors
asserted would present a direct conflict of interest in as far as the commission’s
mandate was concerned (TJRC 2013).
Amid fears that the controversy would derail the commission, there were imme-
diate calls for the chairperson to resign in the interest of the truth-telling process.
This debate proved contentious within KTJN for various reasons. First off, FIDA-K
and KNCHR were civil society representatives on the commissioner selection panel
2 Locating Civil Society in Kenya’s Transitional Justice Agenda… 29
(TJRC 2013). Despite this, there was a strong contingent within KTJN working
group that strongly advocated for Ambassador Kiplagat’s removal. Working group
members such as KHRC, ICPC and ICJ-K began by individually and then collec-
tively under the KTJN banner calling for Ambassador Kiplagat’s resignation or, in
the alternative, the network’s disengagement with the TJRC. This position was far
from unanimous, as some members maintained contact with the TJRC and even
appeared to intercede on Ambassador Kiplagat’s behalf. FIDA-K, for example, was
caught in the crossfire within the network when they sought to invite KTJN to a
consultation with the TJRC on behalf of the TJRC secretariat, which was extending
an olive branch to civil society (personal communications, August 2010).
Ambassador Kiplagat refused to step down and caused gridlock in the TJRC’s oper-
ations which exposed frailties within KTJN.
In what was perceived as a bid to shore up support in the face of mounting hostil-
ity from civil society and the public, the TJRC in August 2010 recruited a number of
victims to be part of a team of 304 statement takers. Among these victims were
members of NVSN who had been trained and referred to the TJRC by some KTJN
members earlier in the process. This presented yet another challenge for KTJN, as
the TJRC utilised NVSN staff members in press engagements to defend the commis-
sion (personal communication, KTJN working group member, August 2010). This
tactic created schisms between KTJN and the victim groups that ascribed to it. KTJN
was aware that some victim groups in areas such as the Rift Valley were engaging
with the TJRC, which by this time had begun its public hearings (KTJN 2010).
Additionally, women’s groups resolved to continue working with the TJRC, assert-
ing that the public hearings provided them with a platform to address women’s mar-
ginalisation that they could not pass up (KTJN 2010a).
Acknowledging that insufficient consultations had occurred before members took
positions regarding the TJRC, KTJN convened a National Dialogue Forum on the
TJRC and Other Options for Justice in Kenya in September 2010 to discuss alternative
approaches to justice for victims and to deliberate on how to forge a common path.
The forum allowed members to ventilate their concerns, but in the end there was no
consensus. The forum instead yielded the following communique:
While acknowledging the democratic right of some victims to engage with the process, we
the Kenya Transitional Justice Network, totally disengage with the TJRC until the credibil-
ity crisis has been resolved, we commit ourselves to pursue other options of truth, justice
and reparations, including using the newly created constitutional and Agenda 4 organs on
historical injustices such as The National Land Commission, the National Human Rights
and Equality Commission, Kenya Anti-Corruption and Integrity Commission, and the
revamped Judiciary. (Ndivo and Ndunge 2010, Appendix IV)
By the close of 2010, KTJN had divided into two groupings. The first was a core
group of “radicals” who felt that the TJRC was a fatally flawed process that could
not achieve justice and therefore should not be sanitised through the involvement of
civil society and victim groups. This was the position held by most working group
members and some victim groups particularly aggrieved by Ambassador Kiplagat’s
presence, such as the victims of the Wagalla massacre (personal communication,
KTJN working group member, March 2015). They pursued a public campaign and
30 A. Songa
By early 2012 it was clear that the TJRC was on course with preparing its final report,
albeit with significant challenges on account of its controversial tenure. Having iso-
lated Ambassador Kiplagat from the development of the report to a large extent, the
TJRC approached KTJN for technical assistance with the report. KTJN members
who had disengaged considered this an opportunity to salvage a flawed process and
restore the prospect of recommendations that would be responsive to victims’ needs
(personal communication, KTJN working group member, March 2015). There were
concerns that due to the lack of resources during the crisis, the quality of the state-
ments collected enjoyed limited public confidence (Malombe 2012).
KTJN provided the TJRC with institutional reports and the data associated with
them as an aid to populating some of the thematic sections of the report and supple-
menting the public statements it had gathered, as well as developing position papers
on an implementation plan, an implementation mechanism, amnesty and a repara-
tions policy. A stand-out success of this collaboration was the incorporation almost
in its entirety of KTJN’s proposed reparations policy in the final TJRC report.
KTJN’s proposal on reparations was spearheaded by ICJ-K, which harnessed insti-
tutional experiences in litigating for redress as well as victim perspectives that had
been obtained through the NVSN conventions and field-based research (ICJ-K and
KHRC 2012; ICTJ 2011).
After seeking two extensions and facing some level of political intrigue with regard
to the submission of its report, the TJRC was finally able to present its final report
to President Kenyatta. This shifted the focus to findings and recommendations and,
more important, the prospects for their implementation, which faced the following
challenges: (1) the timelines for publication of the report and tabling it before par-
liament as required by law were not strictly adhered to and this significantly delayed
the implementation process; (2) with the exception of an abridged version that was
placed in local newspapers, the actual report was not made widely available as the
government printer failed to produce copies as required (a situation that persists to
this day); and (3) there was registered dissent from a section of the commissioners
with respect to the “Land and Conflict” chapter that had been omitted from the final
report. The dissent emerged from the fact that the final draft of the land chapter as
approved by all commissioners was subjected to further edits that altered and omit-
ted certain paragraphs before printing (Slye et al. 2013).
To address these unexplained deviations from procedure and law, KTJN imme-
diately embarked on an advocacy campaign for the publication and wide dissemina-
tion of the report, in addition to consideration before parliament for implementation
to commence. This was done through press statements and direct correspondence
with the office of the attorney general, who was responsible for the inordinate
delays. This led to the issuance a back-dated gazette notice that officially published
32 A. Songa
the TJRC report. KTJN of its own accord published a simplified version of the
report for wide dissemination in the absence of government action (KTJN 2013b).
KTJN also convened a National Convention to sensitise victims and survivors on
the findings and recommendations of the report and to afford them an opportunity
to develop their perspectives with regard to the responsiveness of the TJRC recom-
mendations to their needs. With KTJN learning from the fallout from its disengage-
ment policy, the implementation phase was purposed to have broad-based
consultations from the very beginning. This conference yielded a communique that
not only announced victims’ aspirations for the implementation of the TJRC report
but also informed KTJN’s advocacy on the same (KTJN 2013c). The conference
established a platform for implementation that emphasised the centrality of victims
in the process and holistic reparations (that take due cognisance of tangible and
intangible loss) as the required response to victims’ needs (Sum 2013).
This was followed up with a series of county-based forums that served to dis-
seminate the findings and recommendations of the TJRC report even further. In
addition, KTJN invested in dialogue forums with various policy actors with a role
to play in the implementation of the TJRC report. Such dialogues largely centred on
the implementation framework in light of amendments to the TJR Act by the
National Assembly and options for operationalising reparations within the recom-
mendations. The absence of political will means limited progress has been made, as
the report remains within the precincts of parliament awaiting its consideration
before an implementation framework can be put in place. KTJN has nevertheless
advanced engagements between parliament and victims by facilitating dialogue
with various parliamentary organs such as the Justice and Legal Affairs Committee
(JLAC) and the Kenya Parliamentary Human Rights Caucus (KEPHRA).
These forums have secured rhetorical commitments from legislators, including
the submission of a petition by a legislator on behalf of NVSN (“Parliament to Debate
the TJRC Report” 2016) to advance the implementation of the TJRC report. They have
also maintained the centrality of the victims’ voices in the debate (Kaberia 2016).
A significant turning point occurred in March 2015 when the president in his State of
the Nation Address urged parliament to consider the TJRC report without further delay
and established a fund of 10 billion Kenyan shillings ($9.5 million) over 3 years to
encourage measures he described as restorative justice to ameliorate the plight of vic-
tims (Maliti 2015b). The president went on to offer a blanket apology for all past
wrongs on his behalf and that of his government and all past governments.
While the president’s initiative reinvigorated the debate on historical injustices and
redress for victims, its ambiguous nature has raised questions on how to reconcile it
with the obligations of the TJRC report and in particular the aspect of reparations.
KTJN has become the Department of Justice’s partner in developing an implementation
framework for the president’s pledge and the related fund. This partnership has been in
the form of a technical committee convened by the department and consisting of repre-
sentation from various government departments, from KNCHR and from KTJN and
NVSN, which were tasked with the mandate of developing regulations to guide the
utilisation of the fund. As of August 2017, this collaboration had yielded a draft policy
and set of regulations for consideration by the office of the Attorney General.
2 Locating Civil Society in Kenya’s Transitional Justice Agenda… 33
An effective network is one that succeeds in achieving its goals, satisfies its mem-
bers and musters the resources needed to continue its work (Ashman et al. 2005).
This must serve as the benchmark for KTJN’s future evaluations and purposeful
recalibration where necessary. KTJN arguably excelled in providing a forum to
shape public debate on the implementation of Agenda 4, influencing the formulation
of related policy and developing engagement strategies on the basis of institutional
and individual experiences in advancing redress for victims (personal communica-
tion, KTJN working group member, March 2015). Despite the numerous challenges
encountered in the process, KTJN’s work on the TJRC process attests to this.
The challenge lies in the fact that KTJN carved out for itself an ambitious and
resource-intensive programme that proved unsustainable. The relegation of various
thematic issues such as corruption, land and institutional reform to other networks
meant that the nucleus that brought together a broad KTJN membership was lost.
This has resulted in a dwindling membership focusing only on truth-telling, criminal
justice and reparations. While this has made its interventions sharper and increased
the prospects for impact, it has also meant that KTJN is no longer fully accountable
to its original mission. In addition, KTJN has had limited opportunities for joint
reflection on the extent to which its goals are being achieved, as it had only two reflec-
tion meetings in 2013 and 2015, organised by members working on the TJRC pro-
cess. KTJN’s reflection and planning must ascend from being activity oriented and
invest more on informing strategy and ascertaining the impact of its interventions.
While at its inception KTJN had ambitions of being a formal institutional net-
work guided by a memorandum of understanding, it remains a network of informal
cooperation. KTJN has served as an information network that enables member
organisations to learn from each other’s approaches to addressing transitional jus-
tice issues. It has enabled coordination and joint interventions to avoid duplication
while also enhancing utility of resources, and it has accentuated its members’ col-
lective influence on policy. Rather than adhering strictly to the executive committee
structure proposed at its start, the network has embraced a less rigid structure, invit-
ing various organisations to offer leadership and secretariat duties at various junc-
tures in accordance with their competencies and resources.
At the inception of KTJN, for example, KHRC and ICPC were instrumental
in convening dialogue forums, reaching out to victims and developing the
objectives of KTJN. Upon reengaging with the TJRC, the Kenya office of ICTJ
became an active member of KTJN and provided leadership on interventions
regarding reparations and implementation of the TJRC report. This approach,
which allows for rotational and opportunistic leadership, has enabled KTJN to
be agile and responsive to emerging developments where it would otherwise
have been static and encumbered by bureaucracy.
34 A. Songa
A key challenge presented by this fluid governance structure has been the absence
of clearly defined conflict resolution mechanisms. As demonstrated by the dynam-
ics around the TJRC, KTJN has relied largely on conflict avoidance, or employed ad
hoc measures such as clear-the-air meetings to resolve disputes. It has been the
practice to try and accommodate all perspectives to the extent of undermining cohe-
siveness by allowing members to act alone or take positions contrary to those of the
network. This however should not be construed as constricting opportunities for
dissent or autonomous institutional positions; it emphasises the fact that value sys-
tems and decisions should reflect the broadest consensus of KTJN’s membership if
the vision is to be truly realised.
KTJN must work towards a more deliberate governance structure that strikes
a balance between guarding against excessive bureaucracy and allowing for
inclusive processes in joint decision-making, tracking documentation on the
implementation of such decisions and defining clear conflict resolution mecha-
nisms. This can be achieved by revisiting the development of a memorandum of
understanding that reflects the vision, values and operational principles of the
network. While the notion of rotational leadership and secretariat responsibilities
is one that should be embraced, it must be formally ratified rather than assumed,
as this will enhance the level of accountability for critical network governance
responsibilities such as reflection, refocusing strategy and documentation with a
view to ascertaining impact.
From the outset, KTJN recognised the centrality of victims in Kenya’s transitional
justice agenda as being paramount to any prospects for its success. KTJN has
sought to promote the involvement of victims in the most expansive way possible:
as individual members, through self-initiated victim groups and through the CSOs
that have engaged with victims (personal communication, KTJN and NVSN
member, March 2015). KTJN nurtured the development of NVSN by investing in
dialogue forums as well as enhancing victims’ capacities to engage with Kenya’s
transitional justice agenda, including their membership in KTJN and its advocacy
initiatives. Indeed, one of KTJN’s strongest achievements has been to evolve
NVSN from a pressure group to one that is now considered an active stakeholder
in policy formulation processes, for example contributing to the framework of the
restorative justice fund.
The principle of open participation has not translated into effective participation
in all cases. The decision-making process in the network has not always been inclu-
sive, particularly for victims, as the divisions concerning the TJRC disengagement
policy revealed. With annual national conventions being the primary medium for
broad-based consultation with victims, victims’ input on rapid policy changes tends
to be overlooked or presumed. As institutions assume the mantle of leadership on
the basis of marshalling resources to move the agenda forward, NVSN tends to find
2 Locating Civil Society in Kenya’s Transitional Justice Agenda… 35
itself marginalised on the basis of not being able to mobilise financial resources.
Victim-led initiatives receive minimal support on the basis of being aligned with the
programmatic priorities of individual organisations in KTJN that have some activity-
based resources.
Facilitating a designated NVSN coordinator, for example, and holding regular
meetings that allow victims to reflect on, formulate and communicate positions to
the public have been immense challenges. Yet, when this has been achieved, it has
had a profound effect on policy actors, as the petitions on the implementation of the
TJRC report revealed. Additionally, KTJN has been unable to respond directly to
some of the immediate priorities for victims, such as medical and psychosocial sup-
port (personal communication, KTJN and NVSN member, March 2015). Despite
spearheading the development of NVSN, KTJN has not managed to develop a sus-
tainability strategy for its operations. The end result has been one of victim partici-
pation based largely on dependency rather than empowerment (personal
communication, KTJN and NVSN member, March 2015).
Strengthening KTJN means strengthening NVSN as an authoritative and credi-
ble platform for victims’ voices. There must be conscious efforts to enable NVSN
extend its outreach, communication and advocacy capacities. This should be done
by established member organisations offering mentorship and practical institutional
support to the NVSN coordinator, as well as availing funds and fundraising oppor-
tunities with donors for NVSN activities. Furthermore, KTJN must within its gov-
ernance structures accord due recognition to NVSN in leadership and decision-making
in a manner that abolishes any notion of linking leadership in the network with
financial capabilities. KTJN should also enhance the governance structures of
NVSN by encouraging diversity in its leadership, an articulation of key principles
and modalities for democratised leadership.
KTJN sought to approach the issue of gender in Kenya’s transitional justice process
as both a cross-cutting theme and a specific focus area by including gender-focused
organisations within its membership (personal communication, KTJN working
group member, April, 2015). The network’s executive committee initially included
three gender-focused organisations, namely COVAW, CREAW and FIDA-K, with
the expectation that they would spearhead the incorporation of a gendered approach.
In addition, KHRC, FIDA-K and KLA designed a joint training programme for
grassroots activists to foster the documentation of historical and contemporary
injustices in a manner reflective of the cross-cutting approach. This initiative was
frustrated by KTJN’s disengagement policy (KHRC 2011b). By the time of reen-
gagement with the TJRC, only COVAW effectively rejoined KTJN in relation to the
implementation of the commission’s report.
Despite these challenges, KTJN’s late reengagement saw it provide significant
technical input on the gender-centred chapters of the TJRC report. More impor-
36 A. Songa
tantly, KTJN’s reparations policy draft embraced the cross-cutting and specific
theme approach, including broad-based gender equity principles on consultation
and participation, while also highlighting the specific needs of women as victims
and as beneficiaries of a reparations programme. As noted above, this draft greatly
influenced the reparations framework in the TJRC report.
Outside the TJRC process, COVAW, ICJ-K and PHR, a recent member of KTJN,
have advanced the cause of reparations for SGBV victims through the constitutional
petition referenced above. Their collaboration in this case has accentuated the voices
of SGBV survivors in public and policy debates on reparations and expanded the
membership of NVSN. Arguably, the focus on mainstream, national gender-focused
organisations at the inception of KTJN deprived it of the opportunity to collaborate
with smaller but equally impactful and victim-led organisations that would effec-
tively advance the gender justice component.
In the ongoing initiative to advance the implementation of the TJRC report and
operationalise the restorative justice fund, KTJN has benefited from the inclusion of
organisations such as Grace Agenda Kenya and the Wangu Kanja Foundation, both
founded by victims of sexual violence and working with other victims at the com-
munity level. There is a need for KTJN not only to continue the expansion of its
membership to include other gender-focused organisations but also to reflect on the
degree to which it has managed to mainstream gender justice in light of previous
challenges with a view to developing more concerted interventions going forward.
KTJN’s broad-based agenda presupposed the ability to marshal the necessary resources
to match its ambition. Initially, funding was on the basis of the resources that individ-
ual organisations could channel towards the common agenda. The potential for KTJN
members to fundraise jointly for its agenda is an area that has not been fully explored.
A multi-year proposal for KTJN activities in 2012 developed with operational support
from PACT Kenya stands as the only such effort (personal communication, KTJN
working group member, March 2015). Furthermore, KTJN’s fluid governance struc-
ture and its TJRC disengagement policy were not assets for joint fundraising.
KTJN has however received support for various stages of its work based on a
model of strategic collaborative partnership rather than traditional network donor
funding. CSVR, UAF-A and OHCHR were instrumental in supporting the forma-
tive stages of KTJN. They informed the formulation of KTJN’s agenda through
technical support and availed resources for dialogue forums and KTJN publications.
GiZ similarly provided instrumental support to KTJN, but only after a cessation of
the disengagement policy with the TJRC. KTJN thus received both technical and
financial support for developing the reparations policy, publishing simplified ver-
sions of the TJRC report and organising dialogue forums to disseminate the findings
and recommendations of the TJRC.
2 Locating Civil Society in Kenya’s Transitional Justice Agenda… 37
Conclusion
absence of requisite mechanisms to address the power relations within networks and
ensure that there is downward accountability. The fallout from the TJRC disengage-
ment policy points to the need for considerable reflection on the internal transpar-
ency of networks in terms of sharing information, participation of victims in
decision-making and platforms for feedback and lodging of complaints.
Civil society networks must therefore endeavour to establish governance struc-
tures that are inclusive, facilitate joint decision-making, enable coordination of activ-
ities, include mechanisms for conflict resolution and provide avenues for reflection
and course correction. KTJN’s current system of rotating leadership and secretariat
duties among its members is an appealing model, although it needs to be codified in
a memorandum of understanding and ratified by the membership. Regular meetings,
consultations, well-defined action plans and opportunities to reflect on impact are
key pillars of this approach. Equally essential is empowering victims towards self-
representation and self-articulation of needs in transitional justice processes. KTJN’s
work with NVSN has been highly productive and shrunk the spaces between victims
and policy actors, but this requires a more purposeful and sustained form of invest-
ment that strengthens its operations and reduces elements of dependency.
Resource mobilisation is another critical factor for networks seeking to influence
transitional justice agendas. In KTJN’s experience, employing a model of strategic
collaborative partnership has been the preferred option. In seeking out relationships
that avail funds and some level of technical assistance, networks benefit from insights
from external experiences while establishing a donor relationship based on actual
buy-in to the vision rather than an abstract interaction with a project cycle. The lon-
gevity of transitional justice processes and long-term outcomes however mean that
donor fatigue is a common feature. Members of civil society networks must therefore
endeavour to mainstream the operations of the network in their operational plans as
a way of ensuring its sustainability, rather than relying only on joint funding.
A key challenge for civil society in Kenya has remained the breadth of the
country’s transitional justice agenda, which was driven by the motivation to com-
plete a stalled process of democratisation. While civil society was instrumental in
shaping this agenda, it quickly became apparent that following through by engag-
ing in monitoring and implementation processes was going to be a Herculean
task. In KTJN’s experience, it is more appropriate to carve out specific areas of
intervention and acknowledge that one will operate within a wider galaxy of spe-
cialised organisations that can work on the areas not within the scope of your
network. The objective should be to achieve synergy with others and work towards
the common purpose of holding the state accountable for the agenda as a whole.
This approach helps avoid duplication of efforts, maximise utility of resources
and reduce the chances of burnout institutionally.
Kenya’s transitional justice process is far from over. As advocates, authors and
implementers of transitional justice processes, civil society must stay engaged.
Networks such as KTJN remain critical to informing the current phase of imple-
mentation and ensuring that the processes meet the intended outcomes of justice,
national healing and reconciliation. As civil society continues to play the role of
vanguard, it must equally subject itself to transparent reflections on its strategies and
2 Locating Civil Society in Kenya’s Transitional Justice Agenda… 39
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Chapter 3
Transitional Justice in Liberia: The Interface
Between Civil Society Organisations
and the Liberian Truth and Reconciliation
Commission
Introduction
Fourteen years of civil war left devastating consequences for the Liberian people.
During the first Liberian civil war (1989–1997) and the second Liberian civil war
(1999–2003) horrific human rights abuses were perpetrated with impunity against
civilians by both government forces and rebel groups. These included widespread
and systematic rape, assault, mutilation and torture, killing, numerous large-scale
massacres, detention without trial, summary executions, extortion, destruction of
property, forced labour and large-scale forced conscription and use of child combat-
ants (TRC 2009: 169–195). At the height of the civil war, women fleeing the fight-
ing were raped by government soldiers at checkpoints (Simmons 2003). Other
atrocities ranged from the National Patriotic Front of Liberia’s (NPFL) slaughter of
500 Mandingos in Lofa County (Ellis 2007: 79) and the Armed Forces of Liberia’s
(AFL) killing of 600 displaced persons mainly of Gio and Mano ethnicity at St.
Peter’s Lutheran Church in Monrovia (Pham 2004: 101), to NPFL rebels testing
people’s ability to speak the Gio or Mano dialects and putting those who failed to
death on the spot (Outram 1997: 360). It was a bloody civil war in which by 1990
over 5,000 Liberians had been killed (Howe 1990) and over 500,000 had fled the
country (Human Rights Watch 1990: 2). The war resulted in an influx of Liberian
refugees to Ivory Coast, Guinea, Ghana, Sierra Leone and Nigeria. By 1995 as
many as 700,000 of the 2.5 million Liberians were refugees in other West African
states (Lowenkopf 1995: 94). A large number of these refugees made their way to
the United States, Canada and various European countries.
After several previous peace negotiations failed to stop the war,1 the warring par-
ties signed the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) on August 18, 2003, in
Accra, Ghana, brokered by the Economic Community of West African States
(ECOWAS) with the support of civil society organisations (CSOs) and the interna-
tional community. Signed between the government of Liberia and two leading rebel
groups, Liberians United for Reconciliation and Democracy (LURD) and the
Movement for Democracy in Liberia (MODEL), the CPA marked the beginning of
Liberia’s transition from war to peace. The transition commenced with the deploy-
ment of a United Nations Mission in Liberia (UNMIL) peacekeeping mission to
monitor the ceasefire, restore order and create the political space for rebuilding state
apparatuses and social fabric ruptured by years of civil war. The Liberian Truth and
Reconciliation Commission (LTRC) was established by the National Transitional
Legislative Assembly of Liberia (NTLA) of the National Transitional Government
of Liberia (NTGL) in 2005. The LTRC is the only transitional justice process pro-
vided for by the CPA, despite demands by prominent CSO representatives for crimi-
nal prosecutions of alleged perpetrators, especially former warlords.
This chapter first sets the context for the interface between CSOs and the LTRC,
discussing the nature of civil society engagement with conflict resolution and peace-
building during the war, as well as CSO activities during the peace negotiations and
in the NTGL and NTLA. It examines the working relationship between CSOs and
the LTRC, including the drafting of the law that established the commission, the
selection of commissioners, and the launch and operationalisation of the LTRC. It
then discusses CSOs’ role in the aftermath of the LTRC. The chapter is based on 4
years of research on the LTRC and its contribution to peace and reconciliation. It
draws insights from my interviews with civil society representatives,2 victims, wit-
nesses and alleged perpetrators, and from two LTRC conferences I attended in the
United States and Liberia between July 2009 and November 2010.
This chapter defines civil society as “a broad range of organisations, such as
community groups, women groups, faith-based organizations, registered charitable
organizations, independent media, professional associations, think tanks, indepen-
dent educational organizations and social movements” (World Bank 2006: 2), oper-
ating in the public sphere and freely engaging to advance their interests, distinct
from the state, the family and the market. The chapter argues that Liberia had a
vibrant civil society before the civil war, through which citizens worked for change.
When war broke out, CSOs became actively involved in finding a peaceful resolu-
tion by organising conflict resolution workshops and peace conferences, lobbying
warring parties and carrying out demonstrations to galvanise local support so as to
1
See United States Institute of Peace (2003), “Peace Agreements: Liberia”, http://www.usip.org/
publications/peace-agreements-liberia (Accessed 4 May 2016).
2
UNMIL Human Rights Section, Catholic Relief Services (CRS), International Center for
Transitional Justice (ICTJ), Lutheran Church Massacre Survivors Association (LUMASA),
Association of Evangelicals of Liberia (AEL), West Africa Network for Peacebuilding (WANEP),
Women in Peacebuilding Network (WIPNET), OXFAM-Liberia, Advocates for Human Rights,
Union of Liberian Organisations in the United Kingdom (ULO-UK), European Federation of
Liberian Associations (EFLA) and Union of Liberian Associations in USA (ULAA).
3 Transitional Justice in Liberia: The Interface Between Civil Society Organisations… 45
mount pressure on government and rebel groups to reach a peace agreement. After
the CPA, CSOs took on a central role in running the NTGL and legislative assembly.
Their involvement in the direct running of government resulted in a mixed bag of
the good, the bad and the ugly. Although civil society’s image was tarnished due to
corruption in government, the chapter argues that its role in drafting and passing the
LTRC Act and in vetting the LTRC commissioners was indispensable. While some
outspoken CSOs were critical of the LTRC commissioners’ managerial, procedural
and structural arrangements, and even distanced themselves from implementing the
LTRC’s mandate during its lifetime, the responsibility of implementing the LTRC
final report’s recommendations has become mainly the responsibility of CSOs. The
lack of a formal structure for CSOs’ engagement with the transitional process and
the LTRC’s ad hoc relationship with CSOs resulted in the LTRC underutilising
CSOs’ capacities and networks. Nevertheless the engagement between CSOs and
the LTRC resulted in new agendas for both CSOs and government.
In Liberia and for this chapter there are four categories of CSOs: the politically
oriented, which are involved in advocacy, monitoring and lobbying government for
policy change and in informing and mobilising the general citizenry for action; the
faith based, which are involved in providing relief and humanitarian assistance,
development and empowerment from a religious perspective; non-faith based,
which are involved in delivering relief and humanitarian assistance, development
and empowerment without a religious orientation; and those in the diaspora, which
are a mixture of the categories based in Liberia.
Before the outbreak of civil war, well-established Liberian politically oriented
CSOs, such as the Progressive Alliance of Liberia and the Movement for Justice in
Africa, advocated for rapid political reform, calling for the adoption of socialism, an
activist pan-Africanist foreign policy and a response to injustice and poverty. During
this time CSOs demanded political reforms, accountability and transparency in gov-
ernment, and their character was mainly political (Lund 2006: 3). The remnants of
these organisations organised themselves into the Transitional Justice Working
Group (TJWG), which was involved in the peace negotiations, and hence some of
its members worked their way into the NTGL and NTLA. There were also faith-
based and non-faith-based CSOs, such as Samaritan’s Purse (SP), Serving in
Mission (SIM), Eternal Love Winning Africa (ELWA), Orphan Relief and Rescue
(ORR) and Catholic Relief Services (CRS), which were involved in the provision of
healthcare, education and agricultural services and in building and managing
schools and hospitals.
While these CSOs had various strengths, they had no experience in dealing with
massive human rights abuses. Following the start of the civil war in 1989 many of
the CSOs’ activities were influenced by international non-governmental organisa-
tions (NGOs) and international agencies, which offered financial support and
46 J.T. Dhizaala
In fact, CSOs were at the forefront of all Liberian peace negotiations aimed at
finding a lasting solution to the civil war. Starting in 1990, the IMC was actively
3
Susukuu was an offshoot of the Movement for Justice in Africa, one of the oldest CSOs in Liberia,
which was entrusted with a socio-economic advisory role to government since the 1970s.
3 Transitional Justice in Liberia: The Interface Between Civil Society Organisations… 47
involved in the search for peace.4 It spearheaded the first effort towards a negotiated
settlement by holding a consultative meeting in June 1990 between the parties to the
conflict, namely representatives of the Doe regime, the NPFL and the AFL in
Freetown (Dunn 1998). To garner local public support for this peace initiative, the
IMC organised two massive “peace marches” through Monrovia on June 14 and 26,
1990. It also organised “stay-at-home protests” in March 1995 and February 1996
against “rewarding” warlords with positions in government (Pham 2006: 82). In
addition, the IMC initiated a campaign to encourage disarmament in the country.
In 2002, IMC and the Liberia Leadership Forum called for and organised peace
talks between the government and LURD and MODEL at a peace conference in
Ghana (Hayner 2007: 7), moderated by Abdulsalami Abubakar, an ECOWAS repre-
sentative and the former president of Nigeria. During the peace talks, stakes were
high because the warring parties were locked in a military stalemate. Local CSOs
and regional and international organisations increased pressure on them to end the
civil war. The Special Court for Sierra Leone’s indictment against Charles Taylor on
June 4, 2003, forced him to step down from power, which opened the way for the
CPA to be signed later in the year (Hayner 2007; Neill and Ward 2005).5
Another factor in the peace negotiations was Women of Liberia Mass Action for
Peace’s campaign, which started in early April 2003 in Monrovia. These Christian
and Muslim women joined together to protest the deteriorating security situation in
the country. In their effort to see that peace returned to Liberia, they sent several
women representatives from Monrovia to Accra to mobilise Liberian women resid-
ing in the Buduburam refugee camp to continue their anti-war protest while the
peace talks were going on. In solidarity was the West Africa Network for
Peacebuilding (WANEP); the women made ribbons stating, “Peace for Liberia
now”, and pinned them on delegates at the peace talks to symbolise the urgent need
for peace. They mounted a 2-month vigil in front of the building where the peace
negotiations were held, presented several position statements to the delegates,
scheduled meetings with delegates and mediators and threatened to strip off their
clothes in protest against delays. The women urged delegates to reach a ceasefire.
They blocked the entrance and exit of the conference hall and sent a letter to the
chief mediator telling him that they were not allowing delegates to leave the hall and
no food would enter the hall until the ceasefire was signed (Schirch and Sewak
2005: 9–10). This brought the women’s demand for a ceasefire and signing of a
peace agreement to the attention of the delegates.
4
The IMC is an amalgamation of the Liberian Council of Churches (LCC) and the National
Muslim Council of Liberia (NMCL). The negotiations included the Banjul and Standing Mediation
Committee (SMC) (1990), the Yamoussoukro Accord (1991), the Cotonou Agreement (1993), the
Akosombo Peace Talks (1994) and the Abuja Accord (1995).
5
Taylor handed power to Vice President Moses Blah a week later, on August 11, 2002. At the invi-
tation of the president of Nigeria, Taylor left Liberia for Calabar, Nigeria, with a rather ominous
promise, “I leave you with these parting words: God willing, I will come back” (Jarrett Murphy
2003).
48 J.T. Dhizaala
After Charles Taylor was removed from the picture, he tried to short-circuit the pos-
sibility of holding him and his cronies accountable for the atrocities committed
(Hayner 2007: 18). Taylor influenced the Liberian legislature to pass an amnesty
law just days before he left office.6 International observers to the peace negotiations
insisted that amnesty for serious crimes was not allowed under international law.
Politically oriented CSOs in TJWG and the Association of Female Lawyers of
Liberia (AFELL), whose members served as delegates, and others lobbied the par-
ties on the perimeter of the formal meetings, kept an eye on the discussion of
amnesty and sent messages to the chairman of the peace negotiations insisting that
any amnesty provision should exclude crimes against humanity, war crimes and
other serious abuses such as rape. While international and local CSO representatives
pushed for a war crimes tribunal in Liberia, similar to the Special Court for Sierra
Leone, the peace negotiations were in a stalemate. Negotiators realised that granting
amnesty to rebels might encourage wars in the future but that any threat of prosecu-
tion would make it difficult to end the war, as the faction leaders vowed to continue
fighting.
Several factors influenced the negotiations concerning an amnesty clause in the
CPA: that all previous peace efforts excluded amnesty provisions; that national
courts were dilapidated from the war; and that in neighbouring Sierra Leone the
peace agreement granted a blanket amnesty. The warring parties thus had little to
worry about as regards prosecutions and felt it was not necessary to insist on legal
immunity, instead bargaining for political power in the transitional government.
They refused to sign a ceasefire agreement until they received some guarantee of
their role in the interim government. General Abubakar, the mediator, argued that
some atrocities were so severe that they could simply never be amnestied and had to
be brought to justice (Hayner 2007: 15). He suggested, however, that the decision
on establishing a war crimes tribunal should wait until a new government was
elected.
As a result, instead of having a war crimes tribunal and cutting short any discus-
sion of amnesty, a truth commission was proposed, and it was fairly quickly accepted
(Hayner 2007: 8). According to Conmany Wesseh, who actively participated in the
CPA negotiations, the “warring parties agreed to the truth commission concept
because they wanted to prevent the establishment of a war crimes tribunal” (quoted
in Pajibo 2007: 290). During the peace talks, the Cable News Network (CNN) pro-
vided live coverage from Monrovia of the rebels’ indiscriminate shelling of the city
and of gangs and militias committing violence in the streets. With the warring par-
ties’ delegates using the CNN coverage as a bargaining chip, the other delegates felt
6
Act to Grant Immunity from Both Civil and Criminal Proceedings against All Persons within the
Jurisdiction of Republic of Liberia from Acts or Crimes Committed during the Civil War from
December 1989 to August 2003, passed on August 7, 2003.
3 Transitional Justice in Liberia: The Interface Between Civil Society Organisations… 49
the pressure to give in to their demands for positions in the transitional government.
One CSO participant in the negotiations recalls how “one or two rockets would be
sent into Monrovia, and people in Monrovia would be telling us ‘you have to give
them anything they want, to get it to stop.’ … Once they felt they were getting what
they wanted, the fighting would simmer down. Sometimes I thought they were
blackmailing us” (Hayner 2007: 14). I think it was fair enough for the CSO repre-
sentatives to agree to postpone the discussion of human rights accountability to the
future because at that time the immediate need was to reach a ceasefire that would
stop the killing in Liberia. Thus when the warring parties agreed to a ceasefire on
June 17, 2003, and shortly thereafter to the CPA, it was a big achievement and a
relief for the CSO participants and other delegates and observers.
CSO representatives, who were former employees of organisations, adopted a new
approach in the CPA from the previous vague lines of separation between civil society
and civilian political groups that cast themselves as non-partisan advocates. This time
they sought not only to be included in the Accra peace negotiations but also for a for-
mal role in the transitional government being negotiated. The argument was that with
most of Liberia’s political class tainted by complicity in the war or worse, leaders
from civil society needed to step in and participate directly in governance (Pham
2004). CSOs’ participation in the peace negotiations resulted in a four-way power-
sharing arrangement that distributed positions in the NTGL cabinet, the NTLA and
the civil service among representatives of civil society, the National Patriotic Party
(NPP) that emerged from NPFL, and the LURD and MODEL rebels.
Civil society and special interest groups were allocated 7 of the 76 seats in the
NTLA.7 The position of vice chair of the executive body of the NTGL went to
Wesley Momo Johnson, a representative of civil society. In the NTGL cabinet,
CSO representatives headed six ministries.8 CSO representatives were also
entrusted with managing 16 government agencies,9 and some of Liberia’s publicly
owned corporations and autonomous government agencies and commissions.10
7
The NTLA was composed of 76 members distributed as follows: (a) the three warring factions
with 12 representatives from MODEL, 12 representatives from LURD and 12 representatives from
the former government of Liberia; (b) one seat for each of the 18 registered political parties that
participated in the peace negotiations; (c) one seat each for the 15 political subdivisions, or coun-
ties, of the country; and (d) seven seats for civil society and interest groups. For further details, see
Article 14 of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement.
8
National security, education, gender and development, information, rural development, and youth
and sports.
9
The Bureau of Immigration and Naturalization, the Bureau of General Auditing, the Bureau of
State Enterprises, the Center for National Documents and Records, the Civil Service Agency, the
John F. Kennedy Memorial Medical Center, the Independent National Human Rights Commission,
the Liberia National Police Force, the Truth and Reconciliation Commission, the National Bureau
of Investigation, the National Fire Services, the National Food Assistance Agency, the Contracts
and Monopoly Commission, the National Elections Commission and the Governance Reform
Commission.
10
The Agriculture Industrial Training Board, the Liberia Domestic Airport Authority, the Liberia
Mining Corporation, Liberia National Lotteries, the Liberia Rubber Development Unit, the Liberia
National Oil Company, the Monrovia Transit Authority, the National Housing and Savings Bank,
the National Housing Authority and the National Insurance Corporation.
50 J.T. Dhizaala
The LTRC Act envisioned the commission as a forum to address issues of impunity,
give victims and perpetrators of human rights violations the opportunity to share
their experiences, and provide a clear picture of the past so as to facilitate genuine
healing and reconciliation (United States Institute of Peace 2003: 11). This vision of
the LTRC did not totally arise as a result of grassroots and collective civil society
3 Transitional Justice in Liberia: The Interface Between Civil Society Organisations… 51
demands because during the initial peace negotiations the Liberian general public
and the CSOs’ major concern was reaching a ceasefire. The idea of the LTRC as the
only transitional justice process was a product of the compromise reached by the
delegates to the CPA negotiations. While CSOs advocated for a transitional justice
process similar to that in Sierra Leone, where the Truth and Reconciliation
Commission and the Special Court for Sierra Leone operated concurrently, the war-
ring parties wanted amnesty and international observers wanted a form of criminal
accountability. So the dynamics and ideas that informed the CPA agreement were
primarily based on international debates and perspectives on transitional justice,
especially with regard to truth commissions.
Since the South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission (SATRC) was
regarded as a first step to reconciling South Africans after apartheid, many African
countries transitioning from war to peace wished to emulate the South African
example of balancing powerful opposing interests. South Africa’s ambassador to
Senegal, Rantobeng William Mokou, attributes the SATRC’s success to Nelson
Mandela’s determination to bring about reconciliation, observing, “I think much has
been achieved by the [SA]TRC judging by the fact that other countries want to
emulate the way in which we dealt with our problems in South Africa”.11 Coupled
with the Sierra Leone Truth and Reconciliation Commission having just submitted
its final report, the delegates to the CPA thought it fitting to recommend a truth com-
mission for Liberia.
The LTRC bill was enacted into law almost 2 years after the NTGL and the NTLA
were instituted. Although the NTLA was dominated by former warlords and rem-
nants of Charles Taylor’s government (United States Institute of Peace 2003: 16), the
Act establishing the LTRC was comprehensive, aligning with Jane Alexander’s core
objectives for truth commissions, which include compiling a comprehensive record
of human rights violations; providing a suitable platform for victims to share their
suffering and experiences; providing official acknowledgement and condemnation of
violations; identifying root causes and the institutions responsible for violations; and
making recommendations for further measures related to prevention of violations,
accountability, justice, reparations, institutional reform and promoting respect for
human rights (Alexander 2003: 32). The credit for this goes to both the CSO repre-
sentatives in the NTGL and CSO activities outside the legislature. The Act was a
result of CSOs’ wide consultations, participation, debates and negotiations with vari-
ous interest groups at the national and international levels.
The CSO representatives in the NTLA were concerned about the significance
and relevance of the LTRC in contributing to unity, peace and reconciliation, and in
line with this requirement was the general public agitation for accountability for war
crimes. The Forum for the Establishment of a War Crimes Court in Liberia
(FEWCCIL) submitted a petition to the Liberian parliament to establish a war
crimes court in Liberia. The petition caught the attention of the media and a public
11
“South Africa’s reconciliation sets example in Africa”, Panapress, August 18, 2001, www.pana-
press.com/South-Africa-s-reconciliation-sets-example-in-Africa--12-55008 (Accessed 12 September
2016).
52 J.T. Dhizaala
debate ensued (Amnesty International 2008). Since Charles Taylor was on trial in
The Hague, CSOs wanted other former warlords to face similar retributive justice.
They also wanted to ensure that victims would get some form of reparations. They
raised these concerns in legislature debates during the drafting of the LTRC bill, and
pressed for an enabling mandate that would hold perpetrators accountable for
human rights abuses.
Meanwhile, CSOs outside government campaigned and lobbied government
officials to draft an enabling LTRC legislation to address various concerns. They
sent a petition to legislators demanding specific concerns to be covered by the LTRC
mandate. LWI, for example, focused on the plight of women and children during the
war by drawing attention to atrocities such as rape, and criticised the mass recruit-
ment of child soldiers by the warring factions. LWI succeeded in placing women’s
and children’s issues on the LTRC’s agenda. Local CSOs, international NGOs and
members of the Liberian diaspora also campaigned for the LTRC bill to open the
way for criminal prosecutions, reparations and exposure of past abuses committed
against Liberians. These CSO strategies undermined efforts by former warlords in
the NTGL to argue against a strong LTRC, at the time in support of the CSOs’
demand for a comprehensive mandate.
Seeing that government officials were struggling with how to draft an innovative
and broad mandate to address all gross human rights violations, violations of inter-
national humanitarian law and economic crimes, the Center for Democratic
Empowerment (CEDE) coordinated and provided some funding for activities lead-
ing up to the production of the LTRC draft bill. With additional United Nations
Development Programme funding for an initial workshop, CSOs constituted a tech-
nical committee composed of a coalition of 20 local CSO representatives named
TJWG12 and international experts on truth commissions in Africa that took on the
responsibility of producing a draft of the LTRC Act (Pajibo 2010: 3). As a strategy
to ensure a robust truth commission, this draft was subjected to a peer review pro-
cess and shared for comment with additional experts who had participated in truth
commissions in other countries, especially South Africa and Sierra Leone.13
In September 2004, when the draft LTRC Act was presented to government, the
NTGL expressed serious reservations about provisions relating to the inclusion of
non-Liberians as LTRC commissioners, arguing that they would lack in-depth
understanding of the historical events under investigation. To reach a compromise,
12
TJWG member organisations included the Center for Democratic Empowerment, Foundation for
Human Rights and Democracy, Association of Female Lawyers in Liberia, Catholic Justice and
Peace Commission, Center for Democratic Empowerment, Flomo Theater, Humanist Watch
Liberia, Liberia Democracy Institute, National Human Rights Center of Liberia, Pentecostal
Church of God Action for Development and Peace, Movement for Democracy and Human Rights,
Forum for African Women Educationalists, Liberia Democracy Watch, Fore-Runners of Children
Universal Rights for Survival Growth and Development, West Africa Peacebuilding Network,
Foundation for International Dignity and True Witness.
13
The International Center for Transitional Justice and Yasmin Sooka, a former commissioner of
the SATRC and Sierra Leone TRC, made comments on the draft that led to amendments being
made.
3 Transitional Justice in Liberia: The Interface Between Civil Society Organisations… 53
CSO representatives, the UNMIL human rights section, the Liberian Ministry of
Justice and the executive entered into negotiations and agreed that all commission-
ers should be Liberians. Knowing very well that there were no Liberians with expe-
rience in implementing truth commission, the drafters of the LTRC bill included a
clause to capacitate future commissioners with skills, knowledge and exposure
through the inclusion of an International Technical Advisory Committee (ITAC) of
three people,14 who would work directly with the commissioners to fulfil the LTRC
mandate.
In preparation for the launch of the LTRC Act, and since according to TJWG
“people don’t know what the issues are … they don’t know what a truth and recon-
ciliation commission is” (Amnesty International 2004: 21), TJWG undertook an
extensive campaign to raise public awareness and to obtain the views of the general
population on the LTRC. During a 3-month preparatory period prior to the launch
of the LTRC, members of TJWG carried out several awareness-raising workshops
in different Liberian counties, educating the population about the role of LTRC.
They also conducted outreach activities throughout the country, ranging from dis-
tributing door-to-door pamphlets with information on the commission and its work-
ing methods to holding media briefings with radio, television and newspaper outlets
to explain the functions and powers of the LTRC.
Members of TJWG engaged the public through live national radio and television
broadcasts discussing the draft of the LTRC Act and receiving feedback. They pub-
lished the draft in leading daily newspapers and conducted community outreach on
the content of the bill across the country. After 3 months of public outreach and
consultation, on February 7, 2005, the NTGL forwarded the draft of the LTRC Act
to the NTLA as an “urgent passage” issue. CSOs worked tirelessly to ensure that the
LTRC Act was comprehensive, covering a range of harms, from discussing dis-
crimination against indigenous Liberians by Americo-Liberians to identifying
causes of the Liberian civil war, apportioning responsibility for human rights abuses,
identifying victims and victim groups, and rebuilding and reconciling the country.
No wonder, then, that when a vote was called to pass the bill, former warlords and
their party members sought to block the law because it could lead to them being
held accountable. Nevertheless, on May 12, 2005, the NTLA passed the LTRC Act
after a tie vote, which was broken by the speaker of the assembly.
After the LTRC Act was passed, CSOs sought to identify the right people to
serve as LTRC commissioners. The LTRC Act stipulated that the commission would
have nine commissioners, all Liberian nationals, including at least four women. The
credit for the gender balance in the Act goes to women’s groups that were active in
peacebuilding and the peace negotiations, particularly LWI. Since in a prolonged
civil war individuals may have several roles at one time, including victim, perpetra-
tor, witness and bystander, finding commissioners whose hands were not “soaked
with blood” was very challenging. The drafters of the LTRC Act, especially the
CSOs, had this in mind when they included Article V, Section 8, which provided for
The individuals were to be of international distinction and reputation, with two individuals nomi-
14
nated by ECOWAS and one by the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights.
54 J.T. Dhizaala
15
In early 2004, Gyude Bryant, chairman of the NTGL, appointed 9 commissioners prior to the
passage of the LTRC Act, but since this appointment process lacked transparency, civil society and
UN actors called successfully for the process to be aborted and pushed for a more participatory
selection process once the LTRC bill was enacted by the legislature.
16
Article V, Section 11, of the LTRC Act provides the basic framework by which to vet commis-
sioners, but the selection committee, which is mandated in Sections 8 and 9 of the same article,
developed more (Aaron et al. 2008).
17
The commissioners were Cllr. Jerome J. Verdier, the chairperson and a human rights lawyer and
civil society activist; Dede A. Dolopei, co-chairperson and an administrator, manager, social
worker and peace activist; Oumu K. Syllah, a registered nurse, HIV/AIDS counsellor and social
worker; John H.T. Stewart, Jr., a journalist, human rights advocate and activist; Massa
A. Washington, a journalist, peace advocate and diaspora Liberian representative; Cllr. Pearl
Brown Bull, a lawyer, peacebuilding activist, women’s and human rights advocate and politician;
Shielkh Ka Kafum ba Konneh, a Muslim authority and conflict resolution and peacebuilding activ-
ist; Gerald B. Coleman, an electrical engineer, project manager and spiritual elder; and Bishop
Arthur F. Kulah, a Methodist pastor, educator, administrator and author.
3 Transitional Justice in Liberia: The Interface Between Civil Society Organisations… 55
18
Benetech Human Rights Data Analysis Group is a California-based organisation contracted for
3 years to help in establishing analytical objectives, collecting data and designing and implement-
ing an information management system.
56 J.T. Dhizaala
Liberians had unrealistic expectations of the LTRC. A case in point is that victims
expected the LTRC to compensate them for their suffering. Some Liberians expected
the LTRC to hold former warlords accountable for the crimes perpetrated during the
civil war through a local court of law or an international court as in Sierra Leone. A
June 2007 survey showed that while 80% of the adult population in Liberia was
aware of the LTRC, less than half were aware of its powers to recommend amnes-
ties, prosecutions and reparations (Koscis 2007). A good outreach programme
would have made most Liberians aware of the LTRC’s mandate, processes, struc-
ture, role and limitations, so that they would have realistic expectations, which
would have boosted public confidence and participation in statement giving and
hearings. CSOs failed to maximally utilise their existing community outreach struc-
tures for the benefit of LTRC activities. A good working relationship with
community-based organisations, NGOs and church groupings would have tremen-
dously assisted in building a more functional relationship with Liberians in rural
areas, permitting the LTRC not only to work with them but also to interact with
them during hearings and statement taking. As observed in a UNMIL report, state-
ment takers could not reach certain remote areas where serious human rights viola-
tions are known to have occurred (UNMIL 2008: 24).
When LTRC commissioners were accused of lacking integrity, with one com-
missioner identified as an Americo-Liberian sympathiser and another accused of
having participated in human rights abuses during the civil war (Allen et al. 2010:
15), the chairperson was said to lack the leadership traits needed to head a commis-
sion of that nature and fellow commissioners began to undermine his leadership
(Steinberg 2009: 135–144). Coupled with the LTRC’s lack of a strategy and finan-
cial plan, the developments regarding commissioners further disillusioned major
CSOs, including TJWG. When the LTRC was hit with financial hardship, most
CSOs just stood by and watched. Instead of trying to come to some form of rescue
by fundraising, CSOs decided to revert to the traditional role of watchdog, assessing
and evaluating the commission’s work. The LTRC became increasingly reluctant to
involve CSOs in its processes. A case in point is that the LTRC did not place its
statement-taking processes within faith- and community-based organisation struc-
tures, more often using statement-takers working for a salary, not volunteers. If the
LTRC had solicited civil society participation and community involvement in
recruiting and using volunteers, the statement-taking exercise would not have halted
when the LTRC hit financial difficulties.
Another example is failures in the commission’s psychosocial support. Even if
the LTRC initially devised an ambitious plan for psychosocial support to victims,
perpetrators, family members, commissioners and staff (Amnesty International
2008: 23), the psychosocial unit was scaled down as a result of the commission’s
inability to raise money to cover its entire budget and the LTRC could not provide
such services throughout the country. Without psychosocial support, some
statement-givers chose not to come forward, which hampered the ability of the
LTRC to come up with the full truth. During the war and continuing during the time
of the LTRC, international NGOs, such as Save the Children, Médecins du Monde,
the Center for Victims of Torture and the Lutheran World Federation/World Service,
3 Transitional Justice in Liberia: The Interface Between Civil Society Organisations… 57
Despite the problems in their relationship with the LTRC, CSOs welcomed the
commission’s draft report when it was released on June 30, 2009. The commission
recommended reparations and rehabilitation of victims and perpetrators in need of
specialised psychosocial and other rehabilitation services; legal, institutional and
other reforms; conditional amnesty; and continuing investigations and inquiries into
particular matters. CSOs were the first to embrace the report and congratulate the
commissioners on work well done. Some CSOs, such as CEDE, JPC, FEWCCIL
and the National Human Rights Council of Liberia, welcomed the report because it
listed well-known perpetrators and recommended their prosecution in a domestic or
international court. The report contrasted with the popular Liberian dogma of “let
bygones be bygones”, especially by former warlords, and instead pushed for justice
to prevail over impunity by not turning a blind eye to the rapes, sexual slavery, tor-
ture and inhumane deaths that characterised Liberia’s civil war.
The LTRC report and its recommendations have attracted mixed reactions. While
on the one hand ordinary Liberian citizens are happy that the report lists those who
bear the greatest responsibility for the human rights abuses perpetrated before and
during the civil war and are determined to see its implementation, on the other hand
alleged perpetrators and warlords, a number of whom have joined the executive,
legislature and judiciary, have reservations about the report and want it withdrawn.
Former leaders of warring factions, under a group calling itself Signatories to the
Accra Comprehensive Peace Accord, who are now government officials, held a
press conference a week after the LTRC report’s release. They dismissed the entire
report and accused LTRC Chair Jerome Verdier of treason for trying to overthrow
Johnson-Sirleaf’s government (Weah 2012: 1).
58 J.T. Dhizaala
Joe Pemagbi, head of the Liberia Programme of the Open Society Institute,
which supported the TRC, was not hesitant to note that “there are some recommen-
dations that people consider to be controversial, but that is for Liberians to deter-
mine. … We have supported the work of the commission [TRC] and would now like
to follow up on the recommendations” (IRIN 2009).
The LTRC report provided a foundation for the government and CSOs to build
on, although CSOs disagreed with some of the LTRC’s recommendations. For
example, they critiqued its suggestion that the government grant amnesty to Joseph
Blahyi, a.k.a. General Butt Naked,19 who admitted responsibility for the deaths of
some 20,000 people. This recommendation is regarded as inconsistent by human
rights organisations, such as the FEWCCIL, on the grounds that amnesty for a self-
confessed perpetrator is against international humanitarian law. Some recommenda-
tions were also successfully challenged both through the media and in court, such
as the LTRC’s recommendation for public sanction of 49 individuals (including
Richelieu Archie Williams, who petitioned the court) who committed certain crimi-
nal offenses to be barred for 30 years from holding public office (TRC 2009: 361).
Nonetheless, CSOs are now building on what the LTRC process started with
bottom-up peace and reconciliation efforts. A CSO chairperson observed how the
organisation’s activities and programmes link to the work of the LTRC:
We now face the reality of the day. The TRC is phasing out, so what next? Whether the
process went on rightly or there were gaps or no gaps, we have come to the crucial point in
our history. The TRC is winding up. Whatever recommendation that comes out of that com-
mission determines our fate as a nation. So we as civil society organisation we think that it
is no longer time to continue pressing that you did good, you have done this correct or you
are wrong. Who is right and who is wrong is not important right now. What is important is
how we claim that space that the TRC has created. (Dhizaala 2013: 272)
The space created by the LTRC process includes the political space of open pub-
lic discussion of the nature of human rights atrocities, victims and perpetrators,
reparations to individuals and communities, memorialisation of the dead, and indi-
vidual and community reconciliation.
19
Due to his predilection to fight the enemy naked in the belief that this would protect him.
3 Transitional Justice in Liberia: The Interface Between Civil Society Organisations… 59
Since the release of the commission’s report, additional truth-telling and recon-
ciliation initiatives have been initiated in response to issues arising from the LTRC
process, with a focus on restorative measures. The LTRC called for the establish-
ment of a traditional dispute resolution mechanism called the National Palava Hut
Forum as a complementary tool for justice and national reconciliation at the local
level that would require all factions to appear before it (LTRC 2008). The traditional
palava hut process used prior to the Liberian civil war is a restorative dispute resolu-
tion mechanism convened by elders to settle community matters such as extramari-
tal affairs, divorces, land disputes, debt and occasionally theft and murder. It sought
confession of the wrongful act, apology for the harm committed and forgiveness
from the victim, followed by cleansing rituals and restitution (Pajibo 2007: 18–19).
CSOs such as TJWG, AFELL, the Women NGOs Secretariat of Liberia
(WONGOSOL), the Liberian Massacre and Survivors’ Association (LIMASA) and
the Liberian Council of Churches (LCC) reviewed the LTRC’s final report and
started to conduct advocacy at national government level for implementation of
LTRC recommendations. The Lutheran Church Massacre Survivors Association
(LUMASA) reviewed the report, and in early 2010 petitioned the legislature to
include reparations on its agenda for that year (Allen et al. 2010: 30). The Lutheran
Church, in collaboration with the Christian Health Association of Liberia (CHAL),
which in 1991 initiated a trauma healing and reconciliation programme, also has
been doing trauma healing and reconciliation activities via the training of pastors,
lay leaders and health workers. Since the LTRC report, it has adapted its programme
to address relations between victims and perpetrators of civil war violence. And
several “crusades” have been staged to preach forgiveness and peace. The bishop-
elect of the Lutheran Church emphasised how his first preoccupation would be
genuine reconciliation among all Lutheran members in the country (Castelli 2013).
Diaspora CSOs are building on the LTRC’s reconciliation efforts to heal victims
of the civil war who fled Liberia. In another example of collective restorative mea-
sures, LWI has organised victim support roundtables for women to facilitate healing
through storytelling. In the roundtables Liberian war victims in the United States
meet to share their experiences. Similarly, the Coalition for Justice (CJL), a
US-based coalition of five Liberian CSOs, sees reconciliation as a product of justice
and views the LTRC report as worthwhile to implement as a means to justice. In an
open letter to President Johnson-Sirleaf, CJL argued that to ensure sustained peace
and a strong foundation for national unity, justice for the victims of the Liberian
civil war must be provided.20
The LTRC report passed through the legislature, which established a major fol-
low-up body, the Independent National Commission on Human Rights (INCHR),
based on its recommendations. Under the banner of the National Human Rights
Action Plan (NHRAP), INCHR seeks to guarantee civil, political, social, economic
and cultural rights, with a specific focus on the issues of women, children and per-
sons with disabilities, and to provide for the implementation of the country’s
20
“An open letter to President Sirleaf”, Newstime Africa, December 18, 2012, http://www.news-
timeafrica.com/archives/30190 (Accessed 15 November 2016).
60 J.T. Dhizaala
Conclusion
This chapter has argued that before the outbreak of the civil war in Liberia, CSOs
were active in their traditional roles as advocacy and watchdog groups, in addition
to directly providing social and health services. When the civil war started, CSOs
had to take on the additional responsibility of providing humanitarian assistance
and finding a peaceful resolution to the conflict. Liberian CSOs were involved in the
peace negotiations through dialogue, as emissaries, as organisers of peace confer-
ences and by lobbying warring parties to negotiate for the end of the conflict.
Because of their successful involvement in the peace process, representatives of
many of these CSOs were then involved in the NTGL and NTLA, taking on leader-
ship and managerial roles in ministries, state corporations and government agen-
cies—a move that both dented civil society’s image because of corruption issues in
the transitional government and boosted its involvement in the drafting of the LTRC
Act and the vetting of LTRC commissioners. In the process of implementing the
21
The road map marks the following as key components of the country’s national reconciliation
programme: the palava hut process of addressing past wrongs; memorialisation, reparation, dias-
pora and reconciliation; political dialogue; conflict prevention and mediation; women’s recovery
and empowerment; children and youth recovery and empowerment; psychosocial recovery and
empowerment of persons with disabilities; inclusive people’s history and collective identity; trans-
formative education system; and constitutional law reforms.
3 Transitional Justice in Liberia: The Interface Between Civil Society Organisations… 61
LTRC’s mandate, CSOs were critical of the weak managerial, structural and proce-
dural arrangements made by the commissioners, which caused outspoken CSOs to
be sidelined by the commission. Nevertheless, after the LTRC final report was
released, CSOs integrated many of its recommendations into their activities.
The most consistent issue identified by CSOs that participated in Liberia’s tran-
sitional justice process is the lack of a formal structure for their engagement. The
text of the CPA did not designate which specific CSO or individual should assume
which role in the NTGL and NTLA; as a result the process of engagement was the
scene of rather inappropriate rows as civil society leaders, who presented them-
selves as non-political, non-governmental and representative, contended with one
another for positions in government. With CSO leaders having entered the political
fray, the ability of CSOs to remain credibly “above” politics and act as neutral
monitors of the implementation of the CPA was questionable.
One lesson learnt through the Liberian civil society experience is that a truth
commission with a short lifespan (2 years in this case) can only achieve limited
goals. Since the LTRC did not replace CSOs’ traditional role but instead comple-
mented it, CSOs were able to take over from the commission by building on its
ambitious initiatives for conflict resolution, peacebuilding and reconciliation and
integrating them into their agendas. While the LTRC sought CSO participation with
the aim of accessing civil society networks for broader outreach to fulfil its man-
date, such engagement was uneven and sometimes viewed as less important. The
difficulties for CSOs in engaging with the LTRC resulted from poor coordination
and the LTRC’s ad hoc relationship with CSOs, resulting in the commission’s fail-
ure to take advantage of CSOs’ capacities and networks. The commission would
have had more of an impact had CSOs worked collaboratively with the LTRC by
volunteering their human resources, finances and networks where necessary. With
the closing of the LTRC come new challenges and opportunities. Liberian CSOs are
bracing themselves for the challenges, and embracing the new opportunities.
CSOs’ engagement with the LTRC resulted in a new agenda for civil society after
the release of the commission’s final report. Many CSOs took the LTRC’s recommen-
dations on board in their programmes. For example, CSOs are now conducting memo-
rialisation activities to commemorate victims of the civil war, advocating for the
establishment of a special criminal court for Liberia and distributing cash and cows as
a form of reparation. It can be argued that CSOs’ engagement with the LTRC also
resulted in a new agenda for the government of Liberia, which has adopted a set of
commissions and strategic policies to address some of the LTRC’s recommendations.
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Chapter 4
Taking Transitional Justice to the People:
Challenges for Civil Society in Zimbabwe
Shastry Njeru
Introduction
This chapter contributes to the discussion on the role of civil society in transitional
justice in Africa through a review of the Zimbabwe Human Rights NGO Forum’s
Taking Transitional Justice to the People outreach programme, which ran from 2009
to 2011.1 This programme was designed to prepare citizens for an envisaged transi-
tional justice process that was to take place in Zimbabwe following years of human
rights violations. Zimbabwe had experienced multiple episodes of political violence
resulting in systematic violations of human rights, which a euphoric Zimbabwean
society least expected at the time of independence.
I would like to thank my colleagues at the Zimbabwe Human Rights NGO Forum who were
involved in the initial planning and implementation of the Taking Transitional Justice to the People
outreach programme. The immensity of their work motivated this piece. These were courageous
people, including Brian Penduka (programmes coordinator), the late Eileen Sawyer (advisor to the
director), Abel Chikomo (executive director) and Dzikamai Bere (initial researcher for the transi-
tional justice programme). I also want to thank Michelle Matsvaire (legal projects officer) for
reading through the chapter and gleaning out mistakes.
1
The Forum is a coalition of 21 human rights NGOs in Zimbabwe that, while having their own
objectives, are concerned with the level and nature of human rights abuses in the country perpe-
trated mainly, though not exclusively, by state agents and their ancillaries. It came into existence at
the time of the food riots in 1998. Over the years the Forum has litigated on behalf of victims
in local and regional courts, registering various successes. The Forum introduced and lobbied suc-
cessfully for transitional justice at a time when many civil society organisations in Zimbabwe hesi-
tated. The constitution that was framed and agreed on in 2013 now provides for transitional justice
in Section 252.
S. Njeru (*)
Zimbabwe Human Rights NGO Forum, Harare, Zimbabwe
e-mail: [email protected]
Ironically, the postcolonial state in Zimbabwe continued with the “broad structural
and human rights abuses that were a constitutive part of colonial rule” (Eppel and
Raftopoulos 2008: 2). The history of Zimbabwe is characterised by three major periods
of human rights abuses: the war of liberation (1965–1979), the disturbances in
Matabeleland and the Midlands (1980–1988) and the era of violence since 2000 (Eppel
2003). The human rights abuses of the colonial period were a result of the “struggles
between the violent structural exclusions of settler colonial ideology and practice, and
the often intolerant assertions for unity by a nationalist movement” (Eppel and
Raftopoulos 2008: 2–3). The postcolonial administration was brutal and militaristic and
violated human rights. The state also amnestied perpetrators of rights violations.
Connected to the foregoing, the Zimbabwean Government did not attend to issues
of justice and accountability or how they can be freely aired and discussed. These
challenges were reinforced by a combination of state repression and citizen fear that
pervaded “the realities and consciousness of the general population, as well as those
who endeavoured to further justice and accountability agenda” (Forum 2006: 2).
Until the 1990s, the accountability agenda was on the backburner for most in civil
society (Forum 2006). When discussed, it remained in the circles of a few human
rights activists and lawyers, to the exclusion of victims. The Forum confirms the exis-
tence of this weakness: “The debate around transitional justice options in Zimbabwean
civil society is embryonic and remains largely confined to a small grouping of non-
governmental organisations” (7). Most human rights non-governmental organisations
(NGOs) focused their attention only on monitoring and documenting violations and,
where possible, seeking relief for victims through the courts and other local remedial
mechanisms. Even with these embryonic developments, it is particularly important to
note that civil society in Zimbabwe was not very vocal on or active in stamping out the
state’s malpractices and holding it accountable. As such, there was systematic failure
by civil society to take legal action for violations committed by the state against its
people. This weakness was addressed by the “widespread discourses during the con-
stitutional debates of the late 1990s, where justice and accountability concerns were
raised though in relation to constitutional reforms of the year 2000, but not in relation
to retrospective notions of liability” (7).
Civil society in Zimbabwe was wrongly viewed as a force for democratising the
authoritarian state. It was “eulogized as the ultimate medical compound, capable of
curing (all) ills” (Stewart 1997: 16). This glorious description did not fit the bill in
terms of confronting sensitive issues like dealing with the past. In fact, civil society
was not only “vulnerable” (van de Walle 2002: 76) but also “weak and dependent”
(Mandaza 1994: 269). Civic groups, generally urban-based NGOs, were unlikely to
take risks or to be innovative and challenge the status quo (Edwards 1998). Restricted
mainly to urban centres, civil society existed among the indigenous “petty bour-
geois element and … [was] factionalised along urban and rural spaces, and in some
cases mirroring the state which they sought to confront” (Moyo 1993: 4). It was
observed that most civil society organisations in Zimbabwe did “not encourage an
interest in matters beyond their own immediate concerns”. Instead, they sought to
“typically equate their own narrow aims with those of the public realm” and thus to
“manipulate the [environment] for their own selfish purposes” (4). This explains
the thin civil society participation in transitional justice issues before and during
4 Taking Transitional Justice to the People: Challenges for Civil Society in Zimbabwe 67
the outreach period, and how the ruling party, the Zimbabwe African National
Union–Patriotic Front (ZANU-PF), was able to claim to be “the sole legitimate
representative of the people” (7).
Following the formation of the opposition party Movement for Democratic
Change (MDC) in 1999 and the subsequent litany of violations and repression
towards opposition parties by the government, there was a massive growth in inter-
est in accountability for human rights abuses, institutional reform and reparations
for victims. Discussions during the subsequent drafting of a new constitution raised
these important concerns onto a pedestal. For instance, the National Constitutional
Assembly (NCA)2 campaigned for a truth commission tasked with “investigations
of past violations to ‘provide remedies for people injured by such abuses’, to ‘pro-
mote reconciliation in order to avoid conflict in the future’, and to ‘prevent conflict
in the future by engaging in mediation and dispute settlement’” (NCA 2002a, b: 60).
The MDC had similar recommendations under its policy rubric of constitutional-
ism, truth and justice (MDC 2003).
At this juncture, it was becoming clearer that meaningful civil society engage-
ment and support was a critical precondition for the effective implementation of
transitional justice options. This was one of the lessons of the constitutional reforms
that occurred from 1999 to 2000: despite state limitations, participation of the peo-
ple could enable them to make informed decisions and choices. This experience
informed the design of the Forum’s outreach efforts. The Forum sought to motivate
the people’s involvement and ownership of the transitional justice process, to
heighten their stake to determine, participate in and benefit from the future transi-
tional justice project. To create this citizen buy-in and trust, the Forum insisted on a
victim-centred strategy that would cater for the needs of victims in a meaningful
way. It recognised that, for maximum results, the process had to be extensive in
consultation with victims and the broader community (Lesizwe 2004).
This chapter critically reviews the Zimbabwean context and its effects on transi-
tional justice from the viewpoint of a civil society initiative. The chapter starts by
reviewing Zimbabwe’s history and transitional justice context. It discusses attempts
to deal with the past in the country before presenting an overview of the Forum’s
outreach programme and the methods it used. The final part of the chapter reviews
the options for transitional justice in Zimbabwe as reflected in participants’ discus-
sions during the outreach. It concludes that no matter how difficult it can be to push
for transitional justice in a nontransitional context, such a process is necessary to
finding closure and lasting peace. The chapter benefits from the author’s close rela-
tionship with the project and the Forum, where the author implemented and observed
the unfolding of the transitional justice initiatives in Zimbabwe.3
2
The NCA was an NGO founded in 1997 by Zimbabwean individuals and civic organisations,
among which were trade unions, opposition parties, student groups, women’s groups, representa-
tives of the informal sector, and church groups. The NCA was inspired by the popular uprising of
the 1990s and came to see the constitution as an ideal umbrella cause in pursuing an array of politi-
cal, social and economic causes.
3
The perspectives advanced in this chapter are entirely those of the author, not of the Forum.
68 S. Njeru
Context
parties as early as November 1980, noting that “speakers, including several ZANU
ministers, insulted ZAPU … and said all minority parties should be ‘crushed’”
(Nkomo 2001: 189). These vitriolic charges from ZANU-PF resulted in years of
infamous Gukurahundi pogroms in Matabeleland and the Midlands, in which many
were killed. President Mugabe’s description of the Gukurahundi as a “moment of
madness” (Doran 2015) years after his “reconciliation” speech confirms ZANU-
PF’s lack of desire for accountability and justice for the wronged in Zimbabwe.
The political contestations in post-independence Zimbabwe bear testimony to
how uncompromising ZANU-PF became. Muscular methods of contesting for
power were its principle, from primitive stone-throwing and beating with sticks to
state-organised and sophisticated violence orchestrated by the ruling party taking
advantage of its levers of power (Sachikonye 2011: 17). ZANU-PF wanted to retain
power by hook and by crook. This included intimidation, violence, property destruc-
tion and post-election retribution to those who dared to campaign or be elected on a
ticket other than ZANU-PF. After such violence, President Mugabe would find
ways of pardoning those responsible, confirming impunity and that those who kill
for the president will not be punished.
However, blanket amnesties were increasingly being delegitimised internation-
ally as a result of the growth of an international human rights culture. This change
led to the setting up of courts such as the International Criminal Tribunals for the
former Yugoslavia and Rwanda and the International Criminal Court (Ramsbotham
et al. 2005), as the quest for accountability began to grow worldwide. In addition,
holistic approaches including alternative dispute resolution mechanisms gained
credibility as appropriate forms of intervention in diverse conflict and postconflict
contexts. While this shift long failed to get traction in Zimbabwe—with any civil
society organisation that considered accountability projects viewed as an agent of
regime change and an enemy of the state—the situation changed after 2008.
The year 2008 witnessed a political and economic crisis that led to massive vio-
lence. The violence was a result of ZANU-PF losing its majority in parliament to
MDC in that year’s elections. In response ZANU-PF staged an operation to hold on
to power through intimidation and violence against the opposition. It is alleged that
soldiers, police and intelligence operatives committed the bulk of these acts of vio-
lence (Makhowa 2013). The escalation forced opposition leader Morgan Tsvangirai
to announce his withdrawal from the 2008 presidential elections, citing unprece-
dented levels of state-orchestrated violence against rural areas believed to be MDC
strongholds (Smith-Höhn 2009a, b). Nevertheless, the elections went ahead, result-
ing in a resounding 86% victory for President Mugabe. This electoral victory for
ZANU-PF was aided by the manipulation of the results by the institution responsi-
ble for administering elections (Smith-Höhn 2009a, b). The results were dismissed
as a sham by practically all observer groups (Makhowa 2013), and the impasse that
followed necessitated a power-sharing arrangement in Zimbabwe.
As a forerunner to the Global Political Agreement, on July 21, 2008, ZANU-PF
and the MDC formations signed a memorandum of understanding (MOU), commit-
ting their parties to “creating a genuine, viable, permanent, and sustainable solution
70 S. Njeru
to stabilise the economy but did not transform it. The government is believed to have
failed to develop innovative policies to deal with economic challenges, to build
consensus on key economic challenges and processes, which were to include reindus-
trialisation and an agricultural revival policy, as well as to deal with corruption, trans-
parency and accountability in the utilisation of resources (4).
To summarise, on paper the GPA provided such amenable terms and conditions
that it looked promising for a good operating and political environment, but in prac-
tice it also sowed tension and confusion. Despite this, the Forum embraced some of
the opportunities and began its outreach campaign to “create awareness amongst
ordinary Zimbabweans on what transitional justice is all about” (Forum 2009: 3).
Dealing with the Past: Which Past, Whose Past and Why?
Already in 2003, the Forum began to turn the slow wheels of transitional justice
advocacy in Zimbabwe, which would gather speed only after 2008. The Forum
began by organising a symposium in Johannesburg (Forum 2003) and subsequently
a workshop in Harare 5 years later (Forum 2008a, b) to discuss options for justice
and redress for human rights abuses in Zimbabwe. Seventy civil society organisa-
tions and individuals from Zimbabwe and the region with an interest in transitional
justice participated. Many academics and practitioners with experience of South
Africa’s transitional justice process were present, particularly at the Johannesburg
symposium. However, reflecting the dominance of urban NGOs in Zimbabwean
civil society and debates on transitional justice, the Forum neglected to invite vic-
tims and survivors to either meeting. This approach may have been influenced by
the nascence of the concept of transitional justice in Zimbabwe and the decision to
involve regional practitioners and theorists at this brainstorming stage.
Participants in the meetings noted a decline in citizens’ faith in the legal system
to address the “ever-increasing violations” against Zimbabwe’s citizens, and in
political will to address them. Impunity had become an epidemic. There were calls
from civil society to develop its “own positions on how to redress the abuses, using
both domestic and international legal and institutional mechanisms”. In the broadest
of terms, the symposium and workshop participants agreed to “explore how best to
achieve justice in the broadest possible sense for the many victims of the past and
present human rights abuses in Zimbabwe” (Forum 2010: 9). It is this concentration
on civil and political rights violations that became one of the weaknesses of the
Taking Transitional Justice to the People outreach programme. Social and economic
rights were severely marginalised.
Participants agreed on the following principles that they thought would drive an
effective and legitimate transitional justice process in Zimbabwe:
• Victim centred
• Comprehensive, inclusive, consultative participation for all stakeholders, partic-
ularly victims
72 S. Njeru
4
The lack of sound documentation of the excesses of state formation in Southern Africa led to the
need to be pragmatic about transitional justice in Zimbabwe. It was agreed that an effective process
should rely on sound evidence, not just conjectures. However, this should not downplay the role of
early settlers in the violent expropriation of African land. The focus on the post-Second World War
period was made easier by the development of international law and human rights jurisprudence.
Besides, the land issue was settled in Zimbabwe, albeit in a violent way, during the land reform
programmes from 2000.
4 Taking Transitional Justice to the People: Challenges for Civil Society in Zimbabwe 75
happily into the arms of the state, which went all the way to show that there were no
political changes necessary, let alone transitions to be experienced in the short run.
The Forum carried out Taking Transitional Justice to the People in order to fulfil its
broad goal of creating awareness among ordinary people on what transitional jus-
tice is all about. This outreach had the specific objectives of training participants on:
• The nature and history of transitional justice
• The aims and objectives of transitional justice mechanisms
• The options and challenges of transitional justice within the Zimbabwean con-
text (Forum 2009: 3)
To achieve these objectives, the Forum started by deploying its staff to 51 con-
stituencies in the provinces and districts where significant levels of human rights
violations had been documented before and after 2008. The Forum had initially
identified 84 electoral constituencies for outreach, but ended up working in 51 com-
munities due to a combination of resource constraints, inhibitive political tensions
in some areas and threats to the outreach teams in others (Table 4.1). The choice of
the target constituencies for outreach was based on the Zimbabwe Political Crisis
Map.5 The lead facilitators for the meetings were mainly lawyers from the Forum’s
legal unit and the Forum’s researchers, who were assisted by an academic with a
background in the social sciences. At the beginning of the outreach, the Forum
deployed a minimum of four facilitators for every meeting. In the final phase of the
outreach, two facilitators, who had become the core of the programme, were respon-
sible for the meetings.
Three broad approaches defined this outreach work: training, consultation and
citizen involvement in transitional justice work and processes. The Forum’s vision
was to create awareness of transitional justice among rural and urban people, and to
establish a cadre of activists who would become the critical drivers of the transi-
tional justice process in Zimbabwe and shape the discussion going forward.
Although the consultation approach was not thoroughly developed, the programme
gave participants the opportunity to review their challenges and discuss their options
for redress.
The planning for the outreach programme required a thorough understanding of
the areas most affected by political violence, including the local political dynamics
and resources. This necessitated a good environmental analysis to determine the
levels of threat and the capacity for turning threats into violence by local vigilantes.
The Forum staff that facilitated the outreach was prepared for the task beforehand,
and even for their withdrawal in the event of a viable threat. They had mobile
5
Zimbabwe Political Crisis Map was created by Ushahidi to identify violence hotspots during the
2008 political crisis in Zimbabwe.
76
phones, off-road vehicles and legal backing, should anything happen. The partici-
pants, however, had none of this support. They simply braved the situation. After
contributing their views, experiences and fears, they would go back to their villages
or communities, where they were “welcomed” by local gatekeepers, militia and
party stalwarts who might threaten them for participating. This was the structural
weakness of the outreach from the outset, for which the designers of the programme
had made few plans.
The outreach was conducted as a result of brave hearts. It was a daredevil adven-
ture since the government had not announced a public policy directed at preparing
the people for such an exercise. This increased the vulnerability of the project to
political activism on the ground. In addition, there was no political pressure from
the opposition MDC formations for accountability at the government level to create
the necessary momentum or political legitimacy for the work. Because the policy
foundations for the exercise were shaky, this presented opportunities for govern-
ment predation on the programme and idea. Some government and local partisan
agencies started to describe the programme as mischief bent on causing despon-
dency among citizens. The uncritical and apostolic partisan supporter challenged
the motive of Taking Transitional Justice to the People. To some it was a regime
change programme by another name, and to others it was an exercise in opening old
wounds (Rusere 2016). Thus, the programme attracted negative attention from the
government and other critics. It became haunted, the most “monitored” action dur-
ing the GPA era (Jesuit-Zimbabwe 2012). The consequences of this monitoring
were only noticed years later when the then executive director of the Forum was
arrested for operating an illegal and “unregistered” institution in 2012. This manoeu-
vre was clearly meant to stop the programme, and it threatened the Forum to its
existential core.
In February 2009 the Forum took its first trip to the communities for the out-
reach programme. This, and the many others that followed, was like voyages of
discovery: exciting and yet full of foreboding. By June 2010, 51 constituencies
had been visited and successful meetings had been held with community mem-
bers as planned. A total of 2,357 people attended these meetings, 43% women and
57% men (Forum 2010: 124). The majority of participants, ranging in age from 21
to 70 (Forum 2009: 10), expressed their desire for institutionalising transitional
justice in order to deal comprehensively with the past in Zimbabwe. The Forum
used local coordinators seconded by its member organisations to invite all its par-
ticipants. There was no discrimination on participation. All people, whether from
ZANU-PF or other political parties, including government officials, were free to
participate.
During the outreach the Forum staff discussed various versions of transitional
justice that had begun to do the rounds in the media and how different groups were
advocating for varying modi operandi. For instance, the staff noted that the state’s
focus was on forgiveness, while the NCA’s focus was on institutional reform and
setting up a truth, justice, reconciliation and conflict-prevention commission (NCA
2001). The Forum also noted the National Association of Non-Governmental
78 S. Njeru
where the outreach was conducted professed ignorance of the transitional justice
concept (Forum 2011).
Obstacles to Participation
The Taking Transitional Justice to the People project began just a few months after
the tempestuous elections and violent presidential run-off in 2008. The Forum
reports that 10,456 citizens were victims of human rights violations during the elec-
tion and immediate post-election period, of whom 107 died (Forum 2008a, b: 49).
Initiating an outreach programme for the people, many shell-shocked and living
among neighbours who were perpetrators, was a difficult proposition. Most of the
people in the communities targeted by the outreach programme had been trauma-
tised by what they went through either as community members or directly as indi-
viduals. In Chipinge, in Manicaland Province, a group of participants “approached
the facilitators in confidence and reported that they were unable to participate freely
for fear of the war veterans and militias who had threatened unspecified action”
(Forum 2010: 16).
ZANU-PF political leaders and activists prevented active participation in many
parts of the country. In all such cases they did not consult the people before making
their interventions. In Zvimba West, local ZANU-PF officials, who accused some
participants of speaking ill of the military during the outreach meetings, threatened
unspecified action, and a retired major in the company of ZANU-PF members
threatened other participants with disappearance and loss of their livelihoods. In
Mberengwa West, two prominent ZANU-PF members, the chairperson and a coun-
cillor, stopped preparations for a meeting, claiming that “the subject of transitional
justice and national healing was forbidden” and ZANU-PF was the only instrument
that could relax that censure (16). In the view of the councillor, the transitional jus-
tice meetings were politically sensitive and could not be allowed to go on as they
ruffled feathers. The experience was similar in Mberengwa South and North.
In Chipinge, ZANU-PF activists turned the tables against the Forum staff and
accused them of organising a political meeting. Fortunately the meeting was allowed
to proceed, but participants were not allowed to contribute because the “people of
Chipinge had nothing to say” (16). The few who tried to contribute were disrupted
by the activists chanting slogans. Similar tactics were encountered in Mount Darwin,
where the police had to step in to protect participants from ZANU-PF activists (a
rare case at the time).
In some cases ZANU-PF activists refused to attend meetings for reasons such as
that the MDC had just announced that it would not work with ZANU-PF in govern-
ment, as was the case during a meeting held in Mbare, Harare. In Mhondoro-
Mubaira, ZANU-PF ordered traditional leaders not to participate during discussions.
The police also played a significant role in curtailing participation, for example in
80 S. Njeru
Since 2003, civil society, the political opposition and the labour movement, particu-
larly the Zimbabwe Congress of Trade Unions (ZCTU), have argued that a transi-
tional justice process is needed in Zimbabwe. At the community level, citizens,
particularly victims, called for both justice and to be heard (Forum 2010). However,
despite these foundational aspirations in a segment of Zimbabwean society, the
Forum understood that ZANU-PF controlled the state, including the monopoly on
violence. It retained control of the Ministry of Justice, the Central Intelligence
Organisation and the army, and the president had absolute power to appoint the
chief of police, which gave him control over the Joint Operational Command, or the
National Security Council under the auspices of the GPA (Forum 2006). These
loomed as foreboding institutions, reminding Zimbabwean society of the limits to
their desire for accountability and democratisation. In addition, the Zimbabwean
bureaucracy was militarised and military chiefs were deployed to the highest posi-
tions in parastatals, with a vested interest in maintaining the status quo of impunity
(Eppel and Raftopoulos 2008). Thus, the Forum recognised that transitional justice
was not going to be an easy process. Nonetheless, the outreach programme elicited
a number of ideas regarding what ordinary citizens needed from such a process.
Truth Seeking
Truth seeking was one of the pillars of transitional justice highlighted by the Forum
facilitators during the outreach meetings. Following on the previous mandate given
by civil society during the 2003 Johannesburg symposium, the Forum emphasised
during its workshops the setting up of a Truth and Justice Commission to handle this
aspect of dealing with the past in Zimbabwe. The Forum argued that, through the
work of the commission, the facts of past events would be established, thereby giv-
ing voice to victims and their relatives. In addition, the commission would be able
4 Taking Transitional Justice to the People: Challenges for Civil Society in Zimbabwe 81
Prosecutions
Most of the facilitators in the earlier stages of the outreach programme were law-
yers, and they found it easy to highlight the retributive aspect of transitional justice.
The lawyers were drawn from the Forum’s litigation unit and had vast experience in
court actions, but little or no experience in alternative justice methods. In the meet-
ings, prosecution was argued as the best way of achieving justice for victims, and to
some extent imposed on the participants. The Forum saw retributive justice as able
“to give victims and their families a means of justice and catharsis, to officially
confirm the facts and to end impunity and deter potential future perpetrators”. It
further argued that if “trials are perceived as legitimate, they can also signal the
commitment and ability of a government to uphold the rule of law, due process and
human rights” (Domingo 2012: 4). While criminal prosecutions were at the core of
the Forum’s messaging, other forms of justice were discussed, such as the nonpuni-
tive forms that included acknowledgement, proper history records, archiving, com-
munity reparations, reburials and commemorations.
The Forum and participants recognised that there were immediate challenges
that needed to be addressed before justice could be done. First, there was no demo-
cratic transition in Zimbabwe, and ZANU-PF would not allow a process that would
expose it. Second, the MDC was not powerful enough in the GNU to cause the
international community to push for the arrest and prosecution of Zimbabwean
political leaders complicit in violence. More so, there were real fears that ZANU-PF
would issue a blanket amnesty to perpetrators, as is its age-old practice. Nonetheless,
participants called for perpetrators to be prosecuted before matters of reconciliation
82 S. Njeru
were considered. They suggested that prosecution would deter perpetrators from
continued acts of violence and that this would stop the culture of violence. In addi-
tion, participants thought that it would be justice for the victims when “perpetrators
are brought to the book and are punished for their offences” (Forum 2010: 24), thus
making “everyone accountable for the atrocities committed” (31).
Reparations
Reparations found resonance with the traditional practice in Zimbabwe, which says
that the solution to an avenging spirit is to appease it (Mushonga wengozi kuiripa).
Many Zimbabweans have lost so much during the difficult times, including property
and their livelihoods, as well as relatives and friends. Most of the Zimbabweans
interviewed in the Forum’s follow-up survey said that they would not find satisfac-
tion in the incarceration of the perpetrator only, but also needed some form of resti-
tution. Some asked who would be arrested in the case of the perpetrator being dead
or unknown at the time of trails or reparations. In light of historical injustices, some
respondents argued for reparations that emphasised compensation, with the state
expected to take full responsibility (Forum 2011: 19). Respondents also challenged
the state to compensate victims and their families for their losses during land
reforms.
Participants in the outreach programme agreed that material and nonmaterial
reparations were needed, including reburial of the dead, acknowledgement by the
state for the political violence, individual compensation where possible and collec-
tive reparations where wrongs were meted out to groups. However, participants also
recognised that the state would likely plead that it faced resource constraints and
call for prioritisation of national issues. Most participants noted that public acknowl-
edgement by the state would cost nothing and that the state should give this form of
reparations, although not in the manner of President Mugabe who acknowledged
past violations by saying that Gukurahundi was a “moment of madness” (Coltart
2016: 58).
Institutional Reform
The Forum approached institutional reform from the perspective that, in Zimbabwe,
perpetrators had not been charged for their actions because of the protection they
received from the state. During the outreach meetings, the Forum staff argued for
the establishment of guarantees that serious human rights and international law vio-
lations committed in the past would not be repeated. To achieve this, the staff argued
that it was of primary importance to reform institutions that have committed viola-
tions or failed to prevent them. In light of the impunity enjoyed by perpetrators of
serious violations of human rights, and the repetition of crimes, successful reform
of the country’s justice and security sectors was considered crucial.
4 Taking Transitional Justice to the People: Challenges for Civil Society in Zimbabwe 83
rights defenders and ordinary citizens” (32). As such, participants do not view
this body as complementary to a democratic society.
The security sector has also encroached on public institutions. Concerns about
the “Zanufication of the public service, traditional leadership structures, youth train-
ing centers, and militarization of the public institutions” (34) are widespread. This
was manifested through the deployment of “retired military, police and intelligence
personnel to key public institutions including the electoral commission, strategic
grain reserve, judiciary, and prison services, and parastatals”. While there is nothing
wrong with retired security personnel taking up positions in these institutions on a
competitive basis, this particular deployment of ex-service men “to public institu-
tions was an active pursuit of partisan agenda of retaining ZANU PF hegemony”
(34). The pronouncements and actions tailored to advance a political agenda by
these serving and ex-service men reinforced some of the partisan allegations lev-
elled against them.6
The National Youth Service programme, meanwhile, was converted into an anti-
MDC indoctrination programme and a pro-ZANU-PF support group. Particularly in
2002 and 2008, Youth Service training centres became torture camps, where mem-
bers and supporters of opposition parties were tortured and raped. Indoctrinated
youth and war veterans became the vanguard for the violent land dispossession
campaign. This is confirmed by a former youth militia member, who noted, “We are
ZANU PF’s ‘B’ team. The army is the ‘A’ team and we do things the government
does not want the ‘A’ team to do” (Solidarity Peace Trust 2003:54).
Against calls by both the MDC formations and Thabo Mbeki to have security
sector reforms instituted, high-ranking officials in President Mugabe’s government
have remained resolute that there will be no such reforms. Defence Minister
Emmerson Mnangagwa, for example, told senior military personnel that there
would be no reforms as long as he remained in government (International Crisis
Group 2013). These manoeuvres caused anxiety among the impartial participants in
the outreach programme. In Matabeleland, there were concerns on the unbecoming
behaviour of some security personnel. Participants made remarks like, “The police
and CIO have become law unto themselves. Whatever they want to do to whoever,
they do without fear [Indel’ampholisa lama CIO enza ngayo angani bahlala kwe-
labo ilizwe hatshi kuleli esikilo. Benza santando benganakile lutho]” (Forum 2010:
58). One participant in Mashonaland West noted, “If I was in power, I would replace
all the security forces with a totally new force” (82). Participants argued that vetting
or disbanding the elements of the current security sector and building a new, profes-
sional stock were central to transitional justice in Zimbabwe.
6
In 2009, General Constantine Chiwenga, commander of Zimbabwe Defence Forces, said that he
would have difficulties in saluting Mr. Morgan Tsvangirai because he lacked liberation war creden-
tials. See http://messagefromafrica.com/2009/02/22/i-will-have-difficulties-saluting-tsvangirai-
constantine-chiwenga (Accessed 14 December 2017).
4 Taking Transitional Justice to the People: Challenges for Civil Society in Zimbabwe 85
Memorialisation
Conclusion
picture of a healed and accountable society in sight, will continue with its work.
There are no obstacles too big and power too fearful to stop the Forum’s current
commitment to dealing with the past in Zimbabwe.
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Chapter 5
Persistent Injuries, the Law and Politics:
The South African Victims’ Support Group
Khulumani and Its Struggle for Redress
Introduction
Z. Puwana
Independent, Cape Town, South Africa
e-mail: [email protected]
R. Kesselring (*)
University of Basel, Basel, Switzerland
e-mail: [email protected]
The situation apartheid victims find themselves in today was considerably shaped
by how the transition from an apartheid state to a democratically elected govern-
ment came about. In the years following the release of Nelson Mandela and the
5 Persistent Injuries, the Law and Politics: The South African Victims’ Support Group… 93
The country prepared for the first democratic elections, which took place in April
1994 and brought the ANC to power. Shortly thereafter, the first postapartheid min-
ister of justice, Dullah Omar, opened a lengthy consultative process as to what an
inquiry into past political crimes would look like, and he proposed a truth commis-
sion. Civil society organisations, individuals, religious groups and international
advisors were prominently involved. These constituencies filed proposals and rec-
ommendations, participated in a series of workshops and presented their submis-
sions at hearings.1 Among other things, they advocated for a victim-centred
approach, for instance through funds for nongovernmental organisations (NGOs) to
provide assistance to victims, such as counselling and socio-economic empower-
ment.2 Not everyone in the ANC was happy with an inquiry into the party’s own
1
For the various submissions made by organisations and individuals, see http://truth.wwl.wits.
ac.za/coll_home.php.
2
See, for instance, Proposal for the Establishment of the Commission for Truth and Reconciliation
in South Africa prepared by the Trauma Centre for Victims of Violence and Torture (June 30,
1994). Retrieved from http://truth.wwl.wits.ac.za/doc_page.php?did=1016&li=cat.
94 Z. Puwana and R. Kesselring
abuses. Victims, on the other hand, are on record as calling for a much tougher
course of action and prosecutions of perpetrators (Boraine 1995).
In short, the main concerns in the early 1990s were surely not victims or pro-
cesses of reconciliation but putting an end to violence. As the following section
demonstrates, the main transitional justice issue was amnesty and not reparations,
and the main theme was (the treatment of suspected) perpetrators and not victims.
The Promotion of National Unity and Reconciliation Act of 1995 led to the estab-
lishment of the TRC, which consisted of three committees: the Committee on
Human Rights Violations, the Amnesty Committee and the Reparation and
Rehabilitation Committee. The Act gave power to the Amnesty Committee to grant
amnesty to those who made full disclosure of their crimes in cases where political
motivation and proportionality between the act and the political objective pursued
were proven. Perpetrators were not required to express any remorse for their actions.
Importantly, if amnesty was refused, the Commission stated that the applicant could
face criminal or civil prosecutions in the future.3
The Act not only concretised amnesty provisions but also teased out victims’
rights. The “need for reparations” cited in the Interim Constitution was given
expression in the Act, which defines reparations as “any form of compensation, ex
gratia payment, restitution, rehabilitation or recognition” (Section 1 (xiv)). The
reparation measures were to be sourced from a soon-to-be-established “President’s
Fund” (Section 42). The only—and excluding—qualification for reparations was
that the recipient had to be a victim of a gross violation of human rights as defined
in Section 1 of the Act and “as found by the Commission” (TRC 1998, vol. 5: 176).4
The Reparation and Rehabilitation Committee worked for 15 months starting in
April 1996. Thousands of citizens came to give statements in town halls, hospitals
and churches all around the country, thus reopening wounds to inform the public
about the atrocities they experienced. It received statements from 21,290 persons of
3
The amnesty provision in the TRC Act was challenged in South Africa’s highest court, the
Constitutional Court. In its decision in Azanian People’s Organization (AZAPO) and Others v. the
President of the Republic of South Africa and Others, the Constitutional Court ruled that the grant-
ing of amnesty was constitutional, and at the same time asserted that perpetrators who failed to
satisfy the amnesty requirements could face civil and criminal charges.
4
In terms of Section 1 of the Act, victims are (a) persons who, individually or together with one or
more persons, suffered harm in the form of physical or mental injury, emotional suffering, pecuni-
ary loss or a substantial impairment of human rights (1) as a result of a gross violation of human
rights, or (2) as a result of an act associated with a political objective for which amnesty has been
granted; (b) persons who, individually or together with one or more persons, suffered harm in the
form of physical or mental injury, emotional suffering, pecuniary loss or a substantial impairment
of human rights, as a result of such person intervening to assist persons contemplated in paragraph
(a) who were in distress or to prevent victimisation of such persons; and (c) such relatives or
dependents of victims as may be prescribed.
5 Persistent Injuries, the Law and Politics: The South African Victims’ Support Group… 95
whom “more than 19,050 persons were found to be victims of a gross violation of
human rights” (TRC 2003, vol. 7: 1). In addition, 2,975 persons were identified as
victims during the amnesty process.5
Most of the persons who gave statements did so in place of a family member who
was murdered or had disappeared (Ross 2002). They told what they knew to a
statement-taker in a formalised process (Wilson 2000). Victims received a letter
which acknowledged their statement, some were visited by an investigator and, at
some stage, they were informed whether they qualified for reparations. In this pro-
cess, there was little psychosocial support provided.
Victims had to wait for the president to make a decision regarding reparations for
another 5 years, though, because it took the Amnesty Committee until 2003 to table
their findings and recommendations with regard to amnesty.6 Survivors and victims
could challenge the amnesty applications publicly and often did so, but they were
disadvantaged by inconsistent notification about relevant cases, the court-like nature
of the hearings and often the poor quality of their legal representation (Chapman
and Van der Merwe 2008c: 11; Sarkin-Hughes 2004: 199ff).
In our opinion, the TRC was charged with a monumental task: to retell, to under-
stand and to classify the South African past and, wherever possible, to contribute to
the country’s future by facilitating closure through reconciliation. Scholars working
on the TRC largely agree that the Commission did not fulfil these formidable expec-
tations. From its very inception, the TRC was accompanied by critical scholarship
and received many recommendations from NGOs and other concerned bodies from
both abroad and South Africa (cf. Fullard and Rousseau 2008). Not only in transi-
tional justice scholarship but also in South African society itself the TRC came to
have a decisive role in shaping what proceeded from it (despite the multiplicity of
voices within the TRC, see Fullard and Rousseau 2008).
Among victims, the TRC had different effects. It distinguished between those fall-
ing into its category of victim and those failing to meet the requirements. It further
distinguished between those who gave statements and those who chose not to,7 or
who missed the opportunity to do so. It thereby distinguished between those who
5
The list of victims as identified by the TRC (2003, vol. 7:936–976) can be accessed on Khulumani’s
home page: http://khulumani.net/khulumani/documents/file/35-trc-report-volume-7-victims-list.
html.
6
The Amnesty Committee held its last public hearing in December 2000 and finished its work at
its official dissolution by President Mbeki on May 13, 2001. It held more than 250 public hearings,
and received between 7,115 and 7,127 amnesty applications. This number was deflated by the
granting of indemnity, immunity or presidential pardon to many thousands of prisoners during the
negotiation process (Sarkin-Hughes 2004:194ff).
7
See Ross (2003:172) and (2002:163) for a list of reasons why people decided not to give a
statement.
96 Z. Puwana and R. Kesselring
were entitled to financial redress and those who were not. Only a few victims of
apartheid were able to fully claim “victim” status (Khulumani Support Group 2016).
As a result, there was this “list” that is a closed list of the persons who had quali-
fied for victim status. The list most likely does not include thousands of persons
who would qualify for such. As Mahmood Mamdani notes,
The result was a list of individuals, with no reference to groups. But if the violence of apart-
heid targeted groups more than specific individuals, it would not be surprising if most vic-
tims of apartheid turned out to be unidentified individuals. This, in turn, would be an
argument for giving reparations to communities rather than individuals. (Mamdani 2002: 40)
The “list” suggests not only that victimhood can be assessed and redressed indi-
vidually but also that there is a set number of victims. Everyone who is not on the
list has ever since not benefited from any reparations. Certainly, the Commission’s
intention was the opposite. It attempted—discursively (although not legally)—to
integrate everyone’s suffering and pain into a shared understanding of victimhood
(Wilson 2000: 80). To do that, it used a representative—individualised—victim-
hood which was meant to speak to and for everyone.
The aspect of the TRC’s mandate which was possibly most consequential for
victims’ lives up to today was that it could not make binding recommendations for
provisions of reparations and redress. This, however, is the case with most truth
commissions. The state poorly followed the recommendations of the TRC. One
major negligence has been the almost non-existent follow-up on prosecuting perpe-
trators who were not granted amnesty. In terms of the recommendations that con-
cerned victims directly, the Reparation and Rehabilitation Committee recommended
Individual Reparation Grants of R20,000 a year for a period of 6 years. Instead, the
then President Thabo Mbeki decided on a one-time payment of R30,000 per victim
or surviving family. The announcement was made in 2003, thus 7 years after victims
gave their statements to the Committee. The government’s delay in paying out indi-
vidual reparations and the lack of any clear idea of how to roll out the recommended
community reparations (see below) have become the major issues of contestation
for victims—and despair.
It was only in 2005 that the South African Government established a TRC Unit
in the Department of Justice that was supposed to take forward the recommendation
of community reparations. Its precise mandate and organisation have remained
unclear up to today. The TRC Unit was established to develop and implement pro-
grammes for communities which are particularly ridden by the legacy of apartheid-
era violence. These programmes should be financed from the President’s Fund. The
President’s Fund is another major pending TRC-related issue. Many states includ-
ing Switzerland and Germany contributed to it. Since its establishment in the mid-
1990s, it has accumulated more than R1 billion (USD70 million) (Gontsana 2016).
In May 2011, the Department of Justice gazetted draft regulations for assistance
to victims in respect of basic and higher education and in relation to medical bene-
fits for victims and their dependents, and invited responses. The regulations indi-
cated that only victims identified and listed by the TRC were eligible. Civil society
groups harshly criticised the “closed list” approach and demanded that the process
5 Persistent Injuries, the Law and Politics: The South African Victims’ Support Group… 97
be stopped until “meaningful consultation are carried out with victims and inter-
ested parties”.8
In sum, victims came to judge the TRC by the state’s poor follow-up of the
Commission’s recommendations. Measured against the expectations raised by the
TRC process, the state has failed on all accounts to properly deliver on them.
Reflecting on the many strong civil society initiatives demanding to take the
“unfinished business” of the TRC further, Chapman and Van der Merwe (2008a)
write:
In some respects, the TRC seems to have made more of an impact on civil society in South
Africa [than the government]. Many organizations in civil society have taken on various
transitional justice tasks relating to expanding and deepening the work of the TRC. Some
of these initiatives are clearly more suited for civil society actors, but others have been
developed to fill the gap left by government. Continued efforts are also aimed at lobbying
government to fulfill its own transitional justice obligations. (Chapman and Van der Merwe
2008b: 282)
They suggest that the TRC prompted various initiatives which draw on the short-
comings of its work. And, indeed, the lack of follow-up and the exclusion of most
victims from the TRC process were obvious failures for Khulumani to draw on in
their demands. However, victims and other civil society actors first had to establish
the societal ground for such criticism which was not self-evident to the ordinary not
directly affected South African or to the international community.
A clear sign that apartheid victimhood indeed was an issue a decade or longer
after the first democratic elections was the exponential increase in persons who
joined Khulumani as members.
8
Press Statement of the South African Coalition for Transitional Justice, June 2011: http://www.
csvr.org.za/index.php/media-articles/news-and-events/56-latest-news/2498-press-statement-the-
state-must-honour-its-reparations-obligations-to-all-victims-victims-reject-the-dojs-closed-list-
approach-.html. The statement of the South African Coalition for Transitional Justice can be
accessed on https://www.ictj.org/sites/default/files/SACTJ-South-Africa-Reparations-Submission-
2011-English.pdf.
9
The Centre for the Study of Violence and Reconciliation ran a Truth Recovery Project in which it
constructed a South African Disappearances Database. It is not a membership-based database but
addresses similar issues as Khulumani. In South Africa, there are also many military veteran and
ex-combatant associations. Khulumani and these associations have different target groups, but
there are surely overlaps in members. Government recently created a Department of Military
Veterans, and in 2011, parliament passed the Military Veterans’ Act which empowers the
Department to assist military veterans.
98 Z. Puwana and R. Kesselring
around 105,000 members. Between 2009 and 2012 alone, about 20,000 people
applied for membership—a number equivalent to the entire TRC list of victims.
Only about 10% of Khulumani’s members were officially recognised as “victims”
by the TRC and granted reparations (Madlingozi 2007a: 120).
Members are individuals who survived some form of violence inflicted by the
apartheid security forces, its collaborators or the liberation movements, such as tor-
ture, detention without trial and severe ill treatment of various sorts, including sex-
ual assault, abuse or harassment, banning and banishment orders, deliberate
withholding of medical attention, food and water, destruction of homes, and mutila-
tion of body parts. Members are also those whose family members were abducted,
disappeared or killed by the apartheid regime.
Each and every member has an entry in Khulumani’s national database. To
become a member, applicants have to present their identification document and a
copy of a death certificate if the victim status is linked to a death in the family. A
data collector fills in a Needs Assessment Form with the prospective member. The
form is structured in four parts: the applicant’s personal details, “urgent needs”
today, violation which the applicant experienced directly or indirectly and “repara-
tion”, that is, the support the applicant has received to mitigate the impact of the
violation on his or her family, as well as whether the applicant was declared a victim
by the TRC.
The nine provincial branches—and the regional branches within them—each
have their own history. The Gauteng Province branch started as a self-help group in
1995 during the time of the TRC hearings (Wilson 2000, 2001), whose meetings
were hosted by the Centre for the Study of Violence and Reconciliation. Given that
the national office in Johannesburg is also the provincial office of Gauteng, the
province is best equipped in terms of finances and staff. Within Gauteng Province,
the East Rand branch has been a particularly active one, and, more recently, the
Sebokeng branch has emerged as a strong and vocal group. KwaZulu-Natal Province
has had a well-funded Khulumani office in Durban for many years. Its staff under-
took regular and frequent field trips to various parts of the province and thus acquired
thousands of new members. The province started its own database already in 1998.
Some provinces, such as Northern Cape and Mpumalanga, only recently opened a
formal office space, unburdening founding members who had been administering
the work from their own homes.
Khulumani Western Cape, which is the focus of the remainder of this chapter,
has always been seen as an exceptional branch in many ways (cf. Backer 2005,
2010; Colvin 2004a, b, 2006). Before it launched as Khulumani WC in September
2000, the group was called Ex-Political Prisoners and Torture Survivors and its
meetings were hosted by the Trauma Centre. In the late 1990s, the Trauma Centre
offered individual counselling and monthly group counselling. The group took on a
life on its own and joined Khulumani (Colvin 2004a).
The Western Cape branch has its office in Salt River, Cape Town. It has a
Provincial Executive Committee made up of representatives from several local
areas and from towns outside Cape Town, including Worcester and Paarl. It is sup-
ported by a youth coordinator, an office assistant and a fieldworker. Khulumani WC
5 Persistent Injuries, the Law and Politics: The South African Victims’ Support Group… 99
has used its proximity to parliament extensively to stage marches and hand over
memoranda during sessions. As a way not only to work through painful experiences
but also to make its concerns public and more accessible, Khulumani WC, at the
initiative of the Human Rights Media Centre, Cape Town, whose director Shirley
Gunn is, a Khulumani board member herself, has undertaken several memory proj-
ects. These include Breaking the Silence: A Luta Continua, a traveling exhibition
(cf. Gunn 2007; Gunn and Krwala 2008), and two documentary films, We Never
Give Up I and II, produced by Cahal McLaughlin (2002, 2012).
Research and collaborations have always been important for Khulumani WC.10
They have helped to mobilise solidarity and contributed to critical reflection within
the group and among its leaders. In a few cases, Khulumani WC was able to capi-
talise on scholarly interest by being directly involved in the design and implementa-
tion of research projects, but often scholars conduct short-term research, come with
their preformulated ideas of what they will hear when engaging with victims and
thus rather profit from the keenness of Khulumani WC to participate in international
knowledge production.
The organisation who most strongly spoke out against this way of sharing knowl-
edge and insights has been the Human Rights Media Centre, with which Khulumani
WC has collaborated on different projects over many years. The rights- and subject-
centred approach that the Centre deploys in its work has sensitised and empowered
members in engaging with researchers and forming partnerships.
The unequal power dynamics in research and knowledge production have
remained a dilemma, though, because refusing to cooperate means less publicity
and positive exchange. The executive structure of Khulumani WC has made a suc-
cessful effort in negotiating with incoming researchers for their own benefit before
allowing them to speak to its members.
The South African TRC became an exemplary case across the world. One could
argue that international and regional actors had to uphold the success story to render
it a model for other conflict-prone regions and countries. Many TRC commissioners
became (albeit critical) advocates for the set-up of truth commissions around the
world. As a result, on the international policy level, there was little criticism of the
institution as a whole, or of the process as it unravelled in the South African case in
particular. South Africa was arranging itself with an incomplete transition, the
10
Many of these collaborations are with South African NGO or research and policy institutions
such as the Centre for the Study of Violence and Reconciliation (Hamber 2006, 2009; Hamber and
Wilson 2002; Sonis and Van der Merwe 2004; Gobodo-Madikizela and Van der Merwe 2007; Van
der Merwe and Chapman 2008; Makhalemele 2004). Tshepo Madlingozi, Khulumani’s national
advocacy coordinator, has also published papers on transitional justice, drawing on his experiences
within the organisation (Madlingozi 2007a, b, 2010).
100 Z. Puwana and R. Kesselring
consequences of which are only coming to the fore 20 years later. Today, notions of
persistent racism and a general structural legacy of apartheid across milieus and
classes are alive as never before. It seems as if the past is catching up, specifically
among a young generation of students (Hefferman and Nieftagodien 2016).
For victims, this incompleteness of the transition, the upholding and even
entrenchment of structural inequality, is nothing new. Khulumani’s demands have
always been that the state review its compromised dealing with the past, and deliver
on the integration of everybody into a new South Africa. While these demands were
successfully kept out of the public domain for nearly a decade, not least because
South Africans were busy rebuilding their own lives, they dramatically came to the
fore in 2002 when apartheid victims filed suit against multinational companies who
allegedly aided and abetted the security branches of the apartheid regime.
The decision to file suit against companies came out of a long process of interna-
tional collaboration and lobbying for debt release or relief by the millennium (cf.
Kesselring 2012) in which Khulumani played a key role. While this so-called apart-
heid litigation was directed at businesses which did not disclose their role in the
perpetration of human rights violations under apartheid rule, for victims, it was
primarily about waking up their own government when the political avenue to pro-
vide a more inclusive redress scheme seemed to be of no avail. The apartheid litiga-
tion was filed under the Alien Tort Statute, which gives non-US citizens the right to
sue in US Federal Courts over violations of international law. The demand to address
experiences of injustice and the role of multinational corporations in them were
backed by national and international NGOs and individuals. For the global human
rights movement, the case was about the applicability of the Alien Tort Stature to
pursue corporate liability.
South Africans and individuals and organisations around the world wrote letters
in support of the applicants. For instance, former Archbishop Desmond Tutu, in his
capacity as former chairperson of the TRC, emphasised that the apartheid litigation
was in line with what the TRC had found:
The obtaining of compensation for victims of apartheid, to supplement the very modest
amount per victim to be rewarded as reparation under the TRC process, could promote
reconciliation, by addressing the needs of those apartheid victims dissatisfied with the small
monetary value of TRC reparations.11
In the course of the suit’s 14 years in courts, the South African Government has
changed its position at least twice (cf. Kesselring 2012). Initially, the South African
Cabinet assured that government neither supported nor opposed legal action in this
matter. On the occasion of the tabling of the two final volumes of the TRC Report
to the National Houses of Parliament and the Nation on April 15, 2003, however,
President Mbeki strongly condemned the legal actions:
We consider it completely unacceptable that matters that are central to the future of our coun-
try should be adjudicated in foreign courts which bear no responsibility for the well-being of
Brief of Amici Curiae Commissioners and Committee Members of South Africa’s Truth and
11
Reconciliation Commission in Support of Appellants, August 30, 2005, p. 10, fn. 10.
5 Persistent Injuries, the Law and Politics: The South African Victims’ Support Group… 101
our country and the observance of the perspective contained in our constitution of the promo-
tion of national reconciliation.
Then South African Minister of Trade and Industry Alec Erwin addressed
Parliament by saying, “We are opposed to and indeed contemptuous of attempts to
use unsound extra-territorial legal precepts in the USA to seek personal financial
gain in South Africa”.12 He condemned “the abuse to use the law of another land to
undermine our sovereign right to settle our past and build our future as we see fit”,
and reproached the plaintiffs for “break[ing] that indefinable collectivist identity
that was the origin of our strength” and for “exploit[ing] our history”. The late
Kader Asmal, then minister of education, argued that South Africa “does not need
the help of ambulance chasers and contingency fee operators, whether in Switzerland,
the Netherlands, or the United States of America”.
Even though the government later softened its stance, plaintiffs were labelled
unpatriotic and treacherous at the time. As a possibly unintended consequence of
the filing of the lawsuits, the relation between victims, international and regional
solidarity groups, and the South African state was put to a test. Or, more to the point,
for victims, the stance of its government in relation to past atrocities and its redress
beyond the TRC crystallised with the help of the apartheid litigation. The litigation
had serious repercussions on the possibility of a dialogue between the South African
Government and victims seeking redress (for more details on the apartheid litiga-
tion, see Kesselring 2016a).
While victims have experienced strong support from TRC commissioners, politi-
cians and South African NGOs and interest groups, it was not strong enough to
change a discourse of the ungrateful victim calling on an international body (the US
courts) to fiddle with domestic affairs.
Khulumani also helped compile several court cases on pardons, the prosecution
policy and negotiations with government around collective reparations beyond the
victims on the TRC list. It forms part of the South African Coalition of Transitional
Justice, an umbrella organisation standing in for the rights of victims and holding
government accountable to its obligations.13
A more recent example of how a legal case can spur a political discussion is the
ongoing trial against four apartheid-era policemen accused in a case of disappear-
ance and murder. Twenty-three-year-old anti-apartheid activist Nokuthula Simelane
was abducted and tortured by the security branch in 1983 and her remains were
never found. More than three decades later, in February 2016, the National
Prosecuting Authority (NPA) finally charged the four policemen of murder and
kidnapping. Importantly, this is one of the few cases the NPA took up from a list of
about 300 the TRC recommended for follow-up in 2002—and only because the
12
Debate on the Truth and Reconciliation Commission Report: Speech by Minister of Trade and
Industry, Alec Erwin, 15 April 2003. Retrieved from http://millenniums-entwicklungsziele.de/
documents/Reactionstrc.pdf.
13
For more information on the court cases and the coalition, see https://www.ictj.org/our-work/
regions-and-countries/south-africa and http://www.saha.org.za/news/2011/June/sactj_submis-
sion_on_trc_reparations_regulations.htm.
102 Z. Puwana and R. Kesselring
Simelane family launched a High Court case. The public support in reaction to the
announcement to finally prosecute Simelane’s killers is indicative of what is at
stake here. Why has it taken the NPA so long, and why have so few perpetrators
denied amnesty by the TRC—and others who did not even apply for it—been
brought to trial?
Khulumani knows of numerous cases like this, with families trying to find the
means and support to bring them to court or public attention. As much as such cases
are about the prosecution of perpetrators, for Khulumani members they are also—
and primarily—a source of information to learn the whereabouts of their loved
ones. By denying justice to society, the NPA denies justice to thousands of individu-
als to find closure.
The litigation had strong repercussions within Khulumani WC. For one, as we wit-
nessed in many meetings but also in daily encounters with members, it raised hopes
for quick payments. Most Khulumani members did not give statements to the TRC
and thus did not qualify for reparations. The litigation offered a crucial remedy to
this shortcoming. In this sense, victims put their hopes in the legal process to finally
give them what every victim deserves. However, apart from a meagre settlement
sum from General Motors (see Kesselring 2012), which was too little to even start
thinking of distributing it among members, no money came out of 14 years of judi-
cial process. Luckily, Khulumani has been represented by lawyers who work on a
contingency basis.
The fact that money might be paid out put the solidary among members at risk
on multiple occasions, however. Many times, individual members accused an exec-
utive committee member that he or she “ate the money”, that is, used his or her
position and access to the lawyers and misappropriated what was meant for the
communities. Such accusations could easily turn critical for the safety of the accused
and needed a lot of attention, with the executive committee calling for a special
meeting to rectify the misinformation.
Another factor connected to the possible payout of redress money was the ques-
tion of who would benefit and in which way. The papers filed in court did not elabo-
rate on this. Never was there a possible damages lump sum mentioned, and it was
therefore up to victims to think through what would happen in case of an out-of-
court settlement or a decision by the court.
Many spoke out for individual payments, largely, they said, because they have
become suspicious of community funding projects as so often rolled out by political
parties or municipalities in South Africa. In their experience, payments at the
community level mean that a ward councillor and his or her friends benefit, and that
the majority is left out. Especially women have learnt through experience that they
are the best managers of a household budget. Members also debated among them-
selves whether the gravity and the kind of injury should be reflected in the amount
5 Persistent Injuries, the Law and Politics: The South African Victims’ Support Group… 103
of money a person would receive. Finally, it should be noted that, as happened years
earlier when victims who gave statements to the TRC were anticipating the repara-
tion payment, several members (who were automatically plaintiffs and thus poten-
tial beneficiaries) started projects, such as converting a shack into a brick house,
which they hoped to pay off with the money coming from the litigation.
Lawyers, most of all the South African advisor to the litigation, Charles
Abrahams, were always cautious not to raise hopes among Khulumani members,
but they also often found themselves in the role of motivating members to not give
up their hopes, a concern they shared with us repeatedly.
In other words, while the apartheid litigation is formulated around legal account-
ability, the political campaigns around the litigation have been much broader and far
reaching. On the positive side, the apartheid litigation managed to bring victims’
concerns, which were previously sidelined and dismissed by the government, into
the public realm. At the very least, the international litigation helped to generate the
conditions for a more critical (local and international) public of government’s role
in transitional justice processes.
In the landscape of South African civil society organisations concerned with the
legacy of apartheid-era crimes, Khulumani is, apart from military veterans’ groups,
the only group that is not only membership based but also has victims as members
(see above). Apart from numerous initiatives which it started on its own, as a result
of its unique status as a victim and membership-based organisation, Khulumani WC
has often been asked to join coalitions, participate in marches, sign statements and
join discussions, among other kinds of activities initiated by other organisations.
Examples are the Centre for the Study of Violence and Reconciliation, the Institute
of Justice and Reconciliation and the Human Rights Media Centre. While such a
network of partner organisations has been vital to maintaining a public discussion
of victimhood and redress, the specificity of these partnerships and of Khulumani
has presented challenges.
Given Khulumani’s unique organisational structure, participating in equal part-
nerships with other organisations is not easy. Khulumani WC (unlike the national
office in Johannesburg) does not have formally trained staff. It is also not an NGO
with, for instance, a research agenda. Rather, it is there to serve its members to the
best of its abilities, with access to very little funding, and equipped primarily with
its own experiences of victimhood. Translating victimhood into a public and politi-
cal discourse is difficult for victims who have to deal with the aftereffects of violent
experiences on a daily basis. As a result, professional, research NGOs are potentially
better positioned to speak authoritatively. While Khulumani WC has by and large
profited from collaborations with other NGOs, they have also ended up being talked
about on their behalf (e.g. Méndez 2016).
104 Z. Puwana and R. Kesselring
Just as relationships with other organisations are key to any possible success but not
always easy, similarly Khulumani WC’s standing in the communities where its
members come from has two sides to it. For instance, Khulumani WC is a non-
partisan organisation which does not exclude anyone from becoming a member if
he or she qualifies as such. In this, it is exceptional. Many groups differentiate them-
selves along political party lines. As a result, Khulumani WC is often misread as a
critic of government and of the ruling ANC, or accused of only being open to some
community members but not others. Generally, however, community members from
marginalised areas like the townships of Langa, Gugulethu, Philippi and Khayelitsha
5 Persistent Injuries, the Law and Politics: The South African Victims’ Support Group… 105
are happy to finally meet a group which is genuinely not interested in party politics
and takes up the everyday concerns of ordinary women and men.
The fact that Khulumani WC directly engages with communities through its
fieldworker also causes rifts within communities. For example, Khulumani is often
misread as only representing the victims of one specific incident during the apart-
heid era, and thus accused of leaving out the majority of victims. While this is not
the case, the fieldworker can only do so much in so many communities and neces-
sarily some benefit more than others. This accusation is one of the reasons why the
general meetings are held in a “neutral” space in Salt River, a suburb away from
where members live.
But even within the communities, not everyone agrees with Khulumani WC’s
argument that the state has not satisfyingly dealt with the past and that the past mat-
ters still today. Many want to move forward, and are tired of neighbours persistently
pointing to the past to explain their condition today.
For its members and others, Khulumani WC oftentimes takes on tasks which are
typically government’s responsibility. For instance, executive committee members
and the fieldworker tirelessly advise members on how to access social grants and
where they can get medical treatment.
The main challenge for Khulumani WC in terms of its relations with communi-
ties is that it primarily operates within the city of Cape Town and tends to neglect
the rural areas in Western Cape Province. This is a problem for many organisations
in South Africa. Unless there is funding for regular outreach in rural areas or several
offices spread across an area, this bias towards the urban will not change.
In recent years, Khulumani WC, like Khulumani as a whole, has been trying to
expand its reach beyond apartheid victimhood by including groups victimised by
migration, xenophobic violence and unfair labour conditions, among other factors.
However, faced with countless needs from apartheid victims, such an expansion has
been a practical challenge. The national office has rolled out a number of
programmes,14 but Khulumani WC has struggled to initiate programmes which
explicitly address vulnerable groups in general apart from targeted contributions in
projects initiated by other partners in the region.
Overcoming Victimhood
14
See Khulumani’s website: www.khulumani.net.
106 Z. Puwana and R. Kesselring
something that people would rather do away with.15 The problem is that the damage
apartheid caused is far from being redressed or healed. It is not only Khulumani
members who know this but also emerging social movements that are protesting an
education system in pieces, poor or non-existent service delivery, and a corrupt and
self-interested government, to name but a few issues.16
What all these movements have in common is the realisation that the transition
to democracy has not brought what was hoped for, that the state has failed on its
promises and that the past does indeed still shape the way things are today. Apartheid
victims are the embodiment of this emerging consciousness, which is increasingly
translated into open criticism of the current state of affairs and which can be broadly
summarised under the umbrella term transitional justice, that is, how to become a
more just society.
Against this background, Khulumani has often been misunderstood as being pre-
occupied with the past—looking back instead of looking forward. This is a gross
misunderstanding of victims’ demands. Acknowledging and redressing past experi-
ences enable a society to make a positive contribution to the future. The South
African state has failed to realise this, and the international community has largely
fallen for its line of a successful transition.
Victims’ demands are, next to their embodied memories of harm and hopes for jus-
tice, centrally shaped by the TRC. What is more, only the existence of the TRC
made certain processes in its aftermath possible. On the one hand, the TRC shaped
government policies with regard to apartheid-era crimes and the prosecution of per-
petrators; on the other hand, its mandate and limitations provided justification and
legitimacy to challenges to those policies. The TRC is thus a central point of refer-
ence for all actors involved. Furthermore, the articulation of victims’ social con-
cerns in courts has resulted in renewed attention to their demands in South African
society.
While the TRC fell far short of a victim-centred approach and did not meet vic-
tims’ expectations, it gave victims more prominence than they had before. It gave
relevance to their experiences. One important conclusion that can be drawn from the
South African case in terms of transitional justice is that a truth commission does
raise awareness of victims’ plight and needs. As short-lived as it is, this public con-
sciousness can be used to build upon. As we tried to show above, however, there is
15
Here, we mainly refer to a general sense among Khulumani WC’s members. However, such
perception and experience are also backed up by, for instance, data from the Reconciliation
Barometer Project (http://www.ijr.org.za/political-analysis-SARB.php).
16
See, for instance, findings from research at the Social Change Research Unit, University of
Johannesburg (Alexander et al. 2015).
5 Persistent Injuries, the Law and Politics: The South African Victims’ Support Group… 107
a very different side to this coin: the fact that the TRC dealt so prominently with
victims also meant that the general public, and the international community, was
more or less satisfied and thought victims’ lives were to improve as a result. One
could even argue that the TRC, a governmental institution born out of a political
negotiation, stole the show and diverted attention from victims’ concerns. As we
showed above, victims ever since the TRC have struggled to explain why the past is
not resolved.
In what follows, we propose five lessons learnt through the South African transi-
tional justice process which we believe, if considered early on in a transitional set-
up in other contexts, can make the transition process more just for victims. Firstly,
the South African case shows that the course for reparations and redress in a (post)
transition country is set early. In South Africa, ever since the list of victims was
publicised in the final report of the TRC (2003, vol. 7), there was little chance for
Khulumani and others to successfully lobby for a reopening of the TRC process to
those who were left out. This means that victims’ groups need to campaign for an
inclusive notion of victimhood early in the negotiation process.
Secondly, the victims’ question needs to be part of peace negotiations. As we
showed, reparations and redress were not a topic in South Africa in the early 1990s,
but rather amnesty and indemnity. One could read it as the powerful being preoc-
cupied with saving their skin first and foremost. In this process, victims are too
easily forgotten. If the victims’ question is not on the negotiation table, it is hard to
get it back in once the transitional years unfold. In the case of South Africa, victims’
concerns were not a priority and, later, victims never fully managed to bring their
plight to government’s enduring attention. To achieve this, it seems that relation-
ships to those in office are crucial. As in any context, to have an impact, an issue
must grab a person’s attention and emotion—preferably a person who is in a
decision-making position.
Thirdly, we argue that victims’ groups need to have a modest—and locally
anchored—professional structure in order to be heard in media and in the public in
ways that bring political and social acknowledgement. As a victims’ and
membership-based organisation, Khulumani WC did not have an easy standing in a
post-apartheid landscape where many well-educated freedom fighters founded their
own NGOs or accepted offers of a government post. While this might be particular
to the South African situation, in any transitional or postconflict situation the fate of
victims is quickly decided for victims instead of by them (e.g. Méndez 2016). It is
important that victims’ groups develop strong organisational skills which allow
them to raise funding for their programmes and enter into partnerships with sympa-
thetic civil society formations, within the country and beyond, on an equal standing.
Khulumani WC, in comparison to the other provincial branches of Khulumani but
also more generally, has been relatively successful in raising funds, running its own
programmes and entering into direct and equal relationships with partner organisa-
tions and communities.
108 Z. Puwana and R. Kesselring
Fourthly, taking legal recourse against the state or other entities such as compa-
nies is a double-edged sword. We showed that the “apartheid litigation” in the
United States came as a last resort to victims after political avenues to gain attention
and recognition proved very difficult. Going to court creates attention, in the public,
in government ministries and internationally (and possibly some reparations), but it
also creates confusion, expectations and hierarchies among victims. This is, of
course, not the plaintiffs’ fault but is rather due to the logic of the law (cf. Kesselring
2016b). Plaintiffs need strong bonds among themselves to not be corrupted by the
legal process and the complex political processes that follow from it.
Fifthly, we strongly propose that the recommendations of a truth commission
should be binding for the state. The South African case shows that the Commission
had moderately radical suggestions as to how to redress the past. It was, however,
up to the president and the various ministries to choose and implement from a list of
recommendations—something they hardly did. Making recommendations binding
would ensure that the transition is followed through.17 As a result of legally binding
recommendations, civil society actors would have much more power to put pressure
on their government. Certainly, this suggestion needs to be applied in conjunction
with our points above, particularly that the Commission’s reach be as inclusive as
possible.
In 2003, the year when the TRC’s report was finally tabled to parliament, S’fiso
Ngesi took a critical look at how the TRC had been used by the political system:
Many politicians are indifferent to the plight of those who have been left behind. The vic-
tims who were temporarily acknowledged by the system have been let down. They have
been forgotten. […] There is a difference between political peace and reconciliation. In
South Africa, we have used the TRC process to achieve a temporary political peace. I use
the word ‘temporary’ because the peace is fragile. Its future depends on how the state deals
with victims and those who are unable to share in the fruits of the new South Africa. (Ngesi
2003: 311)
The TRC was a deal, a pact between the new and the old state, and victims some-
how played along. Up to today, this “peace”, as fragile as it indeed is, has not been
broken. Victims have been patient, they have struggled to get by and many have
already passed on without recognition or the assurance that their grandchildren will
grow up in a better South Africa. Outright resistance to the current state of affairs
and against the government will most probably not come from victims, for they are
too old, too broken but also too faithful to the project of liberation. Resistance, how-
ever, is growing in other corners of society, including among students, township
residents and workers. Khulumani members by and large share their concerns and
will join in. They know that the past needs to be addressed openly in order to imag-
ine a future for all.
17
A truth commission’s recommendations are rarely binding. Exceptions are the recommendations
of Guatemala’s Historical Clarification Commission and El Salvador’s Commission on the Truth.
Both commissions operated on the basis of peace accords, which were binding on the
government.
5 Persistent Injuries, the Law and Politics: The South African Victims’ Support Group… 109
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Chapter 6
Cooperation and Conflict: Civil Society
Resistance and Engagement with Transitional
Justice in Burundi
Wendy Lambourne
Introduction
The Central African country of Burundi has experienced cycles of political and
interethnic violence and mass atrocities starting soon after gaining independence
from Belgium in 1962. Contestations and contradictions abound in attempting to
account for this turbulent past organised primarily around conflict between the Tutsi
minority and the Hutu majority, but also around internal and cross-cutting divisions
within the political elite (Lemarchand 1996; Watt 2016). Accusations of genocide
have been made in both directions, focusing on the crisis of 1972 and subsequent
massacres targeting each ethnic group in turn. According to Lemarchand, the use of
the term genocide in relation to Burundi has been “designed to discredit rather than
to illuminate” (Lemarchand 1996: xxvi). It is within this atmosphere of mutual dis-
trust and violence that civil society began to emerge as a significant force in
Burundian politics in the early 1990s.
This chapter is concerned with the role of civil society in efforts to deal with the
past which have been pursued since the signing of the Arusha Peace and
Reconciliation Agreement in 2000 and the subsequent creation of a power-sharing
government in Burundi. In relation to transitional justice, the Arusha Agreement
called for the establishment of a Truth and Reconciliation Commission (Commission
This research was supported in part by funding from the Faculty of Arts and Social Sciences at the
University of Sydney. I am indebted to Trauma Healing and Reconciliation Services (THARS) and
its executive director, Dr. David Niyonzima, for hosting my research visits to Burundi over the past
4 years, and to Raphael Manirakiza, a former civil society activist who left Burundi in mid-2013,
for the translation of key documents and helping to fill some of the gaps in my knowledge and
understanding of the Burundian political context and the role of civil society. I take full responsi-
bility for any mistakes or misinformation I may have unwittingly reproduced in this chapter.
W. Lambourne (*)
University of Sydney, Sydney, NSW, Australia
e-mail: [email protected]
1
Sources included participant observation, interviews and meetings during 8 separate visits to
Burundi between May 2012 and August 2016, and 1 visit to Rwanda in August 2016, with a num-
ber of different representatives or members of government, the United Nations, funding bodies and
local and international NGOs, including CENAP, FORSC, Impunity Watch, Global Rights, GiZ,
THARS, QPN Burundi, MiPAREC, AMEPCI, La Benevolencija Grands Lacs, AFSC, RCN Justice
& Democratie, members of FONAREC, GRJT and the UN Transitional Justice Unit. Individual
interviewees and informants are not directly named in the interests of confidentiality and security.
6 Cooperation and Conflict: Civil Society Resistance and Engagement… 113
cant divisions based on politics and ethnicity, with CSOs seemingly split between
those (mostly Hutu) remaining in the country who support the CVR and those (mostly
Tutsi) who are in exile and alienated from the transitional justice process.2
The kingdom of Burundi in the Great Lakes region of central Africa was colonised
and administered first by Germany from 1890 and then by Belgium after the end of
the First World War until Burundi became independent in 1962. As in neighbouring
Rwanda, the colonial power had deepened pre-existing differences between the
three ethnic groups, the majority Hutu who were farmers (approximately 85% of the
population), cattle-owning Tutsi (14%) and original pygmy inhabitants, the Twa
(1%), setting the stage for ethnic politics to emerge in the postcolonial period. But
unlike Rwanda, post-independence Burundi, after a brief period of shared rule,
became dominated by Tutsi-led governments. The country was beset by a series of
political assassinations and coups d’état starting with the crisis of 1965, followed
and preceded by massacres and revenge killings as the population became further
divided on both ethnic and political grounds. The year 1972 is especially remem-
bered by the Hutu population for a genocide committed by the Tutsi government,
when approximately 200,000 Hutu were killed and 300,000 fled as refugees, mostly
to neighbouring Tanzania. In 1988 a localised Hutu revolt was crushed by the Tutsi
army with further mass killings which were not investigated. A culture of impunity
had been created, along with collective trauma and fear of the other ethnic group
affecting the whole population.
As part of a post-Cold War move to multiethnic, multiparty politics in Burundi,
the first Hutu president took office in July 1993, but he was assassinated in October.
Approximately 50,000 Tutsis were killed in a revenge massacre, and 700,000 Hutus
fled in fear of reprisal killings. The ensuing civil war resulted in further refugee
flows, internally displaced persons (IDPs), many wounded and more than 300,000
deaths. The war was officially ended with the signing of the Arusha Agreement on
August 28, 2000, and the UN provided a peacekeeping mission which supervised the
election of a power-sharing government in 2005. However, the fighting continued
until December 2008 when the last of the rebel groups, the Party for the Liberation
of the Hutu People–National Liberation Forces (Parti pour la Libération du Peuple
Hutu–Forces Nationales de Libération, or Palipehutu-FNL), finally agreed to disarm,
but only after assurances that they would not be arrested and prosecuted (Vandeginste
2012). Other transitional justice issues that were discussed during the final peace
negotiations included the release of combatants and prisoners of war, integration of
2
Note that this conclusion reflects the perspective of those in exile and the diaspora, including both
Hutu and Tutsi, who are openly opposed to the third term of the current president. Civil society
leaders remaining in Burundi who are supporting the CVR process do not necessarily see them-
selves as taking a political position, but rather as supporting peace, reconciliation and healing for
their fellow Burundians. Personal interviews, Bujumbura, Kigali and Sydney, July–August 2016.
114 W. Lambourne
former combatants into the security forces and the rebels’ preference for a “Truth,
Forgiveness and Reconciliation Commission” (Vandeginste 2012: 3). Eventually the
CVR was created, but prosecutions have not been pursued, despite advocacy from
civil society, support from the political opposition and strong pressure from the UN.
Civil society may be defined as “social organisations occupying the space between the
household and the state that enable people to coordinate their management of resources
and activities” (Layton 2006: 3). Civil society may be defined as non-profit, voluntary,
non-political organisations, but may also include corporations, religious organisa-
tions, media groups and political parties. In Burundi we can see how these different
categories of civil society groupings have developed over time to become particularly
strong in terms of religious institutions and media groups, as well as voluntary non-
profit organisations which may be linked in partnership with major international
NGOs. Political party affiliation came to define Burundian social relations more than
ethnic groups in the post-civil war period, and at least until April 2015 was providing
a significant form of civil society organisation in local communities.
Civil society can be seen as playing two major roles: (1) complementing the
capacity of states in delivering essential services to citizens, particularly in cases
where states have become weak due to poor governance structures, and (2) provid-
ing oversight to ensure governmental accountability (Centre for Conflict Resolution
2005). In Burundi, both kinds of CSOs existed prior to the end of the civil war and
in the post-Arusha period (Omara and Ackson 2010). For example, the first CSOs,
Ligue ITEKA and SONERA, were human rights NGOs formed by academics in
Burundi in the early 1990s which played a significant role in the second category,
investigating human rights violations and speaking out against torture and corrup-
tion. In subsequent decades a large number of CSOs in the first category emerged,
including NGOs dealing with a wide variety of issues from women’s and youth
associations to religious organisations and those working on women’s and chil-
dren’s rights, development, health, education, HIV/AIDS and poverty eradication
(Omara and Ackson 2010). The human rights NGO Association for the Protection
of Human Rights and Detained Persons (APRODH) was established in 2001 with a
focus on the rights of prisoners and victims of torture. Faith-based charity organisa-
tions have provided humanitarian assistance to orphans and others affected by the
war, and a number of Quaker organisations emerged following the end of the war
focusing on peacebuilding, reconciliation and development, including Ministry for
Peace and Reconciliation under the Cross (MiPAREC), Trauma Healing and
Reconciliation Services (THARS) and several NGOs focusing specifically on chil-
dren and women in need (Watt 2016).3 Many of these NGOs, including APRODH
3
Many of these human rights, peace and development NGOs, while based in the capital city of
Bujumbura, also have a strong presence and connection with communities in rural areas, including
especially the second biggest province of Gitega.
6 Cooperation and Conflict: Civil Society Resistance and Engagement… 115
and THARS, were started by victims and focus on the rights (second category) or
needs (first category) of victims of torture, sexual violence, child abuse or other
violence suffered during the civil war and since the war officially ended.
The emergence of a vibrant civil society in Burundi was assisted by the involve-
ment of external actors in the various peace processes. New opposition groups and
members of civil society, including especially religious leaders, were invited by the
Burundian Government to observe the Arusha peace talks in 2000. According to
Quaker leaders in Burundi, they were encouraged by the approach of the mediator,
former South African President and elder statesman, Nelson Mandela, who allowed
some of the civil society observers to speak in the official plenary. Although they were
able to “lobby the political parties and to insert some issues on the agenda” (Manirakiza
2016: 56), other civil society members disagreed with this assessment and expressed
their frustration at not being invited as full participants in the process.4
Burundian civil society members subsequently became more empowered to par-
ticipate in the governance of their country through the principles set out in the
Arusha Agreement and enshrined in the constitution of 2003 in relation to the devel-
opment of a multiparty political system (Omara and Ackson 2010). For example,
Burundian civil society actors played a key role in the Global Platform for the
Prevention of Armed Conflict (GPPAC) campaign which resulted in the creation of
the United Nations Peacebuilding Commission (UNPBC).5 The UNPBC started
operations in Burundi in 2006, with civil society playing an active role in its work
on poverty reduction and peacebuilding priorities for the country. In this way, an
international CSO, GPPAC, facilitated the already active local Burundian civil soci-
ety actors in acquiring a voice on the international stage and in influencing national
policy outcomes.
As explained by Uvin, “Burundians became angry” as a result of the civil war
and the experience of ordinary Burundians that “nobody in power gave a damn
about the needs of the poor” (Uvin 2009: 76). Rural Burundians revealed a similar
lack of trust in the government to provide any sense of the rule of law or services for
the community, which has been reflected in the increasing assertiveness of civil
society in the capital city of Bujumbura and criticism of the government also
observed by Uvin (2009).
One of the most important changes in civil society following the end of the civil
war was the growth in independent media, which provided alternative voices and
means of communicating information outside of the normal channels of government-
controlled media and communications, creating a more informed citizenry (Uvin
2009; Omara and Ackson 2010). Trade unions also developed, and Burundian
NGOs proliferated and strengthened in opposition as well as support of the govern-
ment, creating an apparently pluralist civil society.6
4
Interviews conducted in Bujumbura in August 2016.
5
Personal interview, Kigali, August 2016.
6
Examples of the increasing influence of CSOs at the time included the release from prison of
several opposition and CSO leaders, and the allowing of CSOs which had been suspended to
recommence operations.
116 W. Lambourne
Civil society in Burundi has thus from its origins played both roles identified ear-
lier in this chapter, in supporting the delivery of services by the government, such as
faith-based peace or charity organisations, and providing a critical voice through the
media, trade unions and human rights NGOs. The relationship between these two
groups in civil society has fluctuated over time depending on the political context.
For example, following the 2005 elections which installed as president Pierre
Nkurunziza, the leader of the newly formed political party of former rebels, the
National Council for the Defence of Democracy–Forces for the Defence of
Democracy (Conseil National pour la Défense de Démocratie–Forces pour la
Défense de Démocratie, or CNDD-FDD), several events served to unite the differ-
ent CSOs and strengthened them in working together against the government.7 The
first of these events was the massacre of more than 30 civilians alleged to be sup-
porters of the opposition rebel group Palipehutu-FNL in Muyinga Province in 2006
(Human Rights Watch 2008), followed in 2007 by the “illegal sale” of the presiden-
tial jet by the president.
In 2009, the extrajudicial killing of leading anti-corruption activist Ernest
Manirumva, who was vice president of the CSO Anti-corruption and Economic
Malpractice Observatory (Observatoire de Lutte contre la Corruption et les
Malversations Economiques, or OLUCOME), had a profound impact on Burundian
civil society activists, who mounted a campaign calling for justice through the CSO
umbrella organisation, Forum for the Strengthening of Civil Society (Forum pour le
Reinforcement de la Société Civile, or FORSC). The government issued an ordi-
nance banning the activities of FORSC, and other CSO members and journalists
who publicly denounced Manirumva’s killing and the failings of judicial inquiries
into the case were subjected to threats and intimidation.8 When the trial verdict was
finally announced in 2012 a group of 13 Burundian and 7 international NGOs issued
a joint statement condemning the trial for failing to investigate senior figures in the
Burundian security and police services (Human Rights Watch 2012). In addition to
Ligue ITEKA, FORSC and OLUCOME, the Burundian civil society signatories
included prominent human rights NGO APRODH and the Forum of Burundian
Journalists (Union Burundaise des Journalistes, or UBJ).
The Burundian Government responded by creating “dummy” or front NGOs
(nyakuri) to support its policies and activities, which had the effect of creating, or
appearing to create, divisions in civil society where otherwise none might have exist-
ed.9 For example, some (mostly Hutu) religious organisations which supported the
7
This was in contrast to the initial position of a number of CSOs and opposition political parties
which had determined to give the new CNDD-FDD government a chance and not actively oppose
it.
8
http://reliefweb.int/report/burundi/burundi-reverse-ban-civil-society-group (Accessed 10 December
2016).
9
The civil society leaders and organisations discussed in this chapter should be distinguished from
those which have been created by the government as “front” NGOs, ostensibly to counterbalance
the perceived opposition bias of existing CSOs. They include PISC-Burundi (the platform for
Burundian civil society) and CAPES+ (the collective of associations of people infected and
affected by HIV/AIDS), which have praised the Burundian Government’s banning of other CSOs
since April 2015 as well as the expulsion of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, and
6 Cooperation and Conflict: Civil Society Resistance and Engagement… 117
ruling party were co-opted through business interests and travelled the country sup-
porting activities such as a choir associated with the first lady (Komezagusenga, or
“keep praying”) and a soccer team (Alleluya FC) led by the president.10 At the same
time, competition for funding, poor resource sustainability and lack of trust reduced
cooperation and coordination between local Burundian CSOs (Omara and Ackson
2010), and perceptions of ethnic bias in the member organisations of FORSC limited
its potential effectiveness as a coordinating body for Burundian civil society.
In the few years leading up to the political crisis that began in April 2015, the
relationship between CSOs and the government had been steadily improving and
freedom of speech and the media was lauded as a positive development.11 This
occurred despite setbacks such as the new media law introduced in June 2013 which
limited the protection of journalistic sources and banned reporting on stories related
to national defence, security, public safety or the economy (IMS 2015). The role of
Burundian civil society in holding to account an oppressive government was becom-
ing less significant and there was some curtailment in civil society activity. However,
the previous flourishing of civil society took an even sharper downturn in late April
2015 when the government forcibly shut down the independent media outlets and
began imprisoning and targeting for assassination civil society leaders opposed to the
third term of President Nkurunziza. Journalists who worked for private radio sta-
tions, along with the leaders of FORSC and Ligue ITEKA, fled into exile, mostly to
neighbouring Rwanda, where their resistance has continued through online reporting
and activism. The founder and president of APRODH, Pierre Claver Mbonimpa,
survived an assassination attempt and was medically evacuated to Belgium where he
remains in exile while continuing to campaign for human rights.12 Those civil society
leaders who remained openly operating in the country during the political crisis,
mostly Hutu, were seen by some of those in exile, mostly Tutsi, as nyakuri, whether
or not they actively support the ruling party.13 Civil society was thus becoming more
divided along both political and ethnic lines as a result of the crisis.14
It was in this oppressive and violent environment and threatened return to the
ethnic “politics of the past” that the government declared the commencement of the
operations of the CVR. As will be argued in this chapter, the timing of this move can
denounced the politicisation of civil society groups such as APRODH and FORSC. http://www.
iwacu-burundi.org/englishnews/pisc-burundi-and-capes-praise-government-ban-on-other-civil-
society-organisations/ (Accessed 10 December 2016).
10
Interviews conducted in Sydney and Bujumbura, July–August 2016.
11
Meetings with CSO leaders in Bujumbura in 2012 and 2013, and interviews conducted in 2014.
12
In 2016, Mbunimpa was the recipient of the Alison des Forges Award for Extraordinary Activism.
https://www.hrw.org/news/2016/09/01/pierre-claver-mbonimpa-burundi (Accessed 10 December
2016).
13
Interviews conducted in Bujumbura and Kigali, August 2016.
14
While this perception of increasing division was reported by some civil society leaders in exile in
Kigali, it was not reported by all, and it was not the view expressed by civil society leaders remain-
ing in Burundi who were more likely to express solidarity with those in exile. My preliminary analy-
sis suggested that the division was not between Hutu and Tutsi, or between those who supported and
those who opposed the ruling party, but between those who were united across ethnic lines in work-
ing for peace whether inside the country or in exile, and those who were more actively opposing the
president’s third term and perceived the struggle in more political and ethnic terms.
118 W. Lambourne
be seen as a deliberate attempt to limit the participation and impact of civil society
in relation to the CVR and maximise control by the ruling elite over its functioning
and outcomes.
15
The consultations were funded by the UN Peacebuilding Fund.
6 Cooperation and Conflict: Civil Society Resistance and Engagement… 119
ing the potential impact of civil society on the design of the transitional justice
process (Manirakiza 2016: 42).
The results of the national consultations released in 2010 were interpreted as
revealing majority support for the establishment of a truth and reconciliation com-
mission with a mixed national and international composition and a mandate to inves-
tigate the full range of crimes from independence in 1962 until the end of the civil
war in 2008, as well as provision for reparations (Boloquy et al. 2013; Government
of Burundi 2010).16 However, the public preference for a mixed truth commission
was not pursued. After the 2010 elections, the Burundian Government established a
technical committee to elaborate the law for the creation of the CVR and present it to
parliament. The committee, which was composed of seven members appointed by
the government, on October 18, 2011, released its report, known as the Kavakure
report after the head of the committee, Minister Laurent Kavakure. Kavakure was
then special adviser to the president after having served previously as ambassador to
Belgium and foreign affairs minister. His key role on the technical committee sug-
gests that the report’s recommendations for the planned CVR would not be indepen-
dent of government power and interests. On the other hand, as one of my informants
explained, it seems that civil society through the GRJT did have some influence on
the drafting of the Kavakure report, as discussed later in this chapter.17
In August 2011, the American Friends Service Committee (a US-based Quaker
NGO) organised a conference on “Transitional Justice Mechanisms: Lessons
Learned from Truth and Reconciliation Commissions” in Bujumbura which was
attended by 41 members of international and local civil society, government repre-
sentatives, the UN and diplomats from embassies in Burundi, as well as 14 foreign
participants from South Africa, Sierra Leone, Liberia, Democratic Republic of
Congo, Kenya, Uganda, the USA and Spain, including several who had served as
commissioners in various truth commissions. The participants included Burundian
members of the technical committee which had a few months previously produced
the Kavakure report on the creation of the CVR. The conference was thus a signifi-
cant opportunity for Burundian civil society to share knowledge and ideas about
other truth commissions and the potential for the CVR planned in Burundi.
One of the observations was that in Africa, economic, social and cultural rights
are a critical issue in addition to the civil and political rights violations which are
normally the main focus of truth commissions (AFSC Burundi 2011: 14). A concern
was also expressed about the potential impact on already existing successful
community-based peace and reconciliation initiatives, such as the local Peace
16
Some CSOs have subsequently called for the CVR to stop its work and to recommence when the
mandate can be expanded to cover human rights violations committed in association with the
political crisis commencing in April 2015. In November 2016 the UN Human Rights Council set
up an independent commission of inquiry to investigate human rights violations in Burundi since
April 2015, which is mandated to engage with Burundian authorities and other stakeholders,
including civil society, refugees, UN agencies and regional bodies. The International Criminal
Court (ICC) meanwhile is continuing its preliminary examination of alleged crimes against
humanity committed in Burundi since April 2015. Atrocities Watch Africa, Burundi Watch Update
14–20 November & 21–27 November 2016, http://www.atrocitieswatch.org.
17
Interview conducted in Bujumbura, August 2016.
120 W. Lambourne
18
Interview with local civil society member of the GRJT, August 2016.
6 Cooperation and Conflict: Civil Society Resistance and Engagement… 121
19
Meetings with local and international civil society representatives, July 2013, June 2014 and
August 2016.
20
Meetings with local civil society members of the GRJT, July 2013.
21
For an analysis of how the Burundian Government was appearing to comply with international
obligations in relation to transitional justice while failing to genuinely commit to their implemen-
tation, see Taylor (2013b).
22
Interviews conducted in Bujumbura, June 2014.
23
Allegedly nyakuri and not genuine opposition parties. Interviews conducted in Bujumbura and
Sydney, July–August 2016.
24
Meetings with local civil society members in Bujumbura, August 2016, and in Sydney since the
establishment of the CVR in early 2016, considering the political nature of the appointment of
commissioners and confirming the perception that none of those appointed genuinely represented
civil society. This perception represented the perspective that religious leaders had been co-opted
to a partisan political agenda.
25
UN Security Council resolution 2137 of 13 February 2014, which extended the mandate of
BNUB to the end of 2014, included the following in relation to transitional justice: 15. Calls upon
the Government of Burundi to work with international partners and BNUB for the establishment
122 W. Lambourne
Burundian Government’s policies and facing the threat of expulsion from the coun-
try, the TJU turned its attention to supporting civil society engagement in transi-
tional justice in addition to its existing project on witness protection preparing for
the eventual creation of the CVR.26 However, despite significant investment, the
TJU’s efforts were not effective in targeting the needs of civil society.
Civil society representatives interviewed in Burundi in 2012 and 2013 revealed
disappointment with the UN’s approach. They reported a lack of support for transi-
tional justice-related programmes in local communities from the BNUB/TJU
because of constraints in the type of funding available. They also expressed surprise
about the TJU’s approach to creating the Forum of Community Facilitators in
Transitional Justice (Forum National des Relais Communautaire en Justice de
Transition, or FONAREC/JT) independently of existing civil society groups work-
ing on transitional justice. FONAREC/JT, which was created with the aim of
training community facilitators at all levels of Burundian society throughout the
country as a form of popular participation in transitional justice, was later aban-
doned as its shortcomings were recognised by the UN itself (Lambourne 2014).27
FONAREC/JT was a flawed process in a number of ways, including its failure to
build on the existing capacity, experience and involvement of CSOs in transitional
justice, and its focus on transmitting knowledge about the key pillars of transitional
justice as defined by the UN rather than on an authentic engagement in understand-
ing local civil society perspectives and priorities (Lambourne 2014; FONAREC/JT
2012). While it had the potential to be successful in providing a first level of out-
reach in terms of transparency by informing and sensitising the population about the
proposed CVR, it did not appear to be designed to fulfil the second and third levels
of outreach in terms of gathering civil society feedback on the implementation of
the CVR or input to the design of the CVR or other aspects of transitional justice
(Lambourne 2012). A member of the GRJT told me that in his observation the civil
society members selected to be community facilitators in FONAREC/JT were not
necessarily interested in transitional justice, unlike the members of the GRJT who
were not invited.28 This resulted in a lack of sustainability for the project, which the
UN had intended would become locally owned and run, as the volunteer community
facilitators who had been elected would not carry out their functions without con-
tinuing support from the TJU. BNUB and the TJU had a finite life, however, and so
did FONAREC/JT, it seems, ending even before it was fully implemented.29
of transitional justice mechanisms, including a credible and consensual Truth and Reconciliation
Commission to help foster an effective reconciliation of all Burundians and durable peace in
Burundi, in accordance with the results of the work of the Technical Committee, the 2009 national
consultations, Security Council Resolution 1606 (UNSC 2005) as well as the Arusha Agreement
of August 28, 2000.
26
Note that in October 2016 the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, whose mandate
included transitional justice, was expelled by the Burundian Government.
27
Interview with the Head of the TJU, Robert Kotchani, in Bujumbura, June 2014.
28
See also Lambourne (2014) for an account of the election process and interviews with some of
the FONAREC/JT community facilitators.
29
Interviews conducted in Bujumubura and Gitega, Burundi, July 2013, June 2014 and December
2014.
6 Cooperation and Conflict: Civil Society Resistance and Engagement… 123
Local civil society actors in Burundi, with support from international NGOs, have
played two primary roles in relation to transitional justice reflecting the categories
outlined by the Centre for Conflict Resolution (2005) and mentioned earlier in this
chapter: apparent support for the government through their focus on healing and
reconciliation and sensitisation about the CVR, and resistance to the government
position on transitional justice with their focus on accountability and prosecutions.
Some civil society activities and organisations, such as the QPN Burundi, might not
be so easily categorised, as they seek to hold the government to account and offer
alternative models of transitional justice while at the same time pursuing objectives
consistent with the government position.
These differences were apparent in the work of the above-mentioned GRJT, but
have become more significant in the wake of the April 2015 political and security
crisis and the narrowing of any opportunity for resistance within Burundi. Divisions
along political and ethnic lines are emerging between CSOs operating in the first
category or straddling both categories which have remained active in Burundi, and
those clearly within the second category whose leaders are mostly now in hiding or
in exile.30 The strength and potential impact of CSO resistance thus appear to have
been undermined by the breaking down of civil society cooperation across the two
categories in line with the need to be seen as supporting or opposing the ruling
party.
Two significant NGO initiatives will be discussed in detail in order to further
explore the dynamics of cooperation and resistance within local civil society actors
in Burundi, and how they have been impacted post-April 2015: CENAP and the
GRJT, as well as QPN Burundi and its model for transitional justice.
The GRJT was formed in 2008 as the result of a recommendation put forward by a
National Forum convened by local Burundian NGO CENAP as the culmination of
its research, supported by Interpeace, an independent international peacebuilding
organisation based in Geneva, on perceptions of Burundians about the obstacles to
peace. A working group on transitional justice was created as a result of the National
Forum which led to the GRJT being formed. CENAP convened monthly meetings
of the GRJT during 2009 in order to continue the research and reflection based on
the responses and solutions suggested by civil society. At some stage, it seems that
the primary leadership role in the GRJT was taken over by Global Rights, an inter-
national NGO headed locally by well-known Burundian civil society leader Louis
30
Interviews conducted with civil society leaders in Bujumbura and Kigali, August 2016.
124 W. Lambourne
Marie Nindorera, brother of Eugène who was the founding president of Ligue
ITEKA.31 The mission of the GRJT was to enable information exchange and
strengthening of civil society involvement in the transitional justice process in
Burundi, which culminated in at least two significant public statements, as detailed
below, and a number of individual NGO initiatives.32
The GRJT issued a report in December 2011 commenting on the Kavakure report
and making six recommendations in relation to the draft law for the establishment
of the CVR concerning the procedure for the nomination of commissioners; compo-
sition of the CVR and role of the proposed International Consultative Council that
would set up the CVR; gender and children’s rights; protection of victims and wit-
nesses; the mandate of the CVR and crimes covered; and the establishment of a
Special Tribunal (GRJT 2011). Along with the UN and local civil society groups, its
members made submissions to the government regarding subsequent versions of the
draft law.33 These comments included criticisms that it failed to comply with inter-
national standards and did not reflect the findings of the national consultations. For
example, a memorandum issued by the GRJT on June 23, 2014, signed by represen-
tatives of 15 NGOs, including the umbrella organisation FORSC, noted,
At several times, with a collaborative spirit and in order to be able to clearly respect the
rights of victims in transitional justice, the GRJT member organizations produced and pre-
sented recommendations to improve the draft of that law [to set up the CVR]. The GRJT
member organizations realised unfortunately that most of those recommendations were not
taken into account. They take note of the fact but do not give up.
The memorandum called for increased transparency in the process for selection of
commissioners, noting the lack of provisions for an “equitable constitution” of the
membership of the CVR and questioning how the commission could be “representa-
tive and inclusive” (GRJT 2014). It also encouraged members of civil society and
especially faith-based organisations to nominate themselves to be commissioners,
and cautioned those selected “to consider the whole consequences and responsibili-
ties of being part of a commission whose composition will not be deemed competent,
neutral and independent and that may not be powerful enough to respect the voice of
victims and to achieve the goal of having the truth”. The memorandum warned
against perceptions of an unbalanced and politically partisan commission that would
undermine its independence and efficiency and the “trust, collaboration and future
support” of CSOs, including members of the GRJT, victims and witnesses and inter-
national partners of the government. It concluded by calling for accountability and
punishment of the perpetrators of human rights crimes “in order to generate trust, the
enthusiastic participation and support of the victims, [and] those who witnessed hor-
rible crimes in the past” so they would “feel safe and comfortable to collaborate with
31
The original founding of the GRJT is remembered differently by a number of local civil society
members who told me that it was run by Impunity Watch and/or Global Rights and started by Louis
Marie Nindorera.
32
It is possible that additional group statements were issued, but they are not on public record.
33
See Boloquy et al. (2013) and Taylor (2013b) for an analysis of the draft law and the potential for
the proposed TRC to meet the needs of the local population.
6 Cooperation and Conflict: Civil Society Resistance and Engagement… 125
the CVR”. This appears to have been an unusual achievement of compromise, given
the conflicting views of members on the issue of prosecutions, that was agreed
between the signatories after considerable discussion and negotiation under pressure
to respond quickly to the government call for nominations for commissioners which
opened on June 5 and was due to close on June 27, 2014.34
The GRJT’s advocacy in response to the successive drafts of the CVR law was
affected by a lack of consensus on some issues, and in particular significant contes-
tation over attitudes towards prosecutions.35 Apparently one group composed mainly
of the faith-based members of the GRJT was calling for pardon and forgiveness, or
truth telling for healing purposes, while the other group of NGOs was looking
towards prosecution of perpetrators and was adamant about not forgiving them
before they were held to account before the courts.36 While the former were primar-
ily concerned with addressing the needs of victims, the latter were focused more on
advocating for the rights of victims. The government, by contrast, had one clear
view against prosecutions which it was conveying to the population as a form of
“instruction about the need for national reconciliation”.37 The effectiveness of the
GRJT as a site of resistance to state power was thus limited by the differences
between civil society members of the group because of their strong but divergent
individual expressions of resistance.
However, in 2011 the group managed to harmonise its various views to come up
with one voice in order to contribute to the Kavakure commission, and in 2014 they
were able to collaborate in a powerful call for accountability and greater transpar-
ency in the CVR. Although they had limited impact on the selection of CVR com-
missioners and the structure of the CVR, the GRJT did have some influence on the
scope of the commission’s mandate and had a meeting with the CVR
commissioners.38
Despite the limited number of group actions, GRJT members individually have
initiated programmes or activities inspired by their association with the original
CENAP initiative and membership of the GRJT. For example, local NGO Association
for Memory and Protection of Humanity against International Crimes (AMEPCI),
working closely with local victims’ associations, has expressed its resistance by
organising annual commemorations and ad hoc events presenting victim and wit-
ness testimony, and by endeavouring to maintain memorials despite the lack of
34
Interview with civil society members of the GRJT in June 2014; original memorandum in French
on file with the author. According to another civil society member of the GRJT interviewed in
August 2016, the memorandum was sent out by Ligue ITEKA before it was agreed by the group.
35
When conducting my field research in Burundi I was unable to find records of the group’s mem-
bers, meetings or activities, other than a limited number of memoranda issued in the past few years,
so I have relied primarily on interviews with members of the group for this analysis.
36
Interviews with civil society members of GRJT conducted in Bujumbura in 2012 and August
2016.
37
Interview with civil society leader conducted in Bujumbura in 2012.
38
Interview with civil society leader in Bujumbura, August 2016.
126 W. Lambourne
39
On at least one occasion, the general secretary and spokesperson of AMEPCI, Aloys
Batungwanayo, led a campaign objecting to the Burundian Government bulldozing mass gravesites
to make way for a road.
40
Interview with civil society member of the GRJT, Bujumbura, 2012.
41
Interview with civil society member of the GRJT, Bujumbura, 2012.
42
Interview with civil society member of the GRJT, Bujumbura, 2012.
43
Interviews with civil society members of the GRJT in Bujumbura in August 2016.
44
Interviews with civil society leaders in Bujumbura in August 2016; copy of letter dated July 22,
2016, on file with the author, from the president of the CVR, Jean Louis Nahimana, inviting civil
society representatives to a workshop to set up the civil society platform. The initiative to involve
civil society in the CVR was supported by the American Friends Service Committee comprising
local staff based in Bujumbura.
6 Cooperation and Conflict: Civil Society Resistance and Engagement… 127
The leaders of other GRJT member organisations, such as FORSC and APRODH,
had gone into exile and were no longer operating in Burundi when the CVR was
established in March 2016. This reflects a move from differences of opinion in the
group to a significant division into two groups post-April 2015, and the alleged
domination of the new civil society platform to support the CVR by the front NGOs
created by the ruling party, PISC-Burundi and CAPES+ (FORSC 2016).45
QPN Burundi comprises local Quaker-based CSOs working on trauma healing, rec-
onciliation, peacebuilding and development. These include THARS, MiPAREC and
Healing and Rebuilding Our Communities (HROC), which have all been involved in
various ways in supporting transitional justice in Burundi, including through mem-
bership of the GRJT. THARS has been particularly active, with a programme of
trauma healing and reconciliation workshops and initiatives designed to assist in
preparing Burundians psychologically for the CVR (Lambourne and Niyonzima
2016). THARS also has plans for psychosocial accompaniment for the CVR hear-
ings and has conducted research on the level of trauma in the population and attitudes
of Burundians towards various aspects of transitional justice, including the CVR.46
In mid-2013, I facilitated a workshop about transitional justice initiated by
THARS and QPN Burundi which was attended by 20 QPN civil society leaders.47
The workshop enabled the participants to learn about how transitional justice is
defined and implemented by international scholars and practitioners, and to explore
their own ideas about the core concepts of transitional justice including truth, justice
and reconciliation. As a result, QPN Burundi developed its own local model of tran-
sitional justice which it launched publicly a year later in June 2014 at a media con-
ference attended by a significant representation of civil society leaders in Bujumbura,
a representative from the BNUB TJU and a Quaker member of parliament.
The QPN Burundi Model of Transitional Justice proposed an alternative, cultur-
ally adapted version of the UN’s five key pillars of transitional justice: accountabil-
ity, truth daring, positive relations, leadership development and community
empowerment (QPN Burundi 2014). Of note was the focus on accountability rather
45
Interviews with civil society leaders in Bujumbura and Kigali, August 2016.
46
THARS and GIZ ZFD, “Study of the Needs in Psychosocial Accompaniment for Victims during
the Process of Transitional Justice and particularly during the phase of preparation and implemen-
tation of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission in Burundi”, Phase 1, study done in the prov-
inces of Ngozi, Kayanza, Gitega and Makamba, April 2012 (official English translation from the
original report released in French).
47
The 3-day workshop “Transitional Justice: Theory and Practice” was organised by QPN Burundi
in conjunction with THARS and conducted by Dr. Wendy Lambourne, Centre for Peace and
Conflict Studies, University of Sydney. It was held at the THARS Training Centre in Gitega,
Burundi, on July 9–11, 2013.
128 W. Lambourne
than prosecutions, a broader concept which does not exclude the possibility of pros-
ecutions in the longer term, but allows for other forms of accountability which
might be less threatening to the ruling elite in the short term. The model suggested
that accountability could comprise the “clarification of the actions by the presumed
perpetrators themselves” and a focus on moral or symbolic reparations in recogni-
tion of the inability of perpetrators to provide appropriate monetary compensation.
The QPN Burundi model defined accountability as “a commitment by the perpetra-
tors, or presumed perpetrators … to recognize and to reveal to the victims and the
community their involvement in the crimes committed in order to create a peaceful
environment favourable for forgiveness and reconciliation”.48
With regard to truth, the QPN Burundi model emphasised the need for Burundians
to recognise that “the historical truth differs from one social group to another or
from an individual to another”. It encouraged the setting up of a framework and
culture to support all Burundians to tell the truth and share their past experiences in
order to facilitate justice, healing, forgiveness, reconciliation, reintegration, sustain-
able peace and political, social and economic development.
Unlike the UN model, the QPN Burundi model did not include reparations as a
key pillar, in recognition of the extreme poverty which made it unlikely that mean-
ingful reparations could be forthcoming. Instead, it included as a pillar the idea of
“positive relations” through the “establishment of an environment that enables
exchange where everyone feels considered and valued, brings something positive
for national peacebuilding”. In place of institutional reform, the QPN Burundi
model suggested the need to focus on “leadership development”, understood as “the
encouragement and the guidance of a visionary who has the skills and confidence to
mentor others in order to respond to the needs of the community”. The values of a
good leader were defined as including a readiness to serve, sense of responsibility,
flexibility, accessibility, humility and accountability.
Finally, the QPN Burundi model replaced national consultations as a key pillar
with “community empowerment”, understood as “the capacity building of a com-
munity to be able to express itself, be responsible and defend and advocate for its
interests”. It advocates for community empowerment at the social level, including
education and activities to support healing, dialogue, memorialisation and peace-
building; at the economic level, including microloans, social solidarity, professional
training and responsible management of the environment; and at the political level,
including civic and citizenship education, holding leaders accountable, participa-
tion in decision-making and valuing the democratic rights of every Burundian.
The public launch of the QPN Burundi model created some controversy and
much lively debate among civil society actors and representatives of the govern-
ment and UN because of its apparent downplaying of the call for an end to impunity
emphasised by the UN and other civil society members of the GRJT. Religious lead-
48
It is this aspect of the model which has led to misleading perceptions that the Quaker NGOs must
therefore be aligned politically with the ruling party, and, since April 2015, that their support of the
CVR is driven by their Hutu ethnicity. Interviews conducted in Bujumbura in 2014 and 2016, and
Kigali and Sydney in 2016.
6 Cooperation and Conflict: Civil Society Resistance and Engagement… 129
ers who were calling for forgiveness and reconciliation had already been labelled by
human rights and transitional justice actors as being aligned with the government
and a culture of impunity.49 As a result, the UN responded with scepticism about the
motivations of any faith-based actors, including QPN Burundi, and assumed that
calls for reconciliation must mean lack of accountability. Meetings of QPN civil
society leaders with the UN TJU failed to make any impression on the UN’s attitude
to transitional justice priorities in Burundi, despite assurances that they were not
trying to replace the UN model, but rather to propose a complementary model that
could be more effective in the cultural, socio-economic and political context of
Burundi.
Following the onset of the political crisis in April 2015, the QPN Burundi mem-
ber organisations became more significant players in transitional justice, as FORSC
and many of its members fled Burundi into exile. But QPN Burundi itself became
less active. Plans for working groups implementing different aspects of the QPN
Burundi model of transitional justice were not followed through, although individ-
ual organisations have implemented projects relating to its five key pillars and espe-
cially the fifth pillar on community empowerment. THARS has continued to run
healing and dialogue workshops which incorporate opportunities for personal
accountability, while MiPAREC has focused on its network of peace committees
in local rural communities. HROC, meanwhile, initiated a programme of workshops
in Bujumbura focusing on civic and citizenship education as well as healing and
community rebuilding, and a new focus on leadership development. So, to some
extent, the QPN Burundi model has been implemented as envisioned though pro-
grammes of local Quaker organisations, but at the time of writing, a more coordi-
nated implementation had not eventuated.
Conclusion
The UN Secretary-General declared in his 2004 report on the Rule of Law and
Transitional Justice in Conflict and Post-conflict Societies that “the most successful
transitional justice experiences owe a large part of their success to the quantity and
quality of public and victim consultation carried out” (Annan 2004, para. 16).
Scholars and practitioners before and since have expressed concern about the exclu-
sion of civil society views and the lack of focus on victims in the top-down nation-
ally and internationally driven transitional justice industry (Crocker 2000; Lundy
and McGovern 2008; Lambourne 2012). As discussed above, despite the UN’s
adoption of national consultations as the fifth pillar of transitional justice, the imple-
mentation of this measure by the Government of Burundi was limited both in its
execution and its follow-up in terms of the range of options provided for public
comment and the extent to which the opinions gathered were ignored rather than
49
By contrast, QPN Burundi and Quaker NGO leaders were generally perceived as politically
neutral and have worked either independently or cooperatively under the banner of the GRJT.
130 W. Lambourne
helping to shape the approach taken to transitional justice, including the construc-
tion of the CVR.
It has been a significant challenge for civil society in Burundi to have a meaning-
ful say in the proposed CVR, despite the national consultations and UN presence
with its expanded support for civil society, and the formation and efforts of the
GRJT. With the Burundian Government strongly asserting control over the design
and implementation of the CVR, civil society has remained actively engaged, even
since the onset of political violence in April 2015, including those in exile who are
continuing to campaign in relation to the CVR. At the time of writing this chapter,
a new civil society platform was being set up to engage civil society in supporting
the CVR’s activities and the implementation of its mandate. It was too soon to
assess the impact of the initiative, but a large number of NGOs participated in the
first workshop, and early indications were that a core group of civil society leaders
who had participated in the GRJT, including from CENAP and THARS, were tak-
ing on leadership roles.50 At the same time, however, allegations that the new plat-
form is dominated by nyakuri do not bode well for its ability to play a critical role
in the effective functioning of the CVR to ascertain the full truth of the past violence
and human rights abuses (FORSC 2016).
Local civil society actors have questioned their lack of influence over the transi-
tional justice process, despite evidence that in other areas civil society had been
successful in influencing government policy in the past, especially when it engaged
in media campaigns.51 Vandeginste maintains that “societal pressure from below has
not been very significant”, at least in terms of its impact on government decision-
making in relation to transitional justice, despite the creation of the GRJT
(Vandeginste 2009: 8).52 In addition to the national consultations, several interna-
tional and local civil society initiatives have reported on research revealing further
insights into the needs, expectations and priorities of victims and others in the
Burundian population (Boloquy et al. 2013; Taylor 2013a). As with the national
consultations, the government appears to have ignored these efforts by civil society
individually and through the GRJT to participate in the design and implementation
of transitional justice processes in Burundi—except for those religious organisa-
tions53 which appeared to be aligned with the government position on amnesties and
reconciliation.
The examples discussed in this chapter provide evidence of a proactive and
inventive local civil society exhibiting cooperation, activism and resistance in rela-
tion to transitional justice in Burundi, especially through the creation of the GRJT
and the work of QPN Burundi member organisations. At the same time, they reveal
contestation and division between different groups of NGOs which has been more
50
Interviews with civil society leaders from CENAP and THARS, Bujumbura, August 2016.
51
Interview with representative of local civil society media organisation, Bujumbura, July 2013.
52
According to Pacifique Manirakiza (2016: 56–57), civil society in Burundi had a minimal impact
on transitional justice policies because it was not sufficiently proactive and strategic in its
mobilisation.
53
Mostly new evangelical Protestant churches. The Roman Catholic Church has openly expressed
its opposition to the President’s third term.
6 Cooperation and Conflict: Civil Society Resistance and Engagement… 131
or less evident at different stages of the civil war and its aftermath. One group of
NGOs was more directly involved in the defence of human rights, media freedom
and fight against corruption, and therefore more closely identified with opposition
politics and civil society resistance. This group directly challenged the government
by advocating for prosecutions as part of transitional justice. Since the political
crisis and violent crackdown against those seen as opposed to the ruling party began
in April 2015, many of the civil society leaders in this group were threatened and
fled the country into exile and were thus no longer in a position to be directly
involved in the transitional justice process and the CVR in particular.
By contrast, another group of CSOs has been proactive in supporting peacebuild-
ing and development through self-help groups, trauma healing and reconciliation
in local communities, as well as sensitisation of the population in preparation for the
CVR. While these latter activities may not directly challenge the government on
issues of policy and practice, they arguably create sites of resistance to official tran-
sitional justice mechanisms and priorities by focusing on alternative, informal
approaches to support justice and reconciliation. This was especially the case with
the potential for implementation of the QPN Burundi model of transitional justice,
but since the onset of the political crisis these NGOs, although they remained work-
ing in Burundi, focused on individual programmes rather than working in a coordi-
nated way to implement the model. NGOs in this group did, however, become
actively involved in the new civil society platform set up to support the CVR. The
concern here is that more of these NGOs, which were perceived as either neutral or
supportive of the ruling party, may appear to be co-opted by the government and
lose their sense of independence and ability to resist.
The most significant sites of coordinated civil society activism and resistance in
Burundi have stemmed from coalescence in crisis, both during the civil war and
more recently in supporting the April 2015 nonviolent protests against the presi-
dent’s third term, which were nevertheless violently crushed by the president’s
forces. The conflict evolved, however, such that differences became divisions across
both political party and, increasingly, ethnic lines, as the two groups of NGOs
involved in the GRJT found themselves separated geographically as well as ideo-
logically. As in its efforts to control the transitional justice process, the UN, mean-
while, has remained largely impotent in the wings, calling for dialogue and peaceful
negotiations, and unable or unwilling to intervene and challenge the sovereign
power of the Burundian Government nor support civil society resistance. The UN is,
however, through the International Criminal Court and the Human Rights Council,
attempting to put some pressure on the ruling party through investigations of alleged
human rights violations committed in Burundi since April 2015. The climate has
therefore not been conducive to the effective operation of the CVR, and remains so
at the time of writing, with continuing intimidation of the political opposition, no
freedom of speech, political control of information, limited resources and a local
civil society that has become divided, if not silenced (Impunity Watch 2016).54
54
http://www.rfi.fr/emission/20160511-filip-reyntjens-burundi-universite-anvers-genocide-
1972-ethnicite (Accessed 19 June 2016); interviews conducted in Bujumubra and rural areas of
Burundi in June and December 2014, April 2015 and August 2016.
132 W. Lambourne
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Chapter 7
Madly Off in All Directions: Civil Society
and the Use of Customary Justice
as Transitional Justice in Uganda
Joanna R. Quinn
Introduction
Research for this project was carried out with assistance from the Social Sciences and Humanities
Research Council, with research assistance from Tamara Hinan and Tammy Lambert.
J.R. Quinn (*)
University of Western Ontario, London, ON, Canada
e-mail: [email protected]
1
I use the term “customary justice”, recognizing that the practices in use have changed over time.
The commonly used term in Uganda is “traditional justice”.
2
These mechanisms are used across Uganda, but the northern Uganda conflict opened up a space
to be able to talk about their use. The agreements signed at Juba, between the Lord’s Resistance
Army and the Government of Uganda, somewhat codified them (Quinn 2009a).
7 Madly Off in All Directions: Civil Society and the Use of Customary Justice… 137
Background
Since the time of independence in 1962, Uganda has been wracked by conflict.
Under both Idi Amin and Milton Obote, many thousands of Ugandans were wounded
and killed. It is estimated that between 300,000 (Briggs 1998: 23) and 500,000
(Museveni 1997: 41) Ugandans were killed during the time of Idi Amin, from 1971
to 1979, largely in central Uganda. Under the rule of Obote, between 1980 and
1985, approximately 300,000 (Uganda 1998: 53; Ofcansky 1996: 55) to 500,000
(Nadduli interview 2004) were killed, again mostly in central Uganda and in
Luweero District in particular.
138 J.R. Quinn
The current president, Yoweri Museveni, and the National Resistance Army (now
National Resistance Movement, or NRM) seized power by means of military force
in 1986. As with his predecessors, Museveni met with considerable opposition from
many of the 56 different ethnocultural groups throughout the country. Since coming
to power, Museveni has faced more than 27 armed insurgencies,3 including the most
famous in the modern era: the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) under the leadership
of the now-infamous Joseph Kony. The LRA waged a conflict against the GOU in
northern Uganda from roughly 1986 to 2008, displacing more than 1.8 million peo-
ple, abducting children for use as child soldiers and carrying out vicious campaigns
of brutality throughout much of the region.
These multiple conflicts have devastated the country. Especially in the north,
although also in Luweero Triangle and elsewhere, people continue to suffer the
effects of conflict. The physical scars are easy to see: women in Luweero Triangle
have been ostracised from their communities because of gynaecological fistulae;
former abductees in northern Uganda have only scar tissue where once there were
noses and lips; and hospitals and schools are in a state of disrepair. Yet the emotional
and social costs, though harder to spot at first glance, remain, too. These “scars” are
more difficult to fix.
Official Mechanisms
An erratic mix of transitional justice instruments has been utilised in Uganda to deal
with the millions of violations committed there (Quinn 2009b). In 1971, to appease
the international community, Idi Amin appointed a truth commission to deal with
disappearances he, himself, had ordered (Carver 1990). In 1986, Museveni appointed
another truth commission to consider the abuses committed between 1962 and 1986
(Quinn 2010). Subsequently, the GOU promulgated an Amnesty Act, under which
22,107 ex-combatants received amnesty by July 2008 (Draku interview 2008).4
The International Criminal Court (ICC) began an investigation into the crimes
perpetrated by Kony and other senior LRA members in 2004 (Quinn 2008). The
Ugandan Government established a War Crimes Division, now the International
3
These include rebellions by the Action Restore Peace, Allied Democratic Forces, Apac, Citizen
Army for Multiparty Politics, Force Obote Back, Former Uganda National Army, Holy Spirit
Movement, the Lord’s Army, Lord’s Resistance Army, National Federal Army, National Union for
the Liberation of Uganda, Ninth October Movement, People’s Redemption Army, Uganda
Christian Democratic Army, Uganda Federal Democratic Front, Uganda Freedom Movement,
Ugandan National Democratic Army, Uganda National Federal Army, Ugandan National
Liberation Front, Ugandan National Rescue Fronts I and II, Ugandan People’s Army, Ugandan
People’s Democratic Army, Uganda Salvation Army and the West Nile Bank Front (Hovil and
Lomo 2004: 4; 2005: 6).
4
This is the latest publicly available data at the time of writing.
7 Madly Off in All Directions: Civil Society and the Use of Customary Justice… 139
Criminal Division, of the High Court to thwart further ICC action, despite the fact
that Museveni himself referred the situation in northern Uganda to the ICC’s Office
of the Prosecutor, ostensibly in exchange for his own immunity, since the Ugandan
Government, through the military, reportedly also carried out crimes against human-
ity and war crimes during the conflict in northern Uganda.5 Reparations have largely
not been paid, despite a government resolution passed in 2014 and another draft
policy prepared by the Northern Uganda Social Action Fund (NUSAF). The GOU
claims that national development plans like NUSAF and the Peace Recovery and
Development Plan (PRDP) II are sufficient, despite their lack of focus on individual
harms.6 Aside from this, the government has empowered national courts and cus-
tomary courts to hear evidence in both human rights cases and reparations claims.
Uganda is widely known for using a range of international and domestic transi-
tional justice mechanisms, despite the lack of any kind of transition. Yet most of
these mechanisms have lain dormant after being implemented, or have been unwill-
ing or unable to provide any form of “justice” to the victims and survivors of the
many conflicts that have taken place throughout the country. These processes have
all been initiated by the government, which remains in control of the various transi-
tional justice processes, and not by civil society.
Customary Justice
5
Museveni officially referred the situation to the ICC in December 2003. It has been commonly
assumed that Museveni approached the Court first. Information has surfaced that the chief prosecu-
tor actually approached Museveni to ask him to refer the situation. There is a great deal of debate
about what this discrepancy means (Waddell and Clark 2008: 43).
6
A total of 14,000 individual claimants, through the Acholi War Debt Claimants Association, won
a court-ordered settlement for their 2006 case, although the funds have been slow to come and
there were allegations of fraud and fund mismanagement at the time of writing. A number of simi-
lar advocacy groups have sprung up among victims to push for compensation from the GOU.
140 J.R. Quinn
homogeneity often governs whether or not, and whose, “traditions” are used in a
given community (Quinn 2015b).
At the time of independence in 1962, customary practices were made illegal and
the outgoing British decided upon a harmonised legal system modelled on the British
system (British Colonial Office 1961). The many kingdoms and traditional cultural
institutions that existed across the country were banned by President Obote in 1967.
Yet the institutions and practices persisted (Briggs 1998: 23). Traditional cultural
institutions are today recognised under Article 246 of the 1995 Constitution (Republic
of Uganda 1995). Customary practices are now legally provided for under legisla-
tion, including Article 129 of the Constitution, which provides for the operation of
Local Council Courts7 at the sub-county, parish and village levels (Uganda:
Constitution, Government & Legislation), and the Children Statute of 1996, which
grants these courts the authority to mandate any number of remedies, such as recon-
ciliation, compensation, restitution and apology (Republic of Uganda 1996).
The GOU included these practices in the 2008 Agreement on Accountability and
Reconciliation and the subsequent Annexure, which emerged out of the Juba Peace
Talks (Quinn 2008; Gashirabake interview 2008; Ogoola interview 2008).8 Although
these mechanisms fit broadly within very different approaches to justice, whether
retributive or restorative, and fulfil different roles within their respective societies,
from cleansing and welcoming estranged persons back home to prosecution and
punishment, they draw upon commonly observed customary practices and ideas in
the administration of justice in modern times.
These institutions are still widely used throughout the country by many of the 56
ethnocultural groups (Quinn 2009a). The Karamojong use the akiriket councils of
elders to adjudicate disputes according to custom (Novelli 1999: 169–172, 333–
340) through cultural teaching and ritual cleansing ceremonies (Lokeris interview
2004). The Acholi continue to use a complex system of ceremonies in adjudicating
everything from petty theft to murder (Harlacher et al. 2006). Throughout the con-
flict between the LRA and GOU and after, at least two ceremonies were adapted to
welcome child soldiers home after they were decommissioned: mato oput (“drink-
ing the bitter herb”) and nyono tong gweno (a welcoming ceremony in which an egg
is stepped on over an opobo twig) (Finnström 2003: 297–299). These ceremonies
are similar to those used by the Langi, called kayo cuk, the Iteso, called ailuc, and
the Madi, called tonu ci koka (GOU and LRA 2008: Art.21.1). In the northwest of
the country, the Lugbara use a system of elder mediation in family, clan and inter-
clan conflict (Ndrua 1988: 42–56). In 1985, an intertribal reconciliation ceremony,
gomo tong (“bending the spear”), was held to signify that “from that time there
7
The LC Courts were formerly known as Resistance Council Courts and “were first introduced in
Luweero in 1983 during the struggle for liberation. In 1987 they were legally recognized through-
out the country” (Waliggo 2003: 7).
8
Although these agreements were signed, at the time of writing the final agreement had not been
signed for more than 8 years, and both parties had walked away from the talks. When the Working
Group’s Chairman, Justice Ogoola, retired, much of the “attention fizzled out in the donor com-
munity for the work” (Otobi interview 2012).
7 Madly Off in All Directions: Civil Society and the Use of Customary Justice… 141
would be no war or fighting between Acholi and Madi, Kakwa, Lugbara or Alur of
West Nile” (Finnström 2003: 299). A similar ceremony, amelokwit, took place
between the Iteso and the Karamojong in 2004 (Iteso focus group 2006).
In some areas, these practices are no longer used regularly. Customary practices
are, in fact, used far less widely in the “greater south” and among Ugandans of
Bantu origin (Quinn 2015b). From time to time, however, the Baganda use the cus-
tomary kitewuliza, a juridical process with a strong element of reconciliation, to
bring about justice (Waliggo 2005: 1). Among the Bafumbira, land disputes, in par-
ticular, are settled through customary practices, with Local Council officials adjudi-
cating (Tabaro interview 2008). The Annexure to the Agreement on Accountability
and Reconciliation also lists mechanisms used by the Ankole, called okurakaba
(GOU and LRA 2008: Art.21.1), although I have uncovered only weak anecdotal
evidence of their continued use (Katatumba interview 2008).
People from nearly every ethnocultural group in Uganda have reported to me that
“everyone respects these traditions” (Confidential interview 2004) and that recon-
ciliation continues to be an “essential and final part of [the] peaceful settlement of
conflict” (Waliggo 2005: 9). At the same time, many young, educated Ugandans
who live in the city told me that they have never participated in such ceremonies
(Northern Uganda focus group 2006). Still, a common respect for these symbols,
ceremonies, institutions and their meanings remains throughout Uganda, even in
those areas where such practices are no longer carried out. This has been controver-
sial, and opinions have changed throughout the conflict. Adam Branch (2014), for
example, reported that these mechanisms have been distorted and in practice amount
to what he calls “ethnojustice”.
The GOU has been reluctant to support formal transitional justice mechanisms in
any real way. Although it has initiated a number of processes and institutions, it has
largely failed to support them, and has, in fact, backed away from many of them
after putting them in place, as it did with the ICC (Quinn 2009b). It is likely that the
GOU fears that senior officials will be implicated through legitimate transitional
justice processes, and for this reason has simply opted not to act on this front. A
draft Transitional Justice Policy that was first promised in 2008 and then made pub-
lic in 2013 was a specious attempt by the GOU to mollify the ICC, international
donors and national NGOs, which worked hard to draft the document for policy-
makers. NGOs have noted that
at official levels, steps to implement transitional justice have become highly bureaucratic;
opportunities for civil society participation in Transitional Justice Working Group9 meetings
9
The Transitional Justice Working Group, a consortium of government, civil society actors and
international donors.
142 J.R. Quinn
and initiatives have greatly diminished, and the space for engagement has become more
constricted. (Otim and Kihika 2015: 4)
Notwithstanding earlier promises to the contrary, civil society has been excluded,
for the most part, from involvement in and engagement with the transitional justice
policy. Civil society actors, including the INGOs International Center for Transitional
Justice and Avocats Sans Frontières and the Uganda-based African Youth Initiative
Network, have complained that “civil society representatives were only invited at
the end of the process to attend the validation meeting and to submit comments on
the third draft of the transitional justice policy” (Otim and Kihika 2015: fn. 29; ASF
2013: 18).
As a result, CBOs and NGOs tended to focus on the development of customary
justice as a means of settling the accounts of the conflict. To be sure, during the
conflicts and subsequent occupations by victorious rebel groups, including
Museveni’s NRM, when there was no rule of law and little protection or justice to
be had through any formal mechanisms, the population relied on customary justice
to deal with their problems. As noted above, while this reliance has largely disap-
peared in the south of Uganda, it has continued on a wide scale throughout the
greater north, where the LRA conflict was widespread. People have relayed to me
how they trust and rely on these practices, which makes customary justice one of the
only viable transitional justice responses in modern Uganda. As such, customary
practices of justice are a useful lens through which to consider civil society’s role in
the promotion and implementation of transitional justice in that country.
Civil society in Uganda, as elsewhere in Africa, has many different layers and a
rich constellation of actors taking part at each level. The sector is led mainly by
national, Uganda-based NGOs and INGOs, many of whom are bolstered by interna-
tional donors that have pushed for transitional justice initiatives. Faith-based organ-
isations, including the dominant faith groups (the Roman Catholic Church and the
Church of Uganda), as well as interfaith groups like the Inter-Religious Council and
smaller regional organisations like ARLPI, have played what might be called a sup-
porting role. The same can be said of CBOs, which do not play a role on the national
stage but which work with NGOs and INGOs and are often the ones to implement
various initiatives. The transitional justice strategy, ad hoc as it is to date, has reluc-
tantly been agreed to by the GOU, which has tended to acquiesce to the demands of
civil society and the donor community in implementing any transitional justice ini-
tiatives, and then walked away from them almost completely, thereby ensuring that
they will not work.
The head of the National NGO Board, a state regulatory agency, defined civil
society groups as follows:
A community-based organization (CBO) is supposed to be a very small, small organization
doing something for the welfare of the community—even a foreigner cannot be involved;
CBOs should operate only at the sub-county level. A non-governmental organization is
anything that operates beyond the sub-county level, from the county level upwards. This
helps foreigners know their line of working. Civil society and NGOs are always looked as
the same, yet civil society is much broader; a country is split into the government sector and
private sector, and anything else is civil society—anyone else with a common interest is
7 Madly Off in All Directions: Civil Society and the Use of Customary Justice… 143
civil society. Civil society is much broader. Some people refer to ‘civil society’ and they
mean ‘NGO’. (Okello interview 2015)
As such, the GOU has extraordinary regulatory power over NGOs: “The Minister
may, subject to this Act, give to the [National NGO Board] written directions of a
general or specific nature relating to its functions to which it shall be bound to com-
ply” (Republic of Uganda 2006: Art. 2(12)). NGOs are often ordered to close if they
do not comply. Since these organisations must renew their registration with the
GOU annually, most are very concerned about adhering to the GOU’s stated priori-
ties. NGOs talk openly about their concerns regarding censure from the NGO
Board. One interviewee noted, “The Government requires NGOs to register each
year and checks carefully what they are working on. He has been threatening
churches and talks to them about things that don’t mean anything so they won’t
insist on important things” (Confidential interview 2012a). In one example, the
NGO Board banned 38 Ugandan NGOs in mid-2012 when they were accused of
“undermining the national culture by promoting homosexuality” (Smith 2012). In
another example, an international donor consultant recounted a particular research
project she had been involved with, working with both an NGO and an INGO,
wherein the groups “got into trouble with Government for looking into and support-
ing opposition political parties” (Confidential interview 2012b).
In this way, the GOU attempts to keep a tight grip on NGO activities, even as it
outwardly claims that “it is essential for the concept of civil society that their actions
are not planned or dictated by the Government” (Republic of Uganda 2010: 4).
10
The GOU uses the language around “terrorism” as a justification to crack down on NGOs.
144 J.R. Quinn
In reality, “aid priorities in this country are always political decisions”, said one
international donor employee, “Political analysis is missing! The Government wants
to demonstrate to the world that they are in charge” (Confidential interview 2013).
Changing Circumstances
Where, before, clusters of NGOs and INGOs, donors and donor agencies were
actively pushing for a policy of reconciliation and the clear use of customary justice,
which was agreed to by the GOU (Republic of Uganda 2007: Art. 3.1.; Republic of
Uganda and LRA 2008: Arts. 19–22), by 2012 NGOs were very clear that the use of
customary practices and a more general policy of “reconciliation [had] fallen out of
fashion” (Nalwoga interview 2012). This has continued.
For example, the Peace, Recovery and Development Plan for Northern Uganda
(2007–2010) at least nodded to the need for customary justice and acknowledge-
ment, in specifying the need to “ensure that formal and non-formal accountability
and justice mechanisms are in place” (Republic of Uganda 2007: 97). A debate
about and preparations for the potential expanded use, broader recognition and cod-
ification of customary practices was underway in earnest. The then-current Peace,
Recovery and Development Plan for Northern Uganda, Phase 2 (2012–2015) (PRDP
II), in contrast, conflated customary and formal mechanisms with dispute resolution
and focused on only semi-related questions, including sexual and gender-based vio-
lence (Republic of Uganda 2011: 35). The successor to the World Bank-mandated
Poverty Eradication Action Plan, which at least talked about the need for social
rebuilding and justice in northern Uganda (Ministry of Finance 2004a), was the
National Development Plan (Republic of Uganda 2010: 4), which does not mention
the conflict in northern Uganda explicitly, nor lay out any kind of reconciliation or
justice strategy.11
11
The National Development Plan does mention the tumultuous period from 1971 to 1979, when
Uganda was governed by Idi Amin, although it does not list the insurgencies faced by Museveni
since he came to power in 1986, nor the period from 1980 to 1985 when Obote returned to power.
It further lists stability and peace as one of its 6 “vision” points without any further elaboration.
7 Madly Off in All Directions: Civil Society and the Use of Customary Justice… 145
12
“JLOS is a sector-wide approach adopted by Government bringing together institutions with
closely linked mandates of administering justice and maintaining law and order and human rights,
into developing a common vision, policy framework, unified on objectives and plan over the
medium term. It focuses on a holistic approach to improving access to and administration of justice
through the sector wide approach to planning, budgeting, programme implementation, monitoring
and evaluation”. See https://www.jlos.go.ug:442/index.php/about-jlos/our-history.
146 J.R. Quinn
Another striking change, mentioned by most of the NGOs with which I spoke, is
that Museveni has pushed all of the NGOs and INGOs away from their work in
northern Uganda and towards the region of Karamoja, in the northeast of the coun-
try. As the acting secretary of the NGO Board justified it, the rationale for the GOU
to “register, coordinate and monitor NGO activities” is to “provide for the regula-
tion of these freedoms” (Okello interview 2015). He made no secret of the fact that
he believed government could and should be in the business of deciding what NGOs
are able to do, and forcing them to go in the particular direction the GOU chooses.
Many NGOs told me that they were no longer working in northern Uganda
because of a government directive. For example, I was told that “after the Kony war
in 2007, the focus moved to Karamoja” (Mugumya interview 2012). The PRDP II
explains that the “situation has evolved considerably since [2005–2007] as almost
all displaced people have resettled, and the priorities in the North have shifted away
from humanitarian support to peace building and development” (Republic of
Uganda 2011: 5). The Office of the Prime Minister has declared that “following the
resolution of the conflict that faced the region there is renewed impetus for growth”
(Office of the Prime Minister, “Northern Uganda”). And the GOU has indicated that
the activities once carried out in northern Uganda, including “initiatives [to] pro-
mote peaceful resolution of conflicts; undertake peace education and other peace
activities in the communities”, are now to focus on Karamoja (Republic of Uganda
2010: 366–367). Museveni’s wife, Janet Museveni, was appointed minister of state
for Karamoja affairs in 2009, and in 2011 she was appointed minister for Karamoja
affairs, a move many saw as “rais[ing] the prospect of the Karamoja region’s social
problems getting attention that goes beyond political tokenism” (Wakabi 2009).
One interviewee noted, “Janet’s appointment brought the issue to light. For the first
time, someone can articulate that to Museveni” (Confidential interview 2013).13
Museveni’s “push” towards Karamoja has been met with confusion and scepti-
cism from civil society. “MPs are changing the goal posts every day”, reported one
faith-based NGO worker, who continued, “Government is derailing attention away
from other things” (Nalwoga interview 2012). I heard from many people at both
NGOs and INGOs that “in 2009, government aid went to Karamoja. But I’m not
sure it has rested there” (Otobi interview 2012). The government’s stated focus on
Karamoja has created an environment in which NGOs feel unable to focus on any
other region of the country, despite what they think still remains to be done in north-
ern Uganda. Most Ugandan NGO representatives I spoke with feel that they may
only carry out activities explicitly sanctioned by the government, even if their fund-
ing comes from other sources.
13
It is worth noting that opinion on Janet Museveni’s involvement is divided. Some contended that
“she was not going to change anything after all”, or alleged that the Museveni family is engaged in
a land grab that will give them access to oil and mineral rights to resources just being discovered
in the region. Popular sentiment, though, ultimately gauges her appointment as a back-room deal
to enable her eventual succession (Kanyana 2012; Nalugo 2012).
7 Madly Off in All Directions: Civil Society and the Use of Customary Justice… 147
One INGO consultant, who is herself from northern Uganda, wondered whether
the Karamoja move was “a broader strategy by the government to deflect attention
somehow” (Confidential interview 2012b). The GOU has a complicated history in
northern Uganda, owing to the 30-year LRA conflict and the activities of the Uganda
People’s Defence Force there. The GOU allowed the conflict to go on, unstopped,
for years and only reluctantly stepped up its response in the early 2000s. Many of
the people to whom I spoke indicated that they felt that the GOU had no desire to
rebuild northern Uganda following the conflict, since it viewed northerners as hav-
ing been supporters of former President Obote, against whom Museveni fought in
the 1980s to secure the presidency. Northern Ugandans and a growing number of
people across the rest of the country, therefore, suspect malicious neglect of north-
ern Uganda after the LRA conflict to be at the root of Museveni’s decision to shift
attention to Karamoja. “The Government had a lot to do with pushing international
donors away from emergency work in northern Uganda”, said one interviewee.
“Where international NGOs have come in is that we haven’t done a good job in say-
ing those areas still need a lot of work, in getting evidence, in advocacy” (Muculezi
interview 2012). The GOU policy has effectively forced NGOs and INGOs to focus
on Karamoja at the expense of northern Uganda and even a number of INGOs I
interviewed felt obliged to follow this directive, or face having their programmes
suspended too.
Other interviewees were quick to point out that “interest is measured regarding
the presence of international NGOs. Maybe there are no international NGOs left in
Karamoja” (Otobi interview 2012). Others still reported that “international donors
are still in the north” (Othieno interview 2012). It is true that the stated focus of the
PRDP II is on both northern Uganda and Karamoja, although everyone to whom I
spoke indicated that they had been shunted away from northern Uganda and towards
Karamoja.
Personnel Turnover
This shift has caused a revamping of the kinds of programming that NGOs are able
to offer, and significant rearranging of the personnel who are now in place to advise
on and carry out such programmes. Of the 29 people I interviewed in the “peace and
justice” sector of the NGO and INGO space in Uganda, 21 were new to their jobs
within the past year or so. And many of those were people I knew in the past when
they served in other capacities. These interviewees were well aware of the implica-
tions of the shift that had taken place (Tumuwesigye interview 2012; Ocan inter-
view 2012).
One casualty of this shift is that institutional memory of customary practices
built up under old personnel has not been passed along to the people now occupying
their positions. Yet, interviewees seemed puzzled by the shift: “There used to be a
whole dialogue about national reconciliation. I don’t know where that went”
(Confidential interview 2012b). I could find no evidence that organisations were
148 J.R. Quinn
Communication Breakdown
Another factor in the shift away from customary practices is the disconnect between
the people and institutions working in the “peace and justice” sector regarding what
is being discussed and the priorities being articulated.
As always, part of the difficulty is that the GOU does not speak with one voice.
The Minister of Finance has spoken openly about the problem, proposing that “col-
laborative efforts between the different parts of Government should be continuously
encouraged and promoted” (Ministry of Finance 2004b: 6). Instead, documents
spelling out national priorities, as noted above, conflict with one another. The PRDP
II signals something quite different from the National Development Plan, both of
which are different from the former NUSAF and NUSAF II. Both plans are seen by
nearly everyone I spoke with as a cop-out by the government on the important post-
conflict justice questions that remain unanswered. As the then coordinator of the
Civil Society Organization for Peace in Northern Uganda commented, “The PRDP
itself is a problem. It is highly politicised, and has lost its meaning for people”
(Omona interview 2012). Some contend that “the realisation of these plans is lack-
ing” (Odong interview 2012). Nearly all agree that “law and order and the conven-
tional justice system has taken over. And the government is moving in that direction
in the PRDP, too” (Nalwoga interview 2012).
Outside of these policy documents, the work has largely been left to JLOS. “It is
supposed to be going through those channels. The government is trying to limit
NGO voices. [International donors and donor organisations] are called to meet with
the Prime Minister, who tells them not to do X or Y” (Confidential interview 2012b).
JLOS, in turn, takes items to Cabinet for approval. “Cabinet is easy to convince”,
reported one international technical advisor for JLOS, “The challenge is with
7 Madly Off in All Directions: Civil Society and the Use of Customary Justice… 149
Donor Influence
There is a question regarding the extent of the GOU’s control. As the GOU itself
notes, “The Government has to rely on external financing for much of the budget
expenditures” (Republic of Uganda 2010: 4). A local newspaper reported that
“donors fund[ed] 25 per cent of Uganda’s 2012/13 budget by $4.5b (Shs11.2 tril-
lion)” (Monitor Team 2012). These donors have begun to cooperate, and to coordi-
nate their efforts. In early 2006, a Group of Seven Plus One states banded together
150 J.R. Quinn
to support the idea of “peace” in Uganda both morally and financially.14 A constel-
lation of international governments have put in place a joint agency called the Donor
Governance Facility, made up of Denmark, Sweden, Norway, the United Kingdom,
Austria, Ireland, the Netherlands and the European Union, which coordinates those
countries’ funding allocations and sets joint priorities. The facility now funds the
JLOS and the Uganda Human Rights Commission, among other GOU agencies in
Uganda, for example (Barigye interview 2012). Another group, made up of Ireland,
Norway, Sweden and Denmark, supplies “earmarked budget support” to the PRDP
II (Republic of Uganda 2011: 2).
Yet, one faith-based NGO staffer echoed what I heard from a few: “The govern-
ment puts a lot of pressure on donor agencies” (Confidential interview 2012b).
Within the NGO community, there is some sense that the government exerts a modi-
cum of control over donors’ priorities: “If the government says Karamoja needs X,
there’s no way donors can’t” (Omona interview 2012). As long as this funding is in
the direction of the initiatives supported by Museveni’s government, the funding
does not appear to be problematic: “The government has its consortium. Within that
framework, government is managing to herd groups in their direction” (Zedriga
interview 2012). And indeed, a senior policymaker in the Ministry of Justice and
Constitutional Affairs, when asked whether things have shifted over the past couple
of years, asked, “What has changed? Now we are the ones who are in control, not
like that time” (Gashirabake interview 2012).
But funding from donors is required if any of the GOU’s programming is to go
ahead. The PRDP spells out three distinct funding modalities for the work it has
planned:
1. PRDP budget grant: GoU provides PRDP grant funding through the budget
[36% of which is provided by donors] ….
2. On-budget special projects: Some donors provide support through on-budget
“special projects” which are managed by the government (e.g. NUSAF II,
funded by the World Bank and DFID, and KALIP and ALREP, which are funded
by the EU).
3. Off-budget funding: The third modality is off-budget funding, where donors
and other development partners implement projects without the involvement of
government, either directly or through NGOs and CSOs (Republic of Uganda
2011: 2).
Little wonder, then, that the GOU seeks to manage NGO activity to some extent,
and to regulate the activities in which civil society groups like NGOs are able to
participate. The GOU has no control of NGOs if their funding is “off-budget” and
flows directly from donors to civil society, effectively by-passing the GOU.
In fact, contrary to most interviewees’ perceptions, the GOU must abide by the
wishes of international donors if it wants to maintain or increase the funding it
receives: “Donors play a pronounced advisory role when the budget is being
The Group of Seven Plus One was composed of Belgium, Germany, Ireland, the Netherlands,
14
Norway, Sweden, the United Kingdom and Canada. See Government of Canada, (n.d.).
7 Madly Off in All Directions: Civil Society and the Use of Customary Justice… 151
f ormulated, and critics have questioned the influence of donor interests within the
budget process. However, given Uganda’s high reliance on donor funding, it is
unlikely that the role of donors in the budget system can be minimized at present”
(Owomugasho/World Bank website). In December 2012, for example, donors
announced
deeper and longer aid cuts … in response to massive public corruption. The European
Union ambassador to the country announced … that the EU, the United Kingdom, the
World Bank, Austria and other countries had suspended up to $300 million promised in
budgetary support each year, up to 2013 … Sweden and Ireland had earlier suspended their
project support and thus the new agreement suspends all their funds to Uganda while
Norway withdrew all of its support in 2011. (Jeanne and Njoroge 2012)
It is the third category, “off-budget funding”, “where donors and other develop-
ment partners implement projects without the involvement of Government, either
directly or through NGOs and CSOs” (Republic of Uganda 2011: 2), that tells the
enormity of the tale. Funding is given directly to local organisations to carry out the
programming of international donors, without having to be accountable to the GOU
and without the GOU’s knowledge or consent. To some extent, donors act as patrons,
not partners, in the sector (Nesiah 2016). Many NGOs themselves admit to allowing
international donors to call the tune and to set the agenda for their programmatic
decision-making. It is true that large, well-established NGOs have a higher degree
of autonomy, relative to other NGOs, but even they admit to being frustrated by
identifying real needs in Ugandan society and then struggling to find funding to
allow them to work on those particular issues. The executive director of the Refugee
Law Project expressed his frustration at donors’ inability to deal with ongoing
issues like those related to transitional justice, which do not fit neatly into budget
cycles, or necessarily translate to the programmatic priorities that donors have set
(Dolan interview 2015). This was echoed by another Refugee Law Project staffer,
who noted that “[government expects that] donors have their priorities set by the
government. Government has said transitional justice is not a priority so funding has
been pulled. Post-Juba, donors had different agendas” (Oola interview 2015). The
same holds true for INGOs: “The kind of funding we have is driven by what the
donors decide. You might have a very good proposal, but you will fail to find fund-
ing for it” (Businge interview 2016).
In an ideal world, “planning [must] come first, then development … Before rais-
ing a single dollar, an institution should have a clear sense of its mission, aspira-
tions, and priorities—and take the lead … Too much donor control is hazardous to
a nonprofit organization’s integrity” (Donor Direction 2000). This is because “all
aid, at all times, creates incentives and disincentives” (Uvin 1999: 4). Some donors
seek “to (maximally and directly) control the use of funds, either by keeping the
funds and their use in the hands of the donor, or by delegating them to third parties
(NGOs or multi-bi-arrangements)” (Uvin 1999: 10). “What is at issue is how
[donors’] financial power is translated into a set of operational relationships in a
contentious sphere, particularly given contested legitimacy and weak capacity of
governments in recipient countries” (Macrae et al. 2002: 68). And so donors become
“pushers and prodders” (Macrae et al. 2002: 70).
152 J.R. Quinn
This is important in trying to understand how and why thinking about and pro-
gramming in support of customary justice and reconciliation have all but disap-
peared from the landscape. Because the majority of NGOs in Uganda simply do not
have the luxury of having continued budget support that allows them to pick and
choose the kinds of work they pursue, they are beholden to the donors, which drive
particular agendas. The deputy director of programmes at a national NGO told me
that “most NGOs have only project support, so it is difficult to divert support to
other priorities” (Muwanga interview 2012). Another described it this way: “Local
organisations might not have their own resources to tackle these, so there is a ten-
dency to look at where is the donor focus to tap into that” (Apunyo interview 2012).
As a result, another said, “organisations will shift and people break off and go to
where the money is” (Ocan interview 2012). Several people also reported that the
number of NGOs has dropped off considerably since their peak in 2004, citing
“donor fatigue” (Ocan interview 2012; Omona interview 2012).
Many NGOs do try to act in ways they think the donors want, so as to attract
funding. Interviewees reiterated to me that the problem of attracting and keeping
donor funding was common across Ugandan NGOs and INGOs, many of whom
rely on donor funding. “There is a popular thought of making the mzungu [white
person] like you, so you do what they want” (Ocan interview 2012). A faith-based
organisation staffer told me that “NGOs have to follow the donor lead regarding our
priorities” (Nalwoga interview 2012), and so, as her co-worker said, “we tend to
look at the international donors’ focus in determining our priorities” (Apunyo inter-
view 2012). Another interviewee confirmed that “donors have always called the
shots” (Otobi interview 2012). The trouble, as one INGO manager told me, is that
“when you’re dancing to the tune of the donor, you’re not looking after the people
you want to help. Those other NGOs are trying to go to Karamoja because that’s
where the donor wants them to go, but without understanding why, and what situa-
tion they will find there” (Byamukama interview 2012). Indeed, “more than 70% of
our NGOs began after the early 2000s. They distorted the way that our people live,
and offered a better alternative to their life. It affected the people negatively and
positively” (Opobo interview 2012).
Being too eager to please can be a problem, particularly when donors seek to
advance a particular agenda. As one interviewee put it, “donors are the blue-eyed
girl for Uganda. Now NGOs are becoming cautious” (Nalwoga interview 2012). “It
is a problem for NGOs to know their role”, though, reported one research organiza-
tion’s executive director (Okello interview 2012). “Many times”, an INGO repre-
sentative told me, “donors drive the agenda because they have the envelope. But
many NGOs don’t locate the debate in the international instruments that are avail-
able, so they don’t help themselves” (Barigye interview 2012).
Donors themselves may not always know what the important issues are on the
ground. “Even donors may not know precisely what they wish to advance”, one
faith-based organisation representative told me (Otobi interview 2012). I frequently
heard from NGOs and INGOs that “donors often make decisions based on a lack of
7 Madly Off in All Directions: Civil Society and the Use of Customary Justice… 153
knowledge, where there is a lack of information given to them, and on what they
know from back in Europe. Sometimes, there is a lack of cultural sensitivity”
(Barigye interview 2012). “Sometimes donors do come to ask for inputs” about
what NGOs think is best (Othieno interview 2012), but NGO and INGO interview-
ees indicated that this was rare. But there was no question among the people I spoke
to that “donors help a lot to determine the agenda” (Ejoyi interview 2012). A great
number of donors have shifted away from funding transitional justice issues, per se,
while others persist in the sector.
In part, this comes from donors’ own carefully defined stand on a variety of
issues. “We can’t just support an institution that doesn’t recognise basic human
rights”, said the senior programme officer for the Democratic Governance Facility
(Barigye interview 2012). For World Vision, a Christian INGO, for example, the
spirit worship that is often part of customary justice in Uganda is problematic. Their
approach was “not to stop [their initiatives in northern Uganda] from doing tradi-
tional practices, but we made it clear that donor money will not be used for these
activities—although the children were free to do their own spiritual things” (Odong
interview 2008). In another example related to me by a staffer at an international
donor agency, the agency was approached for funding by Rwot Acana, the tradi-
tional cultural leader of the Acholi, but it had reservations regarding gender and
deferred a review of the request until they could be sure that gender concerns would
be properly mitigated (Confidential interview 2013).
Further confusion stems from lack of coordination, especially for those organisa-
tions funded outside of the GOU’s budget process. Ugandan NGO interviewees
expressed frustration about the confusion this can create. One, for example, told me
that “NGOs don’t know what each other is working on, and there’s sometimes
80–90% of duplication of work. It can send contradictory messages to the commu-
nity if two NGOs are working there from different angles” (Okello interview 2012).
A now more than decade-old report recommended that to clear this confusion up, “a
more systematic approach would improve efforts … which are often duplicated, or
remaining gaps are often not addressed efficiently. There is a need for these institu-
tions and policies to work together in better coordination on [these] issues” (NUPI
2006: iii).
Conclusions
NGOs and INGOs in Uganda that formerly worked in the “peace and justice” sector
on issues related to the use of customary practices of justice and acknowledgement
have gone madly off in all directions. No formal transitional justice policy has been
enacted. The GOU has shifted its attention to the International Criminal Division of
the High Court. NGOs are no longer working on “peace and justice”, broadly speak-
ing. They have been pushed by the GOU into working in the Karamoja region,
154 J.R. Quinn
where issues of acute conflict are not in evidence, and where there is not a need for
transitional justice. NGO workers themselves have also moved on. As a result, pro-
grammes supporting customary justice—the only form of transitional justice that
was much in evidence from 1986 to the time of writing—have all but disappeared.
The official transitional justice mechanisms appointed by the GOU, meanwhile,
have never come close to fulfilling their mandates, nor to effecting any kind of
proper transition.
More important, the disconnect between actors has led to serious confusion. The
GOU’s failure to articulate any one particular position is problematic, as always.
But the failure of JLOS to articulate a convincing strategy for policymakers to pur-
sue is particularly worrying, because the “peace and justice” agenda has been left to
them. Internationally funded NGOs have stepped in where they can, circumventing
the funding and regulatory problems faced by nationally funded NGOs. But they
face increasing pressure from both the GOU and from international donors to influ-
ence and support the official transitional justice policy process, which remains in
draft form after years of negotiation. Even foreign NGOs are not immune from the
vagaries of the GOU, as they, too, are regulated by the GOU’s NGO Board.
The critical role of international donors, and of the influence they continue to
exert, has been largely overlooked in analyses of how and why customary practices
of justice and acknowledgement are or are not being pursued in Uganda. It is essen-
tial to understand that NGOs are caught between the GOU and international donors,
without any real understanding of how to steer the process according to their own
principles and unable to be informed by their own experiences in communities.
National NGOs have significant experience within communities across the coun-
try. In many cases, they are from the very communities that need assistance. Local
staffers understand the ethnocultural specificities, as well as the practical limitations
of any programmatic goal, although this is lessened when NGOs are staffed by
Ugandans who come from other areas of the country and are less familiar with local
practices. But NGOs are either unwilling or unable to articulate these ideas to inter-
national donors who simply need a group, any group, to carry out the programmes
they seek to fund. This has not been helped by the rotating staff contingents that
have passed through these NGOs, taking with them any institutional memory that
once existed.
At the same time, with all available hands assisting programming that is either
conceived of and funded by the ever-opaque GOU or by international donors that
are not always, themselves, clear about what their on-the-ground programming
should encompass, few are listening to communities’ wants and needs. And so even
though community members continue to ask for support for customary practices of
justice and acknowledgement, and for more community-based approaches to resolv-
ing long-standing conflicts, none is forthcoming for now. People continue to use
customary justice on a small scale to address transitional justice issues, at the com-
munity level, but any formalisation or codification of its use, or any justice across
ethnocultural groups—as has been advocated by some—has not been carried out.
7 Madly Off in All Directions: Civil Society and the Use of Customary Justice… 155
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Kizza-Aliba, E. (2012, May 28). Executive Secretary, Catholic Commission for Justice and Peace.
Interview by author. Nsambya, Uganda.
Lokeris, P. (2004, November 18). Minister of State for Karamoja. Interview by author. Kampala,
Uganda.
Muculezi, D. (2012, May 24). Save the Children in Uganda. Interview by author. Kampala,
Uganda.
Mugumya, A. (2012, May 14). Project Co-ordinator, Center for Conflict Resolution. Interview by
author. Kampala, Uganda.
Muwanga, S. (2012, March 18). Deputy Director-Programs, Foundation for Human Rights
Initiative. Interview by author. Kampala, Uganda.
Nadduli, A. (2004, November 17). LC5 District Chairman. Interview by author. Luweero Town,
Uganda.
Nalwoga, J. (2012, May 8). Manager, planning, development and rehabilitation, Church of
Uganda. Interview by author. Kampala, Uganda.
Ocan, Rev. Ali. (2012, May 4). Acting Director, JYAK. Interview by author. Kampala, Uganda.
Odong, J. (2008, September 25). Associate Director for Peace and Reconciliation, World Vision
International. Interview by author.
Odong, S. (2012, May 9). Programs Manager, Human Rights Network-Uganda. Interview by
author. Ntinda, Uganda.
Ogoola, Hon. Jus. James. (2008, September 25). Principal Justice, High Court and Chairman,
Transitional Justice Working Group. Interview by author. Kampala, Uganda.
Okello, J. (2012, May 10). Executive Director, African Institute for Strategic Research Governance
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author. Kampala, Uganda.
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7 Madly Off in All Directions: Civil Society and the Use of Customary Justice… 159
Focus Groups
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Chapter 8
Civil Society Engagement with Communities:
Tradition, Authority and Transitional Justice
in Rural African Communities
Andrew Iliff
Introduction
This chapter discusses engagement between civil society and communities in pur-
suit of transitional justice (TJ) in Africa, focusing on the role of civil society in
leading and supporting community-based TJ processes. Civil society organisations
(CSOs) and TJ practitioners have increasingly focused on community-based TJ pro-
cesses in recent years, both as complements and alternatives to national TJ pro-
cesses. While national TJ processes tend to garner more headlines, community
initiatives, supported by civil society bodies, may better reflect the agency of survi-
vors and more effectively unravel the complexities of local power dynamics that lie
at the root of conflict (Arriaza and Roht-Arriaza 2008). However, CSO engagement
with communities is shaped by local culture power dynamics. The impact of these
local power dynamics on TJ processes and outcomes depends on the ability of CSOs
to engage constructively and thoughtfully with communities and their leadership.
A single chapter cannot hope to cover more than a sampling of the most impor-
tant issues, especially when, as here, the frame of reference is an entire continent.
Questions of authority, inclusion and ownership are at the heart of civil society
engagement with communities in the TJ field (Androff 2012). This chapter calls
I would like to thank the participants in the Centre for the Study of Violence and Reconciliation
February 2015 workshop on civil society and transitional justice in Africa for their insightful pre-
sentations and thoughtful feedback. I would also like to thank Hugo van de Merwe and Jasmina
Brankovic for their feedback and assistance in shaping and revising this chapter.
A. Iliff (*)
Harvard Global Health Institute, Cambridge, MA, USA
e-mail: [email protected]
1
Throughout this chapter, I have placed the word “tradition” in quotation marks to emphasise that,
as discussed in this chapter, the canon of customary practice and philosophy designated “tradi-
tional” is neither static nor uncontested.
2
In one of the most prominent examples, Archbishop Desmond Tutu’s faith illuminated his articu-
lation of the philosophy of ubuntu, which in turn was a guiding principle in the work of the South
African Truth and Reconciliation Commission.
8 Civil Society Engagement with Communities: Tradition, Authority and Transitional… 163
The field of transitional justice first took shape around highly state-centric
approaches in the 1980s and 1990s, with examples ranging from trials and national
commissions in post-dictatorship Latin America to vetting and lustration pro-
grammes in post-communist Europe and the broad scope of the South African Truth
and Reconciliation Commission. Since then, the scope of TJ has expanded to
include supranational and subnational forums and processes. Supranational fora
include the International Criminal Court (ICC), hybrid courts like the Special Court
for Sierra Leone3 and influential transnational human rights organisations like the
International Center for Transitional Justice.4
Many national and supranational TJ processes have been criticised for their geo-
graphic and conceptual distance from those with the most at stake: victims, perpe-
trators and families and communities in which they live. Critics have noted that
these processes are extremely expensive and have usually fallen short of their ambi-
tious range of objectives (Annan 2004). Partly in response to these criticisms, sub-
national and specifically community-based TJ processes have become increasingly
prominent in TJ discourse and practice (Shaw et al. 2010). Community-based TJ
processes take a wide variety of forms, from local, elected commissions to “tradi-
tional” processes of reconciliation and social healing (Androff 2012; Huyse and
Salter 2008).
The goals and methods of these processes are shaped by the engagement between
NGOs and the communities in which the TJ initiatives take place. NGOs are an
integral element of many TJ processes, but play a particularly important role in
community-based TJ processes, which are the focus of this chapter. In community-
based TJ processes, whether independent stand-alone processes or complements to
state-driven processes, TJ NGOs serve a range of functions, including helping to
identify, articulate and synthesise the diverse priorities of communities and acting
as proxies and advocates for their constituent community members.5
In community-based TJ processes that take place without a formal mandate from
the state, NGOs draw on their expertise and institutional experience to help formu-
late and manage effective interventions. The role of civil society becomes still more
critical where the state constrains civic space, or deploys the rhetoric and form of TJ
3
The Special Court for Sierra Leone sought an accommodation between demands for broad
accountability and truth telling with recognition that many perpetrators could not be considered
fully culpable due to threats and compulsion. While some may disagree with the categorisation of
the ICC as a TJ body, the Court’s policy of “positive complementarity”, encouraging investigation
by states parties wherever possible, has contributed to innovative accountability processes in, for
example, Colombia.
4
For a discussion of the ICTJ as norm entrepreneur, see Naftali (2010).
5
In Sierra Leone, for example, the Fambul Tok community-based intervention (discussed below)
operated alongside national level mechanisms including the Truth and Reconciliation Commission
and the Special Court for Sierra Leone.
164 A. Iliff
A word about terminology. The rubric of “civil society engagement with communi-
ties” is in a sense a tautology, because communities are civil society—indeed, one
of the most fundamental and important forms of civil society. Drawing a distinction
between the two requires careful attention to the specific forms of “community” and
“civil society” under consideration, so as not to reflexively reproduce the discursive
dichotomy of rural village communities and urban-based, donor-funded NGOs.
It is essential to highlight and avoid the stereotypes and oversimplifications that
are often packed into the rhetorical notion of the African “village”, the poster-child
6
Demobilised former child soldiers in Uganda, discussed briefly below, are an example of a par-
ticularly vulnerable group in rural communities that, in the absence of TJ and reintegration pro-
cesses such as mato oput, often struggle to participate in community life (Baines 2007).
7
For a discussion of the central role of victims as a constituency in TJ, see Findlay (2009).
8 Civil Society Engagement with Communities: Tradition, Authority and Transitional… 165
8
In some resettlement communities in Midlands province in Zimbabwe, for example, communities
are fractured between Shona dialect groups such as Karanga, Zezuru and Rozvi.
9
The challenge of defining “civil society” is taken up with varying success by a range of political
theorists seeking to answer difficult questions about the role of revenue generation, partisan poli-
tics, kinship, advocacy and power relations between members, coercion of different kinds and
many other definitional challenges. See, e.g., Young (1994). For a discussion of the origins of the
idea, see Seligman (1992).
166 A. Iliff
Civil society typically plays a crucial role in promoting and pursuing TJ at all levels,
including through advocacy, provision of technical and legal expertise, facilitating
communication between different stakeholders and building institutional capacity.10
The role of civil society in community-based processes is at least as essential as in
national level processes. In community-based TJ processes, NGOs can act as educa-
tors, champions, facilitators and convenors. Indeed, it can be argued that without
support and engagement by civil society in some or all of these roles, community-
based TJ processes will usually fail (Hovil and Okello 2011).
It is possible to conceive of an emergent grassroots TJ process in which com-
munity members go about the profoundly challenging and often dangerous task of
pursuing healing and reconciliation in their community without the support of any
formal organisation or superstructure. Indeed, examples can occasionally be found
of heroic individuals whose skill and charisma have been sufficient to advance
effective TJ initiatives within their communities.11 But the demands of TJ work—
the challenges and risks faced, the range of skills required and the resources neces-
sary (monetary, structural and psychosocial)—usually require a more structured
base of operations for successful and durable implementation. Advocating for and
marshalling the necessary resources to enable communities to achieve objectives
overlooked or neglected by the state is quintessentially the role of NGOs.12
10
For a typology of the different roles of civil society in TJ processes, with particular reference to
international norms of law and human rights, see Boesenecker and Vinjamuri (2011).
11
In northern Nigeria, for example, two religious leaders—Pastor James Movel Wuye and Imam
Muhammad Nurayan Ashafa, popularly known as “the Pastor and the Imam”—have sought to
reconcile Christian and Muslim militias by drawing on their own personal histories and relation-
ship, creating a grassroots organisation.
12
Other fundamental functions of TJ NGOs—lobbying national governments and commissions, and
making representations to supranational bodies—are addressed in other chapters in this book. Civil
society does oppose certain TJ initiatives in some cases, but here we are concerned with civil society
that seeks to support and promote TJ objectives broadly conceived. See, for example, Stan (2013).
In Africa, Victor Igreja and Elin Skaar have described Mozambican urban civil society as rejecting
a truth commission and remaining on the sidelines of the TJ debate (Igreja and Skaar 2013).
8 Civil Society Engagement with Communities: Tradition, Authority and Transitional… 167
13
Alexis de Tocqueville, one of the great observers and theorists of civil society, observed, “If men
living in democratic countries had no right and no inclination to associate for political purposes,
their independence would be in great jeopardy. … If they never acquired the habit of forming
associations in ordinary life, civilization itself would be endangered” (quoted in Young 1994: 35).
14
Donald Ray (2003) distinguishes between “government” and “governance” to differentiate
between formal state mechanisms and the wider circle including unofficial political activities and
culture.
168 A. Iliff
community members with whom they work. Community members are also vulner-
able to persecution by local officials in ways that NGO staff typically are not. After
NGO staff have returned to the city, community members may have food aid with-
held, or their use of communal land revoked, or be shunned (or worse) by their
communities in retaliation for collaboration or mere participation with NGOs whose
interventions are viewed as politically or otherwise controversial. NGOs, mean-
while, must report to their donors using metrics that are often unintelligible to com-
munity members, and subject to the variable fashions of the donor community.
As a result, NGO objectives seldom align perfectly with community objectives.
TJ NGOs often prize long-term, abstract objectives such as “truth” and “justice”
more than community members, whose primary concern may simply be to feed
their families and avoid violence. Even where community members endorse TJ
objectives, they may prioritise tangible returns: compensation over truth telling, for
example.15 In Zimbabwe, this sentiment—conditioned by more than a decade of
disillusionment with the fruits of human rights discourse in the context of an ever-
deepening political and economic crisis—is expressed in a phrase often flung at
human rights NGO staffers: “You can’t eat human rights”. Reconciling this diver-
gence in priorities requires skilled and thoughtful engagement and ‘sensitisation’ by
NGOs. Indeed, the use of ‘sensitisation’ to mean an effort to inform and secure the
approval of communities and authorities—“community awareness raising but also
… social marketing”—appears to be limited to the work of civil society across
Africa (Krech 2003: 125).16
These divergences between community and NGO, as well as within communities
themselves, mean that this representational problem cannot be overcome, only man-
aged and minimised. Consensus is almost always fictional to some degree, and
results from the silencing of segments of the community. Furthermore, the NGO–
community power differential should alert practitioners to power differentials
within communities, particularly when, as is typical, NGOs partner with commu-
nity leadership in order to convene TJ interventions. While, as discussed below,
custom and “tradition” can be powerful structuring frameworks for TJ processes,
customary processes also typically privilege older men of the dominant ethnicity.
NGOs promoting “traditional” processes, such as mato oput in Uganda, must seek
to broaden participation in such processes to honour their commitments to social
and gender equity.
At their best, NGOs can assist communities to identify and articulate their priori-
ties, furnish relevant technical expertise for implementation and help to convene
15
For example, Khulumani Support Group, a membership-based organisation for survivors of
human rights violations in South Africa, launched the Asikaqedi campaign in 2014, insisting on the
need to address the “unfinished business” of the country’s Truth and Reconciliation Commission,
chiefly reparations and rehabilitation (Khulumani 2014).
16
The (mis)use of the term “sensitisation” to refer to almost any sort of NGO intervention in Sierra
Leone is described in Shepler (2005). The term assumes a more hegemonic aspect in Catherine
Bolten’s (2012) description of the reintegration of ex-combatants in Sierra Leone, in which “sen-
sitisation” refers to the uneasy relationship of these ex-combatants to the official discourse of
peace and amnesty.
8 Civil Society Engagement with Communities: Tradition, Authority and Transitional… 169
effective and inclusive TJ processes. Where the state is indifferent or resistant to the
TJ agenda articulated by communities, civil society can act as champion, pressing
the case domestically and internationally. Where the state continues to resist national
level processes, civil society can help convene community TJ processes, drawing on
global networks of experience, technical expertise and institutional capacity to sup-
port the needs of local communities.
17
Abdullahi Ahmed An-Na’im has discussed the need to foreground “indigenous formations of
justice” in transitional justice processes, and the need to reimagine traditional justice processes in
order to address contemporary conflicts (2013: 199).
170 A. Iliff
Civil society engagement with communities is shaped by the local authorities oper-
ating in those communities. “Tradition” specifies one important local leadership
structure, but many communities boast a dense array of local authorities, with
ambivalent effects on NGO engagement. NGOs that cannot effectively and strategi-
cally navigate the local gatekeepers will see their interventions obstructed or
opposed, with risks for both NGO staff and community members.
Often, multiple local authority structures function as gatekeepers over communi-
ties in their purview, exercising veto power over NGO initiatives. In these circum-
stances, NGOs and their community partners face a daunting challenge navigating
the whims of petty local authorities requiring pain-staking, time-consuming pre-
liminary “sensitisations”, consultations and coaxing before actual work can begin.
Within the liberal paradigm, the process of “sensitisation” of local authorities, and
the signing of a “memorandum of understanding” that may follow, is not strictly
necessary. Provided that NGOs are not breaking the law, it can be argued that local
authorities have no business vetting their work. Yet in many African communities,
established practice gives local authorities veto power over all community-based
activity, on the grounds that these authorities are gatekeepers of community integ-
rity, values and culture.18
NGOs seeking to engage these communities in TJ work must bridge the diver-
gent philosophies of such authorities to arrive at a viable partnership, assuaging the
18
The difficulty of these multiple vetoes in the context of traditional leadership in South Africa is
discussed in Mashele (2004).
8 Civil Society Engagement with Communities: Tradition, Authority and Transitional… 171
multiplying anxieties, concerns and equivocations of the full array of local authori-
ties.19 On the other hand, as in the discussion of tradition above, these same local
authorities can provide effective partners for NGOs seeking to engage communities
in TJ processes. Partnership with local authorities has significant advantages for
NGOs, including increased legitimacy and protection from interference by other
local authorities. The potential for local leaders to help convene community TJ pro-
cesses is particularly important given the tendentiousness of these processes. Where
community leaders have genuine support and standing in their communities, they
can help to reassure community members that the potential gains of a TJ interven-
tion justify the very real hazards of confronting a troubled past. In a sense, local
leaders can act as proxies for TJ NGOs, providing a point of entry to the community,
assisting with identifying and navigating key community concerns, and lending
their endorsement to a divisive, unfamiliar and risky process.
Partnership between NGOs and community leaders also has its risks for both
parties, as well as for the success and integrity of the TJ process itself. NGOs risk
inadvertently promulgating the local authorities’ bias in gender, ethnicity and other
areas, and thus silencing segments of the population through, for example, favourit-
ism in the selection of participants in community-based TJ processes. A TJ process
convened by an ineffective or illegitimate leader may be abortive, and will struggle
to secure the support of other local leaders.
Community leaders also take a considerable risk by supporting TJ initiatives,
which typically represent a calculated gamble that confronting past conflicts will
yield real rewards, by reducing future conflict or fostering community solidarity,
without inflaming dormant conflicts. Should this gamble not pay off—if for exam-
ple perpetrators derail the process, or take revenge on witnesses or even simply
refuse to participate—leaders who convened such a process will at least have their
standing undermined, and may stand to lose their positions entirely.
Such partnerships therefore require on both sides a fine, context-sensitive bal-
ancing of the potential benefits of TJ intervention and the risk of reigniting, perpetu-
ating or exacerbating conflicts. Only a scrupulous and frank self-assessment of
NGO work can appropriately guide this crucial decision, ideally guided by rigorous
and candid monitoring and evaluation. Patience and modesty are crucial virtues. All
too often, the imperative of growth and the internal logic of NGO missions trump
concern for the well-being of community members whose welfare is at the nominal
heart of the mission.
19
Alexander Laban Hinton, following Anna Tsing, describes this interaction between global and
local priorities in the context of transitional justice “transitional frictions” (Hinton 2010: 9).
172 A. Iliff
Case Studies
The Fambul Tok community-based process launched in Sierra Leone in 2007 illus-
trates many of the points raised in the discussion above, including the complex
power dynamics between NGOs and communities and the advantages and potential
drawbacks of deploying the discourse of “tradition” and of collaborating with local
authorities. Like gacaca, Fambul Tok claims to revive a “traditional” form of com-
munity mediation and conflict resolution (Fambul Tok 2011). A 2010 report by the
Fambul Tok organisation places “consultation” at the heart of its work, describing
its engagement with communities in a process of “emergent design” over several
months and sometimes longer. Fambul Tok works with a community for 3–4 months
to prepare for its signature reconciliation bonfire (Caulker 2010). This preparation
involves the selection of a District Executive Committee composed of existing com-
munity leaders (Park 2010).
Fambul Tok seeks “total community participation”, insisting on the inclusion of
leadership from women, youth and other historically marginalised groups (Fambul
Tok 2011). However, local chiefs play a pivotal role. One Fambul Tok report devotes
a two-page spread to “a portrait in leadership” of Chief Ndolleh, who is quoted as
saying, “I realized no one would be brave enough to talk unless we involved the
chiefs”. The report asserts, “The chiefs represent an older, more traditional leader-
ship system that, in spite of the ways it was misused leading up to and during the
war, villagers know and trust” (Fambul Tok 2011: 28). The Fambul Tok organisation
therefore collaborates with chiefs to structure and legitimate its TJ intervention.
However, as Fambul Tok acknowledges, the central role of chiefs can be a cause
for concern. Before the civil war, chiefs oversaw a system of patrimonial exclusion
that contributed to the revolt of young men who formed the Revolutionary United
Front (Jackson 2006). Fambul Tok notes that Chief Ndolleh was accused of wartime
theft but chose to “reconcile” with his accuser, rather than prosecute her as the law
permitted. Further concerns over the involvement of chiefs in community account-
ability processes are raised by the historical role of chiefs in “a local judicial system
regularly handing down fines that were grossly incommensurate with the offences
committed”, though Fambul Tok does not permit money to change hands as part of
its process (Fanthorpe 2006: 30). Finally, the communal work entailed by “peace
gardens” may recall the practice of chiefs calling upon youth for unpaid community
labour, another deeply resented “traditional” practice (Fanthorpe 2001).
If, as is the case in Sierra Leone, “chiefs remain closely involved in almost every
aspect of everyday governance in rural areas”, they may be indispensable partners
for NGOs seeking to engage communities in TJ processes (Fanthorpe 2006: 28). In
such circumstances, as Fambul Tok seems to acknowledge, it may be necessary to
transform troubled but persistent local authorities that cannot be effectively circum-
vented (Graybill 2010). Fambul Tok’s strategy has been to balance chiefly authority
with other local authorities, so that chiefs are only one component of the Fambul
8 Civil Society Engagement with Communities: Tradition, Authority and Transitional… 173
Tok committees, alongside religious leaders, “Mommy Queen” women leaders and
youth. As word of Fambul Tok’s work has spread, interest has grown, enabling the
organisation’s heads to sideline recalcitrant chiefs in favour of other local leaders
(Libby Hoffman, telephone interview with author, September 2011).
The Acholi Religious Leaders Peace Initiative (ARLPI) works in the communities
of northern Uganda. ARLPI substantially shaped national TJ processes in Uganda,
including pushing through a blanket amnesty for ex-combatants from the rebel
Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA), having traditional community reconciliation and
reintegration mechanisms included in the terms of peace settlements, and wide-
spread deployment of these traditional mechanisms (Baines 2007; “Agreement on
Accountability,” 2017; Khadiagala 2001).
ARLPI combines elements of a CBO and a more prototypical NGO.20 Initially
called Joint Justice and Peace, it was formed in 1997 by a multi-faith group of
northern Ugandan religious leaders. In 1998, ARLPI met with Ugandan President
Yoweri Museveni to present its memorandum, “A Call for Peace and an End to
Bloodshed in Acholiland”, securing its legitimacy with local government officials in
northern Uganda (Khadiagala 2001: 4). It subsequently received funding from the
United Nations Development Programme and worked with a wide range of govern-
ment and local authorities. In September 1998, ARLPI was formally requested to
lead a campaign of peace education and sensitisation at a meeting of local govern-
ment authorities. ARLPI’s advocacy was crucial to the passage of the Amnesty Act
in 2000 (Khadiagala 2001).
As a counterpart to its endorsement of legal amnesty, ARLPI promoted “tradi-
tional” Acholi reconciliation processes as a practical means of reintegrating former
combatants into their communities (Khadiagala 2001). ARLPI had a close relation-
ship with the Acholi traditional leaders’ associations, sharing funding partners and
public statements. Tim Allen argues that “the current consensus about customary
Acholi conceptions of justice has largely emerged from the aid-funded collaboration
between these groups” (Allen 2006: 132). The prominence of these “traditional”
processes has been such that they were formally incorporated into the agenda of the
Juba peace talks, and have since been formally adopted in the Ugandan Government’s
draft Transitional Justice Policy and promoted by international donors.21
ARLPI and its allies were successful in promulgating “traditional” community-
based TJ processes such as the mato oput reconciliation ceremony for a number of
reasons. “Traditional”, community-based processes generally have greater traction
Boesenecker and Vinjamuri (2011) identify ARLPI as a “norm reflector” in their typology.
20
The Republic of Uganda, “National Transitional Justice Policy”, prepared by the National
21
22
Mato oput and other Acholi rituals have been criticised for failing to encompass the other ethnic
groups affected by the northern Ugandan conflict (Baines 2007).
8 Civil Society Engagement with Communities: Tradition, Authority and Transitional… 175
23
While peace building and TJ are helpfully conceived of as distinct fields, in the absence of a
transition from a violent political regime, the ongoing threat of violence requires that primarily
retrospective approach of TJ be complemented by the prospective orientation of peace building
work to try and reduce the continuing vulnerability of communities.
176 A. Iliff
past injuries and the way forward. In combination with the density of the local
authorities that govern rural Zimbabwean communities, their politicisation and the
acute sense of vulnerability produced by the experience of violence and persecution
of civic activists, the operations of TJ NGOs in Zimbabwe have been severely con-
strained, including their engagement with communities (National TJ Working
Group 2014).
Nonetheless, community TJ processes have taken place. For better or worse,
NGOs can only engage communities with the approval and, ideally, collaboration of
the local leadership. In Zimbabwe, the formal authority structure of rural communi-
ties includes District Administrators (appointed by the central government), locally
elected councillors and three levels of traditional leadership. These authorities each
have broad, ill-defined powers and responsibilities that are construed so as to give
them a gatekeeping role in almost any civic process. They also come together in a
range of assemblies and committees that meet at irregular intervals, charged with
considering and approving development plans for their areas. Typically, any one of
these authorities is able to effectively veto an NGO’s engagement in their commu-
nity, either by simply withholding their approval, calling on their constituents to
boycott the engagement or reporting the NGO to local law enforcement.
How do Zimbabwean NGOs navigate this “triple veto”?24 Some local authorities,
having witnessed the damage done to their community by political conflict, are
prepared to take the considerable risk of convening TJ processes in their communi-
ties. Local authorities may be persuaded to “de-role” and engage with initiatives as
equal members of their communities rather than as leaders or representatives of
political interests. Other local authorities may be brought on board by framing TJ
initiatives as unthreateningly as possible—as not only non-partisan but also non-
confrontational and non-punitive. Some initiatives serving broad TJ objectives such
as collective memory and institutional reform may be presented as supporting com-
munity development broadly defined by, for example, facilitating collaboration on
communal initiatives such as the renovation of a local school, or else pursuing a
general idea of “peace”.
Given the history of political violence in Zimbabwe, a key feature of local
authorities is their perceived political affiliation. Councillors are typically elected
on the basis of their membership in a political party, making it difficult for them to
convene inclusive processes in politically divided communities. District
Administrators, who are appointed by and serve at the pleasure of the Minister for
Local Government, are (justifiably) understood to be affiliated with the ruling party,
despite their nominal role as senior civil servants.
Traditional leaders have had a tortuous political history in Zimbabwe. The
Mugabe government, feeling betrayed by chiefs for their collaboration with the
Rhodesian state during the liberation struggle, sidelined traditional leaders until the
late 1990s (Makumbe 2010). But in 1997, seeking to bolster its support in rural
areas, the government passed the Traditional Leaders Act, granting expanded legal
24
For analysis and discussion of rural local governance and the resultant “triple veto”, see Centre
for Conflict Management and Transformation (2014).
8 Civil Society Engagement with Communities: Tradition, Authority and Transitional… 177
powers and responsibilities to traditional leaders, and thereby securing the alle-
giance of many (Makumbe 2010).
In this context, PBNZ was formed in 2007 to facilitate the sharing of ideas and
expertise between member NGOs, and to support community dialogue through a
“bottom-up” approach. Although no longer active, at its height PBNZ had 19 mem-
bers covering a range of methodologies, philosophies and organisational sizes.25
Typically, PBNZ member organisations worked in a small number of communities,
drawing on the reputational benefits of long-standing relationships with local lead-
ership. PBNZ members typically solicited invitations from local authorities, or from
CBOs with sufficient standing in the community to prevail upon local authorities,
before beginning work in a community. Invitations were generated by sensitisation,
outreach and a snowballing reputation, in which an effective intervention in one
community may come to the attention of local authorities facing similar challenges
in their own communities.26
Following an invitation from or successful outreach to community leaders,
PBNZ members would collaborate with the leadership to identify a community
intervention, drawing on the NGO’s methodology and expertise but also suited to
the community’s circumstances and needs. This process required a series of consul-
tations with other local authorities and community members until the member had
sufficient confidence that the intervention would not be opposed by a significant
segment of the community, and that there would be sufficiently broad participation.
Once the community had been canvassed, the member NGO usually asked the local
authority partner to convene the intervention, which was often some variation on the
NGO workshop process. By convening the process, the local authority gave it his
imprimatur, shielding it to a limited extent from meddling by parallel authorities,
and offering some assurances to participants (Iliff 2012).
The selection of participants for community TJ processes is an especially fraught
question in the partnership between NGOs and local leadership. Participation in
NGO interventions is viewed as a privilege and a limited good. The convening local
authority typically retains final approval over the group of participants, both as a
prerogative of his role as convener, and because PBNZ members—all of whom are
urban based—are unable to freely select community participants themselves.
Unsurprisingly, the resulting selection of participants is often skewed. During the
2009–2013 Government of National Unity one PBNZ member holding its first com-
munity healing intervention in a rural community realised on the third day of the
intervention that the participants were all members of the local ZANU-PF chapter,
including some who had been perpetrators of violence in the previous elections.
More recently, another PBNZ member holding a preliminary workshop in a com-
munity found that the participants all belonged to a single faction in the ongoing
leadership struggle within the ruling party. In both cases, the intervention risked
25
Much of the following analysis draws on the author’s experience working directly with three
PBNZ member NGOs, and indirect insight into the work of other members.
26
For further discussion of grassroots transitional justice work in Zimbabwe, see the discussion of
PBNZ member organisation Tree of Life in Iliff (2012).
178 A. Iliff
Conclusions
This chapter has discussed a few key features of civil society engagement with
African communities in transitional justice processes. While recognising that both
“civil society” and “community” are extremely broad terms encompassing a wide
range of groups, and including some functional overlap, the chapter has focused on
the engagement of urban-based NGOs with rural African geographic communities.
The chapter has elaborated two broad features that shape many of these engage-
ments between NGOs and communities: the use of “tradition” as a structuring
framework for community healing and reconciliation processes, and the role of
local authorities that govern many rural African communities.
Both of these features are ambivalent in their effect on NGO–community engage-
ments. “Tradition” can furnish a familiar structure for otherwise novel TJ processes,
increasing participation and legitimising the process. However, notions of “tradi-
tion” can also be deployed to exclude segments of the community. The dense array
of local authorities in many African communities makes them indispensable part-
ners for NGOs supporting community-based TJ processes. Yet, local authorities
may hinder NGO–community engagement by interposing multiple gatekeepers
who must each be appeased before permitting it to go forward. Failure to secure this
consent can jeopardise not only the initiative itself, but may put NGO staff and com-
munity members at risk. Nonetheless, the diversity of local authorities, and their
intimate understanding of their communities, challenges NGOs to identify effective
and insightful partners.
TJ NGOs seeking to engage with communities must consider the particular fea-
tures of the social, political and cultural landscape in which they operate to consider
how this analysis applies, never losing sight of the fact that communities and their
constituent members are not merely the substrate for TJ interventions, they are the
stakeholders and direct beneficiaries.
This chapter has identified the role of NGOs in promoting gender, ethnic and age
equity in the communities with which they engage as a central challenge. While
responding to the needs of communities and accommodating their political and
8 Civil Society Engagement with Communities: Tradition, Authority and Transitional… 179
c ustomary landscape, NGOs must refuse to become complicit in the privileging and
silencing that divides many communities.
For TJ-oriented NGOs seeking to engage with African communities, “traditional”
processes may offer an important conceptual framework promoting participation by
community members in an otherwise unfamiliar and fraught initiative. NGOs can
play an important role in identifying and “reinventing” such traditional processes, as
ARLPI has done in northern Uganda. While NGOs cannot typically prescribe a par-
ticular “traditional” ceremony without the participation of traditional leaders, they
can foster debate around the role of “tradition”, particularly where indigenous cus-
toms have been overlooked or undervalued as a source of potential TJ norms and
processes, as Fambul Tok has done in Sierra Leone. NGOs can seek the reinvention
and revitalisation of such processes so as to promote accessibility and inclusivity,
including taking account of contemporary values such as gender equality.
To do so, it is essential that NGOs foster broad grassroots engagement, across
lines of gender, politics, ethnicity and other cleavages, which are particularly acute
during and after conflict. Community cleavages are not always evident, even to
experienced field staff. Before embarking on an intervention, NGOs must meet and
consult not only with official community leaders but also with representatives of
women, youth and minorities. The demands of such engagement may hinder the
rapid rollout of NGO interventions, as in the case of the work of PBNZ, but supports
long-term outcomes.
The density and strength of local authorities make them necessary community
partners for NGOs, who must develop a nuanced understanding of their range, influ-
ence and motivations. In Zimbabwe, community micro-dynamics often trump the
meta-narratives familiar from national headlines, and the political leanings of local
authorities cannot be taken for granted. NGOs must remain alert to the potential
distortions generated by local authority partners, such as the role of chiefs in the
Fambul Tok process, and seek to address these wherever possible. Doing so requires
considerable time investment, as demonstrated by the work of all the NGOs consid-
ered in this chapter. The rollout of community-based TJ processes does not proceed
in a straight line, but piecemeal, in fits and starts as opportunities open and close. It
is the responsibility of TJ NGOs to help communities best take advantage of the
opportunities that arise.
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Chapter 9
Navigating the Storm: Civil Society
and Ambiguous Transitions in Egypt,
Libya and Tunisia
Noha Aboueldahab
Introduction
Since the mass anti-government uprisings in the Arab Spring countries in 2010 and
2011, transitional justice has emerged as a key component driving the transition
processes. In particular, prosecutions of former political leaders, including former
ministers, took centre stage in Egypt, Libya and Tunisia. Far from the paradigmatic
shift from authoritarian rule to liberal democratic rule, the transitions that emerged
in these three countries were ambiguous and resulted in a military-backed authori-
tarian government in Egypt, the return of influential anciens nouveaux politicians in
Tunisia, and violence, insecurity and weak governance in Libya. These varied tran-
sitional contexts pose complex challenges for transitional justice actors, particularly
for civil society. In spite of the contrasting contexts, some commonalities in civil
society strategy can be observed. These commonalities and variations provide a use-
ful basis for making sense of the so-called universal versus the particular transi-
tional justice approaches adopted by civil society.
The North African cases present an important contribution to scholarly discus-
sions regarding the “proliferation” of transitional justice actors (Obel Hansen 2014).
Egypt, Libya and Tunisia demonstrate that various actors and factors drive transi-
tional justice processes and that civil society was and continues to be a crucial driv-
ing force. Given the restrictive environment that has dominated both the pre- and
post-transition period in all three, civil society has had to devise imaginative strate-
gies to advance criminal accountability.
I argue that civil society pursued three primary strategies designed to grapple
with turbulent transitions that have morphed into renewed forms of repression.
First, non-governmental organisations (NGOs) that were established both before
N. Aboueldahab (*)
Brookings Doha Center, Doha, Qatar
e-mail: [email protected]
and after the uprisings have persistently documented human rights abuses. Second,
individual lawyers and lawyers working on behalf of civil society organisations
representing victims have been persistent in their litigation attempts, despite politi-
cised and weak judiciaries. Third, the emphasis on economic crimes and corruption
in the investigations and trials has been driven in part by civil society strategies that
aimed to generate some form of accountability, even while many other human rights
violations would remain unaccounted for.
The findings in this chapter are drawn from interviews conducted between 2012
and 2013 with human rights lawyers, activists, civil society organisations and inter-
national organisations in Egypt, Libya and Tunisia.1 I use the term “civil society” to
encompass a broad range of non-state actors that advocate for a common cause,
including NGOs and individual lawyers and activists. The common cause relevant
to this discussion is criminal accountability for crimes committed by high-level
government officials, including heads of state and ministers.
The chapter proceeds as follows. First, I will briefly discuss the case selection, the
importance of examining the role of civil society and the merits of examining pre- and
post-transition strategies. I will discuss the centrality of prosecutions in the Arab
Spring, thereby justifying the focus of this chapter on prosecutions as opposed to other
transitional justice mechanisms. I will then explain the role of civil society in driving
and shaping prosecutions in pre- and post-transition Egypt, Libya and Tunisia through
a discussion of their documentation and litigation strategies, as well as their focus on
corruption and socio-economic crimes. Finally, I will reflect on the implications of the
findings for civil society and transitional justice scholarship and practice.
North Africa is important for the development of transitional justice research and
practice not least because of the varied types of transitions that have emerged since
2011 and the divergent transitional justice paths pursued. The cases around which
the transitional justice field was formed are largely drawn from Eastern Europe and
Latin America, which shaped the “normative assumptions” of the field and repre-
sented transitions that resemble “Western liberal market democracy” (Sharp 2013:
149). This contrasts with the transitions that unfolded in Egypt, Libya and Tunisia.
In Egypt, the transition has been marked by a shift to a renewed form of authoritari-
anism, under the leadership of President Abdel Fattah El Sisi and his military-
backed government. Libya constitutes a transition that continues to reel from
ongoing violence involving militias and non-state-armed groups, and from political
tensions between two competing governments. While Tunisia has often been
described as the most successful transition to democratic rule in the region, deep
1
This chapter does not address the post-transition developments that have occurred in Egypt since
2013, namely, the military coup that ousted President Mohamed Morsi and its aftermath. While the
role of transitional justice in these developments is important, it is beyond the scope of this chapter.
Eleven interviews were conducted in Egypt, 7 in Libya and 14 in Tunisia.
9 Navigating the Storm: Civil Society and Ambiguous Transitions in Egypt, Libya… 185
state problems remain and they directly impact on decisions regarding prosecution
in particular and transitional justice more generally. Its current president, for exam-
ple, held several ministerial positions both under former President Habib Bourguiba
and under the ousted Ben Ali regime.
Egypt, Libya and Tunisia share crucial attributes. In all three countries, massive
uprisings within the same time period took place, the leaders were toppled and a
drastic political transition ensued. Almost simultaneously, a flurry of activity sur-
rounding the prosecution of political leaders unfolded. The three cases, however, are
also sufficiently different so as to enable a meaningful comparative study. Egypt and
Tunisia prosecuted their political leaders and issued verdicts. Both continue to pur-
sue prosecutions against former regime leaders. However, Egypt experienced a
strong military presence and influence in its transitional process, which sets it apart
from the civilian government elected in Tunisia. Libya’s transition emerged from a
violent civil war between Gaddafi loyalists and anti-Gaddafi militias and with the aid
of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) military intervention to oust
Muammar Gaddafi and his regime. Libya has also been engrossed in a jurisdictional
tug of war with the International Criminal Court (ICC), which issued arrest warrants
targeting the former leader, his son and the former intelligence chief. These are
important differences between the case studies that have impacted on both transi-
tional politics and transitional justice, particularly decisions regarding prosecutions.
While a significant number of new civil society organisations and actors emerged
immediately following the uprisings in Egypt, Libya and Tunisia, many that had
been active for decades persisted and even intensified their work post-transition.
These long-standing individuals, organisations and their networks constitute one of
the most resilient actors that suffered repression in the pre-transition period and, in
many cases, continue to face significant challenges in the post-transition period. A
close look at their activism and strategies with regard to criminal accountability in
the pre-transition period is thus important as it provides insight into how civil soci-
ety has adapted its strategies from one authoritarian context to another (Egypt),
from an authoritarian context to one plagued with violence and insecurity (Libya)
and from an authoritarian context to one where the anciens nouveaux have been
resistant to a comprehensive transitional justice process (Tunisia). The term anciens
nouveaux refers to the re-emergence of certain key figures from the previous regime
that have morphed into the post-transition regime (Yousfi et al. 2014). This chapter,
then, attaches great importance to the study of how civil society worked towards
criminal accountability over time, thus allowing for some critical comparisons
between the pre- and post-transition period.
following his ouster, resulting in his arrest in April 2011 followed by the start of his
trial in August 2011. Mubarak’s two sons, Gamal and Alaa, were also arrested and
put on trial, along with former Interior Minister Habib El Adly.2 All faced multiple
charges of corruption and human rights violations. The human rights charges were
limited to the time period of the 18-day uprising in January and February 2011—
specifically, the killing of protesters—whereas the corruption charges included the
pre-uprising period. This constituted the highest level prosecution in Egypt. Several
other high-level figures from the former Egyptian regime were also put on trial, and
many still face prosecution more than 5 years later (Ahmed 2015).3
The Libyan uprising was in part triggered by the arrest of a prominent lawyer,
Fathi Terbil, whose efforts were aimed at achieving justice for the victims of the
Abu Salim prison massacre. Thousands of political opposition activists were impris-
oned at Abu Salim and more than a thousand were executed following orders by
Gaddafi and his regime in 1996 (Human Rights Watch 2012). Terbil’s arrest on
February 15, 2011, sparked protests in Libya’s eastern town of Benghazi, which
grew into a full-fledged massive uprising on February 17, 2011. In the midst of the
subsequent NATO military intervention and a civil war between Gaddafi loyalists
and anti-Gaddafi revolutionaries, the issue of justice and criminal accountability did
not wane. Following arrest warrants issued by the ICC, Libya decided to prosecute
its leaders domestically and refused to hand over suspects to The Hague.4 It also
won an admissibility appeal for former Intelligence Chief Abdallah El Senussi,
resulting in the annulment of his ICC arrest warrant in July 2014. The ICC arrest
warrants and the success of Libya’s admissibility appeal for El Senussi were major
developments in the transitional justice process in the country, not least because
they revealed from a very early stage the tensions between domestic and interna-
tional criminal accountability.
The ICC rejected Libya’s admissibility challenge for Gaddafi’s son, Saif al-
Islam. Nonetheless, he, along with 36 other defendants, were? tried domestically in
Libya on charges that include war crimes, the killing of protesters and corruption
mainly related to embezzlement of state funds. Given that he was held by Zintan
militias at the time, the trial of Saif al-Islam Gaddafi was conducted in absentia by
a Tripoli court. Other defendants include former Prime Minister al-Baghdadi Ali
al-Mahmoudi, former Foreign Minister Abdul Ati al-Obeidi and former Intelligence
Chief Bouzid Dorda.
The trial of the 37 former Gaddafi regime members started in April 2014 and
verdicts were issued in July 2015. Saif al-Islam Gaddafi, El Senussi, al-Mahmoudi
and six other defendants were sentenced to death by firing squad for committing
2
Gamal Mubarak, who was deputy secretary general of Mubarak’s National Democratic Party, was
active in Egyptian politics and was thought by many to be pushing his way to the presidency, fol-
lowing in the footsteps of his father.
3
Details of some of the trials and charges are outlined in Ahmed (2015).
4
The ICC arrest warrants were issued for Muammar Gaddafi, Saif al-Islam Gaddafi and Abdullah
El Senussi in June 2011. Following the death of Muammar Gaddafi on October 20, 2011, the ICC
terminated its case against him.
9 Navigating the Storm: Civil Society and Ambiguous Transitions in Egypt, Libya… 187
war crimes during the 2011 conflict (Jawad 2015). Seven others were each given a
12-year jail sentence, and four defendants were acquitted. The Supreme Court is
currently reviewing the appeal for Gaddafi and the other former government offi-
cials’ cases.
Tunisia saw numerous prosecutions immediately following the ouster of Ben Ali.
Ben Ali was president of Tunisia for 23 years. He fled to Saudi Arabia, where he has
lived in exile since January 2011. Calls for his extradition to Tunisia have been
ignored. As a result, his trials were all conducted in absentia by a military court in
Tunisia. The charges in the prosecutions of 22 former political leaders, including
former Interior Minister Abdallah Qallel, are a mélange of corruption, economic
crimes and human rights violations, with the majority of the latter pertaining to
crimes committed during the uprising. Some verdicts have been issued, most of
which have been light sentences and acquittals, and about 40 corruption cases filed
since March 2011 are still being investigated. In addition, 420 businessmen were
banned from travelling outside Tunisia pending investigation into their alleged
involvement in corruption.
Other high-level Tunisian Government officials who were tried and issued with
prison sentences include former Minister of Interior Rafiq Haj Kacem, former
Director General of National Security Adel Tiouiri, former Director of the Anti-Riot
Police Jalel Boudrigua, former Director General of Public Security Lotfi Ben
Zouaoui and the powerful former Director of the Presidential Guard Ali Seriati.
However, almost 20 Ben Ali-era senior government officials were set free, follow-
ing decisions by appeals courts to significantly reduce their sentences to time served
(Gall 2014). Human Rights Watch (2015) estimates that a total of 53 former govern-
ment officials, including police and security officers, were tried in military tribunals
in Tunisia in late 2011.
While the examples above represent a snapshot of the prosecutions in each coun-
try, there is no question that prosecutions of former high-level government officials
were—and continue to be—central to the transitional justice processes in Egypt,
Libya and Tunisia. Other transitional justice mechanisms have also begun to take
shape. The Truth and Dignity Commission in Tunisia was established in 2014 for
the purposes of public truth telling, national healing, compensation for victims and
gathering of evidence for prosecutions. Certain financial reconciliation efforts in
Egypt and Tunisia have also moved forward. However, those efforts have been led
by government officials aiming to limit the extent of prosecutions. Tunisia, for
example, passed a controversial financial and economic reconciliation law that
shields corrupt public officials and business people linked to the Ben Ali regime
from prosecutions once they return their ill-gotten gains. The law provoked mass
street protests led by veteran civil society figures. It also led to the formation of the
Manich Msemah (I will not forgive) campaign, whose principal message through
social media, political lobbying and street protests was to say no to prosecutions.
Egypt began to pursue a similar practice of economic reconciliation that has already
benefited the Mubaraks, some former ministers and business tycoons, such as
Hussein Salem, following their return of a large percentage of their illicit gains.
188 N. Aboueldahab
National reconciliation efforts aimed more at truth telling and national healing
are still far from becoming reality. While other transitional justice mechanisms have
not been ruled out, criminal accountability in the form of trials continues to occupy
an important space in the transitional justice psyche of Egyptian, Libyan and
Tunisian civil society. Of the three cases examined here, Tunisia is the only one that
has passed a transitional justice law, in December 2013, and it specifically includes
prosecutions. The reconciliation law, then, effectively creates a “two-tier transi-
tional justice process,” which contradicts the transitional justice law through the
elimination of prosecutions (Yerkes & Muasher 2017).
The powerful symbolism of prosecutions and the retributive justice it fore-
grounds thus hold a central place in the Egyptian, Libyan and Tunisian transitions.
Judy Barsalou and Barry Knight’s survey of Egyptian justice expectations in post-
Mubarak Egypt highlights strong popular support for trials, all the while recognis-
ing that a politicised and weak judiciary and police force have prevented the trials
from satisfying the “public’s desire for justice” (Barsalou and Knight 2013). In
Tunisia, survey results by al-Kawakibi Foundation and No Peace Without Justice
reflect strong popular support for both institutional reform and accountability (Al
Kawakibi 2014). In Libya, support for prosecutions was also evident among high-
level government authorities, such as Justice Minister Salah al-Marghani, who
stated that it was the ministry’s priority at the time to ensure prosecutions and
accountability to address serious human rights violations. While it is never the case
that such justice expectations reflect a national consensus on prosecutions, the
above-mentioned examples illustrate that despite differences in opinion, strong pop-
ular support for prosecutions was still evident in the 5 years following the ouster of
Mubarak, Gaddafi and Ben Ali.
The interview responses across the three case studies indicate that civil society
actors who supported the anti-government uprisings advocated for fair and effective
prosecutions of former senior political figures. However, given the repressive envi-
ronment within which civil society actors had to work in the pre-transition period,
they prioritized the documentation of human rights violations by each regime and
its associated state agencies. The objective was to raise awareness and pressure
governments to change their human rights practices. Second, litigation, instigated
primarily by individual lawyers, figured heavily in the pre- and post-transition
period. Third, an emphasis on corruption and its socioeconomic impact was a major
feature of civil society’s accountability agenda, particularly in Egypt and Tunisia.
This section presents findings from research and interviews conducted in Egypt,
Libya and Tunisia on the strategies used by civil society actors to advance criminal
accountability for former high-level government officials.
9 Navigating the Storm: Civil Society and Ambiguous Transitions in Egypt, Libya… 189
Egypt
Documentation
This link between civil and political rights and socioeconomic rights character-
ises the transitional justice discourse in Egypt. Unlike its predecessors in other parts
of the world, the transitional justice that lawyers and activists sought in Egypt
engages with these two sets of rights as closely intertwined. One of the reasons for
5
The 6 April movement, an influential workers’ rights and human rights mobilising force, was
formed in 2008. Khaled Ali also mentioned that the courts and the prosecution do not accept civil
society documentation as evidence (personal interview, December 9, 2013).
190 N. Aboueldahab
the emphasis on socioeconomic justice in the trials is the particular role played by
civil society in Egypt.
Litigation
Civil society efforts, however, did not stop at documentation and public shaming.
Litigation activism, whereby activists persistently in approached courts to file cases,
was common in Mubarak’s Egypt, and not just for corruption. Tamir Moustafa pro-
vides an insightful explanation of the complex role of courts in authoritarian Egypt
and highlights their function both as “active sites of resistance” and as institutions
of repression (Moustafa 2014). Specifically, he argues that “courts enabled activists
to challenge state policy without having to initiate a broad social movement”
(Moustafa 2014: 282). This proved crucial in a context where civil society had little
room to form strong and effective social movements without violent repercussions.
The ability of individual lawyers and organisations to access the courts for such liti-
gation, then, became central to civil society’s success—however partial—in advanc-
ing criminal accountability, or at least some awareness about it and its challenges.
Moustafa further outlines how civil society’s litigation strategy constituted a form
of protest, despite its inability to bring about drastic change in state policy. “The
purpose of litigation was”, he explains, “not to win, but rather to expose the chasm
between the regime’s rule-of-law rhetoric and the realities on the ground” (Moustafa
2014: 288). Such legal mobilisation was used not only for cases pertaining to politi-
cal repression and violence, but also for corruption crimes prior to the 2011 transi-
tion. The high-level corruption cases of Madinaty and Palm Hills in 2010, for
example, were filed against the president, prime minister and minister of investment
(K. Ali, personal interview, December 9, 2013).6
Many high-level figures from the former Egyptian regime were tried for corruption
(Ahmed 2015). The corruption cases included charges related to the embezzlement
of state funds by politicians, in particular Mubarak and his family, illegal receipt of
expensive gifts from state-owned media institutions, squandering of public funds,
insider stock trading and violation of laws related to monopolistic practices, and
graft and money laundering. The illegal sale of land also figured prominently in the
charges. The Madinaty case is an example of how the corrupt execution of contracts
related to the sale of land and companies reinforces socioeconomic inequality in
Egypt. Land is sold below market value in deals between housing ministers and real
estate tycoons and developers. Madinaty, a vast area east of Cairo, was sold to
developer and real estate tycoon Hisham Talaat Mustafa without a public auction
and significantly below market value, both of which are in violation of Egyptian
6
For more on the Madinaty and Palm Hills cases, see Kassem and Fattah (2011).
9 Navigating the Storm: Civil Society and Ambiguous Transitions in Egypt, Libya… 191
law. Built to accommodate tens of thousands of luxury villas and a $3 billion com-
mercial complex, the Madinaty contract also exempted Mustafa from construction
taxes and fees. This blatant government corruption and waste in the context of mil-
lions of Cairenes without access to proper housing and public services intensified
the visibility of corruption and socioeconomic inequality in Egypt.
Workers’ movements and labour unions played a significant role before, during
and after the uprisings. The general strike led by textile workers in the town of
Mahalla in 2008, for instance, led to the formation of the 6 April movement, which
became an influential workers’ rights and human rights mobilising force. This
movement, along with other similar independent workers’ rights movements, led
mass protests during and after the Egyptian uprising. Before the general strike in
Egypt, the 6 April movement and a number of opposition groups and parties signed
a statement that clearly lays out the socioeconomic and other human rights demands
of the Egyptian opposition and workers’ movements in 2008—a year that served as
a key turning point in the lead-up to the uprising of 2011. What is striking about this
statement is that the demands for social justice and for civil and political rights are
on par with each other (Radsch 2008). There is no prioritisation of one set of rights
over the other—the 6 April movement and its supporters clearly viewed social and
economic rights as inseparable from civil and political rights.
Even before the formation of the 6 April movement in 2008, workers’ protests
and strikes constituted one of the strongest opposition forces in Egypt. Such labour
mobilisation eventually led to the formation of the Egyptian Federation of
Independent Trade Unions (EFITU) soon after the uprising began. EFITU was
established in response to the overtly state-controlled Egyptian Trade Union
Federation (ETUF), which was created in 1957 and whose leaders have always been
appointed by the government rather than elected by workers. As Joel Beinin notes,
the emergence of the independent labour movement—or “militant labour dissi-
dence”—in Egypt saw an escalation of protests in the late 1990s as a result of
ETUF’s failure to adequately represent workers. Beinin argues, “Workers were by
far the largest component of the burgeoning culture of protest in the 2000s that
undermined the legitimacy of the Mubarak regime” (Beinin 2012: 1).
Labour mobilisation through street protests and strikes intensified in post-
uprising Egypt, with calls for an increase in the minimum wage, the replacement of
temporary contracts with permanent ones and the right to strike, among other
demands. While some prominent figures from the independent labour movement
accepted ministerial positions and parliamentary seats in the interim transitional
governments and during Mohamed Morsi’s short tenure as president, thousands of
workers continued to be jailed for staging demonstrations, sit-ins and strikes. Beinin
argues that the repression of these mostly local strikes has worsened in post-
transition Egypt (Beinin 2013). Moreover, tensions between ETUF and EFITU per-
sist and have led to a court case in which ETUF is charging EFITU with violating
Trade Union Law No. 35 of 1976, which prohibits the establishment of independent
labour unions (Mada Masr 2016).
The labour movement in Egypt did not operate alone. The Kifaya movement, for
example, was persistent in its calls for transparent governance and democracy.
192 N. Aboueldahab
There are some notable developments in civil society strategies in pre- and post-
transition Egypt. Documentation of human rights violations and of corrupt prac-
tices, particularly with regard to the embezzlement of state funds and corrupt real
estate contracts, has continued. However, the use of social media to make this docu-
mentation accessible has increased significantly since the 2011 uprising. Moreover,
the content of documentation has broadened to underline the links between civil and
political rights violations and socioeconomic rights.7 Second, litigation has been
persistent despite the continued politicisation of the judiciary. Litigation activists
have, however, become bolder in targeting an increasing number of high-level offi-
cials. They have also enhanced their methods of disseminating updates about their
litigation attempts and trials, mainly through civil society organisations’ websites
and through local and regional media. Since the 2011 uprising, the increase in the
7
The Egyptian Initiative for Personal Rights (EIPR) and the Egyptian Centre for Economic and
Social Rights (ECESR) are examples of NGOs that have increasingly adopted this strategy.
9 Navigating the Storm: Civil Society and Ambiguous Transitions in Egypt, Libya… 193
number of independent media outlets, such as Mada Masr, has significantly strength-
ened public awareness of such cases, making the information more readily avail-
able. Accountability for corruption crimes and their socioeconomic impact has been
stronger in the post-transition period. Whereas resistance was primarily through
strikes and protests prior to the uprising, it is now increasingly conducted through
the courts as well. The ECESR, for example, has been quite successful in its litiga-
tion through the Administrative Court, as it has won several rulings against corrupt
public contracts.
That said, significant challenges remain for Egyptian civil society’s work on
transitional justice. A repressive protest law and the post-transitional government’s
systematic crackdown on NGOs and individual activists, journalists and bloggers
all point to a renewed form of oppression that is all too familiar to such actors.8 As
a result, the momentum behind new initiatives in the immediate aftermath of
Mubarak’s ouster, namely the formation of political parties with the participation of
youth activists, waned. It was instead quickly replaced with resorting to the “old”
methods of documenting, using litigation as a resistance technique and a way of
raising awareness about the flawed justice system and its inability to ensure social
and political justice.
Libya
The authoritarian and repressive policies of the Gaddafi regime made it extremely
difficult for domestic civil society organisations to have any real impact on criminal
accountability for Libyan high-level government officials. Legal restrictions on the
formation and independence of NGOs were significant. Law 19 of 2001 constituted
an Associations Act that imposed further restrictions on the original Associations
Act of 1970 (Law No. 111/1970) by securing oversight by the executive and placing
government representatives in high positions within the organisations (Mikail 2013;
Al Jurshi 2010). Foreign funding was severely restricted by the same law and stipu-
lated that the government’s General People’s Committee must approve receipt of
foreign financial donations. Moreover, Libyan civil society feared potential reper-
cussions for collaborating with foreign funders and often avoided doing so. There
were an estimated 22 NGOs operating in Libya before Gaddafi’s fall in 2011, none
of which were able to work independently (Mercy Corps 2011). This made for a
very small and weak civil society in pre-transition Libya.
Gaddafi’s regime also had to contend with the country’s various tribes. In her
discussion on Libyan tribes as “an alternative” to civil society, Amal Obeidi explains
the nuanced and changing role of Libyan tribes during the Gaddafi era (Obeidi
2001). She notes that while Gaddafi was keen to do away with tribalism at the start
of his reign, he eventually began to realise tribes’ importance within Libyan society
8
Law 107 (2013) on the Right to Public Meetings, Processions and Peaceful Demonstrations, in
addition to Law 84 (2002) on Non-Governmental Organisations.
194 N. Aboueldahab
as they helped ensure internal stability. This was particularly important as Libya
faced difficult external pressures, including sanctions. Tribes, then, served as an
alternative to civil society in the sense that they were given space to provide certain
social services, but they held no formal political role. This lent the regime a degree
of legitimacy without allowing room for a real political threat to its existence.
As Libya increasingly began to suffer the consequences of international isolation
during Gaddafi’s rule, particularly following the United States bombing campaign
against Libya in 1986 and the economic sanctions that followed, a slight release of
the tight grip on the very few civil society organisations also began to emerge. More
associations, particularly in the form of unions under the General Federation of
Producers and Trade Unions, were allowed to form. This federation was tightly
controlled by the government (Al Jurshi 2010). The only relatively influential char-
ity organisations were run by Gaddafi’s relatives.
Documentation
Organisations such as Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International were, how-
ever, active in documenting human rights violations in Libya to raise public aware-
ness and put pressure on the Libyan Government to address violations. This
continues to hold true in the post-transition period. Their position as international
NGOs located outside of Libya no doubt facilitated the publication of their damning
reports during Gaddafi’s rule. Advocacy networks linking Libyan and international
civil society organisations during Gaddafi’s rule between 1969 and 2011 were, how-
ever, extremely weak, undermining the potential impact of the public awareness
campaigns on government policy.
With the fall of the Gaddafi regime, this started to change. Lawyers for Justice in
Libya, a group formed in 2011 by Libyan lawyers in the diaspora that now includes
a network of lawyers in Libya, has been actively monitoring legal developments and
making recommendations to the Libyan Government. Civil society organisations
within Libya have been growing, but the level of engagement with international
actors has remained low (Lawyers for Justice in Libya 2016). However, interna-
tional NGOs such as No Peace Without Justice actively worked to train Libyan legal
professionals and the judiciary to improve accountability for human rights viola-
tions in Libya. The United Nations Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL) also
trained and encouraged the Libyan Government to devise a prosecutorial strategy
(UNSMIL 2012). Given the serious legal and security challenges to those involved
in efforts to prosecute political leaders, most civil society organisations called for
reconciliation as opposed to prosecutions (S. Moschini, personal interview,
September 18, 2013). Stefano Moschini noted the initial growth of civil society
soon after Gaddafi’s ouster, which was quickly followed by their decline because of
restrictions imposed by the government: “[Civil society] started off as 20,000 and
now only twenty-five per cent of them operate” (S. Moschini, personal interview,
September 18, 2013).
9 Navigating the Storm: Civil Society and Ambiguous Transitions in Egypt, Libya… 195
Litigation
9
At the time of writing, the ICC issued two additional arrest warrants in Libya. One was issued
under seal on April 18, 2013, for Al-Tuhamy Mohamed Khaled, former head of the Libyan Internal
Security Agency. This arrest warrant was unsealed on April 24, 2017. The second arrest warrant
was issued onthe 15th August 2017 against Mahmoud Mustafa Busayf Al-Werfalli, commander of
the Al Saiqa Brigade.
196 N. Aboueldahab
“The aim of the revolution was to establish a state of law and to achieve justice for
the Abu Salim victims” (A. Jerary, personal interview, November 8, 2012). It is
revealing, then, that one of the very few pre-transition crimes with which Abdallah
El Senussi is charged is the execution of the Abu Salim prisoners under his orders.
Given the severely restrictive environment within which lawyers and other civil
society actors had to work, none of the interviewees was able to cite examples of
criminal complaints filed against Gaddafi or his aides in the pre-transition period.
Litigation activism in Libya was weak, and largely dependent on individual lawyers
such as Dao al-Mansouri and Fathi Terbil. Litigation attempts were mainly limited
to cases relating to the Abu Salim prison massacre, which remains deeply engraved
in the societal memory of the Gaddafi regime’s abuses in Libya.
Some former regime officials faced corruption charges. Given the lack of public
access to information about the trials, the list of charges remains unclear (Saudi, as
cited in Aboueldahab 2014).10 However, known charges include the squandering of
public funds amounting to $2.5 billion by former Foreign Minister Abdul Ati al-
Obaidi and former head of the General People’s Conference Mohamed El Zway.
These were the first verdicts issued against high-level officials since Gaddafi’s
ouster (BBC News 2013). These funds were used to compensate families of those
killed in the 1988 Lockerbie plane bombing, as a way to get them to drop legal
claims against Libya (Shennib 2013). However, this corruption charge, which nota-
bly relates to an offense committed before the 2011 uprising, was dropped and al-
Obaidi and El Zway were acquitted in June 2013. No explanation was given by the
judge for their acquittal, raising suspicions of the ongoing politicisation of the judi-
ciary in Libya.11
Al-Mahmoudi, who was Libya’s Prime Minister from 2006 to 2011, was charged
with funnelling $25 million of public money to Tunisia to help Gaddafi forces fight-
ing in the 2011 conflict. Saif al-Islam Gaddafi and his brother Saadi were also
accused of “plundering state coffers to fund extravagant playboy lifestyles abroad”
(Stephen 2014). The number of corruption trials, however, does not match that of
the trials in Egypt and Tunisia.
Given the great difficulty for NGOs and other civil society actors in Libya to work
independently and without constant interference by the government, documentation
of human rights violations in the pre-transition period was primarily conducted with
10
Elham Saudi, for example, explained that her organisation, Lawyers for Justice in Libya, faced
difficulty in obtaining information on the charges.
11
Al-Obaidi and El Zway remained in detention, however, on other human rights charges.
9 Navigating the Storm: Civil Society and Ambiguous Transitions in Egypt, Libya… 197
the help of international NGOs such as Human Rights Watch and Amnesty
International. While this continues to be the case in the post-transition period,
organisations such as Lawyers for Justice in Libya work both in the Libyan diaspora
and with Libyan lawyers on the ground to monitor legal developments and to advise
the Libyan authorities on how best to move forward on issues related to constitution
building and transitional justice.
Still, prosecutions remain a prominent and sensitive issue. They have solely tar-
geted former Gaddafi regime officials without any serious investigation of crimes
that may have been committed by the anti-Gaddafi revolutionary militias. A contro-
versial amnesty law providing blanket protection for Libyan rebels from prosecu-
tion was issued, closing the door to a more comprehensive criminal accountability
process. Civil society organisations such as Lawyers for Justice in Libya strongly
opposed this law and issued statements condemning it (Lawyers for Justice in Libya
2012). Moreover, judges, lawyers and prosecutors have faced assassinations and
death threats for being involved in any kind of legal defence of former Gaddafi
regime officials. The security situation and weak governance in the country have
thus had an adverse impact on litigation efforts.
While this does not mean that societal preference for accountability has waned,
civil society has had to reorient itself towards conflict resolution, constitution build-
ing and justice and reconciliation. Finally, while the socioeconomic impact of cor-
rupt practices by Libyan Government officials was less pronounced when compared
to Egypt and Tunisia, major corruption charges related to embezzlement and squan-
dering of public funds were still a central feature of prosecutions.
Tunisia
Documentation
The documentation of human rights abuses guided the work of Tunisia’s civil soci-
ety in the decades before the uprising. Working within a repressive environment,
civil society organisations such as the Tunisian Human Rights League (Ligue
Tunisienne pour la Défense des Droits de l’Homme, or LTDH), established in 1976,
began to document and disseminate information, particularly following a 1978 gen-
eral strike by labour unions, after which union members were tortured and faced
other repressive measures. This, Messaoud Rhomdani argued, is what motivated the
LTDH to document and disseminate information on human rights violations.
Documentation of abuses signified anticipation of a time when prosecutions would
be possible (M. Rhomdani, personal interview, April 25, 2012).
The proliferation of media outlets, increase in the number of civil society organ-
isations, cooperation with international organisations such as Avocats Sans
Frontières and establishment of Tunisia’s Truth and Dignity Commission have all
bolstered the documentation and dissemination of information regarding human
rights violations in Tunisia post-2011. As of July 2017, the Truth and Dignity
Commission had received 62,000 complaints (Belhassine 2017).
198 N. Aboueldahab
Litigation
While there were very few explicit attempts by civil society to trigger domestic
prosecutions of political leaders before the 2010–2011 uprising, notable litigation
efforts were made at the international level. Through universal jurisdiction laws,
two cases targeted former Interior Ministers Abdallah Qallel and General Habib
Ammar in Switzerland in 2001 and 2003, respectively. A third case in 2001 targeted
Khaled Ben Said, a police superintendent in Jendouba who later became vice consul
for Tunisia in the French city of Strasbourg.12 These cases illustrate that, given the
highly repressive context within which Tunisian civil society worked during the Ben
Ali regime, a creative use of French and Swiss universal jurisdiction laws made a
significant crack in the criminal accountability shell. They were successfully
brought forward in part because of cooperation with international organisations,
which helped file the universal jurisdiction cases, but also because of awareness of
the applicability of universal jurisdiction among some of the victims.
Following the ouster of Ben Ali, civil society in Tunisia became emboldened in
its pursuit of criminal accountability domestically. The majority of the complaints
filed against former leaders were instigated by individual plaintiffs and by a group
of lawyers called the Groupe de 25. The Groupe de 25 was formed on January 14,
2011—the day Ben Ali was ousted. Amor Safraoui, the head of the Groupe de 25,
explained that initial efforts aimed at prosecution came after it was evident that the
public prosecutor would not take action to initiate prosecutions (A. Safraoui, per-
sonal interview, April 25, 2012). When I asked why they were more active in filing
for corruption rather than human rights crimes, Charfeddine Kallel, a human rights
lawyer for several victims of the uprising and a prominent member of the Groupe de
25, explained that most of the lawyers in the group did not have extensive experi-
ence nor expertise in how to prepare human rights cases (C. Kallel, personal inter-
view, April 25, 2012).
Furthermore, while Tunisia’s transition was not as repressed by interim authori-
ties as in Egypt, many figures from the Ben Ali era, or the anciens nouveaux, retain
power. Beji Caїd Essebsi, for instance, held senior government positions in both
Bourguiba’s and Ben Ali’s governments and is now Tunisia’s President.13 Since
winning the presidency in December 2014, Essebsi nominated three Ben Ali regime
officials to senior political positions, including Habib Essid as Prime Minister (Petre
2015). As several of the incoming elites had ties to the former Ben Ali regime, the
political will for a more comprehensive set of human rights cases was weak. This is
because, as one diplomat argued, such anciens nouveaux feared that they “might not
be spared” from prosecution for their involvement in human rights violations in the
past (anonymous, personal interview, May 22, 2012). A politicised public prosecu-
tor, allied with the ruling political party, has meant that many human rights cases
continue to be blocked (M. Rhomdani, personal interview, April 25, 2012;
12
Jendouba is a city in northwestern Tunisia. Habib Nassar brought my attention to this case (FIDH
and Human Rights League 2010).
13
Habib Bourguiba was Tunisia’s first post-independence president from 1957 to 1987.
9 Navigating the Storm: Civil Society and Ambiguous Transitions in Egypt, Libya… 199
A. Safraoui, personal interview, April 25, 2012). Essebsi’ strong push for the recon-
ciliation bill is the latest and boldest statement against criminal accountability in
Tunisia.
Nevertheless, some success was had with socioeconomic accountability. The social
and political processes that unfolded in Tunisia point to the significant role workers’
movements and labour unions played before, during and after the uprising.
Moreover, Tunisian civil society was predominantly made up of labour union activ-
ists, particularly as they faced repressive measures from the Bourguiba and Ben Ali
regimes from early on.
A series of mass revolts and strikes against unemployment and economic inequal-
ity in the Tunisian town of Gafsa in 2008, which resulted in several deaths and many
serious injuries, are widely seen as a turning point in the lead-up to the uprising two
and a half years later (M. Rhomdani, personal interview, April 25, 2012; A. Boubakri,
personal interview, April 26, 2012; anonymous, personal interview, April 24, 2012).
Gafsa and its aftermath helped chip away at the fear barrier that prevented many
Tunisians from challenging the regime’s repressive policies. It also demonstrated
the strength of mobilisation in the face of an often brutal police force.
Prior to the Tunisian uprising, the General Union for Tunisian Workers (UGTT)
played a leading role in challenging government policies from its establishment in
1946. It was the country’s strongest opposition, despite its complex relationship
with the Ben Ali regime, which often meant that the union’s executive office was
staffed with individuals loyal to the regime (A. Morai, telephone interview, May 2,
2013). Nonetheless, the UGTT led a general strike during the uprising and oversaw
sit-ins at the Casbah thereafter, all of which strengthened its influence as the govern-
ment’s most serious opposition. Moreover, even with the formation of at least three
other trade union federations in Tunisia since the uprising, the UGTT has main-
tained its powerful position of influence in Tunisia’s labour movement.
As in Egypt, the Tunisian labour movement did not operate alone—human rights
activists such as Moncef Marzouki, Sihem Bensedrine, Hama Hammami and others
were persistent in their calls for democracy and respect for human rights. Those
calling for civil and political rights, such as the right to freedom of expression, the
right to assemble, and freedom from torture and arbitrary detention, were severely
repressed through massive crackdowns led by the police and other state security
forces, resulting in a significantly weakened human rights movement in Tunisia. In
contrast, the labour movement, at the head of which sits the UGTT, was slightly
more tolerated. This is in part due to the fact that the UGTT’s leadership has func-
tioned as both ally and rival to Tunisia’s Government since its establishment during
colonial rule.
The relative success of the Tunisian labour movement in bringing to the fore
demands for social justice and in fighting corruption impacted on the content of the
prosecutions and the emphasis on corruption. As in Egypt, workers’ movements and
200 N. Aboueldahab
labour unions served as one of the drivers of a certain degree of criminal account-
ability for socioeconomic rights violations. On the other hand, the harsh crack-
downs on civil and political rights activists left a seriously weakened human rights
lobby that has been largely unsuccessful in ensuring criminal accountability for
abuses committed both before and during the uprisings. A politicised judiciary, part
of which is allied with the Ben Ali regime, is one reason efforts to bring about
human rights prosecutions have been hampered.14
It should be noted, however, that, as in Libya, other priority areas have consumed
civil society’s work in Tunisia. In particular, efforts geared towards political recon-
ciliation, primarily between the Islamist Ennahda party and the secular Nidaa
Tounes party, became central to the work of civil society. The Nobel Prize awarded
to the so-called Tunisian “quartet” in 2015 served as a strong recognition for the
work of four civil society organisations in helping to resolve a political crisis, but
not criminal justice.15 Still, the significance of the prize lies in its recognition of the
influence civil society has had in post-transition Tunisia and it does not negate the
centrality of prosecutions in the country’s pursuit of transitional justice.
14
The establishment of Tunisia’s Truth and Dignity Commission in 2014 may, however, provide a
potential avenue for pre-transition human rights prosecutions. Mandated with investigating crimes
committed by state and organised groups from Tunisian independence in 1955 to December 2013,
the Commission has acquired a “quasi-judicial” nature to investigate both corruption and civil and
political rights crimes (Robinson 2014).
15
The four organisations that constituted the quartet are the Union Générale Tunisienne du Travail,
the Ligue Tunisienne des Droits de l’Homme, the Confederation of Industry, Trade and Handicrafts
and the Tunisian Order of Lawyers.
9 Navigating the Storm: Civil Society and Ambiguous Transitions in Egypt, Libya… 201
consideration of the financial and economic reconciliation law, which grants corrupt
officials immunity from prosecution in exchange for the return of their ill-gotten
assets.
As in Egypt, corruption and its socioeconomic impact were foregrounded prior
to the uprising in Tunisia and mostly led by the UGTT and related workers’ move-
ments. Protests, strikes and negotiations with the government for policy reform
were common pre-transition and continue to figure heavily in the post-transition
period. Accountability for corruption through the courts is the most distinctive shift
in strategy in post-transition Tunisia, and continues to hold a central place in the
transitional justice process.
Conclusion
Transitions are highly contentious processes and the North African cases are no
exception to this. The prosecution of political leaders in Egypt, Libya and Tunisia has
unfolded within a muddled transitional justice context, marked by ambiguous transi-
tions that do not neatly follow a shift from authoritarian rule to peaceful, liberal
democratic rule. Civil society, then, has had to devise strategies to advance criminal
accountability while also fighting for a transition that is conducive to a meaningful
transitional justice process. These strategies primarily constitute the documentation
of abuses and persistent litigation attempts, despite an opaque judiciary and very
weak prospects for fair prosecutions. Moreover, the emphasis on accountability for
corruption in all three cases was in part driven by civil society strategies that aimed
to generate some form of accountability, even if it meant that decades of human
rights violations would remain unaccounted for. However, as the case of Egypt dem-
onstrates, the link between civil and political rights and socioeconomic justice has
become stronger in the work of civil society actors post-transition.
The challenges faced by civil society in Egypt, Libya and Tunisia are quite simi-
lar. Repressive government policies stifled the formation of civil society organisa-
tions and their actions both pre- and post-transition. A politicised judiciary meant
human rights prosecutions were repeatedly blocked. Fear of violent repercussions
for pursuing cases against high-level government officials meant that human rights
litigation, particularly in Libya, was muted. It comes as no surprise, then, that the
efforts of individual plaintiffs and of lawyers working on behalf of civil society
organisations representing victims in Egypt, Libya and Tunisia were and continue
to be the primary ways in which criminal cases against high-level government offi-
cials are brought forward. The absence of Egyptian and Libyan efforts to pursue
universal jurisdiction, in contrast to Tunisia, may point to a lack of awareness among
civil society and lawyers of the possibility of holding officials accountable in
another country. This, however, is a question that requires further research.16
16
The Arab Network for Human Rights Information has worked with foreign legal organisations to
bring torture charges against former Intelligence Chief Omar Suleiman (G. Eid, personal inter-
view, May 2, 2012).
202 N. Aboueldahab
Following the uprisings, documentation and litigation have continued, but with a
significantly heightened level of awareness of the transitional justice context within
which civil society actors work.
Domestic civil society activism is, of course, insufficient on its own to drive deci-
sions regarding prosecution (Aboueldahab 2017). Analyses of previous transitions
are telling. In Argentina, for example, the post-transition presidential leaderships of
Raúl Alfonsin (1983–1989), Carlos Menem (1989–1999) and Nestor Kirchner
(2003–2007) each shaped decisions regarding prosecution differently (Engstrom
and Pereira 2012). This succession of governments in Argentina and its impact on
the ebbs and flows of amnesties and prosecutions over decades point to the
significance of the political leadership’s influence on decisions regarding prosecu-
tion. This, however, does not diminish the significance of non-state actors, using
tactics such as mass protests and civil society pressure, in pushing for such
decisions.
International actors have had mixed success in impacting decisions regarding
prosecution in Egypt, Libya and Tunisia. While international NGOs played a sig-
nificant role in documenting and raising awareness about human rights violations in
the three countries, they have also faced challenges related to accusations of “for-
eign interference” in the domestic affairs of the state—a charge usually levelled by
the governments. Moreover, as many domestic civil society organisations rely heav-
ily on foreign funding for their work, they have also been accused of “collabora-
tion” with foreign donors and harming the sovereignty of the state. These
repercussions have ranged from arbitrary arrests to serious legal restrictions, such as
Law 84 (2002) on Non-Governmental Organisations—a Mubarak-era law that con-
tinues to restrict civil society’s ability to work and that imposes arbitrary restrictions
on NGO receipt of foreign funding.
In the face of continued repression against civil society and in particular against
efforts aimed at criminal accountability, Egypt, Libya and Tunisia demonstrate that
not all transitions are created equal. The ouster of a head of state has not necessarily
meant the end of authoritarianism. Even in Tunisia, often described as a beacon of
hope for other Arab Spring countries undergoing tumultuous transitions, the anciens
nouveaux have proven fairly resistant to a comprehensive transitional justice pro-
cess and to prosecutions in particular. This has been particularly apparent in
Tunisia’s recent enactment of the financial and economic reconciliation bill (Jamaoui
2015). Such conditions in the North African cases have resulted in civil society
advocating for criminal justice while also battling counter-revolutionary forces that
would rather do away with transitional justice altogether.
Civil society actors have had to grapple continuously with repressive regimes,
violence, insecurity and human rights violations in pre- and post-transition Egypt,
Libya and Tunisia. Their resilient documentation, litigation, foregrounding of cor-
ruption and its link to human rights violations, and activism “against all odds” over
decades make them one of the most important actors to pursue criminal justice in
such uncertain times.
9 Navigating the Storm: Civil Society and Ambiguous Transitions in Egypt, Libya… 203
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Chapter 10
Conclusion: The Role of Local Civil Society
in Shaping Transitional Justice in Africa
In order to place local civil society innovations in the context of the broader transi-
tional justice field and understand how they may contribute to its development, it is
useful to take a step back and look at the historical trajectory of the field.
Transitional justice emerged from practice and is continually reshaped by the shift-
ing forms of policy and practice. Its key ideas, boundaries and mechanisms have been
shaped through global developments where academics, practitioners and national and
international policymakers built a set of tools and a body of knowledge. This set of
assumptions, relating to the underlying causes of conflict, the goals that transitional
societies should pursue and the value of different processes in achieving these goals,
has evolved over time. Civil society is generally an enthusiastic participant in the
promotion of this knowledge, and at times also contributes to its development.
The term “transitional justice” was initially coined in response to debates about
dealing with transitions from authoritarian rule to democracy in Latin America in the
1980s (Arthur 2009). The main tension that these policy deliberations sought to
address was how to balance the fragile nature of democratic consolidation with the
need to affirm norms of accountability that could serve to build a human rights culture.
While the dilemma of how to deal with legacies of mass abuses committed by a past
regime has been a question that has confronted many policymakers over the ages
(from ancient Greece to the transitions to independence from colonial rule), the global
politics at the end of the Cold War created an opportunity to frame these challenges
and opportunities through a human rights lens. Rather than defining a completely new
1
Lorna McGregor (2013) argues, for example, that torture was one of the key initial focuses of
transitional justice, but that the field has had little direct impact on its prevalence due to the failure
to develop a clear strategy that engages with its causes and context.
208 H. van der Merwe
recognised and enforced through courts and transitional justice mechanisms (as dis-
cussed by Zukiswa Puwana and Rita Kesselring in this volume).
For local civil society, these debates are about concrete advocacy strategies and
policy choices that they confront in their national and community contexts. Local
policy processes of transitional justice have always been an arena of fierce contesta-
tion. Both the goals that seek to frame a transformative vision for transitional societ-
ies and the specific mechanisms that are developed can be approached from very
different perspectives and serve competing goals. The end of open warfare or the
fall of a dictatorship does not spell the end of conflict. It opens up new battle lines
between those seeking to shape the future. While shifting international norms may
inject new intellectual capital, strengthen certain bargaining positions and introduce
new role players into these debates, agreement on the policy choices in pursuing
competing agendas has remained elusive.
Transitional justice has proven itself amenable to serving different goals and
surprisingly pliable to manipulation by powerful actors in some contexts. The field
can more usefully be conceived in a non-normative sense, as a range of processes
used by societies to address the legacies of past offenses both in pursuing democra-
tisation and in consolidating authoritarian rule. There are various agendas that drive
transitional justice, ranging from human rights and peacebuilding to regime legiti-
mation and elimination of political opponents. The devil is often in the detail of how
these processes are framed and how their mandates and operations are determined.
This chapter situates local civil society within this political milieu. Civil society
is a political actor that pursues particular agendas in transitional contexts. Its role
and effectiveness can be better understood by reflecting on its location in terms of
international, national and local politics. While much attention in the literature is
given to international norms and their diffusion through civil society, the chapter
seeks to balance this by giving more attention to the local politics of transitional
justice on the African continent.
In this chapter I will unpack why transitional justice is a particularly vexed ques-
tion in the African context, due to the continent’s multilayered experience of local
and international conflict. Building on the contrasting approaches to transitional
justice outlined above (expansive versus targeted), I seek to explain some of the ten-
sions between global and local conceptions of transitional justice, before locating
civil society in these debates. The chapter concludes with a review of the various
CSO strategies examined in this volume and what they tell us regarding the meaning
and trajectory of transitional justice.
When a society adopts transitional justice processes, the stakes can be very high.
Transitional justice discourses and mechanisms frame a moral narrative of victim-
hood and abuse, present diagnoses of what ails a society, prescribe institutional
restructuring to heal it and authorise concrete actions that can remove individuals or
10 Conclusion: The Role of Local Civil Society in Shaping Transitional Justice in Africa 209
whole sets of actors from office or political influence. Where a peace deal has been
concluded, this is often the terrain where the battle for power continues.
Transitional justice has by no means been reduced to a neutral set of mechanisms
with accepted outcomes. While there have been significant developments in framing
tools that are more commonly used, conventions regarding key principles and
increased international scrutiny by donors and international bodies, national level
transitional justice debates remain highly fluid and contested. The increased legali-
sation, bureaucratisation and standardisation of the field have not served to depoliti-
cise the policy choices of key local actors.
In part, this contentiousness is an inevitable product of local politics. The norms
and values for addressing conflict, as well as the narratives of conflict, are embed-
ded in a political contestation relating to competing ideologies, ethnic identities,
notions of the nation and attempts to frame and consolidate the role of the state.
Transitional justice does not exist above the fray. It provides a powerful new vocab-
ulary, toolkits and analytical frameworks for making sense of these challenges and
legitimising certain agendas.
The state has been the master of this terrain for many years. Local civil society is
a relatively newcomer. Yet by building bases of legitimacy among local stakehold-
ers, forging ties with international actors and drawing on formidable technical
expertise, civil society has emerged as a very vocal player within African transi-
tional justice debates.
Civil society faces particular challenges in Africa, both because of the nature and
history of conflict on the continent and because of the specific obstacles confronting
state legitimacy and capacity. Transitions have been a common feature of African
states over the last 60 years. Dealing with transitions from colonial rule to indepen-
dence provided a significant primer for some governments in managing transitions.
Many lessons were learnt: how to maintain continuity while managing change, how
old or emerging elites can manipulate shifting political institutions and narratives to
their own ends, how postcolonial dependencies and imposed economic structures
continue to oppress societies and how new visionary narratives can inspire and build
unity but also marginalise and delegitimise dissent.
Transitional justice norms in African countries have their own historical prece-
dents that were established through colonial institutional cultures, and by their
respective attempts to reframe the nature of the state and build national identity
through reinvented political narratives. The fluidity of politics on the continent pro-
vides rich soil for attempts to formulate new social contracts that transform and
build on the colonial legacy of institutionalised violence and mass violations.
Postcolonial African states have responded in contrasting ways to these legacies of
abuses and institutionalised forms of repression.
Many states have also managed transitions from authoritarian rule to democracy,
and from war to peace, since independence. In most cases these transitions were
controlled by a narrow set of elites, military rulers and powerful regional and inter-
national actors. Civil society is now interfering in a process that was previously the
preserve of a more exclusive set of actors.
African state practices in dealing with transitions (even without civil society
intervention) have been highly diverse. As the contributors to this volume show,
210 H. van der Merwe
examples of amnesty and amnesia, vengeance and victor’s justice, national unity
and reconciliation commitments, and even investigative and truth processes occurred
across the continent in the decades preceding the end of the Cold War. These pro-
cesses served a range of goals, from consolidating national independence and nation
building to elite entrenchment, state legitimation and ethnic reconciliation. And
today, transitional justice is a concept viewed by various states through quite differ-
ent lenses—useful for purposes that seem contradictory. While “transformative jus-
tice” has become a popular term among critical transitional justice scholars (Gready
and Robins 2014), the transformative goals of African transitional justice agendas
have always been apparent. Transformation of the state and society in the African
context has been pursued in dramatic and diverse ways.
Ever since removing the shackles of colonial rule, African states have struggled
with the challenge of redefining their identity and destiny. Transitional justice, at
least in its broader definition, clearly speaks to this journey. The meaning of transi-
tion, the need to deal with a legacy of abuses and build a sense of nationhood united
by a common identity and unifying values, has been at the centre of African politics
since independence.
Transitional justice in Africa, in this sense, still struggles with the unfinished
business of its colonial legacy. In addition, there is the burden of conflicts that have
ravaged countries since independence, alongside continuing global political and
economic inequalities (Muvingi 2009; Abou-El-Fadl 2012). An attempt at a deci-
sive break with the past using “revolutionary justice” to deal with the colonial leg-
acy in Mozambique (Igreja 2010) elicited fierce responses from the West (and local
resistance), resulting in a brutal drawn-out civil war that necessitated further transi-
tional arrangements to revisit the colonial legacy and address subsequent abuses.
The African colonial context provides a toxic mix of unresolved historical agen-
das that provide fuel for ongoing conflict. Conventional international transitional
justice approaches are generally biased towards shorter, more manageable time
frames and narrowly defined sets of abuses (Balint et al. 2014). Apply this to a con-
text where horrendous colonial abuses happened just over the (conveniently placed)
horizon, and internationally prioritised abuses are civil and political violations by
postcolonial states themselves rather than inherited local and ongoing international
social inequalities, and the reasons for scepticism about an imposed agenda driven
by former colonial powers become all too obvious. Transitional justice agendas that
present colonial inheritances, or the moment of independence, as the unquestioned
foundation—the point of reference to which present governments need to return—
come across as an international agenda that seems to reaffirm African dependency
and inferiority. It presents the end of colonialism as the point where things started
going wrong rather than as the foundation for subsequent conflicts.
A common theme shaping state agendas in many transitions has understandably
been nation building and state consolidation. In countries with fairly recent ideas of
nationhood, riven by ethnic divisions that were encouraged by colonial rulers, the
need to build a national identity, frame a vision of a common destiny and c onsolidate
national boundaries as meaningful to identity has been a key challenge that each
transition has had to revisit in some manner. Similarly, the legitimacy of the state
10 Conclusion: The Role of Local Civil Society in Shaping Transitional Justice in Africa 211
and a constitution, and the value of centralised authority, has been incremental
achievements that require repeated assertion in each transitional arrangement.
African civil society presents an additional layer of transitional justice demands
and methodologies that it hopes will replace or be integrated in these state-led pol-
icy processes. One would thus be remiss to view the role of civil society as simply
(or even mainly) being proponents of transitional justice in the face of state resis-
tance to such measures. Both the state and civil society seek to pursue transitional
justice, but on their own terms.
Earlier in this chapter I argued that civil society transitional justice advocates operate
at two levels: an expansive versus a targeted approach to social change. Seeking to
frame the goals of transition or to shape the strategies used during transition in order
to secure certain gains positions civil society in relation to both international and state
agendas. Civil society has been presented as a conduit for global norm diffusion, but
it often also interacts with these norms in a more creative and critical manner.
CSOs have been strident consumers of transitional justice knowledge, gained
through their networks with other regional and international CSOs and their donors,
and through their exposure to globalised education, training and literature. Many
have themselves become voices in the international debates which contribute to
shape the development of the field. This engagement involves exposure to a matrix
of power and knowledge that can be quite seductive and co-optive. The institution-
alisation of transitional justice through the adoption of standardised “pillars” of
knowledge and best practice (namely truth seeking, accountability, institutional
reform and memorialisation) and through funding commitments to expert-led pro-
cesses has framed difficult dilemmas for local practitioners and advocates.
International norms regarding transitional justice have been concretised signifi-
cantly in the last 20 years, but are, in large part, not clearly articulated or justiciable as
yet. Where they have been more clearly spelled out, and slightly more enforceable, as
in the Rome Statute, they remain highly contested. They are embedded in the exercise
of global politics and the imbalance in global governance structures. This growth of the
field has produced a messy collection of enforceable imperatives, best practices, “com-
mon-sense” knowledge, standardised strategies and cutting-edge developments.
Nonetheless, as transitional justice gained traction as a specialised area of interven-
tion adopted by international agencies, international policy proponents have focused on
the technical process whereby the state employs a range of mechanisms to resolve
complex legal, political and social challenges that threaten the new social order after
transition. Aimed at pursuing short-term conflict termination and a stable political
order, this form of transitional justice comprises a set of issues that need to be settled
by the parties to the conflict. In this constricted sense, transitional justice seeks to create
a formalised framework for managing some of the most contentious issues that could
lead to renewed conflict if not managed carefully. It is concerned with establishing a
212 H. van der Merwe
comes with costs and opportunities for different role players in the political conflict.
Each policy choice carries implications for bolstering or undermining a particular
narrative of historical and present conflicts.
The most recent outbreak of war or phase of authoritarian rule is just one histori-
cal layer that requires contextualisation within a longer history of conflict. Each
phase of a conflict, from precolonial to various subnational episodes and cross-
national tensions since independence, provides additional challenges to framing an
inclusive and consensus-based agenda for transitional justice. These tensions pit
national against international actors, and also local political stakeholders against
each other, in framing what are the technical parameters, and who controls the nar-
rative for guiding the mechanisms and interpreting past events. The battle over tran-
sitional justice is thus fought on a number of fronts: whether to embark on it, what
forms it should take, how broad its mandate should be, how quickly to wrap it up
and which historical narrative should frame its goals.
These are all questions that create different divisions and alliances locally and
internationally. For civil society, they contain big questions relating to an expansive
agenda for social change, as well as shorter term strategic questions about the prior-
ity gains that need to be secured during a particular window of opportunity. These
strategy choices require a situational analysis and carefully negotiated relationship
with the state.
Using the broader definition of transitional justice I discussed above, which incor-
porates its manipulation for various agendas (rather than just serving as a human
rights or peacebuilding tool), allows us to analyse the relationship between CSOs
and the state in Africa in a more nuanced manner. Rather than viewing the state’s
position as simply being a promoter or an obstacle to CSO transitional justice agen-
das (or as for or against human rights or democratisation), I argue that its interests
in particular framings of this agenda need to be better understood.
In some cases, it does appear that the state is a somewhat reluctant passenger on
the international transitional justice bandwagon, and simply tries to limit the damage
to particular political party interests. Whether states want it or not, international
expectations are now that an end to war or transition to democracy would be accom-
panied by some form of transitional justice. In some instances, the state appears to
have little stake in transitional justice—not viewing it as a terrain where it can bolster
its legitimacy or consolidate its power, but rather as a series of hoops it needs to jump
through to placate powerful actors. State engagement with transitional justice is then
largely disingenuous or superficial, lacking substantive commitment and conse-
quently failing to deliver on promises the state was pushed into making. Its main goal
may simply be to undermine or marginalise the impact of these measures.
As Joanna Quinn argues in this volume, in Uganda the government tends to “use
the guise of transitional justice as a tool for acquiring some semblance of legitimacy”
10 Conclusion: The Role of Local Civil Society in Shaping Transitional Justice in Africa 215
(Chap. 7). Knowing that the international community has prioritised transitional jus-
tice, governments are under pressure to show some commitment, but often appear to
have little real intention to deliver. Local civil society thus has a critical role in keep-
ing these unresolved issues in the spotlight, both at a national and international level.
These strategies involve both engagement with the expansive agenda that seeks to
highlight national transformative goals and various attempts to bolster specific inter-
ventions when the state allows space for local initiatives.
Just as often the state seeks to reframe the purpose and shape of transitional jus-
tice to direct its activities towards its own goals. The question for local civil society
then becomes one of negotiating collaborative spaces and opportunities within this
framework, or of challenging and limiting the state’s activities where they oppose
its goals or actions. In these contexts, civil society needs to be strategically aware of
the opportunities to shape spaces for public participation and for promoting particu-
lar values or specific groups’ interests.
The case of Rwanda is perhaps most instructive as a state that actively took con-
trol of its transitional justice agenda, framed explicit goals and devised a strategy
with a well-thought-out theory of change. Civil society in Rwanda was supportive
of these efforts (albeit in part because of the repressive environment) and interna-
tional civil society was left divided and confused about what aspects of the pro-
gramme to support and what to challenge (Comlan 2010).
This more ambitious proactive intervention, where the state enthusiastically
adopts a controversial transitional justice agenda, is a worrying scenario when we
recognise how transitional justice language and mechanisms are open to manipula-
tion by the most repressive actors, who have become sophisticated in influencing
public sentiment regarding ideas of victimhood and are able to manipulate the
media to play on people’s insecurities. This battle over the public narrative between
the state and CSOs is clearly illustrated in Kenya’s engagement with the International
Criminal Court, where the discourse of victimhood was dominated by the state’s
presentation of the president as a victim of international intervention rather than as
the perpetrator of mass abuses (Lugano 2017). Justice and truth agendas can be
defined in ways that focus on accountability and exposure for carefully selected
abuses, with particular time frames and geographical jurisdictions that centre narra-
tives of blame and victimhood around certain group interests.2
The Zimbabwean case, as discussed by Shastry Njeru in this volume, is particu-
larly illuminating in this regard. Zimbabwe has had, broadly speaking, three
instances of national transitional justice processes, and ongoing narrative contesta-
tion over allocating blame for past abuses. The state carefully controlled the 1980
post-independence “reconciliation” process, the 1985 response to the Gukurahundi
Massacre and the 2009 Inclusive Government agreement, where the need for state
accountability was consistently discounted. The state’s overriding narrative of
abuse remains focused on colonialism and its legacies, particularly in terms of land
2
Richard Wilson (2001) provides a critique of the South African TRC which presents its mandate
and operations as an exercise in legitimating the new political order and thus serving to justify the
ongoing legacy of apartheid inequalities.
216 H. van der Merwe
3
This is also illustrated through case studies in Europe by Anja Mihr (2017).
10 Conclusion: The Role of Local Civil Society in Shaping Transitional Justice in Africa 217
periods of repression and war that do not necessarily conform to conventional ideas
of civil society. The lack of formal political space has pushed organisations that
have broad legitimacy in a particular society, such as trade unions, religious struc-
tures and traditional authorities, to take on roles of representing certain interests or
engaging the state to advocate for policy changes.
The inverse may also be true. In some contexts, such as Liberia, where long-term
conflict devastated state and customary institutions, local civil society and faith-
based structures stepped in to provide essential services for large parts of the popu-
lation and became key role players in the peace process. This has often provided
them with broad legitimacy and positioned them as trusted public servants. As
pointed out by James Dhizaala in his chapter, in Liberia their subsequent participa-
tion in governance structures during the transition however led to a critique that they
had been co-opted and lost their legitimacy due to their association with corrupt
structures. They ultimately failed to provide an effective counter to the warlords-
turned-politicians who were still in charge. Their ability to advocate for effective
accountability mechanisms and follow through on the Liberian truth commission’s
recommendations was consequently even more limited.
Particularly where transitional justice processes are being pursued in the context
of an untransformed state, the capacity of more conventional CSOs remains highly
restricted. In addition to the ongoing vulnerability of victims and the risks involved
for them in engaging in litigation, local civil society actors face regular state harass-
ment, even when simply gathering views from communities about transitional jus-
tice options, as pointed out by Njeru and Andrew Iliff in the case of Zimbabwe in
this volume.
The social divisions that drive political conflict can also cause ongoing divisions
within civil society. As Wendy Lambourne explains in this volume, difficulties per-
sist in promoting collaborative approaches among CSOs in Burundi due to per-
ceived linkages between them and particular ethnic groups.
In addition, CSOs need to be understood as comprising an elite in their own
right. As has been observed by scholars in other transitional justice contexts, CSOs
are part of an educated elite with ties to the formal economy and international net-
works (Millar 2010). There are thus serious challenges in terms of their ability to
relate to and represent the interests of marginalised and vulnerable groups. A key
focus of Iliff’s chapter in this volume is to unpack the relationship between largely
urban-based, modern CSOs and the more rural and traditional communities whose
needs they seek to address. Unless carefully managed, this divide is a serious stum-
bling block that undermines the legitimacy and effectiveness of CSOs.
Local civil society is however a key stakeholder without which the whole endeav-
our of transitional justice would be substantially diminished. CSOs contribute new
ideas, advocate for key principles, facilitate participation of new or marginalised
voices and ensure broader participation in policy processes. The chapters in this
book provide a rich overview of the numerous ways that civil society has expanded,
challenged and reimagined official political frames of transitional justice and also
pushed these ideas beyond the conventional international thinking.
218 H. van der Merwe
Local CSOs have generally embraced transitional justice as an idea, a set of prac-
tices or a discourse that empowers them to pursue their goals in challenging con-
texts. Yet, transitional justice can serve as a state-sanctioned policy framework that
legitimatises and regulates civil society activities—and directs their resources to
particular problems and particular regions prioritised by the state. CSOs can be
tempted to simply follow these international prescriptions or national policy frame-
works as a way to secure funds for their own survival. Sometimes this is done quite
uncritically or with a narrow self-interested agenda. For example, Lambourne in
this volume suggests that some pro-state and donor-dependent NGOs in Burundi
adopt specific transitional justice agendas that match these political/ideological
allegiances.
Some CSOs have also opportunistically framed their foundation and mission in
relation to transitional justice agendas in the hope of riding the international wave
of interest in this field. Quinn, also in this volume, notes the dual restrictions placed
on CSOs in Uganda: on the one hand, the restrictive state regulatory environment
and, on the other, donor agendas that are not generally sensitive to local political and
cultural dynamics. The space for innovation and independent critical thinking is
often quite limited for smaller CSOs.
At other times, African CSOs have engaged quite critically with these interna-
tional instruments, and instead fashioned local processes and transitional justice
policy proposals that are responsive to their analysis of local priorities, capacities
and opportunities. The chapters in this book provide a number of illustrations of this
adoption, adaption and critical reframing of transitional justice ideals and
concepts.
The local CSOs discussed in greater detail in this book (e.g. Kenya Transitional
Justice Network, Zimbabwe Human Rights NGO Forum, Quaker Peace Network
Burundi and Khulumani Support Group) are however more well established, with
legitimacy in certain communities, professional staff or international reputations.
They have clear commitments to serving the concerns of victim groups and margin-
alised communities, or promoting particular values and social change agendas.
Transitional justice, for them, is essentially a new lens through which to explain
their work, a new avenue that they can use to further their objectives. While for
some it is quite a stretch to make their work legible in this new language, for others
it is an exciting conceptual field that allows them to provide a more comprehensive
and comprehensible explanation of their work and their long-term goals and strate-
gies for social change.
In an attempt to make sense of the range of local civil society engagements with
the international transitional justice framework, we previously proposed a typology
(Van der Merwe and Brankovic 2016) that categorises CSO strategies as falling into
ideal types that highlight some of the underlying tensions that characterise transi-
tional justice politics. This typology, which identifies how CSOs position them-
selves in relation to the conventional transitional justice regime (e.g. implementers,
10 Conclusion: The Role of Local Civil Society in Shaping Transitional Justice in Africa 219
opponents, reframers), proves difficult to apply directly to the case studies in this
volume. The complex strategies described by the contributors span different catego-
ries, and these shift over time. A precise or consistent labelling is therefore not
possible.
As illustrated by Njeru, the Human Rights NGO Forum in Zimbabwe initially
adopted a conventional international framework, along with its legal formalities and
template of four pillars (truth seeking, accountability, memorialisation and institu-
tional reform), but re-evaluated its approach after receiving feedback from local
participants that information on alternative strategies was needed. A broad interna-
tionally framed template may provide an easier basis for initially building an inclu-
sive coalition of different CSO interests around a common campaign, but, as Njeru
notes, these templates are challenged once the campaign is faced with quite diverse
geographic and generational agendas around human rights abuses.
In Burundi the shifting national political environment created new constraints for
CSO engagement with transitional justice issues. As Lambourne notes, local CSOs
sought to encourage and generate the development of community-based and cus-
tomary approaches to transitional justice, particularly in the face of a stalled national
process and a constricting political landscape. Those CSO representatives who per-
severed with key demands of legal accountability have had to flee the country.
Established CSOs have managed to transcend these boundaries by engaging in
more fluid interactions with different actors, adjusting their language and strategies
to respond to particular forums, relationships or shifting political landscapes. As
political space opens, CSOs expand their activities, and as new state mechanisms
get established, CSOs reframe their discourse to be more effectively heard. With
shifting funding agendas, CSOs also relabel their transitional justice activities to fit
with new funding categories, for example shifting from “reconciliation” to “social
cohesion” or revising its language to fit with the United Nations’ Sustainable
Development Goals.
Against this local backdrop, CSOs constantly have to assess the value of the
transitional justice lens. Does it provide recognition for their analysis of the prob-
lem and framing of solutions? Does it allow them to present their work in a way that
gives them access to funding? Does it allow them to present a vision of their work
that has traction with local constituencies? And does it frame their work as poten-
tially collaborative or as oppositional to the state? Transitional justice may not serve
these shifting demands and could quite reasonably be rejected in favour of other
frameworks or social change theories as CSO needs and contexts evolve.
While relatively malleable as a conceptual framing of transitional challenges,
transitional justice discourse has been used as a strong epistemic instrument to
define problems and solutions in a way that seems to translate all too readily into
toolkits, templates, lessons, policy prescriptions and a set of expertise to be wielded
by international consultants. Makau Mutua cautions against
the dominant transitional justice programs based in the West, which have become a cottage
industry. This approach has spawned a college of professionals with prescriptive country
antidotes at the ready. This is a paternalistic and imperialistic approach that should be
rejected out of hand. (2015: 5)
220 H. van der Merwe
4
Efforts to conduct research that empirically documents victims’ demands, such as that conducted
by Simon Robins (2011) in Kenya and other contexts, provide challenging findings to NGOs that
take their own knowledge of victim needs for granted. See also Brankovic (2010) for CSO practi-
tioners’ reflections on this challenge.
10 Conclusion: The Role of Local Civil Society in Shaping Transitional Justice in Africa 221
with policy and conceptual debates put them into quite a different category from the
other CSOs covered in this volume. Yet there are important parallels, and strategic
collaboration, between them and more conventional CSOs, which make them key
role players in these debates.
In their chapter, Puwana and Kesselring outline the complex process of a victim
group’s balance or shift between strategies of collaboration and opposition when
dealing with a truth commission and the new state. They discuss the challenges of a
movement that seeks to address the immediate livelihood needs of a group with a
political agenda that challenges the elite compromise that has marginalised the
unfinished business of the TRC, and the continuation of apartheid injustices and
inequalities. While struggling to make headway using conventional strategies such
as litigation, Khulumani has bolstered its sustainability and political legitimacy
through its accountability to a membership base.
Many CSO-run transitional justice initiatives relate to attempts to build commu-
nity capacity to engage with and respond to national processes. In response to the
limitations in official capacity to educate the public and build more spaces for politi-
cal participation, civil society groups such as the Transitional Justice Working
Group in Liberia worked alongside the truth commission to help with its outreach to
communities across the country. As explained by Dhizaala, where the truth commis-
sion’s hearings were not seen as effective forums or safe spaces, CSOs organised
alternative spaces for community dialogue. Such processes of community engage-
ment and helping to bridge the gap between local communities and national policies
or mechanisms present tough challenges that require CSOs to learn quickly and
reflect critically on their assumptions and theories of change.
Similarly, Iliff points to the role of local authorities, both state and traditional, as
stakeholders and gatekeepers in local community engagement processes. He illumi-
nates the way that these role players mediate entry and limit opportunity, but also
points to their potential interest in facilitating the resolution of transitional justice
challenges. CSOs need to carefully analyse these local authority networks to be able
to gain entry to these spaces and engage with complex local conflict dynamics.
While sometimes seeking to represent certain interest groups directly, local civil
society has gone further by using transitional justice debates and mechanisms as
tools for broadening democratic participation. While transitional justice is conven-
tionally seen as contributing to democratisation, civil society has seized the
opportunity to turn public dialogue spaces about conflict and transitional processes
into forums for increased active citizenship and deliberation.
While relying on international transitional justice concepts, the Zimbabwe
Human Rights NGO Forum nevertheless sought to educate communities across the
country and discuss their transitional justice needs. This shift towards broad public
engagement and ownership of a transitional justice agenda resonates with the other
case studies. It is not just the substance of transitional justice that speaks to a demo-
cratic agenda, but also the opportunities that are created to engage publicly on issues
that previously were censored or considered taboo.
In addition to promoting more modern liberal or participatory democratic mod-
els of engagement, local civil society has sought to resuscitate local capacity that
222 H. van der Merwe
was repressed or marginalised. Civil society has in some cases drawn on and
affirmed traditional resources to be used for pursuing transitional justice goals, such
as local mechanisms for dialogue and healing. Lambourne describes how local
CSOs in Burundi worked with communities to develop more locally rooted transi-
tional justice alternatives. Quinn points out that in Uganda traditional processes
were a key focus for CSOs, which recognised them as more accessible, sustainable
and legitimate than conventional mechanisms. They provided an avenue to con-
cretely address community needs in a context where the state provided recognition
for these processes but failed to provide substantive support, and where the national
policy process did not include much space for civil society input. The Uganda expe-
rience raises deeper concerns about the transitory nature of some CSOs’ engage-
ment with transitional justice, where these remain dependent on international
interest and national political agendas. Where the funding or the political space
shifts to new concerns, many CSOs are tempted or forced to refocus their
interventions.
Iliff, in his analysis of community-based processes in Zimbabwe, Sierra Leone
and Uganda, unpacks the way that CSOs have engaged with tradition and traditional
authorities, pointing out the fluidity of this category and the dangers of re-affirming
or consolidating certain power structures that were undermined during conflict. He
demonstrates opportunities to revitalise and reinvent these structures as more inclu-
sive and accessible spaces, if done in a context-sensitive and carefully negotiated
manner. Rather than being simply a recovery of past capacity, this process can and
should involve innovation and broad participation in its development.
Alongside this broadening and deepening of participatory processes, the Centre
for the Study of Violence and Reconciliation in South Africa has engaged with tran-
sitional justice as an avenue to build social consensus regarding a more radical
transformative agenda that speaks to structural injustices that continue from one
regime to the next. Local civil society has used the politics of transitional justice as
a focal point for broader mobilisation regarding institutional reform and debates
about inequality and underlying causes of violence. Songa, in his chapter on the
Kenya Transitional Justice Network, argues that civil society managed to mobilise
a broad network of organisations in a coordinated fashion to push for a more com-
prehensive transitional justice agenda. While facing various challenges, this broad
collaborative venture sought to use transitional justice debates to pursue
transformative agendas that went beyond just the narrow mandate of the truth com-
mission. Aboueldahab in her analysis of North African criminal accountability pro-
cesses describes the way CSOs have linked with labour movements to pursue
accountability for economic crimes as part of a broader social justice agenda that
addresses the legacies of structural inequality.
This diversity of strategies demonstrates most of all the adaptability of the vari-
ous CSOs examined in this volume. While there are clear common reference points
and conceptual frameworks that show a deeper common agenda, it appears that
African civil society has primarily learnt to develop its own toolkit to fit each
context.
10 Conclusion: The Role of Local Civil Society in Shaping Transitional Justice in Africa 223
Conclusions
Where do the case studies in this book position African CSOs in adopting, resisting
and reinventing this complex agenda? What do they say about the meaning of tran-
sitional justice in Africa, where they need to locate themselves at the intersection of
intense national politics and an evolving international transitional justice framework
of norms and institutions?
All the cases presented here show some level of local adoption and adaption of
international concepts and mechanisms. While drawing on the form and substance
of transitional justice as internationally defined, local CSOs have very clearly local-
ised the concept to make it relevant to their contexts and speak to specific local
needs and aspirations. These reframed transitional justice strategies speak to
expanded national transformative agendas as well as the practical measures needed
to address the immediate needs of marginalised communities. Some particular tacti-
cal lessons that these case studies illustrate include the following:
• Transitional justice politics need to be addressed through engaging with public
imagination. The human rights discourse does not have automatic traction with
the broader public and CSOs need to actively campaign to engage the public in
developing a narrative about the past. This requires, among others, outreach pro-
grammes that can engage communities at a local level and link transitional jus-
tice to more immediate safety and survival concerns.
• Spaces for engaging with transitional justice interventions are unevenly spread in
different regions and sectors of a society. Civil society needs to be adaptable and
responsive to shifting opportunities to engage the state at national and local lev-
els, and take the gap when political windows open, as these are often short lived.
• Transitional justice needs to have traction with local cultural practices. Building
legitimacy for a process, particularly in the face of state resistance or reluctance,
is key to ensuring sustainability.
• Local cultural practices are a resource that provide tools, ideas and sources of
power for innovation. While drawing on this resource requires engagement with
complex local power dynamics, creative and negotiated avenues can be opened
up for interventions.
• State agendas on transitional justice are constantly shifting and CSOs need to
have a clear reading on what drives these agendas and what opportunities they
create for complementary activities.
• The reach of the state is often very limited, both in terms of its geographic scope
and its capacity to provide transitional justice interventions. Civil society often
has important resources to contribute and great legitimacy to lend, which it can
use to shape transitional justice processes in a manner that is more directed at the
needs of local communities and victims.
• In the early stages of transition, state transitional justice agendas are not clearly
developed or articulated, and civil society can play a more influential role in
framing the discourse in a more inclusive and wholistic manner.
224 H. van der Merwe
Transitional justice in Africa is a battlefield of ideas that often pits civil society
against the state. It is also a landscape of challenges and opportunities that present
options for collaboration between apparent enemies. The international transitional
justice policy debates are often presented in overly simplistic terms: international
transitional justice proponents versus national political resistance to this agenda.
The reality is that certain types of changes and certain strategies are promoted and
resisted by both sides. There has been a very conscious shift towards African owner-
ship of transitional justice discourse, both by the states and by African civil society.
As local solutions are increasingly generated by state and civil society initiatives,
the terms of the debate in Africa are increasingly on its own terms. International
transitional justice norms and institutions are still a key point of reference, but they
no longer present a filter that limits the options and opportunities that local policy
advocates can see.
Civil society has a responsibility to constantly question and examine the motives
of the big policy players. Civil society can enter this space most effectively when it
is creative in finding common ground to build sustainable peace, and ensuring that
the process is ultimately accountable to local communities and vulnerable groups.
Civil society needs to engage transitional justice as a broad social reconstruction
process, providing a vision of a new just social order. There is a need for leadership
in shaping the grand transitional justice agenda. At the same time, civil society
needs to engage in the details of how a society can be healed and reconstructed,
using local resources and addressing local needs and local priorities. The global
field of transitional justice can constrain and limit CSO thinking in this regard, but
it can also provide inspiration for new ideas and new hope.
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Index
A B
Access to information, 30, 92, 196 Burundi, xi, xiii, 1, 9–12, 111–131, 217–220, 222
Acholi Religious Leaders Peace Initiative Burundi Truth and Reconciliation Commission
(ARLPI), xiv, 135, 162, 173 (Commission pour la Vérité et la
Acknowledgement, 1, 2, 4, 11, 12, 29, 38, 51, Réconciliation (CVR)), xiii, 112–114,
72, 74, 81, 82, 85, 95, 106–108, 136, 117–128, 130, 131
137, 144, 145, 148, 153, 154, 165, 172,
212
Activist (activism), 14, 19, 35, 45, 66, 75, 77, C
79, 85, 101, 116, 117, 130, 131, 176, Centre for the Study of Violence and
184–186, 189, 190, 192, 193, 195, 196, Reconciliation (CSVR), 25, 36, 68
199, 200, 202, 207 Centre for the Warning and Prevention of
Advocacy, ix, xiii, xiv, 10, 12, 17, 27, 28, 31, Conflict (Centre d’Alerte et Prévention
32, 34, 35, 45, 55, 59, 60, 71, 78, 92, de Conflits (CENAP)), 112, 123, 125,
114, 125, 139, 147, 165, 166, 173, 194, 126, 130
208, 220, 224 Child combatants/child soldiers, 43, 46, 52,
African Union, ix, xi, 12, 212 138, 140
Alien Tort Statute, xiii, 12, 100 Children, 46, 52, 55, 56, 59, 68, 74, 114, 115,
Alternative processes, 78, 161 124, 138, 140, 153, 164
Amnesty, 27, 28, 31, 48, 51, 55–58, 66, 69, 72, Civil and political rights, 71, 119, 189, 191,
81, 92–96, 102, 107, 120, 126, 130, 192, 199–201, 206, 207, 224
135, 138, 173, 194, 195, 197, 202, 206, Civil case (claim), 26, 72
210 Civil society
Apartheid, 11, 12, 51, 91–93, 96–98, 100, 101, accountability, 7, 8, 22, 37, 38, 49, 50, 66,
105, 106, 108, 221 80, 114, 123, 126, 129, 183–185,
Apology, 32, 59, 140 188–198, 201, 202, 212, 216
Arab Spring, xiv, 183–188, 202 coalitions, xii, 17, 103
Authoritarian(ism), ix, 4, 6, 14, 66, 167, 169, collaboration, 11, 17, 54, 124, 202, 215,
183–185, 189, 190, 192, 193, 201, 202, 217, 222, 225
205, 206, 208, 209, 213, 214, 216 community-based organisation (CBO), 10,
Awareness raising, 46, 53, 55, 168 56, 136, 142, 166
Civil society (cont.) Dialogue, 7, 10, 27, 29, 32–34, 36, 58, 60, 101,
faith-based, 11, 13, 114, 116, 125, 142, 128, 129, 131, 147, 177, 221, 222
146, 217 (see also Religious groups) Documentary film, 99
international nongovernmental Documentation, 17, 22, 23, 25, 28, 34, 35, 46,
organisation (INGO), 136, 142, 146, 66, 75, 86, 98, 126, 141, 148, 184,
155, 216 189–194, 196, 197, 200–202
networks, 7, 9, 17, 18, 29, 37, 38, 61, 103, Donor (international), 5, 10, 13, 136, 141–144,
112, 142, 162, 169, 207, 222 147, 148, 150–154, 173
nongovernmental organisation (NGO), 2,
24, 45, 65, 66, 93, 114, 116, 162, 183,
216 E
relationship to the state, 2, 4 Economic Community of West African States
research, 7, 14, 55, 112, 130, 188, 201 (ECOWAS), 44, 47, 54
theory, 1–14, 215 Economic inequality, xii, 199, 210, 213
training, 46, 54, 59, 75, 78, 84, 122, 128, Education, 44–46, 55, 96, 101, 106, 114, 128,
194, 211 129, 146, 173, 211
Class, 21, 22, 24, 49, 100 Egypt, xi, xiv, 1, 9, 10, 12, 184, 191, 202
Cold War, x, 1, 3, 4, 113, 205, 210 Election, 18, 19, 50, 68, 69, 73, 79, 93, 113,
Collective (community) reparations, 81, 82, 116, 119, 177, 192
96, 101 Elites, 4, 6, 20, 22, 24, 26, 78, 111, 118, 128, 198,
Colonialism, 18, 37, 68, 167, 210, 215 207, 209, 210, 216, 217, 221, 224
Commissioner selection, 11, 28, 54 Ethnicity, 3–5, 10, 19, 24, 43, 111, 113, 114,
Community, xiv, 2, 19, 67, 96, 112, 135, 117, 121, 123, 131, 165, 168–171, 174,
161–179, 207 178, 179, 206, 209, 210, 217
Compensation, see Reparations Eurocentrism, 2, 4
Constitution, 9, 19–25, 29, 36, 37, 66, 67, 70, Everyday, 5, 7, 78, 83, 105, 172
73, 93, 94, 101, 112, 115, 124, 140, Exhibition, 99, 130
150, 195, 197, 211 Exhumations (reburial), 81
Corporate accountability, 213
Corruption, xiv, 19, 24, 29, 33, 45, 50, 60, 71,
72, 106, 108, 114, 116, 120, 131, 151, F
170, 184, 186–188, 190–193, 196–202, Facilitation, xii, 7, 8, 19, 20, 22, 25, 32, 35, 38,
213, 217 50, 55, 57, 59, 75, 78–81, 85, 95, 112,
Counselling, 46, 56, 93, 98 115, 122, 127, 128, 150, 153, 164, 166,
Criminal justice/criminal accountability, 22, 176, 177, 194, 217, 221
23, 25–27, 33, 37, 51, 81, 174, Faith-based groups, 11, 13, 44, 114, 116, 124,
183–186, 188–198, 200–202, 222 125, 129, 143, 217
Custom/customary justice, see Traditional See also Religious groups
justice (dispute resolution) Fambul Tok, xiv, 162, 169, 172, 179
Forgiveness, 59, 68, 77, 93, 114, 125, 128,
129, 170, 174, 206
D Forum of Community Facilitators in
Democratisation, ix, x, xii, 2, 3, 6, 9, 10, 13, Transitional Justice (Forum National
14, 18, 19, 22, 24, 29, 35, 38, 52, 66, des Relais Communautaire en Justice de
67, 70, 80, 81, 84, 92, 93, 97, 119, 128, Transition (FONAREC/JT)), 112, 122
153, 183, 184, 195, 201, 205, 206, 208, Fundraising/funders/foreign funding, 30,
214, 221, 224 35–37, 56, 193, 202
Development, xii, xiii, 2, 4, 7, 17, 18, 20–24,
30–34, 36, 37, 45, 52, 56, 58, 60, 66,
70–75, 78, 85, 96, 97, 104, 107, 114, G
115, 117, 120, 126–129, 131, 136, 139, Gatekeepers, 77, 170, 178, 221
142–144, 146, 148–151, 164, 173, 176, Gender, xv, 11, 23, 24, 35, 36, 53, 72, 73, 78,
179, 184, 186, 190, 192, 194, 197, 121, 124, 153, 165, 168, 171, 178, 179,
205–209, 211, 219, 220, 222–224 212
Index 229
H
Healing, xiii, 20, 38, 50, 57, 59, 60, 68, 70, L
72, 79, 81, 86, 87, 106, 112–114, 123, Labour movement, 80, 191, 192, 199, 222
125, 127–129, 131, 163, 164, 166, Lands, 21, 23, 24, 27, 30, 31, 33, 59, 68, 73,
175, 177, 178, 187, 188, 206, 208, 82–84, 101, 139, 141, 145, 168, 190,
222, 225 212, 215
Human rights, xi, xii, 2, 17, 43, 65, 114, 139, Lawsuit/litigation, xiii, 12, 18, 30, 81,
163, 184, 205 100–103, 108, 184, 188, 190, 192, 193,
Human Rights Media Centre (HRMC), 99, 197, 198, 201, 202, 217
103 Liberal paradigm, v, 1, 167
Humanitarian law, 52, 54, 58 Liberia, xi, xiii, 1, 10–12, 25, 43–61, 119, 217,
221
Liberian Truth and Reconciliation
I Commission (LTRC), 10, 43–46,
Impunity, 11, 20, 21, 23, 26, 43, 50, 57, 58, 50–53, 55–61
68, 69, 71, 78, 81, 82, 112, 113, 120, Libya, xiv, 9–12, 184, 195, 196, 202
128, 129, 195 Livelihood, 79, 82, 221
Indigenous, 53, 66, 174, 179
Inquiry, 21, 25, 93, 112, 118
Institutional reforms, xiii, 6, 20, 22, 24, 25, 27, M
33, 37, 51, 58, 67, 78, 81–85, 118, 128, Media, 12, 27, 44, 46, 51, 53, 58, 77, 99, 103,
188, 211, 219, 222 104, 107, 114–117, 127, 130, 131, 190,
Interfaith organisation, 142 192, 197, 200, 215
Intergenerational/transgenerational, 224 Mediation, xii, 7, 18, 20–23, 46, 47, 57, 67,
International Center for Transitional Justice 140, 162, 172
(ICTJ), 25, 31, 33, 118, 142, 163 Memorialisation, xiii, 58, 61, 74, 85, 126, 128,
International Criminal Court (ICC), 21, 26, 37, 211, 219
69, 78, 131, 138, 141, 145, 163, 185, Memory, xiv, 6, 58, 74, 85, 99, 125, 147, 148,
186, 195, 215 154, 176
International human rights law, 55, 74 Military, 9, 18, 79, 80, 83, 186, 209
See also Security forces
Militia, 48, 70, 77, 79, 84, 184–186, 197
J Mobilisation, xiii, 5, 10, 45, 55, 99, 189–191, 199
Judicial systems, 83, 172 Model, xi, 36, 38, 86, 99, 112, 123, 127–129,
Justice 206, 212, 221
distributive, 7, 70 Monitoring, xii, 7, 17, 18, 28, 30, 38, 44, 45,
integral, 7 50, 61, 66, 72, 77, 143, 146, 149, 171,
vs. peace, 118, 144 194, 197
restorative, 6, 7, 32, 34, 36, 59, 78, 140 Mozambique, 169, 210
retributive, 6, 7, 52, 78, 81, 135, 140, 188
sector reform, 84
transformative, 7, 78, 206, 208, 210, 213 N
Justice Law and Order Sector (JLOS), 145, Narrative, 11, 13, 23, 57, 73, 74, 86, 91, 174,
148, 154 179, 208, 209, 214, 215, 223, 224
230 Index
South Africa, 1, 10, 11, 25, 52, 71, 91–108, Truth seeking, 78, 80, 211, 219
119, 162, 163, 206, 216, 220, 222 See also Truth commission investigation
South African Truth and Reconciliation Truth telling (testimony, storytelling), 23, 25,
Commission (SATRC), 51, 163, 206 28, 33, 55, 59, 69, 78, 85, 86, 121, 125,
Special Court for Sierra Leone (SCSL), 47, 163, 168, 187, 188, 206
48, 51, 163 Tunisia, xiv, 10, 12, 183–202, 216
State accountability, 38, 215
Structural change, 78
Survey, 56, 78, 81, 82, 188 U
Uganda, xi, 1, 7, 9, 10, 12, 73, 119, 135–155,
162, 164, 168, 169, 173, 214, 218, 222
T Uncivil society, 2, 5, 12
Torture, 18, 43, 56, 57, 68, 72, 73, 83, 84, 98, Unemployment, 20, 199
101, 114, 115, 189, 192, 195, 197, 199, United Nations, xiii, 12, 52–54, 78, 112, 115,
200, 213 173, 194, 195, 212, 219
Trade union, 4, 10, 80, 115, 143, 191, 192, Urban, xiv, 5, 66, 71, 75, 105, 164–166, 177,
194, 199, 217 178, 217
Traditional (leaders), 10, 79, 83, 84, 167, 170,
172, 174–176, 179
Traditional justice (dispute resolution), 10, 59, V
69, 144, 145 Veteran (military), 9, 18, 47, 78–80, 83, 84,
Transitional justice 103, 138, 139, 165, 183–187
discourse, xiv, 6, 14, 66, 72, 85, 185, 189, Vetting and lustration, 163
206, 208, 219, 223–225 Victims/survivors, 7, 17, 44, 65, 66, 91, 114,
expert, 166, 211, 212, 219 139, 163, 164, 201, 206
industry, 78, 129 Violations (human rights violations), 6, 18, 20,
policy change, 34 21, 23, 25, 50–52, 54–56, 65, 70, 72,
policy development, 29, 30 74, 75, 78, 79, 92, 94, 100, 114, 119,
practice, 1, 6, 8, 12–14, 131, 135, 136, 131, 168, 184, 186–189, 192, 194–198,
142, 184, 185, 218, 223, 224 200–202
public consultation, xii, 129
Transitional justice working group (TJWG), 9,
36, 45, 48, 52–54, 56, 58, 59, 85, 123, W
126, 129, 141, 142, 173, 221 Western (the West), 1, 3, 4, 10, 43, 47, 73, 79,
Trauma 83, 84, 92, 98, 105, 135, 137, 141, 148,
experience of trauma, 46, 57, 169 184, 210, 213, 216, 219
treatment of trauma, 57, 59, 112, 127, 131 Women, xiii, 5, 7, 11, 29, 36, 43, 44, 46, 47, 52,
Truth and Dignity Commission, 187, 197, 200 53, 55, 59, 68, 73, 77, 102, 105, 114,
Truth commission, 11, 28, 81, 99 118, 121, 137, 138, 172, 173, 179
commissioner (see Commissioner Workers (movements), 59, 108, 146, 154, 191,
selection) 192, 199, 201
final report, 21, 51
findings, 17, 81
hearings, 57, 91, 93, 221 Y
investigation, 52, 67, 81 Youth, 21, 84, 98, 114, 142, 149, 165,
mandate, 20, 21, 45, 52, 53, 61, 80, 96, 172–174, 179, 193
119, 200
outreach, 10, 11, 53, 61, 221
recommendations, 21, 51, 67, 81, 93, 96, Z
108, 119, 120, 217 Zimbabwe, xiii, 1, 9–12, 65–87, 162, 165,
statement taking, 57 168, 175–179, 215, 218, 221
Truth, Justice and Reconciliation Commission Zimbabwe Human Rights NGO Forum, xiii,
(TJRC), xiii, 38 65, 85, 216, 218, 221